הפוסט An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There were three central points in Kerry’s plan that dealt with the question of Jerusalem:

The first issue raised in the speech concerns the principle that Jerusalem will be “the capital of the two states.” In addition, Kerry declared that “there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.” While Kerry was clear in his vision of Jerusalem as a shared capital of both states, he did not refer to the question of the division of sovereignty or the possible route for a border within the city. There is no reference to the principle suggested by Clinton, whereby Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would retain Israeli sovereignty, while the Arab neighborhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. It should be noted that the Clinton Parameters did not discuss the question of a “Palestinian capital” at all, but instead focused on the issue of division of sovereignty in East Jerusalem. However, in a speech delivered to the Israel Policy Forum in January 2001, on the eve of his departure from the White House, Clinton described the principles of a future agreement, stating that Jerusalem will serve as two capitals of two states.

The phrase “capital of the two states” was a major source of controversy during the recent round of Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2013-2014 led by Kerry to formulate a framework agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to discuss a compromise in Jerusalem and would not agree to recognize the principle of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians objected to the vague wording that Kerry attempted to promote. Kerry’s latest suggestion differs from Netanyahu’s position and incorporates recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states, but the ambiguous wording—which avoids delineating the territory in which the Palestinian capital would be established—is expected to arouse opposition amongst the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the wording of Kerry’s latest plan indicates that Jerusalem as the capital of two states will be internationally recognized. Indeed, the Kerry proposal emphasizes that this solution in Jerusalem will allow the international community to recognize, for the first time, the Israeli capital beside an international recognition of the Palestinian capital.

The second issue is the question of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Kerry’s proposal calls to protect the holy sites, to guarantee free access to them, and to preserve the status quo. These important basic principles have the support of the relevant parties and of the international community. However, even in this context, Kerry leaves several key questions unanswered and avoids outlining a solution for the Old City of Jerusalem. For instance, will an agreement entail joint management of this area, or an international regime? Kerry also does not address the question of sovereignty over the holy sites, one of the most divisive issues in the negotiations.

Kerry emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo in the holy sites, an issue with which he is deeply familiar. In October 2015, against a backdrop of tensions on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and increased violent incidents in Jerusalem, Kerry led diplomatic efforts between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan. These efforts facilitated a mutual understanding and a statement by Netanyahu, re-asserting Israel’s commitment to the status quo on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and to the policy that permits only Muslims to pray on the site, whereas non-Muslims are permitted to visit there but not to pray.

Kerry stated that the holy sites are sacred to billions of people around the world and asserted that the solution must take into account the needs of all three monotheistic religions, not just those of both parties. This wording stresses that the issue is important beyond the Israel-Palestine context and possibly hints at the need to integrate additional actors into a solution regarding the Old City and the holy sites. Indeed, this framework resembles Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 to establish an international framework for the administration of the “Holy Basin,” which would include not only Israel and Palestine, but also the US, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The third issue in Kerry’s speech was his declaration that “Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967.” This principle affirms that, alongside the agreement that the city would be shared as the capital of both sides, the agreed solution in Jerusalem would not include a strict physical division between the respective parts of the city, as was the situation prior to 1967, when a physical wall ran through the center of the city.

Two points may be made here. First, this position represents the long-standing American position, which has been presented consistently over many years. In December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a peace plan, which stated that Jerusalem should be a “unified city” within which there would be no restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. In addition, President Ronald Reagan’s peace plan in 1982 declared that “Jerusalem must remain undivided.” President Clinton voiced a similar position in a speech on the eve of his retirement from office. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State during the second Bush administration, also reiterated this position.

Second, this position overlaps with the idea of Jerusalem as an “open city,” which has been advocated by the Palestinians for many years. The Palestinians proposed this in the late 1980s and again during the Camp David process (1999-2001) and during the Annapolis process (2007-2008). President Abbas has spoken on many occasions about his vision of Jerusalem as an “open city” and a “shared city”. The Palestinian proposal suggests that, notwithstanding the political division of the city, Jerusalem would remain a single entity under a joint “umbrella municipality” with complete freedom of movement between both sides of the city. Over the course of previous negotiations, the Israelis rejected this proposal and stated that the two states needed to be separated by a clearly delineated physical border for security reasons, including within Jerusalem.

The issue of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Oslo Accords determined that Jerusalem is one of the core issues to be negotiated by the parties in the final status negotiations. It is impossible to achieve peace without an agreed solution to the question of Jerusalem, and every future serious diplomatic effort must address this issue. This will be a difficult endeavor considering the special sensitivities elicited by this question, as Kerry noted in his speech.

Moreover, the situation on the ground in Jerusalem does not remain frozen in time as one peace plan fails and new ones are presented. Since the Clinton Parameters, significant processes and moves have made the city even more complicated and explosive, ensuring that a negotiated solution to the problem of Jerusalem has also become more complicated and difficult. Nevertheless, the Jerusalemite poet Yehuda Amichai wrote that “In Jerusalem you should always hope for the good.” The positive vision presented by Kerry for the future of the city may encourage joint thinking about an alternative Jerusalem that may eventually translate into action.

(originally published in the Matzav blog)

הפוסט The Question of Jerusalem in Kerry’s Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout that long, wasted period of ups and downs, agreements, disagreements and various crises, both sides dug themselves into their respective positions and refused to budge an inch. When the me was right, and the strategic decision to normalize relationship was taken both by Turkey and by Israel, the heretofore “critical” stumbling-blocks became negligible. Proving that when there’s a will, there’s a way.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Path to Normalization between Israel and Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While differences of opinions among allies on key policy issues are legitimate, the style in which these controversies are being handled – which includes personal attacks and meddling in domestic politics – has a negative impact on Israel-US relations. Support for Israel is not as consensual in the US as it used to be, also among the American Jewish community. Israel is increasingly becoming a partisan issue in American politics, and is losing support among key American constituencies.

These worrisome trends led Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies to hold a public symposium on US-Israeli relations. The symposium took place at Tel Aviv University on 19 May 2014, and in cooperation with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. The symposium, moderated by Yael Patir of J Street and the Mitvim Institute, featured three distinguished speakers: Dr. Ilai Saltzman, Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and Lecturer at Claremont McKenna College, USA; Jeremy Ben-Ami, President of J Street, and; Alon Pinkas, former Israeli Consul General in New York.

Dr. Ilai Saltzman argued that the US-Israel “special relationship” has come to resemble a more normal one. As the importance of the alliance has waned, America has adopted a more balanced, ambivalent and likewise critical approach while backing Israel. Jeremy Ben-Ami offered lessons on the Kerry-led peace initiative, and discussed the role J Street plays in fielding continued US involvement in the peace process as Americans grow weary of overseas entanglements. Alon Pinkas warned that Israelis should recognize the strategic asset of their US ally and save this key relationship by earnestly working to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. The following publication includes their lectures in full.

Dr. Saltzman posited that the shift in US attitudes of Israel can best be explained through the lens of the three levels of analysis in International Relations. At the international level, the end of the Cold War, American rapprochement with the Arab World, and reorientation of US foreign policy toward Asia have mitigated the US’ need for Israel as an unconditional ally. At the state level, American support for Israel has become more pluralistic, as observed by the rise of J Street. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between Israeli and American societies, a large stream of liberal Jews feel a duty to express open criticism of various anti-democratic practices in Israel. Finally, at the individual level we observe President Obama’s departure from his predecessors in taking a more distant, tempered approach toward Israel, allowing for more open criticism.

Ben-Ami outlined both the shortcomings and positive takeaways of Secretary of State John Kerry’s attempt to broker a peace deal in 2013-2014. Kerry’s zealous efforts in the negotiations should be seen as a reflection of shared US and Israeli interests, and continuing to pursue a solution keeps the two countries’ interests aligned. The same is true for shared values, which are being offset by Israel’s protracted occupation. Kerry mistakenly believed that he could convince Prime Minister Netanyahu that these shared interests and values were at risk, while again trying to play Israel’s lawyer. Nevertheless, the negotiations produced progress on recognizing mutually beneficial Palestinian security and economic needs, and incorporating the Arab Peace Initiative. As for American domestic politics, it is important to note the increasing isolationism, national rejection of neocon Republican policies and shift within the Democratic Party toward a more dovish worldview as contributors to a break in the consensus on Israel.

Pinkas described the “tectonic” changes in the US-Israel relationship as driving the countries apart, and claimed that Israelis must adapt to save these crucial ties. The US has served as Israel’s strategic asset for a long time, but with the Cold War and more recent post-9/11 period over, the once congruous foreign policies of both countries are gradually diverging. While echoing Dr. Saltzman and Ben-Ami’s analyses of America’s interest in disengaging from the Middle East, Pinkas charged that Israel needs to reinvent itself as an ally and strategic asset to the US by resolving rather than prolonging its conflict with the Palestinians. Otherwise, it may find itself having to deal with the Palestinian issue, and Iran, alone.

This symposium has been part of ongoing efforts by the Mitvim Institute to monitor and analyze US policies towards Israel, the peace process, and the Middle East. We invite you to follow The US and Us: The Mitvim-DC Monthly. Every issue of this publication series includes an analysis of recent developments, a roundup of commentaries by US think tanks and leading experts, and a profile of a relevant US policymaker.

We thank the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University for their partnership in carrying out the public symposium, and J Street, for their partnership in producing this publication.

הפוסט Cracks in the Special Relationship: Israel-US Ties under Obama and Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy: Towards Isolation or Integration? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

By voting to reduce aid to the PA, Congressional representatives jeopardize Abbas’ legitimacy, Israeli security and future prospects for peace.

The bill in question calls for the US to withhold funds “equivalent” to those the PA provides families of Palestinian terrorists, and to prevent dollars to any Palestinian government formed as a result of “an agreement with Hamas.”

Altogether, these restrictions would deny the PA some $70 million of the $400 million it receives annually—a figure less than a quarter of what it was in 2008. Unsurprisingly, the bill was chiefly backed by Republicans, and stands in marked contrast to the Obama administration’s support for continued aid to the “technocratic” government. The bill, however, also reflects a sentiment shared by many Democrats, AIPAC, and 88 of the Senate’s 100 members. The Senate Appropriations Committee is expected to approve a sister bill, after which the two chambers will put them to a general vote.

On the surface, the bill appears well grounded, especially in light of Netanyahu’s protestations and Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s charges that Americans are financing PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ stipends to Palestinian terrorists in prison. In practice, it would weaken an already beleaguered PA, undermining the legitimacy it has recently garnered for the first time in years. In so doing it threatens to collapse the very institution that was created for advancing the peace process and that is demonstrating its willingness against unbearable domestic pressure to cooperate with Israel for its security and against extremism in the region.

For starters, as Sec. Kerry’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, already pointed out, the Israeli government itself has maintained its security cooperation with the PA and in fact had transferred aid to the PA on the same day as the government was announced—a tacit admission that the lack of any actual Hamas leaders in the technocratic government permits continued relations with the PA.

Vindicating this latter point is the PA’s condemnation of the recent kidnapping and its active participation in the search for Israel’s “lost boys,” despite Israel’s mass arrests of Palestinians not connected in the affair, as well as Hamas and Israel’s own controversial MK Haneen Zoabi’s censure of the PA’s efforts as betrayal and a crime.

On a deeper level, the PA represents a moderate force among Palestinians, is often receptive to Western demands, and most of all is key to strengthening the Palestinian economy and infrastructure—ingredients widely accepted as conducive to Israel’s security. Even a partial reduction in aid, as Congress is proposing, would hamper the PA’s ability to pay for projects and employee salaries—a move that would further stall the economy and the Gaza Strip’s long road to recovery. These benefits far outweigh the PA’s less palatable practices, such as the stipends to the families of Palestinian prisoners.

Indeed, it is for these reasons that in a similar congressional climate in 2011, Brigadier General Nitzan Alon—at the time in charge of Israeli security in the West Bank—was prompted to write an article in the New York Times appealing to Congress not to cut funding to the PA. When Congress ultimately froze $200 million in annual funds, then U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta—who has been known to criticize Obama for not taking military action in Syria—also voiced that that it was a “mistake.” That aid, which largely paid for the 22% of the Palestinian work force that the PA employs, was not reinstated until 2013.

Congress as whole should learn from this fruitless episode and forego plans to dwindle the PA’s budget. If anything, it should be praising the PA for having managed to maintain a government of national consensus all the while fighting Hamas and combatting the glorification of terrorism. It should be offering moral support to Abbas in the face of domestic and Israeli critics.

If Congress were to do this, it would strategically position the U.S. to leverage the PA’s cooperative efforts and governing legitimacy, a legitimacy that Israel has long demanded, and to restart negotiations on a credible and durable path to peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Congress Shouldn’t Cut Aid to the Palestinian Authority הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט US Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There are good reasons why the U.S. position on this issue has been slow to evolve. For one thing, the Israeli demand is relatively new; it was first explicitly tied to negotiations by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2007 and later adopted by Benjamin Netanyahu. Its novelty, coupled with the fact that Olmert dropped his insistence once good-faith negotiations with the Palestinians got underway during his last months in office, has made the demand seem, at best, superfluous and, at worst, like an attempt to stonewall progress.

Nevertheless, the United States took a significant step when, in a May 2011 speech, President Obama defined his vision for peace with the words “Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people.” The language made clear that, whatever the Obama administration thought were Netanyahu’s motivations, it accepted that Israel’s demand could no longer be ignored.

הפוסט A new understanding for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.