Erdan, who says he has long aspired to the jobs, reminded us that Israel’s iconic diplomat Abba Eban also served simultaneously in these two senior posts, and claimed he was certain of his ability to fulfill both. As the French would say, “He is proud of his humility”. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu had sought to distance Erdan from Israel for political reasons, he is obviously fully aware of the extent and demands of the two top Foreign Service jobs, having served himself in the US, first as DCM in Washington and then as UN Ambassador.

Representing Israel in the US is a demanding, fulltime job. The ambassador in Washington is in charge of the relationships with the administration and Congress as well as with politicians throughout the 50 states, and with the divided Jewish community. He is also tasked with Israel’s public diplomacy challenges, its security, strategic and economic ties with the US, and oversight over eight Israeli consulates spread all over the country .

The position of Ambassador to the UN is also a non-ending investment of hours and efforts, often in times of crises, of which we supply plenty. Part of the ambassador’s job is also to initiate and conduct ties throughout the year with the representatives of many among the 192 member states and with the organization’s numerous committees. That, too, is more than a full-time position.

I have known Erdan for years, and my appreciation of his skills notwithstanding, I do not believe he can fulfill all these complex tasks at the same time, for the simple reason that no one can do so fully and satisfactorily. Only unique figures, such as Abba Eban, who served at the UN when it was still in its infancy and consisted of only 33 states could have done so.

What, then, is the meaning of Netanyahu’s decision? Cost cutting was obviously not a consideration given the installation of Israel’s biggest and most spendthrift government at the height of an economic-social crisis. The real reason lies in Netanyahu’s consistent attitude and conduct over the past decade toward Israel’s Foreign Service, and the deep contempt he displays toward the ministry that safeguards the state’s essential interests and toward its professional staff.

This attitude has led Netanyahu to strip the Foreign Ministry of many of its traditional purviews, such as diplomatic strategy, the anti-BDS campaign, relations with the Diaspora and public diplomacy and to hand them out as “consolation prizes” to various party loyalists . These moves have deprived the Ministry of many of the key roles its staff carried out for decades on the front lines of Israel’s struggles to establish or renew diplomatic ties with the countries of the world, promote trade agreements and international investments, and defend Israel’s essential interests in international organizations. Some representatives were felled by terrorists in the line of duty. Netanyahu’s moves have demoralized the staff, deprived Israeli diplomats of their professional pride, transferred the handling of important issues to non-professional hands and generated confusion, lack of coordination and even embarrassment.

Last year’s dramatic budget cuts dealt an almost fatal blow to the Ministry and the Foreign Service. The work of the missions abroad ground to a halt due to lack of funding, wages were cut, Israel’s international foreign aid enterprise was suspended, the diplomatic campaign against Iran was stalled, public diplomacy and cultural activities were undermined and the promotion of Israeli economic activity abroad was significantly eroded. As an example of the absurdity of the situation, Israeli diplomats were unable to represent the state at important functions away from the city of their posting because they had no money for train tickets.

Tasking a person of legendary skills like Abba Eban with both positions in the 1950s was born out of necessity when Israel was a young, poor state. A similar move in 2020 reflects the continued systematic destruction of the Israeli Foreign Service even as significant developments are emerging on the horizon with a possible change of administration in Washington and international fallout from the Israeli government’s annexation intentions.

הפוסט Foreign Service Closing-Out Sale: Gilad Erdan’s Dual Appointment to UN and Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since 2009, Israeli politics has been largely shaped by one man. By winning consecutive elections and forming consecutive coalitions of various sorts, Netanyahu managed to dominate Israeli politics, prevent potential contenders from standing a chance against him, and be regarded by most Israelis (and by many in the international community) as invincible. It is not by chance that the term “King Bibi” was used on the covers of both Time and Newsweek, and was the title chosen for a documentary film that explored Netanyahu’s rise to power.

For years, Netanyahu had almost total control of his party, successfully maneuvered leaders and voters of other right-wing parties, effectively disempowered opposition from the center and left, shaped the public discourse to his advantage, delegitimized political rivals while polarizing the society, and overall – stirred Israel’s reality to his direction of interest. Time and time again, Israelis went to the polls with no real hope of leadership change. The main open question used to be which type of coalition will Netanyahu form after results are announced.

And then things changed. Corruption investigations that were initially dismissed and brushed off by Netanyahu, picked up pace. From one legal phase to the other, it became evident to Israelis that a major issue is brewing. Netanyahu’s repeated and increasingly harsh attacks on key personnel in the legal establishment, which were aimed at mobilizing his political base and rally his supporters, exemplified just how problematic his situation is. It was anti-corruption slogans that played a leading role in the downfall of the Likud government in 1992 and the victory of Yitzhak Rabin, and Netanyahu seems to have understood the political danger that his legal issues pose to him.

To try and counter that, Netanyahu hastened into early elections (April 2019). His goal was to quickly form a new coalition that will advance legislation protecting him from being indicted while in office. Election results initially indicated that he has succeeded in paving the way for that. His traditional right-wing bloc had the required majority. But a surprise was in the waiting. Former Minister of Defence, Avigdor Lieberman, a nationalist right-wing politician who has been part of Netanyahu’s camp since the 1990s (although episodes of political rivalry), broke ranks. Without Lieberman’s party, Yisrael Beiteinu, Netanyahu did not have a coalition. His efforts to attract centrist/leftist parties to join a “unity government” or even to bring on board a single defector from another party who will give him the necessary majority in parliament – all failed.

In the past, Netanyahu used to carry out such political moves easily. But, due to his corruption allegation, he became a persona non grata among his opponents. They were not willing to enable him to become prime minister again, given his potential downfall and the legislative reforms he sought to advance. Netanyahu was losing ground. As he failed to form a government and went to repeat elections, his image as invincible and as a “political magician” was shattered. Moreover, his image in Israel as “Mr Security” was now effectively challenged by the Blue and White Party leader, Benny Gantz, which featured three ex-IDF Chiefs of Staff on the top of its list.

Netanyahu sought remedy in diplomatic activism. He saw the realm of foreign policy as one in which he has an added value over his contenders. Billboards of him shaking hands with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin appeared all over Israel, portraying him as a mega-diplomat. International visits and meetings were orchestrated for him, and world leaders were willing to grant Netanyahu new diplomatic achievements that he can present as part of his campaign. However, this – like other elements of his campaign – did not prove to be effective. The September 2019 elections showed a decline in votes for the Likud party, and Netanyahu failed again in forming a government, despite the loyalty of his party and ideological bloc (excluding Lieberman).

Towards the March 2019 elections, that tone of the opposition was already more confident. “He just can’t” was the slogan of Blue and White against Netanyahu, referring to his inability to form a coalition. “Netanyahu only cares about himself”, their campaign said, referring to the court case against Netanyahu that will begin just two weeks after the elections, on March 17^th. Even the announcement of the so-called Trump Plan, which was supposed to be the ultimate political gift to Netanyahu towards the elections, was handled by the opposition in a way that did not increase Netanyahu’s popularity in the polls.

It is still not clear which direction the upcoming elections will go. But, Netanyahu’s time in power should be up. His long tenure led him to develop a sense of entitlement to the position, that prevented him from doing – at least until now – what a prime minister accused of bribe should do: announce resignation. The damage to Israeli democracy, state institutions and governance caused by his political and personal conduct is mounting. Israel is paying a heavy price for this. It is a price that drives voters to the polls time and time again. It is also a price that drives many of them to seek a new prime minister.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט The “Netanyahu Factor” Driving Israelis to the Polls הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

They’re only one example of an exceptional level of international involvement in both this year’s Israeli national election campaigns, unprecedented in both scope and style. The posters, their iconography and their message have a significance beyond the intricacies of Israeli politics. They reveal the developing fault lines dividing two competing global camps – liberals and non-liberals – and their growing willingness to support allies and confront foes in a direct, unvarnished manner.

International support for Israeli political candidates engaged in competitive elections is not new. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit organized by President Clinton to support Shimon Peres’ failed 1996 campaign is a notable example. However, foreign interventions have generally been far more low-key than the explicit pro-Netanyahu lobbying we are now witnessing. Gone are previous campaigns conducted cautiously behind the scenes to back a candidate’s political agenda: these efforts mostly concern the personal rather than the ideological, part of an effort to elevate or to challenge Netanyahu’s image as a global leader.

One of Netanyahu’s main electoral goals is to convince voters that he is indispensable, by branding himself Israel’s only leader with the requisite international magnitude. International feedback is thus a central tool in cementing this play, and in diverting attention from Netanyahu’s pending criminal indictments towards his global prestige. Ahead of the first round of elections in April 2019, Netanyahu’s international allies – leaders of what one could describe as the global non-liberal camp – answered his call by providing both diplomatic gestures and concrete policy steps. The weeks before the election were saturated with international events carefully crafted by the Netanyahu campaign.

Official visits by global allies offered Netanyahu photo-opportunities to land his image as a global leader. Key support was provided by the two competing leaders of the global non-liberal camp: First, Putin, who met with Netanyahu and donated symbolic capital by retrieving Israeli MIA Zachary Baumel’s body. Secondly, and above all else, Trump’s explicit mobilization for Netanyahu’s campaign. Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro were also protagonists in the international re-elect Netanyahu campaign.

Trump’s finest electoral gift was his recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. This act appealed to a majority of Israelis who see the territory as an integral part of Israel. It also resonated with Netanyahu’s own right-wing base who made the annexation of occupied land a leading topic in the campaign. Trump’s declaration allowed Netanyahu to present a clear sense of achievement in the crucial last stretch, which even his opponents could not dispute. Netanyahu once again situated himself as the only Israeli leader capable of stepping onto the international stage and getting results. This, while the international activity of his main contender, Benny Gantz, was limited to speeches at AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference.

Ahead of the coming re-run elections, we already see Netanyahu attempting similar plays to exploit his interpersonal relations with prominent non-liberal leaders to brand him, as his slogan goes, as a leader “of a different league.”

The growing list of world leaders to meet Netanyahu before the election includes another close peer – India’s Prime Minister Modi. But the main campaign’s effort is focused on arranging a timely visit to Israel by Russia’s Putin, during which a monument to fallen Russian soldiers will be unveiled. This step is possibly devised to influence Russianspeaking voters, who are of special electoral importance for Netanyahu this time around. Trump is also reportedly planning moves that can boost Netanyahu’s chances for reelection, possibly including an announcement of new U.S. security guarantees to Israel.

This global support highlights Netanyahu’s status as a central figure in the global non-liberal camp. His domestic policy corresponds with its values, favoring the majoritarian aspect of democracy over liberal values. However, it also put forward a message that goes well beyond the Israeli context – in times of need, the non-liberal network also functions as a practical political alliance.

The liberal camp lags behind, but it too has shown some willingness to get involved in the Israeli election. In light of the global crisis of liberal democracy, there is a growing understanding that like-minded liberals and progressives – in various countries – should better coordinate and cooperate. Bernie Sanders has even called for an “international progressive front” to confront the “new authoritarian axis.” Civil society organizations were the first to take the lead in this challenge, and the Israeli election may signal the beginning of a spillover into the political field. Stav Shaffir, one of the founders of Israel’s left-wing Democratic Camp, has called on progressives to establish a “united movement.”

In this liberal democratic spirit of pushing back, a few days before Israel’s April 2019 election, U.S. Democratic presidential candidates voiced unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of endorsing racism and of being corrupt. Sanders said openly he hoped Netanyahu loses. This was a continuation of a gradual process, in which mainstream Jewish organizations and figures showed willingness to criticize Netanyahu and his domestic policies. This trend was motivated both by resentment towards Netanyahu, and by his overly-close alliance with Trump. Nevertheless, lacking a clear progressive alternative candidate to Netanyahu, liberals’ critical steps never amounted to a direct endorsement of his opponents.

In Europe, liberals have been even more cautious. They tend to refrain from intervening in domestic Israeli politics, partly because they too did not see an appealing alternative to Netanyahu they could wholeheartedly endorse. French President Macron was the exception. Four days prior to the previous election, he hosted Yair Lapid for a meeting, a move which the Blue and White party hoped would boost their international image. Macron’s step could be seen as a personal favor, grounded in pre-existing links with Lapid, but which also stemmed from his position as a central leader within the global liberal camp and as an alternative to Trump.

Despite their limited nature, these tentative steps by liberals indicate that a change may be underway to challenge the loud illiberal support for Netanyahu. But their insufficient nature can be seen by the fact that no further steps have been taken towards the September 2019 elections, and Israel’s center-left politicians have not yet acted to encourage their international allies to take action. That seems even more short-sighted, bearing in mind how global liberals will have no option but to get involved in Israeli affairs should the next Israeli government fulfil Netanyahu’s promise to annex settlements, and as the U.S. presidential election draw near.

Placing the Israeli election as one in a series of global events allows us to obtain a broader perspective of the ongoing realignment of the international system. It demonstrates the willingness of key liberal and non-liberal actors to adopt a more proactive approach in influencing what was until now considered diplomatically as sacred ground – national elections in friendly countries.

It may signal that the gloves are coming off in the global conflict between liberals and nonliberals. However, it also demonstrates the power asymmetry between the camps. The world’s liberals still have much work to do, before they can collectively succeed to turn the tide.

Dr. Gil Murciano is a foreign policy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Israeli Elections and the Global Competition between the Liberal and Non-Liberal Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.