הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first time was in 1980, following the enactment of the Jerusalem Law by the Knesset. The international response to the Israeli move was harsh and included a UN Security Council resolution condemning it and calling on foreign countries to withdraw their embassies from Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was emptied of embassies and Turkey, whose embassy was in Tel Aviv, called its ambassador back. It took another 12 years for a Turkish ambassador to return to Tel Aviv, which was made possible only after the Madrid peace conference.

The second time was in 2011, following the failure of efforts to resolve the Israeli-Turkish crisis that erupted following the Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza. The flotilla incident occurred more than a year earlier, but only after the publication of the UN Palmer Committee Report and the Israeli refusal to accept the compromise agreement formulated by diplomats from both countries did Turkey decide to take measures against Israel, which included downgrading relations. This time, it took about five years before there was an ambassador again in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv.

Jerusalem and Gaza were the reasons for previous Turkish decisions to downgrade relations with Israel. These issues have also been at the basis of the disputes between Israel and Turkey in recent years. The current crisis combines both issues – the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the tension it creates in East Jerusalem, alongside the Palestinian demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and the large number of Palestinians killed therein.

In the past year, a pattern in Erdoğan’s behavior could be observed. In each of the relevant cases – the tension surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque in July 2017, the Trump Declaration on Jerusalem in December 2017, and the recent events related with the transfer of the American embassy and the March of Return in Gaza – the Turkish response included harsh statements against Israel, a call to a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul, and threatening Israel with a possible damage to the bilateral relations.

To date, these moves were mostly symbolic in nature. However, they eroded the trust – which was already poor – between Israel and Turkey, stirred anger among the masses, led to verbal clashes between the countries on Twitter, and slowed down the attempts to inject new content into the relations that took place following the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement of June 2016. The negative dynamic between the two countries was intensified, not only due to bilateral tensions and Erdoğan’s declarations, but also due to an inaccurate perception of Turkey by many in Israel as an ally of Iran, in light of the Russian-TurkishIranian partnership in the Astana process.

Erdoğan’s latest moves, as in previous cases in which he chose to raise the bar of tension with Israel, are also influenced by domestic and regional calculations. On June 24, elections will be held in Turkey, in which Erdoğan is re-running for president. Raising tensions between Turkey and other countries – not only with Israel (Erdoğan currently confronts some European countries as well) – is perceived as a move that may help his election campaign, certainly when it comes to issues that are important to many in Turkey, such as Jerusalem and Gaza.

In addition, Erdoğan’s behavior also helps his regional positioning. While he is reacting harshly to US and Israeli policy, most Arab leaders are keeping a low profile. Erdoğan is thus perceived by the masses as the only regional leader who is seriously challenging Israel. He did so in the past as well, for example when he confronted President Peres at the Davos Conference during operation Cast Lead in 2009, and was later accepted as a hero in Turkey and throughout the Arab world.

The current crisis is somewhat different from previous ones because this time Turkey took diplomatic action also against the US, and not only against Israel. This may serve as a softening factor. So far, the current American administration has not shown interest in Turkey-Israel relations, but it did invest efforts in blurring the significant controversies between the US and Turkey on Syria and in creating a framework for dialogue and coordination. This should be leveraged to create a tripartite Israeli-American-Turkish policy channel that will first address the current diplomatic tension and later focus on other regional issues in which the three countries have shared interests – primarily moderating Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel’s frustration with the Turkish behavior is great, and the anger at Erdoğan is skyrocketing. However, even in such times of crisis, it is worthy to remember the strategic, economic and diplomatic importance of the relations between both countries. It is not by chance that Netanyahu and Erdoğan decided in 2016, in spite of the bad blood between them and despite public criticism, to reach an agreement, and it is not self-evident for Israel to have full, even if problematic, diplomatic relations with a key regional state that has a large Muslim population. These relations should not be casually waived.

In the near future, action must be taken to contain the Israeli-Turkish crisis and prevent further escalation. This must be done through quiet, professional and efficient diplomacy while avoiding provocative measures intended to appease the public at home. There are many in both Israel and Turkey – including in the business, policy, research, and culture sectors – who value the relations between the countries and are willing to step up and help reduce the flames, as they did in the past.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Crisis and the Need for Containment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Supporting Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Disaster diplomacy: The attack that brought Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In mid-December, officials from both countries met in Switzerland in order to finalize principles for an eventual agreement to normalize ties. Reports confirm that an outline and framework for the reconciliation agreement has indeed been reached, although some important issues – such as the blockade on the Gaza Strip – are still unresolved.  Israel and Turkey came close to sealing a reconciliation deal on several occasions since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, most recently in the spring of 2014. However, while diplomats managed to find formulas that would overcome the differences between the countries, political leadership in Ankara and Jerusalem was hesitant to put the agreement into practice. This time around, there seems to be a convergence of economic and geostrategic interests, as well as political will on both sides.

Signs of this steady and deliberate warming have appeared more frequently in recent months. Triggered by joint economic interests over Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries, as well as mutual concern over developments in Syria, Israel and Turkey committed themselves to a sequence of steps that would create a better public atmosphere, and expand upon preexisting areas of cooperation.

Days before the meeting in Switzerland, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Israel-Turkey reconciliation “would be good for us, Israel, Palestine and the entire region.” These sentiments were also expressed by Israel’s Foreign Ministry Director General, Dore Gold, who emphasized “Israel has always strived for stable relations with Turkey and is constantly examining ways to achieve that goal.” In the last five years, statements of this nature were virtually nonexistent.

Since reports of the meeting first aired, additional positive statements were voiced. Turkish Deputy PM Ömer Çelik’s stated that “without a doubt, the state of Israel and the Israeli people are friends of Turkey.” Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said, “There is a serious, meaningful chance for thawing and normalizing relations between Israel and Turkey,” and that this is a huge opportunity for cooperation regarding natural gas.

The leaders of Israel and Turkey should not let this opportunity slip away. Rather, they should capitalize on the current good will and positive momentum, move expeditiously to resolve their remaining differences, sign a reconciliation agreement and restore full diplomatic ties.

Such a deal will not only serve the immediate interests of both countries but it would also contribute to regional security and stability by countering the advance of violent extremism in the Middle East. Moreover, it may also enable Turkey to become a more significant and constructive player in efforts to reconstruct Gaza, support inter-Palestinian reconciliation and promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In his statement on the topic, President Erdoğan said, “I don’t believe the Israeli public is pleased with the current state of relations.” Indeed, an October 2015 public opinion poll conducted by Mitvim (the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies) showed that the Israeli public sees reasons for mending ties with Turkey, with prospects for security cooperation on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Syria topping the list. In Turkey too, there seems to be wide support for the move, as reflected by a statement of Turkey’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who welcomes rapprochement with Israel.

Signing this agreement is a crucial step forward but more efforts will be required in order to restore mutual trust and understanding between our societies and to develop a new narrative in Israel-Turkey relations. In particular, the two countries should work to restoring mutual trust, constructively market the reconciliation agreement to their respective publics, establish diverse official channels of communication, advance new economic initiatives, launch mechanisms for joint analysis and coordination regarding regional events, engage in mutual conflict resolution support and increase dialogue between civil society organizations and new elites.

In particular, civil society organizations – think tanks, universities, and NGOs – should be encouraged to engage in this process. As our experience working together over the last few years has proven, such independent efforts can make impactful contributions to the transformation of bilateral relations.

Turkey and Israel are on the verge of opening a new chapter in their relationship that will potentially contribute to peace, safety, and prosperity in both countries and within the region. Let’s seal the deal.

(originally published in Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Time to seal the Israel-Turkey deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One can say that the Palestinian reconciliation process is also an outcome of the Arab spring. While in the Arab world the masses flocked to the streets and demanded the removal of tyrannous regimes, Palestinian city squares by and large remained quiet and empty. The only voices heard in the Palestinian public sphere were calls to end the intra-Palestinian division.

The failure of the Israeli government-PLO peace talks and the economic crisis in the Gaza Strip pushed the rivals into one each other arms. The announcement of future reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could be described as one more initiative in the process of achieving a way out of the Palestinian political deadlock.

Turkey has emerged as a regional super power in the Palestinian reconciliation process. Hamas sees Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule as a role model for a future Palestinian state. One should also remember that Turkey was the first country that recognized the legitimacy of Hamas to rule over the Palestinian territories after it won the election of June 2006 in a fair democratic process.

Chairman of Hamas politburo Khaled Mashal has a very good personal relationship with the AK Party leadership. On Sept. 30, 2012 Mashal was a guest of honor at the AK Party congress, alongside former Egyptian President Morsi. Since then, Mashal and Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ prime minister in the Gaza Strip, held several meetings with Erdoğan on the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process and on Turkey’s potential role as mediator.

Despite the strong personal relationship between Hamas and the AK Party leadership, the Erdoğan rule did not undermine Mahmoud Abass position as PLO chairman. The Turkish government declined Hamas’ request to open a representative office in Ankara. By doing so, the Turkish government gave Mahmoud Abbas legitimacy in the Islamic sphere. That comes as no surprise. Historically Turkey was also one of the countries in the world that recognized the status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1975.

As we stand days or hours from the establishment of Palestinian unity government, the stability of this government could function in more effective ways under Turkish sponsorship. There is a lot of sympathy in Turkey for the Palestinian street as Erdoğan has won the hearts and the minds of the Palestinians.

The Mavi Maramra incident, the crisis of the Israeli-Turkish relationship and warm hospitality that Turkey gave to ex-Palestinians prisoners that were released in the Gilad Shalit prisoners exchange deals make Turkey very popular among Palestinians.

If Turkey will be more involved in the Palestinian reconciliation process it can open a new window of opportunities in the region. The current state of Turkish-Israeli relations further hinders this position. Perhaps Turkey can play the role of mediator between Israel and Hamas. Even though Israel perceives Turkey as a dishonest broker, and as a hostile state, if Israel were to ask Turkey – which is a regional superpower – to play the role of mediator between them and the Palestinians, it could be the beginning of building a new trusting relationship between the parties.

There is a great a need for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation in these days of regional instability. Both countries are aware to the ramifications of the Syrian civil war and don’t want the violence to cross their borders. There are also new economic factors that can pave the way for renewed Israeli-Turkish relationships that will be based upon strengthened mutual interests. Israel is important for Turkey. The Turkish Industry and Business Association identified Israel as a priority investment partner. Turkey is important for Israel in terms of creating a sphere of regional stability. The discovery of the Israeli gas field and the Turkish need for this energy can boost ties between the sides and be the base for a new treaty that will combine all of the elements that were mentioned before.

The Arab Revolutions created a new Middle East and there are new challenges and opportunities. It is a time for a fresh start, for a period of hope, for a quiet and secure life. Israel and Turkey as regional powers should create a new and stable environment of peace, not only for its own citizens, but for all of the people of the era.

(originally published in The Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט Palestinian reconciliation process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Anadolu Agency (AA) that Israel desires positive relations with Turkey and hopes reconciliation will arrive in the near future, the circumstances under which those statements were given – while exposing an alleged Iranian arms shipment to the Gaza Strip – speaks volumes about his position toward rapprochement. For the two former partners to officially bury the hatchet, a creative solution must be found to solving Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s demand that Israel lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The blockade is an essential aspect to Israel’s security as long as Hamas or any other actor deemed a threat to the lives of Israeli citizens controls the area.

Those positions did not change because of the Gaza flotilla and in fact have only been reinforced by the Klos C’s March 5, 2014 capture.

However, Israel has shown remarkable flexibility on the Gaza issue since Netanyahu’s Obama-orchestrated- apology to Erdoğan one year ago. In that time, Israel oversaw a boost in Turkish humanitarian aid delivered via the Ashdod Port, in addition to signing off on the transfer of materials required to build a Turkish hospital in Gaza. The policy shift was impactful enough to garner the praise of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and will likely continue when diplomatic ties are restored.

Confidence building measures like these have the added benefit of playing a role in the rapprochement process and according to multiple sources, Netanyahu received a copy of a draft agreement in mid-February.

As reported, the deal would include a $20-23 million compensation package that Israel would pay to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who died aboard the MV Mavi Marmara in May 2010. In exchange, Turkey would pass a legislation that would nullify all ongoing lawsuits against the IDF soldiers and officers involved in the raid. Finally, the agreement would draw up a blueprint for normalizing ties between the two countries.

Netanyahu has now been mulling over the draft agreement (which is rumored to only lightly touch upon the Gaza blockade) for nearly one month, which likely prompted Erdoğan’s crabby one-liner that, “Nothing will happen without lifting the siege on Gaza.”

This, of course, only gives Israel’s premier more reason to pause and reconsider.

Netanyahu knows that even if he did sign off on the draft agreement, no consensus between the two parties would be reached until after the completion of Turkey’s municipal elections on March 30.

Erdoğan does not wish to reach a deal with Israel while his party is still campaigning for votes. Elections can’t impact rapprochement, but rapprochement could hypothetically impact elections. (There is a counterargument that Netanyahu doesn’t want to give Erdoğan a critical diplomatic achievement prior to elections.) And while reaching a deal is important to Netanyahu, it is secondary compared to the prevention of Iran’s nuclear program and the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Don’t forget, Netanyahu rejected a draft agreement in 2011 when the conditions were not deemed favorable. He is willing to let talks wither and die until the timing is better and has the support of his cabinet and the Israeli public.

Both Israel and Turkey are looking to end this period of agitation. Rapprochement serves each country’s national interests with the potential of regional influence, natural gas cooperation, and support for each other’s peace processes all on the table.

But in order for this to happen, the Gaza blockade must be negotiated separately. The alternative is for Netanyahu, whose critical worldview has only been reinforced of late by rocket fire and missile smuggling, to again walk away from a deal.

(originally published in the Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט For Netanyahu, security trumps rapprochement with Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The public opinion poll of The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (MITVIM) revealed that 54 percent of Israelis with an opinion would support Tel Aviv in ending its intransigence and apologizing for the killings of the nine aid activists.

But Nimrod Goren, the chairman of MITVIM, is cautious about whether the Israeli government will change its decision and apologize. “[Still], the findings can give backing to those who are trying to convince the government behind the scenes to apologize,” he told the Daily News in a recent interview.

One hears several reasons behind the Israeli government’s decision not to offer Turkey an apology for the killings on the Mavi Marmara. In your view, what is the overriding reason?

It was a political decision. One [part of it] was philosophical, ideological – the belief that Turkey eventually did not want to reconcile with Israel; that no matter what Israel does, relations will not come back to where they were.

Having said that, [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu sent a delegation to negotiate with Turks. They reached an agreement under which Netanyahu seemed to be ready to accept. He sent [Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs] Minister Moshe Ya’alon with the hope that he might give to the deal the legitimacy he was looking for [but it did not work out], because he came back opposing it.

And Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman opposed it. Having these two right-wing politicians against it, Netanyahu made a decision not to go ahead.

Where are we a year after, especially with the developments of the Arab Spring?

It seems that the government, as well as the public are more aware of what the Arab Spring means and the consequences of it. People saw the regime change in Egypt. They see the rise of political Islam. They see the chaos in Syria. They see that Israel has to confront some weak states around it. They feel suddenly without any balancing actor. How can we modify that? One way to modify was to look for allies outside the Middle East. That was the approach toward Greek Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania.

But these are not substitutes to difficult actors in the Muslim Ar ab world with whom Israel needs to deal with. Eventually you cannot escape from the region you are in. We have to find a way to conduct foreign policy within the Middle East. Whether the government will move toward that change or whether we will never reach that change, I am not sure.

So the government tried to find allies from outside the region as a response to the developments of the Arab Spring?

The government adopted the policy of trying to hang onto the status quo. But then came the changing of the priority of threats, the whole debate about Iran, the developments in Egypt and Syria. These put Turkey in a different place. People have a better understanding that Turkey is an ally of the West, a friend of the U.S., an actor that has leverage over several Arab countries [and has] significant means to shape developments in Syria. People now have a better understanding that we cannot remain isolated in the Middle East.

But it looks like the understanding among the public does not resonate with the government. Where exactly does Israel stand as far as relations with Turkey are concerned and about extending an apology?

It’s difficult to talk about it because it is a government of a coalition of different parties, and there are different voices, even within Likud.

[Ultimately], it’s a Netanyahu decision. When Netanyahu [entered into a] unity government with Kadima, one of the assumptions was that it would help to open the door with Turkey. But this unity government did not last long. We are back with a right-wing government that will take us to elections somewhere in the near future. It does not seem that this government is going for any major regional diplomatic initiative.

So it is fair to say that the Netanyahu government holds the same position on the issue of an apology.

But I think it is willing to reconsider it. We do not know exactly what is going on behind the scenes. There are frequent media reports that Brits and Americans are doing some talks here and there. There seems to be something happening.

But definitely the findings of the poll that shows that Israeli people are more supportive [of giving an apology] than before could give some backing to those that are willing to act toward it. In the past, it was seen as a counterproductive political action to do – as far as the public reaction was concerned.
What do you think is behind the change in the public view?

I don’t think the public really knew what the issue was really about. Last year, there was no public debate about the Palmer report [on the flotilla]. Everything was done behind closed doors. The whole debate was about an apology, yes or no. No one knew what we were expected to get out of the apology. The public was not educated, and that enabled the politicians to make a decision without having to engage with the public.

This changed during the year because so many people and so many institutions began to deal with the Arab Spring and its consequences. People are following Middle Eastern affairs [with concern], and when they look at the region, they spot Turkey. It is a country they know. But I don’t think the government is aware of it. People were quite surprised by the findings, including ourselves. We did not expect a majority to be in favor of an apology because last year it was unthinkable. Now they might start to think about the implications.

Is there any likelihood that the Israeli government will change its decision on giving an apology in the short term?

The decision and implementation could be very quick because the formula is known. The question is what will be the political point at which Netanyahu decides it is the best thing to do. Maybe this could be before elections in Israel if [Barack] Obama is re-elected as U.S. president. He might be afraid that Obama might pressure him on the Palestinian issue, and he is giving Obama something on the Turkish issue, which is important for Obama.

It could happen quite quickly. But I am not sure that as long as Lieberman remains as foreign minister, the political environment will enable it [to occur] very smoothly.

Who is Nimrod Goren

הפוסט Israelis readier than ever for raid apology, poll shows הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Israel Is Missing an Opportunity to Mend Ties With Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.