הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s health care system was unprepared to handle COVID-19. Although as of this article’s submission there is a comparatively low death toll – 56 individuals (as for April 6), the majority of whom were senior citizens – the main concern is that Israel’s medical institutions will soon be overrun by coronavirus patients which will indirectly affect the mortality rates of non-coronavirus patients. Israel only possesses some 4,000 ventilators – a critical tool to aid those suffering from the worst conditions. Each day, more health care employees are being sidelined from their tasks due to possible exposure to the virus. Inventive solutions like converting vacant hotels into housing units for patients with mild symptoms may not be enough if government measures cannot flatten the curve.

Mass coronavirus testing – one of the most successful policies adopted by countries like South Korea and Taiwan – has yet to take off efficiently in Israel. Many patients who have been tested received incorrect results, further delaying the health system’s ability to provide a vital service in a timely fashion. An absence of essential chemicals has slowed the existing testing process.

But befitting its moniker as the “startup nation”, Israel has tried to employ technology in order to curtail COVID-19. One initiative is the Health Ministry’s app that permits citizens who download it to see whether their movement has overlapped with anyone with a confirmed infection. The government has also granted the Shin Bet – Israel’s internal security agency – permission to track the movements of coronavirus patients through use of their phones and credit card data. This controversial decision reportedly identified at least 500 individuals carrying the disease.

Not surprisingly, these efforts have proven both imperfect against the coronavirus. Israel’s national expenditure on healthcare is lower than the OECD average and a 2019 Taub Center report deemed the country’s acute care system insufficient for public demand. Ad hoc solutions rarely solve chronic problems. An increasing number of public figures are asking whether the Health Ministry should be the primary actor in this saga or whether the Defense Ministry should assume the lead.

Enforcing a rigid policy of social distancing and lockdown has also proven challenging. Since March 12, Israeli schoolchildren have been homebound but the Education Ministry has been inconsistent with its execution of nationwide distance learning. Air traffic has all but ceased and public transportation has been significantly reduced, but that hasn’t stopped many from seeing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s almost nightly addresses as merely a polite suggestion. Israel’s police – and, more worryingly, its military – now patrol public spaces (including beaches), fining and arresting those violating the government’s directives.

Since day one, communicating a single, clear message to Israel’s diverse population has been a serious challenge for the Israeli government. No case exemplifies this better than the ultra-Orthodox community. Ultra-Orthodox Jews (around 12% of the general population) observe a rigid set of customs that centers around mass religious education and communal participation in lifecycle events. They often live in distinct neighborhoods and cities, separate from mainstream Israeli society. Whether portions of the ultra-Orthodox community did not receive or were willfully ignorant to the Health Ministry’s directives remains unclear, however images capturing Haredim disregarding government policy seriously damaged the already frayed bonds between this community and mainstream Israeli society. Health Minister Yaakov Litzman, who represents one of the Haredi parties in the Knesset, also violated these public safety restrictions and contracted the coronavirus. Senior government officials, including Netanyahu, are now under quarantine. Haredi leaders are now instructing their devotees not to gather in large numbers, but it has taken longer for these communities to adapt and, unsurprisingly, about half of hospitalized Israelis with COVID-19 are ultra-orthodox. Major Haredi population centers are now under lockdown, cut off from the rest of Israel.

These manifold pressures, in addition to a ballooning unemployment numbers, have manufactured perhaps one, shallow ray of light: the end of Israel’s political deadlock. Publicly, Blue & White leader Benny Gantz claimed that the coronavirus threatened Israel’s future and required that he “put politics aside” after three grueling election cycles. But many see Gantz’s decision as capitulation. And it is difficult to overlook how Netanyahu and Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein strained an already tense political atmosphere to its breaking point by utilizing the coronavirus as legitimate cause for shutting down the legislature and refusing to follow a Supreme Court order to reopen parliament. The cost of establishing a unity government with Netanyahu is high; Gantz’s decision left Israel’s opposition movement in tatters. Firmly back in the driver’s seat, Netanyahu can refocus his attention on his legal battles – and of course coronavirus as well.

As the Passover holiday approaches, most Israelis are trying to look past the egg shortages and the looming economic fallout in order to count their blessings. There is good reason to believe that the national mortality rate will remain low. But similar to many other states affected by the coronavirus, the pandemic’s damage to public trust may require years of rehabilitation.

(originally published in IPSI)

הפוסט A Very Israeli Pandemic Response הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to staying in touch and looking after these Israelis and their families, the MFA, as always, is engaged in other aspects of the national effort to curb the spread of the disease. Missions abroad, with support from headquarters in Jerusalem, are busy locating manufacturers of vital equipment, and in many cases coordinating its transport to Israel. From respirators to antibacterial gel, from protective gear to overalls, from face masks to raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry. To overcome the limitations and restrictions placed by countries on the export of medical equipment at this time, Israeli representatives are required to pull strings, locate suppliers and to the extent necessary, obtain special export licenses. Some embassies hook up foreign and Israeli scientists in order to share experience and help the drive for scientific breakthroughs to stem the pandemic. Understandably, this has become the daily bread and butter of Israeli missions during these times.

To back these efforts, the MFA has announced a “national emergency rescue plan” to bring Israelis home. The decision to designate the MFA as an essential workplace, following an appeal by the Foreign Minister to reverse a previous government decision on the matter, is a welcome move. It allows the ministry to work on full emergency footing in missions abroad and at 50% capacity in Israel. The MFA headquarters plays a vital role in the overall diplomatic endeavors. Formulating policy and implementing it through instructions to the field, running a complex system of some 100 representative offices, managing human resources and ensuring the necessary security requires a fully functioning main office. The decision to exclude the MFA from near total lockdown testifies to the recognition of its vital task and underscores the need for a strong and significant Foreign Ministry as an integral part of the national effort.

The essential role of the MFA in emergencies is not new. One of my earliest memories of work at the ministry was the massive activity during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in mobilizing reserve soldiers traveling abroad and whisking them home. I also remember well the activation of Israeli missions in obtaining essential input for the economy. Along with these tasks, the MFA continued to carry out its “traditional” roles, among them mobilizing diplomatic support in international arenas and blocking initiatives to curtail Israel’s military room for maneuver, as well as conducting public diplomacy to boost favorable world public opinion.

The need for an active and accessible Foreign Service is growing. We live in an era of globalization and global challenges the solutions for which cross borders – from countering terrorism to fighting epidemics. In light of the above, Israel must ensure an active physical presence in international forums, personal acquaintance with and access to decision makers in all sectors, and experience with a large number of international arenas. This cannot be accomplished by remote control. The personal dimension – the ongoing personal contact – is an irreplaceable added value of the Foreign Service which enables both public diplomacy and “political intelligence”. Preparation for the day after the Coronavirus crisis is also important – to ensure continuity and prevent the current exigencies from undermining future needs. Once the storm abates, we will require stable infrastructure for economic recovery and growth in the international arena, too. That obviously means having a strong Foreign Ministry in normal times and in emergency situations as well.

The MFA has a key role in ensuring Israel’s national resilience. Nonetheless, as mentioned by a former senior defense official against the backdrop of the current crisis, the Ministry has been weakened in recent years and its budgets slashed (he mentioned the Health Ministry in the same breath but that is an issue for another discussion). Indeed, the status of the MFA has suffered persistent, severe and debilitating erosion in recent years at the initiative of the government. Budgets and responsibilities were shifted to other agencies for unjustified political reasons. This must be rectified at once by the new government, no matter who is at its helm.

A September 2019 Mitvim Institute poll indicated that 48% of Israelis think the MFA’s status has declined. Of these, more respondents (30%) think this downgrading significantly undermines national security than those who think it does not (18%). The importance that the public attributes to diplomacy and foreign policy is encouraging considering its insufficient awareness of the wide array of matters with which the MFA deals. The extent to which the public understands the link between the correct conduct of foreign policy and National Security (national resilience) is also encouraging. Leaders of the state, too, must recognize the need to strengthen the MFA and translate this recognition into practical terms. A strong Foreign Ministry, backed in practice by the government that it represents throughout the world, is vital under every scenario, whether in routine times or emergencies.

The MFA may not being doing enough in terms of domestic public relations. It will not tweet about “clandestine nighttime operations” that take place, and will not make public every security or civilian deal involving an Israeli ambassador. Our diplomats, men and women, hold thousands of meetings, public and private, with leaders, opinion shapers, captains of industry and others to ensure Israel’s security, and its economic and social prosperity both in normal times and in emergencies. The MFA staff operate with humility, discretion and determination, often under the radar, sometimes even in countries with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations, often under complex security conditions for themselves and their families. The Foreign Minister was right in publicly praising the Ministry’s work everywhere. It is important that the political echelons back his declarations, translate them into action, and restore responsibilities and proper budgets to the MFA.

In times of wars and military operations, the MFA places its capabilities at the disposal of the state to provide a “temporary diplomatic window” enabling completion of a military campaign. The current crisis, with its unique and different characteristics, creates new and unfamiliar challenges for the state. Addressing them requires activity abroad, too, which brings into play the capacities and capabilities of the MFA. The last thing the government should be doing now is adopting the recommendations of bean counters who define the MFA as a non-essential agency. Adopting such a classification, continuing to undermine its authority and stealing its budgets will distance our potential future diplomats, and harm – you guessed it – the State of Israel.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Foreign Ministry on the Frontlines of the Coronavirus Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The isolation imposed on the MFA by the outgoing government resulted in its gradual decline: responsibilities were transferred to other government ministries, chief among them the Ministry for Strategic Affairs; the MFA’s budgetary shortfalls grew to the extent that they hampered daily operations and led to labor disputes; and the exclusion of diplomats from key decision-making junctions increased, leading top diplomats to complain they lacked relevance and influence. At the same time, the prime minister (who served as acting foreign minister from 2015 to early 2019, and continues to do so de facto to this day) took control of most diplomatic activity, or entrusted it to close associates.

Public figures have protested loudly over the decline in the MFA’s stature over the last few years, underlining the damage this causes to Israel’s national security. Members of Knesset spoke up on this issue in the plenary, in committees, in caucuses, at press conferences, in legislation proposals and in opinion pieces. Think tanks highlighted the need to empower Israeli democracy and suggested possible ways to achieve this goal; retired ambassadors began working together to raise public awareness of the MFA’s troubled standing; ministry officials waged struggles and protests, behind closed doors and in the public arena; civil society and cultural activists pointed to the difficulties they faced in the international arena due to the ministry’s weakness; and Israelis expressed dissatisfaction in polls over this state of affairs.

The challenges currently facing Israel are more diplomatic in nature and less military. So are the opportunities, that can enable Israel to increase its regional belonging in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. As demonstrated by the Coronavirus crisis, the current era requires a diplomacy that is more focused on global issues. Just in recent days, for example, the MFA played a key role in diplomatic efforts that enabled the importation to Israel of masks and Coronavirus test equipment from other countries. However, Israel’s involvement in global issues should not be limited to advancing its own interests. Rather, it should also foster international solidarity – placing Israeli knowledge, equity and resources at the disposal of other countries and peoples who are dealing with challenging global phenomena.

Under such circumstances, diplomacy plays an increasingly important role. Now more than ever, Israel must adopt an internationalist foreign policy. One that is not focused any longer on inward-looking, deflecting criticism, justifying positions and blocking international initiatives, but rather one that views Israel as a key player in the global arena, that expands Israeli involvement in international organizations and foreign aid, that is open to dialogue with broad audiences (critical ones, too) and that is committed to the democratic value system. In the current era, Israel’s success will largely depend on its ability to work in concert with other countries in order to jointly identify solutions to challenges, promote joint interests, and create new frameworks for collective action. That requires a capable, influential MFA, and the identity of Israel’s next foreign minister will be a key element in that regard.

The next Israeli government will have to immediately appoint a fulltime foreign minister, unlike what Netanyahu did when he formed his last government. It is crucial to appoint a foreign minister with political power, who is capable of and motivated to carry out significant change. The new foreign minister will have to adopt rapid measures to strengthen the MFA, chief among them restoring its authority and increasing its budget; lead a reform of its structure and operations; improve the interface between the ministry, the public and decision-makers; and advance a new approach to Israel’s foreign policy.

The new foreign minister will also have to examine Israel’s achievements and failures in the foreign policy arena in recent years: pay attention to missed opportunities, to the peace that has grown distant, to the threats that have intensified, to the values eroded and the relationships that were undermined. He or she will have to formulate a new national foreign policy paradigm and to ensure its support by the government, and to embark on a diplomatic voyage that will free the MFA from isolation, and propel Israel to a future of peace, prosperity and security; a future in which Israel will find its rightful place in the region and among the family of nations.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Founder and Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט Set Israel’s Foreign Ministry Free from Quarantine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A 2018 study of Israel-Iraq relations, written within the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s ties with Arab states, stressed that a rapprochement between official Iraq and Israel was unlikely. Its central argument was that relations between the two countries were hardly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict and that the main factor influencing relations was the conflict between Israel (and perhaps the US, too) and Iran. The events of recent months bolstered this assessment. Iran and its proxies within the Iraqi regime accuse the West and Israel of fanning the unrest. The Shiite militias, the standard bearers of Iraq’s cooperation with Iran, ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric even before the protests broke out. Given this polarized state of affairs, another trend spotlighted in the previous study is gaining momentum – wide-ranging solidarity manifested on social media between a growing number of Iraqis and Israelis, stemming from hostility to Iran and an affinity for the history of Iraqi Jewry. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and senior political figures contributed significantly to boosting this trend in 2019.

This article reviews the changes that occurred in 2019 in the nature of Israel-Iraq cooperation, as they relate to diplomatic, security, economic and civilian aspects.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Assessing Israel Katz’s First Year as Foreign Minister הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Towards an Increased Role for the Knesset in Foreign Affairs: Summary of a Knesset event held by the Mitvim Institute and the Caucus for Strengthening Israel’s Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.