1. Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – Israel forged diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and announced progress in normalization with Sudan. These moves were underpinned by US encouragement and support, as expressed in significant defense, diplomatic and economic benefits for the participating Arab states. The formal relations led to advancement of agreements and cooperation in a wide array of fields, with official delegations conducting mutual visits. Attempts were made to harness Saudi participation in the normalization wave, including a reported trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Bin Salman and Pompeo.

2. Advancing normalization with new Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan – the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain prompted a flourishing of security, economic and civilian cooperation encouraged and promoted by the governments. Direct flights were launched between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval to overfly its air space, and maritime trade routes were advanced. Israel and the UAE reacted with enthusiasm to the new relationship, as reflected in the agreement on mutual visa exemptions and the visit of tens of thousands of Israelis to the UAE. The advancement of normalization with Gulf states was particularly pronounced compared to the ongoing freeze in Israel’s civilian relations with Egypt and Jordan.

3. Freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation – Under international and local political pressure, and the conditions set by the UAE for normalization, Netanyahu announced a freeze of his West Bank annexation intentions. Nonetheless, his government continued to move ahead with de facto annexation, without formal declarations, including construction plans in east Jerusalem and the settlements, along with demolitions of Palestinian homes in Area C, special funding transfers to the settlements and Knesset initiatives to legalize outposts.

4. Capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests – Ahead of the US presidential elections, Israel took advantage of the Trump administration’s desire to display foreign policy achievements in order to promote normalization agreements with Arab states, despite the absence of progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. Following Joe Biden’s victory, Israel sought to capitalize on Trump’s final days in office to promote US recognition of the legality of the settlements. The election results also prompted the Palestinian Authority to resume security and civilian coordination with Israel. Israel’s preparations for the Biden administration focused on the Iranian issue in light of an expected US intention to resume negotiations with Iran on the nuclear agreement.

5. Bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts – Israel has strengthened its alliance with Greece and Cyprus, especially in the fields of security, energy, health and tourism, and accepted a Cypriot initiative to form a trilateral secretariat of the alliance in Nicosia. Israel backed Greece and Cyprus in their maritime border disputes with Turkey, but did so cautiously. It wanted to avoid being dragged into a conflict to which it is not a side and not to exacerbate relations with Turkey, also given recent signals of Ankara’s interest in warmer ties.

6. Leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits – Israel took advantage of its energy resources and geopolitical location to advance regional cooperation. It promoted, in cooperation with Egypt, the formalization of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a recognized international organization, and ratified its foundation charter. Israel also entered US-mediated negotiations with Lebanon on marking the maritime border between the two states. It approved the plan for a gas pipeline to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, and advanced cooperation with the UAE on conveying energy through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.

7. Leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran – Israel continued its military activity against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, in coordination with Russia, and its diplomatic activity against the nuclear agreement and in favor of broader sanctions on Iran, in cooperation with the US. The Israeli MFA’s efforts affected decisions by additional states to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to Iran played a significant role in bolstering Israel’s relationship with Gulf states and in Israel’s decision to supply arms to Azerbaijan as part of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

8. Adopting a more positive approach toward the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue – The EU harshly condemned Netanyahu’s planned West Bank annexation intentions and expanded Israeli construction in the settlements and east Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi adopted a positive attitude toward the EU and underlined the importance of improved ties with it. He participated in an unofficial meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, and advanced ties with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, attempts to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council have yet to bear fruit. Israel’s ties with populist, a-liberal leaders in Central and Eastern Europe were sidelined, contrary to Netanyahu’s boasting of these relationships in previous years.

9. Empowering Israel’s MFA in terms of its professionalism, policy influence and public image – The MFA instituted new working procedures and promoted dozens of professional appointments, some of which are still awaiting government confirmation. Ashkenazi sought to ensure the participation of MFA representatives in all relevant government forums, and to strengthen coordination with other government ministries. The MFA also intensified its media exposure efforts, including spotlighting its contribution to the promotion of relation with Arab states against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords. The MFA stepped up its recruitment efforts, resulting in higher enrollment than in previous years for its cadet training and making the upcoming cadet course the biggest in recent years.

**This article was published on The Jerusalem Post, January 16 2021.

הפוסט Semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies with Arab states הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Former Diplomats in Israel’s Public Sphere הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent decades, the foreign ministry’s area of activity has gradually contracted despite its extensive contribution and that of its staff. Indeed, its contribution spanned all areas of national security and foreign policy all over the world. The erosion in the MFA’s role occurred for a variety of reasons, including because the defense establishment, the intelligence community, and often officials in the Prime Minister’s Office took part in these efforts.

הפוסט The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This DNA has brought the best and the brightest to the foreign service, and their leading motivation has been to serve the country, any time, any place and in all circumstances.

To say that presenting Israel’s policies abroad nowadays is an easy task would be a lie. Not only Israel’s enemies but also some of our closest friends and allies do not understand them, let alone accept some of their basic tenets. And yes, some of our devoted diplomats, those who have courage to act so, feel that it is their duty to report to the policy-makers in Jerusalem the problems they are facing, the question marks raised, the changes in public opinion. But more often than not we kill the messenger.

With the passing of time, I keep wondering (and grieving) at the instinct to destruction so prevalent in today’s politics, the determination to destroy, to shred to pieces all that was good and built with great pains. The Foreign Ministry, one of the best tools at the service of this country’s interests, has been taken apart by our prime minister, who offered large chunks of it and some of its basic tasks, as a consolation prize, to some of the ministers in his coalition. Thus, in the absence of a clear, complete and coherent view of the picture, the ministry is becoming irrelevant. Moreover, it is being turned into the punching bag of politicians who make it responsible for their own failures.

Unfortunately, it is our country that will pay the price for this behavior.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The minister’s punching bag הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In light of this reality, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Knesset Lobby for Strengthening Israel`s Foreign Affairs System, Chaired by MK Dr. Nachman Shai (Zionist Union), convened on 28 December 2015 a special conference at the Israeli parliament.

The conference was attended by Members of Knesset, diplomats, experts and journalists. It focused on mapping the key problems faced by the MFA, offering solutions and recommendations, and debating the importance of a strong MFA to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

This document summarizes the remarks made at the conference by: MK Isaac Herzog, MK Tzipi Livni, MK Dr. Nachman Shai, MK Dr. Michael Oren, MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg, MK Eyal Ben-Reuven, MK Haim Jelin, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute), Colette Avital (former MK and ambassador), Magali Wahaba (former MK and deputy foreign minister), Barak Ravid (Haaretz diplomatic correspondent), Victor Harel (former ambassador), Eran Etzion (former director of policy planning at the MFA), Prof. Yossi Shain (Tel Aviv University), Daniel Shek (former ambassador) and Hanan Goder (Head of the MFA worker’s union).

In addition, the full conference can be viewed (in Hebrew) on Mitvim Institute’s YouTube channel.

הפוסט The Role of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 Israeli Foreign Policy Index הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Empowering Israeli Diplomacy through Legislation: Promoting a Foreign Service Bill הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israeli Foreign Policy and the Modern Diplomacy of the 21st Century הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israeli Foreign Policy and the Modern Diplomacy of the 21st Century הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Key Elements of Israel’s Foreign Policy Paradigms הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The keynote speakers at the symposium were MK Dr. Ronen Hoffman (Yesh Atid), Chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and Public Diplomacy; Dr. Yuval Benziman of the Mitvim Institute, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and Tel Aviv University; and Prof. Joel Peters of Virginia Tech University and the Mitvim Institute. .

הפוסט Key Elements of Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.