The lack of focus and the inability to materialize the dozens of signed agreements is evident these days, emphasizing what has not yet been implemented. For instance, an agreement for employing Moroccan migrant workers in Israel has not yet been signed, despite the statement made by the former interior minister Ayelet Shaked in July 2022. Nor has the economic infrastructure to enable business between the countries been completed, namely agreements on customs, double taxation avoidance, promotion and protection of investments, and other systems to enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of the trade channel between Morocco and Israel.

Moroccan decision makers, for their part, appear to regard the ongoing war with Hamas, and no less so the current Israeli government, as detrimental to the resumption of relations between the countries to its positive course. Statements by senior Israeli officials calling for the destruction of Gaza, while vehemently opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, echo in the Moroccan media, damage Israel’s image, and mainly serve opposition parties who wish to harm the special relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, Morocco’s official position regarding relations with Israel as a strategic interest remains intact. This was evidenced by the results of the extraordinary Arab Islamic Conference held in Riyadh in November, in which Morocco – alongside other key Arab and Muslim countries – was reluctant to embrace actual decisions or actions against their relations with Israel. Morocco’s decision to keep its ambassador in Tel Aviv – despite the Israeli mission staff being evacuated from Rabat – is a significant statement in itself.

In the economic field, businesses more or less continue as usual. Israeli companies come to Morocco or meet their partners in third-country destinations such as France and Spain. This discreet arrangement seems convenient for everyone.

Tourism has almost completely stopped between the countries

Tourism is the most affected sector, with direct flights between Tel Aviv and Rabat still on hold, and a travel warning in effect with a rating of three out of four, advising Israelis to avoid non-essential travel to Morocco. As a result, Israeli and international Jewish tourism to Morocco has almost entirely stopped. This situation is exacting a price from Israeli tourism agencies and Moroccan hotels and service providers. While tourism is a key to people-to-people connections, most civil and cultural partnerships are currently on hold and in a “waiting” situation until the end of the war.

Despite the challenges, some joint initiatives can be preserved, finding creative ways to sustain them, such as transferring them from a bilateral framework to a multi-sided one under an American, European, Emirati, or other umbrella, or conducting activities online whenever possible.

One of the main challenges in the civil context is the sentiment among Israelis of Moroccan descent regarding Morocco. It ranges from disappointment to astonishment and a lack of understanding in light of images of mass protests from Rabat and other cities in Morocco and even antisemitic incidents that do not receive official condemnation.

Here, it should be noted that Israeli frustration is partly due to cultural and behavioral differences between Israel and Morocco, despite their close cultural connection. According to the Moroccan perspective, including that of decision-makers, it is preferable to avoid conflicts, make explicit statements, and deal with matters quietly behind the scenes. In their view, the secrecy of action is a key to success, preserving internal stability and advancing a wishful agenda. That’s because, according to their understanding, one cannot resist what one does not see or know, so ultimately, maintaining quiet preserves the status quo as if nothing has been done. In Morocco, non-action is considered, in practice, equivalent to any action, and perhaps even the most proper and challenging action to execute.

Three years after the resumption of official ties, and in the shadow of the Gaza war challenges, the crisis also provides a new opportunity for regional and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Morocco’s relatively neutral position may in fact enable it to play an important role in the aftermath of the war as part of a broader coalition dedicated to rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. It could help in the reconstruction and in implementing local and regional programs to deal with and prevent extremism and violence.

Morocco could assist in the training of Palestinian public employees deployed in Gaza. Morocco could also host forums, meetings, and conferences to support and promote a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The good relations that Morocco maintains with both sides – Israeli and Palestinian – and the religious authority of King Mohammed VI, including his role as the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, are just some of the assets Morocco can bring to this complex task.

The connection with Morocco is a significant asset for Israel in times of peace and war alike. It is important that we learn and derive insights from the past three years towards the new chapter in relations that will unfold once the war is over.

The article was published on Janurary 1, 2024 in the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Morocco and resolving the Gaza crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is committed to the Palestinian issue and to safeguarding Islam’s holy sites, a commitment stemming above all from the religious authority vested in its king as a descendant of the Alawite dynasty and Prophet Muhammad’s family. Morocco has been an Arab League member since 1958 and has chaired the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Al-Quds Committee for the protection of Islam’s holy sites since 1975.

This role makes Morocco relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially to any discussion of Jerusalem as a core issue in such negotiations. A deep cultural tie also binds Morocco to Israeli Jews of Moroccan origin. Tens of thousands of Israelis visit Morocco annually, many of them in search of their roots and heritage, often more than once. The Moroccan language, culture and heritage remain conspicuously present in many Israeli homes.

Morocco has played a role in the peace process between Israel and its neighbors from time to time throughout its history due to its relatively neutral foreign policy, its location between east and west, and the trust it engenders in both sides to the conflict.

King Hassan II attributed importance to this role and his involvement consisted mainly of facilitating communication between rival actors and providing an ideal meeting venue for initial stages of negotiations. Such was the case at the difficult birth of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in the 1970s.

However, since the Second Intifada broke out in October 2000, Morocco’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shrunk significantly and to this day is characterized by avoidance and excessive caution.

Nonetheless, Morocco has increased its involvement in mediating other conflicts in the Arab world and Africa in recent years as a tenet of its foreign policy. This may provide an opportunity for increased Moroccan involvement in moves to advance Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution, which would depend on the political and public attitudes of Israelis, Moroccans and Palestinians.

Public perceptions in Israel present an opportunity for cooperation. The declaration of renewed official ties between Israel and Morocco generated widespread support in Israel. For Many Israelis, Morocco is not just “another state” in the region; it blends seamlessly into the landscape of nostalgia and memory that is the backdrop of Israeli society. An extensive network of civilian ties based on shared Moroccan identity and values also binds the two countries.

Some one million Jews of Moroccan origin live in Israel, where they preserve their Moroccan identity alongside their Israeli one. Morocco recognizes them as its second-largest diaspora in the world (after France).

Morocco’s renewal of ties with Israel generated a measured response by the Palestinian Authority, certainly compared to its harsh criticism of Israel’s Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Personal calls by the Moroccan monarch to PA President Mahmoud Abbas may have softened its stand, as well as Morocco’s insistence that it was not forging new ties with Israel within the Abraham Accords framework but merely resuming previous relations. The PA’s reluctance to damage its ties with Morocco was also a contributing factor. However, the renewed ties might have damaged Morocco’s neutral image in the eyes of the Palestinians to a certain extent.

The Palestinian issue remains on Morocco’s agenda, and pro-Palestinian public activity has increased significantly in recent years. Reactions in Morocco to the official renewal of relations with Israel were complex. On the one hand, they were highly positive, primarily due to the resulting US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and prompted a significant awakening of new organizations dedicated to strengthening ties with Israel and expansion of activities by existing ones. On the other hand, the move generated protests and significant opposition, along with sensitive questions in the Moroccan political arena as it prepares for elections this year.

Morocco has not been and will not be the main engine or catalyst for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, nor a key mediator. There are other more powerful international actors with greater resources and more effective leverage that could play a more significant role under certain circumstances in prompting or accompanying the peace process. However, Morocco’s politics, geography and identity provide it with an opportunity to assist and support on a wide variety of issues that are key to advancing peace.

Moroccan foreign policy that strives for a posture of neutrality and for contributing to regional stability, the positive attitude and relative trust it engenders among both Palestinians and Israelis, as well as its historic experience, provide it with an opportunity to assist in mediating between the sides. For example, on the issue of Jerusalem.

This issue is broader than the national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and involves many actors, such as adherents of the three monotheistic faiths, Jordan that serves as the Arab world’s custodian of the Jerusalem sites holy to Islam, Saudi Arabia that is seeking a prestigious foothold in Jerusalem, as well as Turkey, the Catholic and Orthodox churches and, of course, Morocco, which as mentioned, holds a formal position on behalf of the OIC.

Morocco has important symbolic standing in this arena and an opportunity to legitimize whatever creative agreements the sides reach on the future of Jerusalem. It could also aid in improving the fabric of ties in the city even before agreement is reached.

Morocco’s geopolitical location between East and West and Africa and Europe also provides it with opportunities to contribute to the peace process. Morocco is a member of African regional organizations, which it could harness in support of the peace process. Morocco is also part of the Mediterranean, together with Israel and the PA.

While Israel’s immediate interests in that region lie in its partnership with Greece and Cyprus, Morocco could constitute a significant partner for strengthening institutions and cooperation throughout the Mediterranean, at the same time leveraging regional frameworks to advance Israeli-Palestinian cooperation (such as the Union for the Mediterranean, of which Israel and the PA are also members).

Morocco could also contribute to mobilizing public Israeli support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by virtue of its symbolic and emotional value for many Israelis of Moroccan origin. Morocco’s support, and the support of King Mohammed for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could have a positive impact on the attitudes of Israelis of Moroccan origin to negotiations. This impact could increase as civilian ties between the two states expand and their relationship warms.

The international community sees similarities between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara, at least in terms of international law on occupation and sovereignty claims. Morocco is doing all it can, and is likely to continue doing so, to prevent such comparison, but there is undoubtedly room to study and compare international attitudes and policies to both these cases.

Should Israelis and Palestinians harness the political will to advance peace, both will find a credible, committed and positive ally in Morocco, which offers relevant opportunities and assets and would be positively inclined to help to the best of its ability to ensure the success of the process. And until the peace process is revived, it would be worthwhile offering Morocco a role in encouraging dialogue on the issue of Jerusalem in order to ease tensions and prevent escalation.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 8th 2021.

הפוסט How Morocco relates to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the eve of Passover this year, I am most looking forward to the Mimuna holiday — a traditional Jewish Moroccan celebration and feast which immediately follows the end of Passover. The Mimuna is a holiday full of love for others, good neighborliness, hospitality and multiculturalism – the same values ​​that can also be expressed through Israel’s relations with its neighbors.

Personally, I am a “sabra” of Ashkenazi descent, but Mimuna is nonetheless my favorite holiday and I have always wished to receive an invitation from my Moroccan friends to celebrate. Not only because of the plethora of sweets (which are sure to throw me off my diet), but because of the values that ​​the Mimuna represents.

My love for the holiday developed under the influence of two Ashkenazis like me. Firstly, my political mentor Shimon Peres, who resolutely nurtured Israel’s relations with Morocco. Secondly, my father-in-law Dr. Dan Ronen, who was an expert on ethnic folklore, wrote a booklet on the Mimuna and for a year was the MC of the main Mimuna event in Jerusalem.

Peres had close relations with King Hassan II of Morocco and with the heads of the Jewish community in Morocco. He saw Morocco’s moderate diplomatic approach as having the potential to affect Israel’s relations with the entire region. The event that most prominently demonstrated Peres’ vision of the “New Middle East” – The same vision that was once harshly criticized by those who are promoting it today, was the Casablanca Economic Conference in 1995.

At the time, Morocco was one of the countries in which an Israeli mission was established in the wake of the Oslo Accords. Unfortunately, it was terminated following the intifada and the deterioration of relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Despite the freeze in diplomatic relations between the two countries, Morocco remained open to Israeli tourists and business. Morocco also tried to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians, as it did between Israel and Egypt before the Camp David Accords. In the Palestinian context, Morocco has a special status as chairing the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of Muslim States and therefore has a clear commitment to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully.

As part of a series of lectures this year on March 2^nd called “With the Face to the Maghreb”, the author, journalist and former MK Daniel Ben Simon, whose book “The Moroccans” was published in 2016, hosted Andre Azoulay, Special Adviser to the King of Morocco Muhammad VI and to his father King Hassan II.

Azoulay was a close friend of Peres’ and continued to serve today as a member of the International Board of Governors of the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation. In his lecture, Azoulay expressed his desire for “the normalization between Morocco and Israel to provide an opportunity for the entire region”.

“We have all long hoped for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. In the 1990’s we were close and we missed a lot of opportunities, I think if we can help bring that spirit back it will be one of the important things that will contribute to the relations between Morocco and Israel,” Azoulay went on to say.

Morocco carries a sense of loss for the significant and vibrant Jewish community that left the country in the 1960’s, taking with it an important component of Moroccan multiculturalism. In Morocco, there exists a prevailing discourse of tolerance and acceptance of “the other”, based on a long tradition of reciprocity and mutual respect between members of the country’s three main religions. The Jewish community in Morocco had a history of open and broad-minded Judaism intertwined with universal values.

Our current representatives in Morocco, Ambassador David Govrin, who is a veteran diplomat with experience as ambassador to Egypt, and Einat Levy, an expert on Moroccan issues, are a great choice to renew diplomatic relations between countries.

It is imperative that the Israeli government use this opportunity to cultivate a spirit of reconciliation between neighbors – Arabs and Jews – and to advance the process of settling the conflict with the Palestinians while strengthening bilateral relations.

The Peres Center for Peace and Innovation is ready and willing to take part in this process and fulfill Peres’ legacy by using the expertise he has gained over his 25 years in peace projects in various disciplines – health, education, business and environment – and by harnessing the power of Israeli innovation to promote peace and “Tikun Olam” (repairing the world).

“Tirbachu and Tisadu (Have fun and dine)”!

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 28 March 2021

הפוסט What has changed this Mimuna? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a part of the tourism industry, I often come across Jordanians, Egyptians, Moroccans, Iraqis and other nationals from the Middle East who express great interest in visiting Israel. Some contact me in person, and others through colleagues or mutual friends. In most cases, these are middle-class people who dream of visiting the holy sites of Islam in Israel or liberal, educated people who want to experience an encounter with the other – and sometimes both. Nevertheless, it seems that even when there is a will and the financial means necessary, there is a particularly stubborn barrier: the lack of reciprocity and the heavy bureaucracy involved in visiting Israel for tourists from the MENA region.

Israel calls this policy the “Countries under Consideration.” It is applied to nationals from Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, South Sudan, Mali and Mauritania. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are still defined as enemy states, and their nationals are banned from visiting Israel. Nationals from these countries are subject to security checks before the tourist visa is granted. Meeting Israel’s security standards, even if the process is justified, is cumbersome and extends the application process by many months. Sometimes the application remains simply unanswered. In these cases, the excitement and interest of visa applicants from these “countries under consideration” who managed to overcome the initial barriers are replaced by despair and frustration. The gap between the need for security checks and the problematic way in which they are carried out requires rethinking.

Israel’s ties with most of the countries in the Middle East are largely based on security and economic interests, partially due to the ‘closed door’ that tourists from those countries face. This is the case, for example, with Jordan and Egypt, who have signed peace agreements with Israel. While the current security coordination between Israel and Egypt is currently at its highest level, the number of Egyptian tourists visiting Israel in 2018 was only about 6,200, some of whom are Coptic tourists who came on organized tours. The number of Egyptian tourists looks even smaller when it is compared to the 400,000 Israeli tourists who visited Egypt that same year, even though most likely traveled to peripheral Sinai, rather than to Cairo.

Although the number of Jordanian tourists was higher, it is far from reaching its true potential. A total of about 18,000 Jordanians visited Israel in 2018, some of whom were visiting their friends and relatives. Jordan also serves as a transit hub for tourists traveling from Israel to other Middle Eastern countries due to the presence of an Israeli embassy in Jordan. Muslim pilgrims from the MENA region visit Jordan on their way to Mecca and Medina and some participate in tours that visit the holy sites of Islam in Jerusalem. Jordan is also a transit hub for Arab and Palestinian citizens of Israel who travel to Mecca and Medina or for those who are seeking to obtain a visa for an organized trip to Lebanon. The sanctity of Jerusalem, which is a source of conflict in some areas, is a source of creative solutions when it comes to the tourism industry.

There are also tourists from countries in the region which do not have official diplomatic relations with Israel and Morocco is one of them. Israeli tourists were granted a special permit to visit Morocco since the 1980s. This became official in the 1990s while the Oslo process was underway. Despite the warm relations between the peoples, the number of Moroccan tourists who visited Israel in 2018 is still low, standing at about 3,000. In the absence of an Israeli representative office in Rabat, the bureaucratic process is long, expensive, and complicated, sometimes requiring travel outside of Morocco to obtain a tourist visa to Israel more than one time. In an attempt to help their Moroccan friends, some Israelis apply for a visa from the Interior Ministry in their lieu, but even then, there is no easy solution. The Israeli applicant is required to deposit between 10,000 and 30,000 NIS to the bank account of the Interior Ministry. The deposit is refunded only after the tourist leaves the country. An Israeli t
ravel agency that organizes trips from Morocco or one of the other “countries under consideration” to Israel is required to deposit 200,000 NIS in advance and is liable for the group visiting Israel throughout their stay in the country.

In contrast to the Israeli bureaucracy, Morocco shows flexibility, which makes it possible to leverage the deep cultural connection and bring about a consistent growth in the number of Israeli tourists who visit Morocco every year. As the former King of Morocco Hassan II put it, “when a Jew leaves Morocco, we do not lose a citizen, but gain an ambassador.”

**The article was published by Jpost on 2 October 2020.

הפוסט Tourism is the key for civic ties between Israel and the MENA region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan: Continued Deterioration / Yitzhak Gal
Israel-Egypt: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? / Dr. Haim Koren
Israel-UAE: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs/ Dr. Moran Zaga
Israel-Morocco: Warming from the Bottom Up / Einat Levi
Israel-Iraq: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming / Dr. Ronen Zeidel

הפוסט Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article examines the current Israel-Morocco cooperation and its development through 2019. It briefly describes developments in diplomatic, security, economic and civilian arenas in order to find common ground and identify trends. Naturally, the paper will not elaborate much on the security-intelligence aspect of the cooperation, despite its centrality, due to its classified nature

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Cooperation in 2019: Warming from the Bottom Up הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A new type of peace in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The American decision to hold the workshop in Bahrain is undoubtedly novel. Bahrain has not hosted many international conferences. It has never hosted an Arab summit, for example. Bahrain’s ruler Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa agreed to do so for several reasons. First, he leads a Sunni elite ruling an island 70 percent of whose residents are Shiite and for whom the specter of a Shiite takeover bolstered by a tailwind from neighboring Iran is a source of constant worry. Their fear is well grounded. Shiite protests erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but speedy military help provided by the Saudis from the other side of the Gulf put an end to them. Second, Bahrain has been relying for years on US aid. In fact, the 5th Fleet is headquartered there, the two sides signed a defense pact in 1991 and a free trade agreement in 2006, and over 200 US firms operate on the small island. Hosting the workshop is therefore not a high price for the monarchy and ruling family to pay for their reliance on the Americans and Saudis that ensure stability. What is more, the Saudi-Bahraini cooperation allows Saudi Arabia to use Bahrain as a trial balloon for a policy likely to meet opposition in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia traditionally traipses cautiously through the political Islamic and Arab minefield, due to its position as the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites.

The choice of Bahrain is convenient for Israel, too. In recent years, Bahrain’s rulers have been publicly displaying openness toward Israel, contrary to the Saudis whose contacts with Israel are conducted largely behind closed doors. Israel and Bahrain do not have diplomatic ties and Bahrain did not set up a diplomatic representation in Israeli during the Oslo period (unlike Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania). Nonetheless, the two sides have been conducting public and clandestine ties since then. Yossi Sarid was the first senior Israeli official to visit Manama as Minister of Environmental Affairs within the framework of the multilateral working group in October 1994. Ties were upped a notch in the previous decade when Shimon Peres, then Minister of Regional Cooperation, met with the Crown Prince of Bahrain.

At the height of these public contacts, Peres as President and Tzipi Livni as Foreign Minister met with King Hamed in New York in 2009. However, most contacts were conducted behind the scenes. According to WikiLeaks documents, King Hamed told the US Ambassador in 2005 that his country conducts defense and intelligence ties with Israel through the Mossad. In another conversation, this one by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister with a US diplomat, Bahrain was said to be conducting “quiet business-like ties” with Israel. What is more, the King ordered officials to stop using the words “enemy” and “Zionist entity” when referring to Israel. The Kingdom also has interfaith relations with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and in December 2018, it named Rabbi Marc Schneier as special adviser to the King on the Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence that he had founded in Manama. Schneier has been working for the past 15 years to create interfaith bridges between Israel, the Gulf States and especially Bahrain. The Manama center, in cooperation with the Wiesenthal Center, organized an interfaith visit of 24 clerics from Bahrain to Israel in December 2017. The visit took place although President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital just days earlier. Houda Ezra Nonoo, a Jewish Bahraini woman, served as her country’s Ambassador to the US from 2008 to 2013. All this places Bahrain in an excellent position to host Trump’s economic summit, which in any case fits in with the Kingdom’s defense and economic interests.

However, Bahrain’s rulers have not had a change of heart on the Palestinian issue. In all their declarations, they invariably make clear that progress on the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for any normalization with Israel. The main problem is that the Palestinians are boycotting the conference, thereby threatening to undermine its prospects of success. The Palestinian opposition to the conference is understandable given that Trump is not perceived as a balanced and honest mediator between the sides and because they fear that “economic peace” will constitute an alternative to a real, political peace. In any case, all the available information indicates that the political part of the peace plan, once unveiled, will be “thin” on diplomatic substance as far as the Palestinians are concerned. On the other hand, the Palestinian reaction places them, once more, as serial refusniks (e.g., the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Olmert-Abbas negotiations of 2007-8, and more).

The disappointing historic experience with the contribution of economic conferences to political aspects of the peace process, combined with recent events, lead to the conclusion that Trump would have been better off delaying or cancelling the economic workshop altogether. It is safe to assume that ego and honor will prevent him from doing so. Trump decided to launch the “deal of the century” by thinking “outside the box.” Undoubtedly, he succeeded; it is the first time anyone has tried to resolve the conflict without consulting, sharing or coordinating with one of the parties involved in the conflict. This “original” idea cannot provide a fair solution; it actually has the potential to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The appointment on November 4, 2018 of René Trabelsi – a Jewish businessman from the Island of Djerba – as Minister of Tourism in Tunisia has received a great deal of international attention, and at the same time has raised controversy among local political, media, and social circles. Tunisia nowadays has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, despite past precedents of positive relations. There are those in Tunisia who adamantly oppose normalizing relations with Israel, and who directly support the BDS movement and a boycott of Israel. Considering this mindset, the appointment of Trabelsi – a Jewish travel agency owner who has, for years, hosted Israelis in Tunisia, who has himself visited Israel, and who supports peace with Israel – to an official role in which he can actualize his theoretical ideas and turn them into policy, is curious.

Trabelsi is currently the only Jew serving as a minister in an Arab country, and altogether the third Jew in Tunisia to have served in such a position since its independence in 1957. On the one hand, this is a rather meager representation for a Jewish community who has lived in the area since the destruction of the First Temple. On the other hand, the appointment is significant because of its nature and timing, and it holds several important messages, both about Israel and about the potential role Tunisian Jews – wherever they are – may play in establishing relations between the two countries.

Trabelsi’s appointment is not the only example of positive attitudes toward Jews in Tunisia. In the April 2018 local elections in the city of Monastir, a Jew was placed on the candidate list of the a-Nahda party. While he did not get elected into the city council, placing him on the list was meant to convey a message of tolerance and openness. In addition, Tunisia is not the only Arab country in which Jews have reached high positions and have been treated well by the regime and the local population. Morocco, in fact, leads in this respect: in the past, Jews have served as ministers and senior business persons, and until today the highest-ranking Jew in the kingdom, Andre Azoulay, serves as Senior Adviser to the king. Azoulay is a key person in inter-faith and intercommunal relations, mainly in the field of culture and the arts in which there is lively cooperation between Israelis (many of whom are of Moroccan decent) and Jewish and Muslim Moroccans.

Jewish communities in Arab and Muslim lands, like Jews from those countries who live in Israel, constitute a natural – and to date yet unrealized – bridge between these countries and Israel. This is true particularly regarding Tunisia and Morocco, where there still exist active Jewish communities, but also with regard to Iraq where there was historically a prosperous and influential Jewish community. This does not mean that the only important connection is with high ranking Jewish diplomatic and political personnel, since having them place too much emphasis on contacts with Israel may actually hurt their efforts and narrow the range of their potential activities vis-à-vis Israel. What it does mean, is that there exists a historical, cultural, inter-personal, and inter-communal connection between Jewish communities in Middle Eastern and North African countries and these countries’ diasporas in Israel. In addition, there are ties between Israel and non-Jewish politicians and business persons in Tunisia, Morocco, and other countries, and these relations can potentially become more meaningful with the “backing” of historical and current Jewish relations in these countries.

The importance of strategic, security, or economic partnerships between Israel and other countries in the region should not be underestimated. However, rather than chasing after shallow, secret, and short-term contacts with authoritarian leaders, Israel should be attuned to signals coming – directly or indirectly – from more moderate countries like Tunisia and Morocco. With them, it is possible to build relations of a more civil and cultural nature, and which are based on deep and authentic ties. Publicly exaggerating the importance of Trabelsi’s appointment may harm its potential, but paying attention to the real opportunities embedded in it – without slogans and noisy headlines – may open important doors.

Dr. Adina Friedman is a guest researcher at Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Policies. She teaches conflict resolution at George Mason University, and is an experienced leader of courses in and educational trips to Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, the West Bank/Gaza, and Israel. This article is based on a research paper titled “Tunisia Following the Arab Spring and its Relations with Israel”, published by the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from Tunisia on the Jewish Bridge to the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Whether or not the Holocaust will be introduced into the Moroccan curriculum, Morocco has a unique story as a Muslim state willing to acknowledge the Holocaust. Most Muslim states oscillate between avoiding taking a stance on the matter and Holocaust denial, because acknowledging the Holocaust is perceived as harmful to Palestinian interests. So how can it be that Morocco acknowledges the Holocaust? The answer to this, as in many other matters, is the king, in this case Mohammed V. According to the Moroccan narrative, which many Moroccans are familiar with, when the Vichy regime ruled Morocco at the beginning of the 1940s, King Mohammed V was asked to hand over the Jews of his country to the Nazis. The Moroccans relate with pride that the king refused to concede to this demand, arguing fervently that there were only Moroccans in his country. Of course, in reality the story was more complex, restrictive decrees against the Jews were imposed at the instruction of the Vichy regime and freedom of employment, movement etc. were limited. Until today, the issue remains a source of dispute, and despite the important role Mohammed V had played, he was not yet awarded the title Righteous Among the Nations. However, Mohammed V was and remains a hero who saved the Jews. Here lays the real meaning of the story and whether accurate or exaggerated, it allowed the Morocco to develop a positive national identity with regard to the events that took place during the Second World War and the horrors of that period. While in Europe the Jews were annihilated, the Muslims in Morocco helped save them.

But what has happened since Mohammed V’s gesture to the Jews of his land and how does Morocco relate to the Holocaust today? Until 2009, Morocco made almost no public statements regarding the Holocaust. Morocco did not officially acknowledge or deny it. Among the general public a range of opinions existed, but on the national level silence reigned. In 2009, UNESCO inaugurated the Aladdin Project, designed to serve as a platform for activities and educational and cultural initiatives that will bring closer Jews and Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. It was initially established by France, Jordan, and Germany; later on, other states such as Indonesia, Mauritania, Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt also joined. One of its endeavors involves the translation of literature and films about the Holocaust into the official languages of the UN, especially Arabic. The project even enables free digital download of the books, thus making quality content on the topic available. Morocco apparently liked the initiative and Mohammed VI, acknowledged the Holocaust in an official message to the initiators of the Aladdin Project. This was a rare official declaration by a leader of a Muslim country.

When the king speaks, his message begins to trickle downwards, even though obstacles are met along the way. In April 2010, André Azoulay, the advisor to the king, declared that the Moroccan Ministry of Education needs to introduce the Holocaust into educational programs in schools. This initiative elicited protest from pro-Palestinian groups: they called for him to pack up his belongings and leave the country. In response to the protest, an opposing campaign, supporting Azoulay and the message he sought to impart, ensued. Despite the opposition, various elements in Moroccan civil society have adopted Azoulay’s message with pride and organized lectures and conferences in higher education institutions, including testimonies by Holocaust survivors who came to Morocco to tell their stories. In September 2011, the Mimouna association, organized one of the first conferences in the Arab world under the title “Mohammed V: Righteous Among the Nations”. In addition, there are other initiatives in Morocco that seek to change and adapt the educational program, in order to increase the representation of all shades of Moroccan heritage, including Jews and Amazigh (Berbers), which at present are almost completely absent from the history books.

At the bottom line, although Holocaust studies have not yet been officially included in the Moroccan curriculum, it is possible that we will see this happen soon in light of the country’s special history. Morocco’s recognition and sensitive approach to the Holocaust is an additional sign of the special relationship between Jews and Muslims in Morocco and the way this relationship is being included as part of the broader Moroccan heritage.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and a strategic consultant specializes in Morocco.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Holocaust Studies in Morocco? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The relationship between Israel and Morocco has not been properly studied since October 2000, when the official relations between the two countries were severed. This article is intended to shed light on the existing and potential relationship between the two countries. The article includes four parts: the first part provides a historical, social and political background on Morocco and the Israeli-Moroccan friendship as it has developed over the years; the second part deals with the interests and characteristics of the cooperation between the two countries and analyzes the potential, while addressing the political, security, economic, business and civil society spheres; the third part includes a mapping of the existing initiatives carried out by Israelis and Moroccans; and the last part deals with the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the relations between the two countries.

The findings of the article are based on Israeli, Moroccan, Arab and Western media sources and on publicly available statistics. In-depth interviews were conducted with experts from academia, with diplomats and with private sector professionals, who were involved (and some are still involved) in Israel-Morocco cooperation. The main challenges in terms of the sources for this article were the lack of studies that map existing cooperation, the difficulty in identifying the many existing initiatives that are facilitated through a third party, and the reluctance of Moroccan and Israeli officials to be interviewed due to sensitivities involved.

הפוסט Israel and Morocco: Cooperation Rooted in Heritage הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Prior to the law’s passing, Arabic was considered Israel’s second official language, a fact that improved Israel’s image in the world due to its recognition of the Arab minority’s culture and identity. This helped Israel present itself as a democratic state, while acting as a bridge between the country and the Arab-speaking region. It also recognized the culture and identity of Jews from Arab countries, for whom Arabic is an inseparable part of their heritage. The fact that Arabic was an official language gave Arab speakers in Israel a sense of both hope and belonging, which is why a change in its status may exact a high price both internally as well as externally.

At the western most tip of Africa sits Morocco, a country that can serve as a fascinating case study on the development of national and cultural identity. Although Morocco is not the most economically advanced country in the world, and has quite a way to go in terms of human rights and democracy, it has, over the years, succeeded in formulating a model of an inclusive national identity, with the understanding and belief that difference and diversity should be encouraged and emphasized.

This wasn’t always the situation. When Morocco declared independence in 1956, it had to formulate a clear national identity after years of colonial influence. Morocco chose an Arab national identity, and through an intensive “melting pot” process, it molded its state symbols and institutions according to this homogenous identity. For example, Morocco joined the Arab League, Arabic was defined as the official language of the state, and some of the streets in the kingdom were given Arabic names.

In the wake of the decision, Morocco underwent an accelerated process of Westernization, which came at the expense of other identities in the kingdom, specifically that of the Amazighs, which make up half the population. The Amazighs, also known as Berbers, are considered the original residents of Morocco and North Africa. They are a separate ethnic group and speak Amazigh languages. The exclusion of Amazigh identity was manifested in banning the group’s languages in schools, on state television and radio broadcasts, and forbidding parents from giving their children Amazigh names on their ID cards. Instead, Amazigh citizens are given Arabic names, which they use at school and vis-à-vis state institutions, as well as an Amazigh name, which they use with family and friends.

This led to numerous Amazigh protests over the years, especially during the reign of King Hassan II. The protesters called to increase Amazigh representation in the Moroccan narrative, bridge socioeconomic gaps, make public services available, and promote employment and equitable distribution of resources. All this drastically changed with King Mohammed VI, who took power in July 1999, and who vowed to connect every home to electricity and water and laid down basic infrastructure in the Amazigh villages. Under the king, Morocco established the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, which works to revive Amazigh languages and to integrate the Amazigh heritage into the national curriculum and encourage research on the topic.

While the situation and representation of the Amazigh improved, the protests did not cease. In February 2011, the winds of the Arab Spring blew through the streets of the country, and hundreds of thousands of Moroccans protested across the kingdom. The king, who feared the protests could destabilize the country, took steps to placate the demonstrators, including by changing the constitution. In July 2011, the kingdom passed an amendment to the constitution by referendum, which redefined Morocco’s national identity as a Muslim state. This time, however, the amendment emphasized the country’s commitment to the rich and diverse heritage of all its residents:

“A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [Amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [Saharo-Hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

The amendment also brought about a change in the status of the Tamazight language, which for the first time became an official language of the state, as per Article 5 of the Constitution:

Arabic is the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/Amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception.

The wording of the amendment was able to emphasize the commonalities between Arabs and Amazighs without undermining the status of Arabic or Morocco’s Arab identity. And while the wording does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground, it does shape perceptions and reality, cultivating one of the central values of Moroccan nationalism, according to which difference and diversity are a source of strength.

The Moroccan case is not identical to that of Israel. And yet, the development of a national hegemonic Arab identity in Morocco to a heterogenous and multicultural one could serve as a lesson for the Jewish state.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute, and a member of the institute’s task-team, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries. This article is based on a study of Israel-Morocco relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט What Israel can learn from Morocco’s multiculturalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This can be attributed to the Moroccan perception that sees the Moroccan Jews living in Israel as part of the Moroccan Diaspora. This perception in grounded in a report issued in March 2016 by the Moroccan Ministry of Diaspora, in which Israel was mentioned as the second largest Moroccan Diaspora after France, with about 800,000 Moroccans. This issue has also been raised in Moroccan public discourse over the question of the right to vote in parliament of the Moroccan diaspora, and if so, does this right apply to Moroccans living in Israel. In addition, an Israeli citizen of Moroccan origin who wants to obtain Moroccan citizenship can do so because the right to Moroccan citizenship applies by filiation up to fourth generation descendants. Not only that, in July 2011 an amendment was introduced to the Moroccan constitution, in which Judaism was mentioned as part of the Moroccan heritage. Where else can we find a Muslim country that views Israel as one of its Diaspora, recognizes Judaism as part of its heritage, and even offers citizenship to its citizens?!

Beyond the Jewish heritage that lasted for more than 2,000 years in Morocco, the IsraeliMoroccan friendship began in the late 1950s with security cooperation against Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and pan-Arabism, and a need to regulate the immigration of Jews from Morocco to Israel. In the 1970s, relations continued to develop thanks to Moroccan mediation throughout the peace process between Israel and Egypt. In the early 1990s, following the signing of the Oslo Accords, relations between the countries improved significantly and became overt. In 1994, liaison offices were opened in Rabat and Tel Aviv, but since October 2000 – following the second intifada – Israel and Morocco do not have any more official diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, there are many surprising types of cooperation that do take place between the two countries. For example, approximately 45,000 Israeli tourists visit Morocco each year. The number of Moroccan tourists visiting Israel is much lower, and is estimated at about 3,500 a year, also due to difficulties in obtaining visas to Israel. Although, while there are no direct flights between Israel and Morocco, El Al and Royal Air Maroc, which is owned by the King, have signed joint aviation agreements. Significant, albeit limited, cooperation, can also be found in the sector of agriculture. Morocco supplies Israel with agricultural produce such as sardines and olives, while Israel supplies Morocco with professional knowledge and technological equipment such as Netafim’s irrigation systems. Morocco also attracts agricultural entrepreneurs because it does not impose agriculturally-related taxes and even provides subsidies. In this context, some Israeli farmers established farms in Morocco and are growing almonds, dates, olives, and citrons there.

However, the most striking cooperation takes place in the civil sphere, and is reflected in the exchange of delegations, the preservation of the Jewish-Moroccan heritage, festivals and music events, cinematic creations taking place in Morocco and Israel, cross-border research, student exchanges and more. Only in June 2018, three Moroccan civil society delegations arrived in Israel, joining a long list of delegations from Morocco in recent years. Similarly, Israeli delegations visited Morocco in recent years on various occasions such as the International Climate Conference held in November 2016 in Marrakech (COP22); The Judo Grand Prix competition that took place last March in Agadir; The Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly held in the Moroccan Parliament in Rabat in October 2017, a study tour conducted by the Maoz Organization for Leadership Development.

The human movement between Israel and Morocco, and the media coverage and attention on social networks it enjoys, make the relations commonplace, and generate what can be called the “routinization effect”. The frequent contacts between the two countries, which take place in various sectors, are transforming the reality on the ground while making the parties involved more used to Israeli-Moroccan interactions. The media coverage in Morocco, even if not always positive, encourages open and courageous dialogue in Morocco on issues related to relations with Israel and to Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world. Thus, the Moroccan public is becoming less sensitive towards signs of public cooperation, and the routinization effect gradually stretches the boundaries of cooperation.

The cooperation between Israel and Morocco takes place despite movements in Morocco that support the Palestinian cause and call to boycott Israel. These movements, that influence Moroccan public opinion through the media and social networks, operate within the professional unions and mobilize the Moroccan public for protest. For example, they led protests against the activity in Morocco of the Israeli shipping company ZIM, and against the selling in Morocco (especially during Ramadan) of Israeli-made Majhul-type dates. These protests have had limited success to date. They do not prevent cooperation altogether, but limit it and prevent Israel and Morocco from fulfilling the full potential of their relations.

The multi-facet cooperation between Israel and Morocco, along with the mutual interest expressed by civil societies in both countries, attest to the great potential for cooperation that has not yet been fulfilled. Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will enable Israel-Morocco to move forward in their relations, as they did in the past. Until that happens, the two countries should continue to develop their unique relationship, which is so different from Israel’s relations with other countries in the region. The hugs between the Israeli and Moroccan fans in the World Cup give room for cautious optimism and indicate that there are real opportunities in Israel-Morocco relations that can be pursued, even if not all of them can be implemented in the current regional reality.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute, and a member of the institute’s task-team, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries. This article is based on a study of Israel-Morocco relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in YaBiladi)

הפוסט Israel: The Second Largest Moroccan Diaspora in the World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is moving between its commitment to the Arab official position, which opposes open ties with Israel, and its desire to strengthen its standing in the international community, which calls for occasional official contact with Israel. The connection between Moroccan Jews in Israel and the Jewish community in Morocco is at the core of the Israeli-Moroccan relations. In the 1990s, liaison offices were opened in Rabat and Tel Aviv, but since the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, they have not maintained official diplomatic relations.

Official interaction with Israel provokes criticism in Morocco and other Arab countries and may harm the standing of the kingdom in the Arab world. Anti-normalization movements in Morocco are at the forefront of the opposition to Israeli-Moroccan ties, while the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the background. The stalemate in the peace process does not allow both countries to realize the full potential of their relations.

However, there is a limited number of collaborations that can be carried out without infringing on Morocco’s ability to portray official Israeli symbols. This is the result of the routinizing effect; that is, making the Israeli-Moroccan connection become a routine. This is possible thanks to the consistent movement of official and unofficial delegations, including tourists, between Israel and Morocco, allowing for the maintenance of bilateral ties in areas such as health, education, communications, culture, and parliamentary diplomacy. The two countries also sometimes work together in different international forums.

The widening coverage of the delegations in the media and social networks in Morocco and Israel is also contributing to the routinizing effect. The Moroccan media expresses great interest in the delegations that visit Israel and follows them closely. The coverage, even if not always positive, encourages open and courageous dialogue in Morocco on issues related to its ties with Israel and Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world.

The routinizing effect is particularly evident in sports, especially in relation to Judo. For example, in May 2015, Israel’s Judo team was detained at the Moroccan airport for hours before being allowed to enter the country to compete. In November 2017, Israel’s Judo team landed in Marrakesh to compete in the World Championship, despite the fact that a few days earlier Morocco announced that it would not allow the team’s arrival. In both cases, Israeli participation was made possible due to the intervention of World Association President Marius Vizer. In 2017, Morocco even allowed Judoka Ori Sasson to wear the Israeli symbol, while a month earlier he was denied the ability to wear it in a competition in Abu Dhabi.

The result, as was manifested in the Judo contest in Agadir, is that the Moroccan public is not as sensitive as it used to be about delegations visiting Morocco or Israel. The routinizing effect manages to stretch the boundaries of cooperation step by step. An Israeli national anthem that is publicly played in Morocco is not something that Moroccans or Israelis are accustomed to; this is a positive development. Morocco, for its part, chooses to be part of the international community and to pay the price of its ties with Israel in return. However, Israel-Morocco relations still have great potential to develop, and its realization depends on advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Einat Levi is a member of a task-team at the Mitvim Institute, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Beyond Judo: The Routinizing Effect in Israel-Morocco Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.