Israel and Egypt have maintained close political and security ties at the highest level in recent years, which remains covert for the most part. In a rare move, Egyptian President a-Sisi revealed it in January an interview to the American program “60 Minutes”, referring to the close cooperation with Israel, including joint military efforts against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula.

The current convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt rests on several layers, that result from the dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent years: the turmoil during and after the Arab Spring; the regional threat posed by Iran, especially to the pragmatic Sunni states; terror activities in Sinai (that require Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, including a reassessment of the security annex to their peace agreement); and the Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Egyptian regime and military are still traumatized by the Muslim Brotherhood rule, which was in place from the ousting of Mubarak and until the overthrow of Morsi. This further explains the joint Israeli-Egyptian efforts to defy the threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic movements, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, the Egyptian and Israeli interests converge when it comes to the energy sector. Simply put, Israel wants to export part of the gas it discovered in the Mediterranean to its closest neighbors. An agreement to export gas from Israel to Jordan has already been signed. Egypt has recently discovered significant gas fields, but at least in the short term it still needs energy for its local economy, and Israel can help supply it. In the medium term, it will be possible to liquefy Israeli gas in Egypt (via two existing facilities there, which have not been in use for the last few years), and then to export it to more distant markets. Therefore, Israeli and Egyptian companies have held intensive negotiations during the recent years, which led to the signing of mutual agreements. However, both governments still need to give their consent, which will provide a legitimizing umbrella for strategic cooperation in the energy sector.

It seems that the warm ties described above should suffice to complete and implement these agreements signed by companies in the private sector. The level of trust between the Israeli and Egyptian governments is high, as exemplified by the recent visit to Cairo by Israeli Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz. Moreover, the gas forum that convened in Egypt, with participation of energy ministers from Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, illustrates the new international geometry that is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. The existing tripartite alliances – Israel-Greece-Cyprus and Egypt-Greece-Cyprus – are now joined by a new tripartite alliance – Jordan-Greece-Cyprus, and by the newly-established Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The existing and emerging alliances may expand and include additional countries, and the informal existing cooperation might institutionalize. Such developments would add positive Mediterranean dimensions to the complex dynamics in the region.

Turkey, an important regional player, is currently absent from these various geometric settings. The countries that are currently cooperating in the Eastern Mediterranean share an anti-Turkish agenda – Egypt, Cyprus and Greece (each to a different extent), and Israel – whose relations with Erdoğan lack trust and are characterized by harsh rhetoric, despite the realistic potential for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the gas sector. The chances to realize this potential were one of the catalysts to the signing in 2016 of the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement. Since, and following new crises between the two countries, these chances have steadily diminished.

Will Israel and Egypt be able to translate their warm ties and convergence of interests into formal energy agreements at state-level? The motivation for them to do so is clear. However, the public in Egypt still opposed any normalization of ties with Israel. After all, even during the Mubarak regime, the Egyptians did not welcome economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries, despite the beneficial cooperation that took place around the joint industrial zones (QIZ). The launching of a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process will clearly help to improve this situation. It will create a more positive atmosphere in the region, and above all a more favorable Arab public opinion. It can be assumed that the a-Sisi regime will succeed in overcoming domestic opposition. After all, energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt serves the interests of both countries, and perhaps Egypt will follow Jordan, who already formalized its energy cooperation with Israel, despite negative public attitudes in Jordan towards it.

The discovery of natural gas reservoirs in the Eastern Mediterranean creates an exceptional convergence of interests between a number of countries in the region, including Israel and its Arab neighbors. This opens up a wide range of additional areas of cooperation between, placing the Eastern Mediterranean on the “global map”. The visit of Steinitz to Cairo, and the unique regional gas forum launched there, may symbolize a significant step towards realizing the potential embedded in this region.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus between 2010 and 2015. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Will Energy be the Next Point of Israeli-Egyptian Convergence? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel expressed its regret over the incident and promised to continue the legal proceedings, as well as pay damages to the families of the two citizens and to the family of PalestinianJordanian judge Raed Zeiter, who was shot to death at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in March 2014. In return, the Israeli Embassy in Jordan will return to full activity, although Ambassador Einat Shlain will not return to her post and will be replaced by a new ambassador.

The Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “Israel attaches great importance to its strategic relations with Jordan, and the two countries will act to advance their cooperation and to strengthen the peace treaty between them.” But if Israel really attaches so much strategic importance to these relations, why did it wait six months before solving the issue?

This isn’t the first time that Israel’s relations with Jordan are marred by a security incident. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting the Island of Peace site in Naharayim. Jordan’s King Hussein rushed to calm the situation down: He cut short a visit to Spain and came to Israel to offer condolences to the victims’ families. He also issued an apology for the schoolgirls’ murder.

Several months later, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil. The operation failed, several Mossad fighters were captured by the local police and others found shelter in the Israeli Embassy building. Then-Mossad Director Danny Yatom was quickly sent by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief the king on the details of the operation. His request to release the detained agents was turned down, but the crisis was solved within 12 days after several Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy and Ariel Sharon, made efforts to calm the king down. Halevy’s proposal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison was the compensation accepted by Jordan.

In August 2011, shortly after the January 25 Revolution which led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, seven Israelis were killed in a series of terror attacks on Highway 12. As part of Israel’s military response, an IDF force entered Sinai and killed five Egyptian policemen. The incident led to a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Egypt, which threatened to recall its ambassador. Two months later, then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued an apology for the killing of the Egyptian policemen, bringing the crisis to an end.

While each incident has its own unique characteristics, several insights can be drawn from these events: First of all, a quick response is highly important. It has the power of preventing the crisis, or at least preventing it from getting worse. It also shows that the other side sees the incident as important and understands the need to come up with an immediate solution.

Netanyahu did send the Shin Bet chief to Jordan immediately to try to solve the problem, but the Jordanian side didn’t feel that the Israeli government saw it as a top priority. The fact that it took six months to reach an agreement indicates that the Israeli government didn’t ascribe much importance to the crisis. Meanwhile, emotions in Jordan ran high against Israel.

Second, the political echelon’s involvement in the negotiations is highly important. The prime minister himself, or at least the defense minister, should lead the reconciliation move.

Third, we should know how to apologize. An apology isn’t a display of weakness, especially if it comes from a place of confidence and strength. Accidentally killing a Jordanian citizen is definitely a reason to apologize.

Fourth, Israel’s decision makers shouldn’t consider “their” public opinion in this case, but rather the public opinion in the other country. Part of the Jordanian anger was directed at way Netanyahu publicly greeted the ambassador and the security guard, in a bid to gain support in the Israeli public opinion. In light of the Jordanian sensitivity, the prime minister could have given up the photo-op and settled for a private rather than public meeting.

Finally, we should offer the other side compensation to convey that we understand the sensitivity on the Jordanian side, and especially its royal family, which has been standing by Israel for years—secretly and behind the scenes—when it comes to important security issues. In other words, the long-term interest overshadows the short-term interest.

We should welcome the agreement, and better late than never, but the decision-making process on the Israeli side—if such a process actually took place—must be criticized. The weak Israeli response emphasizes the absence of the Foreign Ministry, and the absence of a full-time foreign minister, from the process. In any event, we should hope the decision makers draw the lessons from this case and other past tensions with Egypt and Jordan and implement them in the next crisis.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This observation first emerged after the events of June 30, 2013, in which the masses that captured the city’s streets were once again assisted by the military establishment, which led a de facto coup against the regime of Mohamed Morsi, the president chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood.

It currently appears that many of the revolutionary goals have not been achieved.

It is difficult to define the revolution’s goals precisely because it fused social elements with a different, and possibly contradictory, agenda. In general, the revolutionaries’ main goals were to topple Hosni Mubarak; remove the authoritarian regime and replace it with a pluralistic political system; and improve economic conditions, especially employment.

Mubarak was indeed overthrown, but his regime – based on the state’s “deep-seated” institutions (such as the military, the civil courts, bureaucracy, and al-Azhar University) and political elites – remained in place.

The new political system failed to maintain stability or entrench itself after the dissolution of the parliament elected in January 2012. The economic situation in Egypt grew worse as political instability discouraged investors and led to the collapse of the tourist industry, which made it more difficult for the new regime to take action to improve the national economy.

The elements involved in the second “revolution” on June 30, 2013, emphatically claimed that they were redirecting the revolution to its original course, from which it had been deviated during Morsi’s term. However, events since have fanned widespread concerns that the revolutionary train is not yet back on track, for several reasons.

First, the military, which functioned as of the “guardian of the revolution,” has now become a party in the political struggle, with an unmistakable interest in maintaining the status quo. Second, Brotherhood activities were outlawed and its leaders thrown into prison. Third, human rights activists and media professionals who “crossed the line” by criticizing the ruler (whether Morsi or the army’s Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) were thrown in jail or had their programs canceled. Fourth, Mubarak was acquitted and public funds probably smuggled out of the country were not recovered.

All these developments indicate that while Mubarak may have been deposed, Mubarakism is alive and well.

Disconcerting signs of the future of the Egyptian revolution are also expressed in its new constitution, to be ratified in a referendum in January. A 50-member council of experts (which markedly failed to include representatives of the Brotherhood) submitted a draft constitution to the provisional president, Adly Mansour. The new draft is more liberal and social than previous constitutions, but can hardly be called “revolutionary.”

It does protect the rights of children and of Jews and Christians (but not members of non-monotheistic religions), prohibits torture and discrimination against women, and assumes state responsibility for citizens’ health and education.

However, the constitution also reinforces and institutionalizes the autonomous status of the military establishment and the civil judiciary. For example, the military budget is determined according to the military’s needs, as defined by the National Defense Council, and is not subject to parliamentary review. The National Defense Council is also in charge of appointing the defense minister (for the next two presidential terms, at least). Moreover, the constitution permits military trials of civilians prosecuted for offenses in “military areas,” while the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court (which examines the constitutionality of all proposed legislation) will now be elected by the court rather than an external body.

The constitution remains vague in many places, leaving the final decision open to legislation, and dependent on the composition of the to-be elected parliament. In other words, as Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have stated, the new constitution appears to be a victory for the country’s “deep-seated” institutions.

After the June 30 revolution, the liberal-secular forces unexpectedly found themselves in an impossible situation: After joining forces with the military to oust the Brotherhood, they now see that the military has retained its authority in the political system and has reduced the potential for instituting changes in alignment with the original goals of the revolution.

Despite their deep ideological differences, the secularists and the Brotherhood now paradoxically have a common interest in reducing the military’s involvement in politics. Their collaboration recalls the early days of the revolution, when ideologically diverse groups came together to topple Mubarak, with a significant difference: Then, the military stood on the sidelines and did not intervene, but now the military is a major player with an unmistakable agenda of its own.

Three years after the January 25 revolution, the passions that characterized its protagonists appear to have been replaced by despair and frustration resulting from the understanding that a significant change in the foundations of the political system is difficult, if not impossible. In view of the strong desire to restore stability and safety on public streets, the recent personality cult surrounding Sisi is not surprising. This cult recalls the rituals surrounding mythological president Abdel Nasser.

Where, then, is Egypt headed? Is the January 25-June 30 Revolution, the continuation of the historical revolutionary process that began on January 25, or do the events of June 30 mark the beginning of the end of the revolutionary cycle? From the limited historical perspective available to us, it is difficult to decide with certainty, but the Egyptian revolution does appear to be “stuck.”

Armed with the lessons of their recent past, the masses may take to the streets once again to protest against military involvement in politics, but no civil alternative is visible on the horizon.

Under the current circumstances, the revolution will only proceed from the top down, and will be dependent on the goodwill of the military elite.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Egyptian revolution is stuck הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Two Years After Tahrir Square: The Battle for Egypt’s Identity Is Far From Over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.