The interfaith rapprochement between the Gulf States and the Jewish world, including outreach efforts towards Jewish communities, has never been so strong. Bahrain was probably the pioneer of this process, as the only country in the Arab Gulf home to an indigenous Jewish community. Bahrain has emphasised its support for this community, often celebrates Jewish holidays, and appointed a Jewish woman to a leading diplomatic role in the United States. In 2017, another precedent was set when a delegation of Bahraini clerics visited Israel to promote interfaith tolerance.

In the same year, the Abu Dhabi Louvre Museum was opened in the United Arab Emirates, where several Judaic exhibits were displayed as the country declared its ‘Year of Tolerance’. These beginnings in the UAE also opened the door to intra-religious expressions of tolerance, such as the UAE’s inauguration of an official synagogue in Abu Dhabi, alongside a mosque and a church at a shared site.

This trend is also evident in Qatar which, despite its well-known affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood, announced that it would provide kosher food for Jewish visitors from Israel during the 2022 World Cup. Saudi Arabia, as part of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform programme, has also begun to interact with Jewish figures and institutions worldwide. In January 2020, Rabbi Marc Schneier was hosted by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tweeted about having ‘a unique Shabbat Experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’

What are the motivations behind this development, and why is it happening now? These actions, which are evident across the GCC countries with the exception of Kuwait (the only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel), reveal a combination of curiosity, openness and goodwill towards Judaism. While lauding these actions and statements by the Gulf States towards Jews as ‘Islam’s reformation’ – as some commentators have done – may be overstating it, they certainly reflect a changing socio-political reality in the region on two levels: an internal process of identity exploration and cultural development in the Gulf, and an external process of reaching out to the broader Muslim world and the international community. Both processes are driven by the motivation to produce, define and portray a distinct national character within which tolerance and openness towards ‘the other’ comprise important pillars.

While this trend certainly poses reputational benefits for the conservative and authoritarian Gulf States, it also entails deeper motivations, similar to those that led to the intra-Gulf rift in June 2017 in the name of denouncing ‘extremism’ and radical Islam. This boycott was part of a broader internal process of redrawing the imaginary boundaries in the Gulf, not along ethnic or religious lines but along ideological ones, particularly regarding the role of political Islam. Gulf scholar Andreas Krieg describes this process as a ‘war over narratives’ that is dividing the Arab world, and of which the Gulf states have become the main sponsors. Thus, promoting openness to other religions as a manifestation of ‘moderate’ versus ‘radical’ Islam is another aspect of this process of identity construction in the Gulf. Qatar, which is allegedly positioned beyond that imaginary boundary, plays with the same cards of soft power and religious outreach to deflect its opponents’ accusations of being a supporter of extremism.

Expressions of openness and tolerance towards Judaism carry no domestic costs for the Gulf States. In the absence of a significant presence of Jewish communities in their states, this approach does not threaten their internal political stability by risking demands for greater political rights by minority groups (unlike other marginalised groups in the Gulf, such as the Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia or the Bedoon in Kuwait). Furthermore, and most importantly, this trend does not entail normalising political relations with Israel. Yet, despite the separation of public opinion between the relationship with Judaism and that with Israel, the interfaith brand breaks cultural barriers and carries indirect benefits by warming relations between nations and peoples in the region.

In recent years, the Gulf states have taken on a more assertive leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Emirati academic Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla defined this process of the growing regional and international importance of these states as the ‘Gulf Moment’, a period in which the Gulf states assert themselves in the regional and international arenas as new centres of political, economic and cultural power. With this self-perception, these states are becoming more invested in grand strategies of social and religious reforms, and their advocacy for tolerance and interfaith dialogue comprises one prominent manifestation of this. Given these factors, we will probably continue to see these expressions in the near future – even if Israel is not explicitly mentioned in these discussions.

Adam Hoffman is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and Head of the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, a geostrategic analysis and business consultancy. 

Dr Moran Zaga is the academic coordinator of the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy at Haifa University and a policy fellow at Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The appointment on November 4, 2018 of René Trabelsi – a Jewish businessman from the Island of Djerba – as Minister of Tourism in Tunisia has received a great deal of international attention, and at the same time has raised controversy among local political, media, and social circles. Tunisia nowadays has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, despite past precedents of positive relations. There are those in Tunisia who adamantly oppose normalizing relations with Israel, and who directly support the BDS movement and a boycott of Israel. Considering this mindset, the appointment of Trabelsi – a Jewish travel agency owner who has, for years, hosted Israelis in Tunisia, who has himself visited Israel, and who supports peace with Israel – to an official role in which he can actualize his theoretical ideas and turn them into policy, is curious.

Trabelsi is currently the only Jew serving as a minister in an Arab country, and altogether the third Jew in Tunisia to have served in such a position since its independence in 1957. On the one hand, this is a rather meager representation for a Jewish community who has lived in the area since the destruction of the First Temple. On the other hand, the appointment is significant because of its nature and timing, and it holds several important messages, both about Israel and about the potential role Tunisian Jews – wherever they are – may play in establishing relations between the two countries.

Trabelsi’s appointment is not the only example of positive attitudes toward Jews in Tunisia. In the April 2018 local elections in the city of Monastir, a Jew was placed on the candidate list of the a-Nahda party. While he did not get elected into the city council, placing him on the list was meant to convey a message of tolerance and openness. In addition, Tunisia is not the only Arab country in which Jews have reached high positions and have been treated well by the regime and the local population. Morocco, in fact, leads in this respect: in the past, Jews have served as ministers and senior business persons, and until today the highest-ranking Jew in the kingdom, Andre Azoulay, serves as Senior Adviser to the king. Azoulay is a key person in inter-faith and intercommunal relations, mainly in the field of culture and the arts in which there is lively cooperation between Israelis (many of whom are of Moroccan decent) and Jewish and Muslim Moroccans.

Jewish communities in Arab and Muslim lands, like Jews from those countries who live in Israel, constitute a natural – and to date yet unrealized – bridge between these countries and Israel. This is true particularly regarding Tunisia and Morocco, where there still exist active Jewish communities, but also with regard to Iraq where there was historically a prosperous and influential Jewish community. This does not mean that the only important connection is with high ranking Jewish diplomatic and political personnel, since having them place too much emphasis on contacts with Israel may actually hurt their efforts and narrow the range of their potential activities vis-à-vis Israel. What it does mean, is that there exists a historical, cultural, inter-personal, and inter-communal connection between Jewish communities in Middle Eastern and North African countries and these countries’ diasporas in Israel. In addition, there are ties between Israel and non-Jewish politicians and business persons in Tunisia, Morocco, and other countries, and these relations can potentially become more meaningful with the “backing” of historical and current Jewish relations in these countries.

The importance of strategic, security, or economic partnerships between Israel and other countries in the region should not be underestimated. However, rather than chasing after shallow, secret, and short-term contacts with authoritarian leaders, Israel should be attuned to signals coming – directly or indirectly – from more moderate countries like Tunisia and Morocco. With them, it is possible to build relations of a more civil and cultural nature, and which are based on deep and authentic ties. Publicly exaggerating the importance of Trabelsi’s appointment may harm its potential, but paying attention to the real opportunities embedded in it – without slogans and noisy headlines – may open important doors.

Dr. Adina Friedman is a guest researcher at Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Policies. She teaches conflict resolution at George Mason University, and is an experienced leader of courses in and educational trips to Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, the West Bank/Gaza, and Israel. This article is based on a research paper titled “Tunisia Following the Arab Spring and its Relations with Israel”, published by the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from Tunisia on the Jewish Bridge to the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is moving between its commitment to the Arab official position, which opposes open ties with Israel, and its desire to strengthen its standing in the international community, which calls for occasional official contact with Israel. The connection between Moroccan Jews in Israel and the Jewish community in Morocco is at the core of the Israeli-Moroccan relations. In the 1990s, liaison offices were opened in Rabat and Tel Aviv, but since the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, they have not maintained official diplomatic relations.

Official interaction with Israel provokes criticism in Morocco and other Arab countries and may harm the standing of the kingdom in the Arab world. Anti-normalization movements in Morocco are at the forefront of the opposition to Israeli-Moroccan ties, while the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the background. The stalemate in the peace process does not allow both countries to realize the full potential of their relations.

However, there is a limited number of collaborations that can be carried out without infringing on Morocco’s ability to portray official Israeli symbols. This is the result of the routinizing effect; that is, making the Israeli-Moroccan connection become a routine. This is possible thanks to the consistent movement of official and unofficial delegations, including tourists, between Israel and Morocco, allowing for the maintenance of bilateral ties in areas such as health, education, communications, culture, and parliamentary diplomacy. The two countries also sometimes work together in different international forums.

The widening coverage of the delegations in the media and social networks in Morocco and Israel is also contributing to the routinizing effect. The Moroccan media expresses great interest in the delegations that visit Israel and follows them closely. The coverage, even if not always positive, encourages open and courageous dialogue in Morocco on issues related to its ties with Israel and Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world.

The routinizing effect is particularly evident in sports, especially in relation to Judo. For example, in May 2015, Israel’s Judo team was detained at the Moroccan airport for hours before being allowed to enter the country to compete. In November 2017, Israel’s Judo team landed in Marrakesh to compete in the World Championship, despite the fact that a few days earlier Morocco announced that it would not allow the team’s arrival. In both cases, Israeli participation was made possible due to the intervention of World Association President Marius Vizer. In 2017, Morocco even allowed Judoka Ori Sasson to wear the Israeli symbol, while a month earlier he was denied the ability to wear it in a competition in Abu Dhabi.

The result, as was manifested in the Judo contest in Agadir, is that the Moroccan public is not as sensitive as it used to be about delegations visiting Morocco or Israel. The routinizing effect manages to stretch the boundaries of cooperation step by step. An Israeli national anthem that is publicly played in Morocco is not something that Moroccans or Israelis are accustomed to; this is a positive development. Morocco, for its part, chooses to be part of the international community and to pay the price of its ties with Israel in return. However, Israel-Morocco relations still have great potential to develop, and its realization depends on advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Einat Levi is a member of a task-team at the Mitvim Institute, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Beyond Judo: The Routinizing Effect in Israel-Morocco Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Straddling the East-West Divide: A Subjective Israeli Perspective on Muslim Immigration to Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.