Netanyahu is like a scorpion, trying to sting whoever tries to help us. But whereas the scorpion acts against its own interests, Netanyahu, in his attempts to save his own skin, sacrifices the country’s interests for his own.

At the height of the war, Netanyahu directed his “poison machine” at the leaders of the defense establishment, blaming them for the prewar protests and accusing them of misconduct. He continues to incite this hatred by blaming Qatar, the International Red Cross, President Biden, and even the families of hostages.

“Qatar serves Hamas” is a statement made by Netanyahu to families of captives and which was allegedly leaked by him, before he repeated it at a press conference. Really? It was Israel, led by the same Netanyahu, who asked Qatar to use its influence with Hamas in order to create mechanisms to end repeated cycles of violence between Hamas and Israel. It was the same Netanyahu-led Israel that asked Qatar to supply the money that strengthened Hamas in Gaza. This means that if Qatar served Hamas, Netanyahu himself served Hamas. But he has no use for truth, only for his personal interests.

The essence of his policy is “the Palestinian Authority is a burden and Hamas is an asset”, as stated in 2015 by Netanyahu’s collaborator Bezalel Smotrich. In those words, he expressed the declared policy of several Netanyahu governments, which were designed to weaken the PA and strengthen Hamas. Israel executed the first half by itself and Qatar was recruited to do the rest. Now, when a hostage deal threatens his extremist government, he has no inhibitions in attacking that country, even while it is making huge efforts to bring the hostages home.

Thus, the Red Cross, whose people risked their lives by entering the Gaza Strip in order to rescue hostages, also became a target of his poisoned arrows. At a special Knesset meeting with families of hostages, Netanyahu said: “Several days ago, I met with the president of the Red Cross and gave her a box of medication which the hostages require. I told her ‘Take this to the Rafah Crossing’, but she declined”.

The פresident of the Red Cross, Mariana Spoljaric apparently did not understand that she was dealing with a prime minister who has no qualms about using an organization that risks its workers’ lives to help the hostages in an ugly publicity stunt. He knows full well that the Red Cross is not able to visit the hostages or supply them with medication without Hamas approval. He also knows that in order to be able to function in Gaza, Red Cross personnel cannot criticize Hamas or support Israeli hasbara, even if that is how they feel. Doing so would prevent them from fulfilling their humanitarian tasks. Netanyahu knows all that, but nevertheless resorts to it to gain another pathetic round of self-promotion. This behavior conflicts with Israel’s interests.

Netanyahu seeks more and more targets for his poisoned arrows because he knows that the largest arrow of all is pointed at him. It is under his rule that we experienced the worst disaster in our history. It is he whose leadership and policy made Hamas grow economically and militarily. It is his army that moved more and more troops to the West Bank and failed to protect the Gaza envelope communities. He is the one who, for the past four months, has conducted a war with no exit plan and is preventing the most supportive American president from leading an international coalition to defeat Hamas and also promote regional normalization with Israel. It is none other than Netanyahu who has avoided attempts to free the hostages for fear that he will lose his coalition. He does so in order to pacify the far right, mainly Ben Gvir and Smotrich, whose disapproval he desperately fears.

In the face of such a massive failure, his attempt to escape responsibility, coupled with a lack of basic empathy and human decency, leads him to blame whomever he can and to further his own selfish interests including maliciously targeting the hostage’s families themselves.

His goal is to ensure that there is never a quiet moment here, during which his remaining supporters will see that the emperor has no clothes. He is naked of leadership, naked of concern for the country’s future, naked of responsibility for the lives of the hostages, and naked of concern for anyone and anything who is not Netanyahu.

The article was published in “The Times of Israel” on February 15.

הפוסט The­ scorpion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Indeed, while enjoying the status and perquisites of a U.S. special ally, it has pursued policies not only in variance with American strategic interests but often directly adversarial to them. And it has done so on a wide array of fronts, in the Middle East and across the globe.

The adversarial shift began with the ascendance of a specific leader: Benjamin Netanyahu. From his first rise to power in 1996 through the more than years 15 years he has held the reins—after losing an election in 1999, Netanyahu returned in 2009 and, with the exception of an 18-month hiatus between June 2021 and December 2022, has been prime minister ever since—Netanyahu has consistently and increasingly advanced foreign and security policies that, whether directly or indirectly, undercut U.S. strategic interests.

Notably, these policies pertain not only to areas in which Israel could be argued to hold overriding interests, such as the Palestinian one. Although Netanyahu’s diplomatic approach on this front has been at odds with U.S. interests for all but the Trump years, Washington should, and has been, understanding of this divergence between the two allies. The same case can be made for Netanyahu’s policy on Iran, even as he has unequivocally sabotaged and derailed American efforts on this front.

But the remarkable fact is that Netanyahu’s Israel has pursued policies at odds with American strategic interests across much of the world. Let us recount the ways.

In Europe, Netanyahu’s Israel has adopted a policy aimed at undermining the European Union and the liberal democratic order for which it stands. In fact, it has aligned itself not merely with some of Brussels’s staunchest adversaries—such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński and Mateusz Morawiecki, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, to name a few; it has openly embraced some of Europe’s most far-right parties and their populist leaders whose opposition to Brussels transcends E.U. politics and turns on an illiberal agenda with, astonishingly, neo-fascist and even neo-Nazi strains. A partial list includes the Freedom Party of Austria, founded by a former Nazi SS officer, and Germany’s extremist Alternative for Germany (AfD).

For Netanyahu, these relationships have been first and foremost transactional. In exchange for Israel turning a blind eye to their historical and ideological links with neo-Nazism and present-day anti-Semitism at home, these parties provided their support for Israel’s policy on the Palestinian front. Such support, moreover, has also served a wider strategic aim for Netanyahu: by undermining E.U. consensus on foreign policy toward Israel, these relationships contribute to sowing divisions within the E.U. itself and weaken Europe’s core liberal norms.

Of course, Netanyahu’s brazen diplomatic posture against the liberal democratic order—the cornerstone of American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War—has been reflected most strikingly in his intimate relationship with Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin. As Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu should certainly maintain cordial and constructive relations with Moscow, a major world power with a growing presence in the Middle East, including across Israel’s northern border of Syria. But the relationship Netanyahu has cultivated with Putin has gone far beyond what has been strategically necessary to safeguard Israeli interests; worse, it has often come at Washington’s expense.

The full cost to U.S. strategic interests became apparent in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although launched during Netanyahu’s brief hiatus from leadership, the relationship he had cultivated over the years with Putin has made Israel into a natural outlet for Russian capital and commodity exports. The conduct is not limited to Jewish Russian oligarchs, for whose welfare (more in the sense of their wealth than health) Israel could claim to care; enter any supermarket in Israel since Western powers imposed sanctions on Moscow, and the number and variety of products from Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea will settle any question as to where Israel truly stands.

Regardless of whether Israeli supply of arms to Ukraine would make a difference on the battleground, its blank refusal of Kyiv’s requests poked a hole in American efforts to present a unified front against Russian aggression. And although Israel has shifted its rhetoric of neutrality somewhat in favor of Ukraine and is reportedly ready to consider supplying it with some defensive weapons systems—the result, no doubt of Iranian military assistance to Russia and U.S. pressure—Netanyahu’s intimacy with Putin should be regarded as Israeli betrayal of the special relationship with the U.S.

A similar approach can be seen in Netanyahu’s policy toward China, the other global player determined to undercut American leadership. China’s rivalry with the U.S. alone should have restrained Netanyahu from forging a comprehensive partnership with it. Yet under his leadership, Israel has become a leading supplier of R&D and cutting-edge technologies and accelerated China’s transformation into becoming America’s “most serious competitor,” as President Biden has defined it.

Remarkably, Israel has also at least declared itself a a geo-strategic backer of China. At a 2017 meeting with President Xi, Netanyahu encouraged China to assume its rightful place “on the world stage,” and waxed romantic by describing the Israeli-Chinese relationship as “a marriage made in heaven.” Meanwhile here on earth, Netanyahu’s Israel has opened itself up to strategic investments by China in its infrastructure, such as the mass transit system in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, which will also run in sensitive underground locations abutting Israel’s military and defense compound, and parts of the Haifa Bay Port, which may steer the U.S. Sixth Fleet elsewhere.

Perhaps most egregiously, Netanyahu has had the temerity to meddle in American domestic politics. He has used Israel to sow divisions between Democrats and Republicans, to anathematize a sitting U.S. president (Barack Obama), and to manipulate—we are using this word advisedly—another one (Donald Trump) to withdraw from a hard-reached international agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The withdrawal is widely recognized to have been a huge strategic mistake, not only for U.S. security interests but, ironically, also for Israeli ones.

Disagreements between allies are par for the course in international relations. Yet in the case of Netanyahu’s Israel, the kind and quality of its foreign-policy divergences with the U.S. are the stuff of an adversarial relationship, not a friendly one. That there is a certain reluctance to designate Netanyahu’s Israel an adversary of the U.S. is understandable. After all, the U.S. and Israel are bound by a special relationship. And in many ways they are. The very fact that it can contain and subsume the detrimental foreign policies of Netanyahu makes it a very special one indeed.

This article is from “TIME“, from March 23, 2023.

הפוסט Netanyahu Has Made Israel a U.S. Adversary הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The values underpinning the relationship: The Puritan pilgrims that arrived at Plymouth Rock in 1620 Americas regarded themselves as the builders of the New Jerusalem envisioned by the biblical prophets. This theme and ethos were adopted by the founding fathers in writing the Declaration of Independence and US Constitution. Over a century later, the spirit of the US revolution and principles of the Constitution would inspire the founders of Zionism. Many Americans still regard Israel as a sister state peopled by immigrants who established a just, democratic, liberal society after the removal of the English control

Shared interests: Since President Truman’s recognition of Israel 11 minutes after David Ben-Gurion declared its independence, Israeli leaders have aspired to close ties with the US as leader of the free world and the strongest global power. Energy deposits in the Gulf critical to the American and global economy would soon turn the Middle East into a strategic target of US foreign policy. Israel was a US partner in the Cold War and in its war against terrorism, enabling the US to avoid boots on the ground unlike those it deployed in defense of other partnerships in South Korea or West Germany.

Israel’s political influence: Israel enjoyed bipartisan US support for years, with Democrats and Republicans both treating it as an issue transcending their political divide. The pro-Israel forces were and still are well organized and politically strong, deeply involved in US politics and the media. The American Jewish community is only two percent of the population (more than 70 percent Democrats) but to an extent beyond their numbers in donations and influence in politics. The pro-Israel AIPAC lobby, with its professionalism and determination, buoyed by the myth of Jewish influence, became the most powerful and effective foreign policy lobbying group in Washington. As for Israel’s Christian evangelical supporters, they are almost all Republican voters but their large numbers, some 80 million, and organizational capacities are impressive. They believe that support for Israel is a religious imperative that will result in resurrection.

It would seem, then, that all is well and the “special relationship” is robust and deeply rooted. In fact, not all is well because of troubling trends in all three areas.

Values: Based on Donald Trump’s election and policies as President, one might assume that the US shift toward conservative values and its disdain for liberal democracy are similar to Israel’s. Demographics prove otherwise. In Israel, they are in fact pulling to the right given the high ultra-Orthodox birthrate and other factors, such as late marriage age of liberals. In the US, on the other hand, the percentage of minorities leaning to progressive values is growing.

Interests: The US is losing interest in the Middle East, to a large extent justifiably so. It is no longer dependent on the region’s energy resources and all its major interventions in the Middle East have failed – full-scale military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, “leading from behind” in Libya and avoiding action on Syria.

Politics: Israel has become a partisan issue in US politics. The sense among large swathes of the Democratic Party base is that Israel has tied its destiny to the Republicans. The distancing by progressive liberals from Israel is beginning to manifest itself in Congress. Unprecedented criticism of Israel and calls to condition US aid on Israeli policies have also emerged in the Democratic presidential campaign. This trend includes the Jewish community which mostly identifies as liberal and votes for Democratic presidents. Israeli annexation in the West Bank sometime between July 1 and the November elections would further exacerbate things given Democratic voters’ vehement opposition to unilateral moves and violation of international law.

How can Israel remedy the problem?

Israel must return to bipartisan diplomacy with the US and build bridges to progressive and minority elements. Israel must embrace the US Jewish community regardless of political views and streams of Judaism. Israel’s ties with the world’s largest Jewish Diaspora are not only vital to the relationship between states, they stem from Israel’s very mission as the nation state of the Jewish people.

In order to keep the Americans in the Middle East, Israel must promote a contractual defense pact with the US anchored in legislation. Contrary to prevailing views, a defense pact would advance peace by deterring military adventurism. It will increase the US commitment to Israel’s defense, but also incentive to promote peace in the Middle East, and increase the US interest in determining Israel’s borders (diplomacy is far less expensive than wars).

Should the US administration change hands in January 2021, Israel must return to the security plan formulated by Gen. John Allen together with the IDF’s Planning Directorate for the defense of Israel’s Eastern border. The plan drafted at the behest of then-Secretary of State Kerry includes technological means and a US presence in the Jordan Valley and would help cement the US commitment to the region and to Israel’s security.

Israel should also advance civil society links with progressive American individuals and organizations who are unaware that many Israel share their worldview and are engaged in promoting justice regardless of the administrations in either state. A bi-national foundation to promote Tikkun Olam, if formed, could support cooperation between non for-profit organizations and between USAID and Israel’s foreign aid arm, MASHAV.

Israeli public diplomacy should engage with US civil society in a positive manner rather than in detrimental useless arguments and hasbara (public diplomacy). Israel has much to offer the US but our defensive approach makes us appear less relevant and less attractive.

In conclusion, Israel’s relations with the US are more important than its ties with any country in the world and their value is nothing short of strategic. Despite the deep and robust nature of the relations, current trends are greatly troubling and unless we work quickly to address them, Israel’s strategic posture would suffer a fatal blow.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the US: Is the Special Relationship Still Special? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the local turmoil, 2019 saw no significant changes in terms of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq. Neither was there any development in the economic arena, where ties between the states remain non-existent.

However, Israel’s perception of Iraq as a security challenge went up a notch. After ignoring Iraq for several years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior defense officials changed course in 2019. They know Iraq is an important part of the supply route of ballistic and other weapons from Iran to the front with Israel. Israel also closely monitors the construction of a military base near the Syria-Iraq border, and last summer, several fatal drone attacks conducted against Shiite militia bases in Baghdad and deep in Iraqi territory were attributed to Israel. These were the first strikes on Iraq for which Israel took responsibility in almost 40 years; their predecessor is, of course, Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981.

Yet Iraq’s official response was meek. The investigative committee that was appointed belatedly determined that Israel was responsible. However, the Iraqi government did not commit to a response. It was embarrassed and portrayed as weak. The militias, for their part, adopted increasingly harsh rhetoric against Israel, but Iraqi civilians condemned the manner in which Iran sought to turn their country into a wrestling ring with the US and Israel.

The Kurdish region has not taken part in the countrywide protests but, given its dependence on developments in Baghdad, it has been affected nonetheless. Not unexpectedly, Kurdish efforts to repair ties with Iran negatively impacted Israeli-Kurdish relations, at the same time as Israeli-Iraqi relations took tentative steps forward.

In the civilian, cultural and identity arenas some progress has been made, and there is currently more interaction between Israelis and Iraqis, although not on the official level. The Iraqi political elite is bound to Iran on the Israel issue, but this has not prevented a grassroots, people-to-people model of “winning hearts and minds”. Significantly, this trend continued and even intensified after the demonstrations in Iraq broke out. Privately, through social media and rare visits, a growing number of Iraqis express desire for ties with Israel after their country undergoes change. They also plead with Israel to support them by harming Iran. The protesters refrain from publicly identifying with Israel, due to claims by the regime that the protesters are backed and funded by Israel – but tellingly, anti-Israel expressions are extremely marginal.

Israel backs this trend. Notably, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a Facebook page “Israel in Iraqi Dialect”, a unique, first-of-its-kind effort, in late 2018. The Arabic-language page is aimed at encouraging discourse with the Iraqi people, and it gained huge momentum in 2019, especially after expressing clear sympathy for the protesters, who responded with appreciation. Today the page boasts some 292,000 followers. Meanwhile, four delegations from Iraq visited Israel in 2019 as guests of the Foreign Ministry, and Iraqis were also included in another visiting Arab delegation.

In that sense, it can perhaps be said that official Israel “discovered” Arab Iraq in 2019. Whereas Israeli declarations of solidarity were previously directed mainly at the Kurds and their aspirations, no such declarations were issued in 2019. Yet July 2019 saw another leap in messages from Israel to Iraq.

First Israel’s Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, publicly wished the Iraqi people well and expressed his desire for increased cooperation with them. The nature of his Facebook video sought to bypass the government and avoid a direct appeal to the regime. In November, after the wave of protests began, Katz issued a message of support for “the Iraqi people” and their justified demands. And in December, Netanyahu condemned the massacre of protesters carried out by militias in Baghdad and blamed Iran for the bloodshed. Israel’s senior echelons view the protests as an opportunity to challenge Iran – but to date Israel is the only state in the region to have expressed support for the protesters and their demands.

A threat remains, however, After the Foreign Ministry leaked news of the visits in April, discussions began in Iraq regarding normalization of ties with Israel. Yet the militias took the most radical line against the issue, and threats facing Iraqis who meet with Israelis are both serious and tangible.

Today, Iraq stands at an internal crossroads; the direction it takes is bound to impact its relations with Israel. If the protests are suppressed with active Iranian support, Iraq will inevitably become Iran’s first “proxy state” in the region. If Baghdad is, de facto, ruled by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds force, the puppet regime in Baghdad will be almost wholly unable to resist Iranian demands.

Should this happen, repercussions will be felt mostly in the realm of security. For example, Iran could move ballistic equipment to Syria without interruption – and perhaps even use Iraq as a launch pad.

A continued status quo between the government and the protesters in Iraq will further weaken the government, which is already forced to lean on Iran as its sole source of support. The little legitimacy it retains will disappear. Iraq will sink into political paralysis and selfcenteredness, and will lose even more of its importance as a factor and target for improved relations with Israel. But if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the regime, an opportunity will open up for Israel. The deep anti-Iranian sentiment underpinning the protests will lead the state’s new rulers to distance themselves from Tehran. The new Iraq will seek new regional allies that respect the change it has undergone, which would align satisfyingly with Israeli interests.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lieberman, initially an ideological and political ally of Netanyahu, shifted his position over time – first preventing from Netanyahu to form a government after the April 2019 election, then insisting on a unity government between Netanyahu’s Likud and Gantz’s Blue and White after the September 2019 election, and currently indicating he wants Gantz to be the one who is called upon by the president to form a government.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Joint List, which increased its share of votes and now holds 15 seats (out of 120), has become a more legitimate political partner for Jewish parties than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, it still not clear whether this changed to the extent that will enable Gantz to form a minority government based on support from outside by Arab legislators.

This process is surprising Netanyahu, who faces a real threat of ending his 11-year consecutive tenure as prime minister, and at a bad timing for him – just as his court case is about to begin. Netanyahu is fighting back, using almost every rhetorical argument and political maneuver possible. While doing so, he is casting doubts about the legitimacy of the electoral process and about the reliability of state institutions. This has negative implications and increases polarization within the Israeli public as well as incitement against Gantz and his supporters.

A change of Israeli leadership may be near, although a fourth election cycle is also a realistic option. Should Gantz become Israel’s prime minister, even if within the context of some sort of unity government, the Israeli political landscape will change dramatically. His persona and leadership style will be different than Netanyahu’s. His goal will be to “heal the society” from divisions and incitement. His tone is a positivist one, including messages of hope, and not only fear. He represents a commitment to good governance and democracy, which eroded in Israel over the last few years.

Gantz is also likely to change course on several foreign policy issues, some of which are relevant to Israel’s relations in the Middle East. While supporting the Trump Plan, he made it clear that he opposes unilateral annexation and that any Israeli move should be coordinated with the international community and regional actors. Even though Gantz does not prioritize an immediate restart of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, he is likely to take more responsible action on the Palestinian issue, and to be more open to engagement with the Palestinian leadership and with those in Europe and the US Democratic Party who are critical of Israel’s current policies.

In terms of relations with the Arab world, Netanyahu repeatedly tried to show that he can promote normalization with Arab countries, without making any progress on the Palestinian issue. However, his efforts met a glass ceiling. Throughout the past year, he tried to get a public meeting with an Arab leader, to boost his election campaigns, but did not succeed.

Gantz is likely to continue working for improved relations with the Arab world, and to maximize new opportunities that emerge – including with countries in the Gulf. But, in contrast to Netanyahu, he may not see this as a route to bypass the Palestinian issue, but rather as something that could be leveraged to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In such a context, the Arab Peace Initiative – with some modifications due to the changes that took place in regional realities since it was first introduced – could become much more relevant.

The Arab world should regard a leadership change in Israel as an opportunity, reach out to the new prime minister and government, and indicate a willingness to upgrade ties and cooperation should the new prime minister take positive steps. This could be done publicly, or through new dialogue channels that will need to be set up – between new policy actors in Israel and their regional counterparts. Positive messages from the Arab world may help the Israeli leadership to move in a new direction, as Israelis currently view regional cooperation as more possible, desired, and important to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

The transition process in Israel will not be an easy one, domestically, and could still lead to political instability in the coming months. But things are changing in Israeli politics and a new era may soon begin. If this happens, new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations are likely to appear. This is an issue that pro-peace Israelis are eager to speak with their Arab neighbors about. Let’s start the conversation.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Qposts, arabic)

הפוסט Israel Election Results Give Reason for Israel-Arab Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since 2009, Israeli politics has been largely shaped by one man. By winning consecutive elections and forming consecutive coalitions of various sorts, Netanyahu managed to dominate Israeli politics, prevent potential contenders from standing a chance against him, and be regarded by most Israelis (and by many in the international community) as invincible. It is not by chance that the term “King Bibi” was used on the covers of both Time and Newsweek, and was the title chosen for a documentary film that explored Netanyahu’s rise to power.

For years, Netanyahu had almost total control of his party, successfully maneuvered leaders and voters of other right-wing parties, effectively disempowered opposition from the center and left, shaped the public discourse to his advantage, delegitimized political rivals while polarizing the society, and overall – stirred Israel’s reality to his direction of interest. Time and time again, Israelis went to the polls with no real hope of leadership change. The main open question used to be which type of coalition will Netanyahu form after results are announced.

And then things changed. Corruption investigations that were initially dismissed and brushed off by Netanyahu, picked up pace. From one legal phase to the other, it became evident to Israelis that a major issue is brewing. Netanyahu’s repeated and increasingly harsh attacks on key personnel in the legal establishment, which were aimed at mobilizing his political base and rally his supporters, exemplified just how problematic his situation is. It was anti-corruption slogans that played a leading role in the downfall of the Likud government in 1992 and the victory of Yitzhak Rabin, and Netanyahu seems to have understood the political danger that his legal issues pose to him.

To try and counter that, Netanyahu hastened into early elections (April 2019). His goal was to quickly form a new coalition that will advance legislation protecting him from being indicted while in office. Election results initially indicated that he has succeeded in paving the way for that. His traditional right-wing bloc had the required majority. But a surprise was in the waiting. Former Minister of Defence, Avigdor Lieberman, a nationalist right-wing politician who has been part of Netanyahu’s camp since the 1990s (although episodes of political rivalry), broke ranks. Without Lieberman’s party, Yisrael Beiteinu, Netanyahu did not have a coalition. His efforts to attract centrist/leftist parties to join a “unity government” or even to bring on board a single defector from another party who will give him the necessary majority in parliament – all failed.

In the past, Netanyahu used to carry out such political moves easily. But, due to his corruption allegation, he became a persona non grata among his opponents. They were not willing to enable him to become prime minister again, given his potential downfall and the legislative reforms he sought to advance. Netanyahu was losing ground. As he failed to form a government and went to repeat elections, his image as invincible and as a “political magician” was shattered. Moreover, his image in Israel as “Mr Security” was now effectively challenged by the Blue and White Party leader, Benny Gantz, which featured three ex-IDF Chiefs of Staff on the top of its list.

Netanyahu sought remedy in diplomatic activism. He saw the realm of foreign policy as one in which he has an added value over his contenders. Billboards of him shaking hands with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin appeared all over Israel, portraying him as a mega-diplomat. International visits and meetings were orchestrated for him, and world leaders were willing to grant Netanyahu new diplomatic achievements that he can present as part of his campaign. However, this – like other elements of his campaign – did not prove to be effective. The September 2019 elections showed a decline in votes for the Likud party, and Netanyahu failed again in forming a government, despite the loyalty of his party and ideological bloc (excluding Lieberman).

Towards the March 2019 elections, that tone of the opposition was already more confident. “He just can’t” was the slogan of Blue and White against Netanyahu, referring to his inability to form a coalition. “Netanyahu only cares about himself”, their campaign said, referring to the court case against Netanyahu that will begin just two weeks after the elections, on March 17^th. Even the announcement of the so-called Trump Plan, which was supposed to be the ultimate political gift to Netanyahu towards the elections, was handled by the opposition in a way that did not increase Netanyahu’s popularity in the polls.

It is still not clear which direction the upcoming elections will go. But, Netanyahu’s time in power should be up. His long tenure led him to develop a sense of entitlement to the position, that prevented him from doing – at least until now – what a prime minister accused of bribe should do: announce resignation. The damage to Israeli democracy, state institutions and governance caused by his political and personal conduct is mounting. Israel is paying a heavy price for this. It is a price that drives voters to the polls time and time again. It is also a price that drives many of them to seek a new prime minister.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט The “Netanyahu Factor” Driving Israelis to the Polls הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A new type of peace in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the Oslo process, Israel had a two-track policy. It conducted talks with the PLO, which had officially and publicly recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” in the hopes of reaching a final status agreement, and at the same time Israel waged uncompromising war on Hamas, which refused to recognize both Israel and the Oslo Accords. That policy was shared by both the left-wing and right-wing Israeli governments through the 1990s. Suggestions by certain Israeli figures, among them Rabbi Menachem Froman and Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy to promote dialogue with Hamas were rejected out of hand. However, it became increasingly obvious over the years that ignoring Hamas and excluding it from the process would be very hard given its standing in Palestinian society, especially after its 2006 election victory and takeover of the Gaza Strip.

One way of understanding Israel’s dilemma is through the concept of “peace spoilers.” In the 1990s, there was a growing discussion among academics in the field of conflict analysis, about how to relate to actors, often non-state ones, who undertake concerted efforts to thwart peace processes or agreements that they view as a threat to themselves and their goals. One of the main examples discussed in those days were Hamas and Jewish extremists, both of whom sought to foil the Oslo process. Other peace processes in the 1990s encountered a similar phenomenon. In Northern Ireland, the Real Irish Republican Army split from the IRA and carried out terror attacks in a bid to prevent a peace agreement. In South Africa, deadly violence in the early 1990s threatened to undermine attempts of reconciliation. Scholars debated how best to deal with such actors – whether to fight against them or to communicate with them and try to integrate them into the process.

Even after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2007, Israel continued with its parallel policy: Security coordination and peace talks (until the 2014 collapse of negotiations led by US Secretary of State John Kerry) vis-a-vis the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, along with a blockade of Gaza and repeated rounds of fighting with Hamas, whom Israel saw as “peace spoilers” who must be fought.

Successive Israeli governments insisted that they would not conduct any dialogue with a Palestinian unity government if it included Hamas. In October 2017, the Netanyahu government’s security cabinet reiterated this stance in light of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation attempts, announcing that Israel would engage with such a Palestinian government only if Hamas recognized Israel, stopped its terrorist activity, disarmed and severed ties with Iran.

But over the last decade, the ground started shifting, gradually. In 2011 Israel and Hamas reached an agreement on releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners; the parties also negotiated indirectly on ceasefires to end several rounds of fighting. But these contacts were a precursor to a far more dramatic and significant move. Ironically, the most right-wing government in Israeli history, formed in 2015, which did not include representatives of centrist or left-wing parties, was the one that eventually led to a radical shift of Israel’s position. During 2018, Israel and Hamas launched indirect intensive negotiations, mediated by Egypt and UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov.

This shift has several reasons: Both parties were finally open to the idea of dialogue, after a decade of repeated and indecisive clashes, and a primed for a more pragmatic recognition of reality. But at the same time, it also stemmed from a mutual interest in managing the conflict rather than resolving it – and in weakening the PA under Abbas. The same dynamics are true today. The Netanyahu government is not interested in fostering a peace process that would entail territorial concessions in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Hamas is interested in preserving its power and standing. Netanyahu declared in March 2019 that contacts with Hamas were maintaining the split between Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank, thus scuppering the possibility of establishing Palestinian state. A close Netanyahu campaign aide, Jonathan Urich, boasted in an April 2019 interview that his boss had “managed to achieve a split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and in fact crushed the vision of a Palestinian state in these two areas. Part of this achievement is linked to the Qatari money reaching Hamas each month.”

This in itself constituted a turnaround in Israel’s position: for years, it had demanded that control over Gaza be restored to the PA. Looking at the Israel-PA-Hamas triangle, it appears that any real dialogue between Israel and the PA has collapsed; contacts between Hamas and the PA have reached a dead end; and only the channel between Hamas and Israel is still working. During the 2007-2008 Annapolis process, Israel’s goal was to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas and reach a final status agreement with him, which would be expanded in its next phase to include Gaza. However, Israel is now working to preserve the split between the two Palestinian entities, and no longer seeks to create any affinity between Gaza and the PA, or to push for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It’s worth taking a step back to see just how unthinkable (until very recently) Israel’s pivot has been, and how dramatically expedient, or pragmatic, its redefinition of an acceptable partner for dialogue has been. If, as recently as some two years ago, the Israeli government rejected the idea of talks with a Palestinian unity government due to its affiliation with Hamas, today the Israeli government is talking to Hamas, while not conducting any diplomatic dialogue with Abbas, and even adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward him and the Palestinian Authority. The emerging message is that Israel is rewarding Hamas, which uses violent means against Israel (firing rockets and incendiary devices at Israel), and punishing the PA, which has adhered to tight security coordination with Israel.

Lior Lehrs is the Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Peace-Spoilers or Negotiation Partners? Netanyahu’s Understandings with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the plan published by the Trump administration contradicts the interests of the State of Israel, distances us from the two-state solution and is published during very problematic political times. As a result, it will likely do more harm than good.

The two-state solution is an existential interest for Israel. It is a necessary component of the Zionist dream, in which the State of Israel is both the state of the Jewish people and a democracy characterized by complete equality for all its citizens. Yet the two-state solution is unattainable while Palestinian interests are ignored and Palestinian leaders are excluded from the peace process. I would expect Israeli leadership to be capable of making that clear to an American president.

In the past, Prime Minister Sharon tried to convince the Bush administration not to force democracy on conflict-ridden Iraq; Prime Minister Olmert sought to influence the same administration not to push for Palestinian elections at that point in time. Neither succeeded, but in hindsight, both did the right thing, as an ally should.

The Palestinians are rejecting the Trump plan outright, so it will not lead to a settlement. But from it we must try to extract components that will help achieve a settlement in the future. Of importance is the fact that a Palestinian state will be established, even according to Trump’s vision, and that it must have a capital in East Jerusalem as well as an American embassy there.

Contrary to common perception, our ability to promote true peace is stronger now than ever before. In the Palestinian leadership of today, Israel has infinitely better partners for peace than it had in Oslo and Camp David. The leaders of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah understand that terrorism has hurt them just as it has done damage in Israel, and they are trying to achieve independence through non-violent means. The regional context is also more favorable than in the past; most Arab countries see Israel as part of the solution to the problems this region faces, rather than as the problem itself, as they have in the past. This is reflected in the Arab Peace Initiative, which is endorsed time and again at the summits of Arab states and which did not exist during Oslo and Camp David.

In addition, the majority of the Israeli public supports a two-state solution, as evidenced in polls conducted over the past twenty years, even though this wasn’t reflected in the election results in Israel, because our leaders have preferred to instill fear, suppress hope for peace, and remove the Palestinian issue from the agenda.

To the extent that the Trump plan leads to annexation, it will not only keep us away from a solution of two states for two peoples. It will also damage regional stability, our relationship with Jordan and security coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which has led to relative calm and a significant reduction in terror.

Consequently, those who come to power in the upcoming Israeli elections should take significant diplomatic steps that will provide for a real peace plan. They should do so in coordination with the international community, rather than allowing themselves to be dragged on by false initiatives that do not merit the support of most of the international community or the Democratic Party in the US. Israeli leaders must make it clear to our American friends that this is not the way to advance the long-term interests of the State of Israel.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Needs a Real Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the long history of the conflict, only three peace plans have been identified with a US president: The Reagan Plan (1982), the Clinton Parameters (2000), and the “Roadmap” — identified with Bush but did not bear his name (2003). In other cases, American peace plans or initiatives were identified with secretaries of state in order to not embarrass the president in case they failed. This was the case with the Rogers Plan in 1969, the Shultz Initiative in 1988, and the Kerry Initiative in 2013-14.

The release of a peace plan should be outstanding opportunity to advance a resolution. Its release, in general, follows dramatic events, such as wars, revolutions, and regime changes.

It was no surprise that the Rogers Plan was released after the 1967 War; Kissinger began his step by step diplomacy following the Yom Kippur War that led to the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria in 1974-75; Reagan presented his plan after the Lebanon War; Shultz presented his initiative after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987; the Madrid Conference convened in 1991 following the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and Bush released the “Roadmap” during the Second Palestinian Intifada that broke out in 2000.

The release of a peace plan should therefore be a cause for celebration. Delving into the details of the Trump Peace Plan offers no such satisfaction show that the plan is doomed to fail for several reasons: First, the Americans, as honest brokers, should have consulted also with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority and not only with Israel and the Arab states.

Since 2017 there has been a serious rupture between the US and the PA; that bad blood was intensified by Trump’s closure of the Palestinian mission in Washington and the US cutting aid to UNRWA. The absence of the Palestinians from the process of devising the plan has created a situation like a chess game with one player. That the plan was launched with no Palestinian representative is testimony to the discord between Trump and the Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians’ unwillingness to play the game.

Second, the details of the plan show its clear unilateralism in its adoption of Israeli positions, especially those supported by right-wingers and settlers. It gives a green light to the Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements. Palestinians are offered an everdiminishing stake: in the Oslo agreements the Palestinians accepted just 22 percent of historic Palestine (within the 1967 borders), but Trump now offers them much less territory. On Jerusalem and refugees, the plan far from the Palestinians’ positions. In return for their concessions on Jerusalem, territory and the refugees, Trump is trying to entice the Palestinians with a financial “bribe” – $50 billion – an unsecured, unsourced fortune, to be offered over ten years.

The fact that the Trump Peace Plan stands in complete contrast to all previous plans is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if it represents the interests of only one side of the conflict, then it is bad, and it does not have any chance of being accepted.

Every successful peace agreement is a compromise that required each side to give up on demands that were perceived in the past as necessary and vital. They were never achieved dictation or surrender. In a fair agreement, both sides leave with half (or less) of their desired outcomes. That is not the situation here.

This plan is the wet dream of Israelis located in the center and rightward on the political map. However, its presentation, and all the more so, its implementation, will be one bridge too far, and will not serve Israeli goals. There are several reasons for this.

First, it will strengthen the positions of those refusing peace on the Arab side. Those rejectionists argue in any case that Israel (and the “Jewish Lobby”) and the United States are in cahoots. Second, it will further weaken the moderates on the Palestinian side who believe in a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the conflict. In such a situation, escalation with Hamas in Gaza and mass demonstrations in the West Bank are not imaginary scenarios. In fact, the pressure cooker in the West Bank that is already bubbling as a result of economic and social causes, as well as anger about the corruption of the PA, is likely to explode now against Israel (a Third Intifada). The violence would surge if Israel decides to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements.

Third, Egypt and Jordan, signatories to peace treaties with Israel, will now face heavily oppositional domestic public pressure and will not be able to support Trump’s plan, despite the fact that they have an interest in advancing a peaceful solution. But not one that looks like this. Recalling ambassadors and freezing bilateral relations are steps that have already been taken in the past and could easily be re-implemented.

Finally, the creeping normalization of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states is likely to suffer. True, the UAE, Omani and Bahraini ambassadors took part in the launching of the plan and Saudi Arabia released a mild statement in response to the launch. Yet, any Israeli move to unilaterally implement its share of the plan would not pass unanswered.

The release of Trump’s peace plan at the present time is a blatantly political maneuver. It was concocted in coordination between Trump and Netanyahu, in order to assist the Israeli prime minister’s reelection. The release of the plan just before the elections is a direct intervention in Israel’s domestic politics, intended to embarrass Netanyahu’s only real challenger, Benny Ganz by  putting him in a situation where he cannot come out against the plan. If Netanyahu intervened in the domestic politics of the United States when he spoke in Congress in 2015 two weeks before the US elections, Trump has now repaid him.

Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban is often quoted that the “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Interestingly, Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the President, declared on CNN that if the Palestinians reject the plan “they’re going to screw up another opportunity, like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence.” Well, he forgot that Israel as well has missed a few opportunities, of which the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) was the latest and most substantial.

But more important, this time the Palestinians are not be missing an opportunity, because the Trump Peace Plan simply does not constitute an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Sadly, it might end up serving as a trigger for escalation, and the eruption of violence.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently a visiting professor at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Trump Peace Plan: Not Even an Opportunity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, along with its moves to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, Israel has been seeking to expand its links with African states. For example, at a November 2018 meeting with Chad’s President, Netanyahu declared that “Israel is returning to Africa” and hinted at intentions to restore ties with Sudan. The very thought that Netanyahu considered meeting with a man like Omar al-Bashir, who has since been deposed and will soon stand trial for crimes against humanity, generates aversion and concern.

Improved relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East and Africa are undoubtedly a positive development, but does every end justify the means and is every regional leader a worthy Israeli ally? This question has been dogging Israeli foreign policy for decades, but has been underscored in recent years given the changes in Israel’s regional relations and their more public dimension.

What is Israel’s policy regarding the warming relations or rapprochement with countries in the region? Do the government and the Knesset conduct significant debate about the emerging ties between Israel and North African and Middle Eastern states?

Let us start with the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which is tasked with overseeing the government’s defense and foreign affairs activity. In practice, the Knesset’s most prestigious committee has turned into a unidirectional communications channel for senior defense and foreign affairs officials to the legislature, with those testifying before the panel generally failing to answer lawmakers’ questions or providing only partial answers.

In addition, foreign policy issues are relegated to the sidelines of the committee’s agenda with its perpetual focus on defense issues that always appear more important and pressing. The idea of splitting the panel into two separate committees has come up occasionally, but has been discounted.

The State Security Cabinet also appears to be sidelined often and excluded from the decision making loop. For most of the past four years, the Prime Minister has also served as Foreign Minister. His confidante, attorney Yitzhak Molcho often served as his special envoy to Arab states, but was not required to report to the Knesset or the professional levels of government since he was essentially a private individual. The Prime Minister’s power and authority in defense and foreign policy appeared unlimited.

Israel is proud (justifiably so) of being the only democracy in the Middle East. Human rights values are the pillars of Israel’s existence as a democratic state, and must be one of the most important and weighty considerations in formulating policy. What, then, is their weight in determining Israeli foreign policy?

There is no absolute morality in the conduct of foreign policy. Not only that, there is usually an inherent contradiction between morality and the practice of foreign policy since democratic states must maintain contact with non-democratic ones. They must also deal with the fact that such states will use all means at their disposal to promote their interests.

These days, many fans of “realpolitik” in Israel and the world believe that when a state seeks to promote its foreign policy, it should not be fettered by ethical considerations. Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly subscribes to this school of thought. He forges close ties with authoritarian heads of state, sometimes even appearing to prefer them to his colleagues in democratic states. Just as he is not deterred by close links with such leaders, he is not put off by weapons deals with states such as Burma, where authorities are conducting a genocide, according to UN reports.

The murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi provided one of the most obvious examples of Netanyahu’s belief in “realpolitik”. Although US intelligence flatly accused Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman of ordering the hit, President Trump did not sever ties with Riyadh and urged waiting for the findings of the Saudi investigation. Netanyahu convinced Trump to ease US pressure on Riyadh, arguing that the Saudis are an important strategic regional ally.

Much before Netanyahu, Israel conducted relations with “problematic” states, such as South Africa in the apartheid era. Up until the 1970s, Israel had condemned South Africa for the segregation of its black citizens, voted in favor of international sanctions and recalled its ambassador from Cape Town. In those days, Ben-Gurion rejected out of hand any possibility of closer ties with the South African government and adhered to the criticism of its apartheid regime. Following the Yom Kippur War, when many African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, Israel’s approach changed. Israel felt weak and isolated, shunned by the family of nations, and decided to tighten relations with pariah states such as South Africa.

Israel’s current situation is completely different. Everyone understands that Israel needs good relations with its neighbors in order to ensure its security and sovereignty. That is why policy makers should draw red lines clearly defining what Israel is allowed to do and what it must not do.

Israel must not remain silent in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This constitutes a severe violation of its identity and nature as a Jewish and democratic state. Rigorous judgment must be applied to consideration of arms deals. Clearly, certain states buy weapons not only to defend themselves, but also to kill, and that is why policy makers in the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and in the prime minister’s office must always consider not only financial interests, but also ethical ones. In particularly egregious and troubling cases, when journalists and human right activists are subjected to torture and sent to rot in jail, Israel can use its power and influence to urge the US administration to raise human rights and democracy issues in the region rather than blindly supporting the repressive violence of regimes in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministry has clearly defined red lines to which Israel generally adheres in its relations with radical right European parties. It should formulate similar guidelines regarding Israel’s emerging ties with Middle Eastern and African states, ascribing importance and value to democratic and moral components.

In the legislature, Knesset members must breathe new life into the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and insist on the centrality of Israel’s regional ties for the panel’s agenda. They must demand explanations from senior officials appearing before them and insist on getting answers. The Knesset must also anchor in legislation the Prime Minister’s authority in foreign affairs and defense issues and determine standards to which policy makers must adhere.

Israel is not simply another state in the Middle East. It is the only truly functioning democracy in the region. As a democratic state, Israel cannot shirk the human rights issue. There may not be absolute morality in foreign policy, but conducting a foreign policy devoid of all morality is not an option, either.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump did not invent American isolationism, nor did he coin the “America First” slogan (that was down to Charles Lindbergh, the pilot who opposed Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pro-British leanings). However, Trump was the one who engineered its current, embarrassing implementation. Anyone amazed by the vanishing act of the US in Syria, forgets that the American DNA has been isolationist ever since President James Monroe conceived his namesake doctrine in 1823. The US generally goes to war in the wake of “unfriendly visits” to places such as Pearl Harbor or the World Trade Towers, but it does not rush into action following the bombing of Saudi oil fields or even the 1940 London blitz.

The abandonment of the Kurds should not have come as a surprise. Sadly, they are victims of serial desertion. The Soviet Union abandoned them (the short-lived Kurdish republic of Mahabad in western Iran) in 1946, and Iran abandoned them in 1975, followed by Israel. Erdoğan appears to have overcome his initial opposition to Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, with its capital in Erbil. He now sees a Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, with its capital in Qamishli and leadership by the PKK (the Kurdish People’s Party), which Turkey designates as a terror organization and thus as a catalyst for pan-Kurdish sentiment among the Kurdish minority within Turkey and a security threat to Ankara.

The shock in Israel is real and sincere, generating myriad reactions, beginning with Netanyahu’s (which admittedly should be viewed through the lens of Israel-Turkey relations), politicians’ condemnations, hard-to-watch footage, demonstrations, and a noble gesture by some 100 reserve officers. Some even raised their concerns that the frenetic US President would abandon Israel as he did his Kurdish allies. Indeed, in recent weeks Trump seems to be giving a lukewarm and even cold shoulder to Netanyahu, whom he may regard as a loser following two political failures.

However, Israel is not and will not be treated like the Kurds. Israel is a strong country, ranked by US News and World Report as the world’s eighth most powerful nation, immediately after Japan, the UK and France. Israeli-held territory was last invaded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and although it got off to a lame start, Israel overcame great odds and won (with US help). Even if Trump’s creative mind may toy with thoughts of abandonment, this is unlikely feasible with congressional Democrats and Republicans (including Trump’s evangelical base) already joining hands against his Kurdish policy – despite the fact that the Kurds do not have a US political base in the form of communities, federations and legislators. We, on the other hand, do.

Israel enjoys deeply rooted ideological and political support. It has always made an effort, whether under the leadership of the Likud or of center-left parties, to fortify, preserve and nurture bipartisan US support. Israel devotedly maintained strong brotherly ties with all US Jewish streams. Beyond the basic mitzvah of pan-Jewish unity throughout the ages and time zones, given that three quarters of US Jews are Democrats, this was also a wise political move, in hindsight.

However, in recent years, under Netanyahu’s leadership, the Israeli government has been blatantly supporting Republicans and paying homage to Trump. Israel is kicking in the teeth millions of Jews who want to continue supporting it but are hard pressed to do so in light of their continued humiliation at Israel’s hand. The government’s decision rescinding its own plan for pluralistic prayer at the Wailing Wall, its policies on conversion and declarations of territorial annexation, its offensive Nationality Law and backing for ultra-racist parties, and its stand on issues of marriage and divorce all combine to alienate them from the Jewish state. Israel has become a non-enlightened state, which often needs the support of the most enlightened (Jewish) elements in American society. Once Trump is replaced, even without impeachment, we will need our Jewish brothers and sisters vis-à-vis a Democratic administration and Congress.

We may not have crossed the point of no return with US Jewry and the US political system, yet, but nothing is forever. If there is one lesson to be learned from the Trump-Kurds affair, it is that beyond building up its power, Israel should never take sides in US politics or pull out the rug from under its unity with US Jewry.

Ambassador (Ret.) Barukh Binah is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He served as Deputy DirectorGeneral of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, in charge of North American Affairs, as Ambassador to Denmark, Consul General in Chicago, Press Officer in New York and Deputy Head of Mission in Washington, DC.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Lesson for Israel from the US Abandonment of the Kurds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

They’re only one example of an exceptional level of international involvement in both this year’s Israeli national election campaigns, unprecedented in both scope and style. The posters, their iconography and their message have a significance beyond the intricacies of Israeli politics. They reveal the developing fault lines dividing two competing global camps – liberals and non-liberals – and their growing willingness to support allies and confront foes in a direct, unvarnished manner.

International support for Israeli political candidates engaged in competitive elections is not new. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit organized by President Clinton to support Shimon Peres’ failed 1996 campaign is a notable example. However, foreign interventions have generally been far more low-key than the explicit pro-Netanyahu lobbying we are now witnessing. Gone are previous campaigns conducted cautiously behind the scenes to back a candidate’s political agenda: these efforts mostly concern the personal rather than the ideological, part of an effort to elevate or to challenge Netanyahu’s image as a global leader.

One of Netanyahu’s main electoral goals is to convince voters that he is indispensable, by branding himself Israel’s only leader with the requisite international magnitude. International feedback is thus a central tool in cementing this play, and in diverting attention from Netanyahu’s pending criminal indictments towards his global prestige. Ahead of the first round of elections in April 2019, Netanyahu’s international allies – leaders of what one could describe as the global non-liberal camp – answered his call by providing both diplomatic gestures and concrete policy steps. The weeks before the election were saturated with international events carefully crafted by the Netanyahu campaign.

Official visits by global allies offered Netanyahu photo-opportunities to land his image as a global leader. Key support was provided by the two competing leaders of the global non-liberal camp: First, Putin, who met with Netanyahu and donated symbolic capital by retrieving Israeli MIA Zachary Baumel’s body. Secondly, and above all else, Trump’s explicit mobilization for Netanyahu’s campaign. Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro were also protagonists in the international re-elect Netanyahu campaign.

Trump’s finest electoral gift was his recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. This act appealed to a majority of Israelis who see the territory as an integral part of Israel. It also resonated with Netanyahu’s own right-wing base who made the annexation of occupied land a leading topic in the campaign. Trump’s declaration allowed Netanyahu to present a clear sense of achievement in the crucial last stretch, which even his opponents could not dispute. Netanyahu once again situated himself as the only Israeli leader capable of stepping onto the international stage and getting results. This, while the international activity of his main contender, Benny Gantz, was limited to speeches at AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference.

Ahead of the coming re-run elections, we already see Netanyahu attempting similar plays to exploit his interpersonal relations with prominent non-liberal leaders to brand him, as his slogan goes, as a leader “of a different league.”

The growing list of world leaders to meet Netanyahu before the election includes another close peer – India’s Prime Minister Modi. But the main campaign’s effort is focused on arranging a timely visit to Israel by Russia’s Putin, during which a monument to fallen Russian soldiers will be unveiled. This step is possibly devised to influence Russianspeaking voters, who are of special electoral importance for Netanyahu this time around. Trump is also reportedly planning moves that can boost Netanyahu’s chances for reelection, possibly including an announcement of new U.S. security guarantees to Israel.

This global support highlights Netanyahu’s status as a central figure in the global non-liberal camp. His domestic policy corresponds with its values, favoring the majoritarian aspect of democracy over liberal values. However, it also put forward a message that goes well beyond the Israeli context – in times of need, the non-liberal network also functions as a practical political alliance.

The liberal camp lags behind, but it too has shown some willingness to get involved in the Israeli election. In light of the global crisis of liberal democracy, there is a growing understanding that like-minded liberals and progressives – in various countries – should better coordinate and cooperate. Bernie Sanders has even called for an “international progressive front” to confront the “new authoritarian axis.” Civil society organizations were the first to take the lead in this challenge, and the Israeli election may signal the beginning of a spillover into the political field. Stav Shaffir, one of the founders of Israel’s left-wing Democratic Camp, has called on progressives to establish a “united movement.”

In this liberal democratic spirit of pushing back, a few days before Israel’s April 2019 election, U.S. Democratic presidential candidates voiced unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of endorsing racism and of being corrupt. Sanders said openly he hoped Netanyahu loses. This was a continuation of a gradual process, in which mainstream Jewish organizations and figures showed willingness to criticize Netanyahu and his domestic policies. This trend was motivated both by resentment towards Netanyahu, and by his overly-close alliance with Trump. Nevertheless, lacking a clear progressive alternative candidate to Netanyahu, liberals’ critical steps never amounted to a direct endorsement of his opponents.

In Europe, liberals have been even more cautious. They tend to refrain from intervening in domestic Israeli politics, partly because they too did not see an appealing alternative to Netanyahu they could wholeheartedly endorse. French President Macron was the exception. Four days prior to the previous election, he hosted Yair Lapid for a meeting, a move which the Blue and White party hoped would boost their international image. Macron’s step could be seen as a personal favor, grounded in pre-existing links with Lapid, but which also stemmed from his position as a central leader within the global liberal camp and as an alternative to Trump.

Despite their limited nature, these tentative steps by liberals indicate that a change may be underway to challenge the loud illiberal support for Netanyahu. But their insufficient nature can be seen by the fact that no further steps have been taken towards the September 2019 elections, and Israel’s center-left politicians have not yet acted to encourage their international allies to take action. That seems even more short-sighted, bearing in mind how global liberals will have no option but to get involved in Israeli affairs should the next Israeli government fulfil Netanyahu’s promise to annex settlements, and as the U.S. presidential election draw near.

Placing the Israeli election as one in a series of global events allows us to obtain a broader perspective of the ongoing realignment of the international system. It demonstrates the willingness of key liberal and non-liberal actors to adopt a more proactive approach in influencing what was until now considered diplomatically as sacred ground – national elections in friendly countries.

It may signal that the gloves are coming off in the global conflict between liberals and nonliberals. However, it also demonstrates the power asymmetry between the camps. The world’s liberals still have much work to do, before they can collectively succeed to turn the tide.

Dr. Gil Murciano is a foreign policy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Israeli Elections and the Global Competition between the Liberal and Non-Liberal Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During his two election campaigns this year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly boasted of his alleged foreign policy achievements. At the same time, Foreign Affairs Ministry, of which he has been in charge for the past four years, has recorded yet another low in an ongoing process meant to weaken it and decentralize its authority, thereby undermining Israel’s ability to implement diplomatic goals and improve its international relations. The ministry is over NIS 300 million ($85m.) budget deficit makes it hard for diplomats to carry out their work.

However, the essence of the crisis is not budgetary. It lies in the ministry’s ongoing exclusion from the core issues of Israeli diplomacy and the scattering of its roles and budgets among various government ministries and entities. Its public standing has been undermined with deliberate intent, and Israelis are insufficiently aware of the ministry’s importance. The voice of diplomats is marginalized in Israel’s decision-making processes, which therefore lack the broad diplomatic angle that Foreign Ministry professionals could bring to the table. This has a direct negative impact on Israel’s national security.

There is a price to be paid for an enfeebled Foreign Ministry and its inability to promote Israeli interests in the international arena, such as creating diplomatic alliances and expedient terms for cooperation with other countries, forging ties with international organizations and institutions, identifying economic opportunities and helping Israel fulfill its potential. Among the ministry’s other core tasks is aiding Jewish communities around the world and Israeli citizens abroad, promoting foreign aid that contributes to Israel’s sense of self-worth and public image abroad, and carrying out the public diplomacy essential to explaining Israel’s cause and mobilizing international support for its survival and prosperity. The weakening of the Foreign Ministry harms all these missions and damages Israel’s future.

The recent appointment of Israel Katz as a full-time foreign minister, after four years of Netanyahu holding the position among his many other duties, was a positive development that underscored the importance of staffing this post. The new minister is rightly seeking to identify measures to bolster his ministry and help resolve the dispute it has with the Finance Ministry. However, the reform he is proposing, as reported in Haaretz, reportedly consists primarily of shifting the ministry’s focus to the economic realm and is therefore unlikely to solve the issues at stake.

FIRST, REGARDLESS of the proposal itself, a reform in the Foreign Affairs Ministry should be carried out by a minister appointed for a full term, and not as a caretaker in a transition government. It should also be conducted in coordination with the ministry’s professional directors, taking into account the planning work undertaken by them in recent years to prepare it for the future.

Second, the reform as reported merely perpetuates the trend of shrinking and weakening the ministry’s work, undermining the core of its activity: diplomacy. Strengthening the economic component in the ministry’s work and its ability to measure and assess its performance are positive steps, appropriate in the era of modern diplomacy; but only in accordance with additional important measures designed to strengthen the ministry’s impact on foreign policy design and implementation, and boosting its voice at the decision-making level. Presenting Israeli diplomats with new economic demands that are far from the added value they are able to provide is not the solution.

The campaign ahead of Israel’s September 17 elections is an opportunity to reiterate the importance of Israeli diplomacy and foreign relations. It provides an opportunity to demand that the political parties and their candidates boost the standing of the Foreign Service. This is an opportunity for the candidates to explain to voters the importance of a strong diplomatic apparatus and the opportunities that it can help promote, and to present concrete foreign policy goals and action plans. In addition, civil society organizations dedicated to Israeli foreign policy and its Foreign Service are growing in number and strength, representing varied professional and ideological backgrounds, and they can also help shape the conversation during (and after) the elections campaign.

The formation of a new government and ministerial appointments are an opportunity to empower Israel’s Foreign Service, also by restoring to the Foreign Affairs Ministry the foreign policy responsibilities and budgets farmed out to other agencies in recent years, appointing a full-time foreign minister and forming a ministry-led inter-agency committee to coordinate all government activity in the field of foreign relations. This is also an opportunity to ensure that the voices of diplomats and foreign policy professionals become an integral part of decision-making processes.

The swearing in of the next Knesset will be a time to ensure that its committees, especially the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, deal with foreign relations issues properly, and do not allow them to be overshadowed once again by Israel’s security-focused discourse. Israel can follow the example of other countries and establish a parliamentary committee solely dedicated to foreign affairs. This may also present an opportunity to promote structural change in the National Security Council that would ensure a role for diplomats within it, and to encourage the cabinet to demand regular briefings on foreign affairs by the ministry.

The incumbency of a new foreign minister also provides an opportunity to define clear goals for the ministry, build a work plan and set measurable targets with which to assess its achievements, its ethics and equity for Israel’s citizens. The Foreign Affairs Ministry must improve its cooperation with civil society organizations, the media and the Knesset; share information about its ongoing activities and its annual assessments, enable parliamentary and public oversight and encourage transparency, professional freedom and sound administration.

In summing up, Israel’s Foreign Service is weak and is deliberately being weakened even further. We are paying the resulting cost to our diplomacy, economy, civil society and security. None of this is preordained. It stems from a political decision and thus can be transformed. The coming elections are a chance for change. We as citizens must demand that our candidates and parties, from across the political spectrum, pledge to repair the damage and bring Israel’s Foreign Service back to the forefront.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Service Is Being Weakened and We Are All Paying the Price, הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The MFA is a victim of the traditional predominance of military, defense and intelligence agencies in providing responses to the diplomatic and security challenges Israel faces. Politicians and government officials tend to dismiss the ministry’s potential contribution to key issues on the national agenda. This continuous neglect has resulted in a string of budget cuts and closure of Israeli diplomatic missions throughout the world, undermining the ministry’s classic diplomatic roles, chief among them developing and maintaining Israel’s diplomatic ties with other countries. With deliberate intent, Netanyahu’s governments have steadily chipped away at the ministry’s significant role in designing and conducting Israel’s diplomacy and defense agenda.

The next Israeli government could reverse this grim trend if the Prime Minister appoints a full-time Foreign Minister and gives him or her full backing. Provided the new government displays willingness and openness to MFA reform, it will have to start by adopting a conceptual change in mapping the current spheres of influence in the international arena, which are no longer limited to government and state level. There are other, varied spheres of influence, some devoid of any diplomatic or state-level definition, some without an organized structure and/or territorial (or other) borders, which are often more powerful and influential than those of governments and states. These new spheres of influence include the internet and social media, giant corporations and multinational groups. They command huge budgets, often greater than the average budget of a small or medium-sized state. Religious and ethno-cultural streams numbering many millions of believers and members also hold growing sway, as do influential global civil society organizations.

The methodology and means used to exert global influence are also different from the ones we knew. Top-down processes, in which an established state entity conveys messages to broad swathes of the public through traditional media, exert declining influence. These familiar trends are being replaced by a non-hierarchical, non-filtered influence no longer based on traditional media channels but rather on direct contact through internet and social media platforms. Most of them are largely unregulated and uncensored, such as Twitter and Facebook. This constitutes a dramatic change in diplomatic and political influence. Therefore, present-day Israeli diplomacy must reflect a deep understanding of these new avenues of influence, a correct reading of global power centers and the use of innovative and relevant tools to create influence within these arenas – from classic diplomacy within the framework of traditional international relations to digital diplomacy on the internet, social media and digital communications.

Realistic funding for updated MFA operations is also a vital element of any future reform. Israel has traditionally allocated an especially low budget for its Foreign Service compared with other states that increase their foreign affairs budgets significantly each year. This undermines the potential impact of the MFA and its diplomatic activities. The required overhaul must also be based on branding Israel as an innovative purveyor of foreign aid. The MFA’s Agency for International Development Cooperation (known by its Hebrew acronym Mashav) is one of the most efficient tools for improving Israel’s image in the world.

Increasing the extent of Israeli aid to developing countries could greatly enhance its prestige in the world, in general, and in beneficiary states, in particular. The combination of Israel’s image as a start-up nation and its willingness to play a key role in Tikkun Olam – the Jewish value of “repairing the world’, a form of global responsibility – has vast potential for promoting positive branding. Unfortunately, and absurdly, this blend of foreign aid with technology and innovation is undervalued and very far from utilizing its potential. A reconstituted Israeli MFA must change this policy and turn innovation-based foreign aid into a first-rate tool of public diplomacy and branding.

Most importantly and above all, however, a new government must restore the authority stripped from the MFA and the purview over foreign policy and public diplomacy handed over to various agencies, clearly define the ministry’s roles and influence, and anchor them in government decisions and even legislation.

Dr. Ronen Hoffman is an expert on governance and foreign policy at the IDC in Herzliya, who served as a Member of Knesset and Chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy in the 19th Knesset. This article is based on his speech at a conference of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Empowering Israel’s Foreign Service via Modern and Innovative Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On June 23rd, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu defeated the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), Binali Yildirim, in a historic repeat election for Istanbul’s mayoral seat. Imamoğlu surprised many in March when he narrowly bested Yildirim, handpicked and heavily endorsed by Erdoğan. After the initial results were challenged by the AKP, it was deemed that Imamoğlu would have to accomplish the feat twice in order to earn the keys to the city. Imamoğlu second victory – in which he expanded his margin from 13,000 votes in March to 777,000 votes in June – simultaneously ended the debate about Istanbul’s future leadership and opened a new discussion about the prospects for change in Turkey at a national level.

Israeli opposition voices like Lapid and former prime minister Ehud Barak were quick to praise Imamoğlu. But instead of only applauding Istanbul’s new mayor, they should also be learning from his campaign. There are less than three months until Israel’s repeat election. Although some have reported that the major parties do not plan on engaging the public until late August, there is no better time than the present for Israel’s opposition to study Imamoğlu’s strategies and adapt them to the Israeli electorate.

When it was announced in Istanbul that the first election results were being treated as invalid, Imamoğlu had every reason to attack the ruling party and the political system. Nevertheless, he told supporters, “They want conflict from us. But we, the people who don’t want this nation to fight, we will insist upon embracing each other.” This simple message was disseminated through Imamoğlu’s campaign slogan, “Herşey Çok Güzel Olacak” or “Everything Will Be Alright” and ran counter to the polarizing and often fear-based rhetoric employed by Erdoğan and the AKP over the last decade and a half. Rather than trying to divide the electorate, Imamoğlu emphasized the need for cooperation. In doing so, he successfully built bridges between Istanbul’s myriad communities.

Like Turkey, Israeli society is also fragmented and divided. Netanyahu has maintained his position at the top of the political circus largely because of his ability to take advantage of the existing fault lines within the electorate and create new rifts when the opportunity presented itself. He has also benefited from a rudderless opposition that is often more preoccupied on determining its own hierarchy than providing a meaningful alternative for Israelis. If opposition leaders like Gantz and Lapid are truly committed to bringing about change, then they must promote an inclusive campaign message, avoid mudslinging with the establishment, and publish a clear set of policy goals that reflect the shared values of Israel’s opposition parties.

The most impactful way for the Israeli opposition to assume a more inclusive approach is by targeting all potential voters and not settling for the comforts of their political base. In the previous two elections, Haredi and Arab voters accounted for somewhere around 25 percent of the total voting public (this number could be higher, however Arab voting percentages in recent years have been lower than the Jewish population). Both of these populations carry deep historical grievances. Many within these communities do not believe they are equal partners in the state-building enterprise. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that these glass ceilings are being shattered. Engagement with these minority populations is a challenging but necessary step towards gaining public trust and developing new partnerships. This proved to be a winning strategy for Imamoğlu, who crossed party lines and addressed audiences from the most secular and affluent neighborhoods to those traditionally religious strongholds within Istanbul. He openly courted the Kurdish vote, ignoring the existing political tensions in favor of his message of coexistence. What if an Israeli politician did the same?

Israel’s opposition can also borrow Imamoğlu’s positivist philosophy and abandon their doomsday predictions about the collapse of Israeli democracy. Israeli democracy has always been flawed, and without question the Netanyahu years have witnessed both a steady decline in institutional checks-and-balances as well as an increase in political corruption. However, if the democratic process has proven to be resilient a country like Turkey – where the slide towards authoritarianism has been much steeper and far darker – then Israeli opposition leaders should focus more on the policy issues that will draw public support away from the political center than campaigning for “anyone but Bibi”. Imamoğlu’s team was faced with a similar conundrum, particularly after the initial results in Istanbul were rejected. However, the manifesto that helped alter the tone of Imamoğlu’s campaign – a pamphlet called the Book of Radical Love – dissuaded supporters from attacking Erdoğan. Contrary to what has been the logic of Turkish politics for many years, the document called for an issues-based approach that avoided polarizing debate.

Finally, Israel’s opposition needs to decide what it stands for. In order to accomplish this, opposition parties should reach some consensus about their shared goals and then publish those goals for public viewership. Imamoğlu accomplished this by decoupling traditional identity politics from his campaign and focusing on economics, sharing public resources, and emphasizing the importance of good governance. And although many argued the election was about Erdogan, Imamoğlu did not make it personal. Lapid and Gantz should take note of this. Turkey is not only Erdoğan, and Israel is not only Bibi. If you succeed in changing the narrative, you expand the public’s imagination about what the future can be. Israelis have heard enough about Netanyahu’s illicit activities. What they must receive now are opposition party platforms that map out achievable policy goals in the areas of economics, security, and diplomacy.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. If Israel’s opposition is so inspired by Imamoğlu’s accomplishments, then it should borrow his message and reverse the trend of exclusionary and fear-based politics. Rather than crafting a platform that only addresses the country’s Zionist populations, Israel’s opposition should adopt an inclusive narrative that identifies common interests over identity politics. Instead of permitting the campaign to descend into a referendum on the prime minister’s personality, Israel’s opposition should focus on the policy issues and maintain a positive, conversational tone that welcomes discussion with all parties on the political spectrum. If successfully executed, such a strategy could put an end to the Netanyahu government and revolutionize the nature of Israeli politics in the process.

Upon news of Imamoğlu’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Istanbulites exited onto the streets to celebrate. Addressing the crowds, Istanbul’s new mayor said, “You have shown the world that Turkey still protects its democracy. And we have shown other countries who try to go down the road we were choosing that it is no road at all.” Perhaps what Imamoğlu and his campaign actually revealed was a strategy for thwarting the populist wave the world has witnessed in the last decade. There is arguably no better place to put those strategies to the test than in Israel.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Among other outcomes, the Arab Spring led to the strengthening of the Gulf States’ standing in the Middle East, given the stability they displayed in the face of events that affected almost every country in the region. Consequently, the Gulf States leveraged the new balance of power to expand their international and regional influence, as was evident in Emirati-funded infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, Saudi-led high-level diplomatic moves, Oman’s call for regional mediation, the race for hosting international events in these countries, and many more soft-power displays. Kuwait has been the one exception, remaining virtually isolated. Thus, Israel must acknowledge these new nexuses of power in the Middle East, and draw up a corresponding map of alliances. Its integration into the expanding circle of opportunities emerging around the Gulf countries has the potential to be dually beneficial, since it does not only consist of bilateral or regional cooperation, but also of international opportunities.

The Expo events afford tremendous economic values for the participating countries, as well as the opportunity to shape their national image within the global community. The exposure to millions of visitors and the platform for establishing direct contacts among diplomatic representatives and key figures from around the world, generates a unique hub of diplomacy. Indeed, beyond its importance for Israel’s economy and image, Israel’s participation in this event, hosted by an Arab Muslim country it has no current and past diplomatic relations with, is a significant achievement, which reflects the nature of Israel’s current relations with the UAE.

On the one hand, the UAE, as the host of an international event, is expected by the international community to provide access to all countries, including Israel. As a result, the UAE and other Gulf countries have legitimized in recent years the arrival of Israeli nationals to international conferences and tournaments they hosted. In that sense, the UAE’s decision to invite Israel to Expo 2020 does not reflect a change in the status of ties between the two states, nor does it forecast the beginning of direct and formal relations. On the other hand, meeting this international code points to the UAE’s willingness to compromise on anti-normalization measures towards Israel.

Currently, the UAE government distinguishes between bilateral ties with Israel and international cooperation with it, leaving room to maneuver in the case of the latter. In the international realm, an Israeli representative office has been operating for the past three years in Abu Dhabi, the capital, under the auspices of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Israel and the UAE also conduct Air Force exercises and business cooperation in the fields of diamond trade and cyber technology, under international umbrellas. This demonstrates the warming relations between the countries mainly within multilateral frameworks, and is making headlines in the Israeli media mostly due to its public and symbolic nature. The UAE was a pioneer among the Gulf States in allowing an Israeli sports team to display its national symbols at the October 2018 international judo championship in Abu Dhabi. As part of the latter event, the Emiratis also hosted Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sports Miri Regev according to full ceremonial protocol. Additional sports events in the UAE, such as tennis tournaments, a car race and the Special Olympics have also included growing participation of Israeli delegations in recent years.

Conversely, the UAE strictly limits bilateral relations with Israel, conditioning them on a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Accordingly, the country has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel regarding measures it defines as unjust toward the Palestinian people. Therefore, it does not cooperate with Israel in areas such as culture, research, tourism, industry and media despite mutual interests in doing so. In the diplomatic arena, there are occasional reports of meetings between senior officials of both states, such as the September 2012 meeting between Netanyahu and the UAE Foreign Minister, and the recent January 2019 visit to the UAE by Labor Party leader Avi Gabbay who met with senior ministers. Nonetheless, such meetings are not intended for public knowledge (despite the occasional leaks) and are not considered official breakthroughs in official relations.

At the same time, we are witnessing a new phenomenon in which Gulf citizens express support for Israel on social media, and a growing number of senior Emiratis call for the establishment of direct ties with Israel. For example, Khalaf al-Habtoor, a leading Emirati executive, asked on twitter why the Gulf States are not signing a peace agreement with Israel “same as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan have done before”. Such voices do not regard Israel as an enemy, and view cooperation with it as a vital source of regional stability and development. While not reflecting an official government line, they signal a gradual shift from a formerly taboo subject to an increasingly acceptable opinion. These expressions of interest in bilateral relations create a crack in the traditional demand that has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key obstacle to normalization with Israel.

The gap between the official UAE policy toward Israel and the mutual courtship between the two nations demonstrates that Israel is on the cusp of a formative phase in these relations. At this point of time, Israel would do well to leverage the relative openness of the Gulf States towards it by expanding its involvement in the region. Just as Israel sought a formal invitation to Expo 2020, it should continue to identify opportunities, map scheduled international events in the Gulf and ask to participate. Israel should also invite Gulf countries to take part in international events it hosts.

One important issue that arises from increased interactions between Israel and Gulf States is the need to study the culture, values, sensitivities and local laws when preparing Israeli delegations for excursions in the Gulf. Such preparation should be overseen by a government agency, which will formulate a plan for ties with the Gulf States and will be put in charge of these ties through diplomatic, security, economic and civilian channels. By so doing, Israel’s presence in the Gulf could become more acceptable and even be expanded. However, if Israel seeks a more significant opening to the region, it must advance a resolution of the Palestinian issue through a genuine process that would also be of great benefit for its ties with the Gulf States.

Dr. Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a Research Fellow at the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US President Donald Trump is closely aligned with Netanyahu and is expected to give him leeway over such policies. The EU today is less united against Netanyahu’s policies than in the past. So it may need a Democratic US administration in 2020 to present and enforce some red lines, in part because Netanyahu will face no significant domestic opposition on foreign policy or national security issues.

The two major pro-peace parties (Labor and Meretz) together have less than ten percent of the Knesset. While Blue and White’s 35 seats is a major achievement for a first-time political run, it does not endorse a two-state solution, and includes some right-wing hard-liners on the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu has portrayed himself as a master-statesman and highlighted his relations with (mostly) populist and anti-liberal world leaders. This trend is set to continue, further eroding the democratic component of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite its weakness, Israel’s opposition must present an alternative vision based on advancing peace, increasing regional belonging in Europe and the Middle East, and anchoring Israel to the club of liberal democracies. This will not be easy, but Israel’s friends around the world need to know that there is more to Israel and its foreign relations than Netanyahu.

(originally published in the Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Trump Gives Israel’s ‘Master Statesman’ License to Carry On הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation.

According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail.

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan’s special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of Islamic State. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: the public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king’s decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel’s decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel’s “everything will be OK” (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan’s quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves now national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so.

What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries’ shared experience.

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to “enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.” A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

In June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel’s foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, it seems that the glorious days of the ministry, if they ever truly existed, have long passed. Ever since the current government was formed in 2015, there has been no full-time foreign minister. The ministry, which – despite its prestige – has always struggled for a leading role in the decision-making process, is generally excluded from significant aspects of Israel’s foreign and defense policy. Salaries of the ministry’s officials are low, especially when considering the strict screening process and the job requirements. Moreover, some of the responsibilities it used to have in the past were transferred to other ministries such as the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs.

The crisis in the ministry is also radiating outwards, and in recent years there has been a sharp drop in the number of candidates for the competitive cadet course. In 2012, there were 2,773 candidates whereas in 2017 only 1,374 candidates started the screening process. In an attempt to change the situation, employees at the ministry decided to take measures and in 2014 they even shut down the headquarters and embassies for the first time in Israel’s history. In late August 2018, the support staff in the ministry (which accounts to some 60% of personal abroad), staged another strike, with little notice.

The crisis in our ‘diplomatic kingdom’ is not unique to Israel. Technology, especially the digital media, allows governments to interact directory, with foreign officials and publics, making diplomatic interventions almost redundant. The decline of the nation-state and the rise of other important non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international aid organizations, and even global cities, have weakened the need for conventional diplomacy.

But despite this state of affairs, Israel should not neglect its foreign service. In fact, it is needed today more than ever before. First and foremost, in order to prepare for global power transformations. The first change that requires strong foreign service is the rise of important new global players, such as China, but also India and in our region, Russia. We are transitioning from a world of American dominance to a world of multiple powers, that are likely to intervene in regional politics, such as ours. In such circumstances, small countries like Israel, will be required to refined diplomatic skills in order to navigate safely among the various foci of power. In recent decades Israel was in a convenient position: the US was the dominant player in the global system, and we were its closest allies. A vibrant Jewish community in the US has helped us and has been part of an effective pro-Israel lobby. It was often sufficient to appeal to Washington in order to achieve political goals in international forums such as the UN security council. However, in the new world, whereby Israel is required to maintain good relations with both the US and China (in spite of the tension between them), a more sophisticated approach will be required. Israel needs a corpus of skilled diplomats that will be able to cut the right alliances and lead Israel safely among nations.

The second change that requires a strong ministry of foreign affairs is the identity of the emerging powers. After five centuries of European and then American dominance, the 21st century is expected to be the Asian century. China has already overtaken or matched the US on a number of indicators, such as high-speed trains and supercomputers. This will require a significant shift in our mindset. The Euro-American scene is familiar to us, and to a certain extent we are part of it. For example, some of our prime ministers attended elite institutions in the US. The current prime minister (as well as the education minister) were even had American citizenship in the past. Our familiarity with the Euro-Atlantic powers is a result of demography. In the past few centuries, most of the Jewish people have lived in Europe, North America and the Middle East. As a result, we share – in spite of some extremely difficult episodes such as the holocaust – common cultural, religious and historical roots with the European world and its extension in the new world.

This is not the case in Asia. Despite the hectic backpackers’ travels and vipassana workshops that Israelis attend, Asian culture, values and history – are foreign to most Israelis. In order to conduct ourselves effectively in a world where Far-East countries are so important, a professional corpus of skilled and specialized diplomats is required. The foreign service is the natural place to build such a cadre of experts that will make it easier for Israel to face the rising powers. This will require the ministry to invest even more in training and in developing area specializations.

Finally, dispersing the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between various institutions and ministries leads to duplication, inefficiency and the absence of a clear and sharp message. Logically, there should be a concentration of powers in one ministry with a broad outlook and an accurate reflection of the positions of international players with whom the ministry is in continuous contact. One example is the current effort against BDS. Instead of the traditional leadership of the ministry on the matter, aspects of it were securitized. Recent reports indicated that the Israeli security Agency (Shabak) is guiding the security personal in Israel’s airports with an eye towards limiting criticism of Israel’s control over the territories. This lead to some counterproductive outcomes such as an aggressive questioning at the airport this summer of a leading Jewish philanthropist, Meyer Koplow, and a leading Jewish American journalist, Peter Beinart.

In the past, the Zionist movement coped well with global power transitions and was effective in dealing with the fall the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through the Balfour Declaration and all the way to the alliance with the US in recent decades. We are facing a similar moment now, and the Foreign Ministry is perhaps the most important player to help Israel cope with the change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, is very much needed.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization.

It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah.

Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the Muslim and Arab worlds as a result of its control of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina (in fact, the king is called the Custodian of the Two Holy Places), and more than two million people perform the Hajj every year; (2) As an oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia has financial leverage over its beneficiaries that can be used in the diplomatic field when necessary; and (3) Saudi Arabia is considered a “neutral” player in the Israeli-Arab conflict by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia has no treaty with Israel (in contrast to Egypt and Jordan).

The most significant element in the Saudi change of rhetoric is that it potentially could change Saudi society’s image of Israel and the Jews and build a more congenial climate for peace – if and when it is achieved. At least one notable case study may prove this point: Egypt. In the pre-1973 period, certain Egyptian intellectuals began talking about the need to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, for the sake of Egyptian interests.

In the post-1973 period, these voices were given a free rein from above to disseminate their views and they undoubtedly played a role in Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977. The conclusion is that voices of peace sometimes precede and may foreshadow the actual peace.

Saudi Arabia does not need peace with Israel. Israel and Saudi do not share a border and there is no state of war between the two countries. In fact, the two have never fought each other. The Saudis are, however, concerned by regional instability – caused by deterioration on the Israeli-Palestinian or the Iranian fronts – and its impact on oil prices. This is partially the reason why the Saudis have already initiated two peace plans – the Fahd and Abdallah initiatives (1981 and 2002 respectively), which turned into Arab peace plans. Israel unequivocally rejected these initiatives, at least in part due to its negative image of the Saudis.

The changing climate in Saudi Arabia poses yet another opportunity to Israeli decision makers. In Saudi Arabia, they might find a partner who is most willing to cooperate against Iran and also willing to cooperate in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. The ultimate deal for Israel, to use a worn-out phrase, is not between Israel and the Palestinians – important as is – but with the greater parts of the Islamic and Arab worlds, to which Saudi Arabia might pave the way. There are no free lunches, but that is exactly what the Netanyahu government is trying to do with the Saudis, when he is trying to promote cooperation without giving anything in return in the Palestinian track. A move from the hidden to the public domain would necessitate a tangible reward to the Palestinians, but this is not likely to happen, unfortunately.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But Israel – or the “Little Satan” – plays no less central a role. Thanks to tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its proxy war involvement in Syria close to Israel’s northern border, for the first time, Iran and Israel’s relationship is showing signs of evolving from a cold war to a hot war.

Despite this, Iranians and Israelis are, surprisingly, communicating with one another more now than they have since the days of the Shah. And it is during this period of geopolitical uncertainty that civil society actors on both sides should buck the trend and encourage and participate in a new narrative of understanding and goodwill.

Every year, at the state ceremony marking Holocaust Memorial Day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws parallels between the murderous plans of the Nazis and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Islamic Republic. And like their premier, most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat.

Iran’s decades-long propagation of Holocaust denial, as well as arming of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reinforces this ingrained perception. When Iran test fires ballistic missiles decorated with Hebrew writing that calls for Israel’s destruction, it reaffirms popular opinion on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. According to a poll conducted in early May, 44 percent of Israelis support a unilateral strike in order to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The prospects of military confrontation between Israel and Iran have increased over Syria. Israel established two red lines on Iran’s entrenchment and transfers of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, and has responded to Iranian disregard for these red lines with a series of airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria. But Israel does not seek an expansion of this conflict, and is using two soft-power tactics in the hopes of forcing Iran’s hand.

The first tactic is diplomacy with Russia. While successfully lobbying the Trump administration to walk away from the JCPOA and reinstitute economic sanctions on Iran, Netanyahu has simultaneously prioritized his relationship with President Vladimir Putin.

Israel doesn’t have much choice. After Russia installed its S-300 air defense systems in Syria, Israel was compelled to develop a de-conflicting mechanism so that its planes could continue to overfly Syrian airspace without interfering with Moscow’s interests. Negotiations between Jerusalem and the Kremlin over an Iranian withdrawal from southern Syria are ongoing and according to reports, received a boost during Trump and Putin’s Helsinki summit and other recent high-level meetings.

The second Israeli strategy – and one that turns more heads – is a direct courtship of the Iranian people. In a series of videos published on YouTube aimed at the Iranian public, Netanyahu describes the travails of the imaginary 15-year old Iranian teen girl Fatehmeh; he longs for the day when Israeli and Iranian national soccer teams can compete against one another, asks Iranians to consider using Israeli agricultural technology to minimize the effects of drought, and congratulates Iranian protesters for questioning the allocution of state funds to military campaigns in the Middle East.

Israel may be executing this new approach in tandem with the U.S., which over the last year has frequently engaged Iranians and the Iranian government with different messages. Israel’s government seems to have accepted the notion that it can pressure Tehran’s ruling class by addressing the Iranian public. The game plan is simple: force the regime to justify its war-mongering policies to its own people, and force Iranians to ask what price they are willing to pay in order to pursue this ideological end-goal, to query whether the call for the destruction of Israel resonates beyond the Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guards cadre.

No Israeli leader has ever adopted this approach before, and Netanyahu knows full well that he is touching a nerve. The timing is no coincidence. Not only is Tehran under international pressure to rethink its regional agenda, but, domestically, anger over the regime’s disconnected foreign and economic policies is also growing. Slogans such as “Leave Palestine be, think about us [Iran]” and “Palestine, Syria are reasons for our misery” are now commonly used in protests taking place across Iran.

Netanyahu’s message is accurate, but there could not be a worse messenger. Rather than ceding the platform to Netanyahu – an unpopular figure in Iran – Israelis must seize this opportunity and develop their own dialogue with the Iranian people. Similarly, Iranians need to be ready to respond to their Israeli counterparts, and engage in a serious conversation about their vision for the future.

Creating successful mechanisms for Israeli-Iranian dialogue was the central question raised by a group of U.S.-based Israeli and Iranian policy analysts and scholars (including the authors of this piece) in Washington, D.C. in late 2017. While participants agreed that Israeli and Iranian officials would not be conducting direct negotiations to reduce bilateral tensions anytime soon, many felt that the Iran nuclear deal, to which at the time the U.S. was still a signatory, presented an opening for some limited people-to-people dialogue, especially if executed in coordination with Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities. Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, the discussion about how this people-to-people dialogue might develop is as relevant as ever.

Iranians at the meetings explained that, while their countrymen are protesting their government’s adventurism abroad, this should not lead Israelis to assume that anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments in Iran are merely skin-deep. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians over the last decades have strengthened negative Iranian attitudes towards the Jewish state. Moderate voices in Iran who recognize that hostility towards Israel does not serve their country’s interests do exist, however they lack clear incentives to advocate for a moderate approach.

Emphasizing cultural bonds between the two peoples won’t bridge political differences between the two governments, but they deserve more attention. As our meetings revealed, there are no shortage of stories from older generations who recall the once warm relationship between Tehran and Jerusalem. In a similar vein, the 2015 Israeli film “Baba Joon” was well-received by Iranian audiences because of its touching depiction of how an immigrant family from Iran retained their Persian identity despite relocating to Israel. Unsurprisingly, many Persian Israelis root for “Team Melli” during the World Cup.

A similar emphasis should be placed on social media initiatives. The 2012 “Israel Loves Iran” and corresponding “Iran Loves Israel” campaigns attracted the support of thousands to an anti-war message and revealed how many Israelis and Iranians refuse to accept their respective government’s worldview. These campaigns were particularly successful in targeting younger audiences, and breaking taboos – particularly in Iran, where until several years ago the media would never refer to Israel by name.

Above all, Israelis and Iranians need to be realistic about what a military conflict would mean and the role their governments play in perpetuating this antagonism. So long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, an Iranian U-turn on Israel isn’t in the cards. And it is even less likely that Iran will halt its support for other regional actors, such as Hezbollah, in the years to come. Top-down changes within Israel should not be anticipated either. Rather than wait for political elites to make rational choices, Israeli and Iranian citizens must be the ones to engage one another in dialogue, voice their concerns to their respective leaders, and explore every alternative to war.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA damaged the ability of third parties to effectively deescalate tensions between Israel and Iran. Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in Syria should be applauded, but the results may only serve a stopgap before the next chapter of hostilities. Despite this pessimism, the channels of communication have never been more accessible. People-to-people initiatives may not be able to reverse the narrative of conflict that pervades the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but it may thwart a descent into chaos.

Gabriel Mitchell is policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Segev – a former combat soldier, officer and medical doctor – was elected in 1992 as a member of the right wing Tzomet party. In 1994 he left the party. The following year he was appointed minister of energy in the second Rabin government. He also was made a member of the security cabinet, a group of select ministers that discuss and decide on the most important security matters. Although Dr. Segev served as a minister for less than a year, his vote allowed Prime Minister Rabin to secure a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on a crucial vote for the implementation of the controversial peace deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1996, Dr. Segev was ejected from politics.

Then followed a dramatic fall from grace. In 2004, he was convicted of credit card fraud. In 2005 he received a five-year jail sentence for an attempted drug smuggling operation into Israel. Following his 2007 early release, he left the country for Nigeria, where he relaunched his medical career, due in part to the fact that his medical license was revoked in Israel following his drug-related conviction.

Israeli authorities allege that he established contact with Iranian intelligence agents in Nigeria in 2012. According to the indictment, Dr. Segev provided information to Tehran’s agents and assisted them in trying to create relationships with Israeli business figures, mostly veterans of the security establishment.

Several Israelis were convicted of aiding Iran in the 1990s and 2000s, mostly businesspeople who sold Tehran dual-use or military products. Never before, however, has a senior Jewish-Israeli (former) establishment figure been convicted of spying for Iran, or indeed any other Middle Eastern country. Dr. Segev’s case highlights three issues regarding the current state and context of IranianIsraeli competition.

First, the episode highlights that Iran and Israel are engaged in a truly global intelligence struggle. Much of it is driven by Israel’s concerns over the militarized aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. This Israeli-Iranian competition includes, among other means, intelligence cooperation and alliances for both sides with regional and global partners. Former Israeli intelligence officials suggested that they warned

Dr. Segev in the early 2000s that Hezbollah was trying to make contact with him. It is highly likely that Hezbollah’s past efforts were the basis for Iranian contact with Dr. Segev a decade later. Israel, it seems, was assisted by Equatorial Guinea, which arrested Dr. Segev and repatriated him.

This is clearly a sophisticated struggle with bold moves on both sides. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted in a dramatic April 30 press conference of stealing the archive of the Iranian nuclear program; now, Tehran’s ability to recruit a former member of Israel’s security cabinet has been revealed. At the same time, however, one wonders how long Israel may have known about Dr. Segev’s Iranian connections. Perhaps he served (knowingly or otherwise) as a double agent before being arrested? While we cannot know what the next chapter in this spy saga will be, it is quite safe to predict that more is to come.

Secondly, the Iranian revelation came after a string of dramatic Israeli operational and intelligence successes against Iran and its allies. As noted, Israeli intelligence agents stole an entire Iranian archive, and further humiliated their foes by making the achievement public in an April press conference. On May 10, Israel conducted a massive attack on some fifty Iranian targets in Syria, demonstrating both operational and intelligence dominance. In June, word emerged that Israel was able to convince Moscow to pressure Iran to withdraw its forces and allies from the Syrian-Israeli border. All this took place against the backdrop of unprecedented coordination between Jerusalem and Washington.

Israelis have had to exhibit super-human humility in light of these achievements and the sense of invincibility they have invoked. In the past, Israel miscalculated and fell into strategic traps that led to exorbitant costs during the wars of 1973 and 1982 due to an inflated sense of relative military and intelligence prowess. In this respect, Tehran provided Israel with an important reminder about the limits of Jerusalem’s power and effectiveness.

Finally, responses in Israel to the affair show that Israeli-Iranian tensions are not simply a foreign and security matter, driven by the clash of two of the strongest countries in the Middle East. The Iranian threat also is being used to advance internal political positions.

Israeli right-wing politicians were quick to a make a direct connection between Dr. Segev’s vote in 1995 in favor of the peace deal with the PLO and the current spying allegations. The specific implication is to further delegitimize the Oslo peace process. There is also a deeper effort hinted at here: leftists are traitors, and what seems like an effort to reach peace is, in fact, an act of treachery. A hint of this came in the words of Justice Minister, Ayelet Shakked, who stated on June 18 that Dr. Segev started with “ideological treachery” and then moved to “treason against the state.”

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld.

The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against those still seeking its elimination, justifies even the price of certain seclusion. Nevertheless, straying from the high moral standards upon which Israel was established, and breaching the moral boundaries the state founders have set for us, could become a real threat to the existence and wellbeing of Israel as we know it, and of world Jewry.

The visit to Jerusalem this week by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán [18-20 July] symbolizes such moral failure. The recent agreement reached by the Israeli and Polish governments, exonerating Poland of some of its notorious actions during the World War II, is another example of boundaries that Israelis should not cross.

In her unconventional book on the banality of evil, reporting from the trial of Nazi criminal Eichmann, German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “evil can be banal and redefined as a civil norm.” She added that, “most people will comply but some people will not […] The Final Solution […] ‘could happen’ in most places but it did not happen everywhere.” While Orbán and his like across Europe cannot be compared to Nazi criminal Eichmann, reactions today in parts of Europe to immigration from the east serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly and seamlessly moral standards can deteriorate, also and even presently in Europe.

Hosting illiberal leaders in Jerusalem whose raison d’être is elimination of immigration, and by that legitimizing their policies, is an absurdity and an outcry. The reasons pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to court Poland, Hungary and others, in an effort to split and weaken the EU toll in the region is understandable. He and his government often face automatic and even perfunctory criticism from the EU conglomerate, so trying to draw a wedge inside Europe is basic realpolitik. The EU has some responsibility, too, when others are more inclined to accept forces wishing to destroy the principles on which it stands.

Nevertheless, short-term political gains from realigning with Europe’s extreme right might prove very costly for Israel. Endorsing Orbán works against the Jewish state’s core values and interests. For Israeli leadership, national interest should go far beyond immediate political gains and their responsibility extends to world Jewry. The implications of their actions and statements ought to be in good faith for the Jewish people and for Zionism-at-large.

The litmus test for Israel’s leaders in that regard should be whether the Jewish community in the discussed country supports the leadership in question. Are the country’s Jews as a minority feeling welcome, safe and protected? In the case of Hungary, the answer is no. Orbán’s anti-Semitic undertones and policies threaten Hungary’s Jews. That should be sufficient to disinvite him and several others who are in a similar position.

Beyond the immediate political gains, the EU and Israel should act more responsibly in order to serve the long term interests and wellbeing of their people. Brussels and Jerusalem must reestablish trust and increase practical exchange within the wide spectrum of center-right and center-left in both entities. They should work together, within the many existing joint frameworks, to create more unity between moderate forces, and together reject radicalism. Israel has valued expertise it can share with the EU in the field of absorbing immigrants and making refugees feel at home. Europe’s greatest challenge today is one Israel has dealt with throughout its existence, being a true immigrant society. In proportional terms, Israel taking in one million Russian immigrants when it had less than six, some three decades ago, can be compared to Germany taking in over ten million immigrants today. Albeit not similar, specifically on the background of religious affinity between Jews which is absent in Europe, many challenges are the same.

Israel will stand to gain from opposing Europe’s extremists and sticking to the noble values upon which it was established. World Jewry will be proud once again to be affiliated with their second homeland, Israel. And Europe will have an ally with unprecedented credibility in fighting xenophobia, a calming element to a most volatile region at its footsteps, to defend the values upon which the European Union was created, on the rubbles of World War II.

Raanan Eliaz founded and led for a decade the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and its Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD), two organizations dedicated to strengthening relations between Europe and Israel. He is a member of the Mitvim Institute’s task-team on Israel-EU relations.

(originally published by EurActiv)

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quest for an Honest Broker in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The leaders played a significant role in the process. The president of South Korea, as opposed to his predecessors who supported tough policies and the enforcement of sanctions, adhered to his policy of dialogue with the neighbor to the north. He took advantage of the hosting of the Winter Olympics to invite a delegation from North Korea. Indeed, the participation of Kim’s sister in the opening ceremony was the harbinger of the change in North Korea’s position. On the other hand, North Korea’s president, Kim, has shown that his rigid and threatening image was wrong. Whether the economic sanctions and the fear of an American attack played a role, or whether in Kim’s view the last ballistic experiment has deterred the US, the result has been a change in his position. There are obviously those who fear that this is merely a tactical change designed to maximize profits within the international community, but in any case, the leadership has proven that it is capable of changing positions and initiating a “game-changing” course.

In comparison, the leaders on both sides of our “conflict” – Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – have not yet proved that they are capable and willing to promote a real solution to the conflict. Netanyahu’s hands are tied by his right-wing coalition that is ideologically committed to the vision of a greater Israel. He is also engaged in internal political struggles and is troubled by his legal issues of corruption. His policies and behavior convey that he has neither motivation nor determination to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, Abbas has so far escaped two rounds of negotiations, one with Olmert in 2008 and the second with Netanyahu in 2014, and it does not seem that he is inclined – now that he is approaching the end of his political career – to sign the deal of his life. Moreover, Abbas does not enjoy Palestinian legitimacy in the PA, while Hamas challenges his authority. There are two conditions that need to be met in order to promote a solution, legitimacy and determination. Both leaders do not meet these conditions, partially or fully.

The second element concerns the role of the mediator. Trump tried to give a feel of neutrality to his mediation, when he was secretly negotiating with North Korea, during which he also sent the head of the CIA, Pompeo (who in the meanwhile had been appointed Secretary of State) for a visit. He also wisely used “sticks” and “carrots”: on the one hand, he increased the economic pressure on North Korea and also threatened to take military action; On the other hand, he proposed to hold a summit with Kim soon, which previous presidents were not willing to do, thereby granting American legitimacy to the isolated president. Unfortunately, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump has so far made almost every possible mistake, the last of which is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The decision, which was meant to be part of the “carrots” that Israel would receive in exchange for its concessions in the negotiations, eliminated Trump’s pretense of becoming a neutral mediator. He can still correct this by making a counter-decision “in favor of” the Palestinians, but it does not appear that he intends to do so.

Finally, the outstanding issues in the two conflicts are completely different; The main issue in the Korean conflict is the unification of the two parts of the nation, which was arbitrarily separated during the Cold War: the north is afraid of losing power; while the south fears the economic costs of unifying a strong and progressive economy with the backward economy of the north. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated, but it has already been solved elsewhere, when East and West Germany united even though the conditions were different. More importantly, the Korean conflict does not include some of the explosive components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the question of borders, the question of Palestine’s independence, and notably the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The fact that the religious aspect does not play a role in the Korean conflict makes it less complicated and more manageable.

Beyond that, the history of “our” conflict does not work in Trump’s favor; external mediation alone has never been able to solve it. Peace with Egypt was initiated by Sadat; the Oslo Accords were initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil society players; while peace with Jordan was led mainly by Hussein and Rabin. It follows, therefore, that unlike the Korean story, Trump’s chances of breaking the impasse in our conflict are not great. If he wishes to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean arena seems more promising.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dr. Alon Levkowitz is an expert on Korea, teaches at Beit Berl College and is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Korea Is Not a Likely Precedent for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The diplomacy of the 21st century is increasingly different in nature than that of past decades. It is no longer the exclusive domain of ambassadors and diplomats but is characterized by the larger involvement of civil society organizations, business entities, private entrepreneurs, ordinary citizens, and members of parliament.

This poses challenges for foreign ministries worldwide, whose share in implementing foreign policy becomes less significant. In order to cope with this phenomenon, some of them are taking steps that will emphasize – to decision-makers and the public alike – that even in the present age there is no substitute for professional diplomacy and the bodies that lead it.

A review of the steps taken on this issue by foreign ministries in various countries points at a common denominator: the use of public appeal and greater public participation. Foreign ministries, who are used to the practice of influencing public positions in foreign countries, also started investing efforts in fostering relations with the public in their home countries.

Recent steps taken by the foreign services of Germany, England, Australia, Sweden and the EU, for example, include: formulating and presenting foreign policy paradigms and guidelines; leading campaigns that emphasize the importance of diplomacy; explaining to the public the work of a diplomat as well as the work of the foreign ministry and its achievements; holding regular media briefings on current political issues; appearing before a variety of local audiences; and carrying out formal consultations with the public.

It is no coincidence that one of the most prominent signs of the weakening of the US State Department under President Trump, was a significant reduction in the scope and number of media briefings. Reduced interaction with the media entails reduced presence of the ministry in the public discourse therefore less exposure of its work and importance to the public.

The Israeli MFA is currently at a significant point of weakness – not only in terms of budget and manpower, but also due to a deliberate move to weaken it by dispersing its authority. Some of the measures needed to empower the ministry require that the government makes decisions and takes action. However, with regard to enhancing its transparency and sharing more information with the public about its work, the ministry can take action right away.

The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that within the Israeli public there is a desire to know more about the MFA’s activities, and a belief that being more transparent will help in the empowerment of the ministry. Doing so requires a different mindset. Today, the MFA sometimes regards its weakness as a factor that prevents – rather than encourages – more transparency, and this needs to be changed.

The Israeli MFA is on the defensive against an acting Foreign Minister (Prime Minister Netanyahu) who has taken steps in recent years to deliberately weaken the ministry, against a deputy foreign minister (Tzipi Hotovely) who advances an agenda that is further to the right than that of the government, and against other ministries that provide financial means for MFA activities, but in a manner that creates dependence and limitations.

The MFA is recently recognizing the importance of increased transparency. For the first time, its 2018 work plan includes a chapter dealing with improving the ministry’s public positioning and sharing information with the public. While this is a positive development, its implementation still lies in the future. Currently, the MFA does not publish annual reports that summarize its activities and achievements, does not conduct regular media briefings, does not make its annual assessment public (unlike some security bodies), does not provide its representations abroad with clear evaluation criteria for its representations abroad, and excessively tends to seek immunity for the (few) discussions that are held in the Knesset on foreign affairs.

The reasons for this conduct partially lie in the need for a conceptual change within the MFA, as well as in the difficulties facing the ministry in the current political context. In such a reality, the Knesset should play a more important role in encouraging and promoting transparency in the foreign service, and in making diplomacy more central to decision making. The MFA, for its part, must open up to the Israeli public, and continue its adaptation to the modern diplomacy of the 21st century. Doing so will also prepare the ministry for the day when a new Israeli government take shape, hopefully with a full-time foreign minister, who will seek ways to empower the ministry and not further diminish it.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Need for Increased Transparency in the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council) 

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper compares the discourse promoted by the Israeli government, especially by the Prime Minister, that seeks to create an alternative discourse with the one that prevailed until a decade ago. The new discourse is constructed around two main pillars: hope for better relations with the Arab world, but not for a real “peace” or “agreement”, and the belief that it is possible to promote such relations even without attending to the relations with the Palestinians. According to the new working assumptions of the Israeli leadership, this is possible because the Arab world no longer takes interest in the Palestinian struggle as it did in the past, due to two reasons: first, the conflicts within the Arab world (especially the Shia- Sunni conflict) push the moderate Arab states to view Israel as a partner rather than an enemy; and second, because of joint regional interests.

This new perception has no ground to stand on since historically, the relations between Israel and the Arab states have always depended on the Israeli-Palestinian relations. It also overturns the Arab League Initiative, which Netanyahu once claimed was “dangerous to the State of Israel in its current form” (2007) and later claimed “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative” (2016). The “new” Netanyahu is willing to welcome the initiative as a basis for regional peace because he is ignoring its major requirement that an Israeli- Palestinian agreement be signed prior to the establishment of normal regional relations.

This article focuses on the discourse promoted by the Prime Minister and his surroundings since they are the most dominant and central actors shaping the debate. Moreover, even Netanyahu’s political opponents find it difficult to create an alternative discourse: In the absence of a Palestinian partner, who can oppose any strengthening of ties with the Arab states? However, this discourse, sometimes consciously and overtly, tries to avoid the main problem: without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world cannot be normalized. Therefore, this perception leads in practice to continued attempts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of encouraging its resolution.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

First, there is security-related anxiety. Many view the Arab citizens of Israel as a potential fifth column. Israel was born out of a civil war with the local Arab population, and is still around with a generally hostile Arab World. Yet, Israel is very strong and provides effective security, both domestically and externally. It can deal with such a challenge. Moreover, even if Palestinian citizens of Israel identify with the Palestinian people, their involvement in subversive activity against the state has been negligible. Even in the early days of the state, when the scars of the 1947-9 war were fresh, defense officials believed that Israel’s Arab citizens were sufficiently loyal to join the military (IDF). In 1953, then-Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon ordered that Arabs be drafted to the IDF. Thousands flocked to recruitment centers before the initiative was revoked. An interim response to the security-related fear could be forming a coalition in the Knesset that enjoys the prestige of security professionals but leads a mainly civilian agenda. That was the Rabin way: A revered IDF Chief-of-Staff and Defense Minister, who as prime minister was heavily involved in inherently civilian issues such as education and health. The current health challenge even creates an even easier framework for such an approach.

The personal anxiety over a coalition with Arab Members of Knesset (MKs) stems from the repercussions of cultural reservations and the desire to maintain separate spaces (as reflected in polls among Jews) in politics, too. In fact, many spaces, such as the health system, and some governing coalitions in local government are completely integrated. The century-old separation between the two populations is increasingly eroding even in its symbolic dimensions. In 2019, Dr. Haj Yehia was appointed as Chairman of the Board of Bank Leumi, an institution originally established to serve the Zionist movement.

The anxiety over national identity is perhaps the most significant. Many are concerned that inclusion of a non-Zionist Arab party in the coalition poses a threat to the state’s Jewish and Zionist identity. The March 2020 news conference at which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu counted the number of Zionist MKs versus the Arab non-Zionist ones touched on this fear. This is a bit peculiar. in most sectors of Israeli politics, ideology does not appear as central as it was in the past. Very few parties, if all, presented platforms in the last few elections. Under these circumstances, the insistence on ideological commitment should be downplayed. A potential, practical solution is to leave unresolved ideological issues out of any agreement with Arab parties.

Second, on the institutional level, a measure of creativity could alleviate the identity anxieties harbored by some in the Jewish public. For example, the Arab parties could support the government in Knesset votes but grant their MKs freedom to vote according to their conscience on certain issues, or they could decide that only some of the parties that make up the Joint List would vote with the government but not all of them. A strong arbitration mechanism would also help in this regard.

Third, Zionist institutions have a history of cooperation with non-Zionist elements. The Jewish Agency, for example, which was the central tool of Zionist development until the establishment of the state, was formed in 1929 as a partnership with non-Zionist forces (although they subsequently dropped out). In fact, most Israeli governments have included non-Zionist elements, i.e. the ultra-Orthodox parties. In recent years, it was Netanyahu who cooperated with the Arab parties on several political measures, such as mobilizing their Knesset support in 2019 for his appointee as State Comptroller.

Additionally, contrary to public perception, there are precedents for the inclusion of Arab parties in coalitions. In fact, up until the 1970s, almost all coalitions included Arab slates such as the Arab Democratic Party and the Progress and Development Party. Many tended to dismiss these parties as satellites of the powerful ruling Mapai party rather than authentic Arab representatives. Still, some of their members (such as Elias Nakhleh) took to arms against the establishment of the state in the War of Independence. But once the war ended, they were elected to the Knesset and led their parties to membership in coalitions. At the very least, this is an important symbolic precedent.

Finally, it should be recalled that great Zionist leaders, such as Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Yitzhak Gruenbaum were committed to minority coalitions in Russia and Poland, that would include Jewish representation. Jabotinsky foresaw the future Jewish state with Arabs among its top political echelons. A coalition consisting of Jewish and Arab MKs members would also be important for Israel’s foreign relations, for example in helping revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and fostering regional cooperation with Arab states. Such a coalition would even have public diplomacy value in deflecting accusations at international fora that Israel is a racist state.

The anxieties over the inclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the coalition are understandable. However, under current circumstances and given an orderly response to the real fears, the Blue and White party led by three former IDF chiefs must and can create a partnership with the Joint List.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Associate Professor of international affairs at Haifa University and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He is also a visiting researcher at Stanford University’s Political Science Department.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט In With the Arabs: The Joint List Should Be Part of the Coalition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel expressed its regret over the incident and promised to continue the legal proceedings, as well as pay damages to the families of the two citizens and to the family of PalestinianJordanian judge Raed Zeiter, who was shot to death at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in March 2014. In return, the Israeli Embassy in Jordan will return to full activity, although Ambassador Einat Shlain will not return to her post and will be replaced by a new ambassador.

The Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “Israel attaches great importance to its strategic relations with Jordan, and the two countries will act to advance their cooperation and to strengthen the peace treaty between them.” But if Israel really attaches so much strategic importance to these relations, why did it wait six months before solving the issue?

This isn’t the first time that Israel’s relations with Jordan are marred by a security incident. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting the Island of Peace site in Naharayim. Jordan’s King Hussein rushed to calm the situation down: He cut short a visit to Spain and came to Israel to offer condolences to the victims’ families. He also issued an apology for the schoolgirls’ murder.

Several months later, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil. The operation failed, several Mossad fighters were captured by the local police and others found shelter in the Israeli Embassy building. Then-Mossad Director Danny Yatom was quickly sent by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief the king on the details of the operation. His request to release the detained agents was turned down, but the crisis was solved within 12 days after several Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy and Ariel Sharon, made efforts to calm the king down. Halevy’s proposal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison was the compensation accepted by Jordan.

In August 2011, shortly after the January 25 Revolution which led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, seven Israelis were killed in a series of terror attacks on Highway 12. As part of Israel’s military response, an IDF force entered Sinai and killed five Egyptian policemen. The incident led to a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Egypt, which threatened to recall its ambassador. Two months later, then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued an apology for the killing of the Egyptian policemen, bringing the crisis to an end.

While each incident has its own unique characteristics, several insights can be drawn from these events: First of all, a quick response is highly important. It has the power of preventing the crisis, or at least preventing it from getting worse. It also shows that the other side sees the incident as important and understands the need to come up with an immediate solution.

Netanyahu did send the Shin Bet chief to Jordan immediately to try to solve the problem, but the Jordanian side didn’t feel that the Israeli government saw it as a top priority. The fact that it took six months to reach an agreement indicates that the Israeli government didn’t ascribe much importance to the crisis. Meanwhile, emotions in Jordan ran high against Israel.

Second, the political echelon’s involvement in the negotiations is highly important. The prime minister himself, or at least the defense minister, should lead the reconciliation move.

Third, we should know how to apologize. An apology isn’t a display of weakness, especially if it comes from a place of confidence and strength. Accidentally killing a Jordanian citizen is definitely a reason to apologize.

Fourth, Israel’s decision makers shouldn’t consider “their” public opinion in this case, but rather the public opinion in the other country. Part of the Jordanian anger was directed at way Netanyahu publicly greeted the ambassador and the security guard, in a bid to gain support in the Israeli public opinion. In light of the Jordanian sensitivity, the prime minister could have given up the photo-op and settled for a private rather than public meeting.

Finally, we should offer the other side compensation to convey that we understand the sensitivity on the Jordanian side, and especially its royal family, which has been standing by Israel for years—secretly and behind the scenes—when it comes to important security issues. In other words, the long-term interest overshadows the short-term interest.

We should welcome the agreement, and better late than never, but the decision-making process on the Israeli side—if such a process actually took place—must be criticized. The weak Israeli response emphasizes the absence of the Foreign Ministry, and the absence of a full-time foreign minister, from the process. In any event, we should hope the decision makers draw the lessons from this case and other past tensions with Egypt and Jordan and implement them in the next crisis.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It’s hard to be optimistic. Israeli leaders have become too comfortable for too long doing nothing, while the Palestinian leadership seems intent on cannibalizing itself, with the help of the occupation. But future leaders may want to take a look at South Africa, as I did on a recent trip, for some comparative insights about why inaction is a terrible idea.

The first obvious comparison between the two regions made famous in 2006 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s book, Peace, not Apartheid, was important at the time. The shock value (for some) helped place Israel’s occupation on a similar level of severity as the infamous regime. However, over a decade later, the debate over whether occupation should be considered apartheid has grown stale. The word has become a team insignia rather than a signifier, and the toxic argument obscures other valuable insights from South Africa about how a conflict can wane, end, and eventually  transform.

In South Africa today, one implicit question seems to run like a river beneath most conversations: is it working? Did ending apartheid bring a better life for the oppressed, while protecting the erstwhile oppressors and their descendants?

Apartheid’s bitter residue still stains the country. Although the policy ended over two decades ago, Peter Sullivan, former chief editor of The Star, South Africa’s premier daily newspaper, stated pointedly to me, “When did it really end?”

Apartheid’s legacy crops up in conversation about nearly all social issues. Young people live with post-conflict experiments designed to equalize educational and professional opportunities. Art exhibits address contemporary struggles of racial identity. The country seems to hover between the vibrancy of a new society building itself – similar to the spirit that drew me to Israel in my 20s – and a descent into grave ills of corruption and crime.

Thus the second main comparison is less about Israel-Palestine, but relates to other post-conflict societies where I have worked: when conflict ends, it can take decades for society to change. Setbacks abound. Democracy didn’t solve apartheid’s problems – it sparked a process of addressing them that could not start beforehand.

By refusing to advance a political agreement now, Israelis and Palestinians postpone the long exorcism of conflict legacy, which can only begin after the structures of conflict fall.

The third main comparison involves the reasons why leaders postpone this process – and the consequences of waiting.

In Israel one often hears that the two parties are too hostile and cannot trust each other. Israelis are terrified that a Palestinian state might become a terrorist theocracy, while a one-state scenario (or a two-state confederation) could mean that that each side floods the other and destroys their respective national character. “It will take time,” is a commonly heard refrain.

South Africa’s leaders too thought the indeterminate future was a good time for progress. In 1966, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd said: “What about the future? I have…little doubt about the solution of our racial problems, if given the time. If meddlesome people keep their hands off us, we shall… provide all our races with happiness and prosperity.” He was assassinated a short time later. As the end of apartheid neared, its stalwart supporters remained terrified that black South Africans could not govern or coexist with whites. They will destroy us, people had said. “’One person, one vote will happen only once,’” Sullivan recalled critics of democracy saying.

Fears may be legitimate – but they are also eternal. Waiting for them to subside before resolving a conflict probably means never resolving it.

As to the substance of those fears – that an agreement will bring doomsday scenarios – Albie Sachs wrote in his 2016 book We the People: Insights of an Activist Judge: “From a moral point of view, it seems most dubious to refrain from dealing with an actual and manifest evil because of anxiety that its elimination might lead to the appearance of another evil…” Sachs served as a judge on the first Constitutional Court in the newly democratic South Africa; he also lost his right arm and an eye to a bomb for his opposition to apartheid. In the book, he continues: “The best time for fighting for freedom is always now.”

Between the two regions, the consequences of chronically postponing the end of the conflict are starting to resemble each other. South Africa’s apartheid policy long outlived its legitimacy, inspiring a painful international economic and cultural boycott. Various forms of boycott or global censure that may be used against Israel need not be identical, to hurt.

As a last resort (and a last comparison), those who resist resolution in Israel and Palestine will insist that there is simply no answer at present. The two-state solution may no longer be possible, while one state is largely undesired. A two-state confederation is too new to have widespread legitimacy.

But ending apartheid took many forms; the old adage says that peace is a process, not an event. Apartheid laws were repealed in 1991, an interim constitution passed in 1993 and a final one in 1996, the first full-suffrage elections were held in 1994. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission followed, and aggressive affirmative action policies have been implemented to nurture equality. The laborious dismantling of institutions, habits, and behaviors associated with white rule continues today.

The problems cannot be papered over. South Africa is racked by economic inequality; lavish wealth sits atop indigent sprawl, and the gaps are heavily (though not totally) race-bound. Party patronage and hints of tribal politics threaten democratic governance. Crime is so bad that walls and wire barricade private homes; signs threaten thieves with electrocution, armed response, and poison. On August 8, the National Assembly held a vote of no-confidence against President Jacob Zuma, widely seen as corrupt, but failed to win a majority.

And yet, there are clear signs of people taking their destiny into their hands. Civil society makes vigorous efforts to engage citizens and deepen democracy. The no-confidence vote was a secret ballot; Baleka Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly, announced the rules thoroughly and deliberately, with a hint of pride at this procedural integrity. In Durban, a multi-racial stream of joggers stop at hipster cafés in the morning, indicating growing diversity of the middle (and upper) classes.

When I asked Albie Sachs broadly how South Africa is doing now, he said “First of all, we have a country, and nobody predicted we could get a country. People predicted a racial bloodbath…that’s a huge achievement.”

South Africa should remind the ailing leaders of this region, or their successors, that the road to transformation is long and imperfect – and it must start now. Maybe the bar is low now, but first of all, we can do better.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Lessons, Warnings and Hope from South Africa for Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Not even a small family gathering. For 15 years it has been set on the table, clear, inviting, with boundless potential. But at this point, it is a contender for the biggest missed opportunity for peace since the State of Israel was established. Except for a short time during the Ehud Olmert-Tzipi Livni era, Israeli leadership has not dealt with it seriously. Most Israelis do not even know about it.

The Regional Peace Initiative, or the Arab Peace Initiative, was adopted by the Arab League in 2002. It is an initiative for ending the Israeli- Arab conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) adopted the initiative, which means dozens of Muslim countries, including powerhouses like Pakistan and Indonesia. Only a single country – Iran – is opposed to the initiative, and this points to the depth of shared interests between Israel and many Arab and Muslim states.

The condition for normal relations with all these countries is the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. It should be noted that the original phrasing of the initiative also relates to the refugee issue and to Israeli withdrawal from all disputed territories, including the Golan Heights.

These issues raise opposition among most Israeli political actors. However, the Arab League already announced some eight years ago that the initiative does not include the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Regarding the Golan Heights, it has been off the agenda for several years due to the civil war in Syria.

So, there is really only one issue left on the table: the Palestinians.

It is hard to find even one Knesset member who speaks up against the notion of “regional peace.” Even the most hardline Likud or Bayit Yehudi MKs invoke the immense security and economic advantages that Israel would gain from having the whole Middle East and Muslim world open up to it. But they regard the regional initiative as a means to bypass the Palestinian issue. Instead of negotiating with the Palestinians over territories and settlements, they aspire for “economic peace” with the Arab states. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is playing a leading role in promoting this approach. There is just one small problem: no Arab actor has ever agreed to it.

Netanyahu’s approach to the regional issue is a false one: he plays the regional card as an attempt to dissolve any prospect for progress with the Palestinians, and to ensure his own political survival.

To this end he tempted and deluded Labor MK Isaac Herzog, who was willing to join his government to advance a big regional move. Netanyahu has succeeded in putting the peace process into deep freeze. Unfortunately, the regional initiative, and all its potential benefits for Israel, froze along with it.

Nevertheless, even today this initiative is the most relevant of all those discussed.

It is not dead. On the contrary.

Due to the major developments in the Middle East, the prospects for its realization have even become better.

The “price” that Israel has to pay has not changed: A Palestinian state in the territories beyond the Green Line.

This is the core aspect of the conflict, and there is nothing that Netanyahu and Education Minister Naftali Bennett can do to change that.

However, unlike in the past, there is now an Arab willingness to move forward with implementing the regional initiative in parallel to Israeli- Palestinian negotiations, and not only after their successful completion. This is a major change which was revealed in March 2017 at a conference held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. All that is currently needed to significantly improve Israel’s ties with its Arab neighbors is the renewal of a genuine peace process with the Palestinians.

At the height of Netanyahu’s fourth term in office, it is clear that as far as he is concerned, there will never be any progress with the Palestinians.

But perhaps it is not only up to him. US President Donald Trump’s sudden motivation to promote peace, his desire to broker a deal between Israelis and Palestinians, and the heavy boot Russian President Vladimir Putin has put on the ground in Syria – in the heart of the Middle East – may drag Netanyahu to the regional negotiating table in spite of himself.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Arab Peace Initiative is the Greatest Missed Opportunity in Israel’s History הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

More broadly, the visit is part of the Israeli “pivot”, of sorts, to Asia. This is the Prime Minister’s second visit to China in three years. Only in February, he visited Singapore and Australia. Israeli President, Reuven Rivlin, traveled to India in November 2016 and to Vietnam in March 2017. The institutional framework that supports the “pivot” is also being expanded. In February, the Prime Minister (who is also the Foreign Minister) announced that the units responsible for China and India in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be upgraded.

However, this is not only a story about economic cooperation. The broader, global context of the “pivot” is the transformation in great power politics. Asia’s economic and technological rise is bound to lead Asian nations to expand their military and political power. China’s economic prowess already equals the US’ (according to some measures); while the West’s centuries-long hegemony is being shaken in the last decade as both Western Europe and the US faced a number of major political and economic crises, some of which are still unfolding. Israel, and the Zionist movement before, had always sought a great power ally. The “pivot” to Asia, is simply an adaptation of the old policy to new global realities.

However, three question are in order

First, can Israel get close to China without risking its “special relationship” with the United States? China’s rise to great power status and the specific challenges it poses to American hegemony – both in terms of power and in terms of norms – have already strained AmericanChinese relations. The Trump administration seems to further exacerbate the tension, mostly over trade issues. Steven Bannon, the President’s chief strategist, predicted (before the elections) that within a decade Washington and Beijing would go to war with each other. The Falcon deal incident, in which Israel canceled under American pressure (in 2000) an agreement to sell advanced surveillance aircraft to China, is a reminder of the difficulties of the balancing act required from Israel. For this reason, it is convenient for Israel to stress the economic dimension of its relationship with China, rather than a strategic agenda.

Second, will Israel ever be able to develop relations with China that are as close as its relations with the United States? Some of the fundamental building blocks of the IsraeliAmerican “special relationship”– a large Jewish community, an effective pro-Israel lobby – are simply not there. Israel and China further lack the deeper common Judeo-Christian tradition that oils aspects of Israeli-American affinity. Hence the Israeli effort to stress, when talking to Chinese, the similarities of modern states that reflect ancient traditions that both presumably share.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly: how would a close Chinese-Israeli relationship affect Israel’s own democracy, already under strain lately. After all, a state’s internal makings are also affected by the global structures of power, and the state’s alliance in the international arena. It seems that the Chinese stress power and historical rights as a source for legitimate action in the international arena, rather than universal norms. Those in Israel who prefer such an approach might use the example set by the new global power as a justification for a similar approach in Israeli foreign and security policy. Moreover, China traditionally prefers not to intervene in other states’ internal affairs, and is unlikely to comment on the quality of internal Israeli democracy and human rights the way Washington and Western European countries do. A growing role for China in the international community, and a closer alliance with China, are expected to diminish, therefore, the pressure Israel is facing – especially from civil society circles in the West – as it continues to control the Palestinians, and as its democracy is weakening.

Small states, such as Israel, do not always have much choice in the global competition between superpowers. Yet, as Israel reshapes its global alliances, we should be aware of the constraints and costs of getting closer to the rising power from the east.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Netanyahu Goes to China: Three Questions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the lessons learned from the Arafat era, in which violence was encouraged and used as a political tool, Abbas wants to change the way Palestinians are viewed by Western eyes. Instead of Palestinians being viewed as peace rejectionists who adopt violence as what they think is a legitimate tool, Abbas wants them to be viewed as a nation searching for a diplomatic solution for its national tribulations, while receiving support from the global community.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena.

The new American administration does not bode well for the Palestinians. During the election campaign, Trump issued statements that he would give Israel a green light to expand settlements and that he would relocate the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also appointed a right-wing ambassador to Israel (David Friedman) who supports the settlement enterprise. All these actions aroused deep suspicion among the Palestinians. Even if Trump does not carry through on the embassy relocation, due to the sensitivity of the subject and concern over the great anger it would arouse in the Arab world – the very fact that the president supports such an idea teaches the Palestinians that they do not have a friend in the White House.

One of the paths taken by the PA to protest the emerging American policy was to accept a Russian invitation to attend a summit with all the Palestinian factions in Moscow in January 2017. The close ties between the PLO and Russia are natural, as they are based on a positive historic relationship. The socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO enjoy an ideological-historical affinity with the Russians. These groups include: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP; communists). Abbas himself was closely aligned with the Russian regime for many years. It was in Moscow that Abbas wrote his controversial doctorate. Also, Abbas served as chairman of the Russia-PLO Friendship Association for many years.

The goal of the discussions held between the Palestinian factions under the Russian umbrella was to try to promote an internal Palestinian reconciliation, and an actual timetable for its implementation. Following the summit in Moscow, Fatah and Hamas reached a new agreement about conducting municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in mid-May 2017. The discussions regarding the elections dates were held simultaneously with laborious talks between the various factions that attempted to create a formula for reforming the PLO’s political structure and integrating Islamic elements in PLO institutions.

But the growing Palestinian rapprochement with Russia does not only focus on attempts to achieve internal Palestinian reconciliation. It also serves to exert pressure on Israel and diminish US prestige in the region. Thus, the PA is sending out two messages, one to Russia and one to the US. They are telling Russia that the Palestinians are willing to give Russia a role in their internal reconciliation process, and they are sending a message to the US regarding the way the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should be conducted in the future. Abbas declares at every international forum that he accepts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to an Abbas-Netanyahu summit in Moscow. He reiterates that he is waiting for an answer from the Israeli government, to jump-start the peace process.

The fact that the Palestinians do not view the US as an “honest broker” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only heightens Abbas’ achievement in convincing the Obama administration to refrain from using its veto power to block UN Resolution 2334.

Resolution 2334 is one of the salient Palestinian diplomatic achievements in the Obama era. This resolution was warmly received by the PLO. More surprising was that it also drew positive reactions from Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, despite the fact that the resolution supports the two-state solution, calls for continued security coordination between Israel and the PA and is vague regarding if and how pressure will actually be placed on Israel.

The tightening relationship between the PA and Russia against the background of the change of government in the US shows that the Palestinians are trying to tell the Trump administration that there are additional power brokers in the global arena. And, according to the Palestinians, these other entities can counterbalance what they believe will be Trump’s pro-Israel policy.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is growing and is expressed by the active fighting of Russian forces alongside Assad’s regime in Syria against the rebels, and also by Russian provision of advanced weapons to Syria and Iran. This involvement, together with the Palestinian-Russian alliance, creates a sense of Middle East deja-vu. Are we returning to the diplomatic principles of the Cold War?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The future of Palestinian diplomacy in the Trump era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been a busy month for Benjamin Netanyahu. For the third week in a row, Israel’s prime minister has journeyed outside of the Middle East in order to advance his country’s interests. But after enjoying high-profile meetings with British Prime Minister Theresa May and US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu’s world tour heads eastward, with stops in Singapore and Australia.

There is no denying that Netanyahu is making history. Operating as both prime minister and foreign minister, Netanyahu has expanded his international travel schedule, visiting corners of the globe familiar to Israeli backpackers but alien to most of their politicians. In the last year alone, Netanyahu’s passport has collected stamps from Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. His arrival in Sydney this Wednesday will mark the first ever visit by an Israeli head-of-state.

Netanyahu’s jet-setting is indicative of a shift within Israel’s foreign policy strategy away from the United States and Europe. Israel is cognizant that the geopolitical order is shifting away from a unipolar world and is making preparations that will compensate for America’s withdrawal from the world stage. Frustrated with European ‘interference’ in its relationship with the Palestinians, Israel is casting a wide net in search for international partners who are less interested in the conflict. As the aforementioned list demonstrates, this approach has worked predominantly with non-democratic states.

This is not the case with Australia, which boasts strong democratic values, a robust economy and is both culturally and strategically linked with the West. Membership in the anglosphere is yet another important distinction. As Netanyahu will undoubtedly reiterate during his stay, Australia and Israel are natural partners and there are tremendous opportunities for cooperation on a host of issues—including cyber security, counterterrorism, environmental and agricultural sciences and of course high-tech.

But in fact, it is because of these unique qualities that the Australian government can use the same platform it is providing Netanyahu to articulate its own interests.

If Australia wants to contribute to peace in the Middle East, it should reaffirm its support of the two-state solution. The two-state solution has come under heavy scrutiny of late and it is unclear how committed the current US administration is to ensuring that Israelis and Palestinians reach that goal. Still, it was perplexing how Foreign Minister Julie Bishop could support Trump’s damaging “two-state, one-state” remarks just days after joining the near universal condemnation of a controversial Israeli law that retroactively legalizes all West Bank settler homes constructed on private Palestinian land.

Trump’s comments have emboldened Netanyahu’s rivals. Many believe it is only a matter of time before he is ousted from office—he is currently under investigation in multiple police cases—and challenging his position on the settlements is an easy way to score points. Those close to Netanyahu claim that the prime minister still supports the two-state solution, yet such reports are difficult to believe when he always appears to be in a fight for his political life. So goes the game of thrones that is Israeli domestic politics.

When international actors send mixed messages on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it only strengthens the radical camps in both societies—often bearing deadly results. Rather than limiting its involvement to rhetorical statements, the Australian government should try to incentivize Israeli efforts towards peace, perhaps by offering to facilitate dialogue between Israel and ASEAN’s Muslim-majority member states that have historically been reluctant to normalize relations with the Jewish State.

Alternatively, Australia could lend its support for the kind of US-led regional peace initiative that was pursued by the Obama administration and floated during the Trump-Netanyahu press conference in Washington, DC.

Both countries should be thinking as big when it comes to strengthening bilateral ties. The Israel Trade Commission and the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce provide a strong foundation for commercial ties to grow, and their efforts should be applauded. Still, taking the Australia-Israel relationship to the next level requires investment in new bilateral initiatives—similar to the industrial R&D agreement signed by Israel and the NSW government in April 2016—as well as expanding existing scientific exchange programs, establishing joint energy and water management projects, and creating room for future military exchanges.

The future of Australian-Israeli bilateral relations will ultimately be determined by the tone and content of the dialogue between their respective societies. If the last decade is any indication, there is legitimate reason for optimism. Still, the gravity of official state visits such as these should not be overlooked. With Netanyahu finally ‘Down Under’, Australia’s government has a historic opportunity to clarify its own position on the two-state solution at a time when international support is at an all-time low. Such a demonstration from a trusted ally may pressure Netanyahu to clarify some of his own dubious remarks, but more importantly it would resonate with Israelis who are tired of opportunistic politicians and seek international partners that will ‘talk straight’ when engaged in a face-to-face conversation.

(originally published in the Australian Outlook)

הפוסט Why Australia Needs to be Straight-Talking with Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

His ministers followed suit, and have been spreading optimism about regional developments in the making. In June 2016, then-Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation Ayoob Kara declared that within weeks or months Israelis “will hear more good news about ties with several countries in the region”. Eight months have passed, without major breakthroughs, but the optimism is still there. On February 19th, Minister Israel Katz said that Israel’s relations with the Gulf states “can be upgraded, and are going to be upgraded significantly”. Government members frequently tell the Israeli public that Israel’s current state of affairs with the Arab world is better than ever before, even though they usually refuse to provide details, citing a need for secrecy.

Does this reflect a regional reality, or a virtual regional reality? History shows us that progress on the Palestinian issue was a prerequisite for any major breakthrough that ever took place between Israel and the Arab world. The signing of the peace treaty with Egypt was dependent on Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the autonomy plan for the Palestinians. The peace treaty with Jordan was reached only after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords. The Arab Peace Initiative, first published 15 years ago, emphasizes this fact in clear terms. It offers Israel normal relations with the entire Arab world, but only after an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty is reached.

Whenever peace negotiations took place, the Arab world was willing to pitch in, even if its contribution was not a game-changer. Arab leaders participated in the Madrid Summit in 1991, tried to assist Israeli-Palestinian peace summits throughout the 1990s and till the 2000 Camp David summit, and attended the 2007 Annapolis Conference that kicked-off yet another round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It was all in the context of the peace process. And when progress in that process was evident, like in the early 1990s, the fruits of regional cooperation became visible and tangible – diplomatic representations opened up, regional business summits were convened, and high-level visits took place.

The regional approach that Prime Minister Netanyahu is advancing challenges this reality, and attempts at flipping the sequence – calling for improved Israeli-Arab ties first, and progress with the Palestinians later. It is true that Israel currently enjoys better ties with some Arab countries. There is increased security coordination, the relations that do exist are becoming more visible to the public, and new channels for dialogue and cooperation have been put in place. These are positive developments, which derive from the changes occurring in the Middle East in recent years and from the emergence of joint strategic interests. They emphasize the existence of a historic regional opportunity for Israel to reshape its relations in the Middle East.

Some Arab countries are motivated to increase even further their cooperation with Israel, and to expand them to civilian – and not only security – issues. However, the transition from Israeli-Arab relations, which mostly take place behind the scenes and focus on security coordination, to actual normal and visible relations has not yet happened, and is unlikely to happen without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Arab publics are not willing to accept that, and the Arab leaders are not willing to go there.

Arab leaders emphasize this in private meetings as well as in public statements. They see the Netanyahu approach as one that contradicts the Arab Peace Initiative, which they are committed to. Former Saudi official Prince Turki al-Faisal asked in September 2015 to “tell Mr. Netanyahu not to propagate false information. As long as Palestine is occupied by Israel, there’s not going to be cooperation between Saudi Arabia or Sunni states with Israel.” In their speeches at the 2016 UN General Assembly, Egypt’s President al-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah also emphasized the need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as a condition for a genuine regional breakthrough.

John Kerry tried to convince Arab leaders to take some steps towards normalization with Israel even before an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough, but was rejected. Kerry shared insights from such efforts in his final speech before leaving office, saying in December 2016 that “the Arab countries have made clear that they will not make peace with Israel without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – that’s not where their loyalties or their politics are.” In his speech, Kerry added that many Arab leaders with whom he has engaged have shown a willingness to support serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to take steps on the path to normalization of relations – including public meetings — providing there is meaningful progress towards a two state solution.”

The steps that Trump is likely to take in order to strengthen US relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia may lead to increased security coordination between these states and Israel. But in order to fulfill the opportunity for a new era in Israeli-Arab relations, progress towards a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is required. This is what the Arab world requests in return. It is also an Israeli interest, even if it is not on Trump’s priority list. Should the Israeli government maintain its rejectionist policy towards the peace process, the regional opportunity is likely to be missed.

The progress that is currently taking place between Israel and the region is a seedling at best. It is certainly not a full-grown plant. This progress signals just how much potential there is for Israel in the region. It can be a source of hope for the many Israelis who find it difficult to even imagine a future of peace. It is a sign that Israel can truly achieve the regional belonging, which it very much deserves and needs.

Israelis should not settle for regional relations that are mostly secret and limited to security issues, and that do not enjoy public legitimacy in the Arab world. The 15th anniversary of the Arab Peace Initiative, in March 2017, is a reminder that regional cooperation is linked to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and that progress on the peace process can totally alter Israel’s regional standing. There are no shortcuts to a regional breakthrough. The road passes through Ramallah.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט No Shortcuts to a Regional Breakthrough הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The risks and rewards of Israeli-Turkish energy cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The criticism in the U.S. highlighted something important: the disturbing implications of this visit for domestic governing policies and trends in both countries. In a recent paper comparing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the 25-year old Azerbaijan/Armenia conflict, I observed that both sides of each conflict are facing either a severe democracy deficit or significant erosion, to varying levels. Conflict and damage to democratic society appear closely linked.

Cozying up to Azerbaijan means embracing a country with one of the worst human rights records in the world. Azerbaijan has hurtled down a deeply anti-democratic, semi-authoritarian path since independence in 1991. Its Freedom House ratings are now among the lowest possible: “Not Free,” or 16 on a scale from 0-100, deteriorating even compared to the previous year. Human rights workers, political opposition figures and journalists are regularly arrested, jailed, and face physical violence. The country is run through a corrupt, dynastic leadership, by the son of an earlier corrupt, semi-authoritarian leader.

Israel’s embrace of unsavory allies is nothing new. In earlier decades, during the Arab boycott, the Cold War and its own wars, Israel cultivated willing friends regardless of regime type; realpolitik trumped idealism, in international relations parlance. Thus Israel was close with Nicolae Ceaucescu’s Romania and Idi Amin’s Uganda, and counted apartheid South Africa as an ally too. Nor does Israel lack less-than-democratic allies today, cultivating strategic relations with Turkey and Russia, who display appalling contempt for democratic norms. Moreover, Netanyahu is on a search for new friends in response to creeping political pressure from traditional allies in Europe, to show that Israel doesn’t depend solely on their markets. He has nurtured African states and BRIC countries, and clearly views Central Asia as logical strategic addition.

But what makes Azerbaijan notable is how the protracted ethno-territorial conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh contributes to such a severely restricted political environment at home, justifying and perhaps perpetuating these practices.

Karabakh is a small pocket of territory inside Azerbaijan’s sovereign borders. As the Soviet Union fell apart, its majority Armenian population sought to break away from Azerbaijan, preferring to attach themselves to adjacent Armenia, as the republics became independent.

Azerbaijan was enraged at what it experienced as an attempt to dismember its territory. A vicious war broke out from 1991-1994, killing over 20,000 people, creating roughly 1 million refugees (the majority of them Azerbaijani). The resulting stalemate left the political status of Karabakh unresolved to this day. The population there is now almost exclusively Armenian after the flight of the Azeri minority; Armenians there are effectively self-governing, often considered a state-like entity but unrecognized by any other country. Yet Azerbaijan still seethes at the de facto loss of a part of its sovereign, national land.

Immediately after the war, newly-independent Azerbaijan began investing heavily in military armament, flush with oil money from its Caspian Sea fields. This build-up contributed to a mentality of conflict escalation, and there are regular skirmishes along what is called the “Line of Contact” with Karabakh.

The obsession with its territorial loss also fed an increasingly repressive political climate. By the mid-2000s, observers noted that local politicians competed for the most hard-line positions on the conflict. In the name of the existential cause, authorities cracked down on political protest over perceived electoral misconduct. The regime said that “Azerbaijan’s defeat in the war had been due to domestic turmoil,” in the words of Rasim Musabayov, a former advisor to the Azerbaijani leadership.

Leveraging the conflict to crush freedoms spread to other fields. In 2016, Freedom House reported that at least one journalist was jailed on charges of spying for Armenia; academics and students associated with political opposition have been likewise harassed or fired. In 2012, a nationally celebrated writer, Akram Aylisli, published a novella that included Azeri killings of Armenians during the conflict; politicians went on a rampage of incitement, calling to investigate his DNA (perhaps he was actually part Armenian?) and cut off his ear. He was stripped of his titles, his books burned, family members lost their jobs, and his work removed from educational curriculum. This past March, Azerbaijani authorities detained him on his way to a writer’s festival in Italy – part of a trend, say local sources.

Luckily Israel is nowhere near that level. But what if it’s a difference of degree rather than substance? In recent years, a department at Ben Gurion University was hounded by the state’s Council of Higher Education for its political leanings and novelist Dorit Rabinyan saw calls for her book involving a Jewish-Arab romance to be removed from school curriculum, along with the accompanying public vitriol. Governments Netanyahu has led have passed Israel’s most undemocratic laws to date, almost always involving some aspect of the conflict: the Nakba law, the boycott law and restrictive laws designed to target Arabs in Israel (the admissions committees law for small communities and the muezzin bill currently under debate.)

The infamous NGO law attempts to intimidate independent civil society groups who defend human rights and criticize government policy specifically regarding the conflict, echoing the tendency in Azerbaijan to harass human rights activity (in harsh ways), and snuff out government criticism.

Israel’s democratic culture is more tenuous now than in the past. Netanyahu obsessively portrays the occupation as an existential threat from Palestinians, but he also increasingly fuses Israeli left-wing opposition with the scariest physical threats of our time. His 2015 campaign ad accused the left of bringing ISIS to Jerusalem. When the head of B’tselem spoke recently at United Nations against the occupation, Likud coalition whip David Bitan called to strip him of his citizenship. He then suggested that Arab citizens shouldn’t be allowed to vote because they represent “Palestinian interests.” After Netanyahu’s infamous “Arabs voting in droves” video there’s little question who inspired, or legitimized Bitan.

All these together do not put Israel nearly at the level of Azerbaijan in terms of the democratic deficit. And it’s important to recall that Azerbaijan had little culture of democracy prior to independence; Israel inside the Green Line has certainly does.

But the parallels between the role of the conflicts within each society does not bode well. Both conflicts are viewed as existential threats to the very identity of the country. Both are heavily militarized – Azerbaijan with the help of Israeli arms sales – and have made military acquisition a top national and budget priority, often to the detriment of other social priorities. That in turn must be justified by fear-mongering or warmongering in the national rhetoric. Both experience regular deadly escalations. In April 2016, a mini-war over Nagorno-Karabakh caused hundreds of deaths on both sides; Israel experiences stabbing attacks and regular wars. These serve to keep the trauma fresh, the threat level high, and dissent toxic.

The old adage may be newly, and sadly relevant: “Show me who your friends are and I’ll tell you who you are” – or who in the future, whom you may become.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s Visit to Azerbaijan: Cozying Up to Despots הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout that long, wasted period of ups and downs, agreements, disagreements and various crises, both sides dug themselves into their respective positions and refused to budge an inch. When the me was right, and the strategic decision to normalize relationship was taken both by Turkey and by Israel, the heretofore “critical” stumbling-blocks became negligible. Proving that when there’s a will, there’s a way.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Path to Normalization between Israel and Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The adoption of this discourse should not be taken for granted; it is the result of intellectual and media activity undertaken by various civil society organizations that identified a historic opportunity – the result of changes taking place in the region – to cooperate with the “moderate” Arab states who share common interests with Israel, such as halting the political and ideological expansion of Iran and the Shi’ite axis (including Syria and Hezbollah), and a joint struggle against Sunni Jihadist Islamic non-state actors.

The original purpose of the regional concept was not to disregard, escape or divert attention from the Palestinian problem, but rather to harness the Arab states as an umbrella of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As bilateral negotiations are at a standstill, the regional framework was supposed to steer the parties away from the impasse.

According to this logic, the Arab states can help in several ways: Egypt has leverage over Hamas because of their common border; Jordan has an interest in reaching a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem as well as a desire to play a role in the Jerusalem issue; and Saudi Arabia can provide religious legitimacy to any political compromise. All these countries have leverage over the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

However, the main problem is that the public consciousness has shifted in line with the positions of the right-wing politicians. In other words, those who promote the regional discourse do not do so in order to make progress on the Palestinian issue, but rather to reap the benefits of the changes in the region without having to pay its price in the Palestinian sphere. In such a way, the right-wing government also enhances its supposedly moderate image.

Indeed, Egypt’s ambassador’s return to Israel, the visit of its foreign minister (after nine years), intelligence and military cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and possibly the Gulf – all indicate that regional cooperation is alive and kicking, while the Palestinian track has been abandoned.

The public, according to a Mitvim Institute’s public opinion poll (July 2016), graciously accept it; they are mostly interested in cooperation with Egypt, while the PA is lagging behind in fourth place out of five options. In other words, the public welcomes regional cooperation according to the right-wing vision.

This regional approach is misguided and will not ultimately succeed as one may have hoped. Certain achievements may indeed be reached, but they will be limited and kept under wraps. Israel has a history of contacts with countries, organizations and prominent figures in the Arab world. As these connections were viewed in the Arab world as illegitimate, they were kept behind the scenes. Some Arab leaders also paid with their lives for this (such as Jordan’s king Abdullah, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and others). As a result, Israel has suffered over the years from what I call the “mistress syndrome.” The only time it enjoyed an extensive and open relationship with the Arab world was in the ‘90s, after the signing of the Oslo Accords. All of the achievements in the field of diplomatic relations, the economic conferences and projects evaporated at the onset of the al-Aksa intifada in 2000. In other words, real, open and meaningful cooperation will not exist without a solution, or at least significant progress, on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any attempt to promote regional cooperation without tackling the Palestinian issue is throwing dust in one’s eyes.

And, as we know, there is plenty of dust in our region.

In view of the fact that the discourse of “opportunities” and the “regional initiative” have been adopted by the government and the public at large, focus should now be placed on introducing another discourse, one of missed opportunities. The Israeli public likes to quote the legendary foreign minister Abba Eban’s saying that “the Arabs/Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Yet, a recent study that I completed shows that not only have the Palestinians missed opportunities, but Israel has as well. Therefore, emphasis should not only be placed on identifying a historic opportunity – which indeed exists – but emphasis should be placed on ensuring that it will not be missed.

As things stand now, the Israeli government shows no motivation to seize this historic opportunity to advance a regional initiative that includes a two-state solution, in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Quartet Report. In August 1952, David Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that “I do not want to be the man that our grandchildren… blame for having had the chance to try and achieve Jewish-Arab peace – and to have missed it.”

I believe that Netanyahu should hang this quote over his desk.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט From opportunities to missed opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since the API was first presented at the Arab League summit in March 2002, Israel has never officially responded to the Initiative; moreover, for a long period of time, Israel chose to ignore the Initiative, or simply oppose it. Lieberman went even further in 2009, when he called the API nothing less than a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” Olmert was the only one to try and promote the Initiative at the end of his term, but it was too little and too late. Occasionally, various politicians expressed positive statements regarding the Initiative, yet the great majority focused on the API’s alleged drawbacks. In any case, no critical mass of supporters has ever been able to bring a change in the Israeli approach towards the Initiative.

Israeli public opinion has also remained in the dark about the Initiative. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of the public is not aware of the API nor its content. Attempts of various civil society organizations to raise public awareness have failed so far to make a genuine change. This is despite the increasing recognition of the advantages of involving the Arab countries in the peace process, and of the benefits that would ensue from improved relations with these countries, in parallel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As disturbing as the Israeli government’s response to the API is, it is not as disturbing as the typical “Pavlovian” Israeli reaction to any external efforts to advance the peace process. The word “no” has become the hallmark of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the conflict. Here are some typical examples.

First, over the past two years, Israel has opposed four French initiatives: the idea of adopting a Security Council resolution promoting the recognition of Palestinian statehood; an initiative for an international observer presence on the Temple Mount; the establishment of an International Support Group for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; and lastly, an international peace summit, the first stage of which took place in Paris in early June 2016.

Second, the Prime Minister refused to cooperate with the Quartet in the preparation of the report on the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, as the Israeli government came to realize that the report was critical of Israel, they tried to work through the United States (US) to soften the tone of the report. The Netanyahu government acted similarly in 2012 with the Palestinian United Nations bid for statehood. The government initially refused to take part in any negotiations regarding the text of the resolution, and only when the text was finalized did the government try to work with the US to change the text.

Third, Israel ignored, and even ridiculed, the European Union’s (EU) December 2013 initiative to upgrade Israeli and Palestinian relations with the EU to the status of a “special privileged partnership” upon the signing a peace agreement. European criticism of Israeli policy has usually met an aggressive Israeli response, yet when Europe tries to provide positive incentives to solving the conflict, they encounter silence and rejection. This reaction is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the EU is one of Israel’s major trading partners.

Fourth, Israel expressed its opposition to the American security plan, formulated by General John Allen during the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Moreover, in January 2014, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Minister of Defense, said that the plan was not even worth the paper that it was written upon.

Fifth, in February 2016, Netanyahu expressed his concern about the possibility that prior to leaving office, Barack Obama may release his own “parameters” for peace, thus updating the framework presented by Bill Clinton at the end of his term in December 2000. It is important to note that Ehud Barak’s government at the time responded with a “reserved yes” to the Clinton parameters.

Israel’s “no” policy does not only apply to initiatives for the resolution of the conflict. It is also reflected in other areas, such as the government’s steadfast and forthright opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, and even to Germany’s proposal that Israel be indirectly involved in the nuclear talks. Additionally, Israel often chooses to boycott commissions of inquiry or international forums that it believes are too critical of the country.

The Israeli government’s adverse reactions to international initiatives are not only disturbing in content, but also the manner in which the reactions are conveyed. In general, they are harsh and often insulting and condescending. This is in despite of the fact that the majority of the initiatives originate from countries that are friendly to Israel, and whom are genuinely interested in dialogue regarding their content.

If “no” becomes a regular pattern in Israeli foreign policy, then it ceases to be an expression of rational thought, rather an expression of emotional and/or ideological behavior. Israel’s pattern of negative reactions is a manifestation of its current leaders’ fear and anxiety regarding any change in the status quo. The outside world – whether it is ISIS or the EU, and to some extent even the US – is perceived as a threat, and any concession is viewed as an existential threat.

“No” is not a policy prescription that will lead to a better future. This behavior moves us further away from peace, harms relations with friendly countries, and damages our interests. Israel needs to change direction. The next time Israel is presented with an international initiative, Jerusalem should respond with a “yes”, qualified as it may be, rather than a flat “no”.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט “No” as a Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the deal, Israel will deposit $20 million in a Turkish bank account as compensation to the families of those who died during the I.D.F. operation to seize the Mavi Marmara in 2010. In return, Turkey will drop the lawsuit against four senior Israeli officers deemed responsible for the operation. Turkey will also be allowed to play a more central role in supplying humanitarian aid to, and supervising the development of basic infrastructure projects in, the Gaza Strip. Shipments, however, will still be inspected at Israel’s Ashdod port prior to transport via the Erez Crossing—the first of which arrived this weekend. Finally, both sides agreed to exchange ambassadors in the coming weeks.

Analysis of the deal has been skeptical; rapprochement does not change the underlying fact that Turkey continues to support Hamas, an organization committed to Israel’s destruction. One does not need to be an expert in order to predict that the next round of violence in the Gaza Strip—more of a when than an if—will put the deal’s resilience to the test.

But the fact that the two sides reached an accord suggests that differences over Gaza are taking a backseat to more pressing matters. Many didn’t believe that the deal would happen, and yet it did.

For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel is the first step to reversing a failed foreign policy that led to its regional isolation. It is no coincidence that the final round of negotiations began shortly after Turkey downed a Russian jet along the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, or that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued an apology to Moscow shortly after signing the deal with Israel. Increased security cooperation, enabled in part by Ankara’s decision to lift its veto of a permanent Israeli mission to NATO, should contribute to Turkish efforts to contain ISIS as well as joint Israeli-Turkish interest in limiting Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel is also concerned with regional instability, yet its desire to export natural gas seems to be an equally dominant incentive. Of the multiple export options available to Israel, none are more financially viable than the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey. The obstacles standing before a project of this kind are many: a pipeline would run through Cypriot territorial waters and therefore requires Nicosia’ approval; the global energy market could continue to plummet thereby reducing investor interest; and, of course, bilateral ties could collapse again prior to a hypothetical pipeline’s completion. However, given the degree to which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the deal’s impact upon Israel’s future energy security, there can be little doubt as to its centrality in this story.

Deep distrust remains on both sides. Israel and Turkey share many overlapping strategic interests, but they prioritize them differently. Regional challenges such as the Syrian civil war, and the threat of ISIS are not necessarily a source of cohesion. Yet in the last few months, both sides engaged in a public relations campaign in order develop the necessary goodwill for reconciliation. This is likely to continue in the coming months.

Forging a new narrative requires the implementation of a multi-tier process that includes the diversification of official channels that enhance Israeli-Turkish strategic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Civil society actors will play an important role in bolstering these efforts and increasing people-to-people dialogue. Each country’s business community, indirectly responsible for keeping the possibility of reconciliation alive during this period of diplomatic tension, must also be vocal partners in defining the future of the relationship.

Most importantly, Israeli and Turkish leaderships must create a mechanism that will allow them to effectively manage future conflicts. Throughout the decades, Israel-Turkey ties have often been impacted by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But whereas previous Turkish support for the Palestinian cause was limited to diplomatic rhetoric, patronage under Erdogan and the A.K.P. became increasingly proactive, particularly in Gaza, necessitating a reevaluation of the relationship between Turkey and Israel.

As long as Turkey’s relationship with Hamas remains political, détente could provide a window of opportunity to rebuild the Gaza Strip. As revealed a few days after the signing of the deal, Turkey will be permitted to transfer funds to banks in the Gaza for the purpose of financing projects previously approved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Plans are already underway to build a desalination plant and power station. Basic infrastructure projects not only improve the daily lives of Gazans, but also could stave off future conflict between Israel and Hamas by creating a valuable channel of communication that runs through Ankara.

Why should the United States support this process? After all, Erdogan and Netanyahu are persona non grata at the White House these days. Neither has been particularly supportive of President Barack Obama’s Middle East policies, and that may not change after he leaves office in January. However, American security interests are dependent on Washington’s ability to cooperate with and lead its allies. Now that the reconciliation process has confirmed the sources of Israeli-Turkish tension and mutual interest, the next administration will be better positioned to incentivize cooperation over discord.

Rapprochement signals the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. But as emphasized by Israel’s lead negotiator with Turkey, Joseph Ciechanover, the deal only planted a “seedling”. Both parties come away from the reconciliation process with a better understanding of one another’s interests, and therefore will be better adapted to repair and cultivate this partnership going forward. The future of the relationship will be determined by how the two sides choose to care for and grow their partnership, hopefully with an eye toward not only their immediate interests, but also the long-term prospects for peace in the region.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

At the end of the Arab Revolt in 1939, with WWII approaching, the Zionist movement agreed to participate in an international conference in London, which included a Palestinian delegation and senior representatives from five Arab states. As a result of Palestinian/Arab refusal to sit down with the Zionists, Britain was forced to negotiate with each party separately, although Jews and Arabs met behind the scenes in unofficial capacities. The failure of this conference led to the publication of the British White Paper of 1939, which seriously restricted to Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The second conference was held in Lausanne in 1949. Israel was about resubmit its request to join the UN in May 1949 and could not be seen as an opponent to a UN conference addressing the consequences of the 1948 Arab-Israel War, primarily the question of refugees. Here, too, representatives met separately to no avail.

Twenty-five years passed until the next international conference met in Geneva in December 1973. Golda Meir and her government were overwhelmed by the repercussions of the October War, could not refuse the American-Soviet demand for a conference a mere ten days before the elections. Jordan and Egypt attended, Syria did not, and the conference ended after two days with no notable achievements. However, it served as a springboard for bilateral talks with Egypt and Syria, which ultimately led to the signing of two Disengagement Agreements between Israel and Egypt (1974 and 1975), and between Israel and Syria (1975), under the leadership of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

In the 1970s and 1980s, numerous attempts reconvene the Geneva conference failed. Israel and Syria both obstructed these efforts, each for its own reasons. The London Agreement, signed in April 1987 by Shimon Peres and Jordan’s King Hussein, outlined the principles for an international conference under the auspices of the UN, but this attempt was foiled by Yitzchak Shamir, prime minister of the unity government at the time.

Shamir, however, was eventually forced to participate in the Madrid Conference of October 1991 following the collapse of the USSR and the Gulf War. US pressure, combined with the fact that the conference was attended by relevant Arab states, including Syria, forced Shamir to partake in a gathering attended by a JordanianPalestinian delegation, some of whose delegates were not PLO members (but effectively received instructions from the organization). The Madrid Conference jumpstarted three tracks of bilateral talks: with Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians, and the regional players also conducted multilateral talks on the issues of arms control, environment, water and refugees. Although the tracks with Syria and the Palestinians soon stalled, deadlock with the Palestinians prompted the opening of the secret communications channel that led to the Oslo Accords. The Syrian track can also be considered as the prelude to the negotiations that took place later in the 1990s.

The 2007 Annapolis Conference convened by the US was the last international conference designed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to date. Along with representatives of Israel, the PLO, the Quartet, Egypt, and Jordan, attendees included representatives from several countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel such as Saudi Arabia and Syria. It was the first and only time Israel was a willing partner in such an international process. As in the past, the conference was to serve as the starting point for negotiations between the Olmert Government and Abu Mazen. Indeed, these talks continued until the end of Olmert’s administration and almost resulted in an agreement.

What can we learn from this short history of peace conferences? First, except for the Annapolis Conference, Israel was never a willing participant. It was typically forced to attend due to historic circumstances or international pressure. Second, Israel’s opposition to such conferences stemmed from a fear of being isolated and subjected to heavy international pressure that would force it to agree to policies the government deemed unfavorable. Moreover, Israel consistently feared a unified Arab front that would naturally be based on the Arab lowest common denominator. Third, Israel has always believed that direct bilateral talks allowed it to retain the greatest flexibility and has consistently supported direct negotiations with the Palestinians, with US mediation at most. Fourth, no conference has led to a breakthrough, although they have, at times, served as an important stepping stone toward a new formal or informal negotiation channel. Finally, no international conference has damaged Israel.

In light of these conclusions, the refusal of the Netanyahu government to participate in the Paris peace conference should come as no surprise. And yet, Israel’s portrayal as a country that opposes peace causes it tremendous international harm. Therefore, an international conference such as those held in Geneva, Madrid or Annapolis, might be a launching pad for a new negotiation process. If, however, the government has no desire to promote peace with the Palestinians, participation in such a conference would be quite risky, especially if France’s position is perceived to be pro-Palestinian.

Clearly an agreement can be reached only through negotiations between the parties themselves if they are willing. If Netanyahu hopes that Prime Minister al-Sisi and the Saudis will throw him a lifeline and save him from the deluge of peace proposals in the form of regional conferences, one might ask, what is the point of another international conference? In the absence of genuine Israeli and Palestinian motivation and determination to solve the conflict, no international conference will bring us closer to our ultimate goal of peace.

הפוסט Why is Israel Afraid of an International Peace Conference? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent decades, the foreign ministry’s area of activity has gradually contracted despite its extensive contribution and that of its staff. Indeed, its contribution spanned all areas of national security and foreign policy all over the world. The erosion in the MFA’s role occurred for a variety of reasons, including because the defense establishment, the intelligence community, and often officials in the Prime Minister’s Office took part in these efforts.

הפוסט The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Second, the common knowledge that US presidents do not like to embark on new initiatives in their final year in office. There have, however, been exceptions to this rule: Reagan recognized the PLO in late 1988, Clinton published his parameters in late 2000 and Bush mediated between prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in late 2008. Therefore, the possibility that Obama is entertaining a Middle East initiative this year warrants exploration.

Unfortunately, this initiative continues to lie dormant on Israel’s and the US’ doorsteps.

In light of Obama’s mixed legacy in this field, a new late-term initiative may not be a bad idea at all.

The question is what should and can be done? Since the prospects of resuming negotiations between Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are slim at best, Obama should not focus on bilateral issues. The ideas noted in the Wall Street Journal report include a possible UN Security Council resolution to replace UN Resolution 242, a statement by the Middle East Quartet and a presidential speech.

The floated ideas also include several that the US is probably not considering seriously, such as an international conference, which is advanced by France.

Since such a conference is a formidable task, as evidenced by James Baker’s Madrid Conference (1991) and Condoleezza Rice’s Annapolis Conference (2007), a one-shot event would be more expedient.

A presidential speech, declaration, or statement would not demand lengthy, debilitating talks with the conflicting parties and would allow Obama, unfettered by election considerations or the reactions of lobby groups, to lay out his vision for a solution to the conflict. He should not wait for the parties’ approval for his vision, as Clinton did. Such an initiative will hopefully serve as a practical guide for future administrations, and for Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Similarities to the Clinton parameters – in terms and substance – can be expected, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, as it will signal continuity in the American position that future leaders will not be able to dismiss lightly.

Obama’s initiative should, however, seriously consider departing from Clinton’s parameters on at least five points, in line with the developments in the Middle East in the past 15 years. First, emphasis on a structured time frame (today, the passing of time is working to the detriment of both conflicting parties as the possibility of a two-state solution is slowly fading away); second, reference to the fact that the settlements are an impediment to peace; third, reference to Israel’s desire for recognition as a Jewish state; four, emphasis on the positive role of Arab Peace Initiative, which will tie the Israeli- Palestinian settlement to an overall Israeli-Arab settlement, leading to the normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab Middle Eastern countries; and finally, it should be stressed that the parameters in principle also refer to the Gaza Strip although negotiations with Hamas will not take place until it changes its position toward peace and Israel.

Obama’s desire to sign the Iranian nuclear deal was driven by his conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” The same conviction should also guide his thinking in the case of the Middle East conflict.

In 2017, Israel will celebrate the centennial of the Balfour Declaration – the British promise to build a Jewish national home in Palestine. In early 2017, in his final days in office, Obama can define the precise boundaries of that state, which have not yet been conclusively defined.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity for the Obama parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Disaster diplomacy: The attack that brought Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first truth is that despite obvious differences between Obama and Netanyahu, the bond between the United States and Israel remains strong. This should not be taken for granted; even in the days leading up to Biden’s visit a developing story about an alleged scheduling miscommunication between the two heads of state began to overshadow his tour.

Still, reducing the nuances of the U.S.-Israel relationship to the dynamics between their leaders is limiting. Obama and Netanyahu aren’t the first American president and Israeli prime minister to endure a difficult partnership, and they won’t be the last. In the end, regardless of the intense disputes that may poison personal relationships, the success of U.S.-Israel ties depends on shared values and common interests.

This was unexpectedly and tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of Taylor Force’s murder at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist in Jaffa on March 8. Force, a former US army officer and Vanderbilt graduate student, died just a few hundred yards away from Biden’s family, who were spending their evening on the Tel Aviv promenade (the terror attack in Jaffa was one of three that took place that day, leaving another 14 wounded).

“The kind of violence we saw yesterday, the failure to condemn it, the rhetoric that incites that violence, the retribution that it generates has to stop,” Biden told reporters during his press conference with Netanyahu. Although he would later add that terror couldn’t be thwarted by “physical force” alone, Biden’s comments were reassuring to an Israeli public concerned that a chasm has grown between them and the United States.

“You never need to doubt,” Biden reiterated, “the United States of America has Israel’s back.”

The second truth is that the Obama administration will not be leading future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many speculated Biden would push for a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during his trip, which included a brief stopover in Ramallah. According to reports, Biden floated a number of proposals during his meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, notably a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement freezes in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and abandoning the demand for a Palestinian right of return.

However, how serious were Biden’s overtures? Considering that prior to his arrival in Ramallah, Biden critiqued Abbas for failing to condemn the Jaffa terror attack, it is fair to ask how sincere these efforts were, and to what degree the vice president was given a mandate to bring both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table. In the end, Biden’s meeting with Abbas was unproductive.

To Abbas’ credit, acknowledging Biden’s proposals would have only further stained his public image. And though his current political situation is tenuous at best, Abbas (and Netanyahu, for that matter) knows that come January 2017 there will be a new administration in the White House hoping to make its own mark resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, Biden’s visit confirmed what we already knew: that any Obama-led peace initiative would, at best, lay the groundwork for serious negotiations under the next administration, but is unlikely to produce meaningful results.

Finally, Biden’s trip served as a reminder to both sides that Iran will continue to test the mettle of their alliance for years to come. It was no coincidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ testing of ballistic missiles marked with the phrase “Israel must be eliminated” coincided with Biden’s visit. And while it did manage to prompt a direct reassurance from the Vice President that the United States stood behind its Middle Eastern ally, the incident also dredged up their bitter dispute over how to counter the Islamic Republic’s threat to regional stability just as officials in Washington and Jerusalem negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that will determine American military aid to Israel in the coming years.

In light of the fact that Biden is a longtime supporter of Israel, and nearing the end of his political career, perhaps the impact of the vice president’s visit shouldn’t be overstated (even though the U.S. Embassy in Israel entitled its video summary of Biden’s visit, “Friends Forever”). Nevertheless, he succeeded in reminding Israelis that although tensions exist within the U.S.-Israel relationship, a deterioration of ties is preventable so long as there remains an open channel for honest dialogue. Regardless of what occurs during the remainder of the Obama presidency, Biden’s message needs to be internalized by American and Israeli politicians going forward in order to ensure that the U.S.-Israel alliance weathers inevitable future storms.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט Biden in Israel: A reset in diplomatic ties? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This assessment is based on three premises.

First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians.

Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table.

While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation.

Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a homeland for the Jewish people.

This linkage – 50 years of the occupation and 100 years after the Balfour Declaration – lends these events an almost cosmic significance.

On the other side of the political map, the 50-year anniversary is clearly a reason to mourn. The result of the 1967 war – the domination of another people – must be undone. This is a chance to mobilize all peace advocates in Israel and abroad, Jews and non-Jews, people who support a Jewish democratic state within the 1967 borders and see the occupation as a sure recipe for turning Israel into a binational, nondemocratic state.

This is the aim of the group Save Israel, Stop the Occupation, SISO, which has been established to organize events on the injustices of the occupation, culminating in 50thanniversary events. A clash between the opposing worldviews that will find expression next year are bound to lead to a flare-up.

Another factor will be the new U.S. president. It’s not certain the winner will immediately launch a drive to revive the peace process. But history teaches that even a president with a limited understanding of the Middle East, like Jimmy Carter in 1977, achieved a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within two years.

Bill Clinton, meanwhile, finalized the Oslo process and the treaty with Jordan during his first term. History also teaches that a president who really seeks a solution must start early, as proved by Clinton’s missed opportunities with Hafez Assad and Yasser Arafat at the end of his second term. The arrival of a new president on the 50th anniversary of the occupation could provide a spark.

The perception that a two-state solution is no longer applicable is increasingly taking hold. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman claims that the two-state solution is dead and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be remembered as the father of the one-state solution.

But any deep look at the situation on the ground shows that the two-state ideal is still around and viable. It depends on leaders on both sides making it work.

A public campaign in Israel and overseas that will gather momentum toward June 2017 could jump-start diplomatic ideas already on the agenda. These include a new Security Council resolution to replace or be appended to Resolution 242, incorporating elements of the Arab peace initiative.

The resolution would call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with agreed-on border adjustments and land swaps, without addressing tougher issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. Another idea is an international conference in June 2017 that would launch talks between Israel, the Palestinians and moderate Arab countries.

I fear that if these ideas aren’t realized, the despair, frustration and disappointment of the younger Palestinian generation – directed at the occupation and Palestinian leaders who can’t deliver the goods – will lead to an intifada. The reasons have long been there, but the spark hasn’t arrived.

And the fuse will be lying about in 2017. Let’s hope Israelis and their leaders will see 2016 as an opportunity for reconciliation, not escalation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט 2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But in a more nuanced analysis, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, chief of staff of Israel’s armed forces, admitted that while those risks are real, it is likely that for now, Iran will abide by the plan.

The deal reduces Iran’s danger in three ways. First, the existential threat Israel was about to face from an Iranian nuclear weapon is, at a minimum, delayed. It seems reasonable to accept greater Iranian regional reach in exchange for suppressing the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack. Moreover, the regime could divert little of the deal’s financial dividends from the domestic arena, where they would preserve its legitimacy.

Second, opening the channels between Washington and Tehran can facilitate joint action in cases where American, Iranian and indeed even Israeli interests overlap, such as opposing the Islamic State. After all, in the newly chaotic Middle East, there are no friends and enemies, just frenemies: states collide on one front, but cooperate on another. More broadly, talking is always better than shooting. Since the mid-1960s, Washington’s ability to talk to Israel’s foes has benefited the Jewish state and could do so yet again.

Finally, the agreement enhances the chances, small as they are, that Iran will fundamentally alter its posture. The agreement is expected to generate greater interaction between Iran and the world as Tehran is readmitted to global networks of trade and finance. If hardliners’ concerns about foreign infiltration are accurate, Iran’s expected participation in the global economic order might moderate, weaken or constrain the current regime.

Like almost all problems in the Middle East, there are no optimal solutions to the Iranian challenge: a gain on one side of the scales is bound to create some costs on the other. Yet, at least for now, the agreement reduces the immediate threat Israel, and perhaps the region at large, faces.

(originally published in the New York Times)

הפוסט The Threat From Iran Has Been Greatly Reduced הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 Israeli Foreign Policy Index הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The majority of Netanyahu’s monologue was devoted to listing the sins of Iran, as well as the dangers the Islamic Republic poses to the world. While it is true that this year we did not hear of Hitler and the Munich Agreement – although anti-Semitism did in fact feature in his remarks – Netanyahu seized the opportunity to attack and castigate the entire world, and particularly the United Nations that was hosting him, for its silence, as if the entire world is against us again.

In the past, Netanyahu has been able to captivate the world’s attention and focus it on the Iranian nuclear issue. There is no doubt that it is he who was able to raise this issue and place it at the top of the agenda of the international community. This time, however, now that the deal with Iran has been signed, the issue is one for the history books. No one is interested anymore. There is no doubt that Netanyahu is aware that he has failed in this regard. Moreover, he is cognizant of the fact that the manner in which he conducted himself vis-à-vis President Obama and his Administration precluded Israel from having any impact upon the nuclear agreement. Therefore, one must ask why the Israeli Prime Minister still devoted so much room in his remarks to the issue. Even if I were inclined to believe his apocalyptical prophesies, his empty slogans and talking points, which have been uttered so many times before, prevented me from doing so.

Just one day after Abu Mazen’s speech before the General Assembly, and the debate that the organization devoted to the Palestinian question, Netanyahu, too, should have given the issue the attention it deserves. Unfortunately, IsraeliPalestinian peace was but a secondary feature in his remarks. On this issue, too, Netanyahu said nothing new. He pointed an accusatory finger at Abu Mazen and again reminded his listeners of the Palestinian recalcitrance to reaching any agreement. The prime minister reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution. However, in all likelihood the goal behind doing this was to pave his path back into the good graces of the Obama Administration and to restart a positive bilateral dialogue. Other than an unconvincing call to resume negotiations “without preconditions,” Netanyahu did not present any new plan or vision. One must also ask: is the call to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people not a precondition?

In light of the deteriorating situation in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories in recent months, one would have expected a speech whose goal was to calm the situation and create hope in the hearts and minds of his audience – both in Israel and in the territories. Unfortunately, this section of Netanyahu’s speech was hollow and disappointing. What is more, one must wonder why Netanyahu chose to completely ignore the harsh reality of the unfolding events across the region – the ongoing, bloody conflict taking place on Israel’s northern border, as well as the Russian presence in Syria and the risks it carries.

Netanyahu’s speech was another eloquent, missed opportunity for it said nothing about the Israeli policy. This, of course, should come as no surprise: an Israeli foreign policy simply does not exist. And beyond that, it is hard to comprehend why Netanyahu chooses to confront the entire world time and again; why he castigates, protests and admonishes, if need be, exposing how isolated Israel is from the rest of the world. What precisely did he think we stand to gain from that?

הפוסט A Prophet of the Apocalypse הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.