Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?

Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.

In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”

By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”

Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.

The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.

The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Why do we need a formal agreement?

THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?

There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.

Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.

Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.

Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.

Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.

A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.

Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.

Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.

And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.

The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.

The article was publish on July 15th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To watch the recording of the event, please click here.

הפוסט The Israel-UAE Agreement and its Regional Implications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The new American administration wastes no time unmaking Trump’s legacy of indifference calling out loudly actors who violate human rights them, from Russia to Yemen. Several, though not all, of Trump’s decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian track were quickly revoked. The USAID will renew its humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, the U.S. consulate will open its doors again in East Jerusalem and the PLO offices will resume their work in Washington. And yet, it’s abundantly clear that the Israeli-Palestinian file is not in the top of new administration’s agenda, and there is no sense of urgency to try and fix things.

The old proverb says that if it ain’t broken, don’t touch it, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might now seem as the less urgent in comparison to regional disasters of Syria, Yemen or Lebanon. However, it is not going anywhere (despite the reassurances of the settlement lobby) and the situation is as explosive as ever. In absence of clear and consistent American policy, the unmaking of Trump’s legacy in Israel and PA might not be enough to salvage the two-states solution and to prevent the deterioration of the situation on the ground.

To be fair, the stalemate in negotiations between Israel and PA didn’t start with Trump. The leaders on both sides own the responsibility for failing many rounds of negotiations. However, it was Trump who made it crystal-clear which one of Abraham’s children was his favorite and which one will be left alone in the cold. His one-sided, cynical policy instilled confidence in settlement lobby leaders that not only will they have an upper hand in this century-long conflict, but they will do it while being cheered by the American president. At the same time, many Palestinians became completely disillusioned with the role of the U.S. as a fair broker, as well as with the ability of the Palestinian Authority to defend them and to promote their dream of independence. The PA became weaker than ever before, and in absence of direct cooperation with the IDF, the latter took a greater role in civil affairs in Palestinian territories.

The current situation presents us with serious challenges as well as rare opportunities. The situation in West Bank is fragile, the mistrust in the acting Palestinian leadership is immense, the frictions between the would-be heirs of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and their loyalists is growing. The Palestinian elections, set for May 22 and July 31 add even more uncertainty—the trauma of Hamas’s victory in 2006 is still fresh, even though it took place 15 years ago. Whether these elections will eventually take place or not, they are already a significant game-changer, as would-be heirs on both sides will come out and the fight for power will move into a next phase.

At the same time, normalization and peace treaties that were lately signed between Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco as well as the reconciliation between the Gulf states and Qatar had enhanced regional stability and created favorable atmosphere for advancing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Some of these states had indicated priorly that they are not interested in a broker role, while others insist on having on place around the negotiating table, but all of them formally support the two-states solution, notwithstanding the criticism against the Palestinian leadership.

Some might claim that the Abrahamic accords ensured that there will be less Arab pressure on Israel in regards to negotiation process, but this development can also prove to be a double-sword. If the American administration will become serious about reigniting the negotiations, it might work constructively with its allies in the Arab world in order to advance a peace process and to provide Israel with the necessary guarantees.

And finally, change might come to Israel as well. In mid-March, Israel is heading to the polling stations for the fourth time in 2 years, and for now, everything is open. Netanyahu is dreaming about a pure right-wing coalition that will inevitably find itself in confrontation with Biden’s White house. If this scenario fails to materialize, Israel might get a brand new prime-minister and a different government for the first time during the last 12 years. This government will not be significantly more dovish than the previous ones, as it will depend on pure right wing, pro-settlement parties And yet, there is reasonable chance that this new government will be more docile while trying to avoid a serious clash with an American administration.

**The article was published on News Week, 4 March 2021.

הפוסט The Two-State Solution Won’t Save Itself, Mr. President הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – Israel forged diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and announced progress in normalization with Sudan. These moves were underpinned by US encouragement and support, as expressed in significant defense, diplomatic and economic benefits for the participating Arab states. The formal relations led to advancement of agreements and cooperation in a wide array of fields, with official delegations conducting mutual visits. Attempts were made to harness Saudi participation in the normalization wave, including a reported trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Bin Salman and Pompeo.

2. Advancing normalization with new Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan – the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain prompted a flourishing of security, economic and civilian cooperation encouraged and promoted by the governments. Direct flights were launched between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval to overfly its air space, and maritime trade routes were advanced. Israel and the UAE reacted with enthusiasm to the new relationship, as reflected in the agreement on mutual visa exemptions and the visit of tens of thousands of Israelis to the UAE. The advancement of normalization with Gulf states was particularly pronounced compared to the ongoing freeze in Israel’s civilian relations with Egypt and Jordan.

3. Freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation – Under international and local political pressure, and the conditions set by the UAE for normalization, Netanyahu announced a freeze of his West Bank annexation intentions. Nonetheless, his government continued to move ahead with de facto annexation, without formal declarations, including construction plans in east Jerusalem and the settlements, along with demolitions of Palestinian homes in Area C, special funding transfers to the settlements and Knesset initiatives to legalize outposts.

4. Capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests – Ahead of the US presidential elections, Israel took advantage of the Trump administration’s desire to display foreign policy achievements in order to promote normalization agreements with Arab states, despite the absence of progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. Following Joe Biden’s victory, Israel sought to capitalize on Trump’s final days in office to promote US recognition of the legality of the settlements. The election results also prompted the Palestinian Authority to resume security and civilian coordination with Israel. Israel’s preparations for the Biden administration focused on the Iranian issue in light of an expected US intention to resume negotiations with Iran on the nuclear agreement.

5. Bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts – Israel has strengthened its alliance with Greece and Cyprus, especially in the fields of security, energy, health and tourism, and accepted a Cypriot initiative to form a trilateral secretariat of the alliance in Nicosia. Israel backed Greece and Cyprus in their maritime border disputes with Turkey, but did so cautiously. It wanted to avoid being dragged into a conflict to which it is not a side and not to exacerbate relations with Turkey, also given recent signals of Ankara’s interest in warmer ties.

6. Leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits – Israel took advantage of its energy resources and geopolitical location to advance regional cooperation. It promoted, in cooperation with Egypt, the formalization of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a recognized international organization, and ratified its foundation charter. Israel also entered US-mediated negotiations with Lebanon on marking the maritime border between the two states. It approved the plan for a gas pipeline to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, and advanced cooperation with the UAE on conveying energy through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.

7. Leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran – Israel continued its military activity against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, in coordination with Russia, and its diplomatic activity against the nuclear agreement and in favor of broader sanctions on Iran, in cooperation with the US. The Israeli MFA’s efforts affected decisions by additional states to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to Iran played a significant role in bolstering Israel’s relationship with Gulf states and in Israel’s decision to supply arms to Azerbaijan as part of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

8. Adopting a more positive approach toward the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue – The EU harshly condemned Netanyahu’s planned West Bank annexation intentions and expanded Israeli construction in the settlements and east Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi adopted a positive attitude toward the EU and underlined the importance of improved ties with it. He participated in an unofficial meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, and advanced ties with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, attempts to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council have yet to bear fruit. Israel’s ties with populist, a-liberal leaders in Central and Eastern Europe were sidelined, contrary to Netanyahu’s boasting of these relationships in previous years.

9. Empowering Israel’s MFA in terms of its professionalism, policy influence and public image – The MFA instituted new working procedures and promoted dozens of professional appointments, some of which are still awaiting government confirmation. Ashkenazi sought to ensure the participation of MFA representatives in all relevant government forums, and to strengthen coordination with other government ministries. The MFA also intensified its media exposure efforts, including spotlighting its contribution to the promotion of relation with Arab states against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords. The MFA stepped up its recruitment efforts, resulting in higher enrollment than in previous years for its cadet training and making the upcoming cadet course the biggest in recent years.

**This article was published on The Jerusalem Post, January 16 2021.

הפוסט Semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies with Arab states הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Ahead of the anniversary, a Mitvim Institute team visited Amman and held policy dialogues with academics, diplomats and former army officers. Many expressed amazement that we had bothered to come, that someone in Israel is interested in Jordan and wants to know how to improve the relationship, how unnecessary crises can be averted and how the sides can work together toward a common goal of peace and prosperity.

Israeli officials, researchers or politicians hardly ever come here anymore, our interlocutors told us. The one exception are the Israeli security officials who regularly and frequently meet with their Jordanian counterparts. The security aspects of the peace accord run smoothly, reflecting the security-oriented approach of the outgoing government, an approach that prioritizes security relations over all other aspects, believing that no progress on them is possible, in any case.

However, should the strategic ties with the Hashemite Kingdom be limited to security issues, important though they are? Can a limited relationship that begins and ends with ties between defense officials carry the weight of the entire agreement for long? Do economic, diplomatic and civilian ties not create an additional layer to the relationship that can also enhance progress in the security field? The peace agreement with Egypt has also been emptied of real content, being largely limited to security cooperation – and normalization nowhere on the horizon. Many in Israel believe that given the opposition to normalization by many Jordanians and Egyptians, there is no choice but to make do with what is available – security cooperation that does, indeed, save lives and provides security and defense.

During the journey to Amman, we came to realize the extent to which Jordan desires cooperation with Israel in areas such as tourism (medical tourism, too), water and high-tech. Israel does not prioritize these fields and they are not at the top of the government’s diplomatic agenda (if it even has one). Thus, after many years of discussing major and significant mutual projects, these are postponed endlessly to the chagrin of the potential Jordanian partners.

Jordan’s economic crisis and its hosting of 1.5 million Syrian refugees came up in every conversation we had in Amman. The crisis is not new, and last year the Jordanian capital was shaken by mass protest government, cutback and corruption – similar to the ones taking place in Beirut these days. Arab States, the US and the World Bank have provided urgent aid to stabilize the Kingdom, but Israel hardly noticed. The media does not deal with the major projects stuck for years or with the fact that Israel could have done a lot more to help its neighbor to the east attain economic stability, which could have definitely enhanced security, too. Israelis are not sufficiently interested in Jordan, even though the country is of vital importance to Israel’s security – with its 309-kilometer border a vital shield against any troubles from the east.

The Israeli enthusiasm over the signing of the 1994 peace agreement has already waned, and Israelis only touchdown with Jordan only when they fly to the Far East, transiting through Amman or when vacationing in Aqaba. By the way, anyone wishing to shorten the waiting time at the land border between the two states will have to shell out hundreds of dollars for the very short flight. There is barely any demand for that route and the Jordanians would rather sell Israelis cheap tickets for continuing flights to India, Thailand and Sri Lanka, aviation sources told us. The absence of visits also stems from the difficulties of most Jordanians to get entry visas to Israel. Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab told us about repeated requests by his friends and family to visit Israel for family occasions or other needs. “In the end, people simply give up. Israel loses out big time because those who do manage to get a visa are generally favorably impressed and take home a positive impression of the state,” Kuttab said.

The Mitvim Institute 2018 Foreign Policy Index attests to the same attitudes. Most Israelis view Saudi Arabia as the most important Arab state, not Jordan or Egypt – Israel’s strategic peace partners and its immediate neighbors. Of the two, Egypt is regarded as far more important than Jordan. The public is influenced greatly by the policy of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who talks with certainty about the strengthening ties with Arab states and the new horizons for Israel’s relationship with Gulf capitals. He never mentions the decline in trade between Israel and Jordan, the endless foot dragging over the Med-Dead project that generates great anger in Jordan, and the fact that nothing is left of the regional prosperity and cooperation forged in 1994.

The Palestinian issue is central to Israeli-Jordanian relations. The percentage of Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom is a matter of contention – the Jordanians say they constitute 40 percent of the population whereas Israel is convinced they number 60 percent. Either way, the situation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem, has a significant impact on Jordanian attitudes toward Israel. For Netanyahu, the Palestinians are no longer relevant and Arab states have abandoned their cause. However, our conversations in Amman made clear that this approach is illogical and not feasible. Jordan greatly fears escalation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, and seeks better lines of communication with Israel.

With a relatively modest investment and prioritization of the relationship with the Kingdom, Israel could save itself the repeated embarrassments it has recently experienced in relations with Jordan. Jordanian scholars and journalists told us that had Israel acted in a diplomatic and rational fashion, it could have boosted the King’s standing vis-à-vis radicals and BDS proponents. They were puzzled over Israel’s preference for humiliating and undermining its strategic partner and the stability of that regime. Why did Netanyahu embrace the security guard who had shot dead a Jordanian at the embassy in Amman? Why was there no serious, in-depth investigation of the death of a Jordanian judge at the Allenby Bridge border crossing? Why is Israel playing along with Saudi aspirations on Al-Aqsa? Our Jordanian interlocutors wondered what Israel’s policy on Jordan was and had a hard time understanding why Israel was shaking off the important alliance with all its might. In this context, the recent call by Blue and White party Chair Benny Gantz at a rally on the Naharayim Peace Island to strengthen the peace with Jordan and create a “region of cooperation” along the border is of particular importance.

When the argument is heard that Israel’s standing in the Middle East has never been better, it is worth noticing developments in Jordan. The peace agreement with Jordan, just like the Jordan River, tends to dry up over time unless efforts are made to nurture it. Despite the frustration and disappointment, we returned from Amman with a clear sense that repairing or restarting the relationship is within the realm of the possible. Israel could win back Jordan with the right media coverage and attention, by revving up significant economic projects that would help resolve Jordan’s water shortages and create jobs, with an effort to break though the deadlock in the Palestinian arena. In the final analysis, Jordan is right here, within touching distance and not in the dark beyond. Anyone who restores Jordan to the top of Israel’s list of diplomatic priorities would do wonders for the relationship between us, benefitting all sides.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This was not the first time that Saudi officials had harshly criticized the Palestinian leadership for consistently missing historic opportunities to resolve the conflict, but until now they have not done it publicly. The contacts between Riyadh and Jerusalem are perceived by part of the Saudi public as a betrayal of the Palestinian interest, which plays into the hands of the regime’s opponents. Therefore, the royal family should prove that it is not abandoning the Palestinian struggle in favor of normalization with Israel.

The Palestinian issue has never been at the top of the Saudi agenda, but it has been and continues to be, a restraining factor in Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards Israel. Historically, there have been moments in which the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia coincided, but they have never materialized into a dramatic change in the bilateral relations. The reason was the Saudi regime’s fear of harsh reactions on the part of the Arab world, which would undermine its public image and its religious status as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam.

However lately, as the Iranian threat increases, Israel has become a potential ally for Saudi Arabia. Not only do the two countries share the same view of the need to root out radical elements and stabilize the Middle East, but Israel is the only country in the world with the military intentions and capabilities required to fight common enemies. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on its strategic alliance with the United States, but in recent years the American administration’s willingness to intervene in the Middle East’s bloody conflicts has diminished, and Saudi Arabia has virtually remained without a tailwind to effectively curb Iran’s influence. In such circumstances, Israel has become a major player in changing the regional balance of power. Beyond its intelligence and strategic capabilities, Israel serves as an economic model for Saudi Arabia. As the Saudi economy is undergoing a revolution from being an oil-based economy to a productive and advanced economy, Israel’s knowledge and technology has become increasingly attractive.

The hidden potential in normalized Israeli-Saudi relations is enormous. On the strategic level, the bi-lateral relations are not symmetrical in view of Israel’s clear military superiority, but it does not diminish their importance. Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the Arab world could help Israel fight Iran and strengthen the security cooperation with other Arab countries. Nevertheless, Israel’s fear of advanced arms deals between Saudi Arabia and the United States and the possibility of developing Saudi nuclear weapons in response to Iranian nuclear weapons, should not be dismissed. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia could take advantage of Israeli intelligence on Iran and its Middle Eastern affiliates, as well as its defense systems (such as Iron Dome) and its advanced capabilities against Cyber-attacks.

At the diplomatic level, Israeli-Saudi cooperation can help mitigate explosive incidents, such as riots on the Temple Mount. In addition, it will pave the way for the promotion of economic, energy and agricultural projects between Israel and the Arab countries, which presently hardly exist at present. Already, the royal family is exerting pressure to convince the Palestinian leadership to be more flexible with their demands from Israel. Unlike the past, Saudi Arabia has withdrawn from its demand for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and is now talking about a logical solution. Thus, for example, the Saudis no longer support the Palestinian demand for the right of return, rather they seek a solution that will be acceptable to Israel as well. In addition, it does not condition the normalization of its relations with Israel on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and is willing to settle for a breakthrough in negotiations. As far as Israel is concerned, if Israel makes gestures, such as freezing settlements or removing (even partially) the closure on Gaza, that signal to the Arab world that it is willing to negotiate, Saudi Arabia will possibly reward Israel with more gestures.

At the economic level, if the regime removes the economic barriers and allows Israeli merchandise and labor to integrate into the Saudi economy, it will make a huge contribution to the Israeli economy, especially if other Arab countries open their gates to Israeli produce.

Saudi Arabia and Israel are interested in normalizing their relations. This is indisputable. However, despite the mutual will, it is still a long and winding road towards that goal. At this point in time, there is a chance that Saudi Arabia may succeed in bringing the Palestinian leadership to the negotiating table, but it cannot force it to sign a document in which the Palestinians waive their historical demands on Israel. Israel, on its part, does not show willingness to meet the Saudi threshold requirements. With the current coalition, any Israeli gesture toward the Palestinians would be seen as deviating from the ideological positions of the government.

As things stand now, the Israeli and Palestinian leadership are unable to bridge the gap between their positions, despite the American and Arab pressure. Therefore, the chances of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia are unclear. While there has been a dramatic change in the Saudi discourse toward Israel lately, it is doubtful whether the conditions for the Saudi leadership to leap over the Palestinian hurdle are ripe for normalization with the Zionist enemy.

Israel must do its best not to miss the unique window of opportunity that has opened in its relations with Saudi Arabia. Opportunities are deceptive and transient in the Middle East, therefore the common interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia may fade if the current circumstances change. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Israeli government is to restore its credibility in the eyes of the Saudi leadership. Normalization with Saudi Arabia will not be given for free. It has its price. The question is whether Israel is willing to pay it. The worst thing that the Israeli prime minister could do is to instill in the Saudis the feeling that he is ready to make concessions, and then to retract his statement. Saudi Arabia has been disappointed with the Israeli leadership in the past. It must not happen again.

Dr. Michal Yaari is an expert on Saudi Arabia from Tel Aviv University and the Open University and is a member of a task team at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research about Israel-Saudi Arabia relations, which was written as part of a Mitvim Institute project on “Israel’s relations with the Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: From Foes to Potential Friends הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is moving between its commitment to the Arab official position, which opposes open ties with Israel, and its desire to strengthen its standing in the international community, which calls for occasional official contact with Israel. The connection between Moroccan Jews in Israel and the Jewish community in Morocco is at the core of the Israeli-Moroccan relations. In the 1990s, liaison offices were opened in Rabat and Tel Aviv, but since the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, they have not maintained official diplomatic relations.

Official interaction with Israel provokes criticism in Morocco and other Arab countries and may harm the standing of the kingdom in the Arab world. Anti-normalization movements in Morocco are at the forefront of the opposition to Israeli-Moroccan ties, while the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the background. The stalemate in the peace process does not allow both countries to realize the full potential of their relations.

However, there is a limited number of collaborations that can be carried out without infringing on Morocco’s ability to portray official Israeli symbols. This is the result of the routinizing effect; that is, making the Israeli-Moroccan connection become a routine. This is possible thanks to the consistent movement of official and unofficial delegations, including tourists, between Israel and Morocco, allowing for the maintenance of bilateral ties in areas such as health, education, communications, culture, and parliamentary diplomacy. The two countries also sometimes work together in different international forums.

The widening coverage of the delegations in the media and social networks in Morocco and Israel is also contributing to the routinizing effect. The Moroccan media expresses great interest in the delegations that visit Israel and follows them closely. The coverage, even if not always positive, encourages open and courageous dialogue in Morocco on issues related to its ties with Israel and Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world.

The routinizing effect is particularly evident in sports, especially in relation to Judo. For example, in May 2015, Israel’s Judo team was detained at the Moroccan airport for hours before being allowed to enter the country to compete. In November 2017, Israel’s Judo team landed in Marrakesh to compete in the World Championship, despite the fact that a few days earlier Morocco announced that it would not allow the team’s arrival. In both cases, Israeli participation was made possible due to the intervention of World Association President Marius Vizer. In 2017, Morocco even allowed Judoka Ori Sasson to wear the Israeli symbol, while a month earlier he was denied the ability to wear it in a competition in Abu Dhabi.

The result, as was manifested in the Judo contest in Agadir, is that the Moroccan public is not as sensitive as it used to be about delegations visiting Morocco or Israel. The routinizing effect manages to stretch the boundaries of cooperation step by step. An Israeli national anthem that is publicly played in Morocco is not something that Moroccans or Israelis are accustomed to; this is a positive development. Morocco, for its part, chooses to be part of the international community and to pay the price of its ties with Israel in return. However, Israel-Morocco relations still have great potential to develop, and its realization depends on advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Einat Levi is a member of a task-team at the Mitvim Institute, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Beyond Judo: The Routinizing Effect in Israel-Morocco Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.