Next to Barghouti’s portrait is that of the late Yasser Arafat. Placing these two figures together implies an obvious connection; both are revered for their struggles against Israel.

According to a poll of Palestinian public opinion conducted in September, if presidential elections were held for the Palestinian Authority and Mahmoud Abbas did not run, Barghouti would receive 41% of the vote; Ismail Haniyeh, the international leader of Hamas, would receive 17%; ex-Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan, 5%; the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya al-Sinwar, 4%; and Abbas’s confidant Hussein al-Sheikh only 2%.

It’s unclear when presidential elections for the P.A. will take place. Abbas, who was elected to office in 2005, postponed indefinitely the vote scheduled for May 2021. But this is not the only barrier facing Barghouti.

Once an energetic student leader from the West Bank village of Kobar, Barghouti rose to become a leader in Fatah’s military wing, and was arrested 20 years ago in Ramallah by the Israeli Defense Forces. He was tried and convicted on five counts of murder in an Israeli civilian court, unlike most Palestinians, who are tried in Israeli military courts.

He was found guilty of authorizing and organizing the murder of a Greek Orthodox monk, a shooting near the settlement of Givat Ze’ev in which an Israeli civilian was killed, and the 2002 Seafood Market restaurant attack in Tel Aviv in which three civilians were killed. Security sources in Israel said that among the documents the IDF found during raids on the Ramallah offices of the Tanzim (Fatah’s military branch) were memos that showed Barghouti’s direct involvement in planning terrorist attacks.

Barghouti claimed that he supported armed resistance to the Israeli occupation yet condemned attacks against civilians inside the 1967 Green Line. He refused to recognize the legitimacy of the court and waived his right to defend himself. The question of his release was widely discussed in Israel and the West Bank immediately after the trial. Yet in 2006, Knesset Member Avi Dichter, who had served as the director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), said sarcastically during a TV interview I conducted with him that “Barghouti can certainly expect an earlier release—after some 100 years or so.” Today his release seems no more likely than it did 16 years ago.

During the first years of his imprisonment, Barghouti remained active politically. He negotiated a unilateral truce declared by the main Palestinian factions in June 2003, during the Second Intifada. He drafted the so-called Prisoners’ Document in 2006 (in this document all imprisoned Palestinian leaders of all factions called to establish a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders and demanded the right of return for refugees). In 2007 Barghouti was involved in the creation of the Mecca Agreement that intended to heal the split between Fatah and Hamas.

In recent years, however, Barghouti has seldom made important statements on the burning issues that preoccupy the Palestinians. He often emphasizes in general terms the importance of national reconciliation, and just recently called for dates to be set for presidential and parliamentary elections. “The lack of elections for (almost) 20 years makes the Palestinians live in a dangerous political vacuum,” he explained in a letter to his wife Fadwa. Yet, he has not uttered a word about corruption or violations of civil rights in the P.A., the future of a two-state solution, or other issues.

While there is no doubt that for many Palestinians, including the youth, Barghouti is a powerful symbol of resistance, it is unclear how well the imprisoned leader would do in managing internal Palestinian politics. Sources in Ramallah say that while Barghouti has the sympathy of the street, he hasn’t been active or clear enough about his goals, ideology or agenda. Barghouti’s relations with the Fatah Party and the level of support that he enjoys there are also foggy.

According to senior analysts and friends who preferred to remain anonymous, “We knew who Barghouti was years ago. Little is known about his ideology today. He was a popular student leader and an aide of Arafat. But is he ready for the heavy burden of responsibility as president? Will he be able to unite the Fatah ranks? Or will he use this opportunity to just bargain his release out of jail?”

During the preparations for the parliamentary elections last year, Barghouti decided to run on an independent list with his wife Fadwa and Yasser Arafat’s nephew, Nasser al-Qudwa. Over the years, Abbas has successfully purged the leadership of both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the P.A. of Barghouti’s sympathizers. Apart from Barghouti, there are many Fatah contenders for the role of a successor to Abbas, such as Jibril Rajoub, Hussein al-Sheikh and probably Muhammad Dahlan, now based in the United Arab Emirates. Some Palestinian analysts predicted last year that parliamentary elections would lead to another victory for Hamas at the expense of Fatah.

From the Israeli perspective, Barghouti’s winning future Palestinian elections would be dangerous for several reasons. Since currently there is no scenario for his release, if Barghouti were elected president of the P.A., someone else would need to govern in his name. The chance of chaos and anarchy would increase and the P.A.’s legitimacy would continue to decrease, to the benefit of Hamas. At the same time, the international pressure on Israel would grow; Israel could find itself in the shoes of the South African regime that jailed Nelson Mandela. Interestingly, the Palestinian media rarely draw this comparison between the two men, while the international and Israeli press often make use of it.

In short, Israel would find itself in an impossible situation. The Palestinians also would be faced with the difficult reality of having a symbol of resistance instead of a political leader who is able to govern, negotiate and make deals. Combine this messy situation with the emerging far-right Israeli government and you get a perfect storm. In fact, a perfect storm may hit Israel and the P.A. whenever Abbas departs the scene and the battle for his succession officially starts.

This article is from, “Jewish Exponent” from December 14, 2022

הפוסט Will Marwan Barghouti Be the Next Palestinian President? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

EU member states can decide independently whether to recognize a state, and sometimes there are internal disagreements on the subject (for example, on the issue of recognizing Kosovo). However, the EU can also decide on “collective recognition,” for example of states emerging from the collapse of a multinational framework (as was the case with Yugoslavia’s disintegration), or when independence is achieved by agreement (for example, in East Timor and South Sudan). The EU has also adopted collective decisions to withhold recognition, in cases like Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and Crimea.

Recognition as a diplomatic tool

As far back as the 1980 Venice Declaration, European states have consistently supported the Palestinian right to self-determination and a two-state solution. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Europe assumed that recognition of a Palestinian state would be a component of the final status agreement and an incentive to conclude a peace deal. However, following the collapse of the peace process and the diplomatic freeze that has ensued, the issue of recognition has come up once again, but this time as a possible diplomatic tool that can be used before an agreement is concluded.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched its campaign for international recognition of a Palestinian state in the late 1980s. Addressing a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria on Nov. 15, 1988, PLO leader Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. That was also the first time the PLO adopted the two-state principle and at the same time accepted UN Resolution 242 based on the 1967 borders. Following the declaration, over 100 states announced recognition of a Palestinian state, and both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation approved its membership. It should be noted that the states of Eastern Europe (including Poland and Hungary) that are currently members of the EU already recognized the Palestinian state at that stage as part of the Soviet bloc’s support for its independence. Many states subsequently upgraded the level of PLO representation in their countries to the status of an embassy, but beyond such moves, the recognition was mainly symbolic and declarative.

In September 1993, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition. The PLO recognized Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, while Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. However, the Oslo Accords did not include establishment of a Palestinian state, leaving the issue to future negotiations on a permanent agreement. In 2003, the Middle East Quartet — the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia — issued a road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which stipulated that an internationally recognized Palestinian state within temporary borders, bearing all the characteristics of sovereignty, would be established during the second phase of the plan, while the third phase would include negotiations between the two states on a permanent agreement. The UN Security Council approved the plan, but while both sides accepted it, the plan was not implemented.

Palestinian push for international recognition

In 2011, following failed attempts to reach a final status agreement in the 2007-08 Annapolis process and in the 2010-11 Mitchell talks, the Palestinians decided to focus their efforts on international recognition of a Palestinian state. In September 2011, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) applied for full UN membership, but the U.S. warned that it would veto such a resolution, blocking the move. In October 2011, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization approved Palestine as a member, and in November 2012 the UN General Assembly upgraded its status to that of a “non-member observer state.” Concurrently, many Latin American states — including Brazil, Argentina, and Chile — announced their recognition of a Palestinian state in 2010 and 2011, and opened embassies in Ramallah.

During U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s mediation efforts in 2013-14, the Palestinians agreed to drop their push for recognition, but following the failure of the negotiations in summer 2014, the effort was renewed and several European parliaments (among them those of the UK, France, and Ireland) called for the recognition of a Palestinian state. The European Parliament, too, adopted a resolution in that spirit. Nonetheless, only one European state — Sweden — officially announced de facto recognition, in October 2014, upgrading the status of the Palestinian representative office to that of an embassy and labeling the hosting of Abbas as a head-of-state visit. However, Sweden did not open an embassy in Ramallah, and Swedish representation remained at the level of a consulate in East Jerusalem. Various EU states have said they would promote recognition at the “appropriate” time and as part of an agreed Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In 2016, France launched a peace initiative and announced that it would recognize a Palestinian state should the plan fail. French officials subsequently withdrew that promise, and when the initiative failed France did not recognize Palestine.

Advocates of recognition — among them some in Israel’s peace camp — argue that such a move would advance the peace process and provide a more equal structure in negotiations between the two sides. They also contend that given the impasse in the peace process, the growing irrelevance of the two-state vision, and concern over escalation into violence, recognition would preserve the two-state principle, bolster Palestinian moderates, and offer the Palestinian public a political horizon. By contrast, critics claim that the tool of recognition should not be used at the wrong time, and that doing so without an agreement between the two sides would reduce the Palestinians’ incentive to progress with negotiations. Discussion of the issue also raises the legal question of whether the PA meets the required conditions for recognition as a state, and whether recognition would include a reference to borders or leave them to be determined in a future agreement (it is worth noting that Israel’s declaration of independence did not determine borders, either).

What next?

In conclusion, while recognition was discussed in the past as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian agreement, these days several European states are considering it as a response to annexation. A decision on recognition would not require consensus, and each EU member could decide for itself. Although recognition would be an expression of protest against annexation, it would not constitute a European sanction against Israel, and would be perceived instead as a balancing measure designed to preserve the feasibility of the two-state vision, and to bolster the PA against the threat of collapse and escalation. On the one hand, PA representatives appeared to advocate recognition in response to annexation. For example, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has urged EU member states to do so. On the other hand, PA officials have also spoken of a competing option, on the other end of the diplomatic spectrum: declaring the dismantling of the PA’s institutions and “handing the keys” over to Israel in the case of annexation.

Recognition is largely a symbolic measure that does not necessarily augur a de facto change on the ground, as was the case with past recognition declarations that did not result in substantive change. Nonetheless, a broad move by several EU members — especially by key states like Germany and France, as well as the UK, which has exited the EU — could have important diplomatic significance in terms of international legitimization of the Palestinians and affect the international response to Israel’s policy in the West Bank.

The article was published on MEI, August 5, 2020.

הפוסט To recognize or not to recognize: EU recognition of Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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(Originally published in the Palestine-Israel Journal)

הפוסט Beyond the Trump Plan: How Can the International Community Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.