In order to prevent the election of extremists opposed to a political settlement, legitimate restrictions must be placed on the individuals and groups running for the post of president and for membership in the legislative council. These limitations will be based on the three conditions that the Quartet countries laid out for Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections: abandoning the path of terrorism, recognizing Israel, and affirming the previous agreements it signed with the PLO.

The elections must take place in the context of an advanced political process offering hope to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increasing their support for a settlement approach. To that end, Israel will have to declare its commitment to a political process designed to result in a two-state solution, and adopt confidence-building measures that demonstrate its intent to reach a political settlement, including a halt of construction in the settlements. At the same time, the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, will have to guarantee their recognition of a Palestinian state. The United States will also help train the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses, contribute to the development of its economy, and promote reforms in government institutions.

Israel and the international community must lay the groundwork for orderly, internationally supervised elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip that will ensure the election of a suitable national leadership for the Palestinian people. Having won the trust of the people, such a leadership will enjoy legitimacy and be able to promote a stable settlement with Israel. It will also contribute, over time, to strengthening the moderate elements in society and weakening extremist, religious, and nationalist opposition elements.

הפוסט Palestinian Elections: A Vital Step Toward a Stable Political Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From within Hamas, particularly among its leadership outside Gaza, there have been calls for the organization’s integration into the PLO. While this isn’t a new objective for Hamas, it appears that its external leaders now perceive integration with the PLO not only as a means to eventually seize control of the PLO and, consequently, the PA, but also as a strategy for securing political survival post the catastrophic events that Hamas has brought upon Gaza.

PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas is a consistent mistake

The PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas has proven to be a consistent mistake. This trend first surfaced during the Oslo Accords era when Arafat declined to disband Hamas and Islamic Jihad, despite their engagement in acts of terrorism that significantly contributed to the breakdown of the political process with Israel. Furthermore, during the uprising from 2000 to 2005, Fatah’s own factions, including Al-Aqsa Brigades, became involved in terror attacks against Israel.

The subsequent incident was Abbas’s choice not to dismantle the Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations, but rather to broker an agreement with them, establishing a suspension of hostilities (tahdiya) in March 2005. This move aimed to secure calmness preceding Sharon’s plan for disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005. However, this decision starkly contradicted the positions of both Israel and the United States. Abbas prioritized preserving the appearance of Palestinian unity over other critical interests. Notably, the use of the term ‘tahdiya,’ instead of ‘hudna’ which signifies a ‘ceasefire’ with binding Islamic implications, indicated that the resistance movements had no intention of disarming. Instead, they sought to create an illusion of acceptance to prevent undermining the Israeli retreat from Gaza.

However, in the six months leading up to the disengagement, terror attacks persisted, particularly by Islamic Jihad. Consequently, Hamas could claim that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, akin to its retreat from Lebanon, resulted from armed struggle rather than a diplomatic process. This stance, coupled with widespread public discontent over Fatah’s corruption, led to Hamas’s electoral triumph in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of January 2006.

The third repetition of this error was the 2007 agreement brokered in Mecca between Hamas and Fatah, mediated by Saudi Arabia. This accord resulted in the formation of a Palestinian unity government led by Ismail Haniyeh. However, just five months later, Hamas forcibly ousted the PA from Gaza in a violent coup. This act blatantly violated the Mecca Agreement, which expressly mandated a “ban on the shedding of Palestinian blood… and adoption of the language of dialogue as the sole basis for solving political disagreements in the Palestinian arena.”

The fourth event was the deal inked between Fatah and Hamas in October 2017 in Cairo, mediated by Egypt. The primary point of contention that caused the collapse of this agreement stemmed from Hamas’s resistance to disarmament. Their stance was rooted in the assertion that their arms were aimed at Israel rather than the PA.

The PA’s inclination to incorporate Hamas into its power structures post-war contradicts its own self-interest for two critical reasons. Firstly, this move could pave the way for Hamas to eventually seize control of the PA, akin to the historical precedent of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and expulsion of the PA in 2007. Secondly, due to staunch opposition from the United States and Israel, such a proposal lacks any political feasibility.

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests?

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests? One explanation could be its vulnerability or a lack of internal legitimacy, compelling Abbas and Fatah leaders to adopt a stance that aligns with public sentiment. According to a survey conducted by Khalil Shikaki’s respected Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research following the outbreak of the conflict, support for Hamas in the West Bank surged threefold in response to the attack, while trust in Abbas and Fatah dwindled significantly, with around 90% of the public favoring Abbas’s resignation. Additionally, approximately 60% of Palestinians view armed struggle as the most effective means in the conflict with Israel.

In this regard, Abbas and the PA leadership resemble leaders of several Arab states, notably Jordan, who have condemned Israel rather than Hamas, occasionally employing strong rhetoric in their statements. However, while Jordan has upheld its peace treaty with Israel, Abbas’s current commitment to the political process remains uncertain. His adviser, Mahmoud al-Habbash, asserts that Abbas has consistently condemned Hamas in meetings with world leaders, but refrains from doing so publicly during the war. Yet, this assertion remains unverified.

An emerging perspective in Israel posits that the fundamental disparity between Fatah and Hamas lies solely in the methods employed to achieve their shared ultimate objective: the elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state encompassing the entire region from the river to the sea. However, it’s important to note that the historical actions taken by the PA, especially by Abbas himself, do not align with this assertion. This viewpoint, supported by the Netanyahu government, seemingly stems from its reluctance to involve the PA in Gaza post-war. This stance contradicts Israel’s policy in the West Bank, where efforts are made to strengthen the PA under the leadership of Abbas and Fatah.

Irrespective of Israel’s current stance, if the PA aspires to play a role in the post-war scenario in Gaza, as desired by the United States and various states in the Arab world and beyond, it must disavow Hamas and refuse to give it a role in post-war Gaza. Failure to do so risks undermining the PA’s credibility as a feasible negotiating partner. A step in this direction was the statement by Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary General of the executive committee of the PLO, that “all Palestinian factions including Hamas must take a serious look at the failure of their policies to achieve freedom for their people.”

The primary challenge lies in the lack of substantial popular support for the current PA leadership. Hence, any prospective agreement may necessitate engaging with a different leadership – one that is democratically elected, enjoys legitimacy, remains dedicated to a political resolution, and is both capable and willing to confront any Palestinian entity resorting to violence.

The article was published on the Jerusalem Post on December 20.

הפוסט The Palestinian leadership keeps making the same past mistakes הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The latest decision to vaccinate 120,000 Palestinians working in Israel is a step in the right direction, but all Palestinians should be our top priority for all the good reasons – moral, medical, as well as strategic.

From a moral point of view, there is no doubt that we have a responsibility and there is no point in quibbling about unnecessary legal disputes. According to the Israeli government, we have no responsibility for the Palestinians due to the transfer of responsibility for health to the Palestinian Authority in the Oslo Accords. There is a great deal of irony in the fact that the Israeli right-wing camp is suddenly presenting the Oslo Accords at the forefront of its arguments, after years of defaming the agreement, a defamation that even led to the assassination of prime minister Rabin. In addition, it is ironic that the argument about the International Criminal Court having no ruling authority on the Palestinian Authority is 180 degrees opposite to the argument on health, where we hold that this is not a legal entity under international law.

It is important to remember that the Oslo Accords were supposed to lead to a five-year process, at the end of which the temporary state of occupation made possible by international law would end. In reality, not only does the occupation continue, the Israeli government’s policy of promoting settlements and putting demographic pressure on the Palestinian population does not lead to an end to the occupation, but rather to its perpetuation. In addition, we have full control over the mobility of the Palestinians, and even over the population register of their residents. At the bottom line, we definitely have a moral responsibility to their health, as long as they do not have full control and independence as we do.

From a medical viewpoint, we and they are not really separate. Netanyahu was right when he said in an interview with Udi Segal (on Israeli TV Channel 13), that in this context, we are not an island state like Cyprus, New Zealand or Taiwan; but at the same time, Netanyahu misled the public by claiming that the Palestinians were the ones who infected us. The data show that the Palestinian morbidity was caused by contact with Israelis, by contacts that occurred due to political decisions regarding illness-laden flights from New York, Dubai and more.

As we know, Palestinians cannot fly abroad or cross into Jordan without our permission. That is, we could be an island state if we treated the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean as one epidemiological unit, to which uncontrolled entrances should be prevented and all Israelis and Palestinians alike should be vaccinated.

Strategically, the use of vaccines as a lever, in order to improve Israel’s reputation is correct, but we could, with the help of vaccine diplomacy, promote relations with the Palestinians who have invaluable importance to our security and to our future far more so than the residents of Honduras, Guatemala, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to whom Israel offered vaccines. We could also coordinate aid to the Palestinians with the World Health Organization, with the new Biden administration, and with key European countries, which are very rightly concerned about the humanitarian situation of the Palestinians, as very prominently having been raised at the recent AHLC meeting.

We could become an example and role model for the strategic use of vaccine diplomacy. But instead, our government is trying its best to use the vaccines as a political gimmick, which does not have a diplomatic effect on anyone in the world, because its cynicism is transparent and clear.

Countries around the globe are adapting to a change in the leadership of the free world following the recent US elections. Even in our region – the Palestinians are working to promote elections. The Saudis, Egyptians, Turks are changing behavior because they understand that there is a new administration in Washington, for which civil rights and democracy matter.

Only the Israeli government mourns about Trump’s departure, and continues to act as if the world is still led by an inhumane narcissist who has irresponsibly left the World Health Organization in the midst of a global epidemic that cries out for global cooperation.

It is still not too late to correct and leverage the advantage we have in the field of vaccines, in order to do the right thing morally, medically and diplomatically, and to benefit ourselves through aid to the Palestinians.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2021.

הפוסט Coronavirus: Israel must vaccinate our Palestinian neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The new American administration wastes no time unmaking Trump’s legacy of indifference calling out loudly actors who violate human rights them, from Russia to Yemen. Several, though not all, of Trump’s decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian track were quickly revoked. The USAID will renew its humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, the U.S. consulate will open its doors again in East Jerusalem and the PLO offices will resume their work in Washington. And yet, it’s abundantly clear that the Israeli-Palestinian file is not in the top of new administration’s agenda, and there is no sense of urgency to try and fix things.

The old proverb says that if it ain’t broken, don’t touch it, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might now seem as the less urgent in comparison to regional disasters of Syria, Yemen or Lebanon. However, it is not going anywhere (despite the reassurances of the settlement lobby) and the situation is as explosive as ever. In absence of clear and consistent American policy, the unmaking of Trump’s legacy in Israel and PA might not be enough to salvage the two-states solution and to prevent the deterioration of the situation on the ground.

To be fair, the stalemate in negotiations between Israel and PA didn’t start with Trump. The leaders on both sides own the responsibility for failing many rounds of negotiations. However, it was Trump who made it crystal-clear which one of Abraham’s children was his favorite and which one will be left alone in the cold. His one-sided, cynical policy instilled confidence in settlement lobby leaders that not only will they have an upper hand in this century-long conflict, but they will do it while being cheered by the American president. At the same time, many Palestinians became completely disillusioned with the role of the U.S. as a fair broker, as well as with the ability of the Palestinian Authority to defend them and to promote their dream of independence. The PA became weaker than ever before, and in absence of direct cooperation with the IDF, the latter took a greater role in civil affairs in Palestinian territories.

The current situation presents us with serious challenges as well as rare opportunities. The situation in West Bank is fragile, the mistrust in the acting Palestinian leadership is immense, the frictions between the would-be heirs of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and their loyalists is growing. The Palestinian elections, set for May 22 and July 31 add even more uncertainty—the trauma of Hamas’s victory in 2006 is still fresh, even though it took place 15 years ago. Whether these elections will eventually take place or not, they are already a significant game-changer, as would-be heirs on both sides will come out and the fight for power will move into a next phase.

At the same time, normalization and peace treaties that were lately signed between Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco as well as the reconciliation between the Gulf states and Qatar had enhanced regional stability and created favorable atmosphere for advancing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Some of these states had indicated priorly that they are not interested in a broker role, while others insist on having on place around the negotiating table, but all of them formally support the two-states solution, notwithstanding the criticism against the Palestinian leadership.

Some might claim that the Abrahamic accords ensured that there will be less Arab pressure on Israel in regards to negotiation process, but this development can also prove to be a double-sword. If the American administration will become serious about reigniting the negotiations, it might work constructively with its allies in the Arab world in order to advance a peace process and to provide Israel with the necessary guarantees.

And finally, change might come to Israel as well. In mid-March, Israel is heading to the polling stations for the fourth time in 2 years, and for now, everything is open. Netanyahu is dreaming about a pure right-wing coalition that will inevitably find itself in confrontation with Biden’s White house. If this scenario fails to materialize, Israel might get a brand new prime-minister and a different government for the first time during the last 12 years. This government will not be significantly more dovish than the previous ones, as it will depend on pure right wing, pro-settlement parties And yet, there is reasonable chance that this new government will be more docile while trying to avoid a serious clash with an American administration.

**The article was published on News Week, 4 March 2021.

הפוסט The Two-State Solution Won’t Save Itself, Mr. President הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years.

Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, a Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions:

1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden administration must signal at the outset that it attributes importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate declarations and steps attesting to its intention to restore the issue to the international agenda.

2. Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership. The incoming administration must announce at an early stage the renewal of US ties with the Palestinian leadership and launch a high-level political dialogue. The renewed ties should walk back Trump-era measures by re-opening the PLO offices in Washington and the US Consulate in east Jerusalem, and resuming USAID assistance to the Palestinians and funding for UNRWA. The administration could also advance confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, such as promoting economic projects in Area C and assisting in alleviating the COVID-19 crisis. Declaring the return of the US to its traditional support of the two-state solution and opposition to settlements would also be of importance.

3. Emphasizing the US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement. The Biden administration must declare its commitment to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and mutually agreed land swaps as its vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a declaration would ratify the US commitment to international norms, the principles of international law and UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the administration should start formulating parameters for a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to serve as a clear framework for future negotiations and shape the domestic and international discourse. However, the administration should also weigh the challenges in such a move and carefully consider the correct timing and manner of unveiling such parameters.

4. Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines. The Biden Administration must ensure that the two-state plan is preserved as a feasible and concrete solution, blocking efforts on the ground designed to make it irrelevant. The administration will have to draw clear red lines against creeping annexation measures, expansion of settlements, legalization of outposts and Israeli construction in the E1 area and Givat Hamatos. At the same time, the administration could demand that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ratify their commitment to their previous agreements and maintain security and civilian coordination, while demanding that the Palestinians mount a determined campaign against terrorism, condemn terror attacks and counter incitement.

5. Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package. The Biden administration should lead the formation of an international mechanism for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such a mechanism could be based on the P5+1 model (which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal) or on the Quartet, with the addition of key Arab and European states. This mechanism should put together an international incentives package for peace and outline international parameters for resolution of the conflict. It could also serve as a platform for additional multilateral measures, such as forming regional working groups, harnessing regional organizations of which Israel and the PA are members and convening an international peace conference.

6. Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process. The administration should harness progress in relations between Israel and Arab states for the benefit of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. In doing so, it could integrate the states that have normalized relations with Israel into joint forums with Israel and the Palestinians, and into economic and energy projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In attempting to promote normalization agreements with additional Arab states, especially with Saudi Arabia, the administration could create a linkage to the Palestinian issue, inter alia by conditioning normalization on a halt of settlements’ construction and creeping annexation.

7. Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide. The Gaza Strip is facing a harsh humanitarian crisis, beset by explosive tensions that could escalate into violent clashes at any moment. The US has consistently distanced itself from the issue, but the new administration must stop avoiding it and help advance a solution. The administration should advance plans and projects with international partners to improve the well-being of Gaza’s residents, on issues such as energy, border crossings and vaccines. The administration would also do well to increase its involvement in efforts to avoid clashes between Israel and Hamas, help the UN envoy’s efforts on this front, and seek to advance a long-term solution to the Gaza issue under the aegis of the PA.

8. Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in the civil society. The Biden administration should advance dialogue and cooperation between citizens on both sides of the conflict. The administration should provide backing for pro-peace civil society organizations in Israel and the PA, including regular meetings of administration representatives with them, and seek effective implementation of recent legislation that aids organizations engaged in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act). At the same time, the administration should appeal directly to various elements within Israel society in order to strengthen support for the two-state solution and promote a discourse on this issue, while working on the Palestinian side to stem the anti-normalization trend undermining joint Israeli-Palestinian activity.

9. Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public. The administration should shape relations with Israel in a manner conducive to the advancement of peace and creation of mutual trust. It should learn lessons from the Obama years regarding the relationship with Israel’s government and society, and pay attention to the tone and style of the discourse even when expressing criticism. The Biden administration could initiate public goodwill gestures toward Israelis, and display public expressions of sympathy for Israel, and at the same time present the government with clear demands on the Palestinian issue and set red lines.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 March 2021.

הפוסט How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Thus, for example, at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the spread of the disease spawned racism and xenophobia directed at Chinese people the world over. This was also reflected in the intensification of ethnic tensions in states with a Chinese minority. Unprecedented violence was recorded against the Chinese-Muslim Dungan minority in Kazakhstan, and representatives of the Chinese minority in the Philippines complained of incidents of discrimination and racism. Fear of the virus has also led to isolation and border closings, a sensitive issue in conflict areas that can raise tensions even further. For example, the border between the two parts of Cyprus, first opened in 2003, was closed at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, prompting protests.

Studies point to a link between the spread of disease and civil conflicts. A 2017 study found that exposure to contagious disease increased the risk of a violent civil conflict. An additional study, focused on the Ebola epidemic in western Africa in 2014-2015, pointed to a similar correlation. It should be noted that following the Ebola epidemic in western Africa, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to define the outbreak in this region as a threat to international security and peace. The study determined that in conflict areas, or countries recovering from internal wars, unusual government measures to deal with epidemics can serve as fertile ground for increased tensions and hostility resulting in unrest and violence. In areas where tension and mistrust prevail between various groups or regions and the central regime, such situations can be perceived as an excuse for the government to exercise its power, generating resistance and counter-reaction. In various central Asian states, among them Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, the Corona crisis prompted protests by residents against government measures.

The Corona crisis is monopolizing the attention of all the countries in the world, including the superpowers, making it difficult for the international community to deal with other issues and divert resources to other causes. The restrictions on movement also undermine such efforts. A report by the International Crisis Group argues that the Covid-19 pandemic undermines the ability of international institutions to deliver humanitarian aid, advance diplomatic initiatives and operate peacekeeping forces. It should be emphasized that areas of war and conflict are particularly vulnerable, raising deep concerns about the spread of the epidemic in such countries as Libya, Syria and Afghanistan. This is well illustrated in the difficulties experienced by international organizations in eradicating Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to fighting that prevented access to infected regions and also resulted in injury to medical personnel.

However, along with the risks and negative repercussions, disasters and epidemics can also demonstrate to rivals that they are facing a common enemy and must join forces to confront it, as President Rivlin argued. Agreement on such cooperation could spill over into other issues and serve as a confidence building measures and an eventual turning point in the relationship between sides to a conflict. Such events underscore similarities between rival parties and the immediate need for humanitarian aid, unrelated to politics, and the crisis can turn into an opportunity. Such situations have given rise to what is known as “disaster diplomacy” in which rival parties help each other in a time of crisis as a goodwill gesture. The United Arab Emirates, for example, recently transferred humanitarian relief to Iran, hard hit by Covid-19, despite the tension between these two states.

Such crises can also lead to ceasefires. That was the case, for example, when the “Guinea Worm” disease started spreading in Sudan in 1995, prompting six-month ceasefire between the north and south to tackle the deep crisis afflicting numerous villages. In the current crisis, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a call for a global ceasefire in order to combat the Coronavirus, and warring sides in various conflict areas, such as Yemen, Libya and the Philippines expressed support for the initiative.

The massive 2005 earthquake that hit India and Pakistan, including the disputed territory of Kashmir, provides another example of rivals helping each other. India transferred huge amounts of aid to Pakistan, whose President publicly acknowledged the assistance and offered his thanks. Shortly thereafter, the sides advanced initiatives on linking the two parts of Kashmir – initially, through phone lines connecting the two sides and then free passage in order to provide disaster relief. These moves generated hope, but violence eventually resumed and the “disaster diplomacy” failed to yield a breakthrough.

However, in some cases disasters did result in real, long-term change. A special case in point was the effect of the December 2004 Indian Ocean quake and tsunami on the conflict between Indonesia and the Aceh Province, which was an epicenter of the disaster that killed over 200,000 people. Following the quake, the President of Indonesia lifted the state of emergency imposed on Aceh, and the Free Aceh Movement declared a ceasefire. In early 2005, Indonesia called for negotiations, which were held in Finland and culminated in a peace agreement in August of that year. It cannot be argued that the disaster led to peace, and the breakthrough was the result of many other weighty elements (among them a political change in Indonesia and successful mediation efforts of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari), but the heavy disaster and the global attention it drew, affected the sides, pushed them to compromise and served as an opportunity for constructive diplomacy.

Turning back to our region, initial indications at the outset of the crisis pointed to encouraging cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. The sides established a special mechanism for close, ongoing coordination, Israel’s Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon met with his Palestinian counterpart Shukri Bishara to discuss economic aspects of the crisis, and Israel transferred aid and equipment to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov praised the cooperation between the sides. However, at the same time, the Palestinians complained on continued operations of the Israel Defense Forces in Palestinian cities and villages, and Israel complained about Palestinian declarations claiming Israel was working to spread the virus. In addition, Hamas leaders threatened that the spread of the disease in Gaza would lead to an escalation with Israel.

It is too soon to say at this stage how the Coronavirus crisis will play out and how it will impact conflict areas. Examples from around the world illustrate that the link between a humanitarian or health disaster and political tensions could be dangerous. Therefore, the Israel-Palestinian cooperation should be welcomed and the parties should make every effort to avert a deterioration into a harsh health or economic crisis that might increase the threat of escalation. Leaders in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority could learn from efforts made in the past by other rival parties to exploit such crises to advance conciliatory moves and a diplomatic breakthrough.

הפוסט War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite its undeniable standing as a sustainable regional power, Israel continues to conduct itself like a state battling for survival. While the state’s key challenges lie in the field of diplomacy and soft power, its politicians present them through a military prism even as security experts caution that military might cannot solve Israel’s fundamental problems.

Israel has been the strongest power in the region and one of the strongest in the world for years. You and your colleagues in the defense establishment are responsible for that remarkable achievement that turned the burning embers of the Holocaust into a Jewish regional power in a relatively short time in historical perspective.

Nonetheless, as the Americans found out in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, even the strongest military in the world lacks solutions to modern challenges. The IDF, which enjoys its strongest advantage ever over our enemies, cannot achieve a decisive victory because that term no longer applies in the modern battlefield.

Whether in terms of relations with our enemies or the ability to translate our military might into a better life for our people, the solutions all lie in the diplomatic arena. Diplomacy also plays a decisive role for Israel’s export-oriented economy that owes its international standing to its innovative capacity. With most challenges becoming increasingly global – pandemics, climate change, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the response can only be found in the diplomatic arena, not in military arsenals.

Nonetheless, from its infancy, successive Israeli prime ministers have weakened the Foreign Ministry for various reasons, some political (from the days of Ben Gurion’s clashes with Sharett and up to the present), others stemming from our survival complex. We have always opted to look for answers in the wrong place. In recent years, the situation has deteriorated. The Foreign Ministry has sustained deep budget cuts, with many of its tasks outsourced to other ministries and its unique expertise in the international arena excluded from the decision-making process on core issues of diplomacy.

While cabinet meetings always include presentations and assessments by military officers, who often also propose solutions, the Foreign Ministry is largely absent, and its professional opinions are not heard. The explanation for this phenomenon is also to be found in the Foreign Ministry itself, which has grown accustomed to staying out of issues that touch on politics, although every core issue obviously has a political bearing, and often vice versa. Foreign Ministry staff have come to believe that their role is limited to conveying to the world decisions made by other people in other ministries. Rather than having significant impact on decision making, the Foreign Ministry has positioned itself as an agency dedicated to public diplomacy and logistics abroad.

You served as chief-of-staff when the IDF adopted a courageous professional stance against an Israeli attack on Iran, which had a decisive effect on the Prime Minister’s decision. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a position taken by the Foreign Ministry that differed from that of decision makers, simply because the Ministry preferred to wait for diplomatic instructions rather than contribute to shaping them.

Diplomats, like military officers, are obviously bound by the decisions of the elected echelon, but their job is also to represent their professional stand with determination and to ensure that their familiarity with the global arena is taken into consideration.

As for substance, following are the issues of the highest priority.

The Foreign Ministry’s most important role is to advance the peace agreements with our neighbors, and in that context, the most urgent priority is to ensure that in the window of time between July and November, no unilateral moves are made that irrevocably exclude a future arrangement based on the two-state principle. The twostate solution is essential to Israel’s preservation as the democratic nation state of the Jewish people, as well as to our strategic relations with Jordan, Egypt and the pro-Western, anti-jihadist axis in the Middle East. Unilateral moves would also undermine the lifesaving security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the PA’s ability to administer the lives of millions of Palestinians, whose lives we have no interest in running. It is also vital that we maintain the potential for bilateral and regional channels to an accommodation with the Palestinians rather than having these issues dealt with by the International Criminal Court and various BDS arenas.

Bipartisanship has constituted the basis for Israel’s special standing with successive US administrations, Congress and public opinion. In recent years, Israel is being perceived as affiliated with the Republican Party, dealing a fatal blow to the special relationship with the world’s leading power. The loss of bipartisan support also severely undermines our ties with US Jewry, our most important Diaspora community, the majority of which backs the Democrats and steers clear of Israel.

The vast majority of world Jewry, and especially in North America, is gradually distancing itself from Israel, put off by the state’s growing tendency toward segregation, extremism, and its reluctance to accept the different streams of Judaism, their needs, views and concerns. Israel’s political establishment tends to prefer ties with Christian evangelists and Orthodox Jews and to treat liberal Jewish communities that make up the vast majority of US Jewry, as irrelevant at best and as non-Jews in the worst-case scenario. This poses an immediate and present danger to the cohesion of the Jewish people, its links with the State of Israel and to a large extent the security of the state, which also relies on the solidarity of Diaspora Jewry with Israel.

Government policy of recent years distances the State of Israel from the Zionist vision of a model, egalitarian society that protects the rights of minorities and empowers the disadvantaged. These values are the foundation on which Israel’s innate alliance with liberal democratic states rests. However, the erosion of this foundation is generating growing aloofness on the part of democratic, liberal nations toward Israel. The government clearly prefers alliances with states led by dictators, nationalists and racists, among them some with anti-Semitic past and/or current anti-Semitic leanings. This process directly endangers the Jewish communities in those countries, where minority rights are crucial for the Jews, both morally and strategically.

In summing up, I urge you to treat the Foreign Minister’s role as an unusual opportunity to influence Israel’s future significantly, to make a difference as a politician and to make your mark on history. Your success is our success, and the sooner you achieve it, the better.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Letter to Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the Oslo process, Israel had a two-track policy. It conducted talks with the PLO, which had officially and publicly recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” in the hopes of reaching a final status agreement, and at the same time Israel waged uncompromising war on Hamas, which refused to recognize both Israel and the Oslo Accords. That policy was shared by both the left-wing and right-wing Israeli governments through the 1990s. Suggestions by certain Israeli figures, among them Rabbi Menachem Froman and Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy to promote dialogue with Hamas were rejected out of hand. However, it became increasingly obvious over the years that ignoring Hamas and excluding it from the process would be very hard given its standing in Palestinian society, especially after its 2006 election victory and takeover of the Gaza Strip.

One way of understanding Israel’s dilemma is through the concept of “peace spoilers.” In the 1990s, there was a growing discussion among academics in the field of conflict analysis, about how to relate to actors, often non-state ones, who undertake concerted efforts to thwart peace processes or agreements that they view as a threat to themselves and their goals. One of the main examples discussed in those days were Hamas and Jewish extremists, both of whom sought to foil the Oslo process. Other peace processes in the 1990s encountered a similar phenomenon. In Northern Ireland, the Real Irish Republican Army split from the IRA and carried out terror attacks in a bid to prevent a peace agreement. In South Africa, deadly violence in the early 1990s threatened to undermine attempts of reconciliation. Scholars debated how best to deal with such actors – whether to fight against them or to communicate with them and try to integrate them into the process.

Even after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2007, Israel continued with its parallel policy: Security coordination and peace talks (until the 2014 collapse of negotiations led by US Secretary of State John Kerry) vis-a-vis the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, along with a blockade of Gaza and repeated rounds of fighting with Hamas, whom Israel saw as “peace spoilers” who must be fought.

Successive Israeli governments insisted that they would not conduct any dialogue with a Palestinian unity government if it included Hamas. In October 2017, the Netanyahu government’s security cabinet reiterated this stance in light of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation attempts, announcing that Israel would engage with such a Palestinian government only if Hamas recognized Israel, stopped its terrorist activity, disarmed and severed ties with Iran.

But over the last decade, the ground started shifting, gradually. In 2011 Israel and Hamas reached an agreement on releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners; the parties also negotiated indirectly on ceasefires to end several rounds of fighting. But these contacts were a precursor to a far more dramatic and significant move. Ironically, the most right-wing government in Israeli history, formed in 2015, which did not include representatives of centrist or left-wing parties, was the one that eventually led to a radical shift of Israel’s position. During 2018, Israel and Hamas launched indirect intensive negotiations, mediated by Egypt and UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov.

This shift has several reasons: Both parties were finally open to the idea of dialogue, after a decade of repeated and indecisive clashes, and a primed for a more pragmatic recognition of reality. But at the same time, it also stemmed from a mutual interest in managing the conflict rather than resolving it – and in weakening the PA under Abbas. The same dynamics are true today. The Netanyahu government is not interested in fostering a peace process that would entail territorial concessions in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Hamas is interested in preserving its power and standing. Netanyahu declared in March 2019 that contacts with Hamas were maintaining the split between Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank, thus scuppering the possibility of establishing Palestinian state. A close Netanyahu campaign aide, Jonathan Urich, boasted in an April 2019 interview that his boss had “managed to achieve a split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and in fact crushed the vision of a Palestinian state in these two areas. Part of this achievement is linked to the Qatari money reaching Hamas each month.”

This in itself constituted a turnaround in Israel’s position: for years, it had demanded that control over Gaza be restored to the PA. Looking at the Israel-PA-Hamas triangle, it appears that any real dialogue between Israel and the PA has collapsed; contacts between Hamas and the PA have reached a dead end; and only the channel between Hamas and Israel is still working. During the 2007-2008 Annapolis process, Israel’s goal was to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas and reach a final status agreement with him, which would be expanded in its next phase to include Gaza. However, Israel is now working to preserve the split between the two Palestinian entities, and no longer seeks to create any affinity between Gaza and the PA, or to push for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It’s worth taking a step back to see just how unthinkable (until very recently) Israel’s pivot has been, and how dramatically expedient, or pragmatic, its redefinition of an acceptable partner for dialogue has been. If, as recently as some two years ago, the Israeli government rejected the idea of talks with a Palestinian unity government due to its affiliation with Hamas, today the Israeli government is talking to Hamas, while not conducting any diplomatic dialogue with Abbas, and even adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward him and the Palestinian Authority. The emerging message is that Israel is rewarding Hamas, which uses violent means against Israel (firing rockets and incendiary devices at Israel), and punishing the PA, which has adhered to tight security coordination with Israel.

Lior Lehrs is the Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Peace-Spoilers or Negotiation Partners? Netanyahu’s Understandings with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the long history of the conflict, only three peace plans have been identified with a US president: The Reagan Plan (1982), the Clinton Parameters (2000), and the “Roadmap” — identified with Bush but did not bear his name (2003). In other cases, American peace plans or initiatives were identified with secretaries of state in order to not embarrass the president in case they failed. This was the case with the Rogers Plan in 1969, the Shultz Initiative in 1988, and the Kerry Initiative in 2013-14.

The release of a peace plan should be outstanding opportunity to advance a resolution. Its release, in general, follows dramatic events, such as wars, revolutions, and regime changes.

It was no surprise that the Rogers Plan was released after the 1967 War; Kissinger began his step by step diplomacy following the Yom Kippur War that led to the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria in 1974-75; Reagan presented his plan after the Lebanon War; Shultz presented his initiative after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987; the Madrid Conference convened in 1991 following the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and Bush released the “Roadmap” during the Second Palestinian Intifada that broke out in 2000.

The release of a peace plan should therefore be a cause for celebration. Delving into the details of the Trump Peace Plan offers no such satisfaction show that the plan is doomed to fail for several reasons: First, the Americans, as honest brokers, should have consulted also with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority and not only with Israel and the Arab states.

Since 2017 there has been a serious rupture between the US and the PA; that bad blood was intensified by Trump’s closure of the Palestinian mission in Washington and the US cutting aid to UNRWA. The absence of the Palestinians from the process of devising the plan has created a situation like a chess game with one player. That the plan was launched with no Palestinian representative is testimony to the discord between Trump and the Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians’ unwillingness to play the game.

Second, the details of the plan show its clear unilateralism in its adoption of Israeli positions, especially those supported by right-wingers and settlers. It gives a green light to the Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements. Palestinians are offered an everdiminishing stake: in the Oslo agreements the Palestinians accepted just 22 percent of historic Palestine (within the 1967 borders), but Trump now offers them much less territory. On Jerusalem and refugees, the plan far from the Palestinians’ positions. In return for their concessions on Jerusalem, territory and the refugees, Trump is trying to entice the Palestinians with a financial “bribe” – $50 billion – an unsecured, unsourced fortune, to be offered over ten years.

The fact that the Trump Peace Plan stands in complete contrast to all previous plans is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if it represents the interests of only one side of the conflict, then it is bad, and it does not have any chance of being accepted.

Every successful peace agreement is a compromise that required each side to give up on demands that were perceived in the past as necessary and vital. They were never achieved dictation or surrender. In a fair agreement, both sides leave with half (or less) of their desired outcomes. That is not the situation here.

This plan is the wet dream of Israelis located in the center and rightward on the political map. However, its presentation, and all the more so, its implementation, will be one bridge too far, and will not serve Israeli goals. There are several reasons for this.

First, it will strengthen the positions of those refusing peace on the Arab side. Those rejectionists argue in any case that Israel (and the “Jewish Lobby”) and the United States are in cahoots. Second, it will further weaken the moderates on the Palestinian side who believe in a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the conflict. In such a situation, escalation with Hamas in Gaza and mass demonstrations in the West Bank are not imaginary scenarios. In fact, the pressure cooker in the West Bank that is already bubbling as a result of economic and social causes, as well as anger about the corruption of the PA, is likely to explode now against Israel (a Third Intifada). The violence would surge if Israel decides to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements.

Third, Egypt and Jordan, signatories to peace treaties with Israel, will now face heavily oppositional domestic public pressure and will not be able to support Trump’s plan, despite the fact that they have an interest in advancing a peaceful solution. But not one that looks like this. Recalling ambassadors and freezing bilateral relations are steps that have already been taken in the past and could easily be re-implemented.

Finally, the creeping normalization of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states is likely to suffer. True, the UAE, Omani and Bahraini ambassadors took part in the launching of the plan and Saudi Arabia released a mild statement in response to the launch. Yet, any Israeli move to unilaterally implement its share of the plan would not pass unanswered.

The release of Trump’s peace plan at the present time is a blatantly political maneuver. It was concocted in coordination between Trump and Netanyahu, in order to assist the Israeli prime minister’s reelection. The release of the plan just before the elections is a direct intervention in Israel’s domestic politics, intended to embarrass Netanyahu’s only real challenger, Benny Ganz by  putting him in a situation where he cannot come out against the plan. If Netanyahu intervened in the domestic politics of the United States when he spoke in Congress in 2015 two weeks before the US elections, Trump has now repaid him.

Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban is often quoted that the “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Interestingly, Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the President, declared on CNN that if the Palestinians reject the plan “they’re going to screw up another opportunity, like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence.” Well, he forgot that Israel as well has missed a few opportunities, of which the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) was the latest and most substantial.

But more important, this time the Palestinians are not be missing an opportunity, because the Trump Peace Plan simply does not constitute an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Sadly, it might end up serving as a trigger for escalation, and the eruption of violence.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently a visiting professor at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Trump Peace Plan: Not Even an Opportunity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shrinking the freedom of expression is a strategic move by the PA. Since its founding, the PA has used censorship as a tool to weaken oppositional voices from Hamas and the Left. At first, limitations on the freedom of expression were not anchored in legislation. The PA, through its security services, directly interacted with editors, journalists and newspaper editorial teams to dictate the limits of freedom of expression, without a formal censorship body. In June 2017 the PA announced – as a complementary step to older censorship laws – a presidential order preventing electronic criminal activity, adjusted to a zeitgeist where the Internet has replaced the city square. The order allows the PA to issue heavy fines and arrest anyone who expresses criticism of the PA online, including journalists and social activists. This order also allows the PA to mark anyone who shares or re-tweets critical content as a target.

The presidential order allowed the PA to begin waves of arrests, first against journalists identified with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, like Ahmad al-Halaiqah from the village of al-Shuyukh, Mamdouh Hamamreh from Husan, and Tareq Abu Zeid from Nablus. The order was also used to allow the arrests of social and political activists who focused their struggle against Israel, like Issa Amro from Hebron (who was arrested after he criticized the PA on social media). This reality stirs up criticism against the PA, domestically and abroad. International human rights organizations and the European Union have followed with concern the shrinking of freedom of expression, especially after the arrest of journalists, and they are not suppressing their criticism.

NEVERTHELESS, IT appears that the PA is not deterred, and is even increasing its measures due to the political circumstances.
The leadership of the PA in the West Bank is worried about a possible coup attempt by Hamas. Although Hamas lacks real military capabilities in the West Bank, it enjoys developed media capabilities. Hamas and Islamic organizations have a network of satellite television channels at their disposal through which they broadcast to the West Bank.

Moreover, they also have a significant number of propaganda outlets, news websites, and news agencies that they are identified with (for example, the Shehab News Agency, which boasts millions of followers), and which have wide exposure in the West Bank and the Arab world. In the age of social media and the fast exchange of messages, these are efficient tools for creating political power and influence. The PA is aware of the strength of Hamas’s media influence and is trying to damage it. The PA is even sacrificing the principle of freedom of expression within Palestinian society for the sake of this goal.

The shrinking of freedom of expression appears to be an organized policy of the PA, meant to help cope with the political challenges it faces in the waning years of Abbas’s presidency. These challenges include a lack of announcements about the identity of Abbas’s successor and the question of the continued existence of the PA in its current form. The expansion of measures limiting freedom of expression demonstrates the importance that the PA gives to the media as shapers of public opinion.

The voices emerging from the streets and the virtual city squares are worrying for the leadership of the PA, and the PA is acting to deepen its control over these spheres. From the perspective of the PA, this is a strategic process that is meant to entrench its control in the lead-up to a period of political instability.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, the director of the Middle East Studies Department at the Emek Yizrael Academic College, and an expert on Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The PA’s shrinking space for freedom of expression הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An unbearable gap exists between professionals in the civil service, most of whom are prevented from expressing themselves in public, who understand that issues of peace and diplomacy should take center stage in public discourse and the state’s strategic order of preference, and politicians who regard such matters as trivial. The politicians stoke the sense of public fear, which then takes them hostage to public opinion, rather than dealing with the many opportunities on our doorstep.

The anti-Israel boycott movement (BDS) illustrates how we have turned a tactical threat that does not endanger Israel’s security or prosperity into an existential threat. Israel’s aggressive policies vis-à-vis the movement violate freedom of expression, which liberal audiences view as a key human right. This, in turn, plays into the hands of those promoting BDS because it alienates many groups deterred by the government’s anti-liberal policies. The Foreign Ministry is familiar with Israel’s target audiences more than any other government agency and is supposed to present the diplomatic angle at government discussions, but it is often excluded from sessions with decision makers and is not a party to shaping policy.

Israeli politicians are distancing themselves from the values of liberal democracies, which most Diaspora Jewry holds dear, too. With short-term considerations in mind, they prefer alliances with populist leaders who have a record of anti-Semitism. In so doing, they sin against the values defined by the founders of the state in its proclamation of independence as well as against the stated purpose of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Israel must not regard Diaspora Jewry as simply a cash cow, a political lobby and a pool for immigration. It must engage with those the state views as an integral part of its national project. Diaspora Jews should be invited to voice their views on Israel-related issues, and Israel should appreciate their involvement even when the views are critical. We must create ways for Jews to be critical of government policy and at the same time love and support the State of Israel.

The issue of relations with Diaspora Jewry is intertwined with that of the Arab Israeli minority. For Diaspora Jews, equality for the Arabs in Israel is a fundamental liberal axiom just as is their expectation of the rights they demand for themselves in their countries of residence. There is a measure of hypocrisy in Israeli criticism leveled at Israel’s Arab citizens over their identification with their Palestinian brothers, while expecting US Jews to identify with Israel. Nonetheless, there is room for optimism.

While Israelis are being exposed often to messages of fear and incitement, polls consistently indicate that a majority favors the two-state for two people solution. Despite it all, many elements that were absent in the past now enable the promotion of this solution. The Arab Peace Initiative accepts the principle of two states within the 1967 borders with certain territorial exchanges as well as Israel’s veto of the number of refugees allowed to return. The Palestinian Authority’s current leadership does not believe violence serves its people and is seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

A change of Israeli leadership, which may be in the offing, could lead Israel and the Palestinians toward a new road that would save the State of Israel’s liberal Zionist dream. When that happens, Israel will no longer have to choose between its character as the nation state of the Jewish people and being a democracy that protects the rights of its minorities.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres. This article is based on his remarks at the 2019 Annual Conference of the Mitvim Institute, held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for Diplomatic Optimism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greenblatt was appointed shortly after Trump’s election victory and initially it appeared both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were willing to work with him. During his first months on the job, Greenblatt met several times with Palestinian President Abbas and other senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, even visiting a Palestinian refugee camp and meeting with Palestinian and Israeli students and religious leaders. At first, he also tried to promote cooperation between the sides and was involved in the contacts on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal that resulted in understandings between Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi and the Head of the PA’s Water Authority Ghuneim. However, these first steps were upended with a series of Trump Administration measures against the Palestinians, starting in late 2017. These included the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, aid cuts, shuttering the PLO office in Washington and departure from the twostate principle – all of which led to a complete and unprecedented rift between the US administrations and Ramallah. Greenblatt became the first US Envoy in the annals of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who lost contact with one of the sides and the ability to serve as a broker.

At that point, rather than taking advantage of his position to calm tensions and to try and restore trust and to facilitate dialogue with the Palestinians through back channels, Greenblatt actually sought to escalate the crisis and exacerbate the public verbal and media conflict with the Palestinians. He did so in contravention of the basic principles of mediation, which every first-year student of international relations learns. Greenblatt began facing off against various Palestinian representatives on Twitter, and tweeted blatant attacks on the Palestinian leadership. His remarks also disavowed the basic principles of the peace process. He spoke, for example, about Israel’s right to annex territories, and expressed disregard for the international resolutions on the conflict. The photos showing Greenblatt taking a hammer to breach an ancient tunnel under the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, at an inauguration ceremony of the “Path of the Pilgrims” that was organized by the Elad organization, was a jarring final note that faithfully reflected the direction in which Greenblatt had taken his role. The much-touted Trump peace plan (dubbed “the deal of the century), over which Greenblatt had labored with Kushner and Amb. Friedman, has yet to be unveiled, with its publication date put off repeatedly, whereas the economic component of the blueprint, which the US team presented in Bahrain, failed to leave its mark.

Despite Greenblatt’s inexperience when he took over his position, he did have several levers of influence he could have used, chief among them the personal ties and trust with President Trump. He also enjoyed the initial willingness of both sides to cooperate with him. However, his mission has come to a crashing end with the unprecedented rift between the US administration and the Palestinian side and his inability to play any significant role in the different issues and aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. We do not know, yet, the reason for Greenblatt’s decision to step down, but it undoubtedly illustrates the pointlessness of the measures to achieve the “deal of the century”, thus far. It will be interesting to see whether Greenblatt’s departure signals a change in approach and policy or whether the remaining Kushner-Friedman team will adhere to the current policy guidelines.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Resignation of Jason Greenblatt, the Peace Envoy Who Did Not Broker הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip is one of transferring the responsibility for the situation over to the “other side”: be it Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the international community. The argument’s essence is: “we are here and they are there”, and Israel therefore claims that it is neither its business nor its responsibility to find a solution. This kind of policy is certainly not appropriate for a country responsible for the humanitarian needs of Gaza, and in doing so Israel is burying its head in the sand. There is no escape from advancing a clear and courageous Israeli strategy towards the Gaza Strip. The guiding point of departure should be that the problem is at our doorstep and it does not really matter whether we are right or wrong. The reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which occasionally comes up as “a necessary alternative that demonstrates Israel’s heavy hand and preserves its deterrence”, is contrary to Israeli interests. It is not without reason that Israeli governments, including the outgoing one, refrained from using this alternative. After all, it is preferable to deal with a rival such as Hamas, even if it is a non-state actor with an extreme ideology, rather than deal with chaos or the rise of even more extreme groups. In the end, after an extensive military move, Israel will likely face the same dilemmas, only at higher cost.

Israel should essentially be interested in preventing a comprehensive escalation in the Gaza Strip and attain a long-term ceasefire, as part of an economic-humanitarian arrangement, while preserving the option to move forward with the peace process, eventually leading to a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement. The proper way to achieve these two objectives is through a broad international initiative, that also includes Israel and other regional actors, for rebuilding the Gaza Strip. This initiative should address the main problems involved: the lack of infrastructure, primarily the shortage of electricity, the water problem, the collapsing health system, high unemployment, and the isolation from the world. It is obvious that the familiar counter-arguments immediately emerge: such a move will strengthen Hamas, the PA will oppose and jeopardize the agreement, Hamas and other organizations will continue smuggling weapons, and finally, it is not clear who will pay for such an extensive rebuilding initiative.

While these arguments are indeed legitimate and correct, at least partially, we should not use them to block all initiatives, or else the problem will remain with us. Currently, the peace process is stalled, and both sides are deeply skeptical about the prospects for its renewal, also due to the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, it should not discourage us, and perhaps even serve as a catalyst for action. Even in the view of Israel’s right-wing government, which is not particularly troubled by the political deadlock and does not seem to be concerned with the renewal of the peace process, a move to rebuild the Gaza Strip must be a major interest.

The proposed outline should include the following components: (a) an Israeli initiative to formulate an international plan – a sort of “Marshall Plan” – for the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip; (b) a rehabilitation plan to be led by the international community, that will include an economic-financial mechanism to support Gaza and provide a political umbrella; (c) involvement of the PA in the implementation of the plan (but this does not need to be a precondition, should the Palestinian leadership refuse); (d) participation of Israel in the process, including in terms of allocating funds for its implementation; (e) formulation of an international supervision mechanism to prevent the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip.

The moral aspect should also lead Israel to take such action. Although Hamas is a non-state actor that is responsible to the serious situation on ground, Israel is facing a serious problem, for which it is partially responsible as well. The duty to protect Israeli citizens and the strategic security interests of the State of Israel are not in conflict with the need to acknowledge the harsh living conditions at our doorstep. Ignoring them seriously jeopardizes Israel’s long-term interests. Israel’s claim to be the only democracy in the region and an island of stability and pluralism obliges us to weigh the ensuing moral responsibility, and to initiate an urgent political-economic-humanitarian process to support Gaza. This will probably not be a perfect move, but a necessary one that serves a host of Israeli interests, and in any case its human and economic cost is lower than that of any other alternative.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Should Advance an International Initiative to Support Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In effect, the government that is now dispersing is the second one Hamdallah has led. He was first appointed prime minister in 2013 and started his second term in 2015 after Abbas picked him to lead the Fatah-Hamas unity government. That government was comprised of technocrats and appointed not only to govern but also to prepare the groundwork for a Palestinian legislative election and to institute reforms that would allow the Palestinian political system to reunite.

The PA is managed as a presidential republic, in which the president holds most of the power and the government is basically an executive body that does what the president wants. Dismissing the government is one of the tools the president can use to send a message to the people, handle criticism from home or coordinate things ahead of actions required to make political change.

Abbas chose to appoint a new government as a way of dealing with political challenges at home and responding to current events in Palestinian society. The race for succession between various Fatah officials is creating considerable tension. One concern all senior officials in the movement share is that Hamdallah is coalescing political and popular power as prime minister and could become a serious rival in the battle to succeed Abbas. Even though Hamdallah, a former president of the al-Najah University in Nablus, is identified with the Fatah, he holds no official role in the movement. So paradoxically, the Fatah leadership took care to portray him as a political player who isn’t really one of them.

The Fatah succession race is playing out alongside the more than decade long struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA’s political system. As head of the unity government, Hamdallah is now having to pay a high political price for the decision by Abbas and the top Fatah echelon to put a cork in efforts to reconcile the two rival Palestinian factions. The main reason Abbas dismissed the government – which will nevertheless still exist and hold ministerial responsibility for forming a new government – is his need to prepare the groundwork for legislative and presidential elections. These elections are slated to be held in the West Bank only, and not in Gaza, and will effectively make the division between Fatah and Hamas into a permanent fact.

Shoving a serving prime minister aside is another signal from Abbas that he is still powerful. Abbas wants to lay down the outline for Palestinian policy in the future and ensure that Fatah stays in power after Gaza was lost on his watch. Despite the concentrated political power he has demonstrated in recent years, which sometimes took the form of limiting free speech, Abbas has decided – along with dismissing the Hamdallah government – to freeze a bill that would establish a Palestinian social security institution. That bill sparked an outcry in many sectors of Palestinian society, as people feared that money would be deducted from their salaries and put into the PA’s accounts.

Until a new PA government is appointed, Abbas and the rest of the Fatah leadership have some time to get a sense of how the public is responding to their political moves. The next PA prime minister will need to deal with less public backing for the Fatah government. The new Palestinian government will also face challenges in building a Palestinian state, given the lack of faith between the PA and the US administration; the lack of a peace plan; and a total freeze in negotiations between the PA and Israel.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in Yisrael Hayom)

הפוסט Where Are Palestinian Politics Headed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The consequences of the “Arab Shaking” have yet to end. Each state that experienced these “winds of change”, withstands the emerging regional and international reality differently, based on the way it defines its current position. Egypt under a-Sisi, and in the post-Mursi era, has re-defined its aims and mode of action. The newly created Egyptian national security outlook prioritized two main objectives: to restore (both domestic and regional) security and to strengthen the Egyptian economy.

Regarding the security objective, as soon as Egypt defined “terrorism” (both domestic and international) as its biggest threat, it made sure to label the Muslin Brotherhood movement a terror organization and carried out severe measures against its members. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have occasionally accused the Hamas of carrying out terror attacks in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and intermittently with ISIS. No wonder that every now and then news surrounding military cooperation between Egypt and Israel battling ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula appear in the media.

In addition to this, the Iranian policy in the Middle East is perceived by Egypt as a threat (and so by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Both Turkey and Qatar are considered Egypt’s consistent and uncompromising rivals, due to their support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and based on their membership in the Middle Eastern axis opposing Egypt. A new reality has evolved that we have never seen before, in which the regional interests of Israel and Egypt, as well as those of other Arab states, have intertwined.

The long-standing Egyptian policy that strives to resolve the Palestinian issue relies, even to this day, on its ability to engage in what is happening in the Gaza strip. Egypt wishes to promote steps of reconciliation within the Palestinian wing itself (between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority), and to serve as a mediator between the Palestinians as well as between the Palestinians and Israel. All actors in this equation view Egypt as a trustworthy and influential actor. In this way, Egypt acts as the most significant mediator that negotiates understandings between Israel and Hamas, and that supports Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Egypt is expected to continue playing such a role in the future as well.

The meeting between Israel and Egypt’s leaders that took place during the 2018 UN General Assembly, was not the first meeting between Netanyahu and a-Sisi this past year. Among the issues discussed by the two leaders were the situation in Gaza, the Palestinian issue, security matters, regional developments and bilateral issues. The meeting reflected rather accurately the cooperative relations between the two countries over the past four years.

The second objective put forward by the Egyptian leadership has been to stabilize the economy. A strong sense of security and a steady economy may turn Egypt into a source for regional stability. This leads Egypt to be increasingly interested in promoting economic and trade cooperation with Israel. Egypt hold an important strategic location, on the maritime route from the Indian ocean through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the interest in Egypt’s stabilization is not limited to regional actors alone, but is also eminent for the US, the EU, Russia, India, and China. This generates international interest in supporting Israeli-Egyptian cooperation as a keystone for enhancing regional stability.

Broader cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the security and-political spheres may stimulate their economic relations and therefore work for the benefit of both countries. Nevertheless, there is still a significant gap between the high level of strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and their much lower level of civil cooperation. The number of Israelis touring Egypt is stable but rather low. Trade between the countries is taking place but to a limited extent, and the same is true regarding the field of agriculture, where there is far greater potential for cooperation than what is taking place today (at least in comparison to cooperation in the 1990’s). In addition to that, there is potential for Egypt to utilize technologies such as solar energy and water desalination, areas of which are widely known as Israel’s field of expertise, both as a manufacturer and as an implementer.

The field of energy, and in particular the production and marketing of natural gas, plays a central role in the Israeli-Egyptian economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, both countries can cooperate in traditional industry fields, in unique qualified industrial zones (QIZ, a three-way agreement that allows the export of free trade Egyptian goods to the US, in the condition they hold a certain percent of Israeli components), in agriculture, tourism and more. Such cooperation can promote both Israel’s and Egypt’s economies, and have a positive economic impact on the broader region.

The announcement made by the Israeli company “Delek Drilling” that it will purchase (together with the Noble Energy and East Gas companies) the Egyptian EMG company is a step towards achieving these goals. The natural gas pipeline owned by EMG connects Israel and Egypt, and will deliver natural gas from the “Tamar” and “Leviathan” reservoirs to Egypt. This is considered to be a milestone in transforming Egypt into a regional energy hub, as a major importer and as an exporter based on its liquefying gas facilities. According to Israel’s Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz, the rehabilitation of the Israeli-Egyptian natural gas pipeline, along with the construction of a Jordanian-Israeli pipeline, creates a regional foundation between the “peace countries”. It is rare to have a joint infrastructure project with geo-political significance take shape between Israel and its neighbors.

The positive nature of Israel-Egypt ties in recent years, together with evolving regional developments in the Middle East, Egypt’s role in mediating between Israel and the Palestinians, and the steps taken by Egypt to thaw the “cold” peace with Israel, may all point to the existence of an opportunity for further advancement in ties between two strategic partners in the region – Egypt and Israel.

Dr. Haim Koren, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, served as the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt between the years 2014 and 2016. This article is based on a research on Israel-Egypt relations, written as part of Mitvim Institute’s project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas.

In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a gun. In fact, since he was elected as the President of the Palestinian Authority in 2005, Abbas has not set foot in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, losing control of it is part of his legacy.

In contrast to Yasser Arafat, who had roots in Gaza and spoke like one of the people, Abbas was born in Tzfat, from where his family fled to Syria, and has no special emotional connection to the Strip. Throughout his period in office, he has focused on the project of building the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the diplomatic battle against the State of Israel, neglecting the Gaza Strip. He abandoned the people of Gaza to the hands of Hamas and the economic mercies of the international community and Gulf states, trusting them to add patch after patch to cover the desolation and wretchedness of the Gaza Strip.

After three rounds of warfare, with the Gaza Strip tired and beaten, Abbas has still not changed his strategic approach towards it. Since 2014, not only has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority failed to stretch out its hand to support the people of the Strip economically but, moreover, has imposed a long series of economic sanctions which affect the civilians. These include failure to pay for fuel sent to the Strip, thus increasing civilian pressure on Hamas and proving to the residents of the Strip that the Islamist movement cannot provide for their most basic needs.

Following Abbas’ clear political failure to advance the vision of a Palestinian state, the political struggle against Hamas has become more significant. Hamas of 2018 is looking to the future, and its leadership deems itself the proper heir to the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Abbas, who lost the Gaza Strip, is not interested in losing the political leadership and the historical status of the Fatah movement within the PLO.

The bloody battles since summer 2007 are etched into the memories of Fatah members; the decade-long isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank has increased the estrangement between the sides; Abbas’ despair at the political process, alongside the suspicion and ideological and political disgust he feels towards Hamas, has led him to radicalize his position, making it difficult to reconcile the dialogue between the two sides.

Abbas’ main demand from Hamas to enable an advance towards reconciliation is that the movement dismantle its military wing. Hamas without Jihad, Hamas without arms, will lose not only its ideological identity but also its political bargaining chips. Understanding that Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, Abbas’ only option is to continue putting economic pressure on the movement’s rule in the Gaza Strip. He hopes that these steps will lead to mass protests against Hamas, enabling him to return to the Strip as victor.

The continued economic decline and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip heighten the tension between Hamas and Israel. Hamas must direct its anger and frustration outside, away from itself. Military conflict between Hamas and Israel can result in the dismantlement of Hamas’ weapons following an Israeli military campaign. In the past, the Palestinian Authority ruled out this option, but it seems that now, from Abbas’ perspective, any path that can eventually lead to a unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under his control is deemed suitable. Indeed, a unified control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase the Palestinian Authority’s prestige and allow it to exert greater pressure on the State of Israel in the future, should the peace process between the two sides resume.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of open and direct dialogue between Israel and Hamas necessitates international mediation. While neither Israel nor Hamas are interested in a violent confrontation, such a confrontation can occur at any given moment. The continued hostility between them, alongside a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the inability of Hamas to deliver the economic and political conditions required to end this crisis, maintain prospects for violent outbreaks. The use of violence as a political tool helps Hamas raise the humanitarian crisis in Gaza on the regional agenda, as a means of preserving its status as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

Given that the current state of affairs continues, international mediation initiatives towards a ceasefire in Gaza are doomed to fail. Without an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and without the backing and active involvement of the Palestinian Authority, there is no real prospect to improve living conditions in the Gaza Strip.

In light of Israel’s decision to refrain from an all-out military attack to defeat Hamas, both sides are looking for interim solutions to the challenges posed by Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, which sees itself as the legitimate sovereign of the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which fears a spillover of violence that will undermine stability along the Sinai-Gaza border, are also parties to this charged relationship.

Due to Palestinian Authority’s historical semi-state status and to the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt cannot abrogate Mahmoud Abbas’ demands and ignore the Palestinian Authority’s needs while searching for a solution to Gaza. Abbas sees the recent indirect dialogue between Israel and Hamas as undermining the status of the PLO. The international mediation, led by the UN envoy and some Arab states, grants Hamas with increased political legitimacy, and Abbas, who has already lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, cannot afford a situation whereby the PLO’s political status is further undermined.

Attempts by Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement that does not involve the Palestinian Authority raise concerns among the PLO and Fatah leaderships. The PLO is therefore making efforts to thwart any initiative that does not give it a central role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This was said quite overtly during the recent PLO Central Council meeting in Ramallah (15-17 August 2018). It has also become a major source of contention in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation attempts.

The inability of Hamas and Fatah to unify the Palestinian political system also makes it difficult to reach a regional arrangement in Gaza. The disputes among the Palestinian movements obstruct efforts by the donor countries to extend assistance, since there is no agreed upon mechanism for transferring and managing the funds.

A ceasefire arrangement could serve as a temporary solution, but one that will continue to inflame the tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and between Israel and Hamas. Since Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in the summer of 2014, there have been cycles of violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas, that did not evolve to a comprehensive military conflict. The current year has seen another escalation, which was triggered by the Gazans’ “Return Campaign”, which included marches towards the border fence as well as arson attempts via kites.

These actions and the casualties involved were supposed to generate support of Hamas’ objectives in the Arab world and beyond. This campaign, however, failed. The marches led to escalation and to an increase in Palestinian fatalities, but did not generate the media response and political pressure on Israel that Hamas hoped for, not even on the part of Arab countries. The lack of political achievements of such a popular struggle strengthened Hamas’ military wing, at the expense of the movement’s political wing.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire are intended to produce a glimmer of hope for the residents of Gaza, but the political obstacles, primarily the split between Hamas and Fatah, reduce the chances of success. Moreover, Israel currently sees the developments in Syria (especially the Iranian presence there) as a more urgent challenge to deal with than that of Gaza. But leaving Gaza behind only raises the bar of violence there. It leads to renewed escalation and riots with the IDF along the border, with Hamas closely monitoring their intensity.

As long as the Fatah-Hamas rift remains unresolved, international mediation regarding Gaza can produce only temporary solutions. The socio-economic problems of the Gaza Strip and the division of power within Palestinian society will continue to create difficulties and to challenge the status quo. To counter this, permanent solutions are needed, and these can only be achieved under international auspices and with US support.

However, the current lack of trust between the PLO and the US administration prevents this. Trump’s decision to cut funding to UNRWA reflected once again that Gaza is not just an internal Palestinian issue. It is turning from a regional problem to a complex international one, in which there is a clash between American interests and those of other major countries.

While US President Trump aspires – unsuccessfully for the time being – to lead peace efforts under his own terms, the EU and other donor countries are looking for alternative short-term solutions that will significantly ease living conditions in Gaza. Such solutions, despite their importance, are not likely to solve the intra-Palestinian divide nor to produce a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

The road to an effective solution must include constructive US involvement that backs both sides to the conflict, and not just Israel. This is necessary for Israelis to feel that their security interests are taken care of, for the Palestinians to restore trust in the US, and for the US to once again be able to play the role of an accepted mediator.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the atmosphere on the Gaza border has been heating up in recent weeks, the humanitarian crisis requires an urgent response. This is a clear Israeli interest, since the situation in Gaza encourages violence that affects life in Israel proper, leads to international criticism of Israel and stands in contrast to Jewish and human values.

There are several plans that outline ways to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, including the construction of a port in the El Arish area of Egypt, the construction of infrastructure facilities on an artificial island off the coast of Gaza, the development of the gas field opposite the Gaza Strip in favor of vital electricity generation and desalination projects, and the construction of a marine port in Cyprus.

The Cyprus option was discussed again recently at the initiative of Defense Minister Lieberman during the tripartite meeting between the defense ministers of Israel, Greece and Cyprus on June 22 in Nicosia. The proposed outline includes the construction of a seaport in Cyprus (or, in effect, the allocation of a number of docks in an existing port), which will serve as a conduit for the transfer of aid to the Gaza Strip under Israeli security supervision. The idea is not new, and the Cypriot response is generally cautious, although mostly positive. In the past, they tried to mobilize the EU in order to provide a sponsorship (mainly political) for the initiative and presumably this is what they will try to do now.

Nicosia, on one hand, attaches great importance to the close relationship with Israel, and hence the need for serious consideration of the Israeli request, which puts Cyprus in a power position as a significant regional player. On the other hand, the Cypriots understand that the Palestinian Authority is not enthusiastic about the idea, as generally they are fearful, and rightly so, to meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in view of the split between Hamas and Palestinian Authority.

In Cyprus, as well as in the EU, there is great understanding of Israel’s security concerns and presumably of Israel’s future demand for tight and efficient control of the goods to be transferred from a Cypriot port to the Gaza Strip. The idea of the Cyprus port, which can be part of a successful Israeli policy in the eastern Mediterranean, has several requirements: 1) serious Israeli-Cypriot (and perhaps Greek) dialogue; 2) discussion and arrangement with Egypt; 3) an international political umbrella with the participation of the EU, the US, and possibly relevant Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia); 4) an internal Israeli campaign to mobilize public support for such a move, including the support of the defense administration, which frequently warns against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The construction of a seaport for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus should be dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians; currently negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority do not seem feasible, therefore it should not be a precondition for advancing the initiative. However, there is a need to coordinate it with the Palestinian Authority, in order to neutralize any objection for such a move that could be seen as one that strengthens Hamas. There will also be a need for indirect coordination with Hamas (through the Egyptians) in order to ensure that conditions for a successful deal are in place.

The Israeli interest is to prevent a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip is not in sight, and therefore the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip is still the lesser of two evils in Israel’s view and certainly preferable to the takeover of a more radical Islamist groups.

Furthermore, Israel must initiate and even participate (including through a significant economic contribution) in such an extensive and ambitious effort to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. A sort of “Marshall Plan” is needed for the Gaza Strip, one that will mobilize the Arab states and the international community to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. Such a move would benefit everyone, including Israel, both politically and publicly. The latest round of violence in the Gaza Strip and the almost daily incidents illustrate the explosive potential of Israel-Hamas relations. Presumably, the current cease-fire will not last. The Cypriot initiative, however specific, can trigger a process that will help neutralize what appears to be an inevitable confrontation. Israel must seriously advance this initiative – the sooner the better.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Port in Cyprus Can Help Resolve Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The leaders played a significant role in the process. The president of South Korea, as opposed to his predecessors who supported tough policies and the enforcement of sanctions, adhered to his policy of dialogue with the neighbor to the north. He took advantage of the hosting of the Winter Olympics to invite a delegation from North Korea. Indeed, the participation of Kim’s sister in the opening ceremony was the harbinger of the change in North Korea’s position. On the other hand, North Korea’s president, Kim, has shown that his rigid and threatening image was wrong. Whether the economic sanctions and the fear of an American attack played a role, or whether in Kim’s view the last ballistic experiment has deterred the US, the result has been a change in his position. There are obviously those who fear that this is merely a tactical change designed to maximize profits within the international community, but in any case, the leadership has proven that it is capable of changing positions and initiating a “game-changing” course.

In comparison, the leaders on both sides of our “conflict” – Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – have not yet proved that they are capable and willing to promote a real solution to the conflict. Netanyahu’s hands are tied by his right-wing coalition that is ideologically committed to the vision of a greater Israel. He is also engaged in internal political struggles and is troubled by his legal issues of corruption. His policies and behavior convey that he has neither motivation nor determination to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, Abbas has so far escaped two rounds of negotiations, one with Olmert in 2008 and the second with Netanyahu in 2014, and it does not seem that he is inclined – now that he is approaching the end of his political career – to sign the deal of his life. Moreover, Abbas does not enjoy Palestinian legitimacy in the PA, while Hamas challenges his authority. There are two conditions that need to be met in order to promote a solution, legitimacy and determination. Both leaders do not meet these conditions, partially or fully.

The second element concerns the role of the mediator. Trump tried to give a feel of neutrality to his mediation, when he was secretly negotiating with North Korea, during which he also sent the head of the CIA, Pompeo (who in the meanwhile had been appointed Secretary of State) for a visit. He also wisely used “sticks” and “carrots”: on the one hand, he increased the economic pressure on North Korea and also threatened to take military action; On the other hand, he proposed to hold a summit with Kim soon, which previous presidents were not willing to do, thereby granting American legitimacy to the isolated president. Unfortunately, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump has so far made almost every possible mistake, the last of which is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The decision, which was meant to be part of the “carrots” that Israel would receive in exchange for its concessions in the negotiations, eliminated Trump’s pretense of becoming a neutral mediator. He can still correct this by making a counter-decision “in favor of” the Palestinians, but it does not appear that he intends to do so.

Finally, the outstanding issues in the two conflicts are completely different; The main issue in the Korean conflict is the unification of the two parts of the nation, which was arbitrarily separated during the Cold War: the north is afraid of losing power; while the south fears the economic costs of unifying a strong and progressive economy with the backward economy of the north. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated, but it has already been solved elsewhere, when East and West Germany united even though the conditions were different. More importantly, the Korean conflict does not include some of the explosive components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the question of borders, the question of Palestine’s independence, and notably the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The fact that the religious aspect does not play a role in the Korean conflict makes it less complicated and more manageable.

Beyond that, the history of “our” conflict does not work in Trump’s favor; external mediation alone has never been able to solve it. Peace with Egypt was initiated by Sadat; the Oslo Accords were initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil society players; while peace with Jordan was led mainly by Hussein and Rabin. It follows, therefore, that unlike the Korean story, Trump’s chances of breaking the impasse in our conflict are not great. If he wishes to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean arena seems more promising.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dr. Alon Levkowitz is an expert on Korea, teaches at Beit Berl College and is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Korea Is Not a Likely Precedent for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem based on Resolution 194, formulated in accordance to the Arab peace initiative.

The timing of the announcement of the Palestinian plan is intended to preempt a possible upheaval that could stir the Palestinians upon the release of an American peace plan. Moreover, it is intended to signal, as the Palestinians have already stated more than once, that the US is no longer seen as a fair mediator in view of its unilateral stance on Jerusalem, the reduction of US aid to UNRWA and the threat of closing the Palestinian representation in Washington. From a Palestinian point of view, the imbalance created by an exclusive American mediation, can be mitigated with the involvement of international partners. In addition, the speech is intended to portray Abbas to his people as a leader who dares to challenge the US, thereby strengthening his unstable legitimacy.

In view of the thicket of corruption affairs in Israeli politics, it is no wonder that the announcement about the disclosure of the plan was accepted in Israel with indifference. The Israeli Pavlovian reaction, as expressed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response – “Abbas has not said anything new” – is a reminiscent of countless similar negative reactions by Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers, including the response to the Arab peace plan in 2002. Not only that, but to ensure that Abbas is not seen as someone who is willing to make concessions, Netanyahu stressed that Abbas continues to pay millions of dollars to terrorists. Danny Danon, Israel’s representative to the UN, echoed him and said that Abbas is not part of the solution, but the problem.

The importance of the Palestinian plan is not in its content; it is anyway very general and does not contain any details, which are planned to be determined during long and exhausting negotiations. Its importance is three-fold: first, it stresses – once again – Abbas’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and a possible exchange of territories, thereby refuting the claim that Abbas intends to demand the implementation of the partition boundaries of 1947. The fact that Abbas views the Balfour Declaration as illegitimate does not change the fact that he recognizes and willing to accept the existing reality. The Palestinian narrative that rejects the Balfour Declaration will not change even after a peace agreement is achieved.

Second, Abbas’s insistence on East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital shows, by inference, that Abbas recognizes West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Thirdly, his view of the Palestinian agreement as a milestone to an Israeli-Arab peace agreement and part thereof, as expressed in the Arab peace initiative, signals that the advancement of IsraeliArab reconciliation cannot replace or advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

In August 1981, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Fahd published his first peace initiative (the first Saudi initiative) – which was immediately rejected by Israel – Yoel Marcus, a senior Ha’aretz journalist, wrote that Israel had always been able to respond to Arab bomb-bearing missiles, but not to missiles bearing peace plans. His observation was correct, but not accurate. Israel has learned to intercept both bomb-bearing missiles and peace plans. It does so by simply ignoring, opposing, or announcing that they are a recipe for the destruction of Israel.

Abbas’s peace plan will probably enter the endless collection of peace plans proposed throughout the years of the conflict, which were faded into oblivion. The composition of the current government and the timing of the publication will not give it a chance. Historians will certainly wonder in the future whether a peace plan was ever proposed by an Israeli government. I will give them a hint: not even once.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Matzav Review)

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The internal Palestinian split, manifested in the creation of two geographically and culturally distinct political entities – in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank – has continued for a decade. Throughout this period, the difficulty in bridging the gaps between Fatah and Hamas stemmed from disagreements in the political and social worldview regarding the character of the future Palestinian society and state. It was also a result of the violent circumstances in which the split emerged in 2007 – killings and violent struggle between the two movements in the Gaza Strip.

The cautious optimism among Palestinians following the signing of the Fatah-Hamas agreement is a product of the changing circumstances; first and foremost, the increasing Egyptian involvement in the reconciliation process. It was Egypt, which through a persistent struggle succeeded in creating the current path for the Palestinian dialogue. This has been accomplished after Egypt emphasized its crucial role to both sides and created a system of dependencies.

הפוסט A Look at the Palestinian Reconciliation Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

* The Islamic State is about to disappear territorially. The group has lost most of its territory in Iraq and is on the verge of defeat in Syria.

* The liberation of Mosul has boosted the Iraqi regime, which has reasserted its national identity. While the Kurdish problem continues to divide the country, it does not threaten Iraq’s very existence.

* Vladimir Putin’s Russia has repositioned itself not only as a patron of Syria but also as a significant player in Middle East politics.

* The advent of the Trump administration in the United States has signaled that the decline in American involvement in the Middle East, which began under Barack Obama, isn’t a passing phase but an ongoing trend.

* Saudi Arabia has become the leader of the Sunni world in confronting Iran and its allies, leading the war against the Houthis in Yemen and the sanctions against Qatar.

* Egypt is once again fulfilling a role in the Arab world, both on the Syrian front and against Hamas in Gaza.

Along with all this, one can still point to key issues that haven’t changed this year. Civil wars continue in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Violence could erupt in Morocco and the Palestinian areas.

Syria – both because of its geostrategic position and the many players operating in that country – remains the focus, while wars on the periphery (Libya and Yemen) continue to bleed far from the media’s eye, despite the humanitarian disasters there. The problem of refugees and displaced persons as a result of these wars is still keeping the region and the world busy. There were over 5 million Syrian refugees and 23 million displaced persons in the region at the end of 2015.

Six years after attempts to establish democratic regimes, the Arab world (save for Tunisia) continues to decline in Freedom House’s rankings. The human rights situation in every Arab country (again besides Tunisia) is worse than it was during the previous regime. Arab countries in general still suffer from political instability.

According to the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index for 2017, five of the most fragile states in the world are Arab (Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria and Iraq, in that order). Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suffered the biggest decline – 20 slots in the stability ranking. Still, certain Arab states were actually stable, headed by the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

Arab states have suffered an economic decline since the Arab Spring. Most of these countries are at the bottom of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and only Qatar (29th place) and the UAE (8th) have risen.

The Islamic State may have suffered territorial losses, but its ideology is still flourishing, as one can learn from the terror attacks in Europe. The Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry is still an important characteristic of regional politics, with Iran continuing to lead the Shi’ite camp and Saudi Arabia and Egypt leading the Sunnis. Another characteristic hasn’t changed – Hamas and the Palestinian Authority are still competing for leadership of the Palestinian people.

Hezbollah may have suffered heavy losses in Syria, but its influence in Lebanon and ability to threaten Israel remain robust. In parallel, the danger of a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas remains, and progress toward a peace deal with the PA isn’t on the horizon.

Preliminary forecasts of border changes in the region not only haven’t materialized, the borders seem more set than ever. If changes come, they will be within the borders of states; note, for example, the Kurds’ independence referendum this month, while they have declared autonomy in Syria.

The good news is that Israel faces no existential threat amid the Arab world’s problems. Moreover, the regional problems have served as a base for forging secret alliances between Israel and Arab states that don’t have diplomatic relations with it. The bad news is that Israel will continue to slog through the conflict, with every explosive incident (like at Jerusalem’s holy places) liable to lead to another uprising.

Even worse, seeing the struggles in the Arab world as an opportunity to strengthen Israel’s control in the occupied territories is a grave error that will exact a heavy price from Israel sooner or later. The harsh problems confronting the Arab world actually create an opportunity for Israel to solve the conflict under the best possible conditions from its perspective. Happy holidays? Not in the Middle East.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Happy Holidays? Not in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From a historical perspective, this is one of the worst moments in the history of the Palestinian national movement. The political-geographical split is making it difficult for the PLO leadership to navigate through the diplomatic route toward the two-states-for-two-people solution, as it committed to in the Oslo Agreements. The alternative Hamas tried to present in the form of jihad collapsed too, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The crisis the two leaderships – the PA and the Hamas – are experiencing obligates them to find solutions that could give the young generation a sense of hope. Naturally, the weakness of the national system and party affiliation makes it possible to create political alliances based on alternative identities. So far, it seems the key for creating change in Palestinian society can be found in the creation of communal alliances around strengthening the regional-geographical connection while bolstering the national connection as well.

That’s the background for the recent Egyptian-brokered unnatural affair between Mohammad Dahlan, who was expelled from Fatah in 2011 but sees himself as Mahmoud Abbas’s future successor, and Hamas’s newly elected leader, Yahya Sanwar. Dahlan, the former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force, was described by the Hamas leadership on the eve of the military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007 as a corrupt person damaging the values of Islam.

The parties have surprisingly moved closer not just thanks to a political meeting of interests, but due to traditional cultural identity components, led by the interpersonal connection and the local identity. Sanwar and Dahlan grew up together in the Khan Younis refugee camp, share the refugee mindset and the same background. In addition, there is no history of bad blood between them. Dahlan and Sanwar’s ways parted in the beginning of the first intifada.

Since then, until their recent meeting in Cairo, there has been no animosity between the two, but perhaps yearning.

The personal acquaintance and the local identity shared by Dahlan and Sanwar is seen as an asset by Egypt too, which is interested in severing the ties between Hamas’s military wing and Islamist organizations in the Sinai Peninsula.

The creation of an economic-political dependence system, which passes through Dahlan and is backed by Sanwar, will make it possible for Egypt to achieve these goals. Thus, the local Gazan identity, which receives a lot of legitimization from Egypt, allows Hamas to find a formula that would make its political survival possible.

For Dahlan, the local identity could serve as a renewed stepping stone to a national leadership position. The purpose of the alliance between Dahlan and Hamas is to lead joint moves that would create a better day-to-day life for the strip’s residents, who are suffering from a shortage of electricity, water and basic civilian infrastructure. Dahlan and the donation money from the Gulf are supposed to fill the void left behind by Abbas. The Palestinian president chose to withdraw funds to harm the Gaza Strip’s bureaucratic systems and civilian infrastructure in an attempt to subdue Hamas, following Sanwar’s efforts to create an alternative government that would neutralize the influence of the Palestinian Authority’s government offices in the Gaza Strip.

Beyond the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, the internal Fatah battle between Abbas and Dahlan is personal and filled with bad blood. In the past, Abbas rejected Egyptian attempts to reconcile between the parties, and he is determined to block Dahlan’s way back into Fatah and prevent him from reaching an influential position in the future.

As part of his attempts to try to thwart Dahlan’s return to a political position of power, Abbas initiated last week a meeting with the Hamas leadership in the West Bank, led by Nasser alDin al-Shaer. The meeting between the Fatah and Hamas leaderships in the West Bank focused on the efforts to reach an intra-Palestinian reconciliation and a solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Abbas, like Dahlan and Sanwar, is using communalregional politics to advance issues of national importance and shape a political agenda.

From the West Bank, the message reached the Gaza Strip. One of the Hamas leaders, Salah al-Bardawil, in response called for a return to the reconciliation path. He said Hamas was willing to cancel the alternative government workers’ council in exchange for setting a general election date and implementing a reform in the PLO’s structure.

Fatah, Hamas and Dahlan are using the local identity to make some gains in the Palestinian national political arena. Local, clan and tribal identity components are usually seen as an obstacle to the national pattern of action. In the Palestinian case, the communal-regional politics is being painted in national and Islamic colors and serving as a future engine of growth, which will have a future key role in the inheritance battles in the post-Abbas era.

(originally published in Ynet)

הפוסט Sanwar and Dahlan: An Egyptian-Brokered Alliance against Abbas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The speech attracted little attention from Israeli or global media, for in many ways it was similar to Abbas’s many speeches focusing on the Israeli occupation and its consequences. It did, however, include an interesting section in which the Palestinian president called on the African leaders (many of whom are Muslim or Arab) to stipulate that any upgrade of their ties with Israel would be conditional on Israel ending the occupation.

Given that most experts concur that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will not take unnecessary diplomatic risks or normalize ties with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian issue, we should ask ourselves what Abbas is concerned about.

First, Abbas, who has been heavily involved in shaping Palestinian history, knows that at critical moments, the Arab countries have followed their own separate interests. In 1979, it was Egypt under Sadat that turned its back on the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, there were no Arab efforts to save the PLO from Israel. The organization suffered defeat and was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia. In 1988, Jordan unilaterally disengaged from the West Bank, following the first intifada.

Later, Yasser Arafat abandoned king Hussein by signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the latter’s political umbrella during the 1991 Madrid conference.

King Hussein felt betrayed, but decided to make use of the positive regional momentum to sign a peace treaty with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, without stipulating that the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement or the establishment of a Palestinian state were conditions of the agreement.

Abbas’ second concern is the absence of natural, consistently reliable allies, which is especially disconcerting in view of the PA’s inherent weakness and limited economic resources, and its resulting dependence on regional actors (including Israel). In the past, the PLO could automatically count on the support of the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Today, all these actors have become irrelevant for the PA and its current strategy of relying on moderate states that support the peace process. Such states, however, are not always aligned with the interests of the PA. In 2017, for example, Egypt attempted to amend the Arab Peace Initiative (an attempt blocked by Palestinian objection) and is currently promoting a deal with Hamas to grant Mohammad Dahlan powers in Gaza, contrary to the wishes and at the expense of the interests of the PA.

Finally, Abbas is concerned by recent changes in Israel’s favor in the overall Arab position. In 2013, the Arab Quartet agreed to modify the Arab Peace Initiative and accept the notion of Israeli-Palestinian land swaps without demanding any concession from Israel in return. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has made a series of gestures to Israel over the past two years, including visits, meetings, and allusions to secret security cooperation against common enemies. In May 2017, The Wall Street Journal even reported that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states offered to take some normalization steps toward Israel in return for a limited settlements freeze and an Israeli decision to ease restrictions over trade with Gaza.

Over the years, various Arab countries have conducted behind-the-scenes relations with Israel. The Arab countries were afraid of being caught in public as supporting their Israeli “mistress” rather than their Palestinian “wife.” This “mistress syndrome” is still evident, but recent developments indicate that the interests of these countries, and specifically their desire to deter Iran and its allies, are served by publicizing their diplomatic or security ties with Israel. Making their relations with Israel more public also lays the groundwork for a future upgrade of ties with Israel, once the Israeli-Palestinian peace process moves forward.

Like other experts, I also believed (and continue to believe) that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and other Arab countries will not take major steps toward normalization with Israel before significant progress is made toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, an uncompromising Palestinian position, and the continued split between the PA and Hamas, might lead Arab leaders to prefer their national interests over their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Sadat and king Hussein made such decisions in the past, and others may follow. This is a definite cause of concern for Abbas.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For several months, Israelis were speculating about US President Donald Trump’s next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Each statement by the American president was amplified and analyzed: Trump is serious, Trump is determined, Trump is invested. That had become a common belief.

Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority and Israel was an opportunity to bring some certainty into the debate. However, if there is one key takeaway from the visit, it is that for the new president, regional security is the top priority in the region, not the Israeli- Palestinian peace process.

Whether it was in his speech in Riyadh, his remarks in Bethlehem or his statements in Jerusalem, Trump spoke a similar language – it is time to fight terror, defeat extremism and contain Iran.

Toward these goals he signed gigantic arm deals with the Saudis, called for the establishment of a new regional security partnership and urged the different peoples of the region to join hands and promote their shared interests.

In Israel, the messages regarding regional security had some additional components and twists – a pledge to defend Israel at international organizations, a commitment to prevent a nuclear Iran and a promise to continue the special bond between Israel and the United States. Trump also emphasized the importance of Jerusalem to the Jewish people and told the Israeli public that their prime minister was a man of peace.

Trump echoed Benjamin Netanyahu’s talking points to the probable delight of the Israeli prime minister, who was also content with what Trump chose not to – at least publicly – say: The American president did not refer to the two-state solution; he did not mention the Palestinians’ right to self-determination; he did not criticize Israel over settlement expansion; he did not call on Israel to show maps and define its borders.

Trump chose to speak about peace in general and ambiguous terms, in a more religious than national context. Should the three monotheistic religions be able to cooperate, he claimed, then world peace – including between Israelis and Palestinians – might just be around the corner. He also identified the enemies of peace – Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas – and made clear that he was not in the business of moderating extremists, engaging with Iran or exploring Hamas’s new policy document. He wanted to defeat them. His words on Iran were welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, and his words on Hamas pleased Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu was happy about both.

Trump spelled out regional enemies and threats but kept vague on regional opportunities for peace. In fact, he ignored the most significant peace initiative out there – the Arab Peace Initiative (API).

Trump spoke in Saudi Arabia, the country that initiated the API. He spoke to leaders of Arab and Muslim countries that had adopted the API. He emphasized the need for multilateral efforts toward peace.

Yet he did not mention even once the offer that the Arab League made 15 years ago for normal diplomatic relations between Israel and all Arab states in return for peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors. The API, reaffirmed by the Arab League just two months ago, disappeared from Trump’s talking points, and no alternative plan for regional peace was introduced.

The Trump visit did not provide the much-needed clarity regarding the nature of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and its benefits.

It even challenged the limited clarity that does exist – clarity about American support for a two-state solution, and clarity about the API as a key regional incentive for peace that can provide Israel with additional benefits to those the Palestinians can deliver on their own.

Trump’s visit should serve as a wake-up call for other international actors who care about the peace process.

Lately, the international community is rather paralyzed regarding the peace process: Past initiatives have been shelved, and subsequently, no new initiatives have been put forth. All eyes are focused on the new American president and his statements about promoting peace.

The recent visit to the Middle East indicated that Trump might not be the savior of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as some believed. It is thus time for renewed international activism regarding the peace process, as exemplified by the resolution adopted by the European Parliament just before Trump’s visit, calling for a new European Union initiative to advance Israeli- Palestinian peace.

Despite their disappointment over a lack of progress toward peace during the visit, pro-peace actors – in Israel and beyond – can leverage three messages introduced by Trump during his visit that which contradict popular Israeli rightwing rhetoric: 1. While Netanyahu claims that a breakthrough in ties with the Arab world does not require progress on the Palestinian track, Trump emphasized that steps toward the Palestinians were needed for Israel to upgrade its regional ties.

2. While the Israeli government has been delegitimizing Abbas, Trump stressed that Abbas was a genuine partner for peace.

3. While right-wing Israelis present a dichotomous approach, asking international actors to choose whether they are for Israel or against it, Trump made the case that there is no contradiction between being pro-Israel and pro-Arab.

Trump has gone in and out of three major cities in the Middle East. A major announcement was not made, a new peace plan was not introduced, and a big surprise was not revealed. But just as he departed, it was announced that his special envoy for the peace process was on his way to the region.

So maybe it will all happen the next time around?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump and a Tale of Three Cities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions.

In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process.

According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones.

“Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”.

“It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv.

Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the status quo and continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on these assumptions, the EU is unlikely to take new initiatives and steps regarding the peace process over the coming period. The Israeli government is happy about this, and views EU disengagement from the peace process as a success of Israel’s policy. This is a narrow and distorted view.

Such a European policy is actually a major setback for Israeli interests:

1. Israel is missing an opportunity to significantly upgrade its ties with Europe, which is still a close ally and Israel’s largest trade partner. Israel should aspire to deepen ties with Europe, as offered by the EU in return for Israeli-Palestinian peace;
2. Without significant European involvement, it will be much more difficult to promote and operationalise the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds much potential for Israel’s future;
3. A possible EU decision to cut aid to the Palestinians, due to disengagement from the conflict, might worsen the situation on the ground and will increase the burden on Israel;
4. A European disengagement, coupled with American isolationism, will enable aggressive and less democratic actors (like Russia) to play a much larger regional role. Israel’s interests are not a priority for such actors.

In Israel, Europe is often portrayed – in the media and by politicians from the right – as hostile to Israel. This is not true.

Israel’s relations with European countries and with EU institutions are deep and multi-layered. They serve the needs of all sides involved.

The Israeli-European alliance is not merely an interest-based economic one. It is a deep strategic alliance, based on shared values and on a long and troubled history. Europe has always been an exceptional asset for Israel’s development and security.

Israel has a genuine interest in a strong EU. Instability in Europe, the weakening of EU institutions, and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Europe, all have negative consequences for Israel.

The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that in light of the challenges faced by Europe, a plurality of Israelis thinks that Israel will benefit more from a stronger Europe than from a weaker one.

Israel’s increased ties with Russia, China and other non-democratic countries cannot and should not be a substitute for relations with Europe. Israel’s belonging to the democratic camp, with Europe at its centre, promoted Israel’s international standing along the years and directly contributed to Israel’s prosperity.

In order to maintain the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state, Israel needs to maintain good ties with democratic Europe. It should also work to promote the two state solution, in order to prevent a change in Israel’s national character will change, mounting tensions with Europe, and an intensified pivot towards non-democratic international actors.

Israel is a regional superpower. As such, it can play a leading role, alongside Europe, in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Israel’s existential need is to dismantle regional threats and to establish good relations with its neighbouring countries and peoples.

These goals are also shared by Europe, and Israel has no better partner than Europe to promote them with. The path towards peace and development in the Middle East is long and requires much commitment.

Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an essential step in that direction. There is no way to bypass this path – which Israel currently chooses to avoid, and on which Europe is dragging its feet.

(originally published in EurActiv)

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Palestinian Prisoners’ Strike and Marwan Barghouti’s Race to the Top הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 1999, NATO led the largest international military intervention in Europe since World War II, to stop Serbia’s actions in Kosovo, then a province of Serbia. The war ended with a long and tense political standoff. After negotiations in the mid-2000s failed, Kosovo declared independence in 2008, in a move vehemently opposed by Serbia.

Then in 2013, the two sides took a major step forward, signing a set of principles intended to advance future normalization of relations. It was not a full-fledged peace agreement but contained two major aspects: neither side would block the access of the other to eventual EU accession, and the small Serb minority living in Kosovo would create a municipal association, while being more integrated into Kosovo’s governing structures. Many thought Serbia was coming to accept the increasing fact of Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo implicitly acknowledged the right of the Serb minority to a measure of autonomy and special protection.

The agreement was viewed as a historic step. The international community was thrilled – cautious but unmistakably optimistic.

Thus the first inquiry of this paper is what can be learned from this relatively recent leap towards conflict resolution that may be relevant for Israelis and Palestinians? What factors – incentives, pressure, international or domestic dynamics – contributed to Belgrade and Pristina’s progress, that Israelis and Palestinians can learn from?

The second inquiry regards the agreement itself. What are the core ideas for a workable arrangement between the two entities struggling between forced marriage and contested separation? How were Kosovo’s claims to total sovereignty reconciled with Serbia’s equally unwavering demand that Kosovo remain Serbian sovereign territory, with only circumscribed autonomy? Here the political and constitutional arrangements will be reviewed to consider applicable ideas or lessons for eventual Israeli-Palestinian final-status arrangements.

The paper will then address a third and perhaps thorniest question: the current status of negotiations. Nearly four years after the flurry of optimism, in 2017, the dialogues have been beset by major problems of both interpretation and implementation. Relations between the two regions have stagnated at best, or soured. This mixed and worrying outcome will be compared to experiences in the past and present of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to consider ways to improve such a process in the future.

The analysis reaches several key insights. One is that intensive detail for implementation of an agreement may not substitute for clarity of the core principles for resolving the conflict, and commitment to those political goals by both parties. The lack of agreement on the final status vision, sensitive as this may be, hampers negotiation and erodes chances for eventual resolution. Other insights touch on the need to include parties directly affected by the conflict in the resolution process, or boost their role in negotiations; the possibility that under certain circumstances, hawkish leaders may be the more likely figures to advance peace; as well as the need for protection of minorities while preserving sovereignty – while minimizing ambiguity of sovereignty over any given area.

The paper first outlines the background of the Serbia-Kosovo conflict, then highlights main areas of comparison to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – beginning with general core issues in common, and moving to a more detailed analysis of the trajectory of negotiations.

הפוסט Lessons from Serbia and Kosovo for Israel and Palestine: All Process, No Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the lessons learned from the Arafat era, in which violence was encouraged and used as a political tool, Abbas wants to change the way Palestinians are viewed by Western eyes. Instead of Palestinians being viewed as peace rejectionists who adopt violence as what they think is a legitimate tool, Abbas wants them to be viewed as a nation searching for a diplomatic solution for its national tribulations, while receiving support from the global community.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena.

The new American administration does not bode well for the Palestinians. During the election campaign, Trump issued statements that he would give Israel a green light to expand settlements and that he would relocate the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also appointed a right-wing ambassador to Israel (David Friedman) who supports the settlement enterprise. All these actions aroused deep suspicion among the Palestinians. Even if Trump does not carry through on the embassy relocation, due to the sensitivity of the subject and concern over the great anger it would arouse in the Arab world – the very fact that the president supports such an idea teaches the Palestinians that they do not have a friend in the White House.

One of the paths taken by the PA to protest the emerging American policy was to accept a Russian invitation to attend a summit with all the Palestinian factions in Moscow in January 2017. The close ties between the PLO and Russia are natural, as they are based on a positive historic relationship. The socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO enjoy an ideological-historical affinity with the Russians. These groups include: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP; communists). Abbas himself was closely aligned with the Russian regime for many years. It was in Moscow that Abbas wrote his controversial doctorate. Also, Abbas served as chairman of the Russia-PLO Friendship Association for many years.

The goal of the discussions held between the Palestinian factions under the Russian umbrella was to try to promote an internal Palestinian reconciliation, and an actual timetable for its implementation. Following the summit in Moscow, Fatah and Hamas reached a new agreement about conducting municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in mid-May 2017. The discussions regarding the elections dates were held simultaneously with laborious talks between the various factions that attempted to create a formula for reforming the PLO’s political structure and integrating Islamic elements in PLO institutions.

But the growing Palestinian rapprochement with Russia does not only focus on attempts to achieve internal Palestinian reconciliation. It also serves to exert pressure on Israel and diminish US prestige in the region. Thus, the PA is sending out two messages, one to Russia and one to the US. They are telling Russia that the Palestinians are willing to give Russia a role in their internal reconciliation process, and they are sending a message to the US regarding the way the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should be conducted in the future. Abbas declares at every international forum that he accepts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to an Abbas-Netanyahu summit in Moscow. He reiterates that he is waiting for an answer from the Israeli government, to jump-start the peace process.

The fact that the Palestinians do not view the US as an “honest broker” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only heightens Abbas’ achievement in convincing the Obama administration to refrain from using its veto power to block UN Resolution 2334.

Resolution 2334 is one of the salient Palestinian diplomatic achievements in the Obama era. This resolution was warmly received by the PLO. More surprising was that it also drew positive reactions from Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, despite the fact that the resolution supports the two-state solution, calls for continued security coordination between Israel and the PA and is vague regarding if and how pressure will actually be placed on Israel.

The tightening relationship between the PA and Russia against the background of the change of government in the US shows that the Palestinians are trying to tell the Trump administration that there are additional power brokers in the global arena. And, according to the Palestinians, these other entities can counterbalance what they believe will be Trump’s pro-Israel policy.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is growing and is expressed by the active fighting of Russian forces alongside Assad’s regime in Syria against the rebels, and also by Russian provision of advanced weapons to Syria and Iran. This involvement, together with the Palestinian-Russian alliance, creates a sense of Middle East deja-vu. Are we returning to the diplomatic principles of the Cold War?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The future of Palestinian diplomacy in the Trump era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mahmoud Abbas espouses the diplomatic struggle and the recruiting of international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders. His consistent stance is that institutionalized violent struggle harms Palestinian interests. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334, which was adopted at the end of 2016 and states that the settlements are illegal, encourages the PA to continue this policy and continue to view the diplomatic path as the central element of its comprehensive strategy.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena. This article describes and analyzes these challenges, and points to the possible courses of action open to the PA.

הפוסט The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The split between Fatah and Hamas, the stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the violence in Palestinian society (both inwards and against the IDF and Israeli civilian targets) cannot overshadow the fact that the crisis between Fatah and Hamas will not be concluded until the two movements undergo internal processes of comprehensive reforms.

הפוסט The Postponement of the Palestinian Local Elections and its Ramifications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The adoption of this discourse should not be taken for granted; it is the result of intellectual and media activity undertaken by various civil society organizations that identified a historic opportunity – the result of changes taking place in the region – to cooperate with the “moderate” Arab states who share common interests with Israel, such as halting the political and ideological expansion of Iran and the Shi’ite axis (including Syria and Hezbollah), and a joint struggle against Sunni Jihadist Islamic non-state actors.

The original purpose of the regional concept was not to disregard, escape or divert attention from the Palestinian problem, but rather to harness the Arab states as an umbrella of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As bilateral negotiations are at a standstill, the regional framework was supposed to steer the parties away from the impasse.

According to this logic, the Arab states can help in several ways: Egypt has leverage over Hamas because of their common border; Jordan has an interest in reaching a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem as well as a desire to play a role in the Jerusalem issue; and Saudi Arabia can provide religious legitimacy to any political compromise. All these countries have leverage over the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

However, the main problem is that the public consciousness has shifted in line with the positions of the right-wing politicians. In other words, those who promote the regional discourse do not do so in order to make progress on the Palestinian issue, but rather to reap the benefits of the changes in the region without having to pay its price in the Palestinian sphere. In such a way, the right-wing government also enhances its supposedly moderate image.

Indeed, Egypt’s ambassador’s return to Israel, the visit of its foreign minister (after nine years), intelligence and military cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and possibly the Gulf – all indicate that regional cooperation is alive and kicking, while the Palestinian track has been abandoned.

The public, according to a Mitvim Institute’s public opinion poll (July 2016), graciously accept it; they are mostly interested in cooperation with Egypt, while the PA is lagging behind in fourth place out of five options. In other words, the public welcomes regional cooperation according to the right-wing vision.

This regional approach is misguided and will not ultimately succeed as one may have hoped. Certain achievements may indeed be reached, but they will be limited and kept under wraps. Israel has a history of contacts with countries, organizations and prominent figures in the Arab world. As these connections were viewed in the Arab world as illegitimate, they were kept behind the scenes. Some Arab leaders also paid with their lives for this (such as Jordan’s king Abdullah, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and others). As a result, Israel has suffered over the years from what I call the “mistress syndrome.” The only time it enjoyed an extensive and open relationship with the Arab world was in the ‘90s, after the signing of the Oslo Accords. All of the achievements in the field of diplomatic relations, the economic conferences and projects evaporated at the onset of the al-Aksa intifada in 2000. In other words, real, open and meaningful cooperation will not exist without a solution, or at least significant progress, on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any attempt to promote regional cooperation without tackling the Palestinian issue is throwing dust in one’s eyes.

And, as we know, there is plenty of dust in our region.

In view of the fact that the discourse of “opportunities” and the “regional initiative” have been adopted by the government and the public at large, focus should now be placed on introducing another discourse, one of missed opportunities. The Israeli public likes to quote the legendary foreign minister Abba Eban’s saying that “the Arabs/Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Yet, a recent study that I completed shows that not only have the Palestinians missed opportunities, but Israel has as well. Therefore, emphasis should not only be placed on identifying a historic opportunity – which indeed exists – but emphasis should be placed on ensuring that it will not be missed.

As things stand now, the Israeli government shows no motivation to seize this historic opportunity to advance a regional initiative that includes a two-state solution, in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Quartet Report. In August 1952, David Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that “I do not want to be the man that our grandchildren… blame for having had the chance to try and achieve Jewish-Arab peace – and to have missed it.”

I believe that Netanyahu should hang this quote over his desk.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט From opportunities to missed opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The report was supposed to be the peak of the Quartet’s (United Nations, United States, European Union and Russia) reinvigoration process, that included regular meetings and consultations with leading Arab states. This process also intended to convey the message that the international community has not yet lost interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The aim of the report was to indicate the obstacles that are preventing progress toward peace, and to formulate recommendations that will help create conditions to resume negotiations and maintain the feasibility of the two-state solution.

The Quartet Report of July 2016 is very different and much more modest than the Roadmap published by the Quartet in 2003. It focuses on the analysis of the current situation, and avoids addressing terms of reference for a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The report expresses criticism of both sides: of the Palestinians, for the acts of violence and terrorism in the West Bank, amassing weapons, constructing tunnels and firing rockets from Gaza, and incitement in official media and social networks; of Israel, for continued settlement expansion, “legalizing” outposts, expropriation of land, withholding construction permits from Palestinians in the territories, and settler violence against Palestinians.

One notable achievement of the report is the ability of the Quarter members to agree on these issues, while presenting them in a rather harsh manner. This reflects the zone of agreement that exists on these issues among key players in the international arena. The final version of the report, however, is a softer version of the initial draft, and settles on presenting a snapshot of current reality without dealing with the deeper issues that led to the obstacles identified in the report.

The report is the product of a sort of academic learning process that included interviews with various people from both sides of the conflict. The data scattered throughout the report – numbers of settlers, expropriation of land, building permits, house demolitions – indicate that the drafters of the report were well versed in the facts on the ground. Based on acquired information, the report presents 10 recommendations, which do not go beyond being a wish list.

For example, both parties are asked to “work to de-escalate tensions by exercising restraint and refraining from provocative actions and rhetoric”; both parties are asked to “take all necessary steps to prevent violence and protect the lives and property of all civilians”; the Palestinian Authority (PA) is asked to “act decisively…to cease incitement to violence and strengthen ongoing efforts to combat terrorism”; while Israel is asked to “cease the policy of settlement construction and expansion, designating land for exclusive Israeli use, and denying Palestinian development.”

Moreover, the report calls for a unified, legitimate and democratic Palestinian government, and for Israelis and Palestinians to “foster a climate of tolerance” and promote cooperation in various fields. Yet, the question that the report does not answer is how to do all of this.

The report was written during the historic reality of a diplomatic standstill, lack of trust between Israel and the PA and the lack of recognition between Israel and Hamas and the PA and Hamas. In this situation, the report’s recommendations are expected to fall on deaf ears. The report should have suggested what could be done in this complex reality, as well as what the international community can and should do in the absence of any Israeli or Palestinian political will to move forward.

It was important that the drafters of the report positively referenced the Arab Peace Initiative and the French initiative. In a time when no negotiations between Israelis and Palestinian are taking place but there are several international initiatives on the table, it is essential for the international community to act in accordance and to produce initiatives that do not compete but rather complement one another. This will prevent Israelis and Palestinians from adopting the “divide and conquer” approach in relation to the various initiatives – i.e.

to accept the French initiative and reject the Quartet Report, or to reject the French initiative and accept an initiative for regional security cooperation.

Presumably, a more detailed Quartet Report would not have resulted in a breakthrough in the peace process.

As the well-known English idiom says, “you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.” If the two sides do not want to act decisively to end the conflict, it just won’t happen. As this is the current situation, it seems as if the Quartet Report will join the long list of reports, documents and peace plans that failed to have an impact. But if and when the next round of Israeli-Palestinian violence occurs, the members of the Quartet will be able to say “we told you so.” They have successfully identified the existing obstacles and the roots of future tragedies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Notes on the Quartet report הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Revolt of the Young Palestinian Generation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The curse of stagnation and the need for conflict comparison הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Second, the common knowledge that US presidents do not like to embark on new initiatives in their final year in office. There have, however, been exceptions to this rule: Reagan recognized the PLO in late 1988, Clinton published his parameters in late 2000 and Bush mediated between prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in late 2008. Therefore, the possibility that Obama is entertaining a Middle East initiative this year warrants exploration.

Unfortunately, this initiative continues to lie dormant on Israel’s and the US’ doorsteps.

In light of Obama’s mixed legacy in this field, a new late-term initiative may not be a bad idea at all.

The question is what should and can be done? Since the prospects of resuming negotiations between Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are slim at best, Obama should not focus on bilateral issues. The ideas noted in the Wall Street Journal report include a possible UN Security Council resolution to replace UN Resolution 242, a statement by the Middle East Quartet and a presidential speech.

The floated ideas also include several that the US is probably not considering seriously, such as an international conference, which is advanced by France.

Since such a conference is a formidable task, as evidenced by James Baker’s Madrid Conference (1991) and Condoleezza Rice’s Annapolis Conference (2007), a one-shot event would be more expedient.

A presidential speech, declaration, or statement would not demand lengthy, debilitating talks with the conflicting parties and would allow Obama, unfettered by election considerations or the reactions of lobby groups, to lay out his vision for a solution to the conflict. He should not wait for the parties’ approval for his vision, as Clinton did. Such an initiative will hopefully serve as a practical guide for future administrations, and for Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Similarities to the Clinton parameters – in terms and substance – can be expected, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, as it will signal continuity in the American position that future leaders will not be able to dismiss lightly.

Obama’s initiative should, however, seriously consider departing from Clinton’s parameters on at least five points, in line with the developments in the Middle East in the past 15 years. First, emphasis on a structured time frame (today, the passing of time is working to the detriment of both conflicting parties as the possibility of a two-state solution is slowly fading away); second, reference to the fact that the settlements are an impediment to peace; third, reference to Israel’s desire for recognition as a Jewish state; four, emphasis on the positive role of Arab Peace Initiative, which will tie the Israeli- Palestinian settlement to an overall Israeli-Arab settlement, leading to the normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab Middle Eastern countries; and finally, it should be stressed that the parameters in principle also refer to the Gaza Strip although negotiations with Hamas will not take place until it changes its position toward peace and Israel.

Obama’s desire to sign the Iranian nuclear deal was driven by his conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” The same conviction should also guide his thinking in the case of the Middle East conflict.

In 2017, Israel will celebrate the centennial of the Balfour Declaration – the British promise to build a Jewish national home in Palestine. In early 2017, in his final days in office, Obama can define the precise boundaries of that state, which have not yet been conclusively defined.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity for the Obama parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Impressions from a day in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Abu Mazen: A Man in Search of a Legacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The essence of this “doctrine” is that a combination of engagement and satisfaction of core strategic needs could serve American interests far better than sanctions and isolation.

America, in Obama’s opinion, with its overwhelming power, should have the confidence to take some calculated risks to create important new opportunities.

He believes that the United States is sufficiently powerful to test new diplomatic propositions without putting itself at risk. Although Obama hopes to see a change in Iran’s position in the forthcoming years, leading it to discontinue or slow its nuclear journey, America will be in a position to use its deterrence capabilities and military force if no such change develops.

According to this argument, a superpower with a defense budget of $600 billion should be able to ward off any threat emanating from a nation with $30b budget.

Time will tell whether the Obama Doctrine with regard to Iran (and pariah states in general) was successful or merely wishful thinking, but no one can deny the logic of this reasoning, even if doubts regarding the sincerity of Iranian intentions persist. Interestingly, the logic underlying this doctrine appears to be even more relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case.

A self-confident Israel, with a defense budget amounting to NIS 57b., is a superpower in comparison to the approximately $1b. budget of the Palestinian Authority (the figures for Hamas are more problematic although there is obviously a wide gap here as well). According to the Obama Doctrine, such a gap allows Israel to take risks and offer some substantial concessions with regard to the occupied territories. Israel’s consistent argument that it does not have the luxury to test this proposition is disingenuous because its military might could easily undo whatever has been conceded.

Moreover, an agreement with the Palestinians would be supported by security guarantees provided by the United States, the European Community and perhaps other parties in the region, which would help deter Israel’s potential enemies.

Unfortunately, the chances that the newly composed rightwing government will adopt this line of reasoning are slim at best. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political allies, there is no partner on the Palestinian side. While he may be correct with regard to Hamas, placing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas firmly in the “no partner” square is a mistake. The problem, however, goes far beyond the policy of the current government, as most Israeli governments were reluctant to take initiative in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was even reluctant to formally endorse, or even positively respond, to the Arab Peace Initiative, which might have served as an umbrella for advancing an agreement with the Palestinians.

The conclusion must be, therefore, that the chances for an independent Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough initiated by Israel are close to zero. This leaves the Obama administration as the only viable player that can ignite the process by offering a blueprint for a solution.

If Obama applies his doctrine to the Israeli-Palestinian case, we can expect the Obama Doctrine to be followed by the Obama Peace Plan or the Obama Peace Parameters.

In contrast to Clinton, who offered his vision in his final days in office in December 2000, Obama has sufficient time in office to promote his plan if he acts now. While the chances of this eventuality seem remote in view of the failure of the Kerry mission in 2014, coupled by Obama’s reluctance to further antagonize the Israeli government following the controversy over the Iran deal, perhaps Obama might be ready to take the chance of offering his own vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After all, the deal with Iran was similarly driven by the conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” Such a proposal would surely arouse heated political debate in Israel and may lead to internal changes.

But if the Israeli government involves itself in domestic American politics, there is no reason why the United States cannot do the same.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Applying the ‘Obama Doctrine’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

By voting to reduce aid to the PA, Congressional representatives jeopardize Abbas’ legitimacy, Israeli security and future prospects for peace.

The bill in question calls for the US to withhold funds “equivalent” to those the PA provides families of Palestinian terrorists, and to prevent dollars to any Palestinian government formed as a result of “an agreement with Hamas.”

Altogether, these restrictions would deny the PA some $70 million of the $400 million it receives annually—a figure less than a quarter of what it was in 2008. Unsurprisingly, the bill was chiefly backed by Republicans, and stands in marked contrast to the Obama administration’s support for continued aid to the “technocratic” government. The bill, however, also reflects a sentiment shared by many Democrats, AIPAC, and 88 of the Senate’s 100 members. The Senate Appropriations Committee is expected to approve a sister bill, after which the two chambers will put them to a general vote.

On the surface, the bill appears well grounded, especially in light of Netanyahu’s protestations and Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s charges that Americans are financing PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ stipends to Palestinian terrorists in prison. In practice, it would weaken an already beleaguered PA, undermining the legitimacy it has recently garnered for the first time in years. In so doing it threatens to collapse the very institution that was created for advancing the peace process and that is demonstrating its willingness against unbearable domestic pressure to cooperate with Israel for its security and against extremism in the region.

For starters, as Sec. Kerry’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, already pointed out, the Israeli government itself has maintained its security cooperation with the PA and in fact had transferred aid to the PA on the same day as the government was announced—a tacit admission that the lack of any actual Hamas leaders in the technocratic government permits continued relations with the PA.

Vindicating this latter point is the PA’s condemnation of the recent kidnapping and its active participation in the search for Israel’s “lost boys,” despite Israel’s mass arrests of Palestinians not connected in the affair, as well as Hamas and Israel’s own controversial MK Haneen Zoabi’s censure of the PA’s efforts as betrayal and a crime.

On a deeper level, the PA represents a moderate force among Palestinians, is often receptive to Western demands, and most of all is key to strengthening the Palestinian economy and infrastructure—ingredients widely accepted as conducive to Israel’s security. Even a partial reduction in aid, as Congress is proposing, would hamper the PA’s ability to pay for projects and employee salaries—a move that would further stall the economy and the Gaza Strip’s long road to recovery. These benefits far outweigh the PA’s less palatable practices, such as the stipends to the families of Palestinian prisoners.

Indeed, it is for these reasons that in a similar congressional climate in 2011, Brigadier General Nitzan Alon—at the time in charge of Israeli security in the West Bank—was prompted to write an article in the New York Times appealing to Congress not to cut funding to the PA. When Congress ultimately froze $200 million in annual funds, then U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta—who has been known to criticize Obama for not taking military action in Syria—also voiced that that it was a “mistake.” That aid, which largely paid for the 22% of the Palestinian work force that the PA employs, was not reinstated until 2013.

Congress as whole should learn from this fruitless episode and forego plans to dwindle the PA’s budget. If anything, it should be praising the PA for having managed to maintain a government of national consensus all the while fighting Hamas and combatting the glorification of terrorism. It should be offering moral support to Abbas in the face of domestic and Israeli critics.

If Congress were to do this, it would strategically position the U.S. to leverage the PA’s cooperative efforts and governing legitimacy, a legitimacy that Israel has long demanded, and to restart negotiations on a credible and durable path to peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Congress Shouldn’t Cut Aid to the Palestinian Authority הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a clear and loud voice, Mahmoud Abbas renounced the disgraceful crime of kidnapping three teens in Gush Etzion, and said in front of representatives of states which have no diplomatic relations with Israel that he was determined to continue the security coordination with it.

Abbas declared that the PA would do everything in its power to make sure that the kidnapped teens are located and returned safely to their families. He asserted that this was a Palestinian interest.

Abbas chose to face the populist atmosphere on the Palestinian street courageously. The criminal abduction was accepted by many groups there as a legitimate act. Campaigns celebrating the capture of “three new Gilad Shalits” began popping up on the social media. Not only in the Gaza Strip, but also at Birzeit University, the incident was marked by handing out candy to passersby.

Despicably, under false pretense, the Palestinian terror organizations even began claiming that “three Israeli soldiers” had been taken captive.

הפוסט By condemning abduction, Abbas proved he’s a statesman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There has previously been dramatic news about Palestinian reconciliation that has not amounted to much, and the road toward a unity government may be a long one. But for supporters of the two-state solution, this recent development should be regarded as an opportunity rather than a threat.

The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is one of the largest obstacles to the two-state solution. Even the Israeli peace camp cannot provide a convincing explanation of how a final-status agreement can be implemented with only the West Bank on board.

This obstacle was evident during the Annapolis peace process in 2007-2008. At the time, the parties acknowledged that given the Palestinian split, the most realistic goal was merely to reach a “shelf agreement” that would not be implemented until a later stage in the process.

The situation looks similar this time around. The current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were launched with the ambitious goal of reaching a two-state solution. Alas, recent statements from Washington are introducing a much more modest goal: either a framework for a final-status agreement or an agreement to be implemented in phases.

At this year’s Saban Forum, U.S. President Barack Obama was asked whether peace is possible when the Palestinian people are not united. His response was that if “we can create a pathway to peace, even if initially it’s restricted to the West Bank,” then the Palestinians in Gaza will also want to enjoy its benefits.

הפוסט Israel Should Support Palestinian Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the wake of these elections, originally scheduled for 2011 yet postponed due to political infighting, several storylines emerged:

The Hamas-Fatah rift is widening

Hamas — which has run Gaza since it split following the last round of elections in 2006 and 2007 — officially boycotted the elections, shunning candidates from running in the West Bank and barring any polling centers in Gaza. The elections elicited a trading of barbs between the two parties, with the Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum, asking to “end this disgrace.” Saeb Erekat, the long-entrenched strongman of Fatah, responded that “Hamas cannot have a veto on democracy.”

Fatah and Hamas have long made public overtures for reconciliation, meeting in Cairo in 2011 and then in Doha in April. Yet their plans for hosting these municipal elections together stalled, and the agreement broke down. Indeed, the 2010 elections were cancelled and the 2011 elections postponed due to the rift between the two parties, as the Palestinian Central Elections Committee blamed the political divide as the primary obstacle to holding the elections.

It is unlikely that Saturday’s Fatah-led elections did anything to bridge the divide between the two parties; in fact, the tone from senior officials suggest the rift will only widen. Salam Fayyad, the polarizing Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA), told Ma’an News, “It’s time to get over the split. It was a complicated election but there shouldn’t be any excuses to prevent it going ahead. Hamas will be responsible politically and ethically for preventing people from voting and must be judged for that.”

Fatah’s strength is waning

Despite being the party with the most financial and political resources, Fatah did not claim the sweeping victory it had hoped for on Saturday, winning in just five of the 11 main districts. Showing the political infighting that has plagued the party for years, many cities saw former Fatah party members running independently against the party. After the polls closed, Fatah controlled the seats in cities such as Hebron, Tulkarem and Jericho, yet lost control in Ramallah, Nablus, and Jenin.

Fatah officials had hoped that the elections would show a unified support base in the face of its rival, Hamas, yet what appeared Saturday was a party feeling the repercussions of years of stalled peace process efforts, financial crises, and internal bickering.

High levels of apathy among Palestinians

The elections on Saturday yielded relatively low voter turnout. Despite being the first elections since 2006, where voter turnout was roughly 75 percent, these elections drew out just 54 percent, according to the Central Elections Committee. The drop in participation can be attributed to a couple of factors, most notably the well-documented disillusionment and apathy of the Palestinian voter.

Yet it’s worth noting that the drop in these numbers is comparable with the drop in U.S. voter turnout between a presidential and congressional election. In 2008, U.S. voter turnout was 57 percent, while in 2010 it fell to 38 percent. In short: Are Palestinians disillusioned and apathetic towards the democratic process? Yes. Is it normal to have a drop-off in voter turnout between presidential and municipal elections? Yes. And, coincidentally, does the PA still have a higher voter turnout than the U.S. in its elections? Yes.

In the long run, without an effective central government or any measurable progress in negotiations with the Israeli government, the Palestinian municipal elections may not have a significant impact on the political gridlock. Yet in a region currently witnessing the sometimes-violent emergence of democracies, the Palestinians are quick to note their veteran status. As vocalized by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose own term expired in 2009 with no new presidential elections in sight: “We hope we will be regarded by our brothers in Gaza and everywhere in the Arab world as the ones who first embarked upon democracy, and we continue on this path and we hope everyone will follow us.”

(originally published in The Atlantic)

הפוסט 3 Key Takeaways From This Week’s Palestinian Elections הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Impressions from Meetings with Palestinian Officials from the West Bank, October 2011 

At the beginning of October, prior to the Gilead Shalit prisoners swap deal, representatives of Mitvim participated in meetings with a series of key Palestinian figures from Ramallah and Nablus. The meetings were conducted in cooperation with Ronnie Shaked, from Yediot Aharonot and the Hebrew University’s Truman Institute, and focused on the implications of the Palestinian UN statehood bid of September 2011. This paper summarizes the main points that were raised in the aforementioned meetings. These points do not represent official positions and should not be attributed to all Palestinians; however, they do provide a glimpse into the current state of mind of Palestinian officials from the West Bank.

Abu Mazen returned victorious from the UN, despite the Israeli perception that the Palestinians had lost at the UN. The request for UN recognition of a Palestinian state, Abu Mazen’s speech, and his willingness to confront the United States, were all perceived at the time as major events within the Palestinian national struggle. They sparked a surge in Abu Mazen’s popularity on the ground. The Palestinian Authority held celebrations in parallel to the UN General Assembly, and Abu Mazen was portrayed as a national hero.

Abu Mazen is aware of his power. Despite the continued and repeated rumors regarding retirement from the political sphere, Abu Mazen has not appointed or trained any successors and has limited the power of the younger generation. He is focused on working towards the creation of his own legacy. Abu Mazen knows that he does not have a replacement at the moment, and that his only replacement could be Hamas, which remains unwanted by the United States, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Therefore, he allows himself to adopt a “take it or I leave” approach. Abu Mazen is aware that there is no desire for Hamas to take his place and therefore, various domestic and international actors will eventually accept the policies that he chooses to pursue.

Abu Mazen creates a new ethos, one that stands for non-violence. Abu Mazen has chosen a non-violent political struggle as his strategy and has taken steps to change the ethos of Arafat’s battle. This new policy emphasizes the Palestinian intentions to end the Occupation and acquire a state within the 1967 borders, without violent confrontation with Israel. The new approach is supported by most of Fateh’s figureheads and members. The level of support it enjoys among the Palestinian people, specifically the young generation, is unclear. The choice to follow the non-violent path contributes to a positive self-image among Palestinians, some of whom have compared themselves to India and Gandhi. This approach is perceived as a step that safeguards the Palestinian national interests and increases international support for the Palestinians and their struggle. It appears that in the meantime this is just a tactic, one which has not yet uprooted the ethos of the violent struggle. If they feel helpless or if they think there is a more beneficial path, it seems that the Palestinians will be ready to change course once again. .

The Palestinians feel that they are ready for and deserve a state. Abu Mazen rehabilitated the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) – the economy, the security, and the institutions. The Palestinians feel better about themselves than they have in the past. They are on the road to progress, taking initiative and promoting actions in the international arena. The Palestinians have achieved support (Turkey provided legal advice to the PNA prior to the UN bid) and highlight their readiness for their own state. Nablus, for example, was previously marked by instability and security chaos, whereas today the situation is totally different. The city has developed immensely: economic progress, stability, and civil order. Unemployment has dropped from 65% to 11%, tourism is beginning to pick up and more tourism plans are being created, there is commercial and real estate development, restaurants are opening up, a stock exchange is operating, and more. There is security cooperation with Israel, which everyone is aware of (also in regards to Joseph’s Tomb, which was refurbished by the PNA), and that has brought to the removal of checkpoints around the city and to increased freedom of movement.

First a state, then a permanent status agreement. It seems that today’s Palestinian discourse is focused on the establishment of a state and not on the achievement of a permanent status agreement, or a peace agreement with Israel. There is a lack of faith in the ability to negotiate with the Netanyahu Government. There is an operative plan for diplomatic progress towards statehood and a belief that it will be better (for Israel as well) to negotiate a permanent status agreement on a state-to-state level. It may then be easier for the Palestinians to make compromises on sensitive issues. At the same time, there is an understanding that the parameters of a future peace agreement, based on the 1967 lines, are already more or less known, that it will be possible to eventually reach an agreement on all core issues, and that should Israel adopt a pro-peace policy that a final status agreement can be achieved also before the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Following the UN General Assembly, the Palestinians are patient and realistic. The Palestinians do not expect that a state will be established tomorrow. They understand that there is a long road ahead, and they declare that they possess a great amount of patience. They point out that several states (including Israel) have turned to the UN multiple times until they were accepted as members, and the Palestinians plan to do the same. If America will use their veto, the Palestinians plan to submit another application, and so on and so forth, until they are accepted. They believe that this is an historical process that cannot be stopped and that September 2011 marked the beginning of a new era in the Palestinian political struggle. The Palestinians believe that momentum is on their side and they are not afraid of a political confrontation with Israel or the United Sates. They plan to maintain their tactic of turning to the international community and conducting a diplomatic struggle in parallel to non-violent protests. They feel that they have nothing to lose.

An international Intifada, not a Palestinian one. The Palestinians paid a heavy toll during the second Intifada and they are not searching for another round of violence. They believe that the UN bid will benefit them far more than another Intifada and that the Israelis are afraid of a third Intifada, regardless of the fact that Palestinian leaders have discounted this possibility. In fact, no significant violent confrontations broke out in September. Instead of Palestinians launching an Intifada against Israel, the World is doing it for them. Israel finds itself increasingly isolated by the international community and is losing support among the countries of the region (Turkey and Egypt) as well as among its allies in the West.

There is no point in negotiating with Netanyahu’s Government. Two years ago, Fateh’s convention concluded that there is no possibility of reaching an agreement with the current Israeli government and that the Palestinian struggle for statehood should thus be conducted in the international arena. The Palestinians do not have any faith in Netanyahu and they view his policy proposals as a right-wing political battle with Lieberman. The Palestinians feel that there is no reason to negotiate just for the sake of negotiations. They are waiting for the Israeli Government to say what it wants and to make clear where it is heading to. It hasn’t happened yet.

There are alternatives, and they are less desirable for Israel. If no progress is made in the Palestinian bid for statehood, and if there is no progress in negotiations, then the two-state solution will become less popular among Palestinians. They have warned that Abu Mazen may decide to dismantle the PNA and promote the call for one-state. If Israel will push the Palestinians into a corner, a violent confrontation is not unlikely. It may start with demonstrations similar to those of the Arab Spring – perhaps with organized marches on Fridays towards the fence. The Palestinians feel that Israel is trying to force them into an alliance with Iran, despite the fact that the Palestinians oppose Iranian and Shi’ite attempts to meddle in the politics of the region. However, some said that if all other doors close, then the Palestinians might even decide to “deal with the devil”.

The problem is Israel, and Israel is at a disadvantage. Israel does not understand the changes that are happening around it. These changes are serving Palestinian interests, and not the Israeli ones. Israel is losing friends in the region and is no longer a central figure in determining regional processes. The question is not how much patience the Palestinians have before they turn to violence, but how much time Israel will wait before promoting a solution to the conflict. The deterioration is within Israel. Israel is changing from a liberal society to a less democratic and zealous society. It finds itself increasingly isolated internationally. Today there is no Palestinian leader that can be labeled an obstacle to peace. There is no Palestinian terror. The problem is Israel. There is terrorism from the settlers, which Israel does not control. The settlers are the ones that will destroy Israel and cause a violent explosion. The Palestinians do not understand how it is possible that Israel has refrained from halting the settler violence. Israel does not need to be afraid of a Palestinian state. It should be concerned from Iran. The solution to the Palestinian problem will first and foremost serve Israel, and will improve its regional and global standing. The establishment of a Palestinian state is in Israel’s interest, and there is a belief that about half of the Israeli public understands it, in contrast to the Israeli government’s policies.

The road to Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still long. Some believe that the Fateh-Hamas crisis is temporary, that the reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo will soon be implemented, that democratic elections are near, and that the division between the West Bank and Gaza is not really an obstacle to peace (based on claims that Khaled Mashal respects Abu Mazen’s non-violence policy, and declared that he will accept a final status agreement brought forth by Abu Mazen). Nevertheless, there is an understanding that without including Gaza it will not be possible to implement any Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and that the true Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still far away. The Palestinian people want Palestinian unity and it is possible that they will take to the streets to promote this desire. Abu Mazen is working to maintain Fateh’s power in Gaza, and does so through paying salaries to approximately 60,000 Gaza residents every month without them actually working. A majority of Abu Mazen’s budget is transferred to the Gaza Strip. Fateh believes that it is currently more popular in Gaza than Hamas, and would have gained a majority there should elections take place today. During Abu Mazen’s speech at the UN, Hamas did not allow rallies in support of him. They also threatened to shoot anyone that would demonstrate. Fateh instructed their supporters in Gaza to stay home. They did not want to agitate the situation.

In contrast, Hamas is perceived as being strong in the West Bank. It is allowed to act there as a political organization as long as it operates according to PNA law. Fateh does not directly oppose Hamas (Abu Mazen even met Hamas leaders from Nablus), but it does work to erode Hamas’ power. For example, all of Hamas’ welfare institutions in the West Bank were transferred to the PNA, which currently provides the West Bank residents’ social needs. Fateh has a dilemma in the West Bank, which impacts their ability to gain popularity over Hamas. Fateh veterans that used to be among Israel’s “most wanted” and were responsible for many terror attacks, are now looked at by the younger generation as corrupt officials that drive luxury cars and enjoy VIP permits to enter Israel. The youth are not aware of the militant past of these people, and the Fateh veterans cannot boast about their past because it will not be accepted by the Israelis with whom they cooperate today.

הפוסט Continuing on the Path to Statehood: The Palestinians Following their Septmember 2011 UN Bid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.