הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the current Israeli government’s stated intention to annex parts of the West Bank illustrates the potential for folly, as historian Barbara Tuchman aptly described in her excellent book The March of Folly. In order to define a decision as unwise, according to Tuchman, it must appear so in real time rather than hindsight. Such is the case of the annexation idea, which not only risks Israel’s interests vis-à-vis the Palestinians, Arab states, the European Union and even the United States, it also risks creating a lamentable and irrevocable situation.

In 1969, shortly after the Six Day War and the PLO’s takeover by the Fatah movement headed by Yasser Arafat, the organization adopted the idea of establishing a democratic, secular state of Muslims, Jews and Christians in Palestine. The Jews perceived the plan, rightly so, as a recipe for Israel’s annihilation, and all the Zionist parties rejected it. Slightly over 50 years later, Israel is moving slowly – and if annexation occurs, swiftly – toward the creation of one state, albeit neither secular nor democratic. In other words, a more radical version of the plan categorically rejected a half century ago is about to be adopted by the government and public without serious discussion. Already in 1986, former Military Intelligence chief and Middle East scholar Yehoshafat Harkabi warned in his book Israel’s Fateful Hour that annexation “would bring about implementation of the PLO’s idea for a democratic Palestinian state.”

SO HOW did we get to this point?

Israel’s political system is based on coalition governments (often with a small majority) that prefer to avoid critical decisions, especially controversial ones, in order to preserve their rule.

Since their capture in 1967, the occupied territories, and especially the West Bank, have been a divisive issue among proponents and opponents of Jewish settlement there. The resulting status quo policy de facto sanctioned the creeping takeover of lands, although no government has ever approved a strategic decision to settle or annex the West Bank. Even the Alon Plan, issued in the days of the Labor Party government, remained unofficial policy. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, there was never a conspiratorial plan to settle the West Bank or annex it. Nonetheless, the absence of a clear governmental policy and the determination of the settlers – encouraged by certain governments or ministers – lulled the international community, as well as most Israeli Jews, who oppose this policy, into complacency.

Division of the Land of Israel (Palestine) has always been the widely accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A series of partition plans has been proposed since 1937, each giving the Palestinians less than the previous one. The 2020 Trump plan goes as far as to deprive the Palestinians of one-third of the land promised to them in the Oslo Accords, which in themselves included less than 22% of the territory of Mandatory Palestine. The Trump plan is largely a mirror image of the 1937 British Peel Commission plan, which provided only 15% of Mandatory Palestine for the establishment of a Jewish state. Both sides, as we know, rejected the plan.

Over 80 years after the partition idea was first broached, Israel is purposely and adamantly working to bury it. Annexation of parts of the West Bank – whether of a few percent of the area (only the settlements), 17% (the Jordan Valley) or the entire 30% allocated under the Trump blueprint – means that Israel is in effect destroying the two-state option.

EVENTUALLY, THE annexation plan may not pan out, for a variety of reasons. First, US insistence on implementation of the Trump plan along with the annexation – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state in the remaining parts of the West Bank. Second, the vehement opposition of the EU, including Israel’s friends, and Germany chief among them. During his June 10 visit to Israel, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas expressed his country’s objections and those of other European states. Finally, there is the settlers’ rejection of the price they would have to pay for Israeli sovereignty – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Yet Netanyahu, who will not want to violate his annexation pledge, especially as he is immersed in his trial, could push for a mini-annexation, attesting to his determination but also to his responsibility as a leader attentive to criticism. Such a decision could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, leaving annexation advocates unsatisfied and opponents viewing it as an aggressive and threatening move, requiring response.

However, even if the Israeli government, as Eban remarked, eventually makes a rational decision and avoids annexation, the conclusion will invariably be that Israel does not want a Palestinian state. Pulling back from annexation would not mean that Israel truly wants to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians, but that circumstances and pressure forced it to do so. In other words, avoiding a small foolish move (annexation) cannot change the larger folly of continued occupation of the West Bank.

Most Israelis are oblivious to what goes on in the territories. In fact, most do not consider the annexation a key issue. According to a poll commissioned by the Two-State Coalition, only 3.5% of respondents believed annexation should be one of the two main issues on the government’s agenda. However, those who favored annexation said they supported it even at the cost of undermining Israel’s peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt (60%) and escalating terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians (43.5%). These findings should serve as an alarming warning because annexation is not worth such repercussions.

The only good news to come out of the annexation crisis is the renewed discourse about the future of the occupied territories. From now on, the debate should focus on resolution of the Palestinian problem. Most of the experts dealing with these issues in civil society and academic circles keep insisting on the urgency of dealing with the Palestinian problem, so why is no one listening?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Avoiding a small annexation will not prevent the larger occupation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Relations with Arab states

1. Israel is interested in bolstering the peace with Jordan and Egypt and achieving peace with additional Arab states in order to normalize relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. Arab leaders are invited to visit Israel.

2. Israel’s relations with Arab states should extend beyond the clandestine, security realm to include open diplomatic, economic and civilian cooperation.

3. Israel attaches importance to the thrice-endorsed 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and welcomes the willingness of Arab states to consistently ratify it over time. Israel views the proposal as an opportunity to promote negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel is also interested in launching a regional peace process with the involvement of both Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

4. Israel believes Arab states could play a significant role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such peace would also provide significant opportunities to fulfill the potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Israel calls for a regional conference to relaunch the peace process.

5. Israel seeks to cooperate with Arab states on people-to-people projects that could change negative attitudes and forge links of peace. Israel seeks to contribute its know-how in the fields of hydrology, climate, renewable energy and security for the benefit of the Arab states and their inhabitants.

6. Israel believes its unique geopolitical location enables it to assume a significant role in furthering connections and cooperation between Europe and the Middle East. This is already happening in the Eastern Mediterranean, and should be broadened into wide-ranging, institutionalized multi-regional cooperation beneficial to both Israel and Arab states.

7. Israel will give top priority to restoring relations with Jordan and trust with King Abdullah. These relations are of supreme strategic importance and must be bolstered and developed. Israel recognizes Jordan’s special status vis-à-vis Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. It will work to advance new joint projects with Jordan, fulfill past commitments and is ready to help Jordan deal with the refugee challenge and with threats of terrorism.

8. Israel recognizes Egypt’s key regional importance and the vital role it plays in promoting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and preventing escalation between Israel and Gaza. Israel welcomes the growing cooperation with Egypt on natural gas, and will also invest efforts in promoting civilian ties with Egypt. First off, Israel will immediately appoint a new ambassador to Egypt following a lengthy hiatus during which the position was not staffed.

Relations with the Palestinians

1. Israel is interested in peace with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution and will take steps to advance it. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only reaching an arrangement with Gaza, is a top priority for Israel.

2. Israel is extending its hand to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in a bid to renew dialogue and the peace process and is interested in creating a direct channel between leaders and top officials. Israel also attaches importance to promoting ties and dialogue between the two peoples and building mutual respect and trust.

3. Israel does not want the PA’s collapse. It views the PA as a partner for negotiations and a key partner in resolving the situation in Gaza. Israel chooses to engage with the PA, which recognizes it, rather than with Hamas, which rejects its right to exist.

4. Israel is interested in continuing coordination with the PA to prevent security deterioration and addressing joint challenges and opportunities in other fields. Israel will support the PA’s efforts to unite the West Bank and Gaza Strip into one Palestinian entity under its leadership and to hold elections.

5. Israel pledges to help improve living conditions for the Palestinians, not as an alternative to a diplomatic solution but out of a moral-humanitarian commitment. Israel calls on the international community to contribute to this effort as well as to diplomatic efforts to advance peace.

6. Israel is willing to enable the planned construction in Kalkilya to accommodate natural population growth, to avoid demolishing houses and public facilities in east Jerusalem and Area C, to increase the number of work permits for Palestinians, and ease freedom of movement and the transfer of taxes it collects on behalf of the PA.

7. Israel appreciates the efforts invested by the US administration in formulating its vision of peace, but emphasizes that resolution of the conflict must stem from direct negotiations between the sides, with regional and international involvement, taking into consideration the needs and aspirations of both sides to the conflict.

8. Israel will not undertake unilateral annexation measures in the territories. It will freeze construction in the settlements that risks the feasibility of the two-state solution and will preserve the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Relations with Europe

1. Israel wishes to turn the page on its relationship with the European Union. Israel regards the EU as a friend and partner with which it shares common values and wants to deepen and expand diverse and positive cooperation.

2. Israel will continue promoting bilateral relations with EU member states, viewing them as an effective tool to influence decision-making in Brussels. However, it will not take advantage of such moves to undermine the EU and deepen its internal divisions.

3. As a state committed to the values of liberal democracy, Israel attaches great importance to a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and will prioritize ties with European states that share those same values.

4. Israel will continue to criticize EU measures that it opposes, but will do so through open, honest dialogue and in as positive a climate as possible. The new government will cease the harsh rhetoric and incitement against the EU and express its criticism in a professional manner.

5. Israel will continue to boost its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and promote additional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the formation of regional frameworks with the participation of European and Arab states, and restoration of relations with Turkey to ambassadorial level.

6. Israel extends an invitation to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for an official visit. Israel’s foreign minister will conduct an official visit to Europe, during which he will seek to meet with EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

7. Israel seeks to renew the high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012, in order to update old agreements and discuss new ones.

8. Israel welcomes the 2013 European proposal of upgrading Israel-EU relations to the level of a Special Privileged Partnership once Israeli-Palestinian peace is achieved, and is interested in launching a dialogue on the proposal’s potential content.

9. Israel values the EU’s support for advancement of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation through civil society organizations and other channels and its efforts to promote peace and democracy in the region.

10. Israel would like to inform the EU that it seeks the renewal of the peace process with the Palestinians and will avoid unilateral steps that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Initial policy recommendations for Foreign Minister Ashkenazi – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Now Is the Time for an Israeli Diplomatic Initiative, Not Annexation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The recording of the conference can be watched here. 

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Challenges and Opportunities for Gaza: A Mediterranean Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To read the full document, click here

(Originally published in the Palestine-Israel Journal)

הפוסט Beyond the Trump Plan: How Can the International Community Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Economy in US Efforts to Promote Israeli-Arab Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious.

The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Coronavirus crisis will pass. Humanity will eventually develop a vaccine and find the way to eradicate the virus or develop immunity to the pathogen. The global economy will be hard hit, as will ours, but will recover. The State of Israel is blessed with unusually creative forces that will eventually lead it out of the economic crisis stronger, more resilient and with greater prominence on the world stage.

On the other hand, the danger of annexation is irreversible – it will wipe out the Palestinian Authority and its life-saving security coordination with Israel, boost radical Palestinian forces and pose a real threat to one of Israel’s major strategic assets, the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. Annexation will finalize the divorce between Israel and the US Democratic Party and deepen the alienation of the liberal progressive majority in the most important country in the world and Israel’s greatest ally.

Annexation will push away the majority of the US Jewish community and alienate most Diaspora Jewry, dealing a fatal blow to our existence as the nation state of the Jewish people. Europe, Israel’s most important trade partner, will lose interest in ties with a state that perpetuates occupation. The claim that the occupation was thrust upon us and cannot be ended absent a partner on the other side will shatter. Pro-Western Arab states with which we have a strategic partnership against Iran, ISIS and al-Qaida, will be unable to withstand popular pressure and growing hatred of Israel for burying prospects of a solution to the Palestinian issue, which continues to be a festering sore in the Muslim Arab world. The option of a bilateral solution will disappear and the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be dealt with by the International Criminal Court in The Hague and by the forces of BDS in civil society.

Yes, a number of friends will stand by our side – mostly members of the racist, populist alliance affiliated with the traditional anti-Semitic camp, which supports us now only because at this point in history they see Islam and Middle Eastern refugees as a greater threat to their ethnic purity than the Jews. Yes, on this holiday celebrating our freedom, we will be making a decision pushing us irrevocably into the camp of those leaders who do not believe in freedom and minority rights.

The tragedy is magnified further by the fact that those making possible this coalition agreement are people who understand the threat, who support the two-state solution and who are about to sacrifice it on the altar of the manipulated Corona emergency. In the spirit of the Passover holiday that we just celebrated – they could have placed the sovereignty issue at the top of the agenda where it deserves to be (“dayenu” – as we sing in the Seder, it would have been enough), but they did not. They could have refused to join the government to avoid legitimizing the annexation (“dayenu”, it would have been enough), but they did not. They could have taken advantage of the majority of Knesset members they had on their side to prevent the formation of this government (“dayenu”, it would have been enough), but they did not.

To draw a parallel to the four sons described in the Passover Haggadah, regrettably, the political simpletons hooked up with the wicked sons who are bent on eradicating the vision of the Declaration of Independence, rather than joining the wise sons who favor a liberal alliance consisting of minorities of all stripes. That is how we arrived at this point in time that threatens our liberty even after marking the holiday of freedom and threatening the Zionist vision when we are about to mark our independence.

הפוסט This Day of Independence, We Are in Danger of Risking the Zionist Dream הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the 1990s, Qatar was one of the first Arab states to open a diplomatic mission in Israel and allow Israel to open a commercial office on its territory. With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, relations were suspended, and even when operations of the Israeli trade office were resumed in Qatar in the mid-2000s and when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni conducted an official visit to Qatar, relations were no longer the same. Qatari media adopted a harsh and highly critical tone on Israel, and the regime feared warmer ties would undermine the united Arab stance against normalization with Israel absent an IsraeliPalestinian agreement. In the days of the Arab Spring, Qatar openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and significantly strengthened its links with Turkey, further exacerbating the distrust between Jerusalem and Doha.

The opportunity to improve Israel-Qatar relations arose, of all times, at the height of Israel’s deep crisis with the Gaza Strip. A strange deal was forged between Hamas – a number of whose leaders were being hosted by Qatar after leaving Syria during the civil war, the Qatari regime – which sought to extricate itself from regional isolation and improve its image in Washington, and Israel – which needed a mediator to restore calm and help alleviate the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Leaders in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were likely displeased with the arrangement. Egyptian and Gulf media devoted extensive coverage to news of a rare visit by the head of the Mossad to Doha in February 2020, as revealed by Yisrael Beitenu party Chair Avigdor Liberman, wondering whether Israel was seeking closer ties with Qatar. So far, this pragmatic cooperation between Israel and Qatar, based on the shared interests of all parties involved, has not undermined Israel’s growing rapprochement with other Sunni states.

Nonetheless, by allowing Qatar to play an increasingly significant role in the Gaza Strip, is Israel developing a dependence on the emirate and subsuming reality in the territories to Doha’s wishes? For now, there is no alternative to the Qatari funds keeping the heads of Gaza’s residents above water. However, it is important to realize that this money also perpetuates Hamas’ rule in Gaza, deepens the Islamist movement’s entrenchment in its unyielding attitude toward reconciliation with Fatah and, in fact, undermines domestic Palestinian unity. The Netanyahu government apparently believes that its current “divide and rule” policy serves it well. That explains why Israel has not returned to the negotiating table. Netanyahu believes that the Palestinian issue is no longer on the agenda and that relations with most Arab states can be advanced even without negotiations and compromises.

Reality proves the opposite. Israel is not an island, nor a villa encircled by walls in the middle of the jungle. Israel needs cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in order to advance its interests in the region. The Palestinian issue remains on the table and the absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still hampers establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of partnerships between Israel and most states in the Arab and Muslim world. Visits by Israeli athletes and diplomats in the Gulf are nice to have, but the potential for cooperation with the Gulf States, as well as with Israel’s immediate neighbors Egypt and Jordan, is far greater.

Israel needs a broad regional policy to guide it and enable the promotion of its interests not only in the short term, but in the long one, too. Relations with Doha are possible to have, but Israel must be cautious and approach them with its eyes wide open, given that Qatar’s foreign policy contradicts what Israel believes and would like to see in the Middle East. The Qatari gifts carry a price tag: Aid for Gaza is not just aid for Gaza – it is also a contribution to strengthening the regional Islamist alliance (Qatar-Turkey-Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya), and only a temporary solution to Gaza’s distress. Gaza does not require band aids. What is required is a complex and comprehensive solution, in coordination with regional states that are confronting Islamist terrorism, which will also eventually provide a channel for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar Focus on Shared Interests, Setting Aside Differences הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article examines the current Israel-Morocco cooperation and its development through 2019. It briefly describes developments in diplomatic, security, economic and civilian arenas in order to find common ground and identify trends. Naturally, the paper will not elaborate much on the security-intelligence aspect of the cooperation, despite its centrality, due to its classified nature

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Cooperation in 2019: Warming from the Bottom Up הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Instead of dealing with foreign policy and diplomacy, Israel has over the years developed a narrow and pessimistic concept of national security, which consists of providing military intelligence responses to specific security threats, but lacks a pro-active diplomatic approach. Military-defense thinking is undeniably of paramount importance to Israel’s existence and security, and preparing the IDF and other defense agencies for the many challenges they face is a critical issue, indeed. However, every state has at its disposal a potential array of diplomatic assets that are no less essential, and sometimes even more so, to shaping its national security. Foreign policy is not designed to complement military policy, on the contrary. Military strategy is supposed to be a derivative of foreign policy goals driven, first and foremost, by the desire to forge alliances, agreements and normalization based on a broad complex of international relations in order to preclude clashes and wars.

Israel’s aversion to formulating a comprehensive and integrative diplomatic strategy over the past decade is a mistake, at best, and neglect of its national security needs, at worst. The leadership must shift course and place Israeli foreign policy on a pro-active path, replacing the ad hoc measures of “putting out fires” characterized by passiveness and pessimism to which we have grown accustomed over the past decade. The next government must break out of this foreign policy bunker and emerge into the sunlight and fresh air. Israel is crying out for a strategy that would allow it to achieve regional diplomatic arrangements, to exist within sovereign, permanent borders as a Jewish and democratic state with a distinct Jewish majority, without ruling over another people – while enjoying recognition by most countries of the world and full normalization of relations with them.

The existing Israeli paradigm is illustrated, for example, in the issue of the Gaza Strip’s future. Israel has adopted an essentially military strategy on Gaza and its Hamas rulers, manifested in localized management of the conflict and preservation of the current situation. However, leaders are elected to strive for change and shape a better and more promising future for their country in a responsible and sober manner.

To that end, Israel’s military strategy vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza is insufficient; a distinct foreign policy strategy is required. After all, the Gaza issue has clear regional and global aspects, mainly as regards the humanitarian crisis afflicting the enclave and prospects of infrastructure and financial development and reconstruction using international state and institutional aid.

That is why Israel must define the broad, regional vision to which it aspires. A vision that includes normalization in the Middle East and neighborly relations with a demilitarized Palestinian state would create a context within which Israel could shape policy on various regional issues, including Gaza. However, the road to that goal invariably entails a diplomatic initiative, not a military one.

Various arrangements and mobilization of foreign aid for regional development, including of Gaza, must be set in motion. Within the framework of such broad, diplomatic activity, a determined Israeli initiative is required to renew the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority, giving full consideration to Israel’s security needs. Broader and more comprehensive diplomacy is also required to provide an overarching framework for the whole process: An Israeli initiative for regional negotiations that would include, in addition to the Palestinians, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and the Arab League. Participants would commit to shouldering the burden involved in weakening Hamas and rebuilding Gaza, with the help of the international community. To that end, Israel’s political leadership must first commit to preserving and protecting Israel’s future existence as a Jewish and democratic state. That means striving for separation from the Palestinians with all the attendant diplomatic implications, and ensuring Israel’s security interests and needs, both during negotiations and after an arrangement is reached. There is no guarantee of the strategy’s success, because its implementation depends on additional elements. However, its very adoption and the shift from a passive, reactive policy to initiatives on long-term solutions would benefit Israel in public diplomacy and in presenting its case in the international arena, while safeguarding its security and avoiding significant military concessions. Nothing will change as long as Israel continues to adopt a military-defense strategy without any vision or diplomatic initiative, precludes positive change on the ground, lacks sufficient international legitimization for security activity Israel undertakes, and perpetuates the current stagnation with the Palestinians.

In the coming years, Israel should advance a comprehensive regional agreement under the auspices of the US and other international players, which takes into consideration Israel’s essential, long-term security needs; promote a move to separate from the Palestinians in the context of two independent states and as part of the regional agreement; help reconstruct Gaza, as part of an agreement with the Palestinians and with the support of the international community (including Arab states); develop a public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy in case an agreement with the Palestinians will not be feasible even after Israel makes an effort to achieve one; adopt a “carrot and stick” diplomatic strategy that includes potential deterrence and incentives vis-à-vis significant regional powers, mainly Iran and Turkey; restore bipartisan American support for Israel, taking into account the changes in US politics and society, including within the Jewish community there; work to consolidate Israel’s relations with current and emerging global powers, such as Russia, China and India.

A compelling, relevant foreign policy approach must be developed as a key layer of Israel’s national security. At the same time, it is vital for Israel’s next government to rehabilitate and strengthen Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Israel Needs a Diplomatic Strategy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A research paper that was written on the subject in 2018, in the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab states, outlined how the UAE and Israel cooperate in four central areas: diplomacy, security, economy, and civilian affairs. The paper concluded that, at the date of its publication, there was a large and diverse array of partnerships in the economic sector. The paper also pointed to the fact that most of these partnerships are founded on ad hoc interests and temporary opportunities, and therefore the relationship between the countries cannot be described as consistent or deep. The majority of these collaborations are characterized by secrecy, due to the lack of formal relations or normalization between the UAE and Israel. At the same time, collaborations that take place in international platforms benefit from a higher level of legitimacy and exposure. Examples of this include the joint air force exercises of the two countries together with Greece, Italy, and the US; Israeli athletes’ participation in sporting events that take place in the UAE; and the gatherings of statespersons in various international fora that take place in the UAE. Most of these collaborations stem from the UAE’s desire to expand its role in the international community, and its wish to serve as a hub for international events and conferences. Within this framework, relations between the UAE and Israel have been tested a number of times in recent years, and were eventually strengthened, following the gradual removal of obstacles by the Emiratis.

In 2019, a series of events sharpened the UAE’s focus and priorities: the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen and its efforts to stabilize Yemen’s political system; its involvement in multiple regions, such as Libya and the Horn of Africa; the rising tensions around violent events in the Gulf and the diplomatic measures that the UAE took to pacify Iran; the ongoing crisis with Qatar; and the UAE’s focus on domestic issues, such as the Federal National Council’s elections and efforts to expand local workforce in the labor market. These changes of focus led, inter alia, to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in the UAE’s foreign affairs during the last year. The UAE’s involvement in the Palestinian arena was, in the last year, rather distant and symbolic, with continued humanitarian aid via UNRWA and the support of Mohammad Dahlan (believed to be a protege of Mohammed bin Zayed and the UAE’s main channel to the Palestinians). Additionally, the enduring participation of the Palestinian Nusseibeh family in senior positions in the UAE (Zaki Nusseibeh as a government minister, and his daughter Lana Nusseibeh as Permanent Representative to the UN) serves as another manifestation of the UAE’s solidarity with the Palestinians, though in their own territory.

The rather marginalization of the Palestinian issue was also manifested in a significant decline in statements of support for the Palestinian cause, and in decreased concrete involvement (or involvement attempts) in this arena by the UAE. The extent of the UAE’s support and commitment to the national struggle of the Palestinians is in dispute between researchers and policymakers. Though the decline in the UAE’s active involvement in the Palestinian issue does not necessarily attest to a decline in its commitment to the Palestinians. It may be attributed to its inability to exert influence in the Palestinian arena or to the increasing rapprochement between the UAE and Israel. The first aspect can be linked to the important role of Qatar and Egypt in the Gaza Strip, which restricts Dahlan and the UAE’s ability to exert influence in this arena except in unique cases, such as the months following the Qatar crisis in June 2017.

Turning to the second aspect, simultaneously and in contrast with moving away from the Palestinian arena, the UAE has shown greater openness to Israel and Israeli and Jewish audiences this past year. 2019 was characterized by improved informal relations between the countries, and these collaborations increased and became more diverse. The UAE’s decision to allow Israel to participate in Expo 2020 starting October of this year has become the driving force in shaping direct relations between the countries, and continues to shape them in various areas.

This paper examines existing cooperation between Israel and the UAE, and the changes that have taken place in the relations throughout 2019. The paper assesses these changes in four main areas: diplomacy, security, economy and civilian affairs, and briefly describes the main developments in each area in order to point to common denominators and indicate key trends.

הפוסט Israel-UAE Cooperation in 2019: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Egypt’s international standing as an important regional leader. Egypt’s role as a mediator acceptable to all sides allows it to ensure that the “arrangements” it helps broker serve its own interests as well, including its desire to pursue cooperation with Israel on strategic issues such as security and energy. Addressing the 2019 Herzliya Conference, Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Khaled Azmi expressed his country’s key interest in preserving its stability as a nation-state in the face of regional challenges. He also emphasized the importance of providing a response to the aspirations of millions of young people in the Middle East (where 60% of the population is below the age of 30).

Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven its resilience in the face of changes and shockwaves, and have provided a potential platform for strategic cooperation. However, relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace”. Egypt is unwilling to fully normalize with Israel, despite crucial shared interests, as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. Although this position has become somewhat muted considering the growing defense strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations. A 2018 study that examined existing cooperation between Israel and Egypt pointed to strategic cooperation between the states, as well as cool bilateral relations on all other fronts. This article follows-up and looks at the 2019 developments in the relations.

הפוסט Israel-Egypt Cooperation in 2019: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar: Relations Nurtured by the Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature.

A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank.

Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology.

We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and encourage its non-violent, pro-diplomacy policies. From his first day on the job, Abbas sought agreement, if possible through bilateral negotiations, and if not, by appealing to multinational organizations.

We have turned his attempts at dialogue with Israel into pathetic overtures by continuing to build in the settlements and using negotiations to buy time and create facts on the ground. When the Palestinians tried to achieve their aims by taking multilateral steps, we dubbed their measures “diplomatic terrorism” and exerted pressure on the Americans to block them, even though the same measures – appealing to the UN – gained Israel its own independence.

While Abbas supports a two-state solution and recognition of Israel in its 1967 borders with land swaps, and even accepts the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state, we insist instead on dealing with Hamas, which rejects our existence. Whereas Abbas continues to instruct his security forces to cooperate with the IDF and Shin Bet in foiling terror attacks, and is therefore accused by many Palestinians of collaboration with Israel, we reward Hamas with benefits and payments from Qatar.

A strategic, long-term solution to the Gaza issue is linked to renewal of the diplomatic process with the PA, and to the encouragement of a technocratic unity government in Gaza with which gradual progress can be made on demilitarization and rehabilitation. A long-term solution must be diplomatic. All our previous attempts to create deterrence have taught us that there is no military solution.

We currently have much better Palestinian partners for peace than we had in the past. The terrorist Arafat has been replaced by Abbas, who reviles terrorism; the three “No’s” (no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel) of the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum have been replaced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The key message of that initiative is, “please move ahead with a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian issue so that we can normalize relations with you based on the understanding that Israel could constitute part of the solution to regional problems, rather than the problem itself”.

While all these positive changes were occurring around us, our leaders continued to explain why Israel has no Palestinian partner and to empower Hamas. That is why Israeli discourse keeps going back to the same tactical suggestions that resolve nothing. These solutions only sound logical absent of a strategic alternative. But such an alternative exists and it requires courageous and sober leadership rather than political slogans and hollow clichés.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since 2009, Israeli politics has been largely shaped by one man. By winning consecutive elections and forming consecutive coalitions of various sorts, Netanyahu managed to dominate Israeli politics, prevent potential contenders from standing a chance against him, and be regarded by most Israelis (and by many in the international community) as invincible. It is not by chance that the term “King Bibi” was used on the covers of both Time and Newsweek, and was the title chosen for a documentary film that explored Netanyahu’s rise to power.

For years, Netanyahu had almost total control of his party, successfully maneuvered leaders and voters of other right-wing parties, effectively disempowered opposition from the center and left, shaped the public discourse to his advantage, delegitimized political rivals while polarizing the society, and overall – stirred Israel’s reality to his direction of interest. Time and time again, Israelis went to the polls with no real hope of leadership change. The main open question used to be which type of coalition will Netanyahu form after results are announced.

And then things changed. Corruption investigations that were initially dismissed and brushed off by Netanyahu, picked up pace. From one legal phase to the other, it became evident to Israelis that a major issue is brewing. Netanyahu’s repeated and increasingly harsh attacks on key personnel in the legal establishment, which were aimed at mobilizing his political base and rally his supporters, exemplified just how problematic his situation is. It was anti-corruption slogans that played a leading role in the downfall of the Likud government in 1992 and the victory of Yitzhak Rabin, and Netanyahu seems to have understood the political danger that his legal issues pose to him.

To try and counter that, Netanyahu hastened into early elections (April 2019). His goal was to quickly form a new coalition that will advance legislation protecting him from being indicted while in office. Election results initially indicated that he has succeeded in paving the way for that. His traditional right-wing bloc had the required majority. But a surprise was in the waiting. Former Minister of Defence, Avigdor Lieberman, a nationalist right-wing politician who has been part of Netanyahu’s camp since the 1990s (although episodes of political rivalry), broke ranks. Without Lieberman’s party, Yisrael Beiteinu, Netanyahu did not have a coalition. His efforts to attract centrist/leftist parties to join a “unity government” or even to bring on board a single defector from another party who will give him the necessary majority in parliament – all failed.

In the past, Netanyahu used to carry out such political moves easily. But, due to his corruption allegation, he became a persona non grata among his opponents. They were not willing to enable him to become prime minister again, given his potential downfall and the legislative reforms he sought to advance. Netanyahu was losing ground. As he failed to form a government and went to repeat elections, his image as invincible and as a “political magician” was shattered. Moreover, his image in Israel as “Mr Security” was now effectively challenged by the Blue and White Party leader, Benny Gantz, which featured three ex-IDF Chiefs of Staff on the top of its list.

Netanyahu sought remedy in diplomatic activism. He saw the realm of foreign policy as one in which he has an added value over his contenders. Billboards of him shaking hands with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin appeared all over Israel, portraying him as a mega-diplomat. International visits and meetings were orchestrated for him, and world leaders were willing to grant Netanyahu new diplomatic achievements that he can present as part of his campaign. However, this – like other elements of his campaign – did not prove to be effective. The September 2019 elections showed a decline in votes for the Likud party, and Netanyahu failed again in forming a government, despite the loyalty of his party and ideological bloc (excluding Lieberman).

Towards the March 2019 elections, that tone of the opposition was already more confident. “He just can’t” was the slogan of Blue and White against Netanyahu, referring to his inability to form a coalition. “Netanyahu only cares about himself”, their campaign said, referring to the court case against Netanyahu that will begin just two weeks after the elections, on March 17^th. Even the announcement of the so-called Trump Plan, which was supposed to be the ultimate political gift to Netanyahu towards the elections, was handled by the opposition in a way that did not increase Netanyahu’s popularity in the polls.

It is still not clear which direction the upcoming elections will go. But, Netanyahu’s time in power should be up. His long tenure led him to develop a sense of entitlement to the position, that prevented him from doing – at least until now – what a prime minister accused of bribe should do: announce resignation. The damage to Israeli democracy, state institutions and governance caused by his political and personal conduct is mounting. Israel is paying a heavy price for this. It is a price that drives voters to the polls time and time again. It is also a price that drives many of them to seek a new prime minister.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט The “Netanyahu Factor” Driving Israelis to the Polls הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A new type of peace in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative.

Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today.

Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support.

What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in Israel believe the status quo is not such a bad thing. We live our lives, there is no major violence, and the world seems to be less and less interested in what is happening in this part of the region. But, in fact, nothing can be farther from the truth, as the status quo is nothing but illusion.

Escalation is here already, even if it doesn’t affect daily life of the majority in Israel – yet. In recent weeks there were more attacks, more clashes in Jerusalem, and more desperate and disillusioned young Palestinians that increasingly support the one-state solution.

In fact, a status quo takes us back to the dangers of recent past when the two nations and their leadership lacked communication, understanding, and compromise. While the settlements will grow and the Israelis will be busy annexing segments of West Bank, more and more Palestinians will depart from the two-state solution and opt for one state where they will seek equal political and civil rights. The possibility to separate and draw the border between two warring nations will be lost forever.

Naturally, the Israelis and the Palestinians will be the biggest losers, but the consequences might be quite dangerous for the broader Middle East region, as well. As the situation in Israel and West Bank deteriorates – according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) leaders, it will, barring real progress with negotiations – it inevitably will affect the stability of the West Bank and Jordan, and also damage relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The dream of regional integration, as well as forging a powerful alliance between all those in the region who seek stability and peace will remain just a dream. No positive development between the Palestinians and Israelis will also mean no normalization, integration or advancement of cooperation. We don’t need a status quo, but a reasonable base to resume the negotiations and regional support of the process. The Arab Peace initiative provides this foundation.

Today we have a clear vision of how a partnership in the spheres of technology, trade, tourism and defense might look like between Israel and the Arab states. The only way of getting there is by first taking care of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Whoever emerges as the winner in Israel’s upcoming parliamentary elections will need to focus on two issues: how to prevent the deterioration between Israel and Palestinian Authority, and how to promote Israel’s integration in the region. These two issues are interconnected, and the Arab Peace Initiative should be the key. It’s not too late for that today, however it might be too late tomorrow.

Ksenia Svetlova is a former member of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. Today she serves as Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute and is a senior research analyst at Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya.

(originally published in al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the protracted freeze of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and growing tensions generated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intentions, the Israeli and Palestinian willingness to jointly participate in establishing a new organization is a bright spot not to be taken for granted. The fact that the EMGF includes European and Arab states as full members, as well as the US, EU and other international organizations (such as the World Bank) as observers, further highlights the unique nature of this development.

The underpinning of the new organization is economic, with its members seeking to cooperate in maximizing the energy reserves discovered in the Mediterranean over the past decade. Israel is generally deterred by international groupings, fearing members’ pressure regarding its policy on the Palestinian issue. However, although it initially preferred that the gas forum remain a non-binding body, Israel eventually agreed to its institutional upgrading, probably at Egypt’s behest.

While Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Italy are discussing the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Europe – a project whose economic, technical and diplomatic feasibility is highly doubtful – the new organization positions Egypt as a regional energy hub with its gas liquefaction facilities that enable gas exports to Europe without a pipeline.

The make-up of the current forum is unique, but need not be finite. Lebanon and Turkey are two important regional players currently absent from the EMGF due to disputes and confrontations with forum members. However, in order to realize the cooperation potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the organization should seek to draw them into its ranks in the future. The UN, too, which plays a role in mediation tasks in the Mediterranean region – between Israel and Hamas, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Israel and Lebanon in marking their maritime borders – could also be represented as an observer.

The organization has diplomatic, not just economic, potential, including to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. In recent years, no multinational organizations have been active in this regard. Under the Trump administration, the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) lost whatever limited importance it had beforehand.

French-led efforts to set up an international support group for the peace process were unsuccessful. The absence of an influential multinational body makes it difficult for the international community, for example, to implement its plan to introduce a coordinated package of political and economic incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The EMGF could be an asset for a new Israeli leadership wanting to re-start the peace process and striving to link regional ties to the Palestinian issue. Until such time, and beyond constituting an additional channel to the PA, the new organization could advance Israeli peace ties with Egypt and Jordan.

ISRAELI GAS exports to Egypt and the visits by Israel’s energy minister to Cairo for meetings of the forum are already making a difference in relations. Nonetheless, Israel does not have an ambassador in Cairo, even though the foreign minister approved the appointment of Amira Oron to the post about a year-and-a-half ago. The government has repeatedly avoided approving the appointment and fixing this should be a high priority for the next government.

As for ties with Jordan, cooperation on the gas issue has yet to generate a positive momentum in the relationship. Instead, it has been met with public and political protests in Jordan against the backdrop of the harsh crisis of trust between the two. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently declared that the relationship was at its lowest ebb, and clearly, only a change in Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue as well as prioritizing the rehabilitation of links with Jordan could change that.

Benny Gantz has already issued messages in that direction when he addressed a ceremony in Naharayim marking the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty. The new organization could also help improve Israel’s relations with the EU following several tense years.

The EMGF links Israel and European states in a manner that has won EU approval and that is not viewed in Brussels as a move designed to split and weaken the EU – unlike the alliance Netanyahu forged with the Visegrad Group, especially Hungary. The participation of France in the new organization can also assist – given a new Israeli leadership – to overcome obstacles that prevent the renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the Association Council).

For Israel to effectively make the most of the opportunity provided by the new organization, it must learn the lessons of its conduct in other regional and international organizations. Budgetary difficulties – coupled with a general skepticism towards such organizations – limited Israel’s ability to take full advantage of similar opportunities in the past.

For example, Israel held the position of deputy general secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, which it gave up due, also due to its Foreign Ministry’s financial crisis. Israel also has financial debt to the UN, which casts a shadow over its activity there.

Strengthening the Foreign Ministry can help resolve such issues and realize the potential of Israeli membership in the EMGF. It is the Foreign Ministry that should play a leading role when it comes to Israeli participation in international organizations, unlike the current situation with the EMGF in which it is the Energy Ministry that is mostly in charge.

The establishment of the new organization in the Mediterranean is more than just an important economic development. It is also a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. The next Israeli government would do well to leverage the EMGF not only for the economic profit it can generate from the country’s gas reserves, but also for diplomatic gains that advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and broader regional cooperation.

The writer is the founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the plan published by the Trump administration contradicts the interests of the State of Israel, distances us from the two-state solution and is published during very problematic political times. As a result, it will likely do more harm than good.

The two-state solution is an existential interest for Israel. It is a necessary component of the Zionist dream, in which the State of Israel is both the state of the Jewish people and a democracy characterized by complete equality for all its citizens. Yet the two-state solution is unattainable while Palestinian interests are ignored and Palestinian leaders are excluded from the peace process. I would expect Israeli leadership to be capable of making that clear to an American president.

In the past, Prime Minister Sharon tried to convince the Bush administration not to force democracy on conflict-ridden Iraq; Prime Minister Olmert sought to influence the same administration not to push for Palestinian elections at that point in time. Neither succeeded, but in hindsight, both did the right thing, as an ally should.

The Palestinians are rejecting the Trump plan outright, so it will not lead to a settlement. But from it we must try to extract components that will help achieve a settlement in the future. Of importance is the fact that a Palestinian state will be established, even according to Trump’s vision, and that it must have a capital in East Jerusalem as well as an American embassy there.

Contrary to common perception, our ability to promote true peace is stronger now than ever before. In the Palestinian leadership of today, Israel has infinitely better partners for peace than it had in Oslo and Camp David. The leaders of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah understand that terrorism has hurt them just as it has done damage in Israel, and they are trying to achieve independence through non-violent means. The regional context is also more favorable than in the past; most Arab countries see Israel as part of the solution to the problems this region faces, rather than as the problem itself, as they have in the past. This is reflected in the Arab Peace Initiative, which is endorsed time and again at the summits of Arab states and which did not exist during Oslo and Camp David.

In addition, the majority of the Israeli public supports a two-state solution, as evidenced in polls conducted over the past twenty years, even though this wasn’t reflected in the election results in Israel, because our leaders have preferred to instill fear, suppress hope for peace, and remove the Palestinian issue from the agenda.

To the extent that the Trump plan leads to annexation, it will not only keep us away from a solution of two states for two peoples. It will also damage regional stability, our relationship with Jordan and security coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which has led to relative calm and a significant reduction in terror.

Consequently, those who come to power in the upcoming Israeli elections should take significant diplomatic steps that will provide for a real peace plan. They should do so in coordination with the international community, rather than allowing themselves to be dragged on by false initiatives that do not merit the support of most of the international community or the Democratic Party in the US. Israeli leaders must make it clear to our American friends that this is not the way to advance the long-term interests of the State of Israel.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Needs a Real Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The huge potential in the relationship has not yet been realized. Israel can successfully promote bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and hi-tech, but there is also the feasibility of promoting wider regional cooperation that will increase regional stability and the volume of trade. Jordan can also fulfill an important role in the political arena: leveraging the status it holds over holy sites in Jerusalem, supporting the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and serving as a stabilizing force in the region in general. In order to achieve these goals, Israel must change direction: seek to open new dialogue channels, prioritize relations with Jordan, be attentive to Jordan’s needs and complaints, and reexamine joint projects. Politicians and decision-makers in both countries must understand that inaction and neglecting the relationship will take a high toll.

The establishment of a new government in Israel in 2020 could provide an opportunity for significant change. This can begin with positive Israeli statements about the relations and their importance. Statements should then be transformed into concrete actions. This requires planning ahead of time. As such, we present a list of key recommendations the next Israeli government can take to restart the relationship with Jordan.

Expressions of goodwill and general support for the strengthening of relations are needed. Calls to annex the Jordan Valley and/or parts of the West Bank should be avoided and Jordan’s special role regarding the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem should be reaffirmed by Israeli leaders. Beyond that, Israel and Jordan need real ‘glue’ – substantial projects that will bring them together and focus the relations on growth and development. Israeli decision-makers should prioritize renewing joint projects in the fields of water and infrastructure, increasing exports of Jordanian goods to the Palestinian Authority and advancing cooperation in tourism, hi-tech and medical tourism.

Discussion of water issues should be expanded to include broader solutions in which Israel can assist Jordan. Such support should begin with catalyzing the Aqaba desalination project (even disconnecting it from the Red Sea-Dead Sea project if necessary) and expediting an expanded agreement of water supply from the Galilee to Jordan. Concurrently, we recommend advancing a comprehensive program for collaboration in other fields related to water and energy. That would include, for example, supplying desalinated water from the Mediterranean, supplying electricity from Jordanian solar fields (against Israeli gas supplied to Jordan) as well as other water and wastewater treatment projects, including cooperation in the reconstruction of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

Transportation is another field deserving of attention. During the last two decades, a network of regional railroads has been developed; this can facilitate a land bridge enabling rapid, economically competitive movement of goods between the Gulf states and the Mediterranean Sea. Jordan is strategically located at the junction of this railway system. Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is critical for the implementation of this initiative, which has vast potential to become a game-changer for the Jordanian economy.

Other high-priority issues (both new and pending) include the ‘Jordan Gateway’ joint industrial park, facilitation of trade through the trade corridor via Haifa Port, development of a new version of the QIZ trade agreement focusing on tourism and cooperation in exporting advanced industrial products and services to other markets. Israel must pay close attention to joint programs that have stalled and therefore generate frustration on the Jordanian side. We propose setting up an intra-ministerial task force on the subject, under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office and including representatives from the foreign ministry, as well as from the and ministries of regional cooperation, economy and defense.

Furthermore, the numerous obstacles to maintaining contact with Israel that Jordanian businesspeople face should be removed. Currently, they endure a cumbersome process to get visas to enter Israel, including prolonged and unexplained delays in processing applications, inconsistencies in rejection or approval and reluctance to in granting multi-entry visas. These difficulties drive away many of those Jordanian businesspeople who are interested in developing business relations with Israel, and this must be changed.

We are convinced that despite the unfulfilled potential and differing readings of the peace treaty by both parties a boost of energy and attention dedicated to renewing Israeli-Jordanian relations – along with advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – will transform the dynamics, create a healthy partnership and inject real substance into the peace treaty. In turn, these will provide for multiple economic and political opportunities that will expand bilateral relations and bear the fruits of peace. The stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom must be a priority for Israel, since it will provide stability on its longest border and cooperation from which both parties will benefit.

Yitzhak Gal is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and an adviser specializing in the Arab markets; Ksenia Svetlova is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute and a former member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recommendations for restarting Israel-Jordan relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a member of the Israeli peace camp and as an organizer and participant in numerous meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, I attend these meetings with mixed feelings of excitement and hope alongside skepticism and cynicism. Each time, I am happy for the opportunity to meet and talk to young people on “the other side,” and am sad to discover that our expectations from the encounters are diminished from year to year. Peace? A word too big. Political agreement? No leader has the courage. A diplomatic process? Neither side feels it has a partner. Confidence-building measures? The reality on the ground is different.

In the past, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli-Palestinian encounters were much more common. While these were two difficult, painful and blood-soaked decades of the conflict, it was precisely when hope overcame despair. We had the feeling that change was possible, that there was still a possibility for a solution, and that our leaders were able and willing to advance and implement it. In recent years, I have felt that the hope is replaced by despair, stemming both from reality on the ground and from the fact that our politicians are mainly focused on preserving the illusion of a status quo.

In recent years, I am under the impression that Europe and the international community care more about settling our conflict than we do. Peace initiatives, positive incentives, condemnations and controversial decisions are all examples of measures taken by Europe and the international community showing they have an interest in the region and in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. We can argue about the essence, the motives and the degree of influence of such measures, but there is no doubt that they indicate interest. On my last visit to Brussels, however, I noticed a change of attitude. Europe has many troubles of its own, both at home and abroad, and its focus in the Middle East is no longer necessarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the meetings in Brussels last year, the main message of the European Parliament members present was that Europe definitely wants to see advancement toward a two-state solution and believes it is possible, but without the will of the parties and their leaders the chances for it to happen are slim. During the last visit, however, the main message from our hosts was their impression that there is no solution on the horizon, but that we must try to keep our hopes up, and wait for the right timing, or for a change that allows us to move forward.

In this atmosphere of relatively comfortable despair (for some of us), discussions took place between us Israelis, our Palestinian partners and our European hosts. The atmosphere stayed relatively calm, unlike the heated atmosphere I experienced in previous encounters. Even the tensions over democracy and human rights remained within the bounds of a critical and legitimate discourse of people with different worldviews, living in the “same neighborhood,” but in very different realities. Bystanders were positively impressed – young Israelis and Palestinians can sit in one room and talk to each other. Occasionally they argue, but nevertheless they succeed in finding common ground and reaching understandings and agreements.

On the second day of the program we held a simulation of negotiations over Jerusalem. The discussions within each of the two national groups were no less difficult, and perhaps even more so, than the discussions between the two sides. Although most members of the Israeli delegation had progressive and centrist political views, the attempt to reach agreement was challenging. In the end, all sides recognized the need for clear borders, mutual recognition and international involvement in the Holy Basin, the area in Jerusalem that includes the Old City and its adjacent territories. For the organizers of the simulation, the European mediators, this was evidence that with a little effort and foreign support, the sides are still able to reach understandings, even on the conflict’s most difficult issues. For me, it was actually a reminder that unlike us, the participants, the political echelons on both sides are moving away from the ability to reach and implement agreements.

Despite the difficulties and challenges, each meeting reminds me that there is no substitute for personal contact and sharpens my understanding that dialogue encounters between individuals on both sides must continue. Such meetings are often the only opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to meet each other not on the battlefield and not behind screens, where both sides are often portrayed as a sworn enemy. Meetings between people are a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the Israelis and Palestinians to recognize, know and understand each other. On days when the political horizon seems so far away, it is important to know and remember that on the other side there are quite a few people who aspire to create a better future and yearn for peace.
I can only hope that the next visit of the prime minister to Brussels will be a joint visit with a Palestinian leader. I also hope that for a change, it will be a visit that focuses on dialogue, seeking agreements and building trust – as we tried to do at the meeting of the young leaders – and not another visit of public relations and wrangling.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט International Responses to Annexation: Lessons for Israel from Other Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The European Union is not hostile to Israel. Along with its member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. Europe accounts for almost 50% of Israeli imports, and more than 35%-40% of its exports. Anyone ignoring this Israeli dependence on Europe lacks a basic understanding of reality.

However, ties with Europe are not limited to trade. They encompass many spheres.

Although the EU-Israel Association Council, which is the official framework for high-level dialogue between the sides, has not convened since 2012, Israel and the EU maintain multifaceted ties in accordance with a detailed plan they drew up and a series of agreements on a broad range of issues.

For example, Israel greatly benefits from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and development program, in which it participates. Brexit is expected to affect the Horizon 2020 follow-up program, making it somewhat less beneficial for Israeli researchers, but an amazing network of ties has been forged in recent years, thanks to this program, between Israel’s economic and academic establishment and European institutions and agencies.

Israelis take part in dozens of EU public administration and governance training programs. European experts are placed for periods of over a year in Israeli government agencies to advance implementation of European-standard programs.

Europe’s Open Skies program has created unprecedented links between Israel and the continent, increasing the flow of tourism in both directions.

All these developments have not generated much of an echo nor media exposure, and that is lamentable because many of those polled for Mitvim’s annual poll said that providing the public with additional information about Israeli-EU cooperation could improve Israelis’ perception of the organization.

Tensions between Israel and the EU are mainly political in nature, stemming from differences over the occupation, the settlements and the absence of a peace process with the Palestinians.

Israel blames Brussels and the EU institutions for criticizing its policies and creating tensions, devoting its efforts instead to developing direct ties with EU member states rather than with the EU in its entirety. Other European states act in similar fashion on a variety of issues.

The decision to portray the EU in a negative light is a political one, and Israeli decision-makers must realize how wrong it is, given the extent of Europe’s significance and importance for Israel.

EUROPE IS experiencing an internal crisis, which confronts Israel with a dilemma of principles and practice in its conduct vis-à-vis the EU.

The European crisis is multifaceted, and largely reflected in non-liberal, populist trends. Brexit is a central expression of this process, as are developments in the Visegrad states, mostly Poland and Hungary, and in other states where populist, right-wing forces are on the rise.

This challenge notwithstanding, one must not lose sight of the fact that the EU has been a successful project in realizing its raison d’etre – preventing a pan-European war, such as World War II.

Despite the difficulties, the EU is still robust and still led by liberal, democratic forces.

In economic terms, the EU still serves as a role model, with which Israel should strive for strong ties. A strong EU is good for Israel, first and foremost from an economic point of view, given that any crisis in Europe has an immediate impact on the Israeli economy. Israel is a small state highly dependent on foreign trade. It needs the open markets so characteristic of Europe and not the exclusionary, anti-globalist trends gaining traction in the US and Russia.

Along with diplomatic and economic cooperation, a dialogue on defense and security issues is feasible and advisable, in light of the steps Europe is taking to establish a joint European security agency. Israel is well placed to integrate into this enterprise, to contribute its experience and cooperate with the EU.

It is important to remember that politics is not only about interests; its essence is also in promoting values. The State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, cannot ignore its role in this respect. The State of Israel must not link up with dark forces within Europe out of short-term, purely opportunistic expediency. It must not embrace populist leaders or stand by vis-à-vis developments in Hungary, for example, where anti-democratic liberalism is being entrenched in a manner highly reminiscent of pre-World War II Europe. Israel must not ignore abuse or violations of human rights.

The State of Israel is a powerful, sovereign player which can and must make its views heard on such issues; it must hold a moral compass and enhance liberal democratic values. We want not only to live; there is a reason for living – it is called “values,” which should also be brought into the diplomatic discourse.

The same goes for Israeli politics, where rotten apples have emerged to join forces with like-minded people in other countries. One cannot accuse the whole world of racism and antisemitism without looking in the mirror and examining our own behavior.

The new world order creates many joint interests and challenges for Israel and Europe – for example, regarding China’s role. Israel and the EU can deal with this together as two entities with shared values.

A new European Commission elected to lead the EU is taking office these days. There is tremendous potential in promoting cooperation between Israel and the EU, and leadership changes create an opportunity for a new, more positive dialogue. The next government must turn over a new leaf with Europe.

Dan Catarivas is the chairman of the EU-Israel Chamber of Commerce. This article is based on his remarks at the 3rd annual conference of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, held in November 2019 in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel-EU relations: An annual assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An unbearable gap exists between professionals in the civil service, most of whom are prevented from expressing themselves in public, who understand that issues of peace and diplomacy should take center stage in public discourse and the state’s strategic order of preference, and politicians who regard such matters as trivial. The politicians stoke the sense of public fear, which then takes them hostage to public opinion, rather than dealing with the many opportunities on our doorstep.

The anti-Israel boycott movement (BDS) illustrates how we have turned a tactical threat that does not endanger Israel’s security or prosperity into an existential threat. Israel’s aggressive policies vis-à-vis the movement violate freedom of expression, which liberal audiences view as a key human right. This, in turn, plays into the hands of those promoting BDS because it alienates many groups deterred by the government’s anti-liberal policies. The Foreign Ministry is familiar with Israel’s target audiences more than any other government agency and is supposed to present the diplomatic angle at government discussions, but it is often excluded from sessions with decision makers and is not a party to shaping policy.

Israeli politicians are distancing themselves from the values of liberal democracies, which most Diaspora Jewry holds dear, too. With short-term considerations in mind, they prefer alliances with populist leaders who have a record of anti-Semitism. In so doing, they sin against the values defined by the founders of the state in its proclamation of independence as well as against the stated purpose of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Israel must not regard Diaspora Jewry as simply a cash cow, a political lobby and a pool for immigration. It must engage with those the state views as an integral part of its national project. Diaspora Jews should be invited to voice their views on Israel-related issues, and Israel should appreciate their involvement even when the views are critical. We must create ways for Jews to be critical of government policy and at the same time love and support the State of Israel.

The issue of relations with Diaspora Jewry is intertwined with that of the Arab Israeli minority. For Diaspora Jews, equality for the Arabs in Israel is a fundamental liberal axiom just as is their expectation of the rights they demand for themselves in their countries of residence. There is a measure of hypocrisy in Israeli criticism leveled at Israel’s Arab citizens over their identification with their Palestinian brothers, while expecting US Jews to identify with Israel. Nonetheless, there is room for optimism.

While Israelis are being exposed often to messages of fear and incitement, polls consistently indicate that a majority favors the two-state for two people solution. Despite it all, many elements that were absent in the past now enable the promotion of this solution. The Arab Peace Initiative accepts the principle of two states within the 1967 borders with certain territorial exchanges as well as Israel’s veto of the number of refugees allowed to return. The Palestinian Authority’s current leadership does not believe violence serves its people and is seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

A change of Israeli leadership, which may be in the offing, could lead Israel and the Palestinians toward a new road that would save the State of Israel’s liberal Zionist dream. When that happens, Israel will no longer have to choose between its character as the nation state of the Jewish people and being a democracy that protects the rights of its minorities.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres. This article is based on his remarks at the 2019 Annual Conference of the Mitvim Institute, held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for Diplomatic Optimism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the feelings of frustration, anger and disappointment on the Jordanian side, we returned from Amman with a distinct feeling that the relations could be recharged and saved. After all, both countries have a clear interest in cooperation, and the relationship has survived for 25 years despite all odds, regional challenges and crises, such as the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the terror attack at Naharayim, the second Palestinian intifada, military operations in Gaza, several crises over the issue of Jerusalem (including the relocation of the American embassy) and hostile public opinion in Amman.

However, the extraordinary potential of relations is yet to be fulfilled. Not only can Israel successfully advance bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and high-tech, there are also many prospects of wider, regional cooperation that will allow for increased trade and regional stability. Jordan can also play an important role in the political arena: leveraging its position in relation to Jerusalem’s holy places, supporting advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and as a stabilizing force in the region at large.

In order to achieve these goals, a restart of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship is required. It is necessary to rebuild communication channels, put the relations with Jordan high on the Israeli agenda, pay attention to Jordan’s needs and grievances, and rethink joint projects accordingly. Politicians and decision makers on both sides must fully understand that the cost of non-action and neglecting the relations is extremely high.

This report starts with a snapshot of Israeli-Jordanian relations after 25 years of peace, followed by a discussion of challenges and key issues that were presented by our Jordanian counterparts during the policy dialogue, and ending with recommendations and suggested actions for the immediate term.

הפוסט 25 Years of Israel-Jordan Peace: Time to Restart the Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quality of Israel’s Peace with Jordan is Dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Ahead of the anniversary, a Mitvim Institute team visited Amman and held policy dialogues with academics, diplomats and former army officers. Many expressed amazement that we had bothered to come, that someone in Israel is interested in Jordan and wants to know how to improve the relationship, how unnecessary crises can be averted and how the sides can work together toward a common goal of peace and prosperity.

Israeli officials, researchers or politicians hardly ever come here anymore, our interlocutors told us. The one exception are the Israeli security officials who regularly and frequently meet with their Jordanian counterparts. The security aspects of the peace accord run smoothly, reflecting the security-oriented approach of the outgoing government, an approach that prioritizes security relations over all other aspects, believing that no progress on them is possible, in any case.

However, should the strategic ties with the Hashemite Kingdom be limited to security issues, important though they are? Can a limited relationship that begins and ends with ties between defense officials carry the weight of the entire agreement for long? Do economic, diplomatic and civilian ties not create an additional layer to the relationship that can also enhance progress in the security field? The peace agreement with Egypt has also been emptied of real content, being largely limited to security cooperation – and normalization nowhere on the horizon. Many in Israel believe that given the opposition to normalization by many Jordanians and Egyptians, there is no choice but to make do with what is available – security cooperation that does, indeed, save lives and provides security and defense.

During the journey to Amman, we came to realize the extent to which Jordan desires cooperation with Israel in areas such as tourism (medical tourism, too), water and high-tech. Israel does not prioritize these fields and they are not at the top of the government’s diplomatic agenda (if it even has one). Thus, after many years of discussing major and significant mutual projects, these are postponed endlessly to the chagrin of the potential Jordanian partners.

Jordan’s economic crisis and its hosting of 1.5 million Syrian refugees came up in every conversation we had in Amman. The crisis is not new, and last year the Jordanian capital was shaken by mass protest government, cutback and corruption – similar to the ones taking place in Beirut these days. Arab States, the US and the World Bank have provided urgent aid to stabilize the Kingdom, but Israel hardly noticed. The media does not deal with the major projects stuck for years or with the fact that Israel could have done a lot more to help its neighbor to the east attain economic stability, which could have definitely enhanced security, too. Israelis are not sufficiently interested in Jordan, even though the country is of vital importance to Israel’s security – with its 309-kilometer border a vital shield against any troubles from the east.

The Israeli enthusiasm over the signing of the 1994 peace agreement has already waned, and Israelis only touchdown with Jordan only when they fly to the Far East, transiting through Amman or when vacationing in Aqaba. By the way, anyone wishing to shorten the waiting time at the land border between the two states will have to shell out hundreds of dollars for the very short flight. There is barely any demand for that route and the Jordanians would rather sell Israelis cheap tickets for continuing flights to India, Thailand and Sri Lanka, aviation sources told us. The absence of visits also stems from the difficulties of most Jordanians to get entry visas to Israel. Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab told us about repeated requests by his friends and family to visit Israel for family occasions or other needs. “In the end, people simply give up. Israel loses out big time because those who do manage to get a visa are generally favorably impressed and take home a positive impression of the state,” Kuttab said.

The Mitvim Institute 2018 Foreign Policy Index attests to the same attitudes. Most Israelis view Saudi Arabia as the most important Arab state, not Jordan or Egypt – Israel’s strategic peace partners and its immediate neighbors. Of the two, Egypt is regarded as far more important than Jordan. The public is influenced greatly by the policy of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who talks with certainty about the strengthening ties with Arab states and the new horizons for Israel’s relationship with Gulf capitals. He never mentions the decline in trade between Israel and Jordan, the endless foot dragging over the Med-Dead project that generates great anger in Jordan, and the fact that nothing is left of the regional prosperity and cooperation forged in 1994.

The Palestinian issue is central to Israeli-Jordanian relations. The percentage of Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom is a matter of contention – the Jordanians say they constitute 40 percent of the population whereas Israel is convinced they number 60 percent. Either way, the situation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem, has a significant impact on Jordanian attitudes toward Israel. For Netanyahu, the Palestinians are no longer relevant and Arab states have abandoned their cause. However, our conversations in Amman made clear that this approach is illogical and not feasible. Jordan greatly fears escalation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, and seeks better lines of communication with Israel.

With a relatively modest investment and prioritization of the relationship with the Kingdom, Israel could save itself the repeated embarrassments it has recently experienced in relations with Jordan. Jordanian scholars and journalists told us that had Israel acted in a diplomatic and rational fashion, it could have boosted the King’s standing vis-à-vis radicals and BDS proponents. They were puzzled over Israel’s preference for humiliating and undermining its strategic partner and the stability of that regime. Why did Netanyahu embrace the security guard who had shot dead a Jordanian at the embassy in Amman? Why was there no serious, in-depth investigation of the death of a Jordanian judge at the Allenby Bridge border crossing? Why is Israel playing along with Saudi aspirations on Al-Aqsa? Our Jordanian interlocutors wondered what Israel’s policy on Jordan was and had a hard time understanding why Israel was shaking off the important alliance with all its might. In this context, the recent call by Blue and White party Chair Benny Gantz at a rally on the Naharayim Peace Island to strengthen the peace with Jordan and create a “region of cooperation” along the border is of particular importance.

When the argument is heard that Israel’s standing in the Middle East has never been better, it is worth noticing developments in Jordan. The peace agreement with Jordan, just like the Jordan River, tends to dry up over time unless efforts are made to nurture it. Despite the frustration and disappointment, we returned from Amman with a clear sense that repairing or restarting the relationship is within the realm of the possible. Israel could win back Jordan with the right media coverage and attention, by revving up significant economic projects that would help resolve Jordan’s water shortages and create jobs, with an effort to break though the deadlock in the Palestinian arena. In the final analysis, Jordan is right here, within touching distance and not in the dark beyond. Anyone who restores Jordan to the top of Israel’s list of diplomatic priorities would do wonders for the relationship between us, benefitting all sides.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Knesset does not excel in dealing with foreign affairs, and it does not carry out effective parliamentary supervision on such matters. The plenum debates hardly deal with international developments; there is no separate committee on foreign affairs; foreign issues are not perceived by most MKs as generating electoral profit; and visits of MKs abroad – even when justified – are viewed by the public as self-serving. The opening conditions do not seem promising, but there is still much that MKs can do to advance Israel’s foreign relations, each according to his/her ideological position.

Members of parliament around the world are increasingly engaged in promoting foreign relations, together with civil society organizations, the business sector, and individual entrepreneurs. This reflects the nature of modern diplomacy, which no longer relies solely on ambassadors and foreign ministers. Members of parliament participate and represent their countries in international forums, host foreign delegations, raise global issues on the agenda and contribute to their solution, and generally play a role in supervising their government’s activities on these issues. MKs can also do so, and they have a number of tools available to them.

First and foremost, they must push the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to increase its involvement in foreign issues. The committee is supposed to perform “supervision and control of the country’s foreign policy,” but out of hundreds of debates by the outgoing committee, the vast majority dealt with security and only a few with international affairs. To solve this, the Knesset can establish a separate committee on foreign affairs, as is customary in other countries. In the meantime, a quota for committee discussions on foreign issues should be set, Foreign Ministry officials should be invited to appear before the committee, and the committee’s discussions of non-confidential foreign policy matters should be open for media coverage.

Other committees, too, can discuss relevant foreign policy issues, and cooperate with the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit (KATEF, established in 2018) in improving parliamentary oversight of the Foreign Service. With regard to substance, MKs can establish caucuses  on a variety of foreign policy issues, through which they can work together with civil society organizations to raise awareness and advance diplomatic action. In previous terms, for example, the Knesset had caucuses dealing with Israeli-Arab regional cooperation, Israel-EU relations, Israel-US ties, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the status of the Foreign Service. These should now be re-established.

MKs should also request plenum discussions on foreign policy issues, address them in their speeches, and submit frequent parliamentary questions to Israel’s next foreign minister. Parliamentary questions are also a useful tool for exposing information to the public in the absence of sufficient transparency by the Foreign Service. MKs can also avail themselves of the Knesset Research and Information Center and request studies on international affairs and foreign policy, which until today have not been much in demand.

In their foreign policy work, MKs should seek the assistance of the Knesset’s Diplomatic Advisor – a Foreign Ministry diplomat – and the staff of the Knesset’s International Affairs Division. They can provide information and briefings, ahead of foreign visits, meetings with guests from abroad, and Knesset debates on international affairs. The participation of Foreign Ministry officials in Knesset discussions on foreign affairs should be increased, as a better interface between the Foreign Ministry and MKs will advance a more professional parliamentary diplomacy. In addition, think tanks that offer knowledge and recommendations on foreign policy issues, as well as unofficial opportunities to meet with experts from Israel and abroad, should also be engaged by MKs and seen as an asset.

The international activity of MKs deserves special attention, given the gap between its importance and its negative public image. Traveling abroad is part of the MKs work, and as long as it is done professionally and does not prevent them from fulfilling their duties in parliament, does not deserve excessive public criticism. MKs travel on behalf of the Knesset to strengthen inter-parliamentary relations and diplomatic ties between states; represent Israel in international forums, events and ceremonies; meet with parliamentarians from other countries (including from Arab states); and learn best practices that may be relevant to Israel. Private travels by MKs, which are not commissioned by the Knesset and that include lectures, participation in political conferences and dialogues, strengthening ties with Jewish communities and sister parties, and advancing the political agenda of MKs, are of high importance as well.

Such trips can help enhance the knowledge of MKs on international politics, help formulate clearer positions on a variety of foreign policy issues, and bring Israeli perspectives to international forums. The Knesset should assist MKs succeed in these tasks. It must ensure the freedom of action of MKs on foreign issues, even when their position is inconsistent with the government’s official position. It must also find ways to provide MKs with better guidance and tools to perform international activities, which may include language studies, translation and proofreading services, and diplomatic advice.

Parliamentary diplomacy takes place not only abroad but also in Israel. MKs receive international delegations that visit Israel and host them in the Knesset. They can be active in inter-parliamentary friendship groups and establish contacts with parliamentarians from countries with which such groups do not exist (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey). In addition, they should reach out to foreign embassies and international organizations with representative offices in Israel. These channels of dialogue enable increased political influence, international cooperation and exchange of knowledge – all of which can help MKs advance their agenda, both domestically and internationally.

Thus, MKs have a large number of tools through which they can influence Israel’s foreign relations and position Israel as a more involved and influential player in the international community. The responsibility for improving Israel’s foreign policy is no longer confined to the government’s doorstep, and the new Knesset must rise to the challenge.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; Nehoray Ofri served as Mitvim’s Government Relations Coordinator.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Members of Knesset Can Help Improve Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Importance of Ties between Palestinian Citizens of Israel and Diaspora Jewry: A View from Britain הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced by negotiations and new connections.

How did the Ethiopians and the Eritreans succeed in moving within a few months from a state of protracted conflict to a hopeful peace process? It looks like several factors, that can serve as points of reference for Israelis and Palestinians, have helped the parties:

Bold political leadership: A reality-changing leadership is needed in order to change the course of the long-standing conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made a move which was contrary to popular positions, national mood and narratives that the parties have cultivated over the years, and reached out for peace. The leaders changed the public discourse rather than being led by it. They proved that the leadership must not submit to prevailing patterns and identity perceptions that have taken root over the years, but legitimize reality-changing actions.

External incentives: External incentives are another force that drives leaders and citizens to move toward reconciliation. Leaders can effectively use incentives to mobilize political and economic support in their quest for peace. In the EthiopianEritrean case, apart from achieving peaceful life, landlocked Ethiopia gained an outlet to the sea, renewed its commercial flights to Somalia, and attracted foreign investors who increased their investments in the country. Eritrea, which was in a difficult economic situation, gained economic, media and transportation cooperation with Ethiopia, and the international sanctions that made it one of the poorest countries in the world, were lifted. As a result, the international isolation that was imposed on the country ended.

International support of the peace process: Advancing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves the interests of many international and regional players that are involved in the Horn of Africa and are interested in promoting stability in the volatile region. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have mobilized to mediate, support and guarantee the peace process. The fact that the main intermediaries in the process – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – sided by the weaker Eritrean side, teaches us a lesson when choosing the mediators in our conflict. The Ethiopian diaspora in the US, which politically and economically supported the peace process, made a significant contribution too.

Adapting the peace process to the political reality: The design of the process should necessarily be adapted to the complex and changing political reality, while referring to the structure of negotiations, the pace of the process and its implementation, the coordination of symbolic trust building measures, etc. The parties in the Horn of Africa were able to properly adjust the negotiations structure to the existing political reality in order to reduce risks. For example, the relatively fast pace of the process prevented the formation of an organized and strong opposition, as well as extreme activities that might have harmed the process. Other factors that helped move the process forward were symbolic steps, meetings that are covered by the media, rapid changes on the ground, and leadership that is mobilized to communicate with civil society of the other side.

Promoting internal reconciliation processes, enforcing solidarity and establishing the political system: The transition from a protracted conflict to a peace process is a significant change that disrupts well-established perceptions in society and brings to the surface the internal tensions and disagreements. In order to support change, leaders should build on the resilience of society and the stability of the political system. The parties in the Horn of Africa realized that the in-country situation affected the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between countries. Abiy Ahmed has led extensive reconciliation processes in Ethiopia, including the disarmament of opposition groups and making them a legitimate political party, the establishment of a new and inclusive government that includes a Ministry of Peace that is entrusted with the internal process, and the consolidation of a new ethos for Ethiopia.

Switching back to the Middle East, the absence of a courageous political leadership entails a heavy exasperating toll. When examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict against the backdrop of the peace process in the Horn of Africa, there is a reason to be hopeful: in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Arab Peace Initiative and the promise of a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU, serve as incentives, alongside the security guarantees that the US may offer. Regional and global players who have a vested interest in achieving stability in the Middle East offer themselves as potential mediators and help the sides avoid violence. They can help us garner international support for the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian societies face many challenges related to the rule of law, democracy, human and civil rights, social cohesion, the reduction of violence, and the legitimacy of the leadership. Such challenges should be addressed with no delay in order to enforce solidarity, economic resilience, and trust in government institutions. Civil society and the Diaspora can also play a role since they can promote pro-peace cooperation even in the absence of political will to advance peaceful relations. Similarly, the business community, researchers and government agencies can take advantage of the deadlock in negotiations to examine opportunities and adjust the peace process to the changing political context. Above all, we must continue to believe that a solution is possible.

The case of the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not theoretical. Having a success story, in which leaders, civil society and the international community join forces to advance a peace process to solve a protracted conflict that seems hopeless, is politically powerful. It undermines the defeatist argument that “there is nothing that can be done”, and that we are condemned to “live by the sword”. Peace processes can be “contagious”, and the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example. Their peace agreement led to a series of peace talks and arrangements across the Horn of Africa. Being infected by the “peace virus” would certainly be beneficial for Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper he wrote on the subject, with the assistance of Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Among other outcomes, the Arab Spring led to the strengthening of the Gulf States’ standing in the Middle East, given the stability they displayed in the face of events that affected almost every country in the region. Consequently, the Gulf States leveraged the new balance of power to expand their international and regional influence, as was evident in Emirati-funded infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, Saudi-led high-level diplomatic moves, Oman’s call for regional mediation, the race for hosting international events in these countries, and many more soft-power displays. Kuwait has been the one exception, remaining virtually isolated. Thus, Israel must acknowledge these new nexuses of power in the Middle East, and draw up a corresponding map of alliances. Its integration into the expanding circle of opportunities emerging around the Gulf countries has the potential to be dually beneficial, since it does not only consist of bilateral or regional cooperation, but also of international opportunities.

The Expo events afford tremendous economic values for the participating countries, as well as the opportunity to shape their national image within the global community. The exposure to millions of visitors and the platform for establishing direct contacts among diplomatic representatives and key figures from around the world, generates a unique hub of diplomacy. Indeed, beyond its importance for Israel’s economy and image, Israel’s participation in this event, hosted by an Arab Muslim country it has no current and past diplomatic relations with, is a significant achievement, which reflects the nature of Israel’s current relations with the UAE.

On the one hand, the UAE, as the host of an international event, is expected by the international community to provide access to all countries, including Israel. As a result, the UAE and other Gulf countries have legitimized in recent years the arrival of Israeli nationals to international conferences and tournaments they hosted. In that sense, the UAE’s decision to invite Israel to Expo 2020 does not reflect a change in the status of ties between the two states, nor does it forecast the beginning of direct and formal relations. On the other hand, meeting this international code points to the UAE’s willingness to compromise on anti-normalization measures towards Israel.

Currently, the UAE government distinguishes between bilateral ties with Israel and international cooperation with it, leaving room to maneuver in the case of the latter. In the international realm, an Israeli representative office has been operating for the past three years in Abu Dhabi, the capital, under the auspices of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Israel and the UAE also conduct Air Force exercises and business cooperation in the fields of diamond trade and cyber technology, under international umbrellas. This demonstrates the warming relations between the countries mainly within multilateral frameworks, and is making headlines in the Israeli media mostly due to its public and symbolic nature. The UAE was a pioneer among the Gulf States in allowing an Israeli sports team to display its national symbols at the October 2018 international judo championship in Abu Dhabi. As part of the latter event, the Emiratis also hosted Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sports Miri Regev according to full ceremonial protocol. Additional sports events in the UAE, such as tennis tournaments, a car race and the Special Olympics have also included growing participation of Israeli delegations in recent years.

Conversely, the UAE strictly limits bilateral relations with Israel, conditioning them on a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Accordingly, the country has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel regarding measures it defines as unjust toward the Palestinian people. Therefore, it does not cooperate with Israel in areas such as culture, research, tourism, industry and media despite mutual interests in doing so. In the diplomatic arena, there are occasional reports of meetings between senior officials of both states, such as the September 2012 meeting between Netanyahu and the UAE Foreign Minister, and the recent January 2019 visit to the UAE by Labor Party leader Avi Gabbay who met with senior ministers. Nonetheless, such meetings are not intended for public knowledge (despite the occasional leaks) and are not considered official breakthroughs in official relations.

At the same time, we are witnessing a new phenomenon in which Gulf citizens express support for Israel on social media, and a growing number of senior Emiratis call for the establishment of direct ties with Israel. For example, Khalaf al-Habtoor, a leading Emirati executive, asked on twitter why the Gulf States are not signing a peace agreement with Israel “same as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan have done before”. Such voices do not regard Israel as an enemy, and view cooperation with it as a vital source of regional stability and development. While not reflecting an official government line, they signal a gradual shift from a formerly taboo subject to an increasingly acceptable opinion. These expressions of interest in bilateral relations create a crack in the traditional demand that has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key obstacle to normalization with Israel.

The gap between the official UAE policy toward Israel and the mutual courtship between the two nations demonstrates that Israel is on the cusp of a formative phase in these relations. At this point of time, Israel would do well to leverage the relative openness of the Gulf States towards it by expanding its involvement in the region. Just as Israel sought a formal invitation to Expo 2020, it should continue to identify opportunities, map scheduled international events in the Gulf and ask to participate. Israel should also invite Gulf countries to take part in international events it hosts.

One important issue that arises from increased interactions between Israel and Gulf States is the need to study the culture, values, sensitivities and local laws when preparing Israeli delegations for excursions in the Gulf. Such preparation should be overseen by a government agency, which will formulate a plan for ties with the Gulf States and will be put in charge of these ties through diplomatic, security, economic and civilian channels. By so doing, Israel’s presence in the Gulf could become more acceptable and even be expanded. However, if Israel seeks a more significant opening to the region, it must advance a resolution of the Palestinian issue through a genuine process that would also be of great benefit for its ties with the Gulf States.

Dr. Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a Research Fellow at the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in recent years, the Israeli government has been leading a negative campaign against the EU. It has been criticizing the EU for being anti-Israel, while making efforts to increase divisions between EU Member States in order to limit the EU’s capacity to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Toward the formation of a new Israeli government in late 2019, this article presents ten guiding principles for an improved Israeli foreign policy toward the EU, based on the work of a Mitvim Institute task team.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The American decision to hold the workshop in Bahrain is undoubtedly novel. Bahrain has not hosted many international conferences. It has never hosted an Arab summit, for example. Bahrain’s ruler Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa agreed to do so for several reasons. First, he leads a Sunni elite ruling an island 70 percent of whose residents are Shiite and for whom the specter of a Shiite takeover bolstered by a tailwind from neighboring Iran is a source of constant worry. Their fear is well grounded. Shiite protests erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but speedy military help provided by the Saudis from the other side of the Gulf put an end to them. Second, Bahrain has been relying for years on US aid. In fact, the 5th Fleet is headquartered there, the two sides signed a defense pact in 1991 and a free trade agreement in 2006, and over 200 US firms operate on the small island. Hosting the workshop is therefore not a high price for the monarchy and ruling family to pay for their reliance on the Americans and Saudis that ensure stability. What is more, the Saudi-Bahraini cooperation allows Saudi Arabia to use Bahrain as a trial balloon for a policy likely to meet opposition in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia traditionally traipses cautiously through the political Islamic and Arab minefield, due to its position as the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites.

The choice of Bahrain is convenient for Israel, too. In recent years, Bahrain’s rulers have been publicly displaying openness toward Israel, contrary to the Saudis whose contacts with Israel are conducted largely behind closed doors. Israel and Bahrain do not have diplomatic ties and Bahrain did not set up a diplomatic representation in Israeli during the Oslo period (unlike Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania). Nonetheless, the two sides have been conducting public and clandestine ties since then. Yossi Sarid was the first senior Israeli official to visit Manama as Minister of Environmental Affairs within the framework of the multilateral working group in October 1994. Ties were upped a notch in the previous decade when Shimon Peres, then Minister of Regional Cooperation, met with the Crown Prince of Bahrain.

At the height of these public contacts, Peres as President and Tzipi Livni as Foreign Minister met with King Hamed in New York in 2009. However, most contacts were conducted behind the scenes. According to WikiLeaks documents, King Hamed told the US Ambassador in 2005 that his country conducts defense and intelligence ties with Israel through the Mossad. In another conversation, this one by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister with a US diplomat, Bahrain was said to be conducting “quiet business-like ties” with Israel. What is more, the King ordered officials to stop using the words “enemy” and “Zionist entity” when referring to Israel. The Kingdom also has interfaith relations with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and in December 2018, it named Rabbi Marc Schneier as special adviser to the King on the Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence that he had founded in Manama. Schneier has been working for the past 15 years to create interfaith bridges between Israel, the Gulf States and especially Bahrain. The Manama center, in cooperation with the Wiesenthal Center, organized an interfaith visit of 24 clerics from Bahrain to Israel in December 2017. The visit took place although President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital just days earlier. Houda Ezra Nonoo, a Jewish Bahraini woman, served as her country’s Ambassador to the US from 2008 to 2013. All this places Bahrain in an excellent position to host Trump’s economic summit, which in any case fits in with the Kingdom’s defense and economic interests.

However, Bahrain’s rulers have not had a change of heart on the Palestinian issue. In all their declarations, they invariably make clear that progress on the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for any normalization with Israel. The main problem is that the Palestinians are boycotting the conference, thereby threatening to undermine its prospects of success. The Palestinian opposition to the conference is understandable given that Trump is not perceived as a balanced and honest mediator between the sides and because they fear that “economic peace” will constitute an alternative to a real, political peace. In any case, all the available information indicates that the political part of the peace plan, once unveiled, will be “thin” on diplomatic substance as far as the Palestinians are concerned. On the other hand, the Palestinian reaction places them, once more, as serial refusniks (e.g., the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Olmert-Abbas negotiations of 2007-8, and more).

The disappointing historic experience with the contribution of economic conferences to political aspects of the peace process, combined with recent events, lead to the conclusion that Trump would have been better off delaying or cancelling the economic workshop altogether. It is safe to assume that ego and honor will prevent him from doing so. Trump decided to launch the “deal of the century” by thinking “outside the box.” Undoubtedly, he succeeded; it is the first time anyone has tried to resolve the conflict without consulting, sharing or coordinating with one of the parties involved in the conflict. This “original” idea cannot provide a fair solution; it actually has the potential to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Voters in the world’s largest supranational elections picked 751 representatives from 28 states. Fear of the far-right generated a record turnout, with voters shaking off their usual complacency and heading to the ballot boxes. Some 51 percent of 425 million eligible voters exercised their democratic right, setting a 20-year record.

Twenty-one radical right movements operate in the EU’s 28 member states, enjoying an absolute or relative majority in some. Most favored an EU pullout in the past, but are currently working in tandem across the continent to change the union from within.

Deputy Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, whose Lega party rose from 6 percent of the vote in 2014 to 34 percent, claims Europe is changing. Salvini, expected to be among the leaders of the far-right and Eurosceptic bloc in the EU Parliament, represents a nationalist, xenophobic and centralistic line. He makes no bones about his admiration for Benito Mussolini and often uses expressions similar to ones favored by the fascist World War II leader. On Mussolini’s birthday, Salvini tweeted: “So many enemies, so much honor”, a variation on “Il Duce”’s famous saying. On a recent visit to Mussolini’s hometown Forli, he addressed the crowds from the balcony that Mussolini used.

Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won 52 percent of the Hungarian vote; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally garnered some 23 percent of the French vote (compared with 25 percent in 2014); the neo-Nazis of Alternative for Germany received 11 percent of the German vote (compared with 7 percent in 2014). Slovakia’s neo-Nazis recorded the most significant victory of the elections, with Our Slovakia, which includes various Holocaust deniers and anti-Semites, winning 120,000 votes (12 percent) compared with only 9,000 in 2014.

The common goal of Europe’s far-right is to introduce a Trojan horse into the heart of the continent in order to spread a message of fear, erase current European borders and redraw them. They want a white, Christian, nationalist Europe without immigrants and foreigners. The 2008 financial crisis, combined with the crisis of Middle Eastern and African refugees dreaming to reach Europe, intensified the debate about the very need for a union of 520 million Europeans and the threat looming over “Christian Europe”. The ghosts of World War II Europe have re-emerged and could be strengthened if a financial crisis erupts again. The populist rebellion of the 21st century is not necessarily of the poor; it is a protest of the conservative middle class that feels cheated of its rights, jobs and national pride. They are the major losers of globalization who feel nostalgic for past glories, with some dreaming to be part of an empire once again.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former adviser, spent a long time in Europe prior to the elections in a bid to establish and organize a nationalist right-wing bloc that would dictate Europe’s future – both through the European Parliament and in member states. After winning national elections in Italy, France appears to be the next target of the radical right. France and Italy, who were among the founders of the European community after two world wars and tens of millions of deaths, are now seeing antiEuropean groups placing high in the European Parliament elections. French President Emmanuel Macron dubbed the far-right led by Salvini, Le Pen and Orban “a spreading leprosy”.

Ironically, the European far-right that awakens all the ghosts of the past is seeking a seal of approval from the State of Israel in order to increase its popularity on the continent. Salvini condemns anti-Semitism at every opportunity and even troubled himself recently to Jerusalem and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial. While Jean Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the extreme right in France, claimed the annihilation of European Jews was merely “a detail” of World War II, his daughter Marine tries to distance anti-Semitism from her party and mobilizes French Jews to clear her name. In the 2017 French presidential elections, 11 million French, more than one-third of the electorate, voted for her. Le Pen demands France for the French and aspires to her country’s presidency.

Israel has a significant interest in developments on its neighboring continent, which provides it with significant economic, security, social, and cultural backing. Ties between Israel and Europe are deep, good and ongoing despite political disagreements and the EU’s frequent criticism of Israel’s Palestinian policy. Recent Israeli governments have tried to drive a wedge between European states critical of Israel and populist, nationalist European governments who toe Israel’s line. The bloc headed by Salvini and Le Pen will try to sway European legislation and policy in order to limit anti-Israel criticism.

However, most European Jews do not fall into this trap. They understand that beyond the pleasing rhetoric, some far-right leaders are seeking to downplay their anti-Semitism and xenophobia in a superficial makeover that will generate political profits for them. Jewish leaders and rabbis in Europe are closely monitoring the election results and expressing concern over the creation of a far-right bloc in the heart of Europe, at the center of its parliamentary decision-making.

Quite a few Israelis shuddered when Salvini laid a wreath at Yad Vashem a few months ago. President Reuven Rivlin has persistently rejected all attempts at a relationship of any kind with the European nationalist right. In an unusual step, he expressed support for Macron over Le Pen in the French national elections. No one is saying Israel should cut off ties with states in which the far-right comes to power. However, it should relate to them with a mixture of respect and suspicion rather than expressing undying friendship for them. President Rivlin knows this is a masked ball by the far-right. The foreign ministry does too and urges Israel to avoid ties with such elements as Alternative for Germany and Austria’s Freedom Party.

Israel must continue to strengthen its scientific, defense, economic, cultural and technological ties with Europe. It must aspire to positive relations with Europe even when it is critical of Israel over the Palestinian issue, and prefer democratic allies even when it disagrees with them. Israel must also display sensitivity toward the fears of European Jewish communities over the rise of the right and their concerns over the repercussions of decisions made in Jerusalem.

Despite its growing power and entrenchment, the European far-right was not as successful in the European Parliament elections as it hoped. Most European citizens still chose parties loyal to European integration and liberal-democratic values. However, the struggle against the far-right continues, and Israel has a role to play. It must place itself on the right side of the values scale and help block the European “leprosy”.

Henrique Cymerman is a television journalist and recipient of numerous human rights and journalism, awards. He covers the rise of the European right and lectures at the School of Government of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US President Donald Trump is closely aligned with Netanyahu and is expected to give him leeway over such policies. The EU today is less united against Netanyahu’s policies than in the past. So it may need a Democratic US administration in 2020 to present and enforce some red lines, in part because Netanyahu will face no significant domestic opposition on foreign policy or national security issues.

The two major pro-peace parties (Labor and Meretz) together have less than ten percent of the Knesset. While Blue and White’s 35 seats is a major achievement for a first-time political run, it does not endorse a two-state solution, and includes some right-wing hard-liners on the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu has portrayed himself as a master-statesman and highlighted his relations with (mostly) populist and anti-liberal world leaders. This trend is set to continue, further eroding the democratic component of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite its weakness, Israel’s opposition must present an alternative vision based on advancing peace, increasing regional belonging in Europe and the Middle East, and anchoring Israel to the club of liberal democracies. This will not be easy, but Israel’s friends around the world need to know that there is more to Israel and its foreign relations than Netanyahu.

(originally published in the Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Trump Gives Israel’s ‘Master Statesman’ License to Carry On הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: Strategic Partnership, Civil Remoteness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Tunisia and Its Relations with Israel Following the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Regional Opportunities to Improve the Situation in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The consequences of the “Arab Shaking” have yet to end. Each state that experienced these “winds of change”, withstands the emerging regional and international reality differently, based on the way it defines its current position. Egypt under a-Sisi, and in the post-Mursi era, has re-defined its aims and mode of action. The newly created Egyptian national security outlook prioritized two main objectives: to restore (both domestic and regional) security and to strengthen the Egyptian economy.

Regarding the security objective, as soon as Egypt defined “terrorism” (both domestic and international) as its biggest threat, it made sure to label the Muslin Brotherhood movement a terror organization and carried out severe measures against its members. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have occasionally accused the Hamas of carrying out terror attacks in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and intermittently with ISIS. No wonder that every now and then news surrounding military cooperation between Egypt and Israel battling ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula appear in the media.

In addition to this, the Iranian policy in the Middle East is perceived by Egypt as a threat (and so by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Both Turkey and Qatar are considered Egypt’s consistent and uncompromising rivals, due to their support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and based on their membership in the Middle Eastern axis opposing Egypt. A new reality has evolved that we have never seen before, in which the regional interests of Israel and Egypt, as well as those of other Arab states, have intertwined.

The long-standing Egyptian policy that strives to resolve the Palestinian issue relies, even to this day, on its ability to engage in what is happening in the Gaza strip. Egypt wishes to promote steps of reconciliation within the Palestinian wing itself (between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority), and to serve as a mediator between the Palestinians as well as between the Palestinians and Israel. All actors in this equation view Egypt as a trustworthy and influential actor. In this way, Egypt acts as the most significant mediator that negotiates understandings between Israel and Hamas, and that supports Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Egypt is expected to continue playing such a role in the future as well.

The meeting between Israel and Egypt’s leaders that took place during the 2018 UN General Assembly, was not the first meeting between Netanyahu and a-Sisi this past year. Among the issues discussed by the two leaders were the situation in Gaza, the Palestinian issue, security matters, regional developments and bilateral issues. The meeting reflected rather accurately the cooperative relations between the two countries over the past four years.

The second objective put forward by the Egyptian leadership has been to stabilize the economy. A strong sense of security and a steady economy may turn Egypt into a source for regional stability. This leads Egypt to be increasingly interested in promoting economic and trade cooperation with Israel. Egypt hold an important strategic location, on the maritime route from the Indian ocean through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the interest in Egypt’s stabilization is not limited to regional actors alone, but is also eminent for the US, the EU, Russia, India, and China. This generates international interest in supporting Israeli-Egyptian cooperation as a keystone for enhancing regional stability.

Broader cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the security and-political spheres may stimulate their economic relations and therefore work for the benefit of both countries. Nevertheless, there is still a significant gap between the high level of strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and their much lower level of civil cooperation. The number of Israelis touring Egypt is stable but rather low. Trade between the countries is taking place but to a limited extent, and the same is true regarding the field of agriculture, where there is far greater potential for cooperation than what is taking place today (at least in comparison to cooperation in the 1990’s). In addition to that, there is potential for Egypt to utilize technologies such as solar energy and water desalination, areas of which are widely known as Israel’s field of expertise, both as a manufacturer and as an implementer.

The field of energy, and in particular the production and marketing of natural gas, plays a central role in the Israeli-Egyptian economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, both countries can cooperate in traditional industry fields, in unique qualified industrial zones (QIZ, a three-way agreement that allows the export of free trade Egyptian goods to the US, in the condition they hold a certain percent of Israeli components), in agriculture, tourism and more. Such cooperation can promote both Israel’s and Egypt’s economies, and have a positive economic impact on the broader region.

The announcement made by the Israeli company “Delek Drilling” that it will purchase (together with the Noble Energy and East Gas companies) the Egyptian EMG company is a step towards achieving these goals. The natural gas pipeline owned by EMG connects Israel and Egypt, and will deliver natural gas from the “Tamar” and “Leviathan” reservoirs to Egypt. This is considered to be a milestone in transforming Egypt into a regional energy hub, as a major importer and as an exporter based on its liquefying gas facilities. According to Israel’s Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz, the rehabilitation of the Israeli-Egyptian natural gas pipeline, along with the construction of a Jordanian-Israeli pipeline, creates a regional foundation between the “peace countries”. It is rare to have a joint infrastructure project with geo-political significance take shape between Israel and its neighbors.

The positive nature of Israel-Egypt ties in recent years, together with evolving regional developments in the Middle East, Egypt’s role in mediating between Israel and the Palestinians, and the steps taken by Egypt to thaw the “cold” peace with Israel, may all point to the existence of an opportunity for further advancement in ties between two strategic partners in the region – Egypt and Israel.

Dr. Haim Koren, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, served as the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt between the years 2014 and 2016. This article is based on a research on Israel-Egypt relations, written as part of Mitvim Institute’s project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Whether or not the Holocaust will be introduced into the Moroccan curriculum, Morocco has a unique story as a Muslim state willing to acknowledge the Holocaust. Most Muslim states oscillate between avoiding taking a stance on the matter and Holocaust denial, because acknowledging the Holocaust is perceived as harmful to Palestinian interests. So how can it be that Morocco acknowledges the Holocaust? The answer to this, as in many other matters, is the king, in this case Mohammed V. According to the Moroccan narrative, which many Moroccans are familiar with, when the Vichy regime ruled Morocco at the beginning of the 1940s, King Mohammed V was asked to hand over the Jews of his country to the Nazis. The Moroccans relate with pride that the king refused to concede to this demand, arguing fervently that there were only Moroccans in his country. Of course, in reality the story was more complex, restrictive decrees against the Jews were imposed at the instruction of the Vichy regime and freedom of employment, movement etc. were limited. Until today, the issue remains a source of dispute, and despite the important role Mohammed V had played, he was not yet awarded the title Righteous Among the Nations. However, Mohammed V was and remains a hero who saved the Jews. Here lays the real meaning of the story and whether accurate or exaggerated, it allowed the Morocco to develop a positive national identity with regard to the events that took place during the Second World War and the horrors of that period. While in Europe the Jews were annihilated, the Muslims in Morocco helped save them.

But what has happened since Mohammed V’s gesture to the Jews of his land and how does Morocco relate to the Holocaust today? Until 2009, Morocco made almost no public statements regarding the Holocaust. Morocco did not officially acknowledge or deny it. Among the general public a range of opinions existed, but on the national level silence reigned. In 2009, UNESCO inaugurated the Aladdin Project, designed to serve as a platform for activities and educational and cultural initiatives that will bring closer Jews and Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. It was initially established by France, Jordan, and Germany; later on, other states such as Indonesia, Mauritania, Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt also joined. One of its endeavors involves the translation of literature and films about the Holocaust into the official languages of the UN, especially Arabic. The project even enables free digital download of the books, thus making quality content on the topic available. Morocco apparently liked the initiative and Mohammed VI, acknowledged the Holocaust in an official message to the initiators of the Aladdin Project. This was a rare official declaration by a leader of a Muslim country.

When the king speaks, his message begins to trickle downwards, even though obstacles are met along the way. In April 2010, André Azoulay, the advisor to the king, declared that the Moroccan Ministry of Education needs to introduce the Holocaust into educational programs in schools. This initiative elicited protest from pro-Palestinian groups: they called for him to pack up his belongings and leave the country. In response to the protest, an opposing campaign, supporting Azoulay and the message he sought to impart, ensued. Despite the opposition, various elements in Moroccan civil society have adopted Azoulay’s message with pride and organized lectures and conferences in higher education institutions, including testimonies by Holocaust survivors who came to Morocco to tell their stories. In September 2011, the Mimouna association, organized one of the first conferences in the Arab world under the title “Mohammed V: Righteous Among the Nations”. In addition, there are other initiatives in Morocco that seek to change and adapt the educational program, in order to increase the representation of all shades of Moroccan heritage, including Jews and Amazigh (Berbers), which at present are almost completely absent from the history books.

At the bottom line, although Holocaust studies have not yet been officially included in the Moroccan curriculum, it is possible that we will see this happen soon in light of the country’s special history. Morocco’s recognition and sensitive approach to the Holocaust is an additional sign of the special relationship between Jews and Muslims in Morocco and the way this relationship is being included as part of the broader Moroccan heritage.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and a strategic consultant specializes in Morocco.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Holocaust Studies in Morocco? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Opportunities on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas.

In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a gun. In fact, since he was elected as the President of the Palestinian Authority in 2005, Abbas has not set foot in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, losing control of it is part of his legacy.

In contrast to Yasser Arafat, who had roots in Gaza and spoke like one of the people, Abbas was born in Tzfat, from where his family fled to Syria, and has no special emotional connection to the Strip. Throughout his period in office, he has focused on the project of building the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the diplomatic battle against the State of Israel, neglecting the Gaza Strip. He abandoned the people of Gaza to the hands of Hamas and the economic mercies of the international community and Gulf states, trusting them to add patch after patch to cover the desolation and wretchedness of the Gaza Strip.

After three rounds of warfare, with the Gaza Strip tired and beaten, Abbas has still not changed his strategic approach towards it. Since 2014, not only has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority failed to stretch out its hand to support the people of the Strip economically but, moreover, has imposed a long series of economic sanctions which affect the civilians. These include failure to pay for fuel sent to the Strip, thus increasing civilian pressure on Hamas and proving to the residents of the Strip that the Islamist movement cannot provide for their most basic needs.

Following Abbas’ clear political failure to advance the vision of a Palestinian state, the political struggle against Hamas has become more significant. Hamas of 2018 is looking to the future, and its leadership deems itself the proper heir to the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Abbas, who lost the Gaza Strip, is not interested in losing the political leadership and the historical status of the Fatah movement within the PLO.

The bloody battles since summer 2007 are etched into the memories of Fatah members; the decade-long isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank has increased the estrangement between the sides; Abbas’ despair at the political process, alongside the suspicion and ideological and political disgust he feels towards Hamas, has led him to radicalize his position, making it difficult to reconcile the dialogue between the two sides.

Abbas’ main demand from Hamas to enable an advance towards reconciliation is that the movement dismantle its military wing. Hamas without Jihad, Hamas without arms, will lose not only its ideological identity but also its political bargaining chips. Understanding that Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, Abbas’ only option is to continue putting economic pressure on the movement’s rule in the Gaza Strip. He hopes that these steps will lead to mass protests against Hamas, enabling him to return to the Strip as victor.

The continued economic decline and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip heighten the tension between Hamas and Israel. Hamas must direct its anger and frustration outside, away from itself. Military conflict between Hamas and Israel can result in the dismantlement of Hamas’ weapons following an Israeli military campaign. In the past, the Palestinian Authority ruled out this option, but it seems that now, from Abbas’ perspective, any path that can eventually lead to a unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under his control is deemed suitable. Indeed, a unified control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase the Palestinian Authority’s prestige and allow it to exert greater pressure on the State of Israel in the future, should the peace process between the two sides resume.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation.

According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail.

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan’s special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of Islamic State. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: the public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king’s decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel’s decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel’s “everything will be OK” (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan’s quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves now national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so.

What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries’ shared experience.

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to “enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.” A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

In June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel’s foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement.

In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides.

The Israeli party is to be blamed for three failures: (1) For not stopping the building of new settlements in the occupied territories. On the eve of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, there were fewer than 120,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; by the end of 2016, the number had risen to 400,000 (not including East Jerusalem). This shows – in the Palestinian view – that Israel has never been sincere about implementing the agreement; (2) Israel has never indicated the end result, which is the building of an independent Palestinian state; (3) Israel – in spite of its military strength – has never been generous toward the Palestinians during the negotiations. Instead of treating the Palestinians with respect and honor, it continued humiliating and insulting them. After all, Israel received what it mostly desired – recognition – upfront, while the Palestinians’ most wanted demands – a state with recognized boundaries, control of East Jerusalem and resolution of the refugee problem – remained all unfulfilled.

The Palestinians, for their part, failed as well, on at least three fronts: (1) By not curbing the attacks of Hamas terrorists. It is debatable whether Arafat was capable of confronting Hamas militarily, but it is clear that he did not do his utmost to prevent these suicide attacks; (2) The Palestinian media, including the educational system, continued to delegitimize the Israeli side. This negative media campaign solidified the negative image of Israelis in Palestinian eyes and convinced Israelis that the Palestinians have not really changed their position toward them; (3) The Palestinians have never internalized that in spite of Israel’s military superiority, its psychological psyche needs continued assurance. Acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state would not be harmful to the Palestinians; in many ways it only reaffirms what had been already declared in the UN 1947 partition plan.

In spite of all these failures, the Oslo Agreement could have worked had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated in November 1995. History cannot tell us what could have occurred if Rabin had not been shot, yet in my research on missed opportunities in the ArabIsraeli conflict I reached the conclusion that Rabin – with his military background and political acumen – could have made the difference. It is important also to note that Rabin simultaneously negotiated with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; signing an agreement with him would have laid enormous pressure on Arafat to proceed as well.

We will never know whether Rabin could have succeeded, but his assassination removed from the field a major player who could have made a difference. This act was tantamount to the assassination of the Oslo track. The episode demonstrates that in spite of the importance of historical processes, the role of leaders in history is still paramount. This only accentuates the regretful conclusion that lack of leadership – on both sides of the conflict – is a major reason for the conflict’s endurance.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the atmosphere on the Gaza border has been heating up in recent weeks, the humanitarian crisis requires an urgent response. This is a clear Israeli interest, since the situation in Gaza encourages violence that affects life in Israel proper, leads to international criticism of Israel and stands in contrast to Jewish and human values.

There are several plans that outline ways to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, including the construction of a port in the El Arish area of Egypt, the construction of infrastructure facilities on an artificial island off the coast of Gaza, the development of the gas field opposite the Gaza Strip in favor of vital electricity generation and desalination projects, and the construction of a marine port in Cyprus.

The Cyprus option was discussed again recently at the initiative of Defense Minister Lieberman during the tripartite meeting between the defense ministers of Israel, Greece and Cyprus on June 22 in Nicosia. The proposed outline includes the construction of a seaport in Cyprus (or, in effect, the allocation of a number of docks in an existing port), which will serve as a conduit for the transfer of aid to the Gaza Strip under Israeli security supervision. The idea is not new, and the Cypriot response is generally cautious, although mostly positive. In the past, they tried to mobilize the EU in order to provide a sponsorship (mainly political) for the initiative and presumably this is what they will try to do now.

Nicosia, on one hand, attaches great importance to the close relationship with Israel, and hence the need for serious consideration of the Israeli request, which puts Cyprus in a power position as a significant regional player. On the other hand, the Cypriots understand that the Palestinian Authority is not enthusiastic about the idea, as generally they are fearful, and rightly so, to meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in view of the split between Hamas and Palestinian Authority.

In Cyprus, as well as in the EU, there is great understanding of Israel’s security concerns and presumably of Israel’s future demand for tight and efficient control of the goods to be transferred from a Cypriot port to the Gaza Strip. The idea of the Cyprus port, which can be part of a successful Israeli policy in the eastern Mediterranean, has several requirements: 1) serious Israeli-Cypriot (and perhaps Greek) dialogue; 2) discussion and arrangement with Egypt; 3) an international political umbrella with the participation of the EU, the US, and possibly relevant Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia); 4) an internal Israeli campaign to mobilize public support for such a move, including the support of the defense administration, which frequently warns against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The construction of a seaport for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus should be dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians; currently negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority do not seem feasible, therefore it should not be a precondition for advancing the initiative. However, there is a need to coordinate it with the Palestinian Authority, in order to neutralize any objection for such a move that could be seen as one that strengthens Hamas. There will also be a need for indirect coordination with Hamas (through the Egyptians) in order to ensure that conditions for a successful deal are in place.

The Israeli interest is to prevent a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip is not in sight, and therefore the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip is still the lesser of two evils in Israel’s view and certainly preferable to the takeover of a more radical Islamist groups.

Furthermore, Israel must initiate and even participate (including through a significant economic contribution) in such an extensive and ambitious effort to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. A sort of “Marshall Plan” is needed for the Gaza Strip, one that will mobilize the Arab states and the international community to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. Such a move would benefit everyone, including Israel, both politically and publicly. The latest round of violence in the Gaza Strip and the almost daily incidents illustrate the explosive potential of Israel-Hamas relations. Presumably, the current cease-fire will not last. The Cypriot initiative, however specific, can trigger a process that will help neutralize what appears to be an inevitable confrontation. Israel must seriously advance this initiative – the sooner the better.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Port in Cyprus Can Help Resolve Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Prior to the law’s passing, Arabic was considered Israel’s second official language, a fact that improved Israel’s image in the world due to its recognition of the Arab minority’s culture and identity. This helped Israel present itself as a democratic state, while acting as a bridge between the country and the Arab-speaking region. It also recognized the culture and identity of Jews from Arab countries, for whom Arabic is an inseparable part of their heritage. The fact that Arabic was an official language gave Arab speakers in Israel a sense of both hope and belonging, which is why a change in its status may exact a high price both internally as well as externally.

At the western most tip of Africa sits Morocco, a country that can serve as a fascinating case study on the development of national and cultural identity. Although Morocco is not the most economically advanced country in the world, and has quite a way to go in terms of human rights and democracy, it has, over the years, succeeded in formulating a model of an inclusive national identity, with the understanding and belief that difference and diversity should be encouraged and emphasized.

This wasn’t always the situation. When Morocco declared independence in 1956, it had to formulate a clear national identity after years of colonial influence. Morocco chose an Arab national identity, and through an intensive “melting pot” process, it molded its state symbols and institutions according to this homogenous identity. For example, Morocco joined the Arab League, Arabic was defined as the official language of the state, and some of the streets in the kingdom were given Arabic names.

In the wake of the decision, Morocco underwent an accelerated process of Westernization, which came at the expense of other identities in the kingdom, specifically that of the Amazighs, which make up half the population. The Amazighs, also known as Berbers, are considered the original residents of Morocco and North Africa. They are a separate ethnic group and speak Amazigh languages. The exclusion of Amazigh identity was manifested in banning the group’s languages in schools, on state television and radio broadcasts, and forbidding parents from giving their children Amazigh names on their ID cards. Instead, Amazigh citizens are given Arabic names, which they use at school and vis-à-vis state institutions, as well as an Amazigh name, which they use with family and friends.

This led to numerous Amazigh protests over the years, especially during the reign of King Hassan II. The protesters called to increase Amazigh representation in the Moroccan narrative, bridge socioeconomic gaps, make public services available, and promote employment and equitable distribution of resources. All this drastically changed with King Mohammed VI, who took power in July 1999, and who vowed to connect every home to electricity and water and laid down basic infrastructure in the Amazigh villages. Under the king, Morocco established the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, which works to revive Amazigh languages and to integrate the Amazigh heritage into the national curriculum and encourage research on the topic.

While the situation and representation of the Amazigh improved, the protests did not cease. In February 2011, the winds of the Arab Spring blew through the streets of the country, and hundreds of thousands of Moroccans protested across the kingdom. The king, who feared the protests could destabilize the country, took steps to placate the demonstrators, including by changing the constitution. In July 2011, the kingdom passed an amendment to the constitution by referendum, which redefined Morocco’s national identity as a Muslim state. This time, however, the amendment emphasized the country’s commitment to the rich and diverse heritage of all its residents:

“A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [Amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [Saharo-Hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

The amendment also brought about a change in the status of the Tamazight language, which for the first time became an official language of the state, as per Article 5 of the Constitution:

Arabic is the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/Amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception.

The wording of the amendment was able to emphasize the commonalities between Arabs and Amazighs without undermining the status of Arabic or Morocco’s Arab identity. And while the wording does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground, it does shape perceptions and reality, cultivating one of the central values of Moroccan nationalism, according to which difference and diversity are a source of strength.

The Moroccan case is not identical to that of Israel. And yet, the development of a national hegemonic Arab identity in Morocco to a heterogenous and multicultural one could serve as a lesson for the Jewish state.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute, and a member of the institute’s task-team, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries. This article is based on a study of Israel-Morocco relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט What Israel can learn from Morocco’s multiculturalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization.

It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah.

Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the Muslim and Arab worlds as a result of its control of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina (in fact, the king is called the Custodian of the Two Holy Places), and more than two million people perform the Hajj every year; (2) As an oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia has financial leverage over its beneficiaries that can be used in the diplomatic field when necessary; and (3) Saudi Arabia is considered a “neutral” player in the Israeli-Arab conflict by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia has no treaty with Israel (in contrast to Egypt and Jordan).

The most significant element in the Saudi change of rhetoric is that it potentially could change Saudi society’s image of Israel and the Jews and build a more congenial climate for peace – if and when it is achieved. At least one notable case study may prove this point: Egypt. In the pre-1973 period, certain Egyptian intellectuals began talking about the need to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, for the sake of Egyptian interests.

In the post-1973 period, these voices were given a free rein from above to disseminate their views and they undoubtedly played a role in Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977. The conclusion is that voices of peace sometimes precede and may foreshadow the actual peace.

Saudi Arabia does not need peace with Israel. Israel and Saudi do not share a border and there is no state of war between the two countries. In fact, the two have never fought each other. The Saudis are, however, concerned by regional instability – caused by deterioration on the Israeli-Palestinian or the Iranian fronts – and its impact on oil prices. This is partially the reason why the Saudis have already initiated two peace plans – the Fahd and Abdallah initiatives (1981 and 2002 respectively), which turned into Arab peace plans. Israel unequivocally rejected these initiatives, at least in part due to its negative image of the Saudis.

The changing climate in Saudi Arabia poses yet another opportunity to Israeli decision makers. In Saudi Arabia, they might find a partner who is most willing to cooperate against Iran and also willing to cooperate in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. The ultimate deal for Israel, to use a worn-out phrase, is not between Israel and the Palestinians – important as is – but with the greater parts of the Islamic and Arab worlds, to which Saudi Arabia might pave the way. There are no free lunches, but that is exactly what the Netanyahu government is trying to do with the Saudis, when he is trying to promote cooperation without giving anything in return in the Palestinian track. A move from the hidden to the public domain would necessitate a tangible reward to the Palestinians, but this is not likely to happen, unfortunately.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not stand out in an empty void. In May 2018, an official Bahraini delegation participated in the Giro D’Italia bicycle race, which was held in Israel, and last December an interfaith group of from Bahrain arrived in Israel to promote a dialogue for coexistence and religious tolerance. But, of the events and declarations betweenIsrael and Bahrain in the past year, perhaps the most important was the declaration made by the King of Bahrain in September 2017 at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa condemned the Arab boycott of Israel and announced that Bahraini citizens are now allowed to visit Israel.

In the background of the latest visit of the Israeli delegation to the UNESCO conference, the Israeli media rushed to publish a quote from a “senior Bahraini official” who claimed that “the kingdom will be the first of the Gulf states to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel”. With this announcement, it appeared that the Israeli excitement over the warming of ties between the two countries had reached a new peak. However, this enthusiasm, like many others in the past, reflects to a great extent more of a wishful thinking than an actual rapprochement. In that case, the foreign minister of Bahrain hastened to shatter the illusion of normalization by issuing an official declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that categorically denied the senior official’s claim.

In light of developments described in the relations between the two countries recently, the question asked is why Bahrain took a step back to the traditional position of the Gulf states reasserting its “commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative.” The key issue for understanding that dualist attitude lies in the level of openness on the one hand, and the sensitivity on the other, which characterizes the relations between Israel and Bahrain, and to a large extent, Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. Bahrain’s unique openness towards Israel stems from a combination of security interests, as well as political and social-religious issues.

First, both Bahrain and Israel are against Iran’s armament in nuclear weapons and supported Trump’s pulling out from the nuclear deal. Following the civil protests that broke out in Bahrain during the Arab Spring (2011), Iran criticized the legitimacy of the Sunni regime in Bahrain and supported the political struggle of the Shiite population in the country. As a small country with about two-thirds of its population being Shiite, Bahrain feels threatened by Iran and could use any ally in its diplomatic efforts against Iran’s nuclearization and a strong coalition in a scenario of military confrontation. The location of the US’ Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is not coincidental in this context, nor is the recent hesitant rapprochement with Israel.

Beyond the political and security implications of such converging interests, the shared interests and allegedly common enemy had led in general to a less hostile dialog between the countries in the formal channels, as well as between citizens over the social media platforms. Although difficult to measure, the general atmosphere rising from these exchanges seems to shift from the automatically anti-Israel approach to a more focused criticism in the context of the Palestinian issue, despite the diverse circumstances of events. One of the interesting manifestations of that was in the various comments to the Bahraini foreign minister’s tweet about Israel’s right to defend itself. Along with many sympathetic responses, there were also some negative reactions, but most of them called for advocating the same rights for the Palestinian people and did not reflect the usual narrative of delegitimizing Israel.

Second, Bahrain’s interest in promoting interfaith cooperation can also be associated with its growing openness towards Israel. This track has shaped a unique relationship between the two countries. As a regime that is being criticized for representing the minority Sunni community in Bahrain, the king seeks to advance a pluralistic policy to meet with the needs of the various sectarian and religious groups living in the country. Among them is a small Jewish community of about 100 people that emigrated to the region from Baghdad at the beginning of the 20th century. The partnership between the political and religious leadership of Bahrain with the Jewish Wiesenthal Center led to a natural linkage with Israel; however, its importance is manifested in the moderate, tolerant, and multicultural message that the regime wishes to express internally – addressing the various communities at home.

Thirdly, Bahrain is known for its self-confident, active political mentality relative to its regional power. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to host an Israeli minister (Yossi Sarid in 1994) and the first country in the region to declare Hezbollah’s military and political arms terrorist organizations. Bahrain regularly appeals to NATO against organizations affiliated with the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Bahrain represents a moderate pro-Western line that promotes women’s rights and rights for the many expatriates living in the country. Thus, Bahrain is a convenient ally for Israel, both politically and morally. However, Bahrain also has a political responsibility to maintain the fundamentals of the regional policies under which it operates, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore it will not rush to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel before the greater powers of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates do so.

Carmel Shama-Hacohen, Israel’s ambassador to the OECD and UNESCO, who was supposed to head the Israeli delegation at the conference in Bahrain, said in a radio interview that he would not attend the conference for political and security considerations. These reasons are also indicative of the great sensitivity in these relations as well as the great distance that Israel faces from achieving normalization with the Arab states, even with the moderate and less hostile ones. Eventually, Israel was represented by Deputy Israeli Ambassador to UNESCO and another Israeli diplomat on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The delegation’s participation is an example of a move that can be interpreted as a rapprochement between the two countries, but the far-reaching announcements voiced in the Israeli media hinder the small and measured steps being taken in this direction. In fact, not only did the report cause uneasiness among the Bahraini government, it also threatened the continued cautious rapprochement between the two countries.

Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Persian Gulf Studies, Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

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