Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The leaders played a significant role in the process. The president of South Korea, as opposed to his predecessors who supported tough policies and the enforcement of sanctions, adhered to his policy of dialogue with the neighbor to the north. He took advantage of the hosting of the Winter Olympics to invite a delegation from North Korea. Indeed, the participation of Kim’s sister in the opening ceremony was the harbinger of the change in North Korea’s position. On the other hand, North Korea’s president, Kim, has shown that his rigid and threatening image was wrong. Whether the economic sanctions and the fear of an American attack played a role, or whether in Kim’s view the last ballistic experiment has deterred the US, the result has been a change in his position. There are obviously those who fear that this is merely a tactical change designed to maximize profits within the international community, but in any case, the leadership has proven that it is capable of changing positions and initiating a “game-changing” course.

In comparison, the leaders on both sides of our “conflict” – Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – have not yet proved that they are capable and willing to promote a real solution to the conflict. Netanyahu’s hands are tied by his right-wing coalition that is ideologically committed to the vision of a greater Israel. He is also engaged in internal political struggles and is troubled by his legal issues of corruption. His policies and behavior convey that he has neither motivation nor determination to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, Abbas has so far escaped two rounds of negotiations, one with Olmert in 2008 and the second with Netanyahu in 2014, and it does not seem that he is inclined – now that he is approaching the end of his political career – to sign the deal of his life. Moreover, Abbas does not enjoy Palestinian legitimacy in the PA, while Hamas challenges his authority. There are two conditions that need to be met in order to promote a solution, legitimacy and determination. Both leaders do not meet these conditions, partially or fully.

The second element concerns the role of the mediator. Trump tried to give a feel of neutrality to his mediation, when he was secretly negotiating with North Korea, during which he also sent the head of the CIA, Pompeo (who in the meanwhile had been appointed Secretary of State) for a visit. He also wisely used “sticks” and “carrots”: on the one hand, he increased the economic pressure on North Korea and also threatened to take military action; On the other hand, he proposed to hold a summit with Kim soon, which previous presidents were not willing to do, thereby granting American legitimacy to the isolated president. Unfortunately, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump has so far made almost every possible mistake, the last of which is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The decision, which was meant to be part of the “carrots” that Israel would receive in exchange for its concessions in the negotiations, eliminated Trump’s pretense of becoming a neutral mediator. He can still correct this by making a counter-decision “in favor of” the Palestinians, but it does not appear that he intends to do so.

Finally, the outstanding issues in the two conflicts are completely different; The main issue in the Korean conflict is the unification of the two parts of the nation, which was arbitrarily separated during the Cold War: the north is afraid of losing power; while the south fears the economic costs of unifying a strong and progressive economy with the backward economy of the north. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated, but it has already been solved elsewhere, when East and West Germany united even though the conditions were different. More importantly, the Korean conflict does not include some of the explosive components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the question of borders, the question of Palestine’s independence, and notably the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The fact that the religious aspect does not play a role in the Korean conflict makes it less complicated and more manageable.

Beyond that, the history of “our” conflict does not work in Trump’s favor; external mediation alone has never been able to solve it. Peace with Egypt was initiated by Sadat; the Oslo Accords were initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil society players; while peace with Jordan was led mainly by Hussein and Rabin. It follows, therefore, that unlike the Korean story, Trump’s chances of breaking the impasse in our conflict are not great. If he wishes to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean arena seems more promising.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dr. Alon Levkowitz is an expert on Korea, teaches at Beit Berl College and is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Korea Is Not a Likely Precedent for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.