The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.

Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.

The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”G – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.

Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.

Hamas is not mentioned

The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

Ignoring the negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.

Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

הפוסט Arab Leaders Unite on Paper, but Who Will Rebuild Gaza? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the dust begins to settle from the wars of the past decade, a growing realization emerges: From the ruins of Gaza, Bint Jbeil, and Aleppo will rise the new political order that will define the Middle East for the coming decades. Those leading the rebuilding efforts will be the ones shaping the region’s political future.

The struggle over the narrative of reconstruction places Israel at a critical crossroads – whether to remain in the role of a destroyer or take part in shaping the region as a builder.

The choice is between a future of instability, extremism, and chaos – allowing Iran to reenter the arena – or a future of Israeli-Palestinian partnership in a comprehensive reconstruction plan. In this vision, physical rebuilding could serve as a foundation for reshaping Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, its adversarial neighbors to the north, and the wider Arab world.

The western Middle East lies in ruins, on a scale reminiscent of post-World War II Europe. The devastation is concentrated in three key areas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

The cost of restoring basic life-sustaining infrastructure in Gaza alone is estimated at $20 billion, barely a third of what will be needed to fully rebuild Gaza over the next decade.

Yet, Gaza’s reconstruction pales in comparison to the enormous task of rebuilding Syria, where the destruction caused by the civil war is estimated at $500 billion.

In Lebanon, devastation is the direct result of governance failure – corruption and systemic inefficiency that led to economic and social collapse, with the war merely adding a layer of physical destruction.

What unites these three arenas is the dramatic political shifts brought about by war. All three are in transition between old regimes and new governments, whose capacity to rule will be determined largely by the reconstruction efforts.

This makes rebuilding a direct factor in Israel’s security, not just in terms of immediate threats but also in shaping Israel’s long-term security environment and its relationships with Palestinians and regional states.

For example, who rebuilds southern Lebanon will directly impact the security situation on Israel’s northern border for years to come. If Hezbollah leads the reconstruction using Iranian funds, it will retain, at least partially, its status among the Shi’ite population and their willingness to support it militarily.

However, if Lebanon’s new government takes charge, relying on international economic aid, it could restore its sovereignty and reduce the willingness of southern Lebanese communities to turn their homes into Hezbollah rocket depots.

Similarly, the way Syria is rebuilt will influence its future relations with Israel. If the reconstruction is led by a regional and international coalition, it could serve as leverage to push the new Syrian leadership away from conflict. More importantly, such an effort would prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold, as Tehran is a global expert in exploiting chaos for strategic gains.

The urgency of reconstruction

Regional actors are beginning to grasp both the enormous potential and the pressing necessity of large-scale reconstruction. The sheer scale of destruction has transformed rebuilding into a challenge of historic proportions – akin to a regional Marshall Plan but led by the region itself, primarily the Gulf states.

The regional interest in reconstruction stems from a clear realization: Leaving the wounds of Gaza, Aleppo, and Lebanon open will create the conditions for the next regional war. For Arab states, rebuilding is first and foremost a matter of regional stability.

The recent war demonstrated how quickly shock waves from Gaza and Beirut can destabilize governments and disrupt trade routes across the Middle East. This vulnerability has created a sense of urgency among Arab states to intervene.

The release of Trump’s plan only intensified the urgency for these countries to present an alternative. This set the stage for the regional emergency summit held earlier this week in Cairo, initiated by Egypt to coordinate a joint reconstruction effort.

While momentum builds and plans take shape, Israel remains entirely absent from regional reconstruction efforts. Securing a place at the table – ensuring Israel has a say in shaping the post-war Middle East – requires it to forge a new kind of strategic partnership with those leading the rebuilding efforts, namely the Gulf states and other key Arab partners.

Yet at present, Israel is seen as an irrelevant spoiler – a military power capable of destroying any long-term reconstruction effort, but one that lacks a strategic vision or the willingness to plan for the future.

Above all, Israel’s messianic political vision for Gaza and the West Bank positions it as an obstacle. These policies run counter to the regional understanding that the long-term success of Gaza’s physical reconstruction is inseparable from establishing a stable political future for Gaza.

This is not just about Saudi or Emirati diplomatic sensitivities – it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. There is no logic in investing billions in developing Gaza’s port and energy infrastructure or Lebanon’s economy if they are destined to be bombed in the next escalation.

Yet, instead of engaging with the serious regional discourse on reconstruction, Israel’s leadership remains preoccupied with fantasies about a Gaza Riviera without Palestinians and delusional visions that even Trump’s advisers have abandoned in recent weeks.

As of today, Israeli decision-makers are the only actors in the world clinging to Trump’s so-called reconstruction plan. It took Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states three hours to dismiss Trump’s statement and clarify that their involvement in Gaza’s rebuilding depends on transferring control to a Palestinian authority.

Ultimately, participating in the critical process of regional reconstruction and the reshaping of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors demands a price that Israel’s current government finds unbearable – giving up its messianic dreams of annexation and population transfer. It requires a fundamental shift from being a force of destruction to becoming a partner in designing the Middle East’s future.

The article was published on March 9th, 2025, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Gaza Reconstruction is Israel’s Chance to Shape the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.