While Israel has generally provided effective military response to threats in its immediate maritime domain, such as curbing armed Palestinian terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the 1970s, it has failed to provide a significant naval response in the distant areas of the Red Sea.

It did not resolve Egypt’s obstruction since 1947 of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal by maritime force, nor did it remove the Egyptian blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits during the Yom Kippur War, although such options were examined, at least in 1973.

At the same time, Arab threats to these shipping lanes have created a rare opportunity for Israel to mobilize international support over the years. The blockade imposed on the passage of vessels or goods through the Suez Canal (1947-1967), and the current attacks on vessels in Bab-el-Mandeb threaten not only Israel but the fundamental international principle of freedom of navigation and, in the case of the Suez Canal, the specific international treaty anchoring its operations. Moreover, damage to vessels imposes an economic burden on all commercial maritime activity in the area, not only on shipping to and from Israel, due to increased insurance costs and circuitous shipping routes.

These circumstances generated international support for Israel whenever threats emerged in the Red Sea maritime space. In 1951, for example, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling on Egypt to allow the passage of goods and vessels to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. In 1957, president Dwight D. Eisenhower provided Israel with what it interpreted as a commitment to employ US naval assets to protect the freedom of navigation if the Egyptians once again blocked the Straits of Tiran from shipping to and from Israel.

However, these diplomatic achievements proved insufficient in the absence of international enforcement. The UN Security Council’s firm 1951 support for Israel did not prevent Egypt from hampering the passage of Israel-related shipping in subsequent years, with the issue ultimately resolved only by the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The 1957 American commitment regarding the Straits of Tiran did not translate into the use of international military force to open the waterway in the May 1967 crisis.

THE RENEWED threats and attacks on Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea, this time by the Houthis from Yemen, have prompted international concern at this violation of the international freedom of navigation, with a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the rebels to stop the attacks, and condemnation by at least 40 countries. The two superpowers – the United States and China – appealed directly to Iran to exert its influence over the Houthis to end the attacks. Even Russia avoided imposing a veto on the Security Council resolution.

Hesitating to attack the Houthis

This time, the declarations were translated into action. In December 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian by an international coalition of forces to protect traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The United States and Britain also attacked targets in Yemen in a bid to force an end to the Houthi attacks at sea.

But even the US-led coalition’s effort to defend freedom of navigation is being overshadowed by the same kind of international hesitation demonstrated in the past. Many Operation Prosperity Shield partners provide only symbolic assistance, which usually includes the deployment of a limited number of staff officers.

Most US allies in Western Europe did not join the coalition, translating their concern over the infringement of freedom of navigation into the dispatch of limited forces that would not operate under the US umbrella. Even Spain, an important NATO partner with a proud maritime heritage, refused to send troops, citing the need to avoid undermining “international peace.”

So far, the coalition has not achieved its objectives and the Houthi attacks continue. The escalation of the US response, which included a large-scale attack on Houthi targets together with UK forces, also failed to achieve its objective.

Nonetheless, over a month since the launch of the coalition’s activity, several insights can be gleaned with relevance for Israel.

FIRST, DEFENDING its interests requires increasing Israeli dependence on its allies, especially on the US, in addition to the dependence it has developed since the 1970s for the supply of weapons and political backing in the international arena. The current coalition includes, for the first time since 1991, the use of international, and particularly American, military force to defend Israeli interests (inter alia). The US naval force in the region, while trying to protect commercial shipping, is also intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis towards Israel. In fact, the Gaza war appears to have deepened the Israel-US military cooperation not only at sea, with Pentagon officials reportedly involved in top-level military discussions in Israel immediately after October 7.

Second, as was the case in 1991, such direct military dependence could be used by Washington as a lever to advance its preferences, for example on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Even if Israel’s incumbent prime minister seeks to repel such pressure and a different US president is elected in November, the potential for US leverage remains significant, given Israel’s reliance on US munitions.

Third, while Israel finds itself attacked in terms of its “international legitimacy” in arenas such as The Hague, it enjoys military protection from the international system in the Red Sea, and its interests are consistent with the Security Council’s resolution.

Moreover, China, which prides itself on good relations with all sides, implicitly holds Iran responsible for the infringement on freedom of navigation. The Chinese stance and Russia’s decision to refrain from vetoing the anti-Houthi Security Council resolution highlight the limitations of Iran’s strategy of confronting Israel on multiple fronts (its so-called “unity of arenas” strategy), for example by creating a potential wedge between Tehran and Beijing.

Planners in Jerusalem should examine the current Red Sea challenge in the broader context of chess with Tehran, and not only through the lens of a boxing match with Hamas in Gaza. Such a review could identify additional opportunities for Israel given the breadth, not to mention overload, of Iranian activity.

Fourth, coalition action is also significant in terms of Israeli force structure and its deployment. Israel is not a formal member of the maritime coalition, but it presumably coordinates with the US on certain aspects of the use of force in the Red Sea. The more this coalition (and perhaps similar ones in the future) contributes to protecting Israel, the better the conditions for Israeli participation in future coalition frameworks, including regional ones. This would require some adjustment to improve the suitability of Israeli forces to coalition action. Questions are also expected to re-emerge regarding Israeli military engagement in missions other than those for its own defense, such as the Western expectation in the 1950s that Israel would assist the coalition fighting in Korea at the time.

Finally, Israel’s adversaries clearly understand the harmful potential for Israel of a naval threat. The sea has traditionally been a secondary arena in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but recent developments in Bab-el-Mandeb have led Iran and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to declare that, under certain circumstances, they may threaten Israeli maritime interests in other areas as well, especially the Mediterranean Sea and Israeli ports.

The sea, therefore, may develop into an arena requiring greater Israeli effort, but could also create additional opportunities for international cooperation, and not only in the Red Sea.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 14.

הפוסט What Israel can learn from the US-led coalition’s attacks on the Houthis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The huge potential in the relationship has not yet been realized. Israel can successfully promote bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and hi-tech, but there is also the feasibility of promoting wider regional cooperation that will increase regional stability and the volume of trade. Jordan can also fulfill an important role in the political arena: leveraging the status it holds over holy sites in Jerusalem, supporting the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and serving as a stabilizing force in the region in general. In order to achieve these goals, Israel must change direction: seek to open new dialogue channels, prioritize relations with Jordan, be attentive to Jordan’s needs and complaints, and reexamine joint projects. Politicians and decision-makers in both countries must understand that inaction and neglecting the relationship will take a high toll.

The establishment of a new government in Israel in 2020 could provide an opportunity for significant change. This can begin with positive Israeli statements about the relations and their importance. Statements should then be transformed into concrete actions. This requires planning ahead of time. As such, we present a list of key recommendations the next Israeli government can take to restart the relationship with Jordan.

Expressions of goodwill and general support for the strengthening of relations are needed. Calls to annex the Jordan Valley and/or parts of the West Bank should be avoided and Jordan’s special role regarding the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem should be reaffirmed by Israeli leaders. Beyond that, Israel and Jordan need real ‘glue’ – substantial projects that will bring them together and focus the relations on growth and development. Israeli decision-makers should prioritize renewing joint projects in the fields of water and infrastructure, increasing exports of Jordanian goods to the Palestinian Authority and advancing cooperation in tourism, hi-tech and medical tourism.

Discussion of water issues should be expanded to include broader solutions in which Israel can assist Jordan. Such support should begin with catalyzing the Aqaba desalination project (even disconnecting it from the Red Sea-Dead Sea project if necessary) and expediting an expanded agreement of water supply from the Galilee to Jordan. Concurrently, we recommend advancing a comprehensive program for collaboration in other fields related to water and energy. That would include, for example, supplying desalinated water from the Mediterranean, supplying electricity from Jordanian solar fields (against Israeli gas supplied to Jordan) as well as other water and wastewater treatment projects, including cooperation in the reconstruction of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

Transportation is another field deserving of attention. During the last two decades, a network of regional railroads has been developed; this can facilitate a land bridge enabling rapid, economically competitive movement of goods between the Gulf states and the Mediterranean Sea. Jordan is strategically located at the junction of this railway system. Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is critical for the implementation of this initiative, which has vast potential to become a game-changer for the Jordanian economy.

Other high-priority issues (both new and pending) include the ‘Jordan Gateway’ joint industrial park, facilitation of trade through the trade corridor via Haifa Port, development of a new version of the QIZ trade agreement focusing on tourism and cooperation in exporting advanced industrial products and services to other markets. Israel must pay close attention to joint programs that have stalled and therefore generate frustration on the Jordanian side. We propose setting up an intra-ministerial task force on the subject, under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office and including representatives from the foreign ministry, as well as from the and ministries of regional cooperation, economy and defense.

Furthermore, the numerous obstacles to maintaining contact with Israel that Jordanian businesspeople face should be removed. Currently, they endure a cumbersome process to get visas to enter Israel, including prolonged and unexplained delays in processing applications, inconsistencies in rejection or approval and reluctance to in granting multi-entry visas. These difficulties drive away many of those Jordanian businesspeople who are interested in developing business relations with Israel, and this must be changed.

We are convinced that despite the unfulfilled potential and differing readings of the peace treaty by both parties a boost of energy and attention dedicated to renewing Israeli-Jordanian relations – along with advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – will transform the dynamics, create a healthy partnership and inject real substance into the peace treaty. In turn, these will provide for multiple economic and political opportunities that will expand bilateral relations and bear the fruits of peace. The stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom must be a priority for Israel, since it will provide stability on its longest border and cooperation from which both parties will benefit.

Yitzhak Gal is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and an adviser specializing in the Arab markets; Ksenia Svetlova is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute and a former member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recommendations for restarting Israel-Jordan relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.