הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A key cooperation opportunity lies in the field of energy, and specifically alternative energy transportation methods from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the Mediterranean. On a December 2020 visit to Abu Dhabi shortly before leaving office, Former Trump administration Energy Department secretary Dan Brouillette met with his counterparts from the Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel to discuss energy security and the use of pipelines for gas exports. “If we can move natural gas to the coast of Egypt or the coast of Israel, then we’re moving it through the Mediterranean,” he said. He was referring both to the strategic aspect of such a move vis-à-vis Iran, and the importance of diversifying energy export routes from a sensitive region such as the Persian Gulf.

Following a visit to the Emirates in late January, Israeli Energy Ministry Director-General Udi Adiri issued a statement underscoring “the unique opportunity to develop the energy economy of both states and the entire region.” Adiri said his office was promoting a series of infrastructure projects designed to provide a connection to Europe, “and perhaps to Gulf infrastructure in the future. Electricity and natural gas projects will improve regional cooperation.”

It should be noted that the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company) signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2020 for the transportation of fossil fuel from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The fuel and oil products from the UAE will be shipped to a Red Sea terminal in Eilat and from there to the Mediterranean Ashkelon terminal for distribution to clients. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of the then-US Treasury Secretary and the Emirati Minister of Economy.

Reports and analyses have also emerged in recent weeks about plans for an overland pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. These plans have been denied, citing the high costs of such a project, but those involved in the plans appear to be seized with a spirit of creativity.

The diplomatic-strategic rationale is clear. Diversifying gas and oil export routes from the Gulf would reduce the total dependence on the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, strategic sea route considerably vulnerable to an Iranian attack. In other words, a pipeline running through Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian or Israeli coasts, as mentioned by the former US Energy Secretary, could change the regional energy map and the relationships between the countries involved.

For now, these ideas and plans are all only on paper. However, they have already generated clear concern in Egypt given their possible implications for the Suez Canal.

The head of the Canal Authority has expressed concern about linking the Europe-Asia pipeline to the Persian Gulf. In an Egyptian television interview (January 29) he noted that Egypt was examining ways to deal with the “Israeli-Emirati project” – as he defined it – that could significantly reduce traffic through the canal.

Income from shipping through the canal, it should be noted, is vital to the Egyptian economy, which has already been severely affected by the novel coronavirus crisis. Such plans could also undermine Egypt’s aspirations to become a regional energy hub.

AS PRECIOUSLY noted, the projects’ diplomatic-strategic rationale is sound. The congruence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel, largely based on fear of Iran, could be translated into the energy field.

Nonetheless, Israel has no interest in undermining its relationship with Egypt. Serious thought must be given to integrating Egypt or compensating it appropriately if that is not possible. From an American standpoint, diversifying export alternatives from the Persian Gulf fits its interest in energy security and does not appear to contradict the Biden Administration’s desire to return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

Nonetheless, these plans generate many challenges and question marks. Can the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia adopt such strategic decisions? Is the level of trust with Israel sufficiently high and stable? And if so, can it be preserved and survive future crises? What about the problematic implications for Egypt? And what about the tremendous costs of such an overland pipeline? And of course, what is the position of the new US administration?

In-depth thinking is required to examine the seriousness and feasibility of such plans. Clearly, the Gulf angle opens up a new horizon for relevant players.

Israel is at a strategic-energy crossroads, facing a new range of options. At a news conference (February 14)) alongside the visiting Cypriot president, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to regional cooperation in the post-Abraham Accords era, including energy cooperation. Netanyahu mentioned the UAE’s desire to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and reiterated the shared interest in the proposed East-Med gas pipeline to Europe. The Cypriot president presumably asked how the Gulf angle could be combined with the Hellenic one. As far as Israel is concerned, the two could be complementary.

At issue are strategic-scale decisions and projects. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated global economic uncertainty and cast a measure of doubt on the feasibility of these energy plans and the willingness of international energy companies to invest significant sums given the unclear post-pandemic economic picture.

Nonetheless, Israel is at a fascinating crossroads with significant room for maneuverability. It must ensure a close relationship with the Biden Administration, a necessary precondition for taking advantage of the maneuvering room it now has. The main obstacle for Israel is clear: to conduct itself in light of US plans to renew the nuclear deal with Iran, and to a lesser extent in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a manner that does not place it on a collision course with Biden’s Washington.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2021.

הפוסט Do the Abraham Accords open up new energy opportunities? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel also maintains good ties with Oman and Qatar. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2018 visit to Oman would have made it a natural to follow the UAE and Bahrain in normalizing ties with Israel, but for now that has not occurred. The death earlier this year of the veteran ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, and rise of his successor – as well as Bahrain’s desire to maintain its position as mediator between Iran and the West – are preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, for now. Qatar, although supposedly in the enemy camp, conducts a sophisticated policy of keeping its options open with Israel. Qatar is helping Gaza build infrastructure and pay the salaries of Hamas officials, bringing suitcases full of cash into the enclave. The aid is helping maintain the peace along the Gaza border with Israel, which is clearly in the interests of both Israel and Egypt. During his stops in Israel en route to Gaza, Qatari envoy Mohammed al-Emadi meets with decision-makers in Jerusalem, and thus Israel and Qatar maintain channels of communications even absent formal ties.

The opening of Israeli embassies in Abu Dhabi and Manama will serve as convenient platforms for expanding clandestine and open ties in the Gulf – and strengthen Israel’s hold in the region, right across from Iran. In fact, just as Iran’s allies (Syria and Hezbollah) are positioned on Israel’s borders, Israel now has a foothold near Iran’s borders through the Emirates and Bahrain, as well as along its northern border through its presence in Azerbaijan.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi supported Israel’s warming relations with the Gulf. In fact, Egypt constitutes an important link because it enjoys a close relationship with the UAE and the Saudis, which provide it with financial help, and on the other hand maintains close security and intelligence cooperation with Israel on Gaza and Sinai. Israel also enjoys security and intelligence cooperation with Jordan, although unlike Egypt, the diplomatic relationship between Israel and Jordan is strained due to Israel’s position on the Palestinian issue. The crisis is reflected in severed ties between Netanyahu and King Abdullah, and the monarch’s decision to implement the clause in the peace agreement with Israel that stipulates the return of two border enclaves, Tzofar and Naharayim, leased to Israel for 25 years.

At the same time, Israel has improved ties with Sudan. Israel established diplomatic relations with South Sudan upon its independence in 2011, and has clandestine ties with Khartoum dating back many years, including under Omar al-Bashir’s regime, which toppled in 2019. The new regime views Israel and the Jewish lobby in the US as important conduits for influencing the administration to remove Sudan from the US list of terror-supporting states. Netanyahu met in Uganda last year with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s interim ruler. Behind-the-scenes contacts are under way among Israel, Sudan and the US, and the two states will likely soon establish official ties. Unlike relations with the Gulf states, ties with Sudan are not of economic significance for Israel, but its location, both along the Nile and along the Red Sea, makes it a strategic asset in the Middle Eastern arena.

Israel’s enhanced standing in the Middle East stems from three factors. First, the culmination of several processes that were long in the making in terms of ties with the Gulf states. Second, a weakening of radical Arab states such as Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, in the wake of the Arab Spring, and the commensurate strengthening of the wealthy Gulf states (except for Bahrain) that managed to evade the Arab Spring shock waves. Third, a particularly friendly US administration helping Israel boost its standing in the region. And finally, the weakening of Arab support for the Palestinian problem, partly the result of erosion in the Arab commitment to resolution of the problem and partly of the economic deterioration in the Middle East due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Over the past year, Israel has found itself playing three roles in the Middle Eastern arena. The first, and perhaps the most important, is balancing the Iranian and Turkish aspirations for regional hegemony with an unofficial alliance with the core states of the Arab Sunni world – Egypt, Jordan and some of the Gulf states. The second role Israel is playing is in dividing the Muslim and Arab world. The peace agreements with the UAE and Bahrain deepen the divisions in the Arab world between supporters and opponents of the move. The third role is one of mediator between Arab states and the US administration, directly or through the Jewish lobby. This mediation includes Egyptian and Jordanian demands for US economic help (for example through International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans), support for the sale of F-35 jets to the UAE and for Sudan’s request to be removed from  the list of terror supporting states and support for Morocco’s request for US (and Western) recognition of its annexation of Western Sahara.

Part of Israel’s success in the region stems from its non-involvement in regional conflicts, some of them far from its borders, such as those in Libya and Yemen. However, Israel did not intervene in Syria’s civil war, either, other than aerial strikes on Iranian or Hezbollah positions there.

The overall threat against Israel essentially remains unchanged. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and Turkey, in part, continue to constitute threats, but none is existential. What is more, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and US sanctions on Iran, the repercussions of the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s difficulties in Lebanon following the Beirut port blast, and the Hamas troubles in Gaza reduce the intensity of the threat against Israel. Turkey is somewhere in the middle, because despite the diplomatic tensions stemming from Israel’s rapprochement with Greece and Cyprus, Israel and Turkey continue to maintain diplomatic ties (although not at ambassadorial level) and commercial ties to the tune of several billion dollars annually.

Israel’s failure, however, lies in its divorce from the Palestinian problem. Israel and the US have significantly weakened the Palestinian Authority, adopting unilateral measures such as US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, US aid cutoff to UNRWA, US President Donald Trump’s peace plan and the annexation idea. The peace with the Emirates has saved Netanyahu in the short term from the danger of annexation, but Israel’s continued indifference to the Palestinian issue could overshadow the current achievements next year. Israel must address this problem by establishing an active dialogue with the Palestinian leadership. The Jewish year 5781 will likely be dedicated to medical issues, but resolution of the Palestinian problem is also important for the health of Israeli society.

**The article was published on Jpost, 7 October 2020

הפוסט Israel in the Middle East: A year of achievements and one big failure הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a part of the tourism industry, I often come across Jordanians, Egyptians, Moroccans, Iraqis and other nationals from the Middle East who express great interest in visiting Israel. Some contact me in person, and others through colleagues or mutual friends. In most cases, these are middle-class people who dream of visiting the holy sites of Islam in Israel or liberal, educated people who want to experience an encounter with the other – and sometimes both. Nevertheless, it seems that even when there is a will and the financial means necessary, there is a particularly stubborn barrier: the lack of reciprocity and the heavy bureaucracy involved in visiting Israel for tourists from the MENA region.

Israel calls this policy the “Countries under Consideration.” It is applied to nationals from Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, South Sudan, Mali and Mauritania. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are still defined as enemy states, and their nationals are banned from visiting Israel. Nationals from these countries are subject to security checks before the tourist visa is granted. Meeting Israel’s security standards, even if the process is justified, is cumbersome and extends the application process by many months. Sometimes the application remains simply unanswered. In these cases, the excitement and interest of visa applicants from these “countries under consideration” who managed to overcome the initial barriers are replaced by despair and frustration. The gap between the need for security checks and the problematic way in which they are carried out requires rethinking.

Israel’s ties with most of the countries in the Middle East are largely based on security and economic interests, partially due to the ‘closed door’ that tourists from those countries face. This is the case, for example, with Jordan and Egypt, who have signed peace agreements with Israel. While the current security coordination between Israel and Egypt is currently at its highest level, the number of Egyptian tourists visiting Israel in 2018 was only about 6,200, some of whom are Coptic tourists who came on organized tours. The number of Egyptian tourists looks even smaller when it is compared to the 400,000 Israeli tourists who visited Egypt that same year, even though most likely traveled to peripheral Sinai, rather than to Cairo.

Although the number of Jordanian tourists was higher, it is far from reaching its true potential. A total of about 18,000 Jordanians visited Israel in 2018, some of whom were visiting their friends and relatives. Jordan also serves as a transit hub for tourists traveling from Israel to other Middle Eastern countries due to the presence of an Israeli embassy in Jordan. Muslim pilgrims from the MENA region visit Jordan on their way to Mecca and Medina and some participate in tours that visit the holy sites of Islam in Jerusalem. Jordan is also a transit hub for Arab and Palestinian citizens of Israel who travel to Mecca and Medina or for those who are seeking to obtain a visa for an organized trip to Lebanon. The sanctity of Jerusalem, which is a source of conflict in some areas, is a source of creative solutions when it comes to the tourism industry.

There are also tourists from countries in the region which do not have official diplomatic relations with Israel and Morocco is one of them. Israeli tourists were granted a special permit to visit Morocco since the 1980s. This became official in the 1990s while the Oslo process was underway. Despite the warm relations between the peoples, the number of Moroccan tourists who visited Israel in 2018 is still low, standing at about 3,000. In the absence of an Israeli representative office in Rabat, the bureaucratic process is long, expensive, and complicated, sometimes requiring travel outside of Morocco to obtain a tourist visa to Israel more than one time. In an attempt to help their Moroccan friends, some Israelis apply for a visa from the Interior Ministry in their lieu, but even then, there is no easy solution. The Israeli applicant is required to deposit between 10,000 and 30,000 NIS to the bank account of the Interior Ministry. The deposit is refunded only after the tourist leaves the country. An Israeli t
ravel agency that organizes trips from Morocco or one of the other “countries under consideration” to Israel is required to deposit 200,000 NIS in advance and is liable for the group visiting Israel throughout their stay in the country.

In contrast to the Israeli bureaucracy, Morocco shows flexibility, which makes it possible to leverage the deep cultural connection and bring about a consistent growth in the number of Israeli tourists who visit Morocco every year. As the former King of Morocco Hassan II put it, “when a Jew leaves Morocco, we do not lose a citizen, but gain an ambassador.”

**The article was published by Jpost on 2 October 2020.

הפוסט Tourism is the key for civic ties between Israel and the MENA region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Even prior to recent normalization agreements, Israel had a wide record of ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These ties intensified in recent years and created an infrastructure conducive to the normalization of relations, with multinational and multicultural platforms as the key component. Multilateral engagement on events and agreements or in organizations, agencies, drills, and forums has several advantages for states that do not maintain official diplomatic ties: It legitimizes cooperation by blurring direct contacts, forges collaboration through broad alliances with many players, and facilitates unofficial ties without having to formalize them.

Both the UAE and Bahrain regularly host a variety of multilateral events, reflecting their ambitions to become global hubs for diplomatic, cultural, and economic affairs. Within this framework, they expanded their engagement with Israel and increased the visibility of their ties. Each year, new breakthroughs in relations were achieved under the auspices of international umbrellas, challenging the opposition to normalization with Israel and presenting different interpretations of it.

In the early 2010s, the UAE began permitting Israeli participation in international sporting events hosted in the country. In 2015, Israel opened a formal mission in Abu Dhabi within the framework of the United Nations’ International Renewable Energy Agency. As a host country, the UAE clarified that the presence of the Israeli office did not alter the status of the formal diplomatic relations between the two. In 2018, the UAE allowed Israeli delegations to display national symbols at international events, taking yet another step toward the normalization of relations. Over the next year there was a strengthening of civilian ties, mostly through interfaith initiatives on the part of the Gulf Arab states and their increasing openness toward Judaism. The UAE declared 2019 its “Year of Tolerance.” Within this context, the county announced the establishment of the Abrahamic House, with a mosque, church, and synagogue together in one complex. Already, in 2017, a Bahraini delegation visited Israel to promote religious tolerance and, in 2019, Jerusalem’s chief rabbi visited Bahrain for an interfaith event. Then, in 2020, an additional aspect of direct, public ties emerged with the arrival of two Emirati planes in Israel carrying humanitarian aid for the Palestinians. In June, Israel and the UAE made a joint announcement on scientific cooperation on developing a coronavirus vaccine.

Moreover, ongoing ties reflect the stability of these relations. The UAE admits Israeli visitors bearing foreign passports, even those issued in Tel Aviv; a dual passport bypasses direct ties, by channeling them through an Israel-Gulf-third country triangle. And outside the UAE and Bahrain, international conferences in third countries provided a venue for senior Israeli figures to meet with top Emiratis and Bahrainis.

Multilateral and Bilateral Interactions Between Israel and the UAE or Bahrain

There has been a wide gap between multilateral and bilateral interactions. In the diplomatic sphere, numerous Israeli ministers have visited Bahrain or the UAE, usually for international events hosted in either country. Economically, trade and business deals occurred mostly through third parties, as did overt security deals and drills. And on the civil channels, sports and religion connected Israelis, Bahrainis, and Emiratis in joint platforms. While bilateral relations were covert for the most part and few in number, the international frameworks provided much more significant platforms for engagement, which included exposure and enabled a gradual warming of ties. These ties were a significant element helping to pave the way over time for formal normalization of relations.

Drawing from the experience of the building of ties with the UAE and Bahrain, Israel and other Arab countries can mobilize governmental and civil society players to cultivate relations. An initial step would include mapping multilateral platforms to identify potential opportunities, such as with international business collaborations, research institutes, sporting and cultural events, international forums, and humanitarian aid agencies. Then, proactive outreach could increase potential invitations and engagements. Further, Israel can invest in efforts to host multinational and multicultural organizations and conferences and invite Arab states to take part.

It will take time until such initiatives coalesce into warmer relations and potentially significant diplomatic ties between the states involved. Nevertheless, the “routinizing effect,” created by increased opportunities to engage, promotes ties and brings nations closer. The process requires a large degree of diligence and persistence. But it holds the potential to create a firm basis for stable, long-term ties and perhaps normalized relations.

The article was published on AGSIW.

הפוסט Multilateral Platforms Built Framework for Ties with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Sounds familiar? Indeed, the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates is a prime example of this school of thought.

Since its founding, Israel has operated in two contradictory directions in its strategy towards other states in the Middle East. The first direction was focused on efforts to resolve the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict, i.e. the conflict with the Palestinians, based on the assumption that this would facilitate the participation of Arab states in the process. The other direction was to strive for agreements with Arab states in the hopes that removing them from the conflict would weaken the Palestinians and force them to the negotiating table.

Throughout most of the conflict, Israel has opted for the first policy.

The clandestine ties between Israel and the UAE date to the early days of the 21st century and were conducted by representatives of Israel’s Mossad and other defense agencies. Transportation Minister Ephraim Sneh was the first senior Israeli politician to visit Dubai secretly in 2001. The goal was to establish intelligence and security links to counter the Iranian threat.

A major change occurred following the 2004 death of UAE Federation President Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan and the rise of a younger, more daring and pro-Western generation, especially of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, known by his acronym, MBZ. Initial indications of change emerged in 2005 during Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, with the involvement of an Emirati tycoon in a scheme to purchase Jewish settlement greenhouses and sell them to Palestinians in Gaza. Media exposure jettisoned the deal.

Tzipi Livni, who served as Foreign Minister (2006-2009) in the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, also maintained good relations with MBZ. WikiLeaks documents cite a senior Israeli diplomat as saying that the Emiratis “believe Israel can work magic” in Washington. Indeed, belief in the influence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. has always constituted an important motivation for Arab states in seeking relations with Israel, and the UAE is no exception.

In 2009, then-Mossad Director Meir Dagan suggested to incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel sell drones to the Emirates in return for its cooperation against Iran. Netanyahu approved the transaction, but it did not materialize due to concerns over the leak of advanced U.S./Israeli technology, as well as internal Israeli turf wars.

Then Israel’s 2010 Dubai hotel assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a Hamas operative charged with smuggling weapons from Iran to Gaza, soured relations between the sides. It took two years of covert contacts between Israel and the UAE, facilitated by the US, to reach understandings on the rules of the game.

Relations grew closer following the 2011 Arab Spring and the growing instability it generated in the region, the strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood and increasing concern over Iran’s nuclear program in the wake of its 2015 deal with the Obama administration. Israel scored a major diplomatic achievement in 2015 when the Emirates agreed to Israeli representation at the Abu Dhabi-based International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) established in 2009. The Israeli representative provided an important “peephole” into developments in the Gulf.

Since his 2008 appointment as UAE Ambassador to the U.S., Yousef al-Otaiba has played an important role in consolidating relations with the American Jewish community and Israel. In June 2020, he wrote a landmark op-ed piece in the Hebrew-language Yediot Ahronoth newspaper warning Israel about the potential repercussions of annexation in the West Bank. The headline, “Annexation or Normalization,” served as the opening shot of secret negotiations that culminated in the agreement.

The agreement itself is a prime example of a win-win diplomatic achievement. For Israel, it is an official agreement with a third Arab state, following Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), at relatively little cost.

Giving up the annexation plan, a concession Netanyahu claims is temporary, was in any case an admission that the ambition was dead in the water. President Donald Trump, for his part, hopes to capitalize on the deal to boost his election campaign, while the Emirates is portraying itself as the savior of the Palestinians from the annexation threat. The Palestinians, and others, are obviously not buying this claim.

The Emirati interest lies in positioning itself as a key Middle Eastern and Arab player, as evidenced by its involvement in recent years in Yemen, and far-off Libya and Somalia. Agreement with Israel also positions the UAE as a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From now on, any Israeli measure potentially harmful to the Palestinians, such as annexation for example, could result in abrogation of the peace pact. To a certain extent, Israel will be “hostage” to its Arab affairs policy.

Other Arab states are rumored to be waiting in the wings to follow the UAE, for example Bahrain that has also conducting broad clandestine ties with Israel over the past two decades, and Oman, which has been secretly dealing with Israel since the 1970s, and where Netanyahu visited in October 2018. However, Oman’s veteran leader Sultan Qaboos has since passed away, after 50 years in power, and his successor might not be as bold as Qaboos was.

Observers of the Israel-Arab conflict have long argued that the glass ceiling of relations between Israel and the Arab world cannot be broken unless the Palestinian problem is resolved, or at least significant progress is made toward resolving it. The agreement with the Emirates, and possibly with others states, completely undermines this fundamental concept.

It is still too early to draw far-reaching conclusions, but several thoughts come to mind.

First, the Emirati move was not without a quid-pro-quo in Palestinian currency.

Netanyahu was forced to renege on a pledge that was the foundation stone of his doctrine. While the concession stemmed from an admission that annexation was not truly feasible, and while it in no way advances a solution to the conflict, it is similar in importance to Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from its Gaza Strip settlements by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. If Netanyahu cannot carry off West Bank annexation, no right-wing leader can.

Second, the move by the UAE undoubtedly constitutes a crack in the glass ceiling, but not its break.

The clear and significant sign that it has been smashed will be given by Saudi Arabia, the heavy-weight of the Gulf players in terms of its influence and importance in the Arab and Muslim world, if and when it agrees to normalize relations without any progress on the Palestinian front. The Saudis undoubtedly back the Emirati decision, and they also officially recognize Israel within its 1967 borders, but they are unlikely to give up this card without a significant Israeli concession.

Third, the glass ceiling with the Arab world is still intact as far as the public is concerned. Popular Arab opposition to Israel is alive and well, the result of various factors, including failure to resolve the Palestinian problem. Therefore, if Israel wants full recognition as a regional player it must address the core of the conflict.

Israel is wrong to seek agreement with Arab states while circumventing the Palestinians. Its attempt to isolate and weaken the Palestinians could end in the Palestinians being pushed towards violent struggle as a last resort. Israel will then claim that the Palestinians have reverted to violence once again, ignoring its own role in this deterioration.

The agreement with the Emirates – significant as it is – must be accompanied by an Israeli initiative for resolving the Palestinian issue. It would be nice to visit Dubai, but Ramallah is more important.

The article was published on Haaretz, 26 August 2020.

הפוסט How the UAE and Saudi Arabia Now Hold Israel Hostage הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This extraordinary development comes after almost two decades of rapprochement, careful diplomatic work and a significant shift in global and regional realities that changed perceptions and created new norms. But is there more to the new deal between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi than just diplomacy, a potential military alliance, F-35 stealth fighter jets and reputational gains for the political leadership?

When I first visited the UAE back in 2006, I found that the telephone lines to Israel were blocked, and so were Israeli websites. This reality, reminiscent of the 1970s, when the oil boycott was launched and hateful statements about Israel were the norm, puzzled me.

Saudi and Emirati media outlets (especially those published in London) were presenting readers with a different view of Israel: as a partner rather than an enemy. The signs of growing cooperation were everywhere – in trade, defense and diplomacy.

The 2000s had shaken the traditional dichotomous view of Israel in this part of the Arab world. The tragic events of 9/11; the fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of Iranian hegemony in Iraq; the Arab Spring; black ISIS flags; and the desire of the US to break away from the Middle East had created a new reality: It was not Israel but Iran as well as radical Islamist movements and dissatisfaction among people that were threatening Arab regimes and their stability.

The Palestinians, who were once useful as a tool for mobilization of the masses around their leaders, were largely irrelevant to this new reality, while Israel, as it turned out, held some important keys: advanced technology and weapons, military and economic might, and, most important, the key to the White House. The younger leadership in the region was looking for cooperation, not war, with Israel.

The deal that reached this month between the UAE and Israel reflects all of these realities. While Israel gets to normalize relations with an influential Middle Eastern country that is determined to shape the region in its own image, with an emerging and ambitious leader, the UAE is upgrading its position with the US and laying its hands on state-of-the-art weapons that were previously unavailable, such as F-35 stealth jets (which, by the way, came as something of an unpleasant surprise to the Israelis, who were unaware of this part of the price tag).

Perhaps Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has decided that Israel needs to be more like the UAE and other Arab states in the region, as the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry, and even his partners in the “unity government” – Alternative Prime Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi – were kept in the dark about the deal.

Netanyahu wanted to be the only beneficiary on the Israeli side. But with news of the F-35s, this means he will have to accept full responsibility for the departure from a decades-old principle of Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) in the region.

Amos Gilad, executive director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, told The Media Line that if what has been published regarding the F-35 deal with the UAE is true, it is a grave and dangerous reality.

“Israel currently enjoys extremely close and comfortable relations with the Arab states. This unprecedented reality is based on military superiority of Israel in the air and the image of a strong country that is capable of dealing with any threat or hostile coalition,” Gilad, a retired general and former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Defense Ministry, told The Media Line.

“If Israel is ready to give up the principle of QME – which is [enshrined in] law in United States, for the sake of a normalization agreement with the UAE, more states will demand to get the F-35, which is a revolutionary weapons system that is so much more than just a plane,” he continued.

“Israel is mortgaging its future to developments in the region that might surprise us all,” Gilad continued.

“Turkey and Iran were once close allies of Israel, and now the former is rather hostile to Israel and the latter is Israel’s sworn enemy, while the Muslim Brotherhood was able to take over Egypt not so long ago,” he said. “One has to keep this in mind.”

A source in the Israeli defense establishment who spoke with The Media Line on condition of anonymity, expressed similar sentiments.

“Although there is no immediate danger to Israel from this development, more Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt will demand to buy F-35s, and the principle of military superiority will be lost,” the sources stated. “Also, no one knows what the future might bring or what force, hostile to Israel, might suddenly take charge.”

Nevertheless, there is definitely more to the agreement with the UAE than F-35s and good PR for everyone involved. There is genuine hope that this time, the peace between Israel and an Arab country will not only look like peace, but will include mutual visits, trade, cooperation and diplomacy. There is hope that it has the potential to eventually open a door to an ultimate deal in the Middle East, one that might be facilitated by the US but which will emerge here, in the region itself.

The Palestinian issue might not top the Arab agenda today, yet it is clear that as long as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are simmering, and as long as Qatar, Turkey and Iran get to decide the level of hostilities between Gaza and Israel, it will be hard to achieve stability in this part of the Middle East. The latest rocket attacks and incendiary balloons from Gaza should remind one and all that Israel shares its borders with Palestinians, and not with Dubai.

The question now is what is next for the US, the Arab states and the Palestinians? Will the parties concentrate merely on developing bilateral relations, investment and defense cooperation? Or will they will invest time and energy in order to eventually forge a new regional deal, one that will include not only normalization with Israel in return for some American perks, but also a just and reasonable solution to Palestinian grievances?

The Middle East is in dire need of such a deal in order to push back the Iranian threat, handle radical Islamist forces and rebuild Arab countries and societies crushed by civil wars, economic hardships and repressions. A genuine and powerful “alliance of the moderates” must emerge.

At present, the obstacles to such a rosy future are enormous. The regional challenges are grave, the divisions are deep and the chances for success are small. And yet, “the times, they are a-changin’,” even in the Middle East.

The article was published on the medialine, August 9 2020.

הפוסט UAE, Israel Deal Could be Just the Beginning הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper compares the discourse promoted by the Israeli government, especially by the Prime Minister, that seeks to create an alternative discourse with the one that prevailed until a decade ago. The new discourse is constructed around two main pillars: hope for better relations with the Arab world, but not for a real “peace” or “agreement”, and the belief that it is possible to promote such relations even without attending to the relations with the Palestinians. According to the new working assumptions of the Israeli leadership, this is possible because the Arab world no longer takes interest in the Palestinian struggle as it did in the past, due to two reasons: first, the conflicts within the Arab world (especially the Shia- Sunni conflict) push the moderate Arab states to view Israel as a partner rather than an enemy; and second, because of joint regional interests.

This new perception has no ground to stand on since historically, the relations between Israel and the Arab states have always depended on the Israeli-Palestinian relations. It also overturns the Arab League Initiative, which Netanyahu once claimed was “dangerous to the State of Israel in its current form” (2007) and later claimed “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative” (2016). The “new” Netanyahu is willing to welcome the initiative as a basis for regional peace because he is ignoring its major requirement that an Israeli- Palestinian agreement be signed prior to the establishment of normal regional relations. This article focuses on the discourse promoted by the Prime Minister and his surroundings since they are the most dominant and central actors shaping the debate. Moreover, even Netanyahu’s political opponents find it difficult to create an alternative discourse: In the absence of a Palestinian partner, who can oppose any strengthening of ties with the Arab states? However, this discourse, sometimes consciously and overtly, tries to avoid the main problem: without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world cannot be normalized. Therefore, this perception leads in practice to continued attempts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of encouraging its resolution.

**Published as part of the publication series: Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries: The unfulfilled Potential

הפוסט Netanyahu’s Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.