ארכיון Saudi Arabia - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/saudi-arabia/ מתווים Tue, 20 May 2025 14:44:13 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Saudi Arabia - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/saudi-arabia/ 32 32 Saudi Arabia’s Status in the Regional Arena and Relations with Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/saudi-arabias-status-in-the-regional-arena-and-relations-with-israel/ Tue, 20 May 2025 14:44:13 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12935 Dr. Aziz Alghashian is a Saudi researcher specializing in the kingdom’s foreign policy strategies. He is a senior research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. Alghashian is especially known as an expert on Saudi–Israeli relations and broader Arab–Israeli affairs.

הפוסט Saudi Arabia’s Status in the Regional Arena and Relations with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. Aziz Alghashian is a Saudi researcher specializing in the kingdom’s foreign policy strategies. He is a senior research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. Alghashian is especially known as an expert on Saudi–Israeli relations and broader Arab–Israeli affairs.

Reef Itzhaki, Director of Impact at the Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies:
“President Trump’s recent visit to the Middle East stood out by skipping over Israel, while placing renewed strategic emphasis on Saudi Arabia and signaling interest in new partnerships with emerging actors like Syria. What are your main takeaways from this visit? And were there any aspects that surprised you?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Let me begin by saying: I come from a Saudi-centered perspective and I’ll stay within that framework – focusing on Saudi policy toward Israel and the Palestinian issue.

In my view, the avoidance of any reference to Israel wasn’t surprising. Unfortunately, Netanyahu has made engagement with Israel too toxic, and Trump knew it would be too much to ask other Arab countries – especially Saudi Arabia – to cooperate.

Even at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, where he spoke, Trump mentioned the Abraham Accords, but didn’t address Saudi–Israeli normalization. To me, this was a way to frame those agreements as part of his legacy, rather than as a genuine regional shift.

What stood out most to me was the loss of Israeli agency in the region. Netanyahu has led to Israel being seen as just another variable in a U.S.–Saudi deal, rather than as an independent actor.

Trump’s decision to bypass Israel highlighted a strategic shift toward players like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – who have greater purchasing power and regional influence. At the same time, Israel’s agency has become increasingly marginal in both the Saudi-American and Gulf-American discourse.”

Reef Itzhaki:
“As you mentioned, the focus did indeed shift to Saudi Arabia. From Riyadh’s perspective, what message did this visit send to the region and to Israel in particular?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Saudi Arabia is effectively becoming the regional center of gravity. You could even say that the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is taking on this role, with Saudi Arabia at its helm.

Trump’s announcement about lifting sanctions on Syria and his openness to normalize relations with it indicate that Saudi diplomacy has been both proactive and effective. There was a sense of a ‘ripe moment’ – this wasn’t accidental, but the result of quiet, strategic Saudi diplomacy.

This move helps reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold, and enables the GCC states to follow suit, while still exercising fiscal caution. Saudi Arabia won’t invest where there’s no political certainty.

Once sanctions are lifted, it becomes easier to channel financial aid – enabling Syria’s gradual return to the regional system.”

Reef Yitzhaki:
“Before the current government, Israel positioned itself as a proactive player in regional diplomacy. However, there’s a growing sense that it is now perceived as blocking rather than advancing regional initiatives. From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, is Israel now considered a partner or a hindrance?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Unfortunately, Israel is currently seen as a spoiler.
Once – especially in 2021 – even Mohammed bin Salman referred to it as a ‘potential ally.’ The Arab Spring was a turning point – it brought about a certain regional alignment, and Israel was perceived differently at the time.
But over time – especially due to Israel’s political volatility and Netanyahu’s effect – the Saudis have realized it’s far more complex.

After the Abraham Accords, there was hope that this was a constructive step. But the Accords were used negatively, especially by extremist elements, as proof that the Palestinian issue was being sidelined – and this deeply hurt Israel’s image.

Even before October 7, there was talk of normalization – but conditional on significant Israeli concessions. Today, peace and normalization seem worlds apart.
To many, normalization was portrayed as a way to bypass the Palestinian issue – and that’s what damaged trust.
I remember during the Second Intifada, Israel had an extremely negative image – that sentiment hadn’t returned until recent years.

Even in May 2021 there were clashes, but what’s happening now is far more severe. There’s also a deeper understanding now – that Saudi Arabia sees Israel not just as a party to the Gaza conflict, but as responsible for other regional threats as well.
Saudi public opinion has moved far away – one step forward, a hundred steps back.”

Reef Itzhaki:
“At the summit, regional stability was a central theme, especially following the meeting between Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, and President al-Sharaa, which gave renewed legitimacy to the Syrian government.
What is Saudi Arabia’s long-term vision for Syria’s role in the region and for stabilizing the area?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Saudi Vision 2030 was conceived at the height of a wave of Saudi nationalism, with slogans like ‘Saudi Arabia First.’ Today, we’ve moved to the phase of ‘Saudi Arabia – and then others.’

There’s a clear understanding that the vision cannot be realized without regional stability.

The political conflicts have emphasized just how fragile the region is – and how vital it is for Saudi Arabia’s progress.

So the question isn’t just how Saudi Arabia can stabilize the region, but also how others can contribute to that effort.

We need to speak a pragmatic language, understand others’ interests and their fears. When interests are framed as shared, it becomes easier for Saudi Arabia to engage.
That’s also why it supported al-Assad – not out of coercion, but because the messages it heard aligned with its own positions.

When the vision is clear and tangible – support follows.”

הפוסט Saudi Arabia’s Status in the Regional Arena and Relations with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What are implications for Israel regarding Trump’s Middle East visit? – Prof. Elie Podeh, The Jerusalem Post, May 2025 https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/implications-for-israel-regarding-trumps-middle-east-visit/ Tue, 20 May 2025 13:57:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=12928 Although the visit focused on economic matters, it also carried political significance, with important implications for Israel. Read here

הפוסט What are implications for Israel regarding Trump’s Middle East visit? – Prof. Elie Podeh, The Jerusalem Post, May 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Although the visit focused on economic matters, it also carried political significance, with important implications for Israel.

Read here

הפוסט What are implications for Israel regarding Trump’s Middle East visit? – Prof. Elie Podeh, The Jerusalem Post, May 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/middle-east-now-i24news-april-2025/ Mon, 14 Apr 2025 14:03:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=12757 ● Remarks on the situation in Gaza ● Hezbollah and Iran’s Regional Strategy ● Remarks on the Trump relocation proposal ● Analysis of the Saudi strategy and U.S. Relations ● Insights on the Iran Nuclear issue and U.S. diplomacy under Trump Watch the full segment here

הפוסט Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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● Remarks on the situation in Gaza

● Hezbollah and Iran’s Regional Strategy

● Remarks on the Trump relocation proposal

● Analysis of the Saudi strategy and U.S. Relations

● Insights on the Iran Nuclear issue and U.S. diplomacy under Trump

Watch the full segment here

הפוסט Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Riyadh Is the Arab World’s New Real Leader https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/riyadh-is-the-arab-worlds-new-real-leader/ Sun, 02 Feb 2025 15:46:48 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12510 On January 12, two seemingly unrelated events took place in Saudi Arabia. In the first, Real Madrid faced Barcelona in the final of the Spanish Super Cup in Jeddah. Thousands of Saudis filled the stands to witness a thrilling 5-2 victory for Barcelona. The game served as a preview of the FIFA World Cup, which will be hosted by Saudi Arabia in 2034. On the same day, in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with the secretary general of the Arab League and representatives from the European Union and 11 Arab states, convened to discuss developments in Syria. A few days later, the Saudi foreign minister visited Syria. This rapid response highlights the immense importance Saudi Arabia places on developments in Syria for the future of the region, particularly in light of the active involvement of Turkey and Qatar. It also reflects Saudi Arabia’s readiness to offer humanitarian and economic assistance if the new Syrian regime adopts a balanced policy – one that ensures the country’s territorial integrity, protects ethnic and religious minorities, and distances Iran’s proxies. The two events mentioned above clearly demonstrate the prominent role Saudi Arabia has assumed under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a role also evident during the Israel-Gaza War. For instance, on November 11–12, 2023, following a summit of African states, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit bringing together the Arab and Muslim worlds to discuss the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This summit convened both the

הפוסט Riyadh Is the Arab World’s New Real Leader הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On January 12, two seemingly unrelated events took place in Saudi Arabia. In the first, Real Madrid faced Barcelona in the final of the Spanish Super Cup in Jeddah. Thousands of Saudis filled the stands to witness a thrilling 5-2 victory for Barcelona. The game served as a preview of the FIFA World Cup, which will be hosted by Saudi Arabia in 2034.

On the same day, in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with the secretary general of the Arab League and representatives from the European Union and 11 Arab states, convened to discuss developments in Syria. A few days later, the Saudi foreign minister visited Syria.

This rapid response highlights the immense importance Saudi Arabia places on developments in Syria for the future of the region, particularly in light of the active involvement of Turkey and Qatar. It also reflects Saudi Arabia’s readiness to offer humanitarian and economic assistance if the new Syrian regime adopts a balanced policy – one that ensures the country’s territorial integrity, protects ethnic and religious minorities, and distances Iran’s proxies.

The two events mentioned above clearly demonstrate the prominent role Saudi Arabia has assumed under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a role also evident during the Israel-Gaza War. For instance, on November 11–12, 2023, following a summit of African states, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit bringing together the Arab and Muslim worlds to discuss the wars in Gaza and Lebanon.

This summit convened both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – marking the first time in history that these two organizations met simultaneously in the same location. This move by the Saudis served as a clear statement of their intent and their leadership role in the Arab, Islamic, and African spheres.

However, it appears that the crown prince’s ambitions are not confined to the region but are also global, relating to both the diplomatic and economic spheres, as well as to softer areas such as sports and media.

Diplomatically, Saudi Arabia has established, in partnership with the European Union, the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition with some 90 member states. The Saudi declaration that normalization with Israel will not be pursued without a Palestinian state – a significant change of position by the Saudis in the wake of the war – indicates their desire to lead an international process to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the economic sphere, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East. Its Vision 2030 development plan was designed to reduce the country’s dependence on oil incomes by developing new areas of economic activity. The Saudis want to develop other economic areas apart from oil, gas, and petrochemicals, and become a country that attracts tens of millions of tourists every year, with sports – and especially football – an important tool for advancing this policy.

Saudi Arabia has three key advantages in this regard. First, it holds the largest oil reserves in the world, producing approximately three million barrels a day, with the capacity to quickly increase production. In the event of a disruption to global oil supply, Saudi Arabia, alongside the United Arab Emirates, could produce an additional four million barrels daily, rapidly compensating for the shortfall.

Equally important, Saudi Arabia can do so at a relatively low cost, as its cost of producing a barrel of oil is the lowest in the world at just $10. The second advantage is its strategic location, allowing it to serve as a key transport hub between India and Europe, with Israel potentially playing an important role in facilitating this connection.

Saudi Arabia also serves as an important economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the last decade have played a crucial role in maintaining the stability of their regimes. One notable outcome of this economic aid was Egypt’s return of the Sanafir and Tiran islands to Saudi Arabia in 2017.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage is expected to bolster its efforts to gain influence in Syria and Lebanon, particularly after the election of a new president in Lebanon who is not aligned with Hezbollah. It is no surprise that the Saudi foreign minister was quick to visit Lebanon after Joseph Aoun’s election on January 9.

In addition, Saudi Arabia plays an important role in terms of media in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network being no less popular than the Qatari Al Jazeera.

Last but not least, Saudi Arabi enjoys a unique status in Islam due to the location within its borders of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to which more than two million Muslims make the Hajj pilgrimage each year.

Despite its relative military weakness – which it is supposed to overcome thanks to an American air defense umbrella – Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic, economic, religious, and media capabilities, alongside the charismatic leadership of MBS, position it as the natural leader of the Arab world.

These capabilities now face a new American president who seeks to economically pressure Iran while keeping oil prices low. If Trump aims to achieve his vision of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he will need full cooperation from Saudi Arabia. The first step in any process will, of course, be an agreement for the complete release of hostages and the end of the war, which would establish a post-conflict framework for governance in Gaza that is acceptable to both the United States and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia.

For years, Egypt has been seen as the leader of the Arab world, or at least considered the “key player,” a term coined by Egyptian journalist Muhammad Husayn Haykal. While Egypt remains an important regional actor, particularly in relation to Gaza and Arab-Israeli relations, its demographic and economic challenges have weakened its position, creating a vacuum that has been filled by an increasingly assertive Saudi crown prince.

The article was published on Januart 31st 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Riyadh Is the Arab World’s New Real Leader הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/normalizing-relations-with-saudi-arabia-provides-new-opportunities/ Sun, 26 Jan 2025 12:53:23 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12470 Immediately after the signing of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas, incoming US President Donald Trump announced that, after the return of the hostages, he intends to continue the implementation of the Abraham Accords – in other words, to secure an agreement with Saudi Arabia. The normalization of the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was close before October 7, 2023 but was shelved after the attack by Hamas. Indeed, one of the goals of the attack was to torpedo it. The end of the Israel-Hamas War and the agreement for the release of the hostages present a new opportunity to bring this initiative to fruition. We are witnessing an ideal moment, combining two essential elements required for success: first, a significant change; second, the presence of an appealing idea or plan ready to be implemented. The major change is marked by two significant events. First, the end of the war. History shows that wars often create opportunities for large-scale change due to their tectonic impact. This war has caused significant damage to Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and has led to Syria’s removal from the Axis of Resistance. However, such post-war opportunities are not always seized, often due to a lack of leadership or due to short-sightedness, stubbornness, or folly on the part of a country’s leaders. The second major change is the new US administration, with Trump driven by personal ambition to leave a lasting legacy, possibly by securing a Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, there

הפוסט Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Immediately after the signing of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas, incoming US President Donald Trump announced that, after the return of the hostages, he intends to continue the implementation of the Abraham Accords – in other words, to secure an agreement with Saudi Arabia.

The normalization of the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was close before October 7, 2023 but was shelved after the attack by Hamas. Indeed, one of the goals of the attack was to torpedo it.

The end of the Israel-Hamas War and the agreement for the release of the hostages present a new opportunity to bring this initiative to fruition. We are witnessing an ideal moment, combining two essential elements required for success: first, a significant change; second, the presence of an appealing idea or plan ready to be implemented.

The major change is marked by two significant events. First, the end of the war. History shows that wars often create opportunities for large-scale change due to their tectonic impact. This war has caused significant damage to Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and has led to Syria’s removal from the Axis of Resistance.

However, such post-war opportunities are not always seized, often due to a lack of leadership or due to short-sightedness, stubbornness, or folly on the part of a country’s leaders.

The second major change is the new US administration, with Trump driven by personal ambition to leave a lasting legacy, possibly by securing a Nobel Peace Prize.

At the same time, there is an attractive proposal on the table: normalization with Saudi Arabia. For Israel, the appeal of this prospect lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key player in the Gulf, the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as the international stage.

An agreement with Saudi Arabia would strengthen the regional coalition against Iran. Moreover, given that all previous peace and normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states have withstood the test of war, such an agreement would further solidify Israel’s integration into the region.

Riyadh’s influence

Saudi Arabia’s influence is evident in three main arenas. Diplomatically, it plays a leading role in both regional and international processes. For instance, in 2002, Saudi Arabia introduced the peace initiative that evolved into the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still ratified annually by the Arab League summit, though it has never received an official response from Israel.

Similarly, during the recent Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, hosted the 2023 Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, bringing together in a joint meeting both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for the first time.

In addition, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with the European Union, founded the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition of approximately 90 member states.

Most recently, on January 12, 2025, Riyadh hosted the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with representatives from 11 Arab states, to discuss the situation in Syria. This indicates that Saudi Arabia is not willing to cede the Syrian arena to Turkey, Qatar, or extremist Islamic groups.

Economically, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, even surpassing Turkey. It holds the world’s largest oil reserves and has the capacity to increase production. This gives Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, the ability to swiftly compensate for any disruptions in the international oil supply – whether due to boycotts of countries like Iran or Russia, or natural disasters, such as those that have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.

By doing so, Saudi Arabia can prevent a dramatic rise in oil prices, which otherwise would trigger shock waves throughout the global economy.

Saudi Arabia also serves as a crucial economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the past decade have been instrumental in maintaining the stability of their regimes.

This economic leverage is expected to play a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to exert influence in Syria following the formation of a new governing regime, as well as in Lebanon after the election of a new president not aligned with Hezbollah.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia holds considerable media influence in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network surpassing the popularity of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera.

Finally, Saudi Arabia enjoys a unique status in Islam, as it is home to the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, which host the annual Hajj pilgrimage attended by over two million Muslims annually.

For these reasons, normalization with Saudi Arabia opens the door for Israel to the large Saudi market and perhaps also to other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia.

The main challenge, however, lies in resolving the Palestinian issue. Prior to the war, it seemed that Saudi Arabia might settle for a symbolic concession on Palestine as a condition for normalization. However, statements made by senior Saudi officials during the war indicate that the price of normalization has risen significantly and now includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On the other hand, former US secretary of state Antony Blinken stated that normalization “is ready to go,” but two conditions must be met: the end of the war in Gaza and a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood.

Assuming that the war will indeed end, the main bone of contention is the Palestinian issue, especially given that the war has brought about a decline in the willingness of the Jewish public in Israel to agree to a Palestinian state.

However, a survey conducted in early January 2025 found that more than 70% of the Jewish public supports the return of the hostages and the end of the war, normalization with Saudi Arabia, a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians, and the formation of a regional security coalition against Iran.

The concept of a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians may be constructively ambiguous, but it raises several important questions: Will it satisfy the Saudis? Will there be a Palestinian partner? Can a diplomatic and security arrangement be reached in Gaza, potentially in partnership with moderate Arab states, that satisfies both sides?

While the answers to these questions are complex and uncertain, one thing seems clear: An opportunity exists for realizing the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Will it be seized? As Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.”

The article published in January 23rd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/will-an-outstretched-hand-meet-a-sisters-hand/ Wed, 15 Jan 2025 11:18:57 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12359 Last week, Saudi researcher Abdulaziz Alghashian, from the Observer Research Foundation Middle East, published an op-ed in Haaretz arguing that the Israeli public misunderstands Saudi Arabia’s worldview and strategy. Some Israelis mistakenly believe that Saudi Arabia would be willing to sign a normalization agreement with Israel even without resolving the Palestinian issue. He also claimed that Israel’s strategy toward Iran, based on military force, contrasts sharply with the Saudi approach, which emphasizes dialogue with Iran. Notably, he described the October 7 attack as “a barbaric act with no justification”—a clear condemnation that, for the vast majority of Israelis, is considered a minimum starting point for any dialogue with the Arab and Muslim worlds. This, in fact, is the most critical aspect of Alghashian’s remarks and serves as his call to action. As he stated, “I propose one starting point: a mid-level dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. Instead of striving for hollow declarations of victory, we must foster a more serious conversation. Alongside peace efforts from the top-down and bottom-up, we need an in-depth analytical dialogue based on a network of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics.” We wholeheartedly welcome Alghashian’s call and suggest broadening its scope into practice. From my perspective as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, religion is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as to the broader challenges of the Middle East. My goal, and that of my rabbinical colleagues both in Israel and abroad, is to position religion on the other side of the equation: not as part

הפוסט Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Last week, Saudi researcher Abdulaziz Alghashian, from the Observer Research Foundation Middle East, published an op-ed in Haaretz arguing that the Israeli public misunderstands Saudi Arabia’s worldview and strategy. Some Israelis mistakenly believe that Saudi Arabia would be willing to sign a normalization agreement with Israel even without resolving the Palestinian issue. He also claimed that Israel’s strategy toward Iran, based on military force, contrasts sharply with the Saudi approach, which emphasizes dialogue with Iran.

Notably, he described the October 7 attack as “a barbaric act with no justification”—a clear condemnation that, for the vast majority of Israelis, is considered a minimum starting point for any dialogue with the Arab and Muslim worlds. This, in fact, is the most critical aspect of Alghashian’s remarks and serves as his call to action. As he stated, “I propose one starting point: a mid-level dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. Instead of striving for hollow declarations of victory, we must foster a more serious conversation. Alongside peace efforts from the top-down and bottom-up, we need an in-depth analytical dialogue based on a network of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics.”

We wholeheartedly welcome Alghashian’s call and suggest broadening its scope into practice.

From my perspective as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, religion is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as to the broader challenges of the Middle East. My goal, and that of my rabbinical colleagues both in Israel and abroad, is to position religion on the other side of the equation: not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Indeed, we go further: not only can and should religion be part of the solution, but a long-term resolution is likely impossible without incorporating the religious dimension. The reason is clear—religion and tradition play a pivotal role in shaping behavior at every level, from individuals and communities to states and diplomatic relationships in the Middle East. Ignoring the religious aspect and trying to resolve conflicts solely based on shared interests has not proven effective so far, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in the future.

Of course, this does not mean we should neglect shared interests. Israelis and Saudis undeniably share common concerns—like those Alghashian articulated—about “a region engulfed in turmoil and conflict” and “regional instability.” It is worth stating the obvious: most Israelis seek peace and stability, not endless war. It’s also obvious that conspiracy theories suggesting Israeli expansionist ambitions in the Middle East are baseless. Our goal is to be accepted as an equal partner in the region—with formal, open relations—not relegated to a marginalized role, as Alghashian aptly described.

The first step, as Alghashian suggested, is indeed a mid-level dialogue. However, we propose adding religious leaders from both sides to the roster of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics. Many of us, in fact, wear multiple hats as scholars, experts, and more. A dialogue that excludes religious leaders will yield intriguing insights for certain elites, but it won’t facilitate deeper processes, shift attitudes, or persuade veto players on both sides—key actors without whom no agreement can be signed, or if signed, will hold little chance of enduring. This mistake—intentionally sidelining religious leaders—was made during the Oslo Accords, as the architects viewed them as part of the problem. They were correct, but they failed to recognize that without making religious leaders part of the solution, there could be no solution. We all know the result. Let us avoid repeating past mistakes and learn from them.

Alongside addressing shared interests, we must also care for our distinct identities. Neither side has any intention—or expectation—of relinquishing, altering, or compromising their ancient traditions and identities for short-term interests. Instead, we propose an opposite approach: one that focuses on deeply understanding our shared roots, enabling us to transform these different identities from sources of conflict into foundations for a better shared future. After years of deep dialogue with leaders across the Muslim world and a growing group of rabbis well-versed in Islam, the Quran, and fluent in Arabic, we are confident in the transformative potential of such conversations and believe the time has come to expand them.

The renowned Hebrew poet Rachel Bluwstein—so central to Israeli culture that she is simply called “Rachel the Poet”—asked in one of her famous works, “Why does an outstretched hand not meet a sister’s hand?” We see Alghashian’s article as an immensely important outstretched hand, and we respond simply: here is the sister’s hand. Let us meet.

הפוסט Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/saudi-perspective-the-palestinian-issue-cannot-be-pushed-aside/ Wed, 01 Jan 2025 15:50:53 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12351 I heard that Israeli media has been debating about the Saudi position regarding the way to end the war and move forward, and its obligation to the Palestinian issue. It seems that Saudi Arabia’s position is ambiguous to you. The Saudi kingdom is not easy to understand. It is not just a state but an idea, comprised of religious, tribal, and Arab identities that intersect with threat perceptions, existential strategic interests, and dynamic pragmatism. While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse. As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected. This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses. Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace. I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted. The Iranian issue The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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I heard that Israeli media has been debating about the Saudi position regarding the way to end the war and move forward, and its obligation to the Palestinian issue. It seems that Saudi Arabia’s position is ambiguous to you. The Saudi kingdom is not easy to understand. It is not just a state but an idea, comprised of religious, tribal, and Arab identities that intersect with threat perceptions, existential strategic interests, and dynamic pragmatism.

While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse.

As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected.

This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses.

Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace.

I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted.

The Iranian issue

The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting the idea that Saudi-Israeli normalization is the logical outcome of the shared Iranian threat. This idea is inaccurate to say the least. Netanyahu proposes that a major regional confrontation with Iran would lead the Saudi kingdom to move away from its traditional position, to set aside its grievances with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, and to base normalization on a logic of mutual enmity. This is too simplistic, and the Saudi ruling elite thinks in a far more nuanced way than that.

It is true that the Saudis still view Iran as its primary security concern. Equally true, however, is that both Saudi Arabia and Israel fundamentally differ in how they strategically address that concern. While the Saudis have concluded that working with Iran is the best way to address its security grievances, Netanyahu’s robust approach is something the Saudis wish to avoid.

What we Saudis truly fear is a region embroiled in conflict. Saudi anxiety over regional turbulence stems from our concern about the restructuring of our economy, which we consider an existential issue, and we know we cannot achieve our ambitious economic goals in a turbulent region.

What the Saudi ruling elite fears most is the radicalization that is almost certain to arise from this ongoing war.

The images of death, destruction, and the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli lives are painful for all. Some members of the Israeli government talk of resettling Gaza and annexing more territory in the West Bank. This is not only repugnant to us but has two additional effects: It increases the sense of grievance toward Israel and the potential for further extremism in the region.

This leads to the second issue that Netanyahu has misled you on – the notion that the Saudis do not care about the Palestinian issue. Your government has misled you, the Israeli people, into believing that Saudis will willingly abandon their historical stance and normalize relations with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue, which is now an inescapable reality.

Within Saudi Arabia, there is a sense of solidarity that perhaps has not been seen since the Second Intifada. What you will not see are pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli demonstrations taking to the streets of the kingdom, as that is not part of Saudi culture.

But I urge you not to measure the gravity of Saudi support by the absence of such demonstrations, which is about the fear of extremists trying to instrumentalize this pain. In that sense, I also want to communicate to you that October 7 was a barbaric atrocity that took the lives of innocent people. Too much innocent blood has been spilled in this conflict.

The Saudi-Palestinian relationship is not devoid of tensions. However, the reality is that sporadic tensions are part and parcel of deep, longstanding relations. I would suggest you avoid the perception that instances of tension with the Palestinians are signs of imminent Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Moving forward

How do we proceed? Our people have many interests in common, but there is nothing we share more, unfortunately, than the blood of our respective brethren spilled and mutual pain. We must empathize with each other and keep our eyes on the horizon of the necessary peace that will benefit us all.

There might be many possible points of departure, but I will present one: an Arab-Israeli “mid-level dialogue,” between analysts, think tanks, journalists, and academics with the aim of fostering healthier and more constructive Arab-Israeli discourse.

A discourse that speaks to the other, and not over or about the other. Mid-level Arab-Israeli discourse should be forward-thinking, presenting new, creative proposals that address the need for peace, while incentivizing political actors to remain invested in the process.

I know that there are people in Israel who desire real peace. We are ready to engage, but you need to help us by ensuring we jointly aim at solving this issue from its roots. Otherwise, and allow me to use a notion from the book From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020 by Elie Podeh: Israel and Israelis will once again become nothing more than the mistress of the region.

The Abraham Accords are indeed a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. However, history has shown that even mistresses out in the open are still viewed as illegitimate and unacceptable. This can be seen in a range of polls from Abraham Accords countries, which indicate the lack of support by many for relations with Israel.

It is time we enter a process in which Israel moves from being considered a “mistress” into an open and legitimate partner for peace – and that can only happen through a two-state solution.

The article was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/exaggerations-obstacles-and-opportunities-the-saudi-arabian-position-in-the-gaza-war/ Wed, 11 Sep 2024 12:24:49 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11887 The paper aims to shed light on the obstacles and opportunities of Saudi involvement in a future Palestinian-Israeli peace process. It first explains the enigmatic nature of Saudi communication towards Israel and explains why Saudi pragmatism has been misunderstood. The paper also explains the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel, and that Saudi-Israeli normalization is treated as a gateway to a larger game-changing strategic treaty with the United States, rather than a keenness to cooperate with Israel itself. In addition, the paper argues that while the Saudi ruling elite are willing to play financial and security roles in “reconstructing” Gaza, it is unforeseeable that this will ensue without a credible peace process that can justify these efforts, especially against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its own economy. The paper then explains the ways in which Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, and European states can help cooperate in areas such as building a Palestinian economic horizon that can strengthen the Palestinian-Israeli political framework; developing Palestinian-Israeli green cooperation; and developing an Arab-Israeli network of academics, experts, and journalists that can be an intersection of top-down and bottom-up projects that aim to reach a two-state solution. This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The paper aims to shed light on the obstacles and opportunities of Saudi involvement in a future Palestinian-Israeli peace process. It first explains the enigmatic nature of Saudi communication towards Israel and explains why Saudi pragmatism has been misunderstood. The paper also explains the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel, and that Saudi-Israeli normalization is treated as a gateway to a larger game-changing strategic treaty with the United States, rather than a keenness to cooperate with Israel itself. In addition, the paper argues that while the Saudi ruling elite are willing to play financial and security roles in “reconstructing” Gaza, it is unforeseeable that this will ensue without a credible peace process that can justify these efforts, especially against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its own economy. The paper then explains the ways in which Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, and European states can help cooperate in areas such as building a Palestinian economic horizon that can strengthen the Palestinian-Israeli political framework; developing Palestinian-Israeli green cooperation; and developing an Arab-Israeli network of academics, experts, and journalists that can be an intersection of top-down and bottom-up projects that aim to reach a two-state solution.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/secret-meetings-prove-israel-saudi-arabia-still-want-normalization-amid-war/ Wed, 17 Jul 2024 10:49:24 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11538 Normalization with Saudi Arabia has become a central issue during the Israel-Hamas war. Despite the great advantages the normalization holds for Israel, the current government is unable – and seemingly unwilling – to take the initiative. In other words, an open process leading to a formal agreement that will bring normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia does not seem to be in the offing. Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on? Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict. In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.” By contrast, in the Arab

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Normalization with Saudi Arabia has become a central issue during the Israel-Hamas war. Despite the great advantages the normalization holds for Israel, the current government is unable – and seemingly unwilling – to take the initiative. In other words, an open process leading to a formal agreement that will bring normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia does not seem to be in the offing.

Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?

Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.

In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”

By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”

Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.

The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.

The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Why do we need a formal agreement?

THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?

There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.

Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.

Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.

Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.

Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.

A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.

Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.

Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.

And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.

The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.

The article was publish on July 15th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/bilateral-normalization-agreement-with-saudi-arabia-can-offer-something-bigger/ Sun, 23 Jun 2024 10:46:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11428 The Saudi proposal opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world. An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party. For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel. Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem? The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors. The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Saudi proposal opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-road-not-taken-with-saudi-arabia-is-bigger-than-normalization/ Sun, 23 Jun 2024 09:43:44 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11416 The intense diplomatic activity on the Washington-Riyadh axis, as well as statements by top officials on both sides, indicate that an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement is still relevant despite the Gaza war and its ramifications. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and various members of his government have made clear their strong opposition to the Saudi demands linking normalization to a ceasefire (which includes a hostage deal), Gaza’s administration by a non-military mechanism, and, most crucially, Israeli agreement to a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. Israeli rejection of this historic opening would constitute yet another missed opportunity for the Jewish State to make peace with the Arab world’s leading power. Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books. The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The intense diplomatic activity on the Washington-Riyadh axis, as well as statements by top officials on both sides, indicate that an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement is still relevant despite the Gaza war and its ramifications. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and various members of his government have made clear their strong opposition to the Saudi demands linking normalization to a ceasefire (which includes a hostage deal), Gaza’s administration by a non-military mechanism, and, most crucially, Israeli agreement to a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. Israeli rejection of this historic opening would constitute yet another missed opportunity for the Jewish State to make peace with the Arab world’s leading power.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/normalization-with-saudi-arabia-looks-unlikely-but-we-should-try-anyway/ Sun, 25 Feb 2024 10:58:50 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11112 Based on past experience with normalization agreements, three components are presently missing on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust. Over four months have elapsed since the start of the war against Hamas, yet Israel’s objectives and vision for the “day after” in Gaza remain a mystery. At the same time, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and a host of civil society organizations in Israel and abroad are energetically formulating various blueprints for ending the war and moving toward an agreement. Israel’s reluctance to offer a plan for the aftermath of the war stems from political considerations, but the current Israeli government or its successor will soon have to take a clear stand. In examining the “day after” options, it is necessary to review the points of agreement among the relevant parties. All (or most) agree that Hamas cannot control Gaza or be involved in the post-war settlement, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must undertake reforms, that Israel must elect a new government, and that some Arab states will provide economic assistance to rebuild Gaza and strengthen the PA. However, there is no agreement on who will rule Gaza, whether a Palestinian state will be established, and whether such an arrangement will constitute part of a broader regional deal. Judging by historical precedent, military and political cataclysms breed change. The deadly results of the Hamas offensive and the resultant Gaza war are thus creating an opportunity for change in the regional architecture and

הפוסט Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Based on past experience with normalization agreements, three components are presently missing on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust.

Over four months have elapsed since the start of the war against Hamas, yet Israel’s objectives and vision for the “day after” in Gaza remain a mystery. At the same time, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and a host of civil society organizations in Israel and abroad are energetically formulating various blueprints for ending the war and moving toward an agreement.

Israel’s reluctance to offer a plan for the aftermath of the war stems from political considerations, but the current Israeli government or its successor will soon have to take a clear stand.

In examining the “day after” options, it is necessary to review the points of agreement among the relevant parties.

All (or most) agree that Hamas cannot control Gaza or be involved in the post-war settlement, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must undertake reforms, that Israel must elect a new government, and that some Arab states will provide economic assistance to rebuild Gaza and strengthen the PA. However, there is no agreement on who will rule Gaza, whether a Palestinian state will be established, and whether such an arrangement will constitute part of a broader regional deal.

Judging by historical precedent, military and political cataclysms breed change. The deadly results of the Hamas offensive and the resultant Gaza war are thus creating an opportunity for change in the regional architecture and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, based on past experience with peace and normalization agreements, three components are missing at present on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust. That leaves two options. One is to despair and give up, and the other is to examine how progress can be achieved despite these complexities.

A trustworthy mediator is key to any prospect of success. President Joe Biden has taken on this task and is determined to produce a landmark achievement ahead of the November 2024 presidential election. To that end, the United States, in cooperation with 10 European and Arab states, is reportedly drawing up a three-track arrangement.

One is intended to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza and a return of the Israeli abductees; the second is aimed at “reshaping” the PA; the third is the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. A word of warning is warranted: the American Road Map for Peace plan of 2003 also consisted of stages but was halted at an early stage after the PA and Israel failed to fulfill their parts.

Incentives play an important role in optimizing the prospects of a settlement.

What are the incentives of each side?

The Palestinians’ main gain would be the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with agreed territorial swaps – something they were denied after the Oslo Accords. This would include the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza, its acceptance as a member of the UN, and recognition by most countries.

Israel also stands to gain, obtaining guarantees for an agreement designed to prevent a security threat from the Palestinian side, an agreement with the most important country in the Arab and Muslim world (Saudi Arabia); continued integration in the Middle East, opening of new markets; building bridges with distant Muslim countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.); easing resistance to Israel in the region and around the world given the solution to the Palestinian problem, and, finally, greater Saudi involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction, at Qatar’s expense or at its side.

If the Palestinian leadership rejects the emerging deal – as it has done with previous proposals – Saudi Arabia may see Israel’s outreach as a sufficient “fig leaf” for progress toward an agreement. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) told US Jewish leaders in April 2018 that “over the past 40 years, the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given. It’s time for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and come to the negotiating table – or shut up and stop complaining.”

The US-Saudi-Israeli peace deal under discussion would also reward the Saudis with American weapons, a defense agreement, and perhaps even a green light to develop nuclear civilian power. What is more, such a deal would allow the Saudis to boast that, unlike the Abraham Accords states, they indeed advanced the Palestinian cause, an achievement that would buttress Saudi leadership in the Arab world.

Surprisingly, the Saudis have not backed off their intention to promote normalization with Israel, despite the war with Hamas; perhaps not surprisingly, since they knew that Hamas and its Iranian backers had attacked Israel, among other reasons, to sink Israel-Saudi peace prospects. The Saudis have issued at least three positive statements in favor of normalization since the war began but have raised their price. Whereas before the war, they spoke vaguely about progress on the Palestinian issue, they are now demanding the establishment of a Palestinian state, although they could conceivably settle for less.

Four key issues preventing a deal

AT LEAST four hurdles stand in the way of a deal. The first is cognitive in nature. The growing assessment, reinforced by October 7 on both sides, is that the two-state solution is no longer viable. Affecting change in these respects is a long-term process of reshaping collective memories in ways that do not demonize the adversary – through the school system, the media, and other agents of socialization. Egyptian textbooks, for example, are only now undergoing an important change in the portrayal of Jews and Israel – 45 years after the peace treaty with Israel, obviously way too long.

The second hurdle is posed by the spoilers. Just as Hamas effectively disrupted the Oslo Accords and, along with Iran, sought to disrupt Israeli-Saudi normalization, it continues to pose a threat as long as it is excluded from emerging agreements.

Prospects of defanging Hamas will depend on the outcome of the war and whether it emerges weakened or victorious not only in the battlefield but also in the Palestinian perception. In any case, Islamists will remain central to Palestinian society and politics, and if political Islam accepts the new rules of the game, it can join a Palestinian electoral process. However, international and Arab guarantees will be needed to defend these new rules of the game.

The third obstacle stems from the core issues of the conflict with the Palestinians: Jerusalem and refugees. These are sensitive issues with explosive potential, requiring both sides to shift their thinking about the limits of feasibility. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, as numerous creative solutions have been suggested along years of negotiations since the Oslo Accords.

The fourth and perhaps most pressing obstacle is the political timetable. The Biden administration wants a deal before the November 2024 elections, while the necessary Israeli-Palestinian leadership changes could take much longer, if at all. Aaron David Miller, the veteran American Middle East analyst and negotiator, argues that there are two time dimensions in the Middle East: slow and slower. He believes the parameters for peace will have to await a second Biden term and new governments in Israel and the PA.

Given Israel’s preoccupation with the war in Gaza and potential war with Hezbollah, the fate of its abductees, and Hamas, Israelis may well regard talk of Saudi normalization and a Palestinian state as a fantasy. However, forward-thinking and policy alternatives create hope for a better future.

Winston Churchill described a pessimist as one who sees difficulty in every opportunity and an optimist as one who sees opportunity in every difficulty. Israel would do well to adopt the role of the optimist.

Prof. Eli Podeh is a member of Mitvim Institute’s Board of Directors and teaches at the Hebrew University’s Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on February 25th.

הפוסט Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/revisiting-arab-peace-initiative-is-best-hope-to-solve-israel-palestine-conflict/ Tue, 18 Feb 2020 15:11:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3005 The “deal of the century” is here, and so is the simmering, century-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the publication of the details of President Trump’s peace initiative has not so far led to an outbreak of violence, as some experts predicted, there is little hope the new plan will help resume negotiations after years of estrangement. It takes two to tango, and if one of the partners refuses to dance, the outcome may be grim and grotesque. It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative. Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today. Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support. What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The “deal of the century” is here, and so is the simmering, century-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the publication of the details of President Trump’s peace initiative has not so far led to an outbreak of violence, as some experts predicted, there is little hope the new plan will help resume negotiations after years of estrangement. It takes two to tango, and if one of the partners refuses to dance, the outcome may be grim and grotesque.

It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative.

Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today.

Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support.

What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in Israel believe the status quo is not such a bad thing. We live our lives, there is no major violence, and the world seems to be less and less interested in what is happening in this part of the region. But, in fact, nothing can be farther from the truth, as the status quo is nothing but illusion.

Escalation is here already, even if it doesn’t affect daily life of the majority in Israel – yet. In recent weeks there were more attacks, more clashes in Jerusalem, and more desperate and disillusioned young Palestinians that increasingly support the one-state solution.

In fact, a status quo takes us back to the dangers of recent past when the two nations and their leadership lacked communication, understanding, and compromise. While the settlements will grow and the Israelis will be busy annexing segments of West Bank, more and more Palestinians will depart from the two-state solution and opt for one state where they will seek equal political and civil rights. The possibility to separate and draw the border between two warring nations will be lost forever.

Naturally, the Israelis and the Palestinians will be the biggest losers, but the consequences might be quite dangerous for the broader Middle East region, as well. As the situation in Israel and West Bank deteriorates – according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) leaders, it will, barring real progress with negotiations – it inevitably will affect the stability of the West Bank and Jordan, and also damage relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The dream of regional integration, as well as forging a powerful alliance between all those in the region who seek stability and peace will remain just a dream. No positive development between the Palestinians and Israelis will also mean no normalization, integration or advancement of cooperation. We don’t need a status quo, but a reasonable base to resume the negotiations and regional support of the process. The Arab Peace initiative provides this foundation.

Today we have a clear vision of how a partnership in the spheres of technology, trade, tourism and defense might look like between Israel and the Arab states. The only way of getting there is by first taking care of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Whoever emerges as the winner in Israel’s upcoming parliamentary elections will need to focus on two issues: how to prevent the deterioration between Israel and Palestinian Authority, and how to promote Israel’s integration in the region. These two issues are interconnected, and the Arab Peace Initiative should be the key. It’s not too late for that today, however it might be too late tomorrow.

Ksenia Svetlova is a former member of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. Today she serves as Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute and is a senior research analyst at Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya.

(originally published in al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-gulf-states-changing-attitudes-towards-judaism-a-cultural-revolution-in-the-making/ Mon, 10 Feb 2020 15:02:21 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3002 Dr Muhammad al-Issa’s unprecedented visit to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp on 23 January 2020, the 75th anniversary of its liberation, marked a peak in a process of interfaith momentum that has been recently evident in the Muslim world, and more specifically in the Gulf. As Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, Al-Issa is the most senior Islamic leader to visit Auschwitz. In one of the statements he made during his visit, he said, ‘The unconscionable crimes to which we bear witness today are truly crimes against humanity.’ Shortly after his visit, the foreign minister of the UAE, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, tweeted in Arabic: ‘In memory of the Nazi Holocaust, we stand on the side of humanity against racism, hatred, and extremism,’ and Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Bahraini Foreign Minister, retweeted this and added: ‘Yes, it is a humanitarian issue, and the victims are innocent human beings…’. These statements by senior religious and political officials in the Arab Gulf are unusual in their explicit and outspoken condemnation of such a formative event in Jewish history and in their appeal to Arab public opinion. The interfaith rapprochement between the Gulf States and the Jewish world, including outreach efforts towards Jewish communities, has never been so strong. Bahrain was probably the pioneer of this process, as the only country in the Arab Gulf home to an indigenous Jewish community. Bahrain has emphasised its support for this community, often celebrates Jewish holidays, and appointed a Jewish woman to a leading diplomatic role in the United States. In 2017, another precedent

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr Muhammad al-Issa’s unprecedented visit to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp on 23 January 2020, the 75th anniversary of its liberation, marked a peak in a process of interfaith momentum that has been recently evident in the Muslim world, and more specifically in the Gulf. As Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, Al-Issa is the most senior Islamic leader to visit Auschwitz. In one of the statements he made during his visit, he said, ‘The unconscionable crimes to which we bear witness today are truly crimes against humanity.’ Shortly after his visit, the foreign minister of the UAE, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, tweeted in Arabic: ‘In memory of the Nazi Holocaust, we stand on the side of humanity against racism, hatred, and extremism,’ and Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Bahraini Foreign Minister, retweeted this and added: ‘Yes, it is a humanitarian issue, and the victims are innocent human beings…’. These statements by senior religious and political officials in the Arab Gulf are unusual in their explicit and outspoken condemnation of such a formative event in Jewish history and in their appeal to Arab public opinion.

The interfaith rapprochement between the Gulf States and the Jewish world, including outreach efforts towards Jewish communities, has never been so strong. Bahrain was probably the pioneer of this process, as the only country in the Arab Gulf home to an indigenous Jewish community. Bahrain has emphasised its support for this community, often celebrates Jewish holidays, and appointed a Jewish woman to a leading diplomatic role in the United States. In 2017, another precedent was set when a delegation of Bahraini clerics visited Israel to promote interfaith tolerance.

In the same year, the Abu Dhabi Louvre Museum was opened in the United Arab Emirates, where several Judaic exhibits were displayed as the country declared its ‘Year of Tolerance’. These beginnings in the UAE also opened the door to intra-religious expressions of tolerance, such as the UAE’s inauguration of an official synagogue in Abu Dhabi, alongside a mosque and a church at a shared site.

This trend is also evident in Qatar which, despite its well-known affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood, announced that it would provide kosher food for Jewish visitors from Israel during the 2022 World Cup. Saudi Arabia, as part of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform programme, has also begun to interact with Jewish figures and institutions worldwide. In January 2020, Rabbi Marc Schneier was hosted by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tweeted about having ‘a unique Shabbat Experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’

What are the motivations behind this development, and why is it happening now? These actions, which are evident across the GCC countries with the exception of Kuwait (the only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel), reveal a combination of curiosity, openness and goodwill towards Judaism. While lauding these actions and statements by the Gulf States towards Jews as ‘Islam’s reformation’ – as some commentators have done – may be overstating it, they certainly reflect a changing socio-political reality in the region on two levels: an internal process of identity exploration and cultural development in the Gulf, and an external process of reaching out to the broader Muslim world and the international community. Both processes are driven by the motivation to produce, define and portray a distinct national character within which tolerance and openness towards ‘the other’ comprise important pillars.

While this trend certainly poses reputational benefits for the conservative and authoritarian Gulf States, it also entails deeper motivations, similar to those that led to the intra-Gulf rift in June 2017 in the name of denouncing ‘extremism’ and radical Islam. This boycott was part of a broader internal process of redrawing the imaginary boundaries in the Gulf, not along ethnic or religious lines but along ideological ones, particularly regarding the role of political Islam. Gulf scholar Andreas Krieg describes this process as a ‘war over narratives’ that is dividing the Arab world, and of which the Gulf states have become the main sponsors. Thus, promoting openness to other religions as a manifestation of ‘moderate’ versus ‘radical’ Islam is another aspect of this process of identity construction in the Gulf. Qatar, which is allegedly positioned beyond that imaginary boundary, plays with the same cards of soft power and religious outreach to deflect its opponents’ accusations of being a supporter of extremism.

Expressions of openness and tolerance towards Judaism carry no domestic costs for the Gulf States. In the absence of a significant presence of Jewish communities in their states, this approach does not threaten their internal political stability by risking demands for greater political rights by minority groups (unlike other marginalised groups in the Gulf, such as the Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia or the Bedoon in Kuwait). Furthermore, and most importantly, this trend does not entail normalising political relations with Israel. Yet, despite the separation of public opinion between the relationship with Judaism and that with Israel, the interfaith brand breaks cultural barriers and carries indirect benefits by warming relations between nations and peoples in the region.

In recent years, the Gulf states have taken on a more assertive leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Emirati academic Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla defined this process of the growing regional and international importance of these states as the ‘Gulf Moment’, a period in which the Gulf states assert themselves in the regional and international arenas as new centres of political, economic and cultural power. With this self-perception, these states are becoming more invested in grand strategies of social and religious reforms, and their advocacy for tolerance and interfaith dialogue comprises one prominent manifestation of this. Given these factors, we will probably continue to see these expressions in the near future – even if Israel is not explicitly mentioned in these discussions.

Adam Hoffman is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and Head of the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, a geostrategic analysis and business consultancy. 

Dr Moran Zaga is the academic coordinator of the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy at Haifa University and a policy fellow at Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-regional-foreign-policies-an-annual-assessment/ Thu, 19 Dec 2019 10:47:08 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3243 The Mitvim Institute 3rd annual conference provided an annual assessment of Israel’s regional foreign policies. It was held in Tel Aviv on 14 November 2019, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The conference included sessions on Israel’s ties with its adjacent regions – moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren, and participated by Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, former Member of Knesset (MK) Ksenia Svetlova, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz and Dan Catarivas – and on the quest for IsraeliPalestinian peace in Israeli statesmanship – moderated by Yael Patir and participated by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, Kamal Ali-Hassan and Nadav Tamir. MK Yair Lapid (Blue and White party) and EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Susanna Terstal delivered the keynote speeches. This document summarizes the main points covered by the speakers. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel [Hebrew].

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute 3rd annual conference provided an annual assessment of Israel’s regional foreign policies. It was held in Tel Aviv on 14 November 2019, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The conference included sessions on Israel’s ties with its adjacent regions – moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren, and participated by Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, former Member of Knesset (MK) Ksenia Svetlova, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz and Dan Catarivas – and on the quest for IsraeliPalestinian peace in Israeli statesmanship – moderated by Yael Patir and participated by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, Kamal Ali-Hassan and Nadav Tamir. MK Yair Lapid (Blue and White party) and EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Susanna Terstal delivered the keynote speeches. This document summarizes the main points covered by the speakers. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel [Hebrew].

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-palestinian-foreign-service-at-a-time-of-diplomatic-freeze/ Thu, 05 Dec 2019 12:58:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2819 The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause. One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world. The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-democracy-component-in-israels-relations-with-arab-state/ Sun, 03 Nov 2019 12:45:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2813 Something good is happening in relations between Israel and the Arab world, as evidenced by more frequent visits of senior Israeli officials to Arab capitals and conciliatory remarks about Israel by Arab leaders in the Gulf. For the first time since the Oslo era, when several diplomatic missions of Gulf and North African states were opened in Tel Aviv, a real change appears to be taking place in the region’s attitude toward Israel, both on the leadership level and, to some extent, in public opinion. Absent progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, and given the deep freeze in efforts to resolve the conflict, the displays of hostility toward Israel have not vanished, but they have lessened. In recent years, along with its moves to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, Israel has been seeking to expand its links with African states. For example, at a November 2018 meeting with Chad’s President, Netanyahu declared that “Israel is returning to Africa” and hinted at intentions to restore ties with Sudan. The very thought that Netanyahu considered meeting with a man like Omar al-Bashir, who has since been deposed and will soon stand trial for crimes against humanity, generates aversion and concern. Improved relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East and Africa are undoubtedly a positive development, but does every end justify the means and is every regional leader a worthy Israeli ally? This question has been dogging Israeli foreign policy for decades, but has been underscored in recent years

הפוסט The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Something good is happening in relations between Israel and the Arab world, as evidenced by more frequent visits of senior Israeli officials to Arab capitals and conciliatory remarks about Israel by Arab leaders in the Gulf. For the first time since the Oslo era, when several diplomatic missions of Gulf and North African states were opened in Tel Aviv, a real change appears to be taking place in the region’s attitude toward Israel, both on the leadership level and, to some extent, in public opinion. Absent progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, and given the deep freeze in efforts to resolve the conflict, the displays of hostility toward Israel have not vanished, but they have lessened.

In recent years, along with its moves to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, Israel has been seeking to expand its links with African states. For example, at a November 2018 meeting with Chad’s President, Netanyahu declared that “Israel is returning to Africa” and hinted at intentions to restore ties with Sudan. The very thought that Netanyahu considered meeting with a man like Omar al-Bashir, who has since been deposed and will soon stand trial for crimes against humanity, generates aversion and concern.

Improved relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East and Africa are undoubtedly a positive development, but does every end justify the means and is every regional leader a worthy Israeli ally? This question has been dogging Israeli foreign policy for decades, but has been underscored in recent years given the changes in Israel’s regional relations and their more public dimension.

What is Israel’s policy regarding the warming relations or rapprochement with countries in the region? Do the government and the Knesset conduct significant debate about the emerging ties between Israel and North African and Middle Eastern states?

Let us start with the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which is tasked with overseeing the government’s defense and foreign affairs activity. In practice, the Knesset’s most prestigious committee has turned into a unidirectional communications channel for senior defense and foreign affairs officials to the legislature, with those testifying before the panel generally failing to answer lawmakers’ questions or providing only partial answers.

In addition, foreign policy issues are relegated to the sidelines of the committee’s agenda with its perpetual focus on defense issues that always appear more important and pressing. The idea of splitting the panel into two separate committees has come up occasionally, but has been discounted.

The State Security Cabinet also appears to be sidelined often and excluded from the decision making loop. For most of the past four years, the Prime Minister has also served as Foreign Minister. His confidante, attorney Yitzhak Molcho often served as his special envoy to Arab states, but was not required to report to the Knesset or the professional levels of government since he was essentially a private individual. The Prime Minister’s power and authority in defense and foreign policy appeared unlimited.

Israel is proud (justifiably so) of being the only democracy in the Middle East. Human rights values are the pillars of Israel’s existence as a democratic state, and must be one of the most important and weighty considerations in formulating policy. What, then, is their weight in determining Israeli foreign policy?

There is no absolute morality in the conduct of foreign policy. Not only that, there is usually an inherent contradiction between morality and the practice of foreign policy since democratic states must maintain contact with non-democratic ones. They must also deal with the fact that such states will use all means at their disposal to promote their interests.

These days, many fans of “realpolitik” in Israel and the world believe that when a state seeks to promote its foreign policy, it should not be fettered by ethical considerations. Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly subscribes to this school of thought. He forges close ties with authoritarian heads of state, sometimes even appearing to prefer them to his colleagues in democratic states. Just as he is not deterred by close links with such leaders, he is not put off by weapons deals with states such as Burma, where authorities are conducting a genocide, according to UN reports.

The murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi provided one of the most obvious examples of Netanyahu’s belief in “realpolitik”. Although US intelligence flatly accused Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman of ordering the hit, President Trump did not sever ties with Riyadh and urged waiting for the findings of the Saudi investigation. Netanyahu convinced Trump to ease US pressure on Riyadh, arguing that the Saudis are an important strategic regional ally.

Much before Netanyahu, Israel conducted relations with “problematic” states, such as South Africa in the apartheid era. Up until the 1970s, Israel had condemned South Africa for the segregation of its black citizens, voted in favor of international sanctions and recalled its ambassador from Cape Town. In those days, Ben-Gurion rejected out of hand any possibility of closer ties with the South African government and adhered to the criticism of its apartheid regime. Following the Yom Kippur War, when many African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, Israel’s approach changed. Israel felt weak and isolated, shunned by the family of nations, and decided to tighten relations with pariah states such as South Africa.

Israel’s current situation is completely different. Everyone understands that Israel needs good relations with its neighbors in order to ensure its security and sovereignty. That is why policy makers should draw red lines clearly defining what Israel is allowed to do and what it must not do.

Israel must not remain silent in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This constitutes a severe violation of its identity and nature as a Jewish and democratic state. Rigorous judgment must be applied to consideration of arms deals. Clearly, certain states buy weapons not only to defend themselves, but also to kill, and that is why policy makers in the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and in the prime minister’s office must always consider not only financial interests, but also ethical ones. In particularly egregious and troubling cases, when journalists and human right activists are subjected to torture and sent to rot in jail, Israel can use its power and influence to urge the US administration to raise human rights and democracy issues in the region rather than blindly supporting the repressive violence of regimes in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministry has clearly defined red lines to which Israel generally adheres in its relations with radical right European parties. It should formulate similar guidelines regarding Israel’s emerging ties with Middle Eastern and African states, ascribing importance and value to democratic and moral components.

In the legislature, Knesset members must breathe new life into the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and insist on the centrality of Israel’s regional ties for the panel’s agenda. They must demand explanations from senior officials appearing before them and insist on getting answers. The Knesset must also anchor in legislation the Prime Minister’s authority in foreign affairs and defense issues and determine standards to which policy makers must adhere.

Israel is not simply another state in the Middle East. It is the only truly functioning democracy in the region. As a democratic state, Israel cannot shirk the human rights issue. There may not be absolute morality in foreign policy, but conducting a foreign policy devoid of all morality is not an option, either.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/after-25-years-of-peace-israel-jordan-relations-need-a-restart/ Sun, 27 Oct 2019 12:05:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2805 Jordan will not celebrate this month’s 25th anniversary of the festive signing of the historic peace agreement with Israel in Wadi Araba. The winds of reconciliation that blew at the time, the dreams, have long since dissipated. Most people in Amman do not feel there is anything to celebrate, and those who do believe in the agreement and in the vitality of the Kingdom prefer to downplay their emotions. Despite the grimness, and regardless of the crisis between the two states over the Jordanian enclaves of Tzofar and Naharayim, leased to Israel and soon to be returned to Jordanian sovereignty, the peace agreement is alive, albeit light years away from the dreams of Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein, may they rest in peace. Ahead of the anniversary, a Mitvim Institute team visited Amman and held policy dialogues with academics, diplomats and former army officers. Many expressed amazement that we had bothered to come, that someone in Israel is interested in Jordan and wants to know how to improve the relationship, how unnecessary crises can be averted and how the sides can work together toward a common goal of peace and prosperity. Israeli officials, researchers or politicians hardly ever come here anymore, our interlocutors told us. The one exception are the Israeli security officials who regularly and frequently meet with their Jordanian counterparts. The security aspects of the peace accord run smoothly, reflecting the security-oriented approach of the outgoing government, an approach that prioritizes security relations over all other aspects,

הפוסט After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Jordan will not celebrate this month’s 25th anniversary of the festive signing of the historic peace agreement with Israel in Wadi Araba. The winds of reconciliation that blew at the time, the dreams, have long since dissipated. Most people in Amman do not feel there is anything to celebrate, and those who do believe in the agreement and in the vitality of the Kingdom prefer to downplay their emotions. Despite the grimness, and regardless of the crisis between the two states over the Jordanian enclaves of Tzofar and Naharayim, leased to Israel and soon to be returned to Jordanian sovereignty, the peace agreement is alive, albeit light years away from the dreams of Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein, may they rest in peace.

Ahead of the anniversary, a Mitvim Institute team visited Amman and held policy dialogues with academics, diplomats and former army officers. Many expressed amazement that we had bothered to come, that someone in Israel is interested in Jordan and wants to know how to improve the relationship, how unnecessary crises can be averted and how the sides can work together toward a common goal of peace and prosperity.

Israeli officials, researchers or politicians hardly ever come here anymore, our interlocutors told us. The one exception are the Israeli security officials who regularly and frequently meet with their Jordanian counterparts. The security aspects of the peace accord run smoothly, reflecting the security-oriented approach of the outgoing government, an approach that prioritizes security relations over all other aspects, believing that no progress on them is possible, in any case.

However, should the strategic ties with the Hashemite Kingdom be limited to security issues, important though they are? Can a limited relationship that begins and ends with ties between defense officials carry the weight of the entire agreement for long? Do economic, diplomatic and civilian ties not create an additional layer to the relationship that can also enhance progress in the security field? The peace agreement with Egypt has also been emptied of real content, being largely limited to security cooperation – and normalization nowhere on the horizon. Many in Israel believe that given the opposition to normalization by many Jordanians and Egyptians, there is no choice but to make do with what is available – security cooperation that does, indeed, save lives and provides security and defense.

During the journey to Amman, we came to realize the extent to which Jordan desires cooperation with Israel in areas such as tourism (medical tourism, too), water and high-tech. Israel does not prioritize these fields and they are not at the top of the government’s diplomatic agenda (if it even has one). Thus, after many years of discussing major and significant mutual projects, these are postponed endlessly to the chagrin of the potential Jordanian partners.

Jordan’s economic crisis and its hosting of 1.5 million Syrian refugees came up in every conversation we had in Amman. The crisis is not new, and last year the Jordanian capital was shaken by mass protest government, cutback and corruption – similar to the ones taking place in Beirut these days. Arab States, the US and the World Bank have provided urgent aid to stabilize the Kingdom, but Israel hardly noticed. The media does not deal with the major projects stuck for years or with the fact that Israel could have done a lot more to help its neighbor to the east attain economic stability, which could have definitely enhanced security, too. Israelis are not sufficiently interested in Jordan, even though the country is of vital importance to Israel’s security – with its 309-kilometer border a vital shield against any troubles from the east.

The Israeli enthusiasm over the signing of the 1994 peace agreement has already waned, and Israelis only touchdown with Jordan only when they fly to the Far East, transiting through Amman or when vacationing in Aqaba. By the way, anyone wishing to shorten the waiting time at the land border between the two states will have to shell out hundreds of dollars for the very short flight. There is barely any demand for that route and the Jordanians would rather sell Israelis cheap tickets for continuing flights to India, Thailand and Sri Lanka, aviation sources told us. The absence of visits also stems from the difficulties of most Jordanians to get entry visas to Israel. Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab told us about repeated requests by his friends and family to visit Israel for family occasions or other needs. “In the end, people simply give up. Israel loses out big time because those who do manage to get a visa are generally favorably impressed and take home a positive impression of the state,” Kuttab said.

The Mitvim Institute 2018 Foreign Policy Index attests to the same attitudes. Most Israelis view Saudi Arabia as the most important Arab state, not Jordan or Egypt – Israel’s strategic peace partners and its immediate neighbors. Of the two, Egypt is regarded as far more important than Jordan. The public is influenced greatly by the policy of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who talks with certainty about the strengthening ties with Arab states and the new horizons for Israel’s relationship with Gulf capitals. He never mentions the decline in trade between Israel and Jordan, the endless foot dragging over the Med-Dead project that generates great anger in Jordan, and the fact that nothing is left of the regional prosperity and cooperation forged in 1994.

The Palestinian issue is central to Israeli-Jordanian relations. The percentage of Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom is a matter of contention – the Jordanians say they constitute 40 percent of the population whereas Israel is convinced they number 60 percent. Either way, the situation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem, has a significant impact on Jordanian attitudes toward Israel. For Netanyahu, the Palestinians are no longer relevant and Arab states have abandoned their cause. However, our conversations in Amman made clear that this approach is illogical and not feasible. Jordan greatly fears escalation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, and seeks better lines of communication with Israel.

With a relatively modest investment and prioritization of the relationship with the Kingdom, Israel could save itself the repeated embarrassments it has recently experienced in relations with Jordan. Jordanian scholars and journalists told us that had Israel acted in a diplomatic and rational fashion, it could have boosted the King’s standing vis-à-vis radicals and BDS proponents. They were puzzled over Israel’s preference for humiliating and undermining its strategic partner and the stability of that regime. Why did Netanyahu embrace the security guard who had shot dead a Jordanian at the embassy in Amman? Why was there no serious, in-depth investigation of the death of a Jordanian judge at the Allenby Bridge border crossing? Why is Israel playing along with Saudi aspirations on Al-Aqsa? Our Jordanian interlocutors wondered what Israel’s policy on Jordan was and had a hard time understanding why Israel was shaking off the important alliance with all its might. In this context, the recent call by Blue and White party Chair Benny Gantz at a rally on the Naharayim Peace Island to strengthen the peace with Jordan and create a “region of cooperation” along the border is of particular importance.

When the argument is heard that Israel’s standing in the Middle East has never been better, it is worth noticing developments in Jordan. The peace agreement with Jordan, just like the Jordan River, tends to dry up over time unless efforts are made to nurture it. Despite the frustration and disappointment, we returned from Amman with a clear sense that repairing or restarting the relationship is within the realm of the possible. Israel could win back Jordan with the right media coverage and attention, by revving up significant economic projects that would help resolve Jordan’s water shortages and create jobs, with an effort to break though the deadlock in the Palestinian arena. In the final analysis, Jordan is right here, within touching distance and not in the dark beyond. Anyone who restores Jordan to the top of Israel’s list of diplomatic priorities would do wonders for the relationship between us, benefitting all sides.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/existing-and-potential-cooperation-between-israel-and-key-arab-states/ Thu, 19 Sep 2019 10:15:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3219 For the past two years, Mitvim Institute experts have been studying the changing relations between Israel and key Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. They examined the history of Israel’s ties with each of these states; the current level of Israel’s diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation with them; the potential for future cooperation and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Israel’s ties in the Middle East. Based on their research and on task-team deliberations, the experts put together a snapshot of the scope of existing and potential cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as of mid-2019.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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For the past two years, Mitvim Institute experts have been studying the changing relations between Israel and key Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. They examined the history of Israel’s ties with each of these states; the current level of Israel’s diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation with them; the potential for future cooperation and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Israel’s ties in the Middle East. Based on their research and on task-team deliberations, the experts put together a snapshot of the scope of existing and potential cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as of mid-2019.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trouble-in-paradise-cracks-are-forming-in-the-saudi-emirati-relationship/ Wed, 07 Aug 2019 10:37:11 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2797 The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories. The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal. The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories.

The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal.

The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on appropriate responses to common challenges, this time with Iran. While Saudi Arabia took a public stance using confrontational language vis-à-vis Iran, the UAE remained vaguer in its media coverage of events and did not point an unequivocal finger of blame towards Iran. In the first attack against four oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on May 12, the UAE tried to diminish the significance of the attacks, claiming that the damage caused was minor. Some reports even claimed that Saudi Arabia preferred a military response towards Iran, while the UAE sought to smooth over the situation with a diplomatic resolution.

An additional dispute between the two countries relates to the war in Yemen. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have jointly led the campaign in Yemen against the Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels, who have been garnished with weaponry, advisors and money from Tehran. While the Saudi forces focused on air operations, the UAE army has played a more significant role on the ground, leading to several game-changing outcomes. Even though the Saudis led their allies to the war, it is now the UAE who is steering the wheels by gradually withdrawing from Yemen. In its cautious and sophisticated nature, the UAE had calculated its battles on the expanding fronts and realized that its focus should be granted to more immediate and close challenges. As tension with Iran increased, the UAE took a swift step to tackle the rising threat with greater attention and a reallocation of resources for any possible development.

The increasing international criticism over the humanitarian effects of the Yemen war was another catalyst for the Emirati withdrawal. The UAE’s pulling off from Yemen without a satisfactory arrangement acceptable to Saudi Arabia, is a probable source for a conflict between them and a death blow to the latter’s attempt to reach a victorious image in this arena.

Despite the increasing tension and apparent disagreements between the countries, their relationship is yet far from a crisis, as it is based on deep ideological and strategic partnership. The disagreements at this point mainly revolve around methods of action and degrees of force that each of the sides is interested in applying, whether in regard to military action, diplomatic decisions or social processes. Of the two, the UAE behaves like the “responsible adult” in its tactical choices, while Mohammed bin Salman has been portrayed as more reckless. Despite the open channel of communication between the two leaders, their continued proactive policies are increasing the likely challenges in the relationship between them.

The struggle between Iran and the Sunni Arab states has shaped the way researchers, journalists and intelligence analysts have understood and analyzed regional dynamics for many years. This struggle has geostrategic and ideological impacts on the region which affect many arenas. Alongside this struggle, however, another battle has been taking place for a while now which also has a significant impact on the character of the Middle East and beyond. Without standing out to a comparable degree, the competition between the Arab Gulf states, as we have seen in North Africa, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Palestinian arena, has made its mark on the region. This competition, which is driven by aspirations for influence and prestige in the Arab world, indirectly influences such issues as nuclear proliferation and regional arms races, thus bringing up new challenges for the security of the Middle East.

In the past, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia demonstrated restraint in conducting their foreign affairs. They stood in the shadow of others and made primary use of their comparative economic advantage. Today, they are the driving force behind many regional changes, and are key players in many arenas. However, with this power comes the weight of responsibility for maintaining regional stability. In this matter, it seems that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are implementing divergent approaches regarding the use of their power.

Yoel Guzansky is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served at Israel’s National Security Council and advised other ministries including the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.

Moran Zaga is a research fellow at the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy and a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in The National Interest)

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/lessons-from-the-peace-process-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea/ Tue, 09 Jul 2019 10:02:49 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2792 For those interested in promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, the current situation may be discouraging. Indeed, the misconception that there is “no solution” is gaining ground among growing audiences. Those who do not want to sink into despair and be misled by the belief that we have already tried everything, are invited to raise their heads, look around, and learn from other conflicts around the world that can give us new insights and hope. Although each conflict is different, we can still learn lessons and be inspired. Such is the peace process that was forged over the past year in the Horn of Africa. The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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For those interested in promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, the current situation may be discouraging. Indeed, the misconception that there is “no solution” is gaining ground among growing audiences. Those who do not want to sink into despair and be misled by the belief that we have already tried everything, are invited to raise their heads, look around, and learn from other conflicts around the world that can give us new insights and hope. Although each conflict is different, we can still learn lessons and be inspired. Such is the peace process that was forged over the past year in the Horn of Africa.

The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced by negotiations and new connections.

How did the Ethiopians and the Eritreans succeed in moving within a few months from a state of protracted conflict to a hopeful peace process? It looks like several factors, that can serve as points of reference for Israelis and Palestinians, have helped the parties:

Bold political leadership: A reality-changing leadership is needed in order to change the course of the long-standing conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made a move which was contrary to popular positions, national mood and narratives that the parties have cultivated over the years, and reached out for peace. The leaders changed the public discourse rather than being led by it. They proved that the leadership must not submit to prevailing patterns and identity perceptions that have taken root over the years, but legitimize reality-changing actions.

External incentives: External incentives are another force that drives leaders and citizens to move toward reconciliation. Leaders can effectively use incentives to mobilize political and economic support in their quest for peace. In the EthiopianEritrean case, apart from achieving peaceful life, landlocked Ethiopia gained an outlet to the sea, renewed its commercial flights to Somalia, and attracted foreign investors who increased their investments in the country. Eritrea, which was in a difficult economic situation, gained economic, media and transportation cooperation with Ethiopia, and the international sanctions that made it one of the poorest countries in the world, were lifted. As a result, the international isolation that was imposed on the country ended.

International support of the peace process: Advancing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves the interests of many international and regional players that are involved in the Horn of Africa and are interested in promoting stability in the volatile region. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have mobilized to mediate, support and guarantee the peace process. The fact that the main intermediaries in the process – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – sided by the weaker Eritrean side, teaches us a lesson when choosing the mediators in our conflict. The Ethiopian diaspora in the US, which politically and economically supported the peace process, made a significant contribution too.

Adapting the peace process to the political reality: The design of the process should necessarily be adapted to the complex and changing political reality, while referring to the structure of negotiations, the pace of the process and its implementation, the coordination of symbolic trust building measures, etc. The parties in the Horn of Africa were able to properly adjust the negotiations structure to the existing political reality in order to reduce risks. For example, the relatively fast pace of the process prevented the formation of an organized and strong opposition, as well as extreme activities that might have harmed the process. Other factors that helped move the process forward were symbolic steps, meetings that are covered by the media, rapid changes on the ground, and leadership that is mobilized to communicate with civil society of the other side.

Promoting internal reconciliation processes, enforcing solidarity and establishing the political system: The transition from a protracted conflict to a peace process is a significant change that disrupts well-established perceptions in society and brings to the surface the internal tensions and disagreements. In order to support change, leaders should build on the resilience of society and the stability of the political system. The parties in the Horn of Africa realized that the in-country situation affected the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between countries. Abiy Ahmed has led extensive reconciliation processes in Ethiopia, including the disarmament of opposition groups and making them a legitimate political party, the establishment of a new and inclusive government that includes a Ministry of Peace that is entrusted with the internal process, and the consolidation of a new ethos for Ethiopia.

Switching back to the Middle East, the absence of a courageous political leadership entails a heavy exasperating toll. When examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict against the backdrop of the peace process in the Horn of Africa, there is a reason to be hopeful: in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Arab Peace Initiative and the promise of a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU, serve as incentives, alongside the security guarantees that the US may offer. Regional and global players who have a vested interest in achieving stability in the Middle East offer themselves as potential mediators and help the sides avoid violence. They can help us garner international support for the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian societies face many challenges related to the rule of law, democracy, human and civil rights, social cohesion, the reduction of violence, and the legitimacy of the leadership. Such challenges should be addressed with no delay in order to enforce solidarity, economic resilience, and trust in government institutions. Civil society and the Diaspora can also play a role since they can promote pro-peace cooperation even in the absence of political will to advance peaceful relations. Similarly, the business community, researchers and government agencies can take advantage of the deadlock in negotiations to examine opportunities and adjust the peace process to the changing political context. Above all, we must continue to believe that a solution is possible.

The case of the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not theoretical. Having a success story, in which leaders, civil society and the international community join forces to advance a peace process to solve a protracted conflict that seems hopeless, is politically powerful. It undermines the defeatist argument that “there is nothing that can be done”, and that we are condemned to “live by the sword”. Peace processes can be “contagious”, and the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example. Their peace agreement led to a series of peace talks and arrangements across the Horn of Africa. Being infected by the “peace virus” would certainly be beneficial for Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper he wrote on the subject, with the assistance of Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/an-economic-workshop-in-bahrain-with-no-political-horizon/ Tue, 18 Jun 2019 09:22:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2784 The June 25-26 economic workshop planned by the Trump administration in Bahrain is an attempt to put the economic carriage before the diplomatic horse. History shows that most international conferences on the Israeli-Arab conflict have focused on the search for a political solution. Such was the case with the Lausanne Conference (1949), the Geneva Conference (1973), the Madrid Conference (1991), the Annapolis Conference (2007), and more. On the other hand, the four regional conferences held between 1994 and 1997, including the multilateral negotiations on issues of water, the environment, arms control and refugees were closely aligned with the political process (the Oslo Accords and Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan) and designed to strengthen and entrench it. The collapse of the Oslo process meant also the demise of the multilateral track. The American decision to hold the workshop in Bahrain is undoubtedly novel. Bahrain has not hosted many international conferences. It has never hosted an Arab summit, for example. Bahrain’s ruler Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa agreed to do so for several reasons. First, he leads a Sunni elite ruling an island 70 percent of whose residents are Shiite and for whom the specter of a Shiite takeover bolstered by a tailwind from neighboring Iran is a source of constant worry. Their fear is well grounded. Shiite protests erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but speedy military help provided by the Saudis from the other side of the Gulf put an end to them. Second, Bahrain has been relying for years

הפוסט An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The June 25-26 economic workshop planned by the Trump administration in Bahrain is an attempt to put the economic carriage before the diplomatic horse. History shows that most international conferences on the Israeli-Arab conflict have focused on the search for a political solution. Such was the case with the Lausanne Conference (1949), the Geneva Conference (1973), the Madrid Conference (1991), the Annapolis Conference (2007), and more. On the other hand, the four regional conferences held between 1994 and 1997, including the multilateral negotiations on issues of water, the environment, arms control and refugees were closely aligned with the political process (the Oslo Accords and Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan) and designed to strengthen and entrench it. The collapse of the Oslo process meant also the demise of the multilateral track.

The American decision to hold the workshop in Bahrain is undoubtedly novel. Bahrain has not hosted many international conferences. It has never hosted an Arab summit, for example. Bahrain’s ruler Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa agreed to do so for several reasons. First, he leads a Sunni elite ruling an island 70 percent of whose residents are Shiite and for whom the specter of a Shiite takeover bolstered by a tailwind from neighboring Iran is a source of constant worry. Their fear is well grounded. Shiite protests erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but speedy military help provided by the Saudis from the other side of the Gulf put an end to them. Second, Bahrain has been relying for years on US aid. In fact, the 5th Fleet is headquartered there, the two sides signed a defense pact in 1991 and a free trade agreement in 2006, and over 200 US firms operate on the small island. Hosting the workshop is therefore not a high price for the monarchy and ruling family to pay for their reliance on the Americans and Saudis that ensure stability. What is more, the Saudi-Bahraini cooperation allows Saudi Arabia to use Bahrain as a trial balloon for a policy likely to meet opposition in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia traditionally traipses cautiously through the political Islamic and Arab minefield, due to its position as the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites.

The choice of Bahrain is convenient for Israel, too. In recent years, Bahrain’s rulers have been publicly displaying openness toward Israel, contrary to the Saudis whose contacts with Israel are conducted largely behind closed doors. Israel and Bahrain do not have diplomatic ties and Bahrain did not set up a diplomatic representation in Israeli during the Oslo period (unlike Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania). Nonetheless, the two sides have been conducting public and clandestine ties since then. Yossi Sarid was the first senior Israeli official to visit Manama as Minister of Environmental Affairs within the framework of the multilateral working group in October 1994. Ties were upped a notch in the previous decade when Shimon Peres, then Minister of Regional Cooperation, met with the Crown Prince of Bahrain.

At the height of these public contacts, Peres as President and Tzipi Livni as Foreign Minister met with King Hamed in New York in 2009. However, most contacts were conducted behind the scenes. According to WikiLeaks documents, King Hamed told the US Ambassador in 2005 that his country conducts defense and intelligence ties with Israel through the Mossad. In another conversation, this one by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister with a US diplomat, Bahrain was said to be conducting “quiet business-like ties” with Israel. What is more, the King ordered officials to stop using the words “enemy” and “Zionist entity” when referring to Israel. The Kingdom also has interfaith relations with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and in December 2018, it named Rabbi Marc Schneier as special adviser to the King on the Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence that he had founded in Manama. Schneier has been working for the past 15 years to create interfaith bridges between Israel, the Gulf States and especially Bahrain. The Manama center, in cooperation with the Wiesenthal Center, organized an interfaith visit of 24 clerics from Bahrain to Israel in December 2017. The visit took place although President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital just days earlier. Houda Ezra Nonoo, a Jewish Bahraini woman, served as her country’s Ambassador to the US from 2008 to 2013. All this places Bahrain in an excellent position to host Trump’s economic summit, which in any case fits in with the Kingdom’s defense and economic interests.

However, Bahrain’s rulers have not had a change of heart on the Palestinian issue. In all their declarations, they invariably make clear that progress on the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for any normalization with Israel. The main problem is that the Palestinians are boycotting the conference, thereby threatening to undermine its prospects of success. The Palestinian opposition to the conference is understandable given that Trump is not perceived as a balanced and honest mediator between the sides and because they fear that “economic peace” will constitute an alternative to a real, political peace. In any case, all the available information indicates that the political part of the peace plan, once unveiled, will be “thin” on diplomatic substance as far as the Palestinians are concerned. On the other hand, the Palestinian reaction places them, once more, as serial refusniks (e.g., the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Olmert-Abbas negotiations of 2007-8, and more).

The disappointing historic experience with the contribution of economic conferences to political aspects of the peace process, combined with recent events, lead to the conclusion that Trump would have been better off delaying or cancelling the economic workshop altogether. It is safe to assume that ego and honor will prevent him from doing so. Trump decided to launch the “deal of the century” by thinking “outside the box.” Undoubtedly, he succeeded; it is the first time anyone has tried to resolve the conflict without consulting, sharing or coordinating with one of the parties involved in the conflict. This “original” idea cannot provide a fair solution; it actually has the potential to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-better-way-for-the-international-community-to-benefit-the-people-of-gaza/ Fri, 25 Jan 2019 13:02:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2729 The situation in Gaza is horrific. Actually, worse than that. Gazans have been deprived of electricity, water, jobs and salaries; they were stripped off their self-respect and parental authority, and some Gazans say that hope for a better future has also been taken away. The humanitarian crisis is already here: two million people drowning in existential despair are on the brink of explosion. Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The situation in Gaza is horrific. Actually, worse than that. Gazans have been deprived of electricity, water, jobs and salaries; they were stripped off their self-respect and parental authority, and some Gazans say that hope for a better future has also been taken away. The humanitarian crisis is already here: two million people drowning in existential despair are on the brink of explosion.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies-vol-2/ Wed, 02 Jan 2019 06:47:18 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3144 This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-the-united-arab-emirates-pending-opportunities/ Wed, 12 Dec 2018 15:46:00 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3016 Op ed by Dr. Moran Zaga, December 2018

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In a sensational statement, Anwar Gargash shed a light on the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) foreign policy of the last decade. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the UAE said this past summer that ” we are ready to take up more of the burden of security in our own neighborhood”. The economic and political status of the UAE provides it with a significant added value in its foreign relations. In recent years, the UAE has expanded its influence in the Middle East and North Africa through a more active diplomacy and an extensive infrastructure of military bases and ports, in various countries in the region. During the last three years, the UAE has also been active in Yemen’s war and in local conflicts in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. This demonstrates a calculated policy aimed at transforming the UAE into a regional power alongside its ally, Saudi Arabia.

This increasingly activist foreign policy approach also explains the growing interest of the UAE in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In its repeated declarations, the UAE has expressed its support for a two-state solution, but mostly stayed a passive supporter for international peace initiatives. Now, it appears that the UAE is striving to adopt an independent and proactive policy on the issue, with a greater involvement in internal Palestinian politics and in multilateral talks that include Israel.

The UAE is of much importance to Israel. The two countries share common interests and sometimes even similar worldviews, in parallel to the political and ideological gap that separates them. One of the prominent characteristics of the UAE is its moderate Islamic approach and its opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist organizations (Sunnis and Shiites). This worldview is at the center of the UAE’s dispute with Iran and Qatar, and this is where its values and interests converge with those of Israel. The moderate and liberal nature of the two countries, relative to other countries of the region, enables a pragmatic dialogue between them. Furthermore, the UAE enjoys strong political stability, which provides it with obvious economic advantages as well as with unique capabilities to shape long-term processes in the Middle East.

At the international level, the UAE invests considerable efforts and resources in expanding its diplomatic ties and in branding itself as an important global hub. As such, it hosts international institutions, conferences, competitions and events. However, this is a source for dilemma relating to its ties with Israel. On the one hand, the UAE faces domestic and regional criticism for hosting Israelis, and is accused of normalization with Israel. On the other hand, there is international pressure against boycotting Israel at international events, and an understanding in the UAE that such a boycott might lead to a loss of legitimacy. This often forces the UAE to accept Israeli participation in a variety of international events.

It is not far-fetched to imagine direct official contacts between the two countries in the future, but such relations seem unrealistic at this point. The UAE seems to currently prefer to avoid or limit any cooperation with Israel. For example, its official news agencies refrained from reporting on the opening of the Israeli representation to the UN’s International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi in early 2016. However, since there was significant coverage in Israeli and international media outlets about the topic, Maryam al-Falasi, the media officer at the UAE Foreign Ministry, issued an official statement clarifying that IRENA is an independent international agency with its own norms and laws, and that the opening of the Israeli representation does not indicate any change in the UAE’s position towards Israel or in the relations between the two countries.

Business cooperation between the two countries is no longer a secret. Nevertheless, the fact that they have to be covert and the scope of technical obstacles involved in carrying them out, make it difficult for Israel to compete with other countries in entering the desirable UAE markets. The potential for closer business, security, diplomatic and civilian ties is great. An example, is the international EXPO2020 exhibition, which will be held in Dubai in two years, and will be a hub for high level meetings between governments and private sector companies. Israel has not yet received an invitation for this exhibition and might miss out on this great opportunity.

The UAE is a partner in the waiting for Israel. Both Israel and the UAE are essentially pragmatic, and have leverage in the Middle East. The UAE has never participated in any war against Israel and there is no deep hostility between the two countries. The Gulf states, and the UAE among them, regard Israel as a regional player that must be dealt with. They all consider a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a source of regional stability and as a means to confront extremism in their own territories. The UAE Foreign Ministry’s website is full of references calling on Israel and the Palestinians to advance the peace process based on the two-state solution and the Arab peace initiative (2002).

In general, the UAE receives Jews of various nationalities in its territory and does not regard religious differences as the source of its conflict with Israel. Rather, it is Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. The regional influence that the UAE can exert, and its growing importance in the Middle East, position it as a country that can potentially play a significant role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whenever Israel will want to normalize relations with its neighbours and promote regional peace, it is likely to find a very willing partner in the UAE.

Dr. Moran Zaga researches social and geopolitical processes in the Gulf states. She is a Policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center at the University of Haifa and at the Forum for Regional Thinking. This article is based on her study on Israel-UAE relations, which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-turkey-insights-from-a-policy-dialogue-in-the-midst-of-a-crisis/ Tue, 11 Dec 2018 16:01:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2918 The recent escalation in Gaza highlighted once again the crisis in Israel-Turkey relations. A harsh exchange of tweets between the spokespersons of Turkey’s President Erdoğan and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed not only disagreements on policy but also a negative and confrontational discourse. Six months have passed since Israeli and Turkish ambassadors were sent home, following Turkish protest over Israel’s steps in Gaza, and ties have yet to improve. On this background, the Mitvim Institute recently conducted its annual Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue in Istanbul, in cooperation with Friedrich-EbertStiftung. Policy exchanges with a variety of unofficial Turkish counterparts emphasized that even at the height of Israel-Turkey tensions a few months ago – triggered by the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the escalation in Gaza – the two countries refrained from intensifying the crisis beyond a certain level. Thus, for example, despite sending the ambassadors home, they did not formally downgrade the level of relations. This fact will make it easier to solve the crisis, should there be political will to do so. It will be possible to present the return of the ambassadors as a largely technical step, not as one that heralds a new stage in relations. But even should ambassadors’ return, Turkey is not likely to seek a significant improvement in ties due to its long-standing opposition to Israeli policies towards the Palestinian issue. In fact, the Turkish desire for increased influence on the Palestinian issue is a significant reason to seek the return of

הפוסט Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The recent escalation in Gaza highlighted once again the crisis in Israel-Turkey relations. A harsh exchange of tweets between the spokespersons of Turkey’s President Erdoğan and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed not only disagreements on policy but also a negative and confrontational discourse. Six months have passed since Israeli and Turkish ambassadors were sent home, following Turkish protest over Israel’s steps in Gaza, and ties have yet to improve. On this background, the Mitvim Institute recently conducted its annual Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue in Istanbul, in cooperation with Friedrich-EbertStiftung.

Policy exchanges with a variety of unofficial Turkish counterparts emphasized that even at the height of Israel-Turkey tensions a few months ago – triggered by the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the escalation in Gaza – the two countries refrained from intensifying the crisis beyond a certain level. Thus, for example, despite sending the ambassadors home, they did not formally downgrade the level of relations. This fact will make it easier to solve the crisis, should there be political will to do so. It will be possible to present the return of the ambassadors as a largely technical step, not as one that heralds a new stage in relations.

But even should ambassadors’ return, Turkey is not likely to seek a significant improvement in ties due to its long-standing opposition to Israeli policies towards the Palestinian issue. In fact, the Turkish desire for increased influence on the Palestinian issue is a significant reason to seek the return of its diplomatic representatives to Israel. Without an ambassador in Tel Aviv and a consul general in Jerusalem, Turkey finds itself increasingly excluded from processes occurring in domestic Palestinian politics and from international diplomatic efforts regarding the Gaza strip.

The American angle also came up during Mitvim’s policy dialogue in Istanbul, especially in the context of the Jewish community in the US. Turks view with concern the links between Jewish organizations and Saudi and Emirati lobby groups in Washington. This is perceived as aimed at promoting a more negative American attitude towards Turkey. Turkey would be pleased if the Jewish lobby would use its influence on the Trump administration to enable more Turkish involvement in Iraq, also as a counterweight and block to Iran, which is seen in Turkey as also serving Israeli interests. Israel, from its side, is currently not inclined to make gestures towards Turkey, given Erdoğan’s policy and statements towards it. The expectation in Jerusalem is that Turkey should first enable the return of ambassadors, as it was the one who initiated the bilateral crisis.

Concerning Iran, the messages coming from Istanbul were that in contrast to common opinion in Israel, Turkey and Iran are not allies. They indeed conduct neighborly relations and trade, and cooperate on regional issues such as Syria, yet at the same time a significant rivalry exists between them. Similarly to Israel, Turkey too wants to limit the Iranian involvement in Syria, although this is of less importance for Turkey, and is not motivated by security fears but rather by hegemonic and economic concerns. Misperceptions in Israel about Turkey are mirrored by misperceptions in Turkey about Israel. For example, there is a widespread belief in Turkey that Israel secretly desires territorial expansion in the Middle East and is closely allied with the Kurds in northern Syria, which Turkey considers a serious threat.

It seems that Israel and Turkey can find a common language regarding Syria, and that they are not always on different sides of the regional divide. Initiating a strategic Israel-Turkey dialogue concerning Syria should be one of the concrete results of a future return of ambassadors. It will also be helpful to establish a coordination and conflict-management mechanism between the two countries, with the aim of preventing a further collapse of ties in the event of another round of violence in Gaza or renewed tensions in Jerusalem.

The ideological disparities between Erdoğan and Netanyahu are not likely to disappear in the near future, but the practical advantages of improved relations – mainly in the economic and strategic spheres – can lead both leaders to decrease the flames and intensity of their disagreement, as occurred in the past. Turkey and Israel are central countries in the region, which are impacted by developments in the Middle East and can benefit from a dialogue channel about them (even when they do not see eye-to-eye).

Recent progress in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza creates a more favorable context for carrying out diplomatic efforts to enable the return of ambassadors. But until official ties build positive momentum again, it will be mostly up to civil society actors to maintain and broaden channels of dialogue and cooperation between the people and policy elite of both countries. Mitvim’s Israel-Turkey policy dialogue, as well as the ongoing work of the Israeli-Turkish Civil Society Forum, show that this is very much possible and valuable.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-spring-of-israels-relations-with-its-arab-neighbors/ Sun, 09 Dec 2018 15:57:45 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2916 In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well. It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states. The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-renewed-affair-with-oman/ Thu, 08 Nov 2018 15:47:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2913 The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis. Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well. Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-boiling-water-of-the-red-sea-power-struggles-and-israels-interests/ Sat, 01 Sep 2018 09:21:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3095 The Red Sea basin includes 12 states with a combined population of around 300 million. On the eastern shore lie Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel share the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba. On the African coast of the Red Sea are Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The Red Sea basin also includes Ethiopia, with no direct access to the sea, as well as Somaliland and Somalia, which are located in the Gulf of Aden, opposite the shores of Yemen, at the entrance to the Red Sea. In geographical terms, the Red Sea divides between Africa in the west and Asia in the east, and forms part of the Syrian-African rift. In geopolitical terms, throughout history the Red Sea served as one of the most vital trade routes in the world, connecting Europe and the west on the one hand with the Middle East on the other. Today it is the busiest trade route in the world. For this reason, Egypt is of particular importance in the territory of the Red Sea – it constitutes a bridge between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean – as are Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia, which are located on both sides of the straits of Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Likewise, the Red Sea was the maritime route via which every year millions of Muslim pilgrims from all over the world made their way to Mecca and al-Medina, the two holiest cities

הפוסט The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Red Sea basin includes 12 states with a combined population of around 300 million. On the eastern shore lie Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel share the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba. On the African coast of the Red Sea are Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The Red Sea basin also includes Ethiopia, with no direct access to the sea, as well as Somaliland and Somalia, which are located in the Gulf of Aden, opposite the shores of Yemen, at the entrance to the Red Sea. In geographical terms, the Red Sea divides between Africa in the west and Asia in the east, and forms part of the Syrian-African rift. In geopolitical terms, throughout history the Red Sea served as one of the most vital trade routes in the world, connecting Europe and the west on the one hand with the Middle East on the other. Today it is the busiest trade route in the world. For this reason, Egypt is of particular importance in the territory of the Red Sea – it constitutes a bridge between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean – as are Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia, which are located on both sides of the straits of Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Likewise, the Red Sea was the maritime route via which every year millions of Muslim pilgrims from all over the world made their way to Mecca and al-Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam, which are located in Saudi Arabia.

הפוסט The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-in-an-unchanging-middle-east/ Mon, 27 Aug 2018 15:20:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2904 The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time. The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals. No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/voices-of-peace-in-saudi-arabia/ Mon, 06 Aug 2018 15:07:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2901 A serious overview of the Saudi media, as recently done by some MEMRI reports, shows a considerable improvement in the Saudi media’s treatment of Israel. These voices are important since they represent senior Saudi journalists and civil society activists. Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization. It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah. Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A serious overview of the Saudi media, as recently done by some MEMRI reports, shows a considerable improvement in the Saudi media’s treatment of Israel. These voices are important since they represent senior Saudi journalists and civil society activists.

Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization.

It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah.

Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the Muslim and Arab worlds as a result of its control of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina (in fact, the king is called the Custodian of the Two Holy Places), and more than two million people perform the Hajj every year; (2) As an oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia has financial leverage over its beneficiaries that can be used in the diplomatic field when necessary; and (3) Saudi Arabia is considered a “neutral” player in the Israeli-Arab conflict by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia has no treaty with Israel (in contrast to Egypt and Jordan).

The most significant element in the Saudi change of rhetoric is that it potentially could change Saudi society’s image of Israel and the Jews and build a more congenial climate for peace – if and when it is achieved. At least one notable case study may prove this point: Egypt. In the pre-1973 period, certain Egyptian intellectuals began talking about the need to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, for the sake of Egyptian interests.

In the post-1973 period, these voices were given a free rein from above to disseminate their views and they undoubtedly played a role in Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977. The conclusion is that voices of peace sometimes precede and may foreshadow the actual peace.

Saudi Arabia does not need peace with Israel. Israel and Saudi do not share a border and there is no state of war between the two countries. In fact, the two have never fought each other. The Saudis are, however, concerned by regional instability – caused by deterioration on the Israeli-Palestinian or the Iranian fronts – and its impact on oil prices. This is partially the reason why the Saudis have already initiated two peace plans – the Fahd and Abdallah initiatives (1981 and 2002 respectively), which turned into Arab peace plans. Israel unequivocally rejected these initiatives, at least in part due to its negative image of the Saudis.

The changing climate in Saudi Arabia poses yet another opportunity to Israeli decision makers. In Saudi Arabia, they might find a partner who is most willing to cooperate against Iran and also willing to cooperate in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. The ultimate deal for Israel, to use a worn-out phrase, is not between Israel and the Palestinians – important as is – but with the greater parts of the Islamic and Arab worlds, to which Saudi Arabia might pave the way. There are no free lunches, but that is exactly what the Netanyahu government is trying to do with the Saudis, when he is trying to promote cooperation without giving anything in return in the Palestinian track. A move from the hidden to the public domain would necessitate a tangible reward to the Palestinians, but this is not likely to happen, unfortunately.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/are-ties-between-israel-and-bahrain-warming/ Wed, 01 Aug 2018 15:03:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2900 The participation of an Israeli delegation in the 2018 annual UNESCO International Conference held in Bahrain corresponds with the various headlines on Israeli-Bahraini relations during the past year. In May 2018, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed tweeted that Israel has the right to defend itself due to Iran’s violation of the status-quo in the region. This unprecedented reaction made by an Arab country broke the habit of overlooking or condemning the Israeli attacks in Syria. Despite its importance, the statement has not been officially published by Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Choosing to use the channel of social media over the official media brings a personal dimension to the statement and creates a safe diplomatic distance from deterministic declarations regarding the status of Israel. This kind of cautiousness is a customary practice of Arab leaders in their public references to Israel. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not stand out in an empty void. In May 2018, an official Bahraini delegation participated in the Giro D’Italia bicycle race, which was held in Israel, and last December an interfaith group of from Bahrain arrived in Israel to promote a dialogue for coexistence and religious tolerance. But, of the events and declarations betweenIsrael and Bahrain in the past year, perhaps the most important was the declaration made by the King of Bahrain in September 2017 at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa condemned the Arab boycott of Israel and announced that Bahraini citizens are now

הפוסט Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The participation of an Israeli delegation in the 2018 annual UNESCO International Conference held in Bahrain corresponds with the various headlines on Israeli-Bahraini relations during the past year. In May 2018, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed tweeted that Israel has the right to defend itself due to Iran’s violation of the status-quo in the region. This unprecedented reaction made by an Arab country broke the habit of overlooking or condemning the Israeli attacks in Syria. Despite its importance, the statement has not been officially published by Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Choosing to use the channel of social media over the official media brings a personal dimension to the statement and creates a safe diplomatic distance from deterministic declarations regarding the status of Israel. This kind of cautiousness is a customary practice of Arab leaders in their public references to Israel.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not stand out in an empty void. In May 2018, an official Bahraini delegation participated in the Giro D’Italia bicycle race, which was held in Israel, and last December an interfaith group of from Bahrain arrived in Israel to promote a dialogue for coexistence and religious tolerance. But, of the events and declarations betweenIsrael and Bahrain in the past year, perhaps the most important was the declaration made by the King of Bahrain in September 2017 at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa condemned the Arab boycott of Israel and announced that Bahraini citizens are now allowed to visit Israel.

In the background of the latest visit of the Israeli delegation to the UNESCO conference, the Israeli media rushed to publish a quote from a “senior Bahraini official” who claimed that “the kingdom will be the first of the Gulf states to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel”. With this announcement, it appeared that the Israeli excitement over the warming of ties between the two countries had reached a new peak. However, this enthusiasm, like many others in the past, reflects to a great extent more of a wishful thinking than an actual rapprochement. In that case, the foreign minister of Bahrain hastened to shatter the illusion of normalization by issuing an official declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that categorically denied the senior official’s claim.

In light of developments described in the relations between the two countries recently, the question asked is why Bahrain took a step back to the traditional position of the Gulf states reasserting its “commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative.” The key issue for understanding that dualist attitude lies in the level of openness on the one hand, and the sensitivity on the other, which characterizes the relations between Israel and Bahrain, and to a large extent, Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. Bahrain’s unique openness towards Israel stems from a combination of security interests, as well as political and social-religious issues.

First, both Bahrain and Israel are against Iran’s armament in nuclear weapons and supported Trump’s pulling out from the nuclear deal. Following the civil protests that broke out in Bahrain during the Arab Spring (2011), Iran criticized the legitimacy of the Sunni regime in Bahrain and supported the political struggle of the Shiite population in the country. As a small country with about two-thirds of its population being Shiite, Bahrain feels threatened by Iran and could use any ally in its diplomatic efforts against Iran’s nuclearization and a strong coalition in a scenario of military confrontation. The location of the US’ Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is not coincidental in this context, nor is the recent hesitant rapprochement with Israel.

Beyond the political and security implications of such converging interests, the shared interests and allegedly common enemy had led in general to a less hostile dialog between the countries in the formal channels, as well as between citizens over the social media platforms. Although difficult to measure, the general atmosphere rising from these exchanges seems to shift from the automatically anti-Israel approach to a more focused criticism in the context of the Palestinian issue, despite the diverse circumstances of events. One of the interesting manifestations of that was in the various comments to the Bahraini foreign minister’s tweet about Israel’s right to defend itself. Along with many sympathetic responses, there were also some negative reactions, but most of them called for advocating the same rights for the Palestinian people and did not reflect the usual narrative of delegitimizing Israel.

Second, Bahrain’s interest in promoting interfaith cooperation can also be associated with its growing openness towards Israel. This track has shaped a unique relationship between the two countries. As a regime that is being criticized for representing the minority Sunni community in Bahrain, the king seeks to advance a pluralistic policy to meet with the needs of the various sectarian and religious groups living in the country. Among them is a small Jewish community of about 100 people that emigrated to the region from Baghdad at the beginning of the 20th century. The partnership between the political and religious leadership of Bahrain with the Jewish Wiesenthal Center led to a natural linkage with Israel; however, its importance is manifested in the moderate, tolerant, and multicultural message that the regime wishes to express internally – addressing the various communities at home.

Thirdly, Bahrain is known for its self-confident, active political mentality relative to its regional power. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to host an Israeli minister (Yossi Sarid in 1994) and the first country in the region to declare Hezbollah’s military and political arms terrorist organizations. Bahrain regularly appeals to NATO against organizations affiliated with the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Bahrain represents a moderate pro-Western line that promotes women’s rights and rights for the many expatriates living in the country. Thus, Bahrain is a convenient ally for Israel, both politically and morally. However, Bahrain also has a political responsibility to maintain the fundamentals of the regional policies under which it operates, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore it will not rush to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel before the greater powers of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates do so.

Carmel Shama-Hacohen, Israel’s ambassador to the OECD and UNESCO, who was supposed to head the Israeli delegation at the conference in Bahrain, said in a radio interview that he would not attend the conference for political and security considerations. These reasons are also indicative of the great sensitivity in these relations as well as the great distance that Israel faces from achieving normalization with the Arab states, even with the moderate and less hostile ones. Eventually, Israel was represented by Deputy Israeli Ambassador to UNESCO and another Israeli diplomat on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The delegation’s participation is an example of a move that can be interpreted as a rapprochement between the two countries, but the far-reaching announcements voiced in the Israeli media hinder the small and measured steps being taken in this direction. In fact, not only did the report cause uneasiness among the Bahraini government, it also threatened the continued cautious rapprochement between the two countries.

Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Persian Gulf Studies, Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-iraq-relations-opportunities-to-advance-cooperation/ Wed, 01 Aug 2018 10:31:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3086 On 17 May 2018 the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Iraq relations, based on a research by Dr. Ronen Zeidel, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop took place just after the general elections in Iraq, and featured Dr. Ronen Zeidel, Linda Menuhin and Idan Barir. The discussion focused on Iraq’s internal processes, the complexities of the Iraqi state, Israel’s relations with the Kurdish region, strategic and economic interests of Israel in connection with Iraq, the opportunities emerging from the growing civic interactions between Israelis and Iraqis, and the possibility of establishing future economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. This document summarizes the main points of the discussion, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all participants.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 17 May 2018 the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Iraq relations, based on a research by Dr. Ronen Zeidel, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop took place just after the general elections in Iraq, and featured Dr. Ronen Zeidel, Linda Menuhin and Idan Barir. The discussion focused on Iraq’s internal processes, the complexities of the Iraqi state, Israel’s relations with the Kurdish region, strategic and economic interests of Israel in connection with Iraq, the opportunities emerging from the growing civic interactions between Israelis and Iraqis, and the possibility of establishing future economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. This document summarizes the main points of the discussion, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all participants.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-morocco-relations-opportunities-to-advance-cooperation/ Wed, 01 Aug 2018 09:18:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3092 On 18 July 2018, the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Morocco relations, based on research by Einat Levi, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop focused on opportunities to advance cooperation between Israel and Morocco, and on related challenges that need to be addressed. Civil society activists, scholars and experts, diplomats, and businesspeople participated in the workshop. The workshop included a presentation by Einat Levi, an introduction to various civil society initiatives involving Israelis and Moroccans, and a debate among participants. This document summarizes the workshop, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all its participants.

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 18 July 2018, the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Morocco relations, based on research by Einat Levi, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop focused on opportunities to advance cooperation between Israel and Morocco, and on related challenges that need to be addressed. Civil society activists, scholars and experts, diplomats, and businesspeople participated in the workshop. The workshop included a presentation by Einat Levi, an introduction to various civil society initiatives involving Israelis and Moroccans, and a debate among participants. This document summarizes the workshop, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all its participants.

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-new-mideast-in-familiar-clothing/ Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:51:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2897 Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed. Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved. First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-saudi-arabia-on-the-way-to-normalization/ Sun, 01 Jul 2018 10:18:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3076 The tectonic changes in the Middle East since 2011 have created the foundation for a significant rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Alongside their strategic security partnership, cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia engenders enormous potential on the political and economic level. Official diplomatic relations between the two countries will reflect on the stability of the region and will also help advance the peace and reconciliation processes with the Palestinians. Economic cooperation including water, technology, energy, and tourism agreements would bring significant benefits to both countries, and certainly to the Israeli economy. These benefits notwithstanding, normalization between the two countries is not expected before the Palestinian demands are met, or at least until there is a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The reasoning behind this is Saudi Arabia’s historical commitment to advancing the solution of the Palestinian problem. As a result, the Saudi regime prefers in the meantime to follow the path of quiet diplomacy in order to advance national-strategic goals, rather than publicizing its relations with Israel.

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The tectonic changes in the Middle East since 2011 have created the foundation for a significant rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Alongside their strategic security partnership, cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia engenders enormous potential on the political and economic level. Official diplomatic relations between the two countries will reflect on the stability of the region and will also help advance the peace and reconciliation processes with the Palestinians. Economic cooperation including water, technology, energy, and tourism agreements would bring significant benefits to both countries, and certainly to the Israeli economy. These benefits notwithstanding, normalization between the two countries is not expected before the Palestinian demands are met, or at least until there is a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The reasoning behind this is Saudi Arabia’s historical commitment to advancing the solution of the Palestinian problem. As a result, the Saudi regime prefers in the meantime to follow the path of quiet diplomacy in order to advance national-strategic goals, rather than publicizing its relations with Israel.

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Saudi Arabia: From Foes to Potential Friends https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-saudi-arabia-from-foes-to-potential-friends/ Sun, 03 Jun 2018 12:30:43 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2877 The Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, is fed up with the Palestinian leadership. “Over the past 40 years, the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly missed opportunities and rejected all proposals”, he said during a meeting with several Jewish leaders in late March. “It is time for the Palestinians to accept the proposals […] or to remain silent and stop complaining”. This was not the first time that Saudi officials had harshly criticized the Palestinian leadership for consistently missing historic opportunities to resolve the conflict, but until now they have not done it publicly. The contacts between Riyadh and Jerusalem are perceived by part of the Saudi public as a betrayal of the Palestinian interest, which plays into the hands of the regime’s opponents. Therefore, the royal family should prove that it is not abandoning the Palestinian struggle in favor of normalization with Israel. The Palestinian issue has never been at the top of the Saudi agenda, but it has been and continues to be, a restraining factor in Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards Israel. Historically, there have been moments in which the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia coincided, but they have never materialized into a dramatic change in the bilateral relations. The reason was the Saudi regime’s fear of harsh reactions on the part of the Arab world, which would undermine its public image and its religious status as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam. However lately, as the Iranian threat increases, Israel has become a potential ally

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: From Foes to Potential Friends הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, is fed up with the Palestinian leadership. “Over the past 40 years, the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly missed opportunities and rejected all proposals”, he said during a meeting with several Jewish leaders in late March. “It is time for the Palestinians to accept the proposals […] or to remain silent and stop complaining”.

This was not the first time that Saudi officials had harshly criticized the Palestinian leadership for consistently missing historic opportunities to resolve the conflict, but until now they have not done it publicly. The contacts between Riyadh and Jerusalem are perceived by part of the Saudi public as a betrayal of the Palestinian interest, which plays into the hands of the regime’s opponents. Therefore, the royal family should prove that it is not abandoning the Palestinian struggle in favor of normalization with Israel.

The Palestinian issue has never been at the top of the Saudi agenda, but it has been and continues to be, a restraining factor in Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards Israel. Historically, there have been moments in which the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia coincided, but they have never materialized into a dramatic change in the bilateral relations. The reason was the Saudi regime’s fear of harsh reactions on the part of the Arab world, which would undermine its public image and its religious status as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam.

However lately, as the Iranian threat increases, Israel has become a potential ally for Saudi Arabia. Not only do the two countries share the same view of the need to root out radical elements and stabilize the Middle East, but Israel is the only country in the world with the military intentions and capabilities required to fight common enemies. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on its strategic alliance with the United States, but in recent years the American administration’s willingness to intervene in the Middle East’s bloody conflicts has diminished, and Saudi Arabia has virtually remained without a tailwind to effectively curb Iran’s influence. In such circumstances, Israel has become a major player in changing the regional balance of power. Beyond its intelligence and strategic capabilities, Israel serves as an economic model for Saudi Arabia. As the Saudi economy is undergoing a revolution from being an oil-based economy to a productive and advanced economy, Israel’s knowledge and technology has become increasingly attractive.

The hidden potential in normalized Israeli-Saudi relations is enormous. On the strategic level, the bi-lateral relations are not symmetrical in view of Israel’s clear military superiority, but it does not diminish their importance. Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the Arab world could help Israel fight Iran and strengthen the security cooperation with other Arab countries. Nevertheless, Israel’s fear of advanced arms deals between Saudi Arabia and the United States and the possibility of developing Saudi nuclear weapons in response to Iranian nuclear weapons, should not be dismissed. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia could take advantage of Israeli intelligence on Iran and its Middle Eastern affiliates, as well as its defense systems (such as Iron Dome) and its advanced capabilities against Cyber-attacks.

At the diplomatic level, Israeli-Saudi cooperation can help mitigate explosive incidents, such as riots on the Temple Mount. In addition, it will pave the way for the promotion of economic, energy and agricultural projects between Israel and the Arab countries, which presently hardly exist at present. Already, the royal family is exerting pressure to convince the Palestinian leadership to be more flexible with their demands from Israel. Unlike the past, Saudi Arabia has withdrawn from its demand for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and is now talking about a logical solution. Thus, for example, the Saudis no longer support the Palestinian demand for the right of return, rather they seek a solution that will be acceptable to Israel as well. In addition, it does not condition the normalization of its relations with Israel on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and is willing to settle for a breakthrough in negotiations. As far as Israel is concerned, if Israel makes gestures, such as freezing settlements or removing (even partially) the closure on Gaza, that signal to the Arab world that it is willing to negotiate, Saudi Arabia will possibly reward Israel with more gestures.

At the economic level, if the regime removes the economic barriers and allows Israeli merchandise and labor to integrate into the Saudi economy, it will make a huge contribution to the Israeli economy, especially if other Arab countries open their gates to Israeli produce.

Saudi Arabia and Israel are interested in normalizing their relations. This is indisputable. However, despite the mutual will, it is still a long and winding road towards that goal. At this point in time, there is a chance that Saudi Arabia may succeed in bringing the Palestinian leadership to the negotiating table, but it cannot force it to sign a document in which the Palestinians waive their historical demands on Israel. Israel, on its part, does not show willingness to meet the Saudi threshold requirements. With the current coalition, any Israeli gesture toward the Palestinians would be seen as deviating from the ideological positions of the government.

As things stand now, the Israeli and Palestinian leadership are unable to bridge the gap between their positions, despite the American and Arab pressure. Therefore, the chances of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia are unclear. While there has been a dramatic change in the Saudi discourse toward Israel lately, it is doubtful whether the conditions for the Saudi leadership to leap over the Palestinian hurdle are ripe for normalization with the Zionist enemy.

Israel must do its best not to miss the unique window of opportunity that has opened in its relations with Saudi Arabia. Opportunities are deceptive and transient in the Middle East, therefore the common interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia may fade if the current circumstances change. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Israeli government is to restore its credibility in the eyes of the Saudi leadership. Normalization with Saudi Arabia will not be given for free. It has its price. The question is whether Israel is willing to pay it. The worst thing that the Israeli prime minister could do is to instill in the Saudis the feeling that he is ready to make concessions, and then to retract his statement. Saudi Arabia has been disappointed with the Israeli leadership in the past. It must not happen again.

Dr. Michal Yaari is an expert on Saudi Arabia from Tel Aviv University and the Open University and is a member of a task team at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research about Israel-Saudi Arabia relations, which was written as part of a Mitvim Institute project on “Israel’s relations with the Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: From Foes to Potential Friends הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-unfulfilled-potential-of-israels-relations-with-arab-countries/ Tue, 29 May 2018 10:03:34 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3073 On 29 May 2018, the Mitvim Institute and the Leonard Davis Institute held a joint conference devoted to the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The conference took place at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It focused on mapping existing cooperation between Israel and the Arab world, identifying future potential in these relations and analyzing the link between Israel’s regional connections and the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The conference included a keynote address by Member of Knesset (MK) Isaac Herzog (Opposition leader, Zionist Union), in addition to sessions concerning civil, economic and political cooperation between Israel and Arab countries. The conference is part of a Mitvim Institute project on this same topic, and members of the project’s task team presented their conclusions and insights at the conference. This document sums up the main points of the conference.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 29 May 2018, the Mitvim Institute and the Leonard Davis Institute held a joint conference devoted to the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The conference took place at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It focused on mapping existing cooperation between Israel and the Arab world, identifying future potential in these relations and analyzing the link between Israel’s regional connections and the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The conference included a keynote address by Member of Knesset (MK) Isaac Herzog (Opposition leader, Zionist Union), in addition to sessions concerning civil, economic and political cooperation between Israel and Arab countries. The conference is part of a Mitvim Institute project on this same topic, and members of the project’s task team presented their conclusions and insights at the conference. This document sums up the main points of the conference.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-new-israeli-illusion-peace-with-the-arab-world-without-the-palestinians/ Tue, 15 May 2018 11:52:23 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2858 In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.” These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”. Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979,

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.”

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/post-iran-deal-israel-and-the-post-american-era/ Mon, 14 May 2018 11:48:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2857 Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty. Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations. Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/cooperation-jordan-israel-fulfilled-be-still-can-that-potential-a/ Thu, 10 May 2018 09:39:30 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3061 The history of Israel-Jordan relations displays long-term strategic cooperation. The formal peace agreement, signed in 1994, has become one of the pillars of the political-strategic stability of both Israel and Jordan. While the two countries have succeeded in developing extensive security cooperation, the economic, political, and civil aspects, which also have great cooperation potential, have for the most part been neglected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents difficulties in realizing this potential while hindering the Israel-Jordan relations and leading to alienation and hostility between the two peoples. However, the formal agreements and the existing relations make it possible to advance them even under the ongoing conflict. Israel and Jordan can benefit from cooperation on political issues, such as promoting peace and relations with the Palestinians and managing the holy sites in Jerusalem; they can also benefit from cooperation on civil matters, such as joint management of water resources, and resolving environmental, energy, and tourism issues; and lastly, Israel can benefit from economic cooperation while leveraging the geographical position of Jordan which makes it a gateway to Arab markets. This article focuses on the economic aspect and demonstrates how such cooperation can provide Israel with a powerful growth engine that will significantly increase Israeli GDP. It draws attention to the great potential that Israeli-Jordanian ties engender, and to the possibility – which still exists – to realize this potential, which would enhance peaceful and prosperous relationship between Israel and Jordan.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The history of Israel-Jordan relations displays long-term strategic cooperation. The formal peace agreement, signed in 1994, has become one of the pillars of the political-strategic stability of both Israel and Jordan. While the two countries have succeeded in developing extensive security cooperation, the economic, political, and civil aspects, which also have great cooperation potential, have for the most part been neglected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents difficulties in realizing this potential while hindering the Israel-Jordan relations and leading to alienation and hostility between the two peoples. However, the formal agreements and the existing relations make it possible to advance them even under the ongoing conflict. Israel and Jordan can benefit from cooperation on political issues, such as promoting peace and relations with the Palestinians and managing the holy sites in Jerusalem; they can also benefit from cooperation on civil matters, such as joint management of water resources, and resolving environmental, energy, and tourism issues; and lastly, Israel can benefit from economic cooperation while leveraging the geographical position of Jordan which makes it a gateway to Arab markets. This article focuses on the economic aspect and demonstrates how such cooperation can provide Israel with a powerful growth engine that will significantly increase Israeli GDP. It draws attention to the great potential that Israeli-Jordanian ties engender, and to the possibility – which still exists – to realize this potential, which would enhance peaceful and prosperous relationship between Israel and Jordan.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-jcpoa-crisis-and-israeli-iranian-relations/ Mon, 30 Apr 2018 11:31:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2847 Much of the discourse on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran, has centered broadly on two issue sets. The first comprises the issues between Iran and the six powers; the second, perhaps more widely-discussed are dynamics between the U.S. and the other five powers. However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.” It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Much of the discourse on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran, has centered broadly on two issue sets. The first comprises the issues between Iran and the six powers; the second, perhaps more widely-discussed are dynamics between the U.S. and the other five powers.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council) 

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-the-abbas-peace-plan/ Thu, 05 Apr 2018 10:28:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2832 Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority’s chairman, appeared on February 20th before the Security Council and presented a new Palestinian peace plan, with a number of points: first, a request that an international conference be held until mid-2018, with the Security Council permanent members, the Quartet, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and other relevant regional players in attendance. The conference will have three resulting events: recognition of Palestine as a full member of the UN, mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders, and the establishment of an international mechanism that will help both sides discuss and resolve the open permanent issues defined in the Oslo Accords, i.e. Jerusalem, permanent borders, security, Palestinian refugees, in accordance with a pre-defined timetable and guarantees for implementing the agreed solutions. Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority’s chairman, appeared on February 20th before the Security Council and presented a new Palestinian peace plan, with a number of points: first, a request that an international conference be held until mid-2018, with the Security Council permanent members, the Quartet, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and other relevant regional players in attendance. The conference will have three resulting events: recognition of Palestine as a full member of the UN, mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders, and the establishment of an international mechanism that will help both sides discuss and resolve the open permanent issues defined in the Oslo Accords, i.e. Jerusalem, permanent borders, security, Palestinian refugees, in accordance with a pre-defined timetable and guarantees for implementing the agreed solutions.

Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem based on Resolution 194, formulated in accordance to the Arab peace initiative.

The timing of the announcement of the Palestinian plan is intended to preempt a possible upheaval that could stir the Palestinians upon the release of an American peace plan. Moreover, it is intended to signal, as the Palestinians have already stated more than once, that the US is no longer seen as a fair mediator in view of its unilateral stance on Jerusalem, the reduction of US aid to UNRWA and the threat of closing the Palestinian representation in Washington. From a Palestinian point of view, the imbalance created by an exclusive American mediation, can be mitigated with the involvement of international partners. In addition, the speech is intended to portray Abbas to his people as a leader who dares to challenge the US, thereby strengthening his unstable legitimacy.

In view of the thicket of corruption affairs in Israeli politics, it is no wonder that the announcement about the disclosure of the plan was accepted in Israel with indifference. The Israeli Pavlovian reaction, as expressed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response – “Abbas has not said anything new” – is a reminiscent of countless similar negative reactions by Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers, including the response to the Arab peace plan in 2002. Not only that, but to ensure that Abbas is not seen as someone who is willing to make concessions, Netanyahu stressed that Abbas continues to pay millions of dollars to terrorists. Danny Danon, Israel’s representative to the UN, echoed him and said that Abbas is not part of the solution, but the problem.

The importance of the Palestinian plan is not in its content; it is anyway very general and does not contain any details, which are planned to be determined during long and exhausting negotiations. Its importance is three-fold: first, it stresses – once again – Abbas’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and a possible exchange of territories, thereby refuting the claim that Abbas intends to demand the implementation of the partition boundaries of 1947. The fact that Abbas views the Balfour Declaration as illegitimate does not change the fact that he recognizes and willing to accept the existing reality. The Palestinian narrative that rejects the Balfour Declaration will not change even after a peace agreement is achieved.

Second, Abbas’s insistence on East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital shows, by inference, that Abbas recognizes West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Thirdly, his view of the Palestinian agreement as a milestone to an Israeli-Arab peace agreement and part thereof, as expressed in the Arab peace initiative, signals that the advancement of IsraeliArab reconciliation cannot replace or advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

In August 1981, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Fahd published his first peace initiative (the first Saudi initiative) – which was immediately rejected by Israel – Yoel Marcus, a senior Ha’aretz journalist, wrote that Israel had always been able to respond to Arab bomb-bearing missiles, but not to missiles bearing peace plans. His observation was correct, but not accurate. Israel has learned to intercept both bomb-bearing missiles and peace plans. It does so by simply ignoring, opposing, or announcing that they are a recipe for the destruction of Israel.

Abbas’s peace plan will probably enter the endless collection of peace plans proposed throughout the years of the conflict, which were faded into oblivion. The composition of the current government and the timing of the publication will not give it a chance. Historians will certainly wonder in the future whether a peace plan was ever proposed by an Israeli government. I will give them a hint: not even once.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Matzav Review)

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-fruits-of-israeli-jordanian-peace-are-still-waiting-on-the-tree/ Fri, 30 Mar 2018 10:20:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2829 After a six-month diplomatic crisis between Israel and Jordan, a new Israeli ambassador – Amir Weissbrod – is expected to arrive in Amman soon to fully resume the embassy’s operations. This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized. The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements. From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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After a six-month diplomatic crisis between Israel and Jordan, a new Israeli ambassador – Amir Weissbrod – is expected to arrive in Amman soon to fully resume the embassy’s operations.

This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements.

From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas – diplomatic, economic and civilian – haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and have not been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized.

In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries.

In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements – coupled with the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans – point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians.

The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan – in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas – serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given.

The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets.

According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market.

The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit She’an and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network.

This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing public relations efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing – economic and diplomatic – contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trump and a Tale of Three Cities https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trump-and-a-tale-of-three-cities/ Fri, 02 Jun 2017 12:06:59 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4131 He visited Riyadh, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. As each stop approached in his Middle Eastern tour, the suspense in Israel grew and the anticipation increased. When will the major announcement be made? When will the new peace plan be introduced? When will the big surprise be revealed? And then he flew back home. For several months, Israelis were speculating about US President Donald Trump’s next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Each statement by the American president was amplified and analyzed: Trump is serious, Trump is determined, Trump is invested. That had become a common belief. Right-wing politicians then began to voice concern over an American president who supposedly turned from hawk to peacenik. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority and Israel was an opportunity to bring some certainty into the debate. However, if there is one key takeaway from the visit, it is that for the new president, regional security is the top priority in the region, not the Israeli- Palestinian peace process. Whether it was in his speech in Riyadh, his remarks in Bethlehem or his statements in Jerusalem, Trump spoke a similar language – it is time to fight terror, defeat extremism and contain Iran. Toward these goals he signed gigantic arm deals with the Saudis, called for the establishment of a new regional security partnership and urged the different peoples of the region to join hands and promote their shared interests. In Israel, the messages regarding regional security had some additional components and twists –

הפוסט Trump and a Tale of Three Cities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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He visited Riyadh, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. As each stop approached in his Middle Eastern tour, the suspense in Israel grew and the anticipation increased. When will the major announcement be made? When will the new peace plan be introduced? When will the big surprise be revealed? And then he flew back home.

For several months, Israelis were speculating about US President Donald Trump’s next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Each statement by the American president was amplified and analyzed: Trump is serious, Trump is determined, Trump is invested. That had become a common belief.

Right-wing politicians then began to voice concern over an American president who supposedly turned from hawk to peacenik.

Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority and Israel was an opportunity to bring some certainty into the debate. However, if there is one key takeaway from the visit, it is that for the new president, regional security is the top priority in the region, not the Israeli- Palestinian peace process.

Whether it was in his speech in Riyadh, his remarks in Bethlehem or his statements in Jerusalem, Trump spoke a similar language – it is time to fight terror, defeat extremism and contain Iran.

Toward these goals he signed gigantic arm deals with the Saudis, called for the establishment of a new regional security partnership and urged the different peoples of the region to join hands and promote their shared interests.

In Israel, the messages regarding regional security had some additional components and twists – a pledge to defend Israel at international organizations, a commitment to prevent a nuclear Iran and a promise to continue the special bond between Israel and the United States. Trump also emphasized the importance of Jerusalem to the Jewish people and told the Israeli public that their prime minister was a man of peace.

Trump echoed Benjamin Netanyahu’s talking points to the probable delight of the Israeli prime minister, who was also content with what Trump chose not to – at least publicly – say: The American president did not refer to the two-state solution; he did not mention the Palestinians’ right to self-determination; he did not criticize Israel over settlement expansion; he did not call on Israel to show maps and define its borders.

Trump chose to speak about peace in general and ambiguous terms, in a more religious than national context. Should the three monotheistic religions be able to cooperate, he claimed, then world peace – including between Israelis and Palestinians – might just be around the corner. He also identified the enemies of peace – Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas – and made clear that he was not in the business of moderating extremists, engaging with Iran or exploring Hamas’s new policy document. He wanted to defeat them. His words on Iran were welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, and his words on Hamas pleased Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu was happy about both.

Trump spelled out regional enemies and threats but kept vague on regional opportunities for peace. In fact, he ignored the most significant peace initiative out there – the Arab Peace Initiative (API).

Trump spoke in Saudi Arabia, the country that initiated the API. He spoke to leaders of Arab and Muslim countries that had adopted the API. He emphasized the need for multilateral efforts toward peace.

Yet he did not mention even once the offer that the Arab League made 15 years ago for normal diplomatic relations between Israel and all Arab states in return for peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors. The API, reaffirmed by the Arab League just two months ago, disappeared from Trump’s talking points, and no alternative plan for regional peace was introduced.

The Trump visit did not provide the much-needed clarity regarding the nature of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and its benefits.

It even challenged the limited clarity that does exist – clarity about American support for a two-state solution, and clarity about the API as a key regional incentive for peace that can provide Israel with additional benefits to those the Palestinians can deliver on their own.

Trump’s visit should serve as a wake-up call for other international actors who care about the peace process.

Lately, the international community is rather paralyzed regarding the peace process: Past initiatives have been shelved, and subsequently, no new initiatives have been put forth. All eyes are focused on the new American president and his statements about promoting peace.

The recent visit to the Middle East indicated that Trump might not be the savior of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as some believed. It is thus time for renewed international activism regarding the peace process, as exemplified by the resolution adopted by the European Parliament just before Trump’s visit, calling for a new European Union initiative to advance Israeli- Palestinian peace.

Despite their disappointment over a lack of progress toward peace during the visit, pro-peace actors – in Israel and beyond – can leverage three messages introduced by Trump during his visit that which contradict popular Israeli rightwing rhetoric: 1. While Netanyahu claims that a breakthrough in ties with the Arab world does not require progress on the Palestinian track, Trump emphasized that steps toward the Palestinians were needed for Israel to upgrade its regional ties.

2. While the Israeli government has been delegitimizing Abbas, Trump stressed that Abbas was a genuine partner for peace.

3. While right-wing Israelis present a dichotomous approach, asking international actors to choose whether they are for Israel or against it, Trump made the case that there is no contradiction between being pro-Israel and pro-Arab.

Trump has gone in and out of three major cities in the Middle East. A major announcement was not made, a new peace plan was not introduced, and a big surprise was not revealed. But just as he departed, it was announced that his special envoy for the peace process was on his way to the region.

So maybe it will all happen the next time around?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump and a Tale of Three Cities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is Israel’s Regional Opportunity Becoming More Concrete? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-israels-regional-opportunity-becoming-more-concrete/ Mon, 22 May 2017 11:58:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4130 As President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia drew near, the Wall Street Journal reported a new initiative originating from the Gulf states vis-a-vis Israel: Should Israel take steps to promote peace with the Palestinians, including a settlement freeze, the Gulf states will be willing to take some steps towards normalization of relations between the two sides. This report appears merely two months after the Arab League reaffirmed the Arab Peace Initiative (API) at its annual summit in Amman. Fifteen years have passed since the Arab League offered Israel to establish normal relations in return for a peace deal between Israel and its neighbors. All these years, Israel has refrained from issuing any formal response. Nevertheless, the Arab League continues to reaffirm the API – despite both regional turmoil and stagnation in the peace process – and to emphasize its relevance. The API is also a regular component in international statements and initiatives regarding the peace process. The API, however, only relates to the benefits Israel will gain once it signs a final status agreement with the Palestinians. It does not deal with the path to peace. As such, it is similar to other end-game peace incentives offered to Israel – the EU’s offer to grant Israel (and the future state of Palestine) a Special Privileged Partnership status after peace is achieved, and the security plan devised by the Obama administration to ensure Israelis that a two-state solution will enhance – not jeopardize – Israel’s security. These incentives can make peace

הפוסט Is Israel’s Regional Opportunity Becoming More Concrete? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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As President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia drew near, the Wall Street Journal reported a new initiative originating from the Gulf states vis-a-vis Israel: Should Israel take steps to promote peace with the Palestinians, including a settlement freeze, the Gulf states will be willing to take some steps towards normalization of relations between the two sides.

This report appears merely two months after the Arab League reaffirmed the Arab Peace Initiative (API) at its annual summit in Amman. Fifteen years have passed since the Arab League offered Israel to establish normal relations in return for a peace deal between Israel and its neighbors. All these years, Israel has refrained from issuing any formal response. Nevertheless, the Arab League continues to reaffirm the API – despite both regional turmoil and stagnation in the peace process – and to emphasize its relevance.

The API is also a regular component in international statements and initiatives regarding the peace process. The API, however, only relates to the benefits Israel will gain once it signs a final status agreement with the Palestinians. It does not deal with the path to peace. As such, it is similar to other end-game peace incentives offered to Israel – the EU’s offer to grant Israel (and the future state of Palestine) a Special Privileged Partnership status after peace is achieved, and the security plan devised by the Obama administration to ensure Israelis that a two-state solution will enhance – not jeopardize – Israel’s security. These incentives can make peace more attractive to Israelis. Through them, the international community offers Israel additional peace dividends that the Palestinians are unable of delivering on their own.

But an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal is still in the distant future, and this lessens the perceived relevance of the API. The end-game incentives should be coupled with process oriented ones, and the Gulf states’ offer – assuming such an offer actually exists – is exactly such an incentive. It reflects a shift from the previous Arab thinking that focused on the final status agreement, to thinking also about the path leading to such an agreement. The offer puts forth benefits that Israel can gain merely from moving towards peace, and not only from reaching peace. It also helps in turning the somewhat-vague concept of normal relations between Israel and the Arab world into something more concrete. In Israel, there is no serious debate about the type of relations Israel eventually wants to have with the Arab world. Normalization has not been defined, and this is also the case within the Arab world.

The Gulf states’ offer reportedly includes practical and specific steps, which could introduce Israelis with concrete and immediate dividends as a result of progress towards peace – among them are new business opportunities and shorter flight durations to east Asia. Such an offer can help address Israeli skepticism regarding the ability of Arab countries – in the post-Arab Spring era – to actually implement what they promised to Israel in the API. The offer also reflects a distinction between Arab countries as it is offered only by the Gulf states, and not by the entire Arab world (like the API). It highlights those Arab countries that have the political capabilities to develop ties with Israel and that actually have something concrete to offer Israel. Such countries can also be found in North Africa (i.e. Morocco and Tunisia), and not only in the Gulf.

So, can such a Gulf states offer be a game-changer?

Cooperation between Israel and some Arab countries is already taking place, although in a limited manner, mostly behind the scenes, and with a focus on joint security interests. This has led Israeli ministers to often brag about these relations and exaggerate their scope. The Israeli public, on the other hand, has very little actual knowledge about what is really going on between Israel and its neighbors.

It is worth remembering that Arab willingness to improve ties with Israel in return for significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian process – and not in return to the actual end of conflict – is not new. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, a variety of regional doors were opened up for Israel. At the time, some Arab countries even established formal diplomatic missions in Israel. This did not require a peace agreement. Mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO was enough. The next time Israeli and Palestinian leaders reach a breakthrough in the peace process, Israel can expect Arab countries to upgrade their ties with it, even if such an offer is not publicly made in advance.

A public offer can help in empowering pro-peace actors within Israel, and in creating a more favorable domestic atmosphere for a leader interested in promoting peace. Former Secretary of State, John Kerry, tried to generate such an offer, similar in concept to the one reportedly offered by the Gulf states. During the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he tried to convince Arab countries to operationalize the API: to spell out a gradual and concrete road-map for its implementation, including normalization steps in return for progress towards peace. However, his efforts did not bear fruit. The Arab League was not willing to go there.

Therefore, the key question regarding the Gulf states offer is whether it will become a formal and public diplomatic plan or remain as an unconfirmed media report. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia indicates that the latter may be the case. The offer, as well as the API, was not mentioned even once in public statements made during the visit.

Over the last three years, Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly tries to introduce a different sequence than offered in the API. He claims that significant cooperation with the Arab world can be achieved prior to an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough. Arab leaders, however, reject this notion time and again. Kerry also rejected it in his last policy speech on the issue. They all emphasize that progress with the Palestinians is a prerequisite to any serious upgrade in Israel-Arab ties.

The report about the Gulf states’ offer highlights the linkage that exists between the peace process and regional cooperation. It reflects that at least some Arab countries have the will and interest to develop better ties with Israel and the ability to offer Israel specific and attractive tangibles. The offer clearly indicates that Israel must change its policies towards the Palestinian issue and the peace process in order to make the most of the unique regional opportunity placed before it.

הפוסט Is Israel’s Regional Opportunity Becoming More Concrete? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trump’s Visit to the Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/3949/ Sun, 21 May 2017 06:31:13 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3949 Donald Trump made his first foreign trip since taking office to the Middle East. In May 2017 he visited Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. Throughout his regional tour, the US president highlighted common security threats that can help unite nations and religions in the Middle East. He called for joint action against terror and extremism, and expressed hope and belief that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. However, the visit did not include major policy announcements, and many open questions remained about future American policies in the Middle East. This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Donald Trump made his first foreign trip since taking office to the Middle East. In May 2017 he visited Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. Throughout his regional tour, the US president highlighted common security threats that can help unite nations and religions in the Middle East. He called for joint action against terror and extremism, and expressed hope and belief that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. However, the visit did not include major policy announcements, and many open questions remained about future American policies in the Middle East.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/international-involvement-towards-israeli-palestinian-conflict-resolution/ Thu, 02 Mar 2017 11:33:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3350 Given ongoing stagnation in the peace process and the new American administration, the Mitvim Institute convened a policy-planning roundtable to discuss which steps the international community can take in order to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and which mechanisms are required in order to carry out such steps. The roundtable was attended by experts from various pro-peace Israeli organizations. This document summarizes the discussion that took place. It does not necessarily reflect consensus among participants.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Given ongoing stagnation in the peace process and the new American administration, the Mitvim Institute convened a policy-planning roundtable to discuss which steps the international community can take in order to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and which mechanisms are required in order to carry out such steps. The roundtable was attended by experts from various pro-peace Israeli organizations. This document summarizes the discussion that took place. It does not necessarily reflect consensus among participants.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/cooperation-between-israel-and-the-arab-world/ Sat, 23 Jul 2016 18:18:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4237 Israelis see high importance in advancing cooperation with Egypt, while cooperation with the Palestinian Authority is of low priority. This is the main finding from a public opinion poll conducted for the Mitvim Institute on July 13, 2016 by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. It sampled 500 men and women, as a representative sample of the Israeli adult population (aged 18 and older, from both the Jewish and Arab sectors). The findings were first presented on July 20, 2016, at a conference held by the Knesset Caucus for Regional Cooperation (led by MKs Merav Michaeli, Yaakov Peri, and Dr. Michael Oren), in cooperation with the Mitvim Institute. The following are the poll’s findings.

הפוסט Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israelis see high importance in advancing cooperation with Egypt, while cooperation with the Palestinian Authority is of low priority. This is the main finding from a public opinion poll conducted for the Mitvim Institute on July 13, 2016 by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. It sampled 500 men and women, as a representative sample of the Israeli adult population (aged 18 and older, from both the Jewish and Arab sectors). The findings were first presented on July 20, 2016, at a conference held by the Knesset Caucus for Regional Cooperation (led by MKs Merav Michaeli, Yaakov Peri, and Dr. Michael Oren), in cooperation with the Mitvim Institute. The following are the poll’s findings.

הפוסט Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Turkey on the Verge of an Agreement https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-turkey-on-the-verge-of-an-agreement/ Mon, 20 Jun 2016 15:55:38 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4175 Israel and Turkey have been conveying to their publics positive messages about progress in the bilateral negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement. Expectations are that a deal may be announced following the next round of talks, planned for the second half of June, and reconciliatory messages have been voiced in mid- June by the Turkish prime minister as well as by Israeli government officials. The agreement is set to upgrade Israel-Turkey relations to full diplomatic ties, and enable a return to normal relations. Major differences will remain between the two countries (including on Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians), but the two countries will be able to return to constructive working relations, as was the case in the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power, starting in late 2002. Israel and Turkey have been engaged in negotiations to try and mend relations for several years, since the flotilla incident occurred in May 2010. This process had many ups and downs, moving between progress and setbacks. But the fact that despite the growing mistrust and harsh rhetoric the two sides have found their way time and time again to the negotiation table means that they both see value in improving the relationship. A public opinion poll carried out by the Mitvim Institute in late 2015 showed that for the Israeli public, security cooperation is the most important reason to mend ties with Turkey. However, possible export of Israeli natural gas has become an important factor as well. While security

הפוסט Israel and Turkey on the Verge of an Agreement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Turkey have been conveying to their publics positive messages about progress in the bilateral negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement.

Expectations are that a deal may be announced following the next round of talks, planned for the second half of June, and reconciliatory messages have been voiced in mid- June by the Turkish prime minister as well as by Israeli government officials.

The agreement is set to upgrade Israel-Turkey relations to full diplomatic ties, and enable a return to normal relations. Major differences will remain between the two countries (including on Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians), but the two countries will be able to return to constructive working relations, as was the case in the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power, starting in late 2002.

Israel and Turkey have been engaged in negotiations to try and mend relations for several years, since the flotilla incident occurred in May 2010. This process had many ups and downs, moving between progress and setbacks.

But the fact that despite the growing mistrust and harsh rhetoric the two sides have found their way time and time again to the negotiation table means that they both see value in improving the relationship.

A public opinion poll carried out by the Mitvim Institute in late 2015 showed that for the Israeli public, security cooperation is the most important reason to mend ties with Turkey. However, possible export of Israeli natural gas has become an important factor as well. While security and economics are important driving forces, the new chapter of Israel-Turkey relations should include more enhanced civil society cooperation among NGOs and think tanks, including in the fields of conflict resolution and democracy.

For example, over the past four years, the Mitvim Institute and GPoT Center have been working together to support the mending of Israel-Turkey relations, and this cooperation can be a positive model for others. There is also an initiative to launch a Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum, which can help fill a real gap in the field of cooperation between NGOs.

A key pillar in the agreement relates to Gaza. Efforts have been made to find a formula that will address Turkey’s concern about living conditions there, and Israel’s concern regarding security threats.

According to media reports, Turkey will be granted somewhat of a special status in regard to Gaza, which will enable it to support the people of Gaza through providing humanitarian aid, as well as water and energy. Such a formula can enable Israel to improve living conditions in Gaza, without having Hamas be able to claim credit for it. Turkey will be seen as the one to praise for this achievement.

Other regional actors are also of significance. Saudi Arabia, which is gradually becoming a more important factor in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, is also becoming more relevant to Israel- Turkey relations. Although Israel- Saudi relations do not formally exist, there is increased visibility to contacts between the two states (i.e. joint panels of Israeli and Saudi speakers in various conferences).

The Saudis have also stepped up their cooperation with Turkey, and the close relations emerging between Saudi Arabia and Egypt can be valuable for attempts to mend Turkey-Egypt relations. Efforts in this regards have reportedly already taken place. This is something that Israel should encourage, as a parallel Israel-Turkey and Egypt-Turkey reconciliations will shape a much more positive, and win-win, environment in the eastern Mediterranean.

A new chapter in Israel-Turkey relations seems to be quickly approaching, producing a set fresh of bilateral and regional opportunities that are waiting to be explored and acted upon. The Israeli-Turkish reconciliation should be seen as a first step in devising a new win-win regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean, and not merely as a way to increase security coordination and to better confront joint threats.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Turkey on the Verge of an Agreement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Egypt-Saudi Agreements: Policy Analysis and Regional Implications https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-egypt-saudi-agreements-policy-analysis-and-regional-implications/ Sat, 23 Apr 2016 18:03:30 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4214 The first visit by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman to Egypt has led to the signing of significant agreement between the two countries. The visit and its consequences signal a new phase in the relations between two of the Middle East’s most important countries, building upon the historic alliance between them. Closer ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will have regional implications, which will also impact Israel. This document includes commentaries written for the Mitvim Institute by various experts examining different aspects of the evolving Egypt-Saudi relationship: Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Ehud EIran and Dr. Aviad Rubin, Khader Sawaed, and Dr. Michal Yaari.

הפוסט The Egypt-Saudi Agreements: Policy Analysis and Regional Implications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The first visit by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman to Egypt has led to the signing of significant agreement between the two countries. The visit and its consequences signal a new phase in the relations between two of the Middle East’s most important countries, building upon the historic alliance between them. Closer ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will have regional implications, which will also impact Israel. This document includes commentaries written for the Mitvim Institute by various experts examining different aspects of the evolving Egypt-Saudi relationship: Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Ehud EIran and Dr. Aviad Rubin, Khader Sawaed, and Dr. Michal Yaari.

הפוסט The Egypt-Saudi Agreements: Policy Analysis and Regional Implications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Egypt and Saudi Arabia: A Predictable Rapprochement https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/egypt-and-saudi-arabia-a-predictable-rapprochement/ Sat, 23 Apr 2016 18:01:30 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4211 Saudi Arabian King Salman’s five-day visit to Egypt and the extensive media coverage it garnered are an expression of the warming of ties since al-Sisi became president in June 2013. Morsi’s overthrowing and declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013 were welcomed by Riyadh and immediately rewarded with a tremendous $12 billion aid package from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. The Egyptian-Saudi rapprochement manifests itself in various forms. In September 2014 the Saudis opened their largest embassy in Cairo, al-Sisi visited the kingdom three times in his first year in office and he was also awarded the prestigious Abd al-Aziz medal, which is reserved for prominent individuals such as Presidents Bush and Obama.

הפוסט Egypt and Saudi Arabia: A Predictable Rapprochement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Saudi Arabian King Salman’s five-day visit to Egypt and the extensive media coverage it garnered are an expression of the warming of ties since al-Sisi became president in June 2013. Morsi’s overthrowing and declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013 were welcomed by Riyadh and immediately rewarded with a tremendous $12 billion aid package from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. The Egyptian-Saudi rapprochement manifests itself in various forms. In September 2014 the Saudis opened their largest embassy in Cairo, al-Sisi visited the kingdom three times in his first year in office and he was also awarded the prestigious Abd al-Aziz medal, which is reserved for prominent individuals such as Presidents Bush and Obama.

הפוסט Egypt and Saudi Arabia: A Predictable Rapprochement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Saudi Arabia: Lynchpin of the moderate axis in the Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/saudi-arabia-lynchpin-of-the-moderate-axis-in-the-middle-east/ Wed, 13 Apr 2016 15:45:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4166 Saudi Arabian king Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s five-day visit to Egypt is an expression of the warming of ties between the two countries since Abdel Fattah Sisi became president of Egypt in June 2013. The ouster of Mohammed Morsi and declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013 were welcomed by Riyadh and immediately rewarded with a $12 billion aid package from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. Yet with king Abdullah’s passing in January 2015 it seemed that the two states were growing apart. The media was quick to point out disagreements on issues such as the countries’ approaches to Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria, where the Saudis demanded Assad’s departure as part of any outcome and the Egyptians saw Assad as part of the solution. In Yemen, too, despite expressing support Egypt was reticent about contributing troops. However, despite tactical disagreements, the two countries continued to share common strategic interests vis-à-vis regional threats and challenges. Therefore, Salman’s visit is a testament to the strong relationship – one might even say the alliance – between the two countries. Historically, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been a permanent feature of the Arab state system despite short periods of rivalry and the occasional military confrontation (e.g. the 1962- 1967 conflict in Yemen). The visit is consequential for the countries’ bilateral relationship, primarily for Egypt. According to Egyptian media, no fewer than 36 agreements, worth $25b., were signed during the visit, including establishing a

הפוסט Saudi Arabia: Lynchpin of the moderate axis in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Saudi Arabian king Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s five-day visit to Egypt is an expression of the warming of ties between the two countries since Abdel Fattah Sisi became president of Egypt in June 2013. The ouster of Mohammed Morsi and declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013 were welcomed by Riyadh and immediately rewarded with a $12 billion aid package from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

Yet with king Abdullah’s passing in January 2015 it seemed that the two states were growing apart. The media was quick to point out disagreements on issues such as the countries’ approaches to Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria, where the Saudis demanded Assad’s departure as part of any outcome and the Egyptians saw Assad as part of the solution. In Yemen, too, despite expressing support Egypt was reticent about contributing troops. However, despite tactical disagreements, the two countries continued to share common strategic interests vis-à-vis regional threats and challenges.

Therefore, Salman’s visit is a testament to the strong relationship – one might even say the alliance – between the two countries. Historically, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been a permanent feature of the Arab state system despite short periods of rivalry and the occasional military confrontation (e.g. the 1962- 1967 conflict in Yemen).

The visit is consequential for the countries’ bilateral relationship, primarily for Egypt.

According to Egyptian media, no fewer than 36 agreements, worth $25b., were signed during the visit, including establishing a Saudi investment fund worth $16b. The headline is the provision of Saudi aid (perhaps even from the Gulf states) to rebuild Sinai, including creating a free-trade zone, building a university named after Salman and erecting a bridge to connect Sinai and Saudi Arabia. The bridge will allow countless tourists and pilgrims, as well as goods, to cross from one continent to the other. Like the Suez Canal expansion, this project will also contribute significantly to the Egyptian economy. That Sinai is the focus of governmental aid is not surprising, because it is meant to be part of Cairo’s response to the challenge posed by the radical jihadist organizations. The regime understands full well that the answer to the problems in Sinai is not purely military.

During the visit, it was announced that the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, located at the entrance of the Gulf of Eilat, would be handed over to the Saudis, who previously controlled them. In 1950, the Saudis decided to lease the islands to Egypt in order to facilitate the Arab boycott and maritime quarantine of Israel. The islands were conquered by Israel in 1956 and again in 1967 but returned to Egypt after the 1979 peace agreement. Therefore, the current agreement will return them to the rightful owners.

Israel was reassured by Saudi Arabia, as admitted by Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, of its freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran. This revelation indicates that in spite of the absence of formal relations, Israel and Saudi Arabia hold indirect open channels.

From Cairo, King Salman proceeded to Turkey, another regional ally. Apart from strengthening bilateral relations, the king may be mediating a possible Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. Relations between Egypt and Turkey deteriorated following the Turkish support of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Gaza. Salman might also be in a position to smooth the differences between Israel and Turkey, who are close, according to media reports, to finalizing their reconciliation over the Mavi Marmara incident.

In theory, Egypt, Saudi Arabia (and the GCC countries), Turkey and Israel stand on the same side of the fence against Iran and its proxy allies in the Middle East, as well the various Sunni jihadist groups. Yet, the existing antagonism between Egypt and Turkey, on the one hand, and Israel and Turkey, on the other, prevents the emergence of a viable regional axis. In this situation, Saudi Arabia has a unique place: it’s the only regional player that possesses the financial, religious and political clout to influence the other players’ roles.

Since King Salman’s accession to power in January 2015, Saudi Arabia began playing a more assertive role in regional affairs out of concern for its security and stability. In the absence of any meaningful Arab player, Saudi Arabia emerged as an Arab leader by default. It may now serve as the linchpin of a new Middle East grouping.

Though Israelis are customarily apprehensive of the Saudi kingdom because of its puritanical Wahhabi doctrine, recent developments should be welcomed by Israeli decision makers, as the Saudis consider Israel a possible partner in the struggle against Iran and the jihadist groups, as long as this partnership is kept behind closed doors.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Saudi Arabia: Lynchpin of the moderate axis in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s island diplomacy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/egypt-and-saudi-arabias-island-diplomacy/ Wed, 13 Apr 2016 15:43:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4163 The Egyptian transfer of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir in April 2016 to Saudi Arabia can be understood from at least four separate perspectives. First, the agreement between the parties is another testimony of the close relationship between Cairo and Riyadh as part of the anti-Iranian axis. Within this alliance, Saudi Arabia had provided massive economic support to General al-Sisi’s regime and is now using the leverage it has to bring this issue to a close. The islands’ history serves as a further reminder of the depth of Riyadh and Cairo’s relationship. The islands were part of Saudi Arabia until 1950 when Egypt gained effective control over them with Saudi acquiescence, as part of Cairo’s campaign against Israel. Herman Elits, who was the US Ambassador in Egypt in the heyday of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, wrote in 2004 that Saudi Arabia refused to accept one of the islands from Israel, during the years in which Israel controlled the Islands (after the 1967 Six-Day War and until the implementation of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty). According to Elits, the Saudi position, which was based on commitment to the common Arab stance and to Egypt, was that the land should be returned to them only in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement. Secondly, the peaceful resolution of this issue is part of a broader set of bilateral agreements that will benefit both countries. One such project is a joint initiative to build a bridge for transportation across the Red Sea that

הפוסט Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s island diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Egyptian transfer of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir in April 2016 to Saudi Arabia can be understood from at least four separate perspectives.

First, the agreement between the parties is another testimony of the close relationship between Cairo and Riyadh as part of the anti-Iranian axis. Within this alliance, Saudi Arabia had provided massive economic support to General al-Sisi’s regime and is now using the leverage it has to bring this issue to a close.

The islands’ history serves as a further reminder of the depth of Riyadh and Cairo’s relationship. The islands were part of Saudi Arabia until 1950 when Egypt gained effective control over them with Saudi acquiescence, as part of Cairo’s campaign against Israel. Herman Elits, who was the US Ambassador in Egypt in the heyday of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, wrote in 2004 that Saudi Arabia refused to accept one of the islands from Israel, during the years in which Israel controlled the Islands (after the 1967 Six-Day War and until the implementation of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty). According to Elits, the Saudi position, which was based on commitment to the common Arab stance and to Egypt, was that the land should be returned to them only in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement.

Secondly, the peaceful resolution of this issue is part of a broader set of bilateral agreements that will benefit both countries. One such project is a joint initiative to build a bridge for transportation across the Red Sea that will connect southern Sinai and northwestern Saudi Arabia. This bridge, if it is built, will enable a flow of interaction between Arab Africa and Arab Asia. Such a bridge can also increase the volume of trade between the two continents, assisting the Egyptian economy.

Thirdly, both countries chose to resolve the issue bilaterally. The international system and international law in particular furnish disputing parties with multiple channels, fora, and norms to resolve conflicts. A similar approach is seen in some of the other regional disputes, such as the conflict between Israel and Lebanon over the demarcation of their respective international maritime boundary. This is another reminder of the limitations of international mediation – both in terms of substance and process – when coming to resolve inter-state conflicts in the region.

Finally, the agreement is the first formal territorial change in the Arab world since the beginning of the political instability in the region in late 2010. It is not a change in the full sense of the word, as the land was on a “loan” of sorts. And yet, it was significant enough for the numerous Egyptians that protested against the move. While a number of countries like Syria, Iraq and Libya are de-facto divided, the international norm of “border fixity” was strong enough till now to prevent any such formal change. The regional instability is likely to bring more territorial change, especially in disputed areas but perhaps also in formerly unitary states such as Syria.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s island diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/analysis-in-post-nuclear-agreement-middle-east-its-syria-stupid/ Mon, 27 Jul 2015 09:12:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4346 Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004. The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004.

The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman) has the opposite interest of downplaying this threat.

History is familiar with the analogy of the 1938 Munich Agreement, in which Chamberlain and the West capitulated to Hitler but failed to prevent World War II. Yet history is also familiar with efforts to demonize the enemy that were subsequently understood to be exaggerated, if not outright baseless. For example, Israel and the West turned Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s into the Hitler of the Arab world, and according to Israeli intelligence and media sources of the period, the influence of Egypt and Nasser’s pan-Arabism pervaded the entire Arab world, including Iraq, Syria and distant Yemen. Subsequent historiography of the period shows that Nasser’s capabilities were much more limited than the grandiose powers ascribed to him. An assessment of Iran’s true power and regional influence must surely be sober rather than demagogic.

The latent dimension of Iran’s regional influence involves the future of Syria. The keystone of Iran’s strategy in the Arab Middle East is its capacity to support Bashar Assad’s regime. The Iranian-Syrian alliance, which has been in place for over three decades (with a brief interruption during the Gulf War), has become a major axis of regional politics. This is not a “natural” alliance in the respect that it is based on Iran’s cooperation with an Alawite minority regime rather than a broad Shi’ite social foundation. Syria’s significance stems from its geo-strategic location in the heart of the regional system, rather than from any economic resources that it offers. “Whoever would lead the Middle East must control Syria,” wrote esteemed journalist and historian Patrick Seale in the 1960s.

Indeed, harking back to 1950s when Syria became the focus of global and Arab Cold War struggles, at least five powers have competed for control over Syria since the outbreak of the civil war there in 2011: Iran and Russia (through the Alawite regime), the West (through the Free Syria Army), and two jihadi Sunni organizations – IS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

In view of the highly unreliable information from the field, it is difficult to predict what will happen in Syria, or whether it will maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Clearly, Iran’s success in preserving Syria’s Alawite government would be a significant accomplishment and reinforcement of the radical Shi’ite alliance in the region. Assad’s fall, on the other hand, would be a fatal blow to Iran’s regional influence by creating a vacuum in the Shi’ite Crescent, and would also weaken Hezbollah as well as Iran’s influence in Iraq. We can borrow from then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s famous 1992 phrase “It’s the economy, stupid,” and state with equal gusto that in post-nuclear-agreement Middle East, “It’s Syria, stupid!”

Since the Western alternative in Syria now appears to be less probable, the West, including Israel, faces a dilemma regarding whether to support Syria – backed by the demonized Iran – or to bet on an alternative regime, with the risk of chaos, anarchy and even territorial changes. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would prefer to get rid of Assad at all costs, while Egypt has decided to prop up the Assad regime. Indeed, one may wonder whether the potential rise of IS or another radical Islamic entity in Syria might be an even more destructive scenario than the Iranian “threat.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The writing is on the wall https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-writing-is-on-the-wall/ Mon, 15 Dec 2014 07:48:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4313 Senior Israeli security personnel, Israeli and Palestinian political leaders, rabbis and imams have been warning for years that the Jewish-Muslim conflict over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif could trigger a devastating worldwide religious war. Few, however, have paid much attention to the underlying processes propelling the parties inexorably toward impending catastrophe: growing Islamic anti-Semitism or Judeophobia in the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and accelerated Jewish Islamophobia in Israel and the Diaspora, on the other. These destructive trends, which feed off each other, have intensified sharply since Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in June 1967. Israel’s triumphant return to Jerusalem’s religious heartland sparked heady euphoria in the Jewish world and deep trauma among Muslims. A year after Israel’s occupation began, hundreds of religious leaders from all over the Muslim world convened at the al-Azhar Center in Cairo to craft a response. In addition to the staple anti-Zionist rhetoric, they unleashed a flurry of vitriolic anti-Semitic slurs. Jews, they declared, were treacherous, conniving monsters who deserved to die. Secular Arab/Muslim leaders made similar public statements and from time to time called for jihad, or holy war, against the Jews and Israel. The same anti-Semitic tropes appeared in Arab school textbooks and in the media, often based on selective texts from the Koran or the Hadith prophetic tradition. Christian anti-Semitic writings, including blood libels, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and classics like the Merchant of Venice were also adduced to buttress the case against

הפוסט The writing is on the wall הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Senior Israeli security personnel, Israeli and Palestinian political leaders, rabbis and imams have been warning for years that the Jewish-Muslim conflict over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif could trigger a devastating worldwide religious war.

Few, however, have paid much attention to the underlying processes propelling the parties inexorably toward impending catastrophe: growing Islamic anti-Semitism or Judeophobia in the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and accelerated Jewish Islamophobia in Israel and the Diaspora, on the other.

These destructive trends, which feed off each other, have intensified sharply since Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in June 1967. Israel’s triumphant return to Jerusalem’s religious heartland sparked heady euphoria in the Jewish world and deep trauma among Muslims.

A year after Israel’s occupation began, hundreds of religious leaders from all over the Muslim world convened at the al-Azhar Center in Cairo to craft a response. In addition to the staple anti-Zionist rhetoric, they unleashed a flurry of vitriolic anti-Semitic slurs. Jews, they declared, were treacherous, conniving monsters who deserved to die.

Secular Arab/Muslim leaders made similar public statements and from time to time called for jihad, or holy war, against the Jews and Israel. The same anti-Semitic tropes appeared in Arab school textbooks and in the media, often based on selective texts from the Koran or the Hadith prophetic tradition. Christian anti-Semitic writings, including blood libels, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and classics like the Merchant of Venice were also adduced to buttress the case against the Jews.

This murky anti-Semitic wave gathered momentum the more Israeli governments and extremist Jewish groups were perceived as undermining the sanctity of the Haram and the status of East Jerusalem. For example – the annexation of East Jerusalem by the government in 1967 and the Knesset in 1980; persistent Jewish settlement in parts of the city across the 1967 Green Line; the opening of the Western Wall tunnel by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996; Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, which helped to trigger the second intifada.

Parallel to the growing Islamic Judeophobia, radical nationalist and religious messianic trends were developing in Israel, especially among Jews in the national religious movement. The more radical among them advocate the building of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount on the ruins of the existing mosques. In the meantime they insist on the right to go up onto the mountain and pray, in violation of Israeli government agreements with the Muslim waqf, which administers Muslim holy places, including the Haram.

As it developed, national religious radicalism took on an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab character, partly for ideological reasons, and partly in response to Arab terror and Arab/Muslim anti-Semitism. This created a vicious cycle of mutual religion-based hatred, which came to a head with the abortive attempt by the so-called Jewish Underground, led by Yehuda Etzion, to blow up the Dome of the Rock Mosque on the Temple Mount in 1984.

This type of anti-Muslim radicalism is also the driving force behind more recent attacks on mosques and burning of Korans in the occupied territories and Israel proper by Jewish extremists. Israeli leaders, secular and religious, added fuel to the flames with a string of irresponsible declarations – for example, the late Shas leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef called Islam “an ugly religion” and an Israeli broadcaster referred to it on air as a “virus.”

In 1996, national religious rabbis exacerbated an already explosive situation when they challenged a longstanding rabbinical ruling forbidding Jews from going up onto the mountain and pray ing on its holy ground until the coming of the messiah. Since then thousands of Jews have entered the holy compound and prayed, to the chagrin of the Muslim authorities. In highly publicized acts of deliberate provocation, right-wing Knesset Members have also gone up onto the Temple Mount. In early September, Housing Minister Uri Ariel of the national religious Bayit Yehudi party visited the holy space, declaring that Jews should be allowed to pray there whenever they liked and calling for the building of the Third Temple.

Influenced by radical national religious leaders, dozens of organizations sprang up preparing for the rebuilding of the temple. They produced architectural plans, building materials, priestly vestments and programs for training young priests. According to recent public opinion polls, 30 percent of Jews and 45 percent of religious Jews in Israel support the rebuilding of the temple; 64 percent of Israeli Jews are in favor of Jews being allowed to pray on Temple Mount; and 80 percent support a united Jerusalem under Israel’s sole and eternal sovereignty.

Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital has been the position of most Israeli governments since 1967, which did virtually nothing to counter the growing Islamophobic and anti-Arab trends in Israeli society. Worse, Israeli leaders failed to show corresponding flexibility on Jerusalem after Muslim and Arab governments began to discard anti-Semitic and antiIsrael positions in the late 1970s.

Interestingly in 1978, then prime minister Menachem Begin was leaning toward the establishment of a Muslim “Vatican” on the Temple Mount and in East Jerusalem. But he changed his mind and consolidated the demand for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

Nevertheless, on several occasions the Arab side offered Israel a way out of the Jerusalem dilemma based on divided sovereignty and agreed arrangements for the holy sites. For years the kings of Jordan, who have special custodial status on the Haram, have made practical proposals. The Egyptians, too, have called for workable compromise. In November 1977, in his speech to the Knesset, then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat offered Israel peace on condition that it agree to Arab/Muslim sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Haram, excluding the Western Wall. And, in 1979, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Jad al-Haq, published a special fatwa, Muslim religious ruling, in this spirit.

Most importantly, in March 2002, all 22 Arab states backed the Saudi peace initiative offering Israel peace, security and normalization of ties on condition that it agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Shortly afterwards, all 35 remaining non-Arab Muslim states added their support. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also initiated a series of religious dialogues with the participation of Jewish clerics.

However, all Israeli governments, with the tacit exception of the Olmert administration in late 2008, never accepted the Saudi-Arab-Muslim initiative, not even as a basis for negotiation.

Israeli rejection of the Arab initiative has come at a price. It has already contributed to the intensification of Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamophobia, to strains on relations with Jordan and Egypt, to aggravated tension with Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, to international isolation and to the danger of a Muslim-Jewish religious war.

The writing is on the wall: To prevent escalation of the current wave of religion-motivated terror in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu needs to quash false rumors of plans to change the status quo on the Temple Mount. More importantly, on the strategic level, to preempt wider religious conflagration, he needs to move politically to reach an agreement on Jerusalem that takes Muslim sensitivities into account and gives Israel a chance for peace with most of the Muslim world.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Report)

הפוסט The writing is on the wall הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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