With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While meeting Trump in the US, PA President Mahmoud Abbas reportedly presented the maps from the negotiations he conducted with prime minister Ehud Olmert a decade ago, proposing that the US president use them as a starting point for renewed peace talks. The Palestinian team told Trump that the differences between Israeli and Palestinian positions during that round of negotiations had not been so significant, and that Israel’s position on the borders issue at that time is “a good starting point for negotiations.” If this is in fact the position Abbas expressed to Trump, it sheds new light on the Abbas-Olmert talks and shows that the Palestinians’ rejection of Olmert’s offer was a mistake.

The Olmert-Abbas talks were conducted as part of the Annapolis process, which was launched at an international conference attended by almost 50 countries in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007. No fewer than 12 committees were established to discuss core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the main negotiations took place between Olmert and Abbas, and between foreign minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei. The most significant progress in those talks was achieved on the borders issue: Olmert proposed that Israel would annex 6.5% of the West Bank (including Gush Etzion, Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Ariel and the Jewish neighborhoods in east Jerusalem), and in return would give the Palestinians Israeli territory equivalent to 5.8% of the West Bank. The remaining 0.7% would be designated to create a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which would be sovereign Israeli territory but under Palestinian control.

The Palestinians demanded full control over all the 1967-occupied areas, but were willing to agree to land swaps for up to 1.9% of the West Bank, which would not include most of the above-mentioned settlements (except for Gush Etzion). Olmert also proposed a compromise in the Old City of Jerusalem: the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while the Holy Basin (including al-Haram al-Sharif) would be subject to international control, similar to the status of the Vatican. No progress was made on the refugee issue in these talks, as Olmert and Livni presented a tough position.

The Olmert-Abbas talks were interesting not only for their content – a revolutionary Israeli offer in terms of the concessions it included – but also for how they ended. Olmert’s far-reaching offer, supplemented by detailed maps, was made in September 2008, after he had been forced to resign, and when US president George Bush had only a few months left in office. Abbas never replied to Olmert’s final offer. According to the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, president Bush made a last-ditch effort to salvage the negotiations by suggesting that Israel and the Palestinians deposit their positions as reached during the talks, so that these would serve as the starting point for future negotiations under the following US administration and Israeli government. Abbas was scheduled to meet Bush and discuss this in January 2009, but the meeting never took place due to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza.

Several factors were behind Abbas’ hesitance about Olmert’s offer. First, Abbas was concerned that the Israeli government, in its final days, would not be capable of ratifying any agreement; second, Livni had hinted to him that he might be able to improve his position in negotiations with the next Israeli government – possibly with Livni as prime minister. third, the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas made it difficult for Abbas to adopt a position that might be perceived as excessively conciliatory and met with harsh criticism. Finally, Abbas lacked the courage to make such a dramatic decision.

Abbas clearly missed this opportunity to consolidate his understandings with Olmert. The Obama administration would have easily supported them, and would have likely made them the foundation of official American policy, which future administrations would find it hard to reverse. Although the Netanyahu government, which succeeded Olmert’s, presumably would have rejected Olmert’s position as a legitimate end-game (let alone starting point) for negotiations, in that case international diplomatic pressure would have mobilized against Israel, not the Palestinians. Today, almost 10 years after the Olmert-Abbas talks, Abbas is now reportedly reverting to Olmert’s proposal, but this time the circumstances – and the president in the White House – are very different.

Abbas’s missed opportunity can be seen retrospectively as part of a pattern of Palestinian behavior. Their greatest mistake was Haj Amin al-Husseini’s rejection of the 1947 partition plan. Behind closed doors, Palestinian negotiators admitted to this grave historical error. Yasser Arafat also carries some responsibility, for rejecting the Clinton Parameters, which were presented to him in December 2000, days before president Bill Clinton left office. The Israeli government, headed by Ehud Barak, accepted the parameters with reservations, but Arafat rejected them altogether, despite Arab and international pressure. Perhaps the historical lesson of these episodes is that the Palestinian leadership should think long and hard before rejecting offers.

Trump’s visit to the region has triggered new expectations for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, Netanyahu and Abbas do not share mutual trust or intimacy, the gap between their positions is deep and both face domestic challenges from extremists at home. A sober analysis would lead to the conclusion that the chances for progress in the peace process are low. But, as Winston Churchill once said: “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” Let us remain optimistic.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinians also know how to miss opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mahmoud Abbas espouses the diplomatic struggle and the recruiting of international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders. His consistent stance is that institutionalized violent struggle harms Palestinian interests. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334, which was adopted at the end of 2016 and states that the settlements are illegal, encourages the PA to continue this policy and continue to view the diplomatic path as the central element of its comprehensive strategy.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena. This article describes and analyzes these challenges, and points to the possible courses of action open to the PA.

הפוסט The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The curse of stagnation and the need for conflict comparison הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

All other plans originated with third parties (mainly the US) or the Arab side. In addition, Israel missed several opportunities for peace (or at least for some serious negotiations). One such missed opportunity was the Arab Peace Initiative (API), presented in March 2002 by the Arab League. Israel has never officially responded to that initiative. The API is still on the table, as indicated by the most recent Arab summit, held in Baghdad in March 2012.

3. The continuation of the settlement activity undermines another target of Israeli foreign policy: the desire to be a Jewish state – and be recognized as such. This settlement activity – if continued without abatement – will eventually lead to a de facto one-state solution, which is considered a by many Israelis as the end of the Jewish state, taking into account the demographic trend among Jews and Arabs.

4. Israel supports the idea of a unified Jerusalem, which in reality means controlling and absorbing some 300,000 Palestinians in east Jerusalem – a policy that also contradicts the very essence of the desire to establish a Jewish state. In addition, it contradicts the Israeli refusal to admit more than a few thousand Palestinians refugees within a future agreement.

5. Israel recognized the international boundary as a mandatory border with Egypt and Jordan (and negotiated with Syria on its basis), yet it is unwilling to recognize the 1967 Green Line as a mandatory border with the Palestinians.

6. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring and the possibility that Arab regimes will become democratic because it fears the rise of Islamic regimes.

7. Israel fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalist regimes, but in reality Saudi Arabia – which twice in the past proffered peace plans (the Fahd Plan, 1981- 82; the API, or “Abdallah initiative,” as noted, in February 2002) – is “a fundamentalist Islamic state.”

Therefore, an Islamic state is not necessarily an immediate threat to Israel.

8. Israel claims that there is no Palestinian partner, but in reality PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are perhaps the most moderate Palestinian leaders to date and he is in favor of a solution based on the 1967 borders.

9. Israel is the strongest state in the Middle East militarily, with the possession of nuclear capability (according to foreign reports), yet it views the Palestinians, and certainly Iran, as existential threats.

10. The Jews came to Palestine to establish an independent Jewish state and in such a way to disengage themselves from the ghetto mentality they were subjected to in Europe and the Arab countries.

Yet, several generations later, they have managed – with the help of their neighbors – to establish a new ghetto in the Middle East surrounded by walls and fences.

Obviously, the question is what to do next. Well, the first step is to recognize these paradoxes in Israeli policy. Second, there must be an attempt to address them by initiating a major change in the thinking which guides the policy. The continuation of the more-or-less same policy will lead to the perpetuation of these paradoxes in the Israeli foreign policy. The entrance of the more moderate Kadima Party to the coalition creates an opportunity for addressing these paradoxes.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten paradoxes in Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.