Former Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali (later appointed UN secretary-general), coined the term “cold peace” to describe Israel-Egypt relations, a phrase that has identified the bilateral relations ever since. Others suggested the terms “negative peace” or “fragile peace.” These terms convey the idea that peace is made by governments and not by people; that the issues between the two countries have not yet been completely resolved (for example, the Palestinian issue); and that war continues to be an option, as reflected in Egyptian war plans in which Israel is seen as an enemy. Is this term still appropriate to describe the relationship between Israel and Egypt after 40 years?

An analysis of the treaty reveals that there are at least ten components that have ensured stability over the years: First and foremost, peace has never been in danger. Although Egypt has recalled its ambassador to Cairo several times during periods of crisis (such as the 1982 Lebanon War, the 2000 Al-Aqsa, or Second Intifada, etc.), it has never severed diplomatic relations, suspended or canceled peace. Even during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood under Muhammad Morsi (2013-2012), Israel received clear signals that the agreement was not in danger.

Second, Egypt has always respected military agreements. Even when the number of Egyptian troops deployed in the Sinai violated the treaty, it was done with Israel’s permission. Third, the embassies, consulates and academic center continued to function even in periods of crisis (such as after the attack on the embassy in Cairo and its evacuation in September 2011). Fourth, Israeli ships sail through the Suez Canal. Fifth, the economic boycott of Israel was formally lifted. Sixth, Egypt is doing its best to prevent infiltrations or terrorist attacks from its territory into Israel. Seventh, between the countries, there are air, sea and land links. Eighth, there is minimal trade, which increased after the signing of the Qualified Industrial Zone in 2004. The $15 billion agreement to supply Israeli gas to Egypt over 10 years gave the commercial-economic relations a boost as well. However, the large gas reserves that Egypt recently found in its territory raises questions regarding the implementation of the agreement. In any event, Egypt recently established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum with the participation of Israel.

Ninth, there is security and intelligence cooperation, which was strengthened after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rose to power in 2013. Indeed, Sisi has recently confirmed that Israel is assisting Egypt in various ways in its war against jihadist Islamic organizations in the Sinai. The two countries also maintain dialogue and coordination on Gaza and the Hamas regime. In fact, the security coordination with Israel’s security and intelligence officials can be defined as “warm”. Finally, Israel and the Jewish organizations in the US lobbied Congress to ensure the continuation of the military aid to Egypt.

In contrast, the peace agreement suffers from several basic weaknesses: First, the hostile media attacks against Israel and its policies (which is legitimate in itself) sometimes reveal an anti-Semitic tone. TV series broadcast during Ramadan often recite negative stereotypes of Jew. The state, which controls media outlets, can prevent – or reduce – the frequency of these broadcasts, but it refrains from doing so in order to allow steam to be used against Israel instead of the regime. Second, the Egyptian parliament, trade unions and academia oppose any signs of normalization with Israel. For example, MP Tawfiq Okasha was expelled from parliament after meeting with Israeli Ambassador Haim Koren. Although there is an academic center in Cairo, there is no academic cooperation between Israeli and Egyptian universities. Moreover, there are 13 departments that teach Hebrew and Judaism in Egyptian universities, but except for occasional visits to the academic center for learning purposes, there is no institutional connection.

Third, most of the intellectuals in Egypt, regardless of their political or religious affiliation, vehemently criticize Israel. Over the years, there were some courageous intellectuals – such as Lutfi al-Khuli, Ali Salem and Saad Eddin Ibrahim – who were part of the Egyptian peace movement and even visited Israel. But they were harshly criticized. Fourth, Egypt indeed allows its citizens to visit Israel, but in practice it piles up many hurdles. Citizens who want to visit Israel are required to obtain special security permission. Finally, the Egyptian educational system continues to teach content that enhances the negative image of Jews and Israelis. Although the peace treaty was introduced into textbooks – which show that Israel is formally recognized – the historical narrative does not legitimize Israel’s existence, and its citizens are generally described negatively.

This analysis shows that if we use the metaphor of temperature to evaluate peace between Israel and Egypt, in certain areas, such as security and intelligence, we have “warm” peace. But in other areas, such as media, education, academia and civil society, peace is still “cold”. On balance, peace with Egypt can be described as “tepid.” However, if peace is measured by its degree of stability, it is far from being fragile. The hostility between Egypt and Israel – which included no less than five wars – prevailed for 25 years (1948-1973), whereas peace has existed for 40 years. Moreover, an in-depth examination of Egypt’s economic and social problems, especially the problems arising from its demographic growth (Egypt has a population of almost 100 million) prevent Egypt from seriously considering a war against Israel. In this respect, peace is not only an Egyptian need, but a necessity. This is therefore a durable and stable peace, even if it is mild in terms of temperature.

What else can be done to “warm up” peace? Israel must solve the Palestinian problem (which is in its interest anyway), so that the Egyptian regime and the public will not feel guilty about abandoning the Palestinian cause. Egypt, for its part, should deepen the foundations of peace through the media and education. Both countries should make increased use of their foreign offices – and not rely on the security and intelligence apparatuses – to deepen cooperation on the diplomatic and civic levels as well. The chances that such things will happen are not great, but it remains to be hoped that by the 50th anniversary of the peace agreement, we will see further improvement in Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Stable but Tepid: The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty After 40 Years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.