ארכיון Syria - Mitvim

The Fall of Assad Is Just the Beginning: The Struggle for Syria Has Resumed

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 10:44:27 +0000

Syria constantly manages to surprise us anew. With the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar survived against all the odds and contrary to all predictions. At the beginning of the civil war in 2011, most experts wrote him off. Notably, Ehud Barak, then Israel’s defense minister, stated that Assad’s days were numbered. Bashar, of course, survived, albeit largely thanks to the outside help he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah.

In contrast to its image as a stable regime, a quick look at the history of Syria shows that before the rise to power of the Alawite Assad dynasty in 1970, it was the least stable country in the Middle East. From 1949 to 1970, it experienced no fewer than 17 military coups, most of which failed. Hafez al-Assad learned from these earlier failures, gaining a clear understanding of the necessary conditions for establishing a lasting dictatorship.

Syria has long been a focus for regional and international tensions, leading the journalist and Assad’s biographer Patrick Seale to refer to the phenomenon as “the struggle for Syria.” Seale argued that whoever wants to control the Middle East from an international perspective, and whoever wants to lead the Arab world, must rule Syria, due to its geostrategic location and importance. While this thesis has not always stood the test of time, the idea of the struggle over Syria as a reflection of a broader struggle in the regional and international arenas remains entirely valid.

After it sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Syria became an important component of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. With the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League following its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it was Syria – not Iran – that led this axis, and strove for “strategic equilibrium” with the Jewish state. However, the 1990 Gulf War and the collapse of his Soviet patron led Hafez to break off relations with Iran, forge new relations with the United States, and enter into negotiations for a peace treaty with Israel.

During the first decade of his rule, Bashar was courted by both sides, which he exploited to further his own interests and those of his regime. Yet the assistance he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah during the Arab Spring, which made a decisive contribution to his survival, carried a considerable military, economic, foreign policy, and civilian price tag: reliance on the Axis of Resistance to the point of dependence; the transformation of Syria into a Russian and Iranian base of influence in the Middle East; and the use of its territory as a staging post for supplying Hezbollah, Iran’s most important ally in Lebanon.

Not actively fighting Israel

SYRIA HAS not played an active role in the October 7 war, due to the severe consequences of its civil war, though its passive role placed it as part of the Axis of Resistance. However, there were many who hoped that the setbacks suffered by the Axis during the war would lead Bashar to follow his father and switch his military and foreign policy orientation, especially in light of the differences of opinion and concerns recently voiced about a possible Iranian takeover of the country.

The rebels’ assault, then, surprised everyone. They perfectly exploited the moment when Iran and Hezbollah were reeling from major blows inflicted by Israel, while Russia was bogged down in its war in Ukraine and distracted by the political conflict in Georgia. The external actors who saved Assad during the Arab Spring could not save him again this time around.

The problem is that the rebel forces are not a unified bloc. They came together in order to end the Assad regime, but the road to establishing a functioning Syrian national entity will be a long one, because each of the country’s ethnic and religious groups – Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, and Alawites – imagines a Syria in its own image, even if they are all currently united around the new-old Syrian flag (which was the flag of independence from the French Mandate).

There are several scenarios that present themselves in the Syrian arena, with the most optimistic being that the country maintains its recognized borders and establishes a representative government following elections. The pessimistic scenario is that it breaks up into separate entities along ethnic and religious lines.

Between these two extremes are several more realistic possibilities, ranging from the rise of an Islamist regime of some type or other, to armed conflicts between the different groups. Initial signs of this latter outcome are already visible in the north, with fighting between the Kurds and Turkish-backed rebels.

FROM A regional perspective, Syria has returned to its natural position in the Arab world. The alliance with Iran since 1980 has been rather unnatural, given that Syria, from its independence, was allied with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though it was Nasser’s Egypt that promoted Pan-Arabism, the roots of this ideology lie in Syria. Thus, even if Islamist ideology becomes a central feature, Syria will remain an important actor in the Arab world. The removal from power of the Alawites, who are viewed as either infidels or Shi’ites (depending on who is being asked), and the return of Sunni rule means that the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah is no longer relevant.

Israel, of course, has benefited from the changes in Syria, which has ceased to represent a strategic threat for the foreseeable future, due both to the military setbacks it has suffered and to the severe economic consequences of the civil war. Moreover, Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance has major regional implications, because the “Shia Crescent” has now been severed, which will make it much more difficult for Iran to transfer arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, the fact that the Axis of Resistance has become a purely Shi’ite axis creates a countering Sunni axis that shares many common interests with Israel.

The change in Syria is not just another regime change in the Middle East. It is significant because it means the renewal of the struggle in and for Syria, between regional and international forces. The country may have exited the Axis of Resistance, but this does not mean that it has automatically crossed to the opposing camp, especially given that Iran and Russia will try to act to maintain their control or influence there.

On the other hand, the United States is already in contact with the various rebel groups in Syria, and Israel is also not standing idly by. In other words, the struggle for Syria has begun again, with the potential to create new opportunities for Israel and the West.

The article was published on December 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The Fall of Assad Is Just the Beginning: The Struggle for Syria Has Resumed הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has the chance to help reshape Syria and form stable ties

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 18 Dec 2024 11:11:56 +0000

The collapse of the Assad regime confronts Israel with a familiar dilemma, one with which decision-makers grappled a decade ago in the early stages of the Syrian civil war. The question is whether to intervene and contribute to the shaping of the emerging order in Syria or to opt for “splendid isolation” – observing the unfolding events from the sidelines and taking action only to protect Israel’s immediate security interests.

Israel has so far acted true to form, limiting its actions to the military sphere by creating a new buffer zone in Syria and destroying the offensive capabilities of Bashar al-Assad’s army, especially its missile and chemical weapons systems.

But if Israel is to have an impact on shaping this strategically positioned space, it must adopt a broad diplomatic initiative.

How can Israel reshape Syria?

At the current decision-making juncture, we must realize that the process of reshaping Syria is already underway. We must also recognize that in the emerging Syrian narrative, Israel is deemed to have played an integral part in liberating the country from the atrocities of the Assad regime and its Iranian patrons.

My conversations with Syrian colleagues clearly point to the perception that Israel’s victory over Hezbollah had a major impact on the Syrian army’s collapse and provides it with unique influence on future events.

However, resting on our laurels and reveling in the scenes of looting at the Iranian embassy in Damascus is a path fraught with risks. Anyone who thinks the Iranians have washed their hands of Syria probably does not understand the economic situation in Syria or does not know the Iranian regime.

As it has done in Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria itself at the end of the previous decade, Iran excels at exploiting political transitions. While currently perceived as a central pillar of Assad’s oppressive regime – having gambled on his survival and faced setbacks – Iran has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to shifting circumstances.

It has consistently demonstrated a talent for forging alliances, particularly in the face of domestic political vacuums and economic needs. The rebel takeover of Syria only deepens these needs. The Iranians have demonstrated impressive skills in building strategic ties with Syria’s non-Shi’ite population groups, such as the Sunnis and Druze in the south of Syria, and large Sunni tribes in the border area with Iraq.

Let us not forget, either, that the Iranians play a significant role in keeping Syria’s energy and electricity sector running. Iran therefore has significant cards to play against the forces trying to shape a new order in a devastated country despite the innate hostility between them and the rebels in Damascus. Iran’s leaders have, in fact, already expressed a desire to develop ties with the new Syrian regime.

ISRAEL MUST recognize that the current vacuum is temporary and therefore requires it to adopt a far more proactive approach than it did during the Syrian civil war. That includes two policy measures that point in opposite directions but seek to deal with the current uncertainty.

First, Israel must strengthen its relations with major political actors in Syria – the emphasis is, of course, on the Druze in the south, and on Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish state that has emerged over the past decade in the strategic space of northeastern Syria.

The ties should be enhanced through a quiet and cautious dialogue given both the sensitivity of building such ties while the issue of political unity is paramount in Syria, and Israel’s standing in the region is at an all-time low.

In the words of a Syrian-Kurdish friend: This is the worst time to have a public relationship with Israel, and the most important time to have a quiet dialogue with it. Tweets on this matter by reckless Israeli ministers are not helpful to this sensitive effort.

Israel has maintained an informal relationship with the Druze for years, based on a series of unwritten agreements. This was most recently demonstrated last week when the IDF defended the Syrian Druze village of Khader against attacks by local rebels.

The relationship with the Kurds is more complex, in part because of its implications for Israeli-Turkish relations. However, a model for an unofficial strategic relationship already exists in Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. It is rooted, among other factors, in the Kurds’ perception of Israel as a role model for nation-building, survival, and prosperity in a hostile environment.

At the same time, Israel should actively encourage and support the international and regional economic rehabilitation of Syria. This reliance on foreign aid could serve as leverage to shape the future regime, conditioning assistance on the new government’s adoption of moderate policies both domestically and internationally.

Europe and the GCC countries previously refrained from engaging in Syria’s reconstruction because they did not want to strengthen the Assad regime, but that argument is now void.

A large-scale reconstruction process could encourage a return of refugees from Europe and the countries of the region to their homes, easing the burden on their host countries. Western nations and moderate Arab states also share a common interest in removing Russian and Iranian influence from Syria.

ISRAEL’S ROLE in Syria’s reconstruction would be modest but meaningful. Initially, it would focus on guaranteeing respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a commitment to cease attacks as long as the new regime ensures Iran’s exclusion. In the second phase, Israel could help facilitate reconstruction by allowing the use of its air and land routes for logistical support.

The past two years have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between developments in Gaza or the West Bank and events in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.

Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza complicates its coordination with the Arab world on rebuilding Syria and undermines the legitimacy of local actors to collaborate with it, either publicly or covertly. Ending the destructive war in Gaza is therefore crucial for Israel’s ability to engage with regional partners in reshaping the future order in Syria.

The past two years have also taught us an important lesson about the failure of Israel’s “villa in the jungle” approach – the danger of burying one’s head in the sand and ignoring regional developments, leaving the initiative in the hands of meaningful and hostile others. This misguided approach resulted in Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.

Israel must seize the current opportunity to foster a stable and non-hostile relationship with its strategic neighbor to the north.

The article was published on December 18th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel has the chance to help reshape Syria and form stable ties הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanon ups ante on maritime border with Israel

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 28 Apr 2021 14:30:44 +0000

Lebanon’s surprising decision earlier this month to expand its territorial claim by 1,430 square kilometers (552 sq. miles) further complicates the already complex maritime border negotiations with Israel. The negotiations, renewed in October 2020, included direct meetings between the sides but failed to yield a breakthrough, and even resulted in a certain regression. Both countries adopted maximalist stands, contrary to their previous positions, perhaps in order to improve their bargaining power.

Lebanon, as we know, is mired in an unprecedented economic and political crisis. The political actors are unable to form a new government, given a complex web of interests and arm-twisting involving external actors, as is always the case in Lebanon. What, then, prompted the Lebanese decision to further complicate matters?

Several factors are involved. Complex interests, including (or especially) those of Hezbollah, compel Lebanon to present a tough, hawkish position vis-à-vis Israel, even one that contradicts its previous stand. Hezbollah pressure is reflected, for example, in the move by former minister of energy and foreign affairs, Gebran Bassil (President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law) blocking a compromise on formation of a government.

In the energy context, Bassil is unlikely to allow other actors to reap the fruit of an agreement with Israel, which could open up Lebanon’s energy market and send a positive message to the ailing economy (even if it takes years for economic dividends to materialize). Presumably, Iran is also reluctant to back progress in Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel in light of its attempts to renew the nuclear agreement with world powers and impending June presidential elections.

What is more, a somewhat noisy dispute has erupted in recent weeks between Lebanon and Syria over their maritime border. While the dispute is not new and has included appeals to the UN by both sides laying out conflicting interpretations of their rights, the issue has escalated recently over Syria’s contract with a Russian firm on oil and gas survey activities in an area Lebanon claims as part of its economic waters. The dispute has generated criticism of Syria in Lebanon and the foreign minister has insisted on negotiations with Damascus on the matter.

Some two weeks ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad reportedly called President Aoun to complain about the Lebanese criticism of his country. Given current circumstances, Lebanon prefers a “tough patriotic” stand vis-à-vis Israel than against Syria, especially since Russia has taken de facto control in recent years of energy rights in Syrian economic waters (and on land, too).

What does this all mean for Lebanese-Israeli negotiations? Is agreement between the sides still possible? Perhaps. An agreement remains of vital interest, especially for Lebanon. After all, Israel is already enjoying the economic and diplomatic fruit of the natural gas discovered in its waters, while Lebanon is facing a disastrous economic crisis. The latest confrontational move complicates things, but Lebanon might also see it as enhancing its room for maneuver in the no-holds-barred poker game with Israel.

Now, more than ever, US mediation must be restored in order to bring both sides into a more constructive framework. The Biden administration has already adopted an entirely different approach to foreign policy, prompted by its inward domestic focus. Renewing the shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Beirut is vitally important in order to avoid severing all contact and exacerbating tensions and, of course, in order to renew discussions albeit under less convenient and more challenging circumstances. But is this not the secret magic of negotiations?

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, April 28th 2021.

הפוסט Lebanon ups ante on maritime border with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 May 2020 14:24:58 +0000

The final months of 2019 were marked by widespread, prolonged protests throughout Iraq. The demonstrations, centered in Baghdad, targeted the ruling political elite and the state backing it: Iran. When Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned at the end of November, he threw official Iraq into a political vacuum and guaranteed that any premier appointed to replace him would be considered an interim ruler whose government would only be accepted by the weakened political elite, and not by a significant part of the population. Today, a replacement is yet to be found.

Despite the local turmoil, 2019 saw no significant changes in terms of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq. Neither was there any development in the economic arena, where ties between the states remain non-existent.

However, Israel’s perception of Iraq as a security challenge went up a notch. After ignoring Iraq for several years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior defense officials changed course in 2019. They know Iraq is an important part of the supply route of ballistic and other weapons from Iran to the front with Israel. Israel also closely monitors the construction of a military base near the Syria-Iraq border, and last summer, several fatal drone attacks conducted against Shiite militia bases in Baghdad and deep in Iraqi territory were attributed to Israel. These were the first strikes on Iraq for which Israel took responsibility in almost 40 years; their predecessor is, of course, Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981.

Yet Iraq’s official response was meek. The investigative committee that was appointed belatedly determined that Israel was responsible. However, the Iraqi government did not commit to a response. It was embarrassed and portrayed as weak. The militias, for their part, adopted increasingly harsh rhetoric against Israel, but Iraqi civilians condemned the manner in which Iran sought to turn their country into a wrestling ring with the US and Israel.

The Kurdish region has not taken part in the countrywide protests but, given its dependence on developments in Baghdad, it has been affected nonetheless. Not unexpectedly, Kurdish efforts to repair ties with Iran negatively impacted Israeli-Kurdish relations, at the same time as Israeli-Iraqi relations took tentative steps forward.

In the civilian, cultural and identity arenas some progress has been made, and there is currently more interaction between Israelis and Iraqis, although not on the official level. The Iraqi political elite is bound to Iran on the Israel issue, but this has not prevented a grassroots, people-to-people model of “winning hearts and minds”. Significantly, this trend continued and even intensified after the demonstrations in Iraq broke out. Privately, through social media and rare visits, a growing number of Iraqis express desire for ties with Israel after their country undergoes change. They also plead with Israel to support them by harming Iran. The protesters refrain from publicly identifying with Israel, due to claims by the regime that the protesters are backed and funded by Israel – but tellingly, anti-Israel expressions are extremely marginal.

Israel backs this trend. Notably, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a Facebook page “Israel in Iraqi Dialect”, a unique, first-of-its-kind effort, in late 2018. The Arabic-language page is aimed at encouraging discourse with the Iraqi people, and it gained huge momentum in 2019, especially after expressing clear sympathy for the protesters, who responded with appreciation. Today the page boasts some 292,000 followers. Meanwhile, four delegations from Iraq visited Israel in 2019 as guests of the Foreign Ministry, and Iraqis were also included in another visiting Arab delegation.

In that sense, it can perhaps be said that official Israel “discovered” Arab Iraq in 2019. Whereas Israeli declarations of solidarity were previously directed mainly at the Kurds and their aspirations, no such declarations were issued in 2019. Yet July 2019 saw another leap in messages from Israel to Iraq.

First Israel’s Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, publicly wished the Iraqi people well and expressed his desire for increased cooperation with them. The nature of his Facebook video sought to bypass the government and avoid a direct appeal to the regime. In November, after the wave of protests began, Katz issued a message of support for “the Iraqi people” and their justified demands. And in December, Netanyahu condemned the massacre of protesters carried out by militias in Baghdad and blamed Iran for the bloodshed. Israel’s senior echelons view the protests as an opportunity to challenge Iran – but to date Israel is the only state in the region to have expressed support for the protesters and their demands.

A threat remains, however, After the Foreign Ministry leaked news of the visits in April, discussions began in Iraq regarding normalization of ties with Israel. Yet the militias took the most radical line against the issue, and threats facing Iraqis who meet with Israelis are both serious and tangible.

Today, Iraq stands at an internal crossroads; the direction it takes is bound to impact its relations with Israel. If the protests are suppressed with active Iranian support, Iraq will inevitably become Iran’s first “proxy state” in the region. If Baghdad is, de facto, ruled by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds force, the puppet regime in Baghdad will be almost wholly unable to resist Iranian demands.

Should this happen, repercussions will be felt mostly in the realm of security. For example, Iran could move ballistic equipment to Syria without interruption – and perhaps even use Iraq as a launch pad.

A continued status quo between the government and the protesters in Iraq will further weaken the government, which is already forced to lean on Iran as its sole source of support. The little legitimacy it retains will disappear. Iraq will sink into political paralysis and selfcenteredness, and will lose even more of its importance as a factor and target for improved relations with Israel. But if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the regime, an opportunity will open up for Israel. The deep anti-Iranian sentiment underpinning the protests will lead the state’s new rulers to distance themselves from Tehran. The new Iraq will seek new regional allies that respect the change it has undergone, which would align satisfyingly with Israeli interests.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 26 Apr 2020 09:48:54 +0000

Israel is still holding to its traditional security maxim. Based on a perception of a hostile region, Israel’s response includes early warning, deterrence and swift – including pre-emptive – military action, coupled with an alliance with a global power, the US. Israel is adjusting these maxims to a changing reality. Overlapping interests – and perhaps the prospect of an even more open conflict with Iran – led to limited relationships between Israel and some Gulf states. These, however, will be constrained until Israel makes progress on the Palestine issue. Israel aligned with Greece and Cyprus around energy and security, which may lead to conflict with Turkey. Russia’s deployment in Syria placed new constraints on Israeli freedom of action there. The US’s retrenchment from the Middle East is not having a direct effect on Israel, while the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s territorial designs in the West Bank may make it easier for Israel to permanently expand there, thus sowing the seeds for future instability in Israel/Palestine. The EU could try and balance against such developments, but, as seen from Israel, is too divided to have a significant impact.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Limited European Leverage over Israel

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:07:25 +0000

Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 05 Dec 2019 12:58:46 +0000

The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 01 Nov 2019 12:33:14 +0000

The 26th of October marked the silver jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The media emphasized the fact that no formal celebrations were held on both sides of the Jordan River. Indeed, like the 40th anniversary of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the event passed without fanfare. The absence of formal celebrations was assessed as a true manifestation of the frozen peace between Israel and Jordan.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Lesson for Israel from the US Abandonment of the Kurds

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 01 Nov 2019 12:28:01 +0000

President Trump has hastily dispatched his Vice President Pence for urgent talks with President Erdoğan. These talks may have produced a 120 hours pause in the Turkish onslaught into the Kurdish areas, but it is too early to say whether it is the beginning-of-the-end of this skirmish, or not. However, it may suggest that Trump begins to realize the folly of the rushed US withdrawal from Syria. By pulling back fewer than 100 soldiers, the US removed the symbolic block to a Turkish invasion of Syria and, in effect, invited Russia to the region as well as the forces of the Assad regime, which it has dubbed “butcher”. Trump is now issuing hollow threats, but the die are cast and Donald Trump, in his “great and unmatched wisdom“ (by his own twit) will have a hard time pulling out the stone he has thrown into the Syrian well.

Trump did not invent American isolationism, nor did he coin the “America First” slogan (that was down to Charles Lindbergh, the pilot who opposed Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pro-British leanings). However, Trump was the one who engineered its current, embarrassing implementation. Anyone amazed by the vanishing act of the US in Syria, forgets that the American DNA has been isolationist ever since President James Monroe conceived his namesake doctrine in 1823. The US generally goes to war in the wake of “unfriendly visits” to places such as Pearl Harbor or the World Trade Towers, but it does not rush into action following the bombing of Saudi oil fields or even the 1940 London blitz.

The abandonment of the Kurds should not have come as a surprise. Sadly, they are victims of serial desertion. The Soviet Union abandoned them (the short-lived Kurdish republic of Mahabad in western Iran) in 1946, and Iran abandoned them in 1975, followed by Israel. Erdoğan appears to have overcome his initial opposition to Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, with its capital in Erbil. He now sees a Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, with its capital in Qamishli and leadership by the PKK (the Kurdish People’s Party), which Turkey designates as a terror organization and thus as a catalyst for pan-Kurdish sentiment among the Kurdish minority within Turkey and a security threat to Ankara.

The shock in Israel is real and sincere, generating myriad reactions, beginning with Netanyahu’s (which admittedly should be viewed through the lens of Israel-Turkey relations), politicians’ condemnations, hard-to-watch footage, demonstrations, and a noble gesture by some 100 reserve officers. Some even raised their concerns that the frenetic US President would abandon Israel as he did his Kurdish allies. Indeed, in recent weeks Trump seems to be giving a lukewarm and even cold shoulder to Netanyahu, whom he may regard as a loser following two political failures.

However, Israel is not and will not be treated like the Kurds. Israel is a strong country, ranked by US News and World Report as the world’s eighth most powerful nation, immediately after Japan, the UK and France. Israeli-held territory was last invaded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and although it got off to a lame start, Israel overcame great odds and won (with US help). Even if Trump’s creative mind may toy with thoughts of abandonment, this is unlikely feasible with congressional Democrats and Republicans (including Trump’s evangelical base) already joining hands against his Kurdish policy – despite the fact that the Kurds do not have a US political base in the form of communities, federations and legislators. We, on the other hand, do.

Israel enjoys deeply rooted ideological and political support. It has always made an effort, whether under the leadership of the Likud or of center-left parties, to fortify, preserve and nurture bipartisan US support. Israel devotedly maintained strong brotherly ties with all US Jewish streams. Beyond the basic mitzvah of pan-Jewish unity throughout the ages and time zones, given that three quarters of US Jews are Democrats, this was also a wise political move, in hindsight.

However, in recent years, under Netanyahu’s leadership, the Israeli government has been blatantly supporting Republicans and paying homage to Trump. Israel is kicking in the teeth millions of Jews who want to continue supporting it but are hard pressed to do so in light of their continued humiliation at Israel’s hand. The government’s decision rescinding its own plan for pluralistic prayer at the Wailing Wall, its policies on conversion and declarations of territorial annexation, its offensive Nationality Law and backing for ultra-racist parties, and its stand on issues of marriage and divorce all combine to alienate them from the Jewish state. Israel has become a non-enlightened state, which often needs the support of the most enlightened (Jewish) elements in American society. Once Trump is replaced, even without impeachment, we will need our Jewish brothers and sisters vis-à-vis a Democratic administration and Congress.

We may not have crossed the point of no return with US Jewry and the US political system, yet, but nothing is forever. If there is one lesson to be learned from the Trump-Kurds affair, it is that beyond building up its power, Israel should never take sides in US politics or pull out the rug from under its unity with US Jewry.

Ambassador (Ret.) Barukh Binah is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He served as Deputy DirectorGeneral of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, in charge of North American Affairs, as Ambassador to Denmark, Consul General in Chicago, Press Officer in New York and Deputy Head of Mission in Washington, DC.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Lesson for Israel from the US Abandonment of the Kurds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 23 Oct 2019 11:59:34 +0000

When Israelis ask what Brexit means for them, many will think of economy and trade, and about diplomatic relations with Britain and Europe. These are important, but in considering Brexit’s implications, there’s a far bigger picture that Israel’s leaders need to see. Beyond the political crisis in London and Brussels, Brexit represents a clash over the future of world order, and it is this issue which has the most significant long-term significance.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 23 Jul 2019 10:20:27 +0000

Jason Greenblatt, US special envoy, said in a recent interview, “There has never been an honest mediator for this conflict. The mindset of a so-called honest mediator never existed and will never exist…” His comment stems from historic ignorance or perhaps simply a desire to cover up the obvious fact that at this stage, the United States cannot serve as an honest broker between Israelis and Palestinians.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a board member at Mitvim and a professor in the Department of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 02 Apr 2019 08:07:19 +0000

In recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a central focus of world powers, of states in the Middle East, Europe, and beyond, and of international corporations. Regional geopolitical developments, as well as economic opportunities generated by natural gas discoveries in the Mediterranean, have contributed to this trend and turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a distinct sub-region perceived as having unique features. Israel plays a central role in this development. Israeli diplomacy identified these trends correctly, successfully becoming an active and dominant player in the region. The natural gas findings in Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provide it with a wider range of diplomatic options, helping it promote relationships with various states in the region; including some engaged in conflict with each other. Israelis regard the Mediterranean as an important component of their identity, as reflected in the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, in which 22 percent of those surveyed claimed Israel belongs predominantly to this region (compared with 28 percent who said it belongs to the Middle East and 23 percent to Europe).

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue?

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 28 Feb 2019 07:22:44 +0000

Public attention in the upcoming Israeli elections is focusing on domestic political and economic issues, such as Netanyahu’s legal situation and the cost of living – and on security-related political issues, such as Iran, Gaza, Syria and Hezbollah. However, the question of relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been marginalized and has almost disappeared from the political agenda.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 02 Jan 2019 06:47:18 +0000

This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The End of the Struggle Over Syria

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 27 Dec 2018 15:51:04 +0000

US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the remaining American troops from Syria came as a surprise, but the writing was on the wall already in April, when the he announced his intention to do so. This move effectively implies leaving the Syrian territory to Russia and Iran, who strive to control Syria, if not the entire Middle East.

In 1965, British journalist Patrick Seale published a book called The Struggle for Syria, in which he described the international conflicts between the USSR and the US and between Egypt and Iraq over Syria since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. More than 50 years later, the struggle over Syria is ongoing in full force, but it now seems to have been decided. Unlike the past, when the US struggled to maintain its influence in the Middle East, it has now decided to abandon the region.

The civil war in Syria, since 2011, has witnessed unprecedented involvement of internal and external players – more than any other conflict in the region. Upon the beginning of the civil war, the US, Jordan and Saudi Arabia helped the Free Syrian Army – the most significant opposition group – when the goal of the pro-Western coalition was to topple President Bashar Assad’s regime. This coalition was joined by Turkey, which not only attempted at toppling the regime, but also ensured that neither the Kurds nor Islamic State would establish territorial outposts in Syria.

Despite the ideological differences, the establishment of a Kurdish and/or Islamic state on the Turkish border was perceived as a serious threat, while Iran and Hezbollah rushed to assist Assad, followed by Russia who only joined in 2015. The involvement of so many players in the campaign confirmed Seale’s perception that whoever controls Syria also controls the Middle East. This perception results from Syria’s geostrategic role as a link between the Gulf region and the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, in the absence of other Arab allies, Syria has become an important anchor of Russia’s and Iran’s policies in the region.

The withdrawal of the US is not substantial militarily. A 2,000-soldier force, however efficient it may be, cannot significantly alter the balance of power. In fact, the fight over Syria was decided already in 2015, when it became clear that Russia showed relentless resolve to attain its objectives in Syria, in contrast to the hesitancy that the Obama administration demonstrated.

The talks in Astana and Sochi in recent years in an attempt to find a political settlement between the countries involved and the factions in Syria did not include the US. Therefore, Washington has long lost a central role in shaping the new political order in Syria. Yet, the withdrawal of American forces from Syria still holds a symbolic and moral significance that will adversely affect not only the US position in the region in general, but also its allies.

It symbolizes the failure of the US in Syria and the Middle East in general, and emphasizes the absence of a clear strategy and its lack of commitment to recognized allies. Paradoxically, Trump’s policy continues the policy of his predecessor president Barack Obama: first, by gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, and second by betraying his allies.

What does the recent American move mean for Israel? The implications for Israel are not significant, since even prior to this withdrawal, the US no longer played a major role in the Syrian playground. Unlike the Cold War, Israel’s situation today is better because it maintains a dialogue with Russia.

In addition, the fact that Russia and Iran do not necessarily share common interests in Syria may allow Israel to receive Russia’s help in preventing Iran from being even more influential in a Russian-controlled territory. If during the civil war Russia and Iran had a shared objective to secure the Assad regime, then after reaching this goal it is quite possible that competition over the rebuilding of Syria in the aftermath of the civil war may increase the rivalry between the two countries.

In any event, after seven years of bloody civil war that led to the destruction of the country, the death of half a million people and the creation of millions of refugees, Syria poses no threat to Israel. Moreover, based on past experience, the Syrian regime has kept the situation at the Syrian-Israeli border quiet and stable.

The bad news is that the victory of the “axis of resistance” in Syria has given a tailwind to those who are active on the northern front against the West and Israel. The fight over Syria is over for now, but the final word has not yet been said.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The End of the Struggle Over Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 11 Dec 2018 16:01:19 +0000

The recent escalation in Gaza highlighted once again the crisis in Israel-Turkey relations. A harsh exchange of tweets between the spokespersons of Turkey’s President Erdoğan and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed not only disagreements on policy but also a negative and confrontational discourse. Six months have passed since Israeli and Turkish ambassadors were sent home, following Turkish protest over Israel’s steps in Gaza, and ties have yet to improve. On this background, the Mitvim Institute recently conducted its annual Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue in Istanbul, in cooperation with Friedrich-EbertStiftung.

Policy exchanges with a variety of unofficial Turkish counterparts emphasized that even at the height of Israel-Turkey tensions a few months ago – triggered by the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the escalation in Gaza – the two countries refrained from intensifying the crisis beyond a certain level. Thus, for example, despite sending the ambassadors home, they did not formally downgrade the level of relations. This fact will make it easier to solve the crisis, should there be political will to do so. It will be possible to present the return of the ambassadors as a largely technical step, not as one that heralds a new stage in relations.

But even should ambassadors’ return, Turkey is not likely to seek a significant improvement in ties due to its long-standing opposition to Israeli policies towards the Palestinian issue. In fact, the Turkish desire for increased influence on the Palestinian issue is a significant reason to seek the return of its diplomatic representatives to Israel. Without an ambassador in Tel Aviv and a consul general in Jerusalem, Turkey finds itself increasingly excluded from processes occurring in domestic Palestinian politics and from international diplomatic efforts regarding the Gaza strip.

The American angle also came up during Mitvim’s policy dialogue in Istanbul, especially in the context of the Jewish community in the US. Turks view with concern the links between Jewish organizations and Saudi and Emirati lobby groups in Washington. This is perceived as aimed at promoting a more negative American attitude towards Turkey. Turkey would be pleased if the Jewish lobby would use its influence on the Trump administration to enable more Turkish involvement in Iraq, also as a counterweight and block to Iran, which is seen in Turkey as also serving Israeli interests. Israel, from its side, is currently not inclined to make gestures towards Turkey, given Erdoğan’s policy and statements towards it. The expectation in Jerusalem is that Turkey should first enable the return of ambassadors, as it was the one who initiated the bilateral crisis.

Concerning Iran, the messages coming from Istanbul were that in contrast to common opinion in Israel, Turkey and Iran are not allies. They indeed conduct neighborly relations and trade, and cooperate on regional issues such as Syria, yet at the same time a significant rivalry exists between them. Similarly to Israel, Turkey too wants to limit the Iranian involvement in Syria, although this is of less importance for Turkey, and is not motivated by security fears but rather by hegemonic and economic concerns. Misperceptions in Israel about Turkey are mirrored by misperceptions in Turkey about Israel. For example, there is a widespread belief in Turkey that Israel secretly desires territorial expansion in the Middle East and is closely allied with the Kurds in northern Syria, which Turkey considers a serious threat.

It seems that Israel and Turkey can find a common language regarding Syria, and that they are not always on different sides of the regional divide. Initiating a strategic Israel-Turkey dialogue concerning Syria should be one of the concrete results of a future return of ambassadors. It will also be helpful to establish a coordination and conflict-management mechanism between the two countries, with the aim of preventing a further collapse of ties in the event of another round of violence in Gaza or renewed tensions in Jerusalem.

The ideological disparities between Erdoğan and Netanyahu are not likely to disappear in the near future, but the practical advantages of improved relations – mainly in the economic and strategic spheres – can lead both leaders to decrease the flames and intensity of their disagreement, as occurred in the past. Turkey and Israel are central countries in the region, which are impacted by developments in the Middle East and can benefit from a dialogue channel about them (even when they do not see eye-to-eye).

Recent progress in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza creates a more favorable context for carrying out diplomatic efforts to enable the return of ambassadors. But until official ties build positive momentum again, it will be mostly up to civil society actors to maintain and broaden channels of dialogue and cooperation between the people and policy elite of both countries. Mitvim’s Israel-Turkey policy dialogue, as well as the ongoing work of the Israeli-Turkish Civil Society Forum, show that this is very much possible and valuable.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 11 Nov 2018 15:44:10 +0000

It is impossible to isolate the recent escalation of tension between Israel and the Gaza Strip from the stalemate in the internal Palestinian reconciliation process. From the current perspective, Hamas’ political capital is at an all-time low. All Hamas’ attempts to reach a regional agreement that will improve the economic situation in Gaza and enable it to maintain its strategic military abilities have failed. The reconciliation process is a barometer for regional stability. As long as the dialogue between the sides continues, igniting a spark of hope for change, the level of violence between the Gaza Strip and Israel declines. Thus, the failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas is another factor which encourages the escalation of violence in the region.

Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas.

In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a gun. In fact, since he was elected as the President of the Palestinian Authority in 2005, Abbas has not set foot in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, losing control of it is part of his legacy.

In contrast to Yasser Arafat, who had roots in Gaza and spoke like one of the people, Abbas was born in Tzfat, from where his family fled to Syria, and has no special emotional connection to the Strip. Throughout his period in office, he has focused on the project of building the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the diplomatic battle against the State of Israel, neglecting the Gaza Strip. He abandoned the people of Gaza to the hands of Hamas and the economic mercies of the international community and Gulf states, trusting them to add patch after patch to cover the desolation and wretchedness of the Gaza Strip.

After three rounds of warfare, with the Gaza Strip tired and beaten, Abbas has still not changed his strategic approach towards it. Since 2014, not only has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority failed to stretch out its hand to support the people of the Strip economically but, moreover, has imposed a long series of economic sanctions which affect the civilians. These include failure to pay for fuel sent to the Strip, thus increasing civilian pressure on Hamas and proving to the residents of the Strip that the Islamist movement cannot provide for their most basic needs.

Following Abbas’ clear political failure to advance the vision of a Palestinian state, the political struggle against Hamas has become more significant. Hamas of 2018 is looking to the future, and its leadership deems itself the proper heir to the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Abbas, who lost the Gaza Strip, is not interested in losing the political leadership and the historical status of the Fatah movement within the PLO.

The bloody battles since summer 2007 are etched into the memories of Fatah members; the decade-long isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank has increased the estrangement between the sides; Abbas’ despair at the political process, alongside the suspicion and ideological and political disgust he feels towards Hamas, has led him to radicalize his position, making it difficult to reconcile the dialogue between the two sides.

Abbas’ main demand from Hamas to enable an advance towards reconciliation is that the movement dismantle its military wing. Hamas without Jihad, Hamas without arms, will lose not only its ideological identity but also its political bargaining chips. Understanding that Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, Abbas’ only option is to continue putting economic pressure on the movement’s rule in the Gaza Strip. He hopes that these steps will lead to mass protests against Hamas, enabling him to return to the Strip as victor.

The continued economic decline and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip heighten the tension between Hamas and Israel. Hamas must direct its anger and frustration outside, away from itself. Military conflict between Hamas and Israel can result in the dismantlement of Hamas’ weapons following an Israeli military campaign. In the past, the Palestinian Authority ruled out this option, but it seems that now, from Abbas’ perspective, any path that can eventually lead to a unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under his control is deemed suitable. Indeed, a unified control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase the Palestinian Authority’s prestige and allow it to exert greater pressure on the State of Israel in the future, should the peace process between the two sides resume.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 08 Nov 2018 15:47:31 +0000

The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 26 Oct 2018 15:40:53 +0000

Less than 10 months after the resolution of the previous Israeli-Jordanian crisis, a new crisis may be sparked by King Abdullah’s recent decision not to renew the two annexes to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation.

According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail.

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan’s special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of Islamic State. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: the public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king’s decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel’s decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel’s “everything will be OK” (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan’s quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves now national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so.

What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries’ shared experience.

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to “enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.” A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

In June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel’s foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 17 Sep 2018 15:29:25 +0000

Surprisingly for what is considered a failed peace treaty, the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Agreement received significant media coverage. Most of it, as can be expected, was onesided, emphasizing the Palestinian mistakes without attempting to see the wider, balanced picture of the reasons that led to its failure, including the Israeli responsibility.

At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement.

In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides.

The Israeli party is to be blamed for three failures: (1) For not stopping the building of new settlements in the occupied territories. On the eve of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, there were fewer than 120,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; by the end of 2016, the number had risen to 400,000 (not including East Jerusalem). This shows – in the Palestinian view – that Israel has never been sincere about implementing the agreement; (2) Israel has never indicated the end result, which is the building of an independent Palestinian state; (3) Israel – in spite of its military strength – has never been generous toward the Palestinians during the negotiations. Instead of treating the Palestinians with respect and honor, it continued humiliating and insulting them. After all, Israel received what it mostly desired – recognition – upfront, while the Palestinians’ most wanted demands – a state with recognized boundaries, control of East Jerusalem and resolution of the refugee problem – remained all unfulfilled.

The Palestinians, for their part, failed as well, on at least three fronts: (1) By not curbing the attacks of Hamas terrorists. It is debatable whether Arafat was capable of confronting Hamas militarily, but it is clear that he did not do his utmost to prevent these suicide attacks; (2) The Palestinian media, including the educational system, continued to delegitimize the Israeli side. This negative media campaign solidified the negative image of Israelis in Palestinian eyes and convinced Israelis that the Palestinians have not really changed their position toward them; (3) The Palestinians have never internalized that in spite of Israel’s military superiority, its psychological psyche needs continued assurance. Acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state would not be harmful to the Palestinians; in many ways it only reaffirms what had been already declared in the UN 1947 partition plan.

In spite of all these failures, the Oslo Agreement could have worked had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated in November 1995. History cannot tell us what could have occurred if Rabin had not been shot, yet in my research on missed opportunities in the ArabIsraeli conflict I reached the conclusion that Rabin – with his military background and political acumen – could have made the difference. It is important also to note that Rabin simultaneously negotiated with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; signing an agreement with him would have laid enormous pressure on Arafat to proceed as well.

We will never know whether Rabin could have succeeded, but his assassination removed from the field a major player who could have made a difference. This act was tantamount to the assassination of the Oslo track. The episode demonstrates that in spite of the importance of historical processes, the role of leaders in history is still paramount. This only accentuates the regretful conclusion that lack of leadership – on both sides of the conflict – is a major reason for the conflict’s endurance.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 27 Aug 2018 15:20:41 +0000

The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming?

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 01 Aug 2018 15:03:07 +0000

The participation of an Israeli delegation in the 2018 annual UNESCO International Conference held in Bahrain corresponds with the various headlines on Israeli-Bahraini relations during the past year. In May 2018, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed tweeted that Israel has the right to defend itself due to Iran’s violation of the status-quo in the region. This unprecedented reaction made by an Arab country broke the habit of overlooking or condemning the Israeli attacks in Syria. Despite its importance, the statement has not been officially published by Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Choosing to use the channel of social media over the official media brings a personal dimension to the statement and creates a safe diplomatic distance from deterministic declarations regarding the status of Israel. This kind of cautiousness is a customary practice of Arab leaders in their public references to Israel.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not stand out in an empty void. In May 2018, an official Bahraini delegation participated in the Giro D’Italia bicycle race, which was held in Israel, and last December an interfaith group of from Bahrain arrived in Israel to promote a dialogue for coexistence and religious tolerance. But, of the events and declarations betweenIsrael and Bahrain in the past year, perhaps the most important was the declaration made by the King of Bahrain in September 2017 at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa condemned the Arab boycott of Israel and announced that Bahraini citizens are now allowed to visit Israel.

In the background of the latest visit of the Israeli delegation to the UNESCO conference, the Israeli media rushed to publish a quote from a “senior Bahraini official” who claimed that “the kingdom will be the first of the Gulf states to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel”. With this announcement, it appeared that the Israeli excitement over the warming of ties between the two countries had reached a new peak. However, this enthusiasm, like many others in the past, reflects to a great extent more of a wishful thinking than an actual rapprochement. In that case, the foreign minister of Bahrain hastened to shatter the illusion of normalization by issuing an official declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that categorically denied the senior official’s claim.

In light of developments described in the relations between the two countries recently, the question asked is why Bahrain took a step back to the traditional position of the Gulf states reasserting its “commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative.” The key issue for understanding that dualist attitude lies in the level of openness on the one hand, and the sensitivity on the other, which characterizes the relations between Israel and Bahrain, and to a large extent, Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. Bahrain’s unique openness towards Israel stems from a combination of security interests, as well as political and social-religious issues.

First, both Bahrain and Israel are against Iran’s armament in nuclear weapons and supported Trump’s pulling out from the nuclear deal. Following the civil protests that broke out in Bahrain during the Arab Spring (2011), Iran criticized the legitimacy of the Sunni regime in Bahrain and supported the political struggle of the Shiite population in the country. As a small country with about two-thirds of its population being Shiite, Bahrain feels threatened by Iran and could use any ally in its diplomatic efforts against Iran’s nuclearization and a strong coalition in a scenario of military confrontation. The location of the US’ Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is not coincidental in this context, nor is the recent hesitant rapprochement with Israel.

Beyond the political and security implications of such converging interests, the shared interests and allegedly common enemy had led in general to a less hostile dialog between the countries in the formal channels, as well as between citizens over the social media platforms. Although difficult to measure, the general atmosphere rising from these exchanges seems to shift from the automatically anti-Israel approach to a more focused criticism in the context of the Palestinian issue, despite the diverse circumstances of events. One of the interesting manifestations of that was in the various comments to the Bahraini foreign minister’s tweet about Israel’s right to defend itself. Along with many sympathetic responses, there were also some negative reactions, but most of them called for advocating the same rights for the Palestinian people and did not reflect the usual narrative of delegitimizing Israel.

Second, Bahrain’s interest in promoting interfaith cooperation can also be associated with its growing openness towards Israel. This track has shaped a unique relationship between the two countries. As a regime that is being criticized for representing the minority Sunni community in Bahrain, the king seeks to advance a pluralistic policy to meet with the needs of the various sectarian and religious groups living in the country. Among them is a small Jewish community of about 100 people that emigrated to the region from Baghdad at the beginning of the 20th century. The partnership between the political and religious leadership of Bahrain with the Jewish Wiesenthal Center led to a natural linkage with Israel; however, its importance is manifested in the moderate, tolerant, and multicultural message that the regime wishes to express internally – addressing the various communities at home.

Thirdly, Bahrain is known for its self-confident, active political mentality relative to its regional power. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to host an Israeli minister (Yossi Sarid in 1994) and the first country in the region to declare Hezbollah’s military and political arms terrorist organizations. Bahrain regularly appeals to NATO against organizations affiliated with the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Bahrain represents a moderate pro-Western line that promotes women’s rights and rights for the many expatriates living in the country. Thus, Bahrain is a convenient ally for Israel, both politically and morally. However, Bahrain also has a political responsibility to maintain the fundamentals of the regional policies under which it operates, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore it will not rush to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel before the greater powers of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates do so.

Carmel Shama-Hacohen, Israel’s ambassador to the OECD and UNESCO, who was supposed to head the Israeli delegation at the conference in Bahrain, said in a radio interview that he would not attend the conference for political and security considerations. These reasons are also indicative of the great sensitivity in these relations as well as the great distance that Israel faces from achieving normalization with the Arab states, even with the moderate and less hostile ones. Eventually, Israel was represented by Deputy Israeli Ambassador to UNESCO and another Israeli diplomat on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The delegation’s participation is an example of a move that can be interpreted as a rapprochement between the two countries, but the far-reaching announcements voiced in the Israeli media hinder the small and measured steps being taken in this direction. In fact, not only did the report cause uneasiness among the Bahraini government, it also threatened the continued cautious rapprochement between the two countries.

Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Persian Gulf Studies, Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 01 Aug 2018 11:02:55 +0000

This research examines the potential for cooperation between Israel and Iraq, the largest Arab country to Israel’s east. Iraq is changing and is undergoing reconstruction following a series of wars and crises. It works to bring together its diverse ethnic and religious groups, and to navigate through the regional geopolitical conflict between Sunni states and Iran. Israeli decision makers tend to ignore the centrality of Iraq, and to focus only on the Kurds there. Israel generally sees Iraq as a country that lost regional significance following the Gulf wars, and as a failed state under Iranian dominance. This, however, does not reflect reality and needs to change. While the Iraqi leadership is not likely to alter its official policies towards Israel anytime soon, there is a chance for a bottom-up process of change. Israel-Iraq relations can benefit from positive mutual images fostered by the JewishIraqi community, and from existing people-to-people interactions via social media. Practical cooperation can be developed in the fields of trade, infrastructures, agriculture, and tourism, and this can serve as a basis for future diplomatic ties between the two countries.

הפוסט Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 30 Jul 2018 14:56:09 +0000

The Islamic Republic of Iran soon turns 40. Since 1979, the U.S. has been the primary ideological target of Iran’s enmity. Recently, we’ve seen the rhetoric heating up, with Iran’s President Rouhani threatening America with “the mother of all wars,” and President Trump’s all-caps response – that further threats would lead to “unprecedented consequences.”

But Israel – or the “Little Satan” – plays no less central a role. Thanks to tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its proxy war involvement in Syria close to Israel’s northern border, for the first time, Iran and Israel’s relationship is showing signs of evolving from a cold war to a hot war.

Despite this, Iranians and Israelis are, surprisingly, communicating with one another more now than they have since the days of the Shah. And it is during this period of geopolitical uncertainty that civil society actors on both sides should buck the trend and encourage and participate in a new narrative of understanding and goodwill.

Every year, at the state ceremony marking Holocaust Memorial Day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws parallels between the murderous plans of the Nazis and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Islamic Republic. And like their premier, most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat.

Iran’s decades-long propagation of Holocaust denial, as well as arming of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reinforces this ingrained perception. When Iran test fires ballistic missiles decorated with Hebrew writing that calls for Israel’s destruction, it reaffirms popular opinion on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. According to a poll conducted in early May, 44 percent of Israelis support a unilateral strike in order to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The prospects of military confrontation between Israel and Iran have increased over Syria. Israel established two red lines on Iran’s entrenchment and transfers of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, and has responded to Iranian disregard for these red lines with a series of airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria. But Israel does not seek an expansion of this conflict, and is using two soft-power tactics in the hopes of forcing Iran’s hand.

The first tactic is diplomacy with Russia. While successfully lobbying the Trump administration to walk away from the JCPOA and reinstitute economic sanctions on Iran, Netanyahu has simultaneously prioritized his relationship with President Vladimir Putin.

Israel doesn’t have much choice. After Russia installed its S-300 air defense systems in Syria, Israel was compelled to develop a de-conflicting mechanism so that its planes could continue to overfly Syrian airspace without interfering with Moscow’s interests. Negotiations between Jerusalem and the Kremlin over an Iranian withdrawal from southern Syria are ongoing and according to reports, received a boost during Trump and Putin’s Helsinki summit and other recent high-level meetings.

The second Israeli strategy – and one that turns more heads – is a direct courtship of the Iranian people. In a series of videos published on YouTube aimed at the Iranian public, Netanyahu describes the travails of the imaginary 15-year old Iranian teen girl Fatehmeh; he longs for the day when Israeli and Iranian national soccer teams can compete against one another, asks Iranians to consider using Israeli agricultural technology to minimize the effects of drought, and congratulates Iranian protesters for questioning the allocution of state funds to military campaigns in the Middle East.

Israel may be executing this new approach in tandem with the U.S., which over the last year has frequently engaged Iranians and the Iranian government with different messages. Israel’s government seems to have accepted the notion that it can pressure Tehran’s ruling class by addressing the Iranian public. The game plan is simple: force the regime to justify its war-mongering policies to its own people, and force Iranians to ask what price they are willing to pay in order to pursue this ideological end-goal, to query whether the call for the destruction of Israel resonates beyond the Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guards cadre.

No Israeli leader has ever adopted this approach before, and Netanyahu knows full well that he is touching a nerve. The timing is no coincidence. Not only is Tehran under international pressure to rethink its regional agenda, but, domestically, anger over the regime’s disconnected foreign and economic policies is also growing. Slogans such as “Leave Palestine be, think about us [Iran]” and “Palestine, Syria are reasons for our misery” are now commonly used in protests taking place across Iran.

Netanyahu’s message is accurate, but there could not be a worse messenger. Rather than ceding the platform to Netanyahu – an unpopular figure in Iran – Israelis must seize this opportunity and develop their own dialogue with the Iranian people. Similarly, Iranians need to be ready to respond to their Israeli counterparts, and engage in a serious conversation about their vision for the future.

Creating successful mechanisms for Israeli-Iranian dialogue was the central question raised by a group of U.S.-based Israeli and Iranian policy analysts and scholars (including the authors of this piece) in Washington, D.C. in late 2017. While participants agreed that Israeli and Iranian officials would not be conducting direct negotiations to reduce bilateral tensions anytime soon, many felt that the Iran nuclear deal, to which at the time the U.S. was still a signatory, presented an opening for some limited people-to-people dialogue, especially if executed in coordination with Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities. Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, the discussion about how this people-to-people dialogue might develop is as relevant as ever.

Iranians at the meetings explained that, while their countrymen are protesting their government’s adventurism abroad, this should not lead Israelis to assume that anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments in Iran are merely skin-deep. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians over the last decades have strengthened negative Iranian attitudes towards the Jewish state. Moderate voices in Iran who recognize that hostility towards Israel does not serve their country’s interests do exist, however they lack clear incentives to advocate for a moderate approach.

Emphasizing cultural bonds between the two peoples won’t bridge political differences between the two governments, but they deserve more attention. As our meetings revealed, there are no shortage of stories from older generations who recall the once warm relationship between Tehran and Jerusalem. In a similar vein, the 2015 Israeli film “Baba Joon” was well-received by Iranian audiences because of its touching depiction of how an immigrant family from Iran retained their Persian identity despite relocating to Israel. Unsurprisingly, many Persian Israelis root for “Team Melli” during the World Cup.

A similar emphasis should be placed on social media initiatives. The 2012 “Israel Loves Iran” and corresponding “Iran Loves Israel” campaigns attracted the support of thousands to an anti-war message and revealed how many Israelis and Iranians refuse to accept their respective government’s worldview. These campaigns were particularly successful in targeting younger audiences, and breaking taboos – particularly in Iran, where until several years ago the media would never refer to Israel by name.

Above all, Israelis and Iranians need to be realistic about what a military conflict would mean and the role their governments play in perpetuating this antagonism. So long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, an Iranian U-turn on Israel isn’t in the cards. And it is even less likely that Iran will halt its support for other regional actors, such as Hezbollah, in the years to come. Top-down changes within Israel should not be anticipated either. Rather than wait for political elites to make rational choices, Israeli and Iranian citizens must be the ones to engage one another in dialogue, voice their concerns to their respective leaders, and explore every alternative to war.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA damaged the ability of third parties to effectively deescalate tensions between Israel and Iran. Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in Syria should be applauded, but the results may only serve a stopgap before the next chapter of hostilities. Despite this pessimism, the channels of communication have never been more accessible. People-to-people initiatives may not be able to reverse the narrative of conflict that pervades the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but it may thwart a descent into chaos.

Gabriel Mitchell is policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:51:07 +0000

Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:44:28 +0000

Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership style always includes dramatic warnings about threats to Israel. For more than a decade now, Israel’s prime minister warns that Iran – in particular its nuclear program – are the chief threat.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 01 Jul 2018 10:27:55 +0000

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 27 Jun 2018 14:28:42 +0000

On June 15, the Israeli state prosecution indicted a former minister, Dr. Gonen Segev, for spying for Iran. Israeli authorities arrested him about a month earlier. His arrest and indictment were kept secret until a gag order was partially lifted on June 18. If found guilty, Dr. Segev would be the most senior Israeli political figure ever to spy for an enemy country.

Dr. Segev – a former combat soldier, officer and medical doctor – was elected in 1992 as a member of the right wing Tzomet party. In 1994 he left the party. The following year he was appointed minister of energy in the second Rabin government. He also was made a member of the security cabinet, a group of select ministers that discuss and decide on the most important security matters. Although Dr. Segev served as a minister for less than a year, his vote allowed Prime Minister Rabin to secure a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on a crucial vote for the implementation of the controversial peace deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1996, Dr. Segev was ejected from politics.

Then followed a dramatic fall from grace. In 2004, he was convicted of credit card fraud. In 2005 he received a five-year jail sentence for an attempted drug smuggling operation into Israel. Following his 2007 early release, he left the country for Nigeria, where he relaunched his medical career, due in part to the fact that his medical license was revoked in Israel following his drug-related conviction.

Israeli authorities allege that he established contact with Iranian intelligence agents in Nigeria in 2012. According to the indictment, Dr. Segev provided information to Tehran’s agents and assisted them in trying to create relationships with Israeli business figures, mostly veterans of the security establishment.

Several Israelis were convicted of aiding Iran in the 1990s and 2000s, mostly businesspeople who sold Tehran dual-use or military products. Never before, however, has a senior Jewish-Israeli (former) establishment figure been convicted of spying for Iran, or indeed any other Middle Eastern country. Dr. Segev’s case highlights three issues regarding the current state and context of IranianIsraeli competition.

First, the episode highlights that Iran and Israel are engaged in a truly global intelligence struggle. Much of it is driven by Israel’s concerns over the militarized aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. This Israeli-Iranian competition includes, among other means, intelligence cooperation and alliances for both sides with regional and global partners. Former Israeli intelligence officials suggested that they warned

Dr. Segev in the early 2000s that Hezbollah was trying to make contact with him. It is highly likely that Hezbollah’s past efforts were the basis for Iranian contact with Dr. Segev a decade later. Israel, it seems, was assisted by Equatorial Guinea, which arrested Dr. Segev and repatriated him.

This is clearly a sophisticated struggle with bold moves on both sides. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted in a dramatic April 30 press conference of stealing the archive of the Iranian nuclear program; now, Tehran’s ability to recruit a former member of Israel’s security cabinet has been revealed. At the same time, however, one wonders how long Israel may have known about Dr. Segev’s Iranian connections. Perhaps he served (knowingly or otherwise) as a double agent before being arrested? While we cannot know what the next chapter in this spy saga will be, it is quite safe to predict that more is to come.

Secondly, the Iranian revelation came after a string of dramatic Israeli operational and intelligence successes against Iran and its allies. As noted, Israeli intelligence agents stole an entire Iranian archive, and further humiliated their foes by making the achievement public in an April press conference. On May 10, Israel conducted a massive attack on some fifty Iranian targets in Syria, demonstrating both operational and intelligence dominance. In June, word emerged that Israel was able to convince Moscow to pressure Iran to withdraw its forces and allies from the Syrian-Israeli border. All this took place against the backdrop of unprecedented coordination between Jerusalem and Washington.

Israelis have had to exhibit super-human humility in light of these achievements and the sense of invincibility they have invoked. In the past, Israel miscalculated and fell into strategic traps that led to exorbitant costs during the wars of 1973 and 1982 due to an inflated sense of relative military and intelligence prowess. In this respect, Tehran provided Israel with an important reminder about the limits of Jerusalem’s power and effectiveness.

Finally, responses in Israel to the affair show that Israeli-Iranian tensions are not simply a foreign and security matter, driven by the clash of two of the strongest countries in the Middle East. The Iranian threat also is being used to advance internal political positions.

Israeli right-wing politicians were quick to a make a direct connection between Dr. Segev’s vote in 1995 in favor of the peace deal with the PLO and the current spying allegations. The specific implication is to further delegitimize the Oslo peace process. There is also a deeper effort hinted at here: leftists are traitors, and what seems like an effort to reach peace is, in fact, an act of treachery. A hint of this came in the words of Justice Minister, Ayelet Shakked, who stated on June 18 that Dr. Segev started with “ideological treachery” and then moved to “treason against the state.”

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 27 Jun 2018 09:58:42 +0000

Diplomatic engagement between countries in the Eastern Mediterranean presents the opportunity for greater regional cooperation on a range of issues, including policy, security and economic growth. Increased cooperation has the potential to lead to shared regional norms and institutions that promote regional stability and aid in conflict resolution support. But the potential for regional cohesion is limited, both because of differences in national priorities and recent and long-standing conflicts. This policy brief explores the limitations and potential of conflict resolution support in the Eastern Mediterranean. It offers operational recommendations for experts and policy-makers working to strengthen regional dialogue and find new lenses for approaching conflict resolution.

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:46:18 +0000

On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 14 May 2018 11:48:14 +0000

Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 11 May 2018 11:45:37 +0000

The evening US President Donald J. Trump took the United States out of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it smelled in Israel as if war was coming. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cut short a trip to Cyprus. His Chief of Staff canceled his speech in the prestigious Herzliya conference. A few minutes before President Trump began his remarks, the Israel Defense Forces ordered residents of the Golan Heights (a northern region bordering Syria to brace for a possible attack from Syria, due to “abnormal movements of Iranian forces in Syria.” CNN reported that American officials had similar concerns and the State Department issued a travel advisory for the Golan Heights.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 10 May 2018 09:39:30 +0000

The history of Israel-Jordan relations displays long-term strategic cooperation. The formal peace agreement, signed in 1994, has become one of the pillars of the political-strategic stability of both Israel and Jordan. While the two countries have succeeded in developing extensive security cooperation, the economic, political, and civil aspects, which also have great cooperation potential, have for the most part been neglected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents difficulties in realizing this potential while hindering the Israel-Jordan relations and leading to alienation and hostility between the two peoples. However, the formal agreements and the existing relations make it possible to advance them even under the ongoing conflict. Israel and Jordan can benefit from cooperation on political issues, such as promoting peace and relations with the Palestinians and managing the holy sites in Jerusalem; they can also benefit from cooperation on civil matters, such as joint management of water resources, and resolving environmental, energy, and tourism issues; and lastly, Israel can benefit from economic cooperation while leveraging the geographical position of Jordan which makes it a gateway to Arab markets. This article focuses on the economic aspect and demonstrates how such cooperation can provide Israel with a powerful growth engine that will significantly increase Israeli GDP. It draws attention to the great potential that Israeli-Jordanian ties engender, and to the possibility – which still exists – to realize this potential, which would enhance peaceful and prosperous relationship between Israel and Jordan.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 30 Apr 2018 11:31:52 +0000

Much of the discourse on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran, has centered broadly on two issue sets. The first comprises the issues between Iran and the six powers; the second, perhaps more widely-discussed are dynamics between the U.S. and the other five powers.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 25 Apr 2018 09:29:11 +0000

On 25 April 2018, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the EuroMediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) hosted a public event in Jerusalem on New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, to introduce a new joint policy study on the topic. The event featured Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas (ELIAMEP, Greece), Gabriel Mitchell (Mitvim), and Dr. Muriel Asseburg (SWP, Germany), Amb. Ron Adam (Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Valeria Talbot (ISPI, Italy), and was moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren (Mitvim). The presentations focused on the need for collective security schemes in the eastern Mediterranean, the implications of natural gas discoveries, and the regional effects of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 30 Mar 2018 10:20:37 +0000

After a six-month diplomatic crisis between Israel and Jordan, a new Israeli ambassador – Amir Weissbrod – is expected to arrive in Amman soon to fully resume the embassy’s operations.

This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements.

From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas – diplomatic, economic and civilian – haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and have not been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized.

In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries.

In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements – coupled with the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans – point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians.

The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan – in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas – serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given.

The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets.

According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market.

The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit She’an and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network.

This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing public relations efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing – economic and diplomatic – contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 29 Mar 2018 10:15:37 +0000

Iranian involvement in Syria is increasing, bolstering Israeli motivation to influence Syria’s reality. Israel has carried out successful military moves in recent years in order to preserve its security interests around its northern border. Its ability to influence Syria’s future using diplomatic channels, however, appears to be quite low. The February 2018 incident between Israel and Iran near the Syrian border provides Israel an opportunity to explore whether additional diplomatic channels can be put in place in order to promote Israel’s interests in Syria and prevent further escalation.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 10 Mar 2018 08:31:29 +0000

New dynamics are taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean. Signs of increased political cooperation between different countries, new opportunities for economic cooperation due to natural gas finds, and common threats related to security and refugee flow all lead to the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a new sub-region. This has been acknowledged by the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which stated in late 2015 that “the EU will support sub-regional cooperation as appropriate in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Southern Caucasus.”

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 16 Feb 2018 10:06:58 +0000

Following the infiltration of the Iranian drone into Israel’s air space and Israel’s retaliation, the public discourse in recent days focused mainly on the security aspect and the various ways to address it. However, the situation in Syria is increasingly becoming a diplomatic issue, that requires action through sensitive and complex diplomatic channels vis-à-vis various players in the international community.

Although Iran’s move is considered an escalation, it should not come as a surprise. This is a step up in the exchange of messages between the sides, but we can safely assume that Israel anticipated that its actions, according to foreign and/or Syrian sources, would sooner or later provoke a counter-reaction. After all, the Syrian regime has reacted to attacks, presumably carried out by Israel, in a number of cases in the past. In this regard, Iran’s move may be seen as a Syrian-Iranian attempt to draw some red lines, indicating that the military freedom of action in Syria, long enjoyed by Israel, should not be taken for granted.

Either way, the Israeli interests remain unchanged and focus on two main levels.

The first interest relates to preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria, or at least weakening its hold on the state, especially in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel and Jordan. Therefore, we must focus on a series of diplomatic measures:

First, reaching some understandings with the relevant actors – Iran, and the Assad regime – in Syria. The tightening Iran’s grip on Syria is a reality that will be extremely difficult to uproot, at least in the short-to- medium term. The goal, then, is to limit or to prevent it from establishing itself in a way that is too threatening to the Syrian-Israeli border. This goal may be achieved with the intervention of international actors who enjoy open channels and a sufficient level of trust, vis-a-vis both sides.

Under the current circumstances, the most prominent actor is Moscow. The intensive dialogue between Israel and Russia allows for a sincere and deep dialogue, even if their interests are not aligned. The convergence of the Russian-Iranian interests is firm and tight, and it cannot be dismantled now. At the same time, Russia has a clear interest in preventing an undesirable escalation that will harm the strengthening of the Assad regime. Israel can leverage this situation in its dialogue with Moscow, while refraining from intense and unpredictable actions, in return.

Although the US has positioned itself in a less influential (albeit largely secondary) position in Syria, it is necessary to closely coordinate the Israeli-American positions. In addition, it is important to coordinate positions with Arab countries, with whom Israel has shared interests and close dialog. Jordan fears, just like Israel, the Iranian hold on Syria. Egypt is watching Iran with concern as it is becoming a stronger regional power, and Saudi Arabia adopted a most assertive policy vis-a-vis Iran. The Israeli message should be that this regional dynamic should be curbed in a coordinated regional diplomatic effort against the Syrian-Iranian axis.

Although Europe has ceded its premiership in Syria to Russia, it is still possible to recruit prominent European players to increase pressure on Iran. Germany can be a good candidate for that. The focus of the Israeli message, at this stage, should be the Syrian context, rather than the nuclear issue. Moreover, diplomatic levers should be used to make it difficult for the Iranians to further establish their presence in Syria. It is essential to expose to the international community the Iranian attempts to establish military bases, in a manner that will prove to the world Iran’s destructive conduct in the region, while establishing that an Iranian nuclear activity is prohibited before reaching a nuclear agreement.

Another Israeli interest, no less important, focuses on preventing an escalation in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Such a confrontation is not necessary as the deterrence that was achieved following the Second Lebanon War still stands and is manifested in the organization’s various public statements. Moreover, the organization is working to strengthen its political involvement in Lebanon and is looking forward to the elections for the Lebanese parliament. This trend could induce a more responsible conduct on its part, which could prevent a slide into violent confrontations to the detriment of Lebanon, as Israel repeatedly warns. Another round of violence will end with a renewed status quo, that is no different from the current one.

The strengthening of Assad’s regime in Syria continues vigorously. Currently, it is clear to all that the regime has been strengthened to such an extent that no one expects or desires to reverse the process, that was achieved thanks to the involvement of Russia and Iran (and Hezbollah). Israel must have an interest in strengthening the regime, who will, most probably, be able to deal more effectively with an excessively dominant Iranian influence. It should be emphasized again that this is a long-term process, since it is clear that Assad currently has neither the ability nor the will to challenge the tightening Iranian dominance in his country. At the same time, it is hard to ignore the moral consideration of the Assad regime. This is a murderous regime that committed war crimes against its own people. However, as Israel did not directly intervene during the civil war in Syria, it must now consolidate its interests in the face of the emerging reality.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Israel’s strategic balance with Syria, continues to be comfortable, even after the recent escalation. Syria is still in the midst of difficult fighting between the various forces, and Assad’s takeover of the entire country is still far from being over. It should also be remembered that the relationships and interests of the Russia-IranTurkey triangle are in no way smooth. In any event, it is imperative to acknowledge that the freedom of Israeli military action is not unlimited in view of the emerging reality, hence the importance of the political-diplomatic effort. This is a challenge that Israel can and must withstand.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:18:17 +0000

After an Iranian drone entered Israeli airspace 10 February 2018, Israel responded by striking Iranian and Syrian targets in southern Syria. Anti-aircraft fire led to the downing of an Israeli F-16 warplane. This was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, and it has prompted concern over further military escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border. In order to prevent such an escalation, Israel cannot rely only on security means. It should also make effective use of diplomacy: to identify clear and feasible policy goals regarding Syria, to foster alliances with countries that can help advance these goals, and to mobilize these countries into constructive action. This document includes experts’ perspectives on Israeli interests at stake, and diplomatic channels that can be promoted with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Germany in order to prevent further escalation. It is based on a policy workshop convened by the Mitvim Institute on 15 February 2018.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 21 Dec 2017 07:23:54 +0000

The Mitvim Institute’s annual Israeli-Turkish policy dialogue was held in Istanbul on 26-27 October 2017, for the sixth consecutive year. It focused on the state of Israel-Turkey relations following the reconciliation agreement signed by the two countries in June 2016, and on Turkey’s foreign policy in light of the changing the Middle East. The policy dialogue, which was held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, included a series of meetings with Turkish scholars, analysts, and journalists.1 This document summarizes the main insights from the dialogue.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 24 Sep 2017 12:45:03 +0000

On the eve of Kurdistan’s referendum, the international community is rife with speculation about what the vote will mean for the future of Iraq, the fight against ISIS, regional dynamics with Iran, Turkey, Syria, even Israel – and for relations with and between the US and Russia.

The vote is expected to pass, and touch off negotiations with, or demands from, the central government in Iraq about future independence. The Iraqi Parliament has rejected the legitimacy of the vote, and its Supreme Court has ordered it suspended on suspicion of violating Iraq’s constitution. The stage is set for a clash that many fear will ignite yet another war in this tormented country.

But the vote raises another significant question: How are new states born? It is a vexing problem in the post-World War II international scene. Borders are not supposed to be changed by force, yet new states are mostly born in blood.

Lonely exceptions such as the peaceful “Velvet Divorce” of Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the 2006 independence of Montenegro, are far outnumbered by states born of war: the former Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and others fought bitter ethno-nationalist conflicts, the six (or seven, counting Kosovo) independent states to emerge from Yugoslavia’s breakup emerged amidst near-genocidal violence, which formed the backdrop to Montenegro’s later secession.

Even the 2011 establishment of South Sudan following a legal referendum, in agreement with the sovereign state of Sudan, has descended into murderous chaos. The presence of oil resources with disputed ownership in both South Sudan and Kurdistan’s Kirkuk region do not auger well for a peaceful process in Iraq.

This very real threat of violence is one factor that has led Western countries to oppose the Kurdish referendum. But their opposition is rife with self-interest. It is unlikely that the U.S. cares deeply about the effects of war on Kurdish and Iraqi people; they do however worry that such a war could dilute the fight against ISIS – fought largely by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Principles such as the right to self-determination – hardly disputable in the case of the Kurds – appear to be missing from Western governments’ approach. Not even “earned sovereignty”, showing that the state-hopeful has functioning, self-governing and even relatively democratic institutions as Iraqi Kurdistan already does – has dented the Western opposition to date.

Perhaps the one “ideology” driving America’s policy is a residual defense of its 2003 Gulf War, after which Iraq looked, and still looks, a lot like a failed state. Yet America wants the post-Saddam country it helped to create to look like a success, and dismemberment does not fit the picture; no matter that “Kurdish blood has not yet dried” from fighting ISIS, as Kurdish telecom engineer Mohammed Yusuf Ameen told me by phone from Sulaymaniyah.

Russia provides another stark version of international hypocrisy regarding independence movements. Russia has long been the chief obstacle to UN membership for Kosovo, after the latter unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and was recognized by most Western countries. But Russia was only too happy to recognize the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after a short war it waged with Georgia in the summer of 2008 – perhaps as a riposte to the West’s embrace of Kosovo. On the Kurdish referendum, Russia is being coy; a recent major oil deal with Rosneft indicates that financial/resource interests will drive its response.

Similarly, Turkey has no qualms taking part in the four-decade division of Cyprus, and recognizes the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; but of course completely rejects Kurdish secessionism from its own territory.

In this stark realist environment, Israel’s response is logical: It has taken the bold position of breaking with Western allies to support Kurdish independence fairly openly. The self-interest is clear: Israel has a precedent of favoring forces that weaken a “united” hostile Arab front, such as, back in the 1980s, tacitly nurturing Hamas as a counterweight to the PLO, and fighting two and a half wars in Lebanon. A smaller, weaker Iraq is consistent with this approach.

A Western-friendly Kurdish state that could erode or fragment the Iranian Shia and Arab Sunni power struggle in the Middle East poses an attractive potential ally for Israel – sweetened for public consumption by historic friendliness, illustrated in a recent New York Times article. Given Israel’s powerful international allies, its support could actually be meaningful in advancing Kurdish independence.

But the Kurds may also have another, lower profile ally in their struggle: Palestinians. As Bassem al-Wazir, a Palestinian businessman who lived and worked in Erbil for two years, told me: “I am totally for [Kurdish independence]. If this is their national liberation, let them do it! We as an oppressed people say – good for them, hurray. You cannot keep people in a cage.”

Official Palestinian figures are keeping quiet about the referendum, mindful of the tensions regarding Iraqi territorial integrity. But Ghassan Khatib, a professor of political science at Ramallah’s Birzeit University and former Palestinian Authority minister, was less circumspect. He told me that, despite Iraqi integrity being important, “I think the Kurds have the right to self-determination and they should be allowed this right. Supporting the right of self-determination for the Kurds should encourage people to follow the same principle and support the right of self-determination, independence and statehood for the Palestinian people. Although,” he added, “we Palestinians are used to double standards, when it comes to rights by the international community.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Happy Holidays? Not in the Middle East

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 Sep 2017 12:36:29 +0000

How does the Middle East look on the eve of Rosh Hashanah 5778? One can point to a number of important changes that took place over the past year:

* The Islamic State is about to disappear territorially. The group has lost most of its territory in Iraq and is on the verge of defeat in Syria.

* The liberation of Mosul has boosted the Iraqi regime, which has reasserted its national identity. While the Kurdish problem continues to divide the country, it does not threaten Iraq’s very existence.

* Vladimir Putin’s Russia has repositioned itself not only as a patron of Syria but also as a significant player in Middle East politics.

* The advent of the Trump administration in the United States has signaled that the decline in American involvement in the Middle East, which began under Barack Obama, isn’t a passing phase but an ongoing trend.

* Saudi Arabia has become the leader of the Sunni world in confronting Iran and its allies, leading the war against the Houthis in Yemen and the sanctions against Qatar.

* Egypt is once again fulfilling a role in the Arab world, both on the Syrian front and against Hamas in Gaza.

Along with all this, one can still point to key issues that haven’t changed this year. Civil wars continue in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Violence could erupt in Morocco and the Palestinian areas.

Syria – both because of its geostrategic position and the many players operating in that country – remains the focus, while wars on the periphery (Libya and Yemen) continue to bleed far from the media’s eye, despite the humanitarian disasters there. The problem of refugees and displaced persons as a result of these wars is still keeping the region and the world busy. There were over 5 million Syrian refugees and 23 million displaced persons in the region at the end of 2015.

Six years after attempts to establish democratic regimes, the Arab world (save for Tunisia) continues to decline in Freedom House’s rankings. The human rights situation in every Arab country (again besides Tunisia) is worse than it was during the previous regime. Arab countries in general still suffer from political instability.

According to the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index for 2017, five of the most fragile states in the world are Arab (Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria and Iraq, in that order). Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suffered the biggest decline – 20 slots in the stability ranking. Still, certain Arab states were actually stable, headed by the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

Arab states have suffered an economic decline since the Arab Spring. Most of these countries are at the bottom of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and only Qatar (29th place) and the UAE (8th) have risen.

The Islamic State may have suffered territorial losses, but its ideology is still flourishing, as one can learn from the terror attacks in Europe. The Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry is still an important characteristic of regional politics, with Iran continuing to lead the Shi’ite camp and Saudi Arabia and Egypt leading the Sunnis. Another characteristic hasn’t changed – Hamas and the Palestinian Authority are still competing for leadership of the Palestinian people.

Hezbollah may have suffered heavy losses in Syria, but its influence in Lebanon and ability to threaten Israel remain robust. In parallel, the danger of a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas remains, and progress toward a peace deal with the PA isn’t on the horizon.

Preliminary forecasts of border changes in the region not only haven’t materialized, the borders seem more set than ever. If changes come, they will be within the borders of states; note, for example, the Kurds’ independence referendum this month, while they have declared autonomy in Syria.

The good news is that Israel faces no existential threat amid the Arab world’s problems. Moreover, the regional problems have served as a base for forging secret alliances between Israel and Arab states that don’t have diplomatic relations with it. The bad news is that Israel will continue to slog through the conflict, with every explosive incident (like at Jerusalem’s holy places) liable to lead to another uprising.

Even worse, seeing the struggles in the Arab world as an opportunity to strengthen Israel’s control in the occupied territories is a grave error that will exact a heavy price from Israel sooner or later. The harsh problems confronting the Arab world actually create an opportunity for Israel to solve the conflict under the best possible conditions from its perspective. Happy holidays? Not in the Middle East.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Happy Holidays? Not in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Briefing Summary: Israel-Jordan Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 21 Jun 2017 06:36:47 +0000

On 22 March 2017, the Mitvim Institute hosted Dr. Abdullah Swalha for a briefing on Jordan’s foreign policy and its relations with Israel. Dr. Swalha, founder and director of the Center for Israel Studies in Amman, discussed the main challenges that Jordan is currently facing, fields of cooperation between Israel and Jordan, sources of tensions between the countries, public opposition in Jordan to cooperation with Israel, Jordan-US relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This document summarizes the themes discussed in the briefing, which was held at the Jerusalem Van Leer Institute

הפוסט Briefing Summary: Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation?

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 02 Jan 2017 10:27:14 +0000

Turkey and Israel have finally restored diplomatic relations based on a reconciliation deal signed on June 28, 2016, following six years of a tumultuous negotiation process.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Terror Hits Turkey

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 02 Jan 2017 07:44:46 +0000

The New Year’s Eve attack in Istanbul does not bode well for 2017 in Turkey, signifying the continuation of the rise in terrorism the country has been experiencing in the past few years. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2014, 20 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Turkey, and in 2015 that number jumped to 337.

The trend continued in 2016. Terrorist attacks were carried out in central and symbolically significant places in Ankara and Istanbul, including the central pedestrian street, the airport, a soccer stadium and now a high-end nightclub. Turkey currently has the highest number of terror victims of any OECD country, and a solution to this issue is not yet on the horizon.

Terrorist attacks in Turkey in recent years have been carried out by two main perpetrators: the Islamic State group, in protest against the campaign Turkey is waging against it in Syria and Turkey’s cooperation with the international community on that front; and the Kurdish resistance, in a call for Kurdish independence and in protest against Turkey’s military efforts to distance the Kurds from its Syrian border. While the Islamic State attacks are mainly aimed at civilians and tourists, the Kurdish resistance directs its attacks mainly against members of the Turkish security forces.

The growing motivation of both these groups to carry out attacks against Turkey, alongside their easy access to the country in light of its long borders with Syria and Iraq, form the basis for the dramatic rise in terrorism in Turkey. Additionally, Turkey’s growing involvement in events in Syria, including in military operations that Turkey had avoided in the early years of the conflict, contributes to this situation and increases the desire and the sense of urgency among its enemies to carry out attacks against it, on its territory.

The Turkish defense establishment has had difficulty responding to this phenomenon so far. The consequences of the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last July, including the arrests of military and police officers, are not making it any easier to deal with the problem.

In a speech Erdoğan gave on December 31, before the nightclub attack, he stated that his country was facing a “new war of liberation” against the challenges of terrorism. After the attack, he stressed that terrorism in his country is also related to regional events, and that Turkey is determined to eradicate it.

Nevertheless, Turkey is required to deal with these challenges at a time of ongoing tension between it and its traditional Western allies. While Turkey enjoys security cooperation with these countries by virtue of its NATO membership, it seems this is not enough.

Given this reality, some in Turkey expect that the reconciliation with Israel will help with the war on terrorism. Although the Israeli government is highlighting natural gas as the central factor in its decision to normalize relations with Turkey, Turkish interests are also focused on renewed security cooperation with Israel, as revealed in a policy dialogue conducted in Turkey at the time of reconciliation by the Mitvim Institute and the Global Poitical Trends Center, think tanks focused on regional foreign policies.

The New Year’s Eve attack in Istanbul included Israeli victims, for the second time in the past year. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin offered condolences in Turkish. New ambassadors were posted in Turkey and in Israel about a month ago. The infrastructure for a new chapter in the relationship is already in place. Hopefully, this chapter will not be primarily characterized by shared bereavement and a war on terrorism, but by regional cooperation and the pursuit of peace.

הפוסט Terror Hits Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 23 Sep 2016 17:15:00 +0000

Do not write off states as power brokers in the Eastern Mediterranean maritime arena just yet. It is easy to do so. Great powers (past, present and aspiring) as well as non-state actors seem to have eroded the centrality of regional state actors in shaping the region’s maritime security environment in the last few years. Russia – both a past and an aspiring great power – revived the Soviet era fifth Eskadra (flotilla), which includes a permanent force of 10-15 vessels. Moscow further announced that it would be sending its sole aircraft carrier in the fall for a few months to the region. The deployment supports the Russian mission in Syria. It also allows Moscow to show off its technological prowess. On December 8, 2015, the improved Kilo Class diesel electric submarine Rostov on Don, operating in the Mediterranean, was the first-ever Russian submarine to fire operational Kalibr submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) while submerged, targeting Raqqa, the ISIS de-facto capital in Syria. More broadly, coupled with Russia’s energized relationship with Egypt and Israel and recently with Turkey, the deployment signals Russia’s reemergence as a regional power broker. The United States offered a response of sorts, by deploying for the first time in years, two carrier Strike Groups – Truman and Eisenhower – in the region for several weeks in the summer of 2016.

In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities in Greece, Israel, and Egypt, in the last few years. China is also building its first overseas naval station in Djibouti. These moves are part of Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road vision, and will allow it to further secure its crucial sea line of communications to Europe. China’s maritime actions in the region signal that it accepts the responsibilities of a rising world power. In the spring of 2015, its naval forces evacuated not only hundreds of Chinese citizens, but also hundreds of other nationals from war-torn Yemen. There are also early signs of a more direct Chinese military and naval involvement in the region. In August 2016, a Chinese admiral visited Syria, and a month earlier China completed the delivery of a third corvette to the Algerian Navy. The Chinese also conducted a joint drill with the Russians in the Mediterranean in May 2015.

Global superpowers like China and Russia are not the only ones to pose a challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Several sub-state armed groups share the stage. Back in 2006, the Lebanese Hezbollah damaged an Israeli naval vessel, killing four sailors, when it effectively fired a land-sea c-802 missile at the Israeli flagship Saar 5 Class corvette INS Hanit. In recent years, Islamist groups have attacked a merchant ship in the Suez Canal and Egyptian navy vessels on the Mediterranean coast. A senior NATO official expressed concern earlier this year that an even graver threat will evolve in the central Mediterranean, following the expansion of ISIS in Libya.

Yet, states are still important in the maritime regional security architecture. American engagement in the region has waxed and waned since their navy operated against the Barbary pirates in the early 19^th century. In the latest chapter of American naval power projection in the region, the 6^th Fleet presence declined dramatically. At least for the US and China, and to a lesser extent even Russia, the eastern Mediterranean is a peripheral region, far from their core interests. Unlike great powers, local actors will remain engaged in the region due to the dictates of geography. For the regional actors, defending their shores and their sea lines of communications is a core interest: Not only because they are here to stay, but the discovery of offshore gas beginning in the 1990s raises the stakes for Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and possibly other regional actors. Indeed, regional actors have been building their naval capabilities, including power projection abilities in the last few years. In 2016, Israel received its fifth (out of six) German-built diesel submarines. A year earlier it signed a deal with the same German shipyard to purchase four multitask corvettes. In June, Egypt took delivery of the French-built Mistral class landing helicopter dock, and is expected to receive a second one by the fall. This year Egypt also began the local construction of the first of four French-designed Gowind Corvettes, purchased marine helicopters from Russia, commissioned a missile corvette donated by Russia, and a FREMM class French-Italian frigate. Talks of a possible deal for two more French corvettes commenced in 2015. Egypt also took delivery of two American fast missile boats during the summer of 2015, completing an order for four. Cairo also purchased from the United States submerged Harpoon missiles for its submarine fleet.

Similarly, the Turkish Navy, a nine-century-old institution – continued the expansion of its power projection capabilities. In April 2016, Ankara opened an overseas military base in Qatar, which will include naval units. A Turkish shipyard began in May the construction of a landing helicopter dock (LHD) to be completed by 2021. President Erdoğan hinted that his country would move to construct a fully-fledged carrier in the next decade.

Robust regional navies suggest both risks and opportunities. On the risk side, growing naval prowess enhances the chances that an escalating regional conflict can turn violent. Turkish self-confidence on the seas, for example, can lead Ankara to take an even more assertive position over Cyprus’ gas prospecting. In turn, this can affect great powers by forcing them into conflicts they would rather avoid. A possible Hezbollah-Israel clash, for example, might expose the American forces operating in the region to allegations that they support the Israeli effort by virtue of the American-Israeli alliance. Strong regional actors could also humiliate, and even constrain, great power activity. Back in 1968, The Israeli Airforce shot down Soviet jets over Egypt, and more recently it was Turkey that downed a Russian jet. Both events embarrassed Moscow, and in effect, presented a constraint of sorts on its freedom of action.

Effective regional navies also create opportunities. They can serve as allies. After all, three strong regional navies – Egypt, Turkey, and Israel – have solid (though at times, strained) relations with the United States. As such, they can offer a compensation of sorts to the limited presence of the US Navy in the region. Even if not fully-fledged allies of the United States on the waters, some of the regional powers, notably Israel and Turkey, surely share America’s concern over the anti-access/area denial “bubble” the Russians created on Syria’s shores. This is fertile ground for cooperation.

Therefore, although external powers are yet again active in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and despite being challenged by non-state actors from below, regional states still matter in shaping the maritime security environment. The increased capabilities, and expanded reach of the Egyptian, Turkish, and Israeli navies coupled with the Russian and American presence in the region, as well as Chinese ambitions there, all create a more complex environment. In a final analysis, this complexity presents opportunities for the United States, as most of the strong regional actors are closer to Washington than to Moscow. This remains the case, even with the current glitches between the United States and its traditional allies Turkey, Egypt and Israel. If Washington plays this new iteration of a maritime regional “great game” well, it has much to benefit. However, in order to exploit the potential benefits of the relationship with regional states, Washington needs to re-build trust with these regional actors. A clear signal from Washington that the East Mediterranean remains a high priority for the United States, would be a good start.

(originally published by the Hoover Institution)

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now?

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 11 Jul 2016 16:00:53 +0000

After years of negotiations that produced sporadic headlines but few results, Israel and Turkey finally reached terms for reconciliation on June 27. While relations will not return to the “love affair” of the 1990s, there is reason for cautious optimism. Rapprochement will serve to create the foundation for a stronger dialogue between two of the Middle East’s most important actors.

As part of the deal, Israel will deposit $20 million in a Turkish bank account as compensation to the families of those who died during the I.D.F. operation to seize the Mavi Marmara in 2010. In return, Turkey will drop the lawsuit against four senior Israeli officers deemed responsible for the operation. Turkey will also be allowed to play a more central role in supplying humanitarian aid to, and supervising the development of basic infrastructure projects in, the Gaza Strip. Shipments, however, will still be inspected at Israel’s Ashdod port prior to transport via the Erez Crossing—the first of which arrived this weekend. Finally, both sides agreed to exchange ambassadors in the coming weeks.

Analysis of the deal has been skeptical; rapprochement does not change the underlying fact that Turkey continues to support Hamas, an organization committed to Israel’s destruction. One does not need to be an expert in order to predict that the next round of violence in the Gaza Strip—more of a when than an if—will put the deal’s resilience to the test.

But the fact that the two sides reached an accord suggests that differences over Gaza are taking a backseat to more pressing matters. Many didn’t believe that the deal would happen, and yet it did.

For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel is the first step to reversing a failed foreign policy that led to its regional isolation. It is no coincidence that the final round of negotiations began shortly after Turkey downed a Russian jet along the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, or that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued an apology to Moscow shortly after signing the deal with Israel. Increased security cooperation, enabled in part by Ankara’s decision to lift its veto of a permanent Israeli mission to NATO, should contribute to Turkish efforts to contain ISIS as well as joint Israeli-Turkish interest in limiting Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel is also concerned with regional instability, yet its desire to export natural gas seems to be an equally dominant incentive. Of the multiple export options available to Israel, none are more financially viable than the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey. The obstacles standing before a project of this kind are many: a pipeline would run through Cypriot territorial waters and therefore requires Nicosia’ approval; the global energy market could continue to plummet thereby reducing investor interest; and, of course, bilateral ties could collapse again prior to a hypothetical pipeline’s completion. However, given the degree to which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the deal’s impact upon Israel’s future energy security, there can be little doubt as to its centrality in this story.

Deep distrust remains on both sides. Israel and Turkey share many overlapping strategic interests, but they prioritize them differently. Regional challenges such as the Syrian civil war, and the threat of ISIS are not necessarily a source of cohesion. Yet in the last few months, both sides engaged in a public relations campaign in order develop the necessary goodwill for reconciliation. This is likely to continue in the coming months.

Forging a new narrative requires the implementation of a multi-tier process that includes the diversification of official channels that enhance Israeli-Turkish strategic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Civil society actors will play an important role in bolstering these efforts and increasing people-to-people dialogue. Each country’s business community, indirectly responsible for keeping the possibility of reconciliation alive during this period of diplomatic tension, must also be vocal partners in defining the future of the relationship.

Most importantly, Israeli and Turkish leaderships must create a mechanism that will allow them to effectively manage future conflicts. Throughout the decades, Israel-Turkey ties have often been impacted by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But whereas previous Turkish support for the Palestinian cause was limited to diplomatic rhetoric, patronage under Erdogan and the A.K.P. became increasingly proactive, particularly in Gaza, necessitating a reevaluation of the relationship between Turkey and Israel.

As long as Turkey’s relationship with Hamas remains political, détente could provide a window of opportunity to rebuild the Gaza Strip. As revealed a few days after the signing of the deal, Turkey will be permitted to transfer funds to banks in the Gaza for the purpose of financing projects previously approved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Plans are already underway to build a desalination plant and power station. Basic infrastructure projects not only improve the daily lives of Gazans, but also could stave off future conflict between Israel and Hamas by creating a valuable channel of communication that runs through Ankara.

Why should the United States support this process? After all, Erdogan and Netanyahu are persona non grata at the White House these days. Neither has been particularly supportive of President Barack Obama’s Middle East policies, and that may not change after he leaves office in January. However, American security interests are dependent on Washington’s ability to cooperate with and lead its allies. Now that the reconciliation process has confirmed the sources of Israeli-Turkish tension and mutual interest, the next administration will be better positioned to incentivize cooperation over discord.

Rapprochement signals the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. But as emphasized by Israel’s lead negotiator with Turkey, Joseph Ciechanover, the deal only planted a “seedling”. Both parties come away from the reconciliation process with a better understanding of one another’s interests, and therefore will be better adapted to repair and cultivate this partnership going forward. The future of the relationship will be determined by how the two sides choose to care for and grow their partnership, hopefully with an eye toward not only their immediate interests, but also the long-term prospects for peace in the region.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Erdogan keeps changing the rules of the Turkish political game

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 07 May 2016 15:47:54 +0000

Ahmet Davutoglu was apparently the ultimate crony. He has served since 2003 as Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political right-hand man, first as foreign policy adviser to the prime minister, after 2009 as foreign minister, and since 2014, with Erdogan’s election as president, as prime minister himself. It was no wonder, therefore, that the prevailing attitude towards Davutoglu was as a marionette controlled by the president from his opulent new home in Ankara. And yet, this was insufficient for Erdogan. He decided to replace Davutoglu with another prime minister, who was of course even more loyal.

It has been 14 years since a coalition government ruled Turkey, and this is having visible effects. A political culture of compromise and flexibility has given way to an increasingly centralized regime, which is taking aggressive steps against political rivals and is working to silence critical voices in the media and civil society. Erdogan seeks full control over Turkey. He does not at the moment have the ability to change the governing system from parliamentary to presidential because of the absence of a parliamentary majority. But this is in fact already happening. The process led by Erdogan to replace Davutoglu is another step in a general change to the rules of the game that is Turkish politics.

No truly fundamental, ideological, or political disagreement erupted between Erdogan and Davutoglu and led to the prime minister’s stepping down months after leading his party to a clear election victory. Their disagreements, which began to sprout visibly over a year ago, centered on attempts – while very limited – by Davutoglu to give real meaning to his role as prime minister. One example was Davutoglu’s (failed) endeavor in 2015 to make Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, a member of parliament, against Erdogan’s wishes; another was Davutoglu’s recent, overly prominent role in the successful negotiations with the European Union on handling of the Syrian refugee crisis.

All this was not to President Erdogan’s liking, which was seen in the Justice and Development Party’s decision early this month to withdraw from the prime minister the authority to make appointments within the party. This was the signal that symbolized the beginning of the end for Davutoglu’s term. And yet, Davutoglu refrained in his emotional farewell speech from challenging Erdogan. He emphasized their years-long friendship and promised to serve the party as a member of parliament.

Even if he does so in the short term, it’s likely that the tensions between the two will overflow at some point. Davutoglu is not the first of Erdogan’s partners to find himself on the other side of the fence. Other former leaders in the Justice and Development Party, including some who helped found the party, have criticized Erdogan’s centralized behavior and his retreat from the path that characterized the party when it originated. Former president and foreign minister Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister Yaşar Yakış, and former deputy prime minister Bülent Arınç, have all come out at one point or another against moves championed by Erdogan. And yet, despite rumors in the past about the possibility of the creation of a new party out of those religious-conservative circles, not one of them has chosen so far to run against Erdogan in the political arena. It is possible that in the short term, Davutoglu’s resignation will further reinforce this group.

The Turkish plan: zero problems with neighbors

Davutoglu’s resignation also symbolized the end of an era in Turkey’s foreign policy. He joined politics after an academic career as a professor of political science, during which time he wrote extensively on his ideal Turkish foreign policy. His thick volume provided guiding principles and arrangement for Turkey’s desired conduct on the international stage. As foreign minister, Davutoglu worked to implement the paradigm he had developed. He steered Turkey’s foreign policy away from the conservative character that had characterized it for decades and towards a pro-active, ambitious approach.

Davutoglu worked to situate Turkey as a major country on the global stage, one implementing a multi-regional foreign policy. He worked to transform it into a leading actor in the Middle East, based on Ottoman heritage, and to create a reality in which Turkey has “zero problems with the neighbors”.

At the beginning of his term as foreign minister, Turkey indeed succeeded in attaining achievement on the regional and international stages. But later – particularly after the ebbing of power held by political Islam in the Middle East and the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from the Egyptian presidency – Turkey found itself more isolated and uninfluential.

What’s more, the aggressive policy towards Syria championed by Davutoglu, consisting of a commitment to topple Assad, did not yield positive results. Quite the opposite. Not only did Turkey fail to attain its stated goals in Syria, the ramifications of the Syrian war have exacted mounting security, economic, and social costs.

Just at the moment that Turkey’s foreign policy is seen as having failed, Davutoglu managed to supply his final diplomatic achievement, which may have helped hasten his downfall. Davutoglu, seen as of late as a likeable and respected dialogue partner (relative to Erdogan) by Western leaders – especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel – had a central role in arriving at the agreement with the European Union on Syrian refugees.

This agreement included a historic European commitment to Turkey to cancel the visa requirements for Turks traveling to EU nations. It was a commitment that Turkey did not receive even in the days of the great democratic reforms that Erdogan supported during the first half of the prior decade.

The irony is that Davutoglu, who as foreign minister was suspected by the West to be working to distance Turkey from its traditional pro-Western policy, is with his resignation receiving accolades from the West. And yet, the main concern in the West – and among many in Turkey – is not necessarily the change of prime minister. After all, Davutoglu is still seen as obedient to Erdogan, and so his replacement will be. The concern is over the additional erosion of Turkish democracy, which is guided by the nation’s president and is becoming more difficult to bring to a halt.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Erdogan keeps changing the rules of the Turkish political game הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 28 Nov 2015 07:56:00 +0000

Some 100 representatives of approximately 75 leading think tanks and research centers from across the Middle East, North Africa and the European Union (EU) gathered on 8-9 October 2015 in Milano to review Euro-Mediterranean relations. Dr. Nimrod Goren participated on behalf of the Mitvim Institute.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

How can Israel help the Syrian people?

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 28 Sep 2015 07:46:13 +0000

The fact that Israel came into existence at the expense of a Palestinian state has been the cause of much hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors and was the reason for many armed conflicts between them. However, the revolutions and armed struggles that have erupted across the Middle East in the last few years, including the Syrian civil war, have reshaped alliances across the region. These violent clashes have overshadowed the Palestinian refugee problem, which was created as a result of the establishment of the State of Israel.

הפוסט How can Israel help the Syrian people? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 28 Aug 2015 07:42:09 +0000

Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Straddling the East-West Divide: A Subjective Israeli Perspective on Muslim Immigration to Europe

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 28 Jul 2015 07:35:33 +0000

Israelis’ perception of the phenomenon of Muslim immigration to Europe is characterized by trepidation that is deeply rooted in the shared history of Jews and the peoples on the European continent. A departure from ethnocentric preconceptions has the potential to reveal positive perceptions and attitudes that could relate to the current wave of Muslim immigration.

הפוסט Straddling the East-West Divide: A Subjective Israeli Perspective on Muslim Immigration to Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 27 Jul 2015 09:12:02 +0000

Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004.

The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman) has the opposite interest of downplaying this threat.

History is familiar with the analogy of the 1938 Munich Agreement, in which Chamberlain and the West capitulated to Hitler but failed to prevent World War II. Yet history is also familiar with efforts to demonize the enemy that were subsequently understood to be exaggerated, if not outright baseless. For example, Israel and the West turned Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s into the Hitler of the Arab world, and according to Israeli intelligence and media sources of the period, the influence of Egypt and Nasser’s pan-Arabism pervaded the entire Arab world, including Iraq, Syria and distant Yemen. Subsequent historiography of the period shows that Nasser’s capabilities were much more limited than the grandiose powers ascribed to him. An assessment of Iran’s true power and regional influence must surely be sober rather than demagogic.

The latent dimension of Iran’s regional influence involves the future of Syria. The keystone of Iran’s strategy in the Arab Middle East is its capacity to support Bashar Assad’s regime. The Iranian-Syrian alliance, which has been in place for over three decades (with a brief interruption during the Gulf War), has become a major axis of regional politics. This is not a “natural” alliance in the respect that it is based on Iran’s cooperation with an Alawite minority regime rather than a broad Shi’ite social foundation. Syria’s significance stems from its geo-strategic location in the heart of the regional system, rather than from any economic resources that it offers. “Whoever would lead the Middle East must control Syria,” wrote esteemed journalist and historian Patrick Seale in the 1960s.

Indeed, harking back to 1950s when Syria became the focus of global and Arab Cold War struggles, at least five powers have competed for control over Syria since the outbreak of the civil war there in 2011: Iran and Russia (through the Alawite regime), the West (through the Free Syria Army), and two jihadi Sunni organizations – IS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

In view of the highly unreliable information from the field, it is difficult to predict what will happen in Syria, or whether it will maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Clearly, Iran’s success in preserving Syria’s Alawite government would be a significant accomplishment and reinforcement of the radical Shi’ite alliance in the region. Assad’s fall, on the other hand, would be a fatal blow to Iran’s regional influence by creating a vacuum in the Shi’ite Crescent, and would also weaken Hezbollah as well as Iran’s influence in Iraq. We can borrow from then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s famous 1992 phrase “It’s the economy, stupid,” and state with equal gusto that in post-nuclear-agreement Middle East, “It’s Syria, stupid!”

Since the Western alternative in Syria now appears to be less probable, the West, including Israel, faces a dilemma regarding whether to support Syria – backed by the demonized Iran – or to bet on an alternative regime, with the risk of chaos, anarchy and even territorial changes. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would prefer to get rid of Assad at all costs, while Egypt has decided to prop up the Assad regime. Indeed, one may wonder whether the potential rise of IS or another radical Islamic entity in Syria might be an even more destructive scenario than the Iranian “threat.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Turkey: The almost mediator state

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 18 Jul 2015 08:45:19 +0000

Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An opportunity that would not be seized

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 17 May 2015 09:18:55 +0000

The post-Arab Spring period, which witnessed the collapse of dictatorial regimes, the eruption of civil wars and the possible disappearance of several sovereign Arab states, created opportunities that might be seized for progress in different directions. One possible direction involves Israel and its relations with the Palestinians and the moderate Arab countries.

Israel has never been in a more opportune position to advance its aims in the region. In the recent election campaign, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expediently emphasized the threats looming from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS), al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. A more realistic analysis would, however, reveal that Iran is a remote threat in any case; Hamas – squeezed between Israel and Egypt – is preoccupied with its own domestic problems in Gaza; Hezbollah is heavily committed to the Syrian front; and IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other splinter groups do not consider Israel their immediate enemy. Moreover, Israel’s longstanding threat from what was once called the Arab Steadfastness and Rejection Front – the main Arab coalition rejecting peace with Israel – is no longer viable: Iraq, Syria and Libya are bogged down in civil strife and their very survival is in jeopardy; many of the PLO groups are no longer relevant (such as George Habbash’s PFLP and Ahmed Jibril’s PDFLP), and Fatah has largely transformed itself into the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo Accords. In short, Israel does not face an existential threat from any of its immediate or remote Arab neighbors.

It is time for Israel to seize the opportunities that have presented themselves in the post-Arab Spring period. Recognizing that an opportunity exists is, of course, not enough: the parties to the conflict must seize it by extending an attractive offer to the other side. The new Israeli government would be well advised to move forward in two possible directions: one, advance Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state along 1967 borders, with mutually agreed territorial swaps; two, advancing multilateral Israeli-Arab negotiations, under the umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), with the same aim. Though the “Arab World” as we have known it no longer exists, the “dormant” and “dysfunctional” Arab League has, for example, recently sent forces to the Yemen civil war. Thus, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – the so-called moderate Arab countries – not only share with Israel mutual interests, but can also play an active role, as evident in the Yemeni case, in resolving the Palestinian problem.

Unfortunately, Israel’s new government has no intention of seizing this opportunity. The main aim of Netanyahu and his previous and current right-wing coalitions has been to “perpetuate the status-quo,” which is a euphemism for consolidating Israel’s hold on Judea and Samaria – the occupied territories.

This goal is pursued despite realistic assessments that indicate that such a course of action will slowly but surely cause Israel’s political, economic and even cultural ostracization by the international community, becoming a pariah state. A third Palestinian intifada may currently seem an unlikely possibility, but it cannot be ruled out, in view of the despair and frustration emanating from “no hope on the horizon.”

It is possible that under US, EU and other international pressure, Netanyahu will re-confirm his support, or even commitment, to the two-state solution, as proclaimed in his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. But declarations of this kind would be mere fig leafs for a policy that is effectively strengthening Israel’s control over the occupied territories. Such a declaration would be no different from the so-called peace plan that prime minister Yitzhak Shamir devised in 1989 in response to the first Palestinian intifada and the PLO’s recognition of UN Resolution 242 – a media public spin designed to placate the international community.

Future historians will surely lament the fact that the previous and current Netanyahu governments have completely ignored regional developments and the consequent opportunity to resolve the Palestinian issue, surely Israel’s thorniest foreign policy issue.

Israeli prime ministers have always bragged that they have “left no stone unturned” in their pursuit of peace. Regardless of the accuracy of these assessments, it does not seem likely that anyone is going to turn over the current stone in the near future.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity that would not be seized הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Turkey: The Almost Mediator State

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 26 Apr 2015 08:42:56 +0000

Most analysts consider Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to religious conservative movements like the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, the failures of the last few years must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey has insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the United States and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“Israel Benefits from the Collapse of Syria”

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 26 May 2014 10:12:54 +0000

In January 2014, as the second Geneva conference on the Syrian civil war was being conducted, Channel 9 and The Mitvim Institute’s Ksenia Svetlova interviewed Dr. Samir al-Taqi, a former advisor of Syrian President Bashar Assad and now a consultant to the Syrian opposition and the Director of the Orient Research Centre in Dubai. The interview was first broadcast on Dojd, a Russian television network, and then on Israel’s Channel 9. During the interview, al-Taqi guaranteed that the civil war in Syria has crippled the country’s ability to continue functioning as a unified state, and that Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries from its collapse.

הפוסט “Israel Benefits from the Collapse of Syria” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Obama dials down in the Middle East – but is it the right move?

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 10 Nov 2013 08:59:56 +0000

‘There’s a whole word out there, and we’ve got interests and opportunities in that whole world.” In one sentence, Susan Rice, the National Security Adviser, succinctly summed up the Obama administration’s latest efforts in shifting the focus outside of the Middle East.

Pundits, citizens, and policymakers alike are all familiar with the “Asia pivot” – the administration’s headline-friendly byword for reallocating resources and efforts that came about a few years ago. Now, in the midst of Egyptian despondency and Syrian dystopia, Obama appears geared toward dialing down, yet again, in the Middle East.

It used to be you could place America’s core interests in the Middle East in three categories: 1) democratization, or the spread of democracy; 2) the pursuit of the global war on terror; and 3) the unimpeded exchange of commerce (read: oil) out of the region.

To varying degrees depending on the presidency, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict floated in and out of these objectives. This was especially true with George W. Bush, who pursued both 1 and 3 in Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan, and in his second term the peace process.

So it was when Obama ascended to the presidency in 2008, and many assumed these core interests would remain. Certainly, Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo resonated with the democratization interest, and his increased drone campaign coincided with the war on terror.

Yet as events unfolded in the Middle East, Obama let these goals get away from him.

Indeed, as the Arab Spring unfolded, American interests increasingly became subverted by outside interests.

Nothing highlighted that more than the contrast in how the US approached Libya and Syria.

With Gaddafi, international pressure and opinion was overwhelmingly in support of a US-led no-fly zone, essentially handicapping the regime and boosting the rebels. In Syria, with global opinion less cohesive, the US was simply upended by Russia.

Intervening on behalf of the rebels in Syria coincided directly with the spread of democracy and the fight on terror that so dominated the political calculus for Bush; the contrast with Obama’s approach was sharp.

Even Israel’s hawkish stance on Iran, long a talking point in DC circles, has become a prominent fixture in Obama’s recent policy evaluation.

According to the same New York Times article quoted above, Rice has made it clear that the core interests for the remaining years of Obama’s tenure will be supporting the ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, limiting the Syrian violence, and resolving the Iranian issue. According to the article: “everything else will take a back seat.”

The focus, then, will be on the diplomatic front, with support mobilizing for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and for resolutions with Syria and Iran. But is this the right move for the US? In downgrading the US’s role in the region, does it leave a gap for another foreign entity to fill? Is it a high-risk, low-reward scenario? Or is it the right move for a nation with little to no domestic interest in intervening in the Middle East? Depending on who you ask, it’s a little bit of both. As Marc Lynch wrote, the US doesn’t really have to worry about any other foreign power getting involved in the Middle East. And for all of Russia’s diplomatic rhetoric, the Middle East is essentially the Miley Cyrus of the geopolitical arena: you don’t want anything to do with it but you can’t stop watching.

And so long as intervening in the Middle East is polling lower than Congress in the US, it is still going to be the safe bet, politically, to avoid any further involvement in the troubled region.

But on the strategic front, you don’t have to go far to find those who disagree with Obama’s shift.

Most notably, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who – when not visiting Egypt or sneaking into Syria – are adamant critics of Obama’s shift toward Asia.

In an op-ed written in The Washington Post, they criticize Obama for abandoning US interests in the region, including, among other things, a lack of support for the Free Syrian Army.

Clearly, it’s an issue that transcends politics in the US. For Obama, it’s almost a lose-lose scenario. Allocate resources and redouble efforts in the Middle East and suffer domestic reprisals, abandon the region and potentially risk adverse side effects that would be detrimental to any combination of US interests.

Perhaps if given a breakthrough on one of the main issues – Israel/ Palestine, Syria, Iran – Obama and Rice will feel comfortable refocusing their efforts on issues such as Egypt, or Libya, or the growing refugee crisis in Jordan. Or perhaps not.

As the past couple years have shown us, Obama has little tolerance for the Middle East, and why add to the grey hairs in the last years of his tenure?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Obama dials down in the Middle East – but is it the right move? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 05 Nov 2013 08:35:15 +0000

From tales of Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan revealing the names of 10 Mossad assets to Iranian authorities, to El Al being locked out of the Turkish market, it is hard to find a silver lining amid the darkening clouds of Israeli-Turkish relations.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Putin Doctrine

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 08:57:28 +0000

For more than a decade — after he replaced Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin and even during the time he had to serve as prime minister under his protege, Dmitry Medvedev — Russian President Vladimir Putin has systematically and consistently pursued a policy that can be labeled the Putin Doctrine. In a nutshell, Putin seeks to renew Russia’s status and influence in both regional and global politics and make the Russian Federation a great power again. To achieve this goal, he challenges and subverts America’s posture and interests, relying on three main components.

First, Putin orchestrated a comprehensive buildup in the Russian armed forces, using the growing revenue from the country’s energy resources, primarily natural gas and crude oil. For most of the 1990s, Russian policymakers were overwhelmingly preoccupied with political and economic survival, and the defense establishment was one of the main sectors that suffered. Salaries were not paid, bases in the former Soviet republics were abandoned, training was scarce, critical equipment was left to rust and operational preparedness reached an all-time low. Since the early 2000s, when Putin first took office as president, however, Russia’s military budget has tripled and, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it currently constitutes 4.4% of Russia’s GDP, or more than $90 billion.

Second, Putin was able to use a number of institutional platforms to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives he considered harmful to Russian interests. In 2003, before the Iraq war, for example, Russia was successful in blocking the Bush administration from getting a U.N. resolution passed to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. Today, as the Syria crisis unfolds and President Obama is seeking congressional approval for a limited punitive strike against Syria, Russia actively uses its veto power at the U.N. Security Council to preemptively obstruct any American attempt to gain international legitimization for such an attack. Russia follows the same pattern of behavior at the International Atomic Energy Agency when the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is discussed.

Third, Putin crafted an association of states that share his basic anti-American strategic vision for the international system. China has become Russia’s chief ally in frustrating Obama’s foreign policy goals. Whether it is Iran or Syria, the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit or the global economic crisis, Beijing and Moscow see eye to eye when it comes to the United States. Russia and China are devoted to a multipolar global power configuration that essentially means the erosion of American hyper-power and political predominance.

Putin has also exploited diplomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. For example, in 2003, during the Iraq war, he met with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac numerous times to coordinate their antiwar moves within and outside the United Nations.

In the beginning of his presidency, Obama sought to “reset” relations between Washington and Moscow. He even revised some controversial plans to deploy missile systems in Eastern Europe as a trust-building measure designed to appease Putin. Yet the fundamental objectives of the Putin Doctrine made these American gestures ineffective and, in fact, only bolstered Putin’s determination and tenacity.

Putin believes that the U.S. is economically and politically declining and that it is socially degenerating. Indeed, Putin sees the wariness among the American people and their political representatives in the case of Syria and thinks that this is more proof of U.S. weakness and indecisiveness amid Russia’s growing power and influence.

Regardless of the prospects of the Russian proposal to dismantle the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile — an initiative some observers believe is designed to split the White House, Congress and the American public — Putin has shown his diplomatic craftiness and strategic interests in reclaiming Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics. By positioning Moscow alongside the Bashar Assad government and forcing Obama to blink first, Putin showcased his personal leadership, resolve and willingness to confront the United States. We should expect to see more of this doctrine in action, perhaps in the case of Iran.

The Cold War ended more than two decades ago, but Putin has revived some traits of the Soviet empire, and his doctrine is the key to his success. The Obama administration should realize that Putin’s objectives are diametrically opposed to most American interests and come up with a doctrine of its own to deal with him if it wishes to maintain U.S. national interests over time.

(originally published in the LA Times)

הפוסט The Putin Doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If only Morsi had listened to Erdoğan

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 29 Aug 2013 08:32:48 +0000

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s September 2011 visit to Cairo was full of pomp and circumstance. Thousands of adoring Egyptians welcomed him waving Turkish flags and sounding their support. At the time, Time Magazine said Erdoğan was greeted “like a rock star.”

Two years later Erdoğan has become a persona non grata in Egypt. Following Morsi’s downfall, Erdoğan and other Turkish ministers lashed out at the Egyptian Army. Erdoğan considered Morsi’s ouster a blow to democracy and a betrayal of the popular will, and resolved that Turkey could not sit back as the violence in Egypt escalated.

Erdoğan sparks outrage in Egypt. He is perceived to be meddling in Egypt’s internal affairs and his conduct considered a breach of diplomatic protocol, aimed at further dividing Egyptian society.

As the tension mounted, Egypt also announced that it would deny Erdoğan access from its territory to the Gaza Strip. This supposed sanction may be a blessing in disguise for Erdoğan. Since 2011, Hamas leaders and residents of Gaza have been awaiting Erdoğan’s visit. Dates have been set, announcements made and plans approved – but the visit has yet to take place. Reasons vary, but Erdoğan’s inability to carry out his Gaza visit exemplifies the gap between Turkey’s foreign policy declarations and their implementation.

These recent tensions undermine one of the interesting post-Arab Spring coalitions. During Morsi’s term, Egypt and Turkey, two Western allies who, in the past, inhibited each other’s efforts to gain regional hegemony, began building an intimate relationship.

The rise of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was welcomed by Erdoğan. It was thus only natural for the AKP to invite Morsi to Turkey, as a guest of honor, at its September 2012 congress.

Turkey was delighted to lend a helping hand, promising Morsi’s Egypt unprecedented financial aid. The two nation’s militaries also began building closer relations. In November 2012, Erdoğan made another visit to Egypt; this time under the pretext of Israel’s operation; a crisis that also motivated Davutoğlu to visit Gaza while hostilities were still ongoing.

Davutoğlu coined the term “Axis of Democracy” to describe the emerging relationship between Turkey and Egypt. However, in a development evocative of the collapse of the strategic partnership between Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Turko-Egyptian partnership did not survive the upheaval in Egypt.

Erdoğan may have considered Morsi an ally, but he was not devoid of criticism of his policies. In his 2011 visit to Cairo, Erdoğan marked the path which he believed political Islam in Egypt should pursue, sparking resentment among Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. “I hope the new Egyptian regime will be secular”, he said, adding that while he personally was a Muslim, the nation which he headed was a secular one. “I recommend a secular constitution for Egypt,” declared Erdoğan, emphasizing that secularism was not an “enemy of religion.”

The roadmap that Erdoğan outlined was, in his opinion, the key to success, for a religious party aspiring to successfully rule over a country where the military establishment and a large portion of the public consider political Islam an enemy. Erdoğan’s attempt to do so in Turkey was successful. Morsi’s similar Egyptian endeavor was not.

In 2011, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood dismissed Erdoğan’s warning as an intervention in internal Egyptian affairs. “You cannot transfer the experience of other countries to Egypt,” responded the movement’s spokesman. Indeed, Erdoğan’s advice was not heeded and the policies Morsi implemented in its place contributed significantly to his ouster.

During his term as president, Morsi chose to follow in the footsteps of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister, who was overthrown in 1997 following a military ultimatum, after only one year in office. The perception of Morsi was that of a president with a decidedly Islamist agenda, who preferred to appoint members of the Muslim Brotherhood to key government positions and attempted to rapidly undermine the secular establishment.

Morsi was viewed as a president who had the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests and not those of the Egyptian people, at heart. This approach significantly contrasts that adopted by Erdoğan during his first years as prime minister. These days Erdoğan might miss Morsi, but he undoubtedly believes that had the Egyptian Prime Minister heeded his advice – his would have been a different fate.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט If only Morsi had listened to Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 20 Jun 2013 18:50:54 +0000

The Arab Spring was initially embraced with much enthusiasm and hope in the West. In Israel, however, it has been generally perceived as a threat to national security. Israel’s official policies towards the Arab Spring reflect these concerns. But recent regional developments should not be seen only through a negative lens. They also offer important opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy and for its regional standing, which Israeli decision makers should act upon.

1. Engaging with Political Islam: In contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish.

2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma can, in the long run, bring to power a Sunni legitimate regime that may be more amenable to peaceful relations to Israel. In the more immediate future, it signals the weakening of the anti-Israeli axis, led by Iran and Syria. Iran’s ability to project power on Israel’s immediate environment has undoubtedly declined. The Syrian crisis also offered Israel opportunities to improve ties with Jordan and Turkey. These opportunities have already been partially exploited over the past months. Israel and Jordan are tacitly coordinating their policy vis-à-vis the Syrian front, while Israel and Turkey are in the midst of mending their relations.

3. A New Sunni Coalition: The Arab Spring has changed the balance of power between the Sunna and Shi’a. The Iranian role in the Middle East has received a blow. Consequently, a new Sunni coalition seems to be emerging in the region, with Turkey and Egypt being central players, backed by the moderate monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. This Sunni axis and Israel have several common interests in the region: diminishing the Iranian nuclear challenge; containing the looming threats from Syria; and ending the stalemate on the Palestinian front, which might deteriorate into a third Intifada.

4. Engaging with the Arab Street: In the past, Israel has dealt mainly with Arab elites. Yet, the Arab Spring accentuated the role of the masses. Reaching out to them—be they secular or Islamic—is difficult for Israel. Yet, because of their growing importance, Israel should attempt—publicly or behind the scenes—to do just so. The Arab Spring empowered the common people and created an opportunity for self-expression of groups and communities. In this “new” Arab world, there is growing curiosity and readiness to challenge the conventions of the old regimes. These circumstances might just enable a new discourse on Israel and with Israelis. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track is a key to making best use of this opportunity.

5. Promoting Peace: The Arab Spring has put on hold the possibility of reaching peace with Syria. The Israeli-Palestinian track remains the only possible track for negotiations. In the absence of a bi-lateral breakthrough, Israel should use the Arab Peace Initiative (API) to break the ice. The allegation that changes of regimes following the Arab Spring has rendered the API meaningless is untrue. The 2013 summit of the Arab League clearly re-affirmed the API, and the results of the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Arab League leaders in May 2013 have made this even more evident.

The Arab Spring—in contrast to the prevailing Israeli view—does not only offer threats but provides opportunities as well. Israeli decision makers should take advantage of these developments in order to tap into regional processes and introduce a change in the traditional Israeli policy toward the Middle East, which has thus far been characterized by a policy of “prevention” rather than “initiation.”

(originally published in The Daily Beast)

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 18:55:27 +0000

The Arab Spring upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East started in Tunisia at the end of 2010, and subsequently spread into Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, triggering repercussions in a wide arc of Arab countries.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad.

Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.”

Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with Turkey, perhaps within a “new democratic axis of power” (the Turkish foreign minister’s phrase). Egypt has also come closer to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states that are deeply concerned (alongside Israel and Turkey) by the Iranian threat, as well as by the survival of the pro-Iranian regime in Syria.

With regard to Israel, despite hostile expressions by Islamic militants, Egypt’s President Morsi has appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas to end the IDF operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

To be sure, President Morsi has a vested interest to settle not only the Hamas-Israel conflict, but also the entire Palestinian-Israeli dispute. According to him, “The Palestinian issue is first priority for Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim States,” as he stated at the Islamic Solidarity Conference held in Mecca in August 2012.

Hashim Kandil, Egypt’s Prime Minister, noted at the Davos conference this January that his country expected that the new Israeli government would renew the peace process with the Palestinians for the sake of its own interests, and the interests of Egypt and the entire region. Like all Arab states and most Muslim nations, Egypt has continued to support, up to the present, the Saudi/Arab League peace initiative of March 2002.

As is well-known, this initiative, which has been recently approved again, offers Israel peace, security and normalized relations with all Arab countries, in exchange for Israel agreeing to the erection of a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as settling the Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. Resolution 194 (of December 1948). Israel has not yet accepted this unprecedented initiative, which has the potential to be a critical breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations.

Indeed, Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Why Israel Shouldn’t Consider a ‘Security Zone’ in Syria

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 18:47:04 +0000

With the chaos of the Syrian civil war escalating, tensions on the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line on the Golan Heights are running high. Israeli defense officials stated just over a week ago that they were expecting a complex terror attack on the Syrian front, though the identity of the would-be attackers was not discussed.

Israeli officials have also recently divulged that Israel had already taken a number of preventative measures, including the erection of a new electronic fence along the existing Israeli-Syrian line (announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu at the beginning of January) and the deployment of elite ground forces there.

A week before the terror threat statement, on February 3rd, the British Sunday Times reported that the IDF has drafted a plan to create a 16 kilometer-wide “security zone” on the Syrian side of the current ceasefire line on the Golan, presumably to enhance security on the Israeli side.

The term “security zone” has an all-too-familiar ring, as it recalls the similar concept Israel employed in Lebanon between 1985 and 2000. The situation in Lebanon at the time was comparable in some respects to the scenario Israel currently fears developing on the Syrian front: It was a civil war in a neighboring Arab country that spilled into a security threat to Israel’s north.

But these two challenges – Lebanon and Syria – are not identical. For one, the Lebanon arena of the 1980s and 1990s never included the type of weaponry that could still plausibly be used on the Syrian front. Further, Israel’s 15 year-long deployment in the “security zone” should give us reason to pause, before Israel rushes to create a new one in Syria.

Most of all, it is far from clear if the “security zone” in Lebanon was indeed necessary. At least from the early 1990s, if not earlier, Israel’s main foe in Lebanon was Hezbollah, and not the Palestinian organizations that had triggered Israel’s initial drive into Lebanon. Hezbollah, unlike the Palestinians, did not try to infiltrate Israeli territory but rather focused its efforts on the Israeli military personnel deployed in Lebanon.

This is an important difference, because the “security zone” was designed primarily to defend against possible infiltrations into Israel, but it was maintained at the cost of some 20 Israeli fatalities a year on average, even when no infiltrations were attempted. Indeed, to date, Israel’s defensive posture against Hezbollah is based on deterrence, not on an actual presence in Lebanese territory.

The second cautionary note from Israel’s 1985-2000 “security zone” experience in Lebanon is that it benefitted Hezbollah far more than it assisted Israel. The organization gained legitimacy, status, and power in the domestic Lebanese political arena, by portraying itself as the only true opposition to the Israeli presence in South Lebanon. By the time Israeli forces left Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah had become the most dominant organization in Lebanon with its own “state within a state” apparatus.

Less than two decades earlier, when Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon, Hezbollah did not even exist; in effect, Israel created the rationale for a resistance movement to its occupation of Lebanese land.

The comparison to today’s situation is clear: If Israel has direct military engagements with the global jihad forces, such as al-Qaida offshoots active on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, Israel’s actions might once again indirectly lead to the creation of an effective and highly motivated opponent, such as it has not yet faced in earnest on this front until now.

The third lesson to consider is the broad strategic outlook for Israel. By helping Hezbollah, indirectly, to build itself in Lebanon, Israel handed Iran a real lever over Jerusalem’s freedom of action. Various reports indicated that in calculating possible moves against the Iranian nuclear program, Jerusalem is affected by the possibility that Hezbollah will shell Israeli territory as it did in the 2006 war. We cannot anticipate now, who might face Israel in Syria, but we should consider the effects of this possible friction on Israel’s future freedom of action.

All this is not to say that the challenges on the Golan should be treated lightly. Israel may indeed face new threats in the wake of the demise of the Assad regime in Syria and will need to deal with them. Yet, as Israel learned painfully in Lebanon, some solutions merely lead to new, and more menacing, threats. A solution based on a “security zone” in all likelihood falls into this category.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Why Israel Shouldn’t Consider a ‘Security Zone’ in Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Syria as a Linchpin

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 09:14:04 +0000

In 1965, the eminent British journalist Patrick Seale published an important book titled “The Struggle for Syria.” Its main thesis was that anyone who wants to acquire dominant status in the Middle East must control Syria or have friendly relations with it. The primary reason for Syria’s importance in the regional system stemmed, in his opinion, from its geostrategic location in the heart of the Middle East. This status led, in the 1950s and ’60s, until Hafez Assad’s ascent to power in 1970, to the fact that Syria became a focus of both the struggles between Egypt and Iraq for hegemony in the Arab world, and between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Read the full article at Haaretz

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What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 23 Feb 2012 18:35:28 +0000

Since its birth in 1948, Israel has launched numerous preemptive military strikes against its foes. In 1981 and 2007, it destroyed the nuclear reactors of Iraq and Syria, operations that did not lead to war. But now, Israelis are discussing the possibility of another preemptive attack — against Iran — that might result in a wider conflict.

The public debate in Israel about whether Jerusalem should order a strike on Iran’s nuclear program is surprisingly frank. Politicians and policymakers often discuss the merits of an attack in public; over the past year, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have sparred regularly and openly with former Mossad director Meir Dagan, the most prominent opponent of an Israeli operation. But much of the conversation is focused on whether Israel should strike, not on what might happen if it does — in other words, the result on the “day after.”

Read the full article at Foreign Affairs

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