To counter public claims asserting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had no actual intention of implementing annexation, the Emirati leadership has emphasized that the Abraham Accords were the result of a diplomatic effort for the sake of the Palestinian people. The UAE presented Israel’s decision to halt the annexation as a quid pro quo for the normalization agreements and as the result of pressure the UAE exerted on the Israeli government.

Senior Emirati officials emphasized in the Israeli media the importance of halting annexation and of the Israeli and American commitments to do so under their agreement. The UAE thus set a red line in its relationship with Israel regarding future annexation attempts. The linkage between normalization with Israel and an end to the threat of annexation of Palestinian land signals a new stage in the UAE’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previously, the UAE was passive on the issue, supporting the Arab Peace Initiative from the sidelines. Now, it is leading a significant move positioning itself as an active player in this arena, despite its rift with the Palestinian leadership.

However, while annexation was defined as a clear red line in Israeli-Emirati relations, other issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain a gray area, for example, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank. Along with positive relations and flourishing cooperation, the UAE has been implicitly critical of Israel over its activities in the West Bank. In December 2020, the Emirati media gave wide coverage of the shooting of a young Palestinian by Israeli soldiers, and in February 2021, it reported on the decision of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate whether Israel had committed war crimes in the Palestinian Territories.

Additionally, the two countries share new economic relations, with many Israeli delegations visiting the UAE, including one representing the Shomron Regional Council, the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in the northern West Bank. In December 2020, the Shomron Council signed an export agreement with the UAE’s FAM Holdings. Such cooperation, however, is limited to the private sector, and UAE officials have yet to present clear positions on the purchase of settlement-made goods, ties with the settlements and, in general, the settlement enterprise. Nonetheless, the developing cooperation with Israel will presumably force the UAE to formulate such a policy, or at least to respond to initiatives relating to the territories.

The Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif issue is also considered a gray area in the Israeli-Emirati relationship. On August 31, 2020, during the first official Israeli delegation visit to Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed declared his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem.

IN OCTOBER 2020, senior Emirati representatives visited al-Aqsa Mosque and encountered angry Palestinians who cursed them and shouted at them to get out, an incident that inflamed tensions between the sides and could result in rethinking the sovereignty issue at the holy site. The incident prompted Israel to strengthen security at the site for visitors from the Gulf, but once tourism from the UAE and Bahrain opens up, the site could once again provoke friction in the trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Gulf states relationship.

Those following the UAE’s diplomatic declarations and activities undoubtedly noticed that in the initial three months after plans were announced to normalize ties with Israel, the Emirati leadership went out of its way to express its commitment to Palestinian national aspirations. The many statements on the issue could attest to its importance to the Emirati leadership as well as the concern over criticism of the agreement with Israel.

Given the precedent it set among Arab and Muslim states by forging full diplomatic relations with Israel, the UAE invested heavily in public diplomacy vis-à-vis its own citizens, the Palestinian people, and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the absence of dialogue with the Palestinian leaderships deprives the UAE of significant leverage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and forces it to choose roundabout channels to exert influence, for example, through Jordan, Egypt and the UN.

Jordan and Egypt serve as a mediating channel between the Emirates and the Palestinians, given their close relationship and importance to both sides, but most of the activity within these channels remains classified. The UN, on the other hand, serves as a public platform on which the UAE demonstrates its support of the Palestinians by providing humanitarian aid, for example, by coordinating Emirati medical equipment delivered to the Palestinians during the pandemic. Israel has now also joined these Emirati channels of influence, which provide it with a certain measure of involvement in the Palestinian arena, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and possibly in a future negotiating process.

According to Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, despite Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords, the agreements could actually serve the Palestinian position in the conflict with Israel by:

1) Introducing a new paradigm for peacemaking.

2) Introducing new actors into the peace process, such as the Emirates, serving both Israeli and Palestinian interests.

3) Changing Israeli public opinion regarding the Arab world and the benefits Israel could derive from peace agreements, thereby boosting support for negotiations with the Palestinians. This narrative serves as the UAE’s main argument in explaining its influence on regional stability and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – in both practical terms and in raising awareness.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has sought to spotlight its direct humanitarian contribution to the Palestinians (though not via UNRWA), its relationship with the Palestinian community in the Emirates, its intention to develop new economic channels for the Palestinians and, as mentioned, its commitment to the Palestinian people and to the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

The Emirati leadership’s key message is that its decision to forge ties with Israel was designed to benefit peace, but not at the expense of the Palestinian issue. At a UN Security Council debate, the UAE urged all sides to harness the momentum created by the peace agreement with Israel for renewed negotiations with the Palestinians. With this message, the UAE is outlining its role within the new paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations and the new rules of the game it has defined.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 10th 2021.

הפוסט A look at UAE policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This was not the first time that Saudi officials had harshly criticized the Palestinian leadership for consistently missing historic opportunities to resolve the conflict, but until now they have not done it publicly. The contacts between Riyadh and Jerusalem are perceived by part of the Saudi public as a betrayal of the Palestinian interest, which plays into the hands of the regime’s opponents. Therefore, the royal family should prove that it is not abandoning the Palestinian struggle in favor of normalization with Israel.

The Palestinian issue has never been at the top of the Saudi agenda, but it has been and continues to be, a restraining factor in Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards Israel. Historically, there have been moments in which the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia coincided, but they have never materialized into a dramatic change in the bilateral relations. The reason was the Saudi regime’s fear of harsh reactions on the part of the Arab world, which would undermine its public image and its religious status as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam.

However lately, as the Iranian threat increases, Israel has become a potential ally for Saudi Arabia. Not only do the two countries share the same view of the need to root out radical elements and stabilize the Middle East, but Israel is the only country in the world with the military intentions and capabilities required to fight common enemies. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on its strategic alliance with the United States, but in recent years the American administration’s willingness to intervene in the Middle East’s bloody conflicts has diminished, and Saudi Arabia has virtually remained without a tailwind to effectively curb Iran’s influence. In such circumstances, Israel has become a major player in changing the regional balance of power. Beyond its intelligence and strategic capabilities, Israel serves as an economic model for Saudi Arabia. As the Saudi economy is undergoing a revolution from being an oil-based economy to a productive and advanced economy, Israel’s knowledge and technology has become increasingly attractive.

The hidden potential in normalized Israeli-Saudi relations is enormous. On the strategic level, the bi-lateral relations are not symmetrical in view of Israel’s clear military superiority, but it does not diminish their importance. Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the Arab world could help Israel fight Iran and strengthen the security cooperation with other Arab countries. Nevertheless, Israel’s fear of advanced arms deals between Saudi Arabia and the United States and the possibility of developing Saudi nuclear weapons in response to Iranian nuclear weapons, should not be dismissed. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia could take advantage of Israeli intelligence on Iran and its Middle Eastern affiliates, as well as its defense systems (such as Iron Dome) and its advanced capabilities against Cyber-attacks.

At the diplomatic level, Israeli-Saudi cooperation can help mitigate explosive incidents, such as riots on the Temple Mount. In addition, it will pave the way for the promotion of economic, energy and agricultural projects between Israel and the Arab countries, which presently hardly exist at present. Already, the royal family is exerting pressure to convince the Palestinian leadership to be more flexible with their demands from Israel. Unlike the past, Saudi Arabia has withdrawn from its demand for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and is now talking about a logical solution. Thus, for example, the Saudis no longer support the Palestinian demand for the right of return, rather they seek a solution that will be acceptable to Israel as well. In addition, it does not condition the normalization of its relations with Israel on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and is willing to settle for a breakthrough in negotiations. As far as Israel is concerned, if Israel makes gestures, such as freezing settlements or removing (even partially) the closure on Gaza, that signal to the Arab world that it is willing to negotiate, Saudi Arabia will possibly reward Israel with more gestures.

At the economic level, if the regime removes the economic barriers and allows Israeli merchandise and labor to integrate into the Saudi economy, it will make a huge contribution to the Israeli economy, especially if other Arab countries open their gates to Israeli produce.

Saudi Arabia and Israel are interested in normalizing their relations. This is indisputable. However, despite the mutual will, it is still a long and winding road towards that goal. At this point in time, there is a chance that Saudi Arabia may succeed in bringing the Palestinian leadership to the negotiating table, but it cannot force it to sign a document in which the Palestinians waive their historical demands on Israel. Israel, on its part, does not show willingness to meet the Saudi threshold requirements. With the current coalition, any Israeli gesture toward the Palestinians would be seen as deviating from the ideological positions of the government.

As things stand now, the Israeli and Palestinian leadership are unable to bridge the gap between their positions, despite the American and Arab pressure. Therefore, the chances of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia are unclear. While there has been a dramatic change in the Saudi discourse toward Israel lately, it is doubtful whether the conditions for the Saudi leadership to leap over the Palestinian hurdle are ripe for normalization with the Zionist enemy.

Israel must do its best not to miss the unique window of opportunity that has opened in its relations with Saudi Arabia. Opportunities are deceptive and transient in the Middle East, therefore the common interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia may fade if the current circumstances change. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Israeli government is to restore its credibility in the eyes of the Saudi leadership. Normalization with Saudi Arabia will not be given for free. It has its price. The question is whether Israel is willing to pay it. The worst thing that the Israeli prime minister could do is to instill in the Saudis the feeling that he is ready to make concessions, and then to retract his statement. Saudi Arabia has been disappointed with the Israeli leadership in the past. It must not happen again.

Dr. Michal Yaari is an expert on Saudi Arabia from Tel Aviv University and the Open University and is a member of a task team at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research about Israel-Saudi Arabia relations, which was written as part of a Mitvim Institute project on “Israel’s relations with the Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: From Foes to Potential Friends הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Briefing Summary: Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There were three central points in Kerry’s plan that dealt with the question of Jerusalem:

The first issue raised in the speech concerns the principle that Jerusalem will be “the capital of the two states.” In addition, Kerry declared that “there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.” While Kerry was clear in his vision of Jerusalem as a shared capital of both states, he did not refer to the question of the division of sovereignty or the possible route for a border within the city. There is no reference to the principle suggested by Clinton, whereby Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would retain Israeli sovereignty, while the Arab neighborhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. It should be noted that the Clinton Parameters did not discuss the question of a “Palestinian capital” at all, but instead focused on the issue of division of sovereignty in East Jerusalem. However, in a speech delivered to the Israel Policy Forum in January 2001, on the eve of his departure from the White House, Clinton described the principles of a future agreement, stating that Jerusalem will serve as two capitals of two states.

The phrase “capital of the two states” was a major source of controversy during the recent round of Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2013-2014 led by Kerry to formulate a framework agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to discuss a compromise in Jerusalem and would not agree to recognize the principle of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians objected to the vague wording that Kerry attempted to promote. Kerry’s latest suggestion differs from Netanyahu’s position and incorporates recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states, but the ambiguous wording—which avoids delineating the territory in which the Palestinian capital would be established—is expected to arouse opposition amongst the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the wording of Kerry’s latest plan indicates that Jerusalem as the capital of two states will be internationally recognized. Indeed, the Kerry proposal emphasizes that this solution in Jerusalem will allow the international community to recognize, for the first time, the Israeli capital beside an international recognition of the Palestinian capital.

The second issue is the question of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Kerry’s proposal calls to protect the holy sites, to guarantee free access to them, and to preserve the status quo. These important basic principles have the support of the relevant parties and of the international community. However, even in this context, Kerry leaves several key questions unanswered and avoids outlining a solution for the Old City of Jerusalem. For instance, will an agreement entail joint management of this area, or an international regime? Kerry also does not address the question of sovereignty over the holy sites, one of the most divisive issues in the negotiations.

Kerry emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo in the holy sites, an issue with which he is deeply familiar. In October 2015, against a backdrop of tensions on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and increased violent incidents in Jerusalem, Kerry led diplomatic efforts between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan. These efforts facilitated a mutual understanding and a statement by Netanyahu, re-asserting Israel’s commitment to the status quo on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and to the policy that permits only Muslims to pray on the site, whereas non-Muslims are permitted to visit there but not to pray.

Kerry stated that the holy sites are sacred to billions of people around the world and asserted that the solution must take into account the needs of all three monotheistic religions, not just those of both parties. This wording stresses that the issue is important beyond the Israel-Palestine context and possibly hints at the need to integrate additional actors into a solution regarding the Old City and the holy sites. Indeed, this framework resembles Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 to establish an international framework for the administration of the “Holy Basin,” which would include not only Israel and Palestine, but also the US, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The third issue in Kerry’s speech was his declaration that “Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967.” This principle affirms that, alongside the agreement that the city would be shared as the capital of both sides, the agreed solution in Jerusalem would not include a strict physical division between the respective parts of the city, as was the situation prior to 1967, when a physical wall ran through the center of the city.

Two points may be made here. First, this position represents the long-standing American position, which has been presented consistently over many years. In December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a peace plan, which stated that Jerusalem should be a “unified city” within which there would be no restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. In addition, President Ronald Reagan’s peace plan in 1982 declared that “Jerusalem must remain undivided.” President Clinton voiced a similar position in a speech on the eve of his retirement from office. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State during the second Bush administration, also reiterated this position.

Second, this position overlaps with the idea of Jerusalem as an “open city,” which has been advocated by the Palestinians for many years. The Palestinians proposed this in the late 1980s and again during the Camp David process (1999-2001) and during the Annapolis process (2007-2008). President Abbas has spoken on many occasions about his vision of Jerusalem as an “open city” and a “shared city”. The Palestinian proposal suggests that, notwithstanding the political division of the city, Jerusalem would remain a single entity under a joint “umbrella municipality” with complete freedom of movement between both sides of the city. Over the course of previous negotiations, the Israelis rejected this proposal and stated that the two states needed to be separated by a clearly delineated physical border for security reasons, including within Jerusalem.

The issue of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Oslo Accords determined that Jerusalem is one of the core issues to be negotiated by the parties in the final status negotiations. It is impossible to achieve peace without an agreed solution to the question of Jerusalem, and every future serious diplomatic effort must address this issue. This will be a difficult endeavor considering the special sensitivities elicited by this question, as Kerry noted in his speech.

Moreover, the situation on the ground in Jerusalem does not remain frozen in time as one peace plan fails and new ones are presented. Since the Clinton Parameters, significant processes and moves have made the city even more complicated and explosive, ensuring that a negotiated solution to the problem of Jerusalem has also become more complicated and difficult. Nevertheless, the Jerusalemite poet Yehuda Amichai wrote that “In Jerusalem you should always hope for the good.” The positive vision presented by Kerry for the future of the city may encourage joint thinking about an alternative Jerusalem that may eventually translate into action.

(originally published in the Matzav blog)

הפוסט The Question of Jerusalem in Kerry’s Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Few, however, have paid much attention to the underlying processes propelling the parties inexorably toward impending catastrophe: growing Islamic anti-Semitism or Judeophobia in the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and accelerated Jewish Islamophobia in Israel and the Diaspora, on the other.

These destructive trends, which feed off each other, have intensified sharply since Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in June 1967. Israel’s triumphant return to Jerusalem’s religious heartland sparked heady euphoria in the Jewish world and deep trauma among Muslims.

A year after Israel’s occupation began, hundreds of religious leaders from all over the Muslim world convened at the al-Azhar Center in Cairo to craft a response. In addition to the staple anti-Zionist rhetoric, they unleashed a flurry of vitriolic anti-Semitic slurs. Jews, they declared, were treacherous, conniving monsters who deserved to die.

Secular Arab/Muslim leaders made similar public statements and from time to time called for jihad, or holy war, against the Jews and Israel. The same anti-Semitic tropes appeared in Arab school textbooks and in the media, often based on selective texts from the Koran or the Hadith prophetic tradition. Christian anti-Semitic writings, including blood libels, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and classics like the Merchant of Venice were also adduced to buttress the case against the Jews.

This murky anti-Semitic wave gathered momentum the more Israeli governments and extremist Jewish groups were perceived as undermining the sanctity of the Haram and the status of East Jerusalem. For example – the annexation of East Jerusalem by the government in 1967 and the Knesset in 1980; persistent Jewish settlement in parts of the city across the 1967 Green Line; the opening of the Western Wall tunnel by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996; Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, which helped to trigger the second intifada.

Parallel to the growing Islamic Judeophobia, radical nationalist and religious messianic trends were developing in Israel, especially among Jews in the national religious movement. The more radical among them advocate the building of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount on the ruins of the existing mosques. In the meantime they insist on the right to go up onto the mountain and pray, in violation of Israeli government agreements with the Muslim waqf, which administers Muslim holy places, including the Haram.

As it developed, national religious radicalism took on an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab character, partly for ideological reasons, and partly in response to Arab terror and Arab/Muslim anti-Semitism. This created a vicious cycle of mutual religion-based hatred, which came to a head with the abortive attempt by the so-called Jewish Underground, led by Yehuda Etzion, to blow up the Dome of the Rock Mosque on the Temple Mount in 1984.

This type of anti-Muslim radicalism is also the driving force behind more recent attacks on mosques and burning of Korans in the occupied territories and Israel proper by Jewish extremists. Israeli leaders, secular and religious, added fuel to the flames with a string of irresponsible declarations – for example, the late Shas leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef called Islam “an ugly religion” and an Israeli broadcaster referred to it on air as a “virus.”

In 1996, national religious rabbis exacerbated an already explosive situation when they challenged a longstanding rabbinical ruling forbidding Jews from going up onto the mountain and pray ing on its holy ground until the coming of the messiah. Since then thousands of Jews have entered the holy compound and prayed, to the chagrin of the Muslim authorities. In highly publicized acts of deliberate provocation, right-wing Knesset Members have also gone up onto the Temple Mount. In early September, Housing Minister Uri Ariel of the national religious Bayit Yehudi party visited the holy space, declaring that Jews should be allowed to pray there whenever they liked and calling for the building of the Third Temple.

Influenced by radical national religious leaders, dozens of organizations sprang up preparing for the rebuilding of the temple. They produced architectural plans, building materials, priestly vestments and programs for training young priests. According to recent public opinion polls, 30 percent of Jews and 45 percent of religious Jews in Israel support the rebuilding of the temple; 64 percent of Israeli Jews are in favor of Jews being allowed to pray on Temple Mount; and 80 percent support a united Jerusalem under Israel’s sole and eternal sovereignty.

Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital has been the position of most Israeli governments since 1967, which did virtually nothing to counter the growing Islamophobic and anti-Arab trends in Israeli society. Worse, Israeli leaders failed to show corresponding flexibility on Jerusalem after Muslim and Arab governments began to discard anti-Semitic and antiIsrael positions in the late 1970s.

Interestingly in 1978, then prime minister Menachem Begin was leaning toward the establishment of a Muslim “Vatican” on the Temple Mount and in East Jerusalem. But he changed his mind and consolidated the demand for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

Nevertheless, on several occasions the Arab side offered Israel a way out of the Jerusalem dilemma based on divided sovereignty and agreed arrangements for the holy sites. For years the kings of Jordan, who have special custodial status on the Haram, have made practical proposals. The Egyptians, too, have called for workable compromise. In November 1977, in his speech to the Knesset, then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat offered Israel peace on condition that it agree to Arab/Muslim sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Haram, excluding the Western Wall. And, in 1979, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Jad al-Haq, published a special fatwa, Muslim religious ruling, in this spirit.

Most importantly, in March 2002, all 22 Arab states backed the Saudi peace initiative offering Israel peace, security and normalization of ties on condition that it agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Shortly afterwards, all 35 remaining non-Arab Muslim states added their support. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also initiated a series of religious dialogues with the participation of Jewish clerics.

However, all Israeli governments, with the tacit exception of the Olmert administration in late 2008, never accepted the Saudi-Arab-Muslim initiative, not even as a basis for negotiation.

Israeli rejection of the Arab initiative has come at a price. It has already contributed to the intensification of Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamophobia, to strains on relations with Jordan and Egypt, to aggravated tension with Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, to international isolation and to the danger of a Muslim-Jewish religious war.

The writing is on the wall: To prevent escalation of the current wave of religion-motivated terror in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu needs to quash false rumors of plans to change the status quo on the Temple Mount. More importantly, on the strategic level, to preempt wider religious conflagration, he needs to move politically to reach an agreement on Jerusalem that takes Muslim sensitivities into account and gives Israel a chance for peace with most of the Muslim world.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Report)

הפוסט The writing is on the wall הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.