1. The Israeli government keeps thwarting regional and international mediation attempts to end the war and promote a hostage deal in accordance with the Biden plan, signaling that it intends to maintain a military presence in Gaza and refusing to discuss the “day after the war” – The Western and Arab world undertook efforts to promote a clear outline for ending the war in Gaza and implementing a hostage deal, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the re-entry of the Palestinian Authority, and initiating a clear political process to implement the two-state solution. Israel participated in various rounds of talks in Qatar and Egypt but steadfastly rejected Hamas demands to vacate Gaza and end the war. It also opposed the proposals for a reformed Palestinian Authority to replace Hamas and govern Gaza. Faced with opportunities to clinch a deal, Israel created obstacles, adding new terms and conditions (such as its insistence on a military presence along the “Philadelphi corridor”). Israel’s refusal to initiate or discuss post-war arrangements for Gaza placed it at odds with the rest of the world, contributed to renewing Hamas civilian control of the Gaza Strip and to the ongoing low-intensity war, prevented a hostage release deal, and signaled intentions to maintain a long-term presence in Gaza.

2. Israeli military action in Gaza and its deepening occupation of the West Bank result in international arrest warrants against the prime minister and defense minister, growing international allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and increasing ostracism – Israel moved to expel the Palestinian population of the northern Gaza Strip, while halting the delivery of humanitarian aid into the area (which was subsequently renewed to some extent under US pressure), and undertaking massive destruction of residential areas. Difficulties in the delivery of humanitarian aid due to the lack of an alternative to Hamas, the looting of aid trucks and risks to aid workers, together with the winter conditions, exacerbated the humanitarian disaster. Citing the scale of civilian casualties and destruction in Gaza, many international reports accused Israel of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. The International Court of Justice ruled that the Israeli occupation is illegal and must end as soon as possible, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant, and Israel’s failure to establish a state commission of inquiry into the events of Oct. 7 and treat suspected violations of international law led to an international drive to prosecute Israeli soldiers in other courts around the world.

3. The Israeli government accelerates annexation processes in the West Bank thereby precluding the feasibility of the two-state solution, and supports and encourages settlement and outpost expansion without public discussion of the issue or official decisions. International sanctions on settlers and the settlement movement fail to change course – The Israeli government continued implementing measures in violation of the Oslo Accords in order to deepen annexation of the West Bank without a formal decision and political and public discussion of the issue. These measures included designating thousands of acrs as state land, constructing settlements, and establishing outposts. They also involved transferring millions of shekels for settlement development, building strategic infrastructure in Area C, and weakening the Palestinian Authority through legislation and withholding funds. Other actions included legislation against UNRWA, supporting settler violence backed by the military to abuse and expel Palestinian communities, assuming civilian authority over Area B, and changing status quo in Jerusalem by promoting prayer on the Temple Mount and evicting Palestinians from East Jerusalem neighborhoods. The government continued its efforts to weaken the Palestinian Authority despite the anti-Hamas campaign the PA mounted in the Jenin area, with Israeli military and international support. Some Western countries, led by US example, imposed sanctions on individuals and organizations of the settlement movement, and attacked the Israeli government’s annexation policy, but failed to prevent the push for annexation.

4. Israel escalates the campaign against Hezbollah, and successful military operations severely damage it and lead the parties to agree to a ceasefire and re-implement Resolution 1701 – Israel disregarded US efforts to prevent escalation in the north and mounted massive strikes against Hezbollah. These strikes killed its secretary-general Nasrallah, dismantled the group’s chain of command, and severely damaged the organization. With American and French mediation, Israel and Hezbollah subsequently agreed to a 60-day ceasefire based on the terms of Resolution 1701. The parties began implementing the deal, with the Lebanese army deploying in the south of the country and the IDF starting to withdraw its forces. However, Israel continued attacking Hezbollah activities to reshape the rules of engagement from the outset, aiming to foil any signs of militia buildup along the border.

5. With the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel’s military moves to counter potential risks, but the government does little to take political and diplomatic advantage of the opportunities for cooperation with other stakeholders in Syria – with the collapse of the Assad regime Israel seized a buffer zone along the border in Syrian territory, including the strategically placed Syrian Mount Hermon, and announced that the 1974 Israel-Syria force separation agreement had collapsed. The military took advantage of the opportunity to destroy many of the Syrian army’s military capabilities. Regional countries condemned the seizure of Syrian territory, and Israel failed to exploit the opportunity to initiate diplomatic moves within the framework of the regional reshaping.

6. The Israel-Iran conflict is reshaped by direct attacks between the sides given the collapse of Iran’s proxies, pushing Iran towards a decision on its nuclear program – The blow to Hamas in Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah and its agreement to a ceasefire with Israel, the fall of the Assad regime, Russia’s resulting withdrawal from Syria, and the cessation of rocket fire by Iran-allied militias in Iraq, deprived Iran of significant capabilities to attack or deter Israel. Only the Houthis in Yemen intensified their attacks on Israel and continued to block the Red Sea’s maritime route. Iran launched a missile attack on Israel following the assassination of Haniyeh on its soil. Israel’s allies once again stood by it in repelling the attack, demonstrating the strategic potential of regional cooperation. Israel responded by targeting Iran’s air defense systems, leaving them vulnerable to further attacks, and attacked civilian infrastructure in Yemen. Amid Iran’s growing sense of vulnerability, indications emerged of a domestic struggle over the future of the country’s nuclear program – whether to pursue a nuclear bomb or an agreement with Trump’s United States.

7. Israel’s Arab allies are frustrated by its policy on the territories and the continued Gaza war, but nonetheless continue cooperating with it in the face of regional security challenges – Egypt tried unsuccessfully to mediate an end to the fighting in Gaza and bring about a hostage deal, accusing Israel of acting based on political considerations. Israel’s insistence on controlling the Philadelphi Route and the Rafah crossing, citing these as reasons to block a hostage deal, increased tensions between the two countries. Jordan expressed renewed concern about the change in the status quo in Jerusalem and the West Bank, leading to increased public pressure against its ties with Israel. The countries nonetheless continued their close security cooperation to counter Iran, while addressing the consequences of the fall of the Assad regime. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco did not sever relations with Israel, but refrained from promoting groundbreaking cooperation projects, while Saudi Arabia reiterated that it would not agree to normalize ties with Israel unless the war in Gaza ends and Israel agrees to a meaningful political process culminating in the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Abraham Accord states expressed willingness to assist Gaza’s reconstruction processes if Israel determines to resolve the Palestinian issue.

8. Israel benefits from an absence of European consensus on Gaza and the geopolitical changes that emphasize its equity, both of which blunt the harsh criticism of the war and violation of international law to some extent. The war in Gaza has become a political issue in the various countries that adopt an independent policy toward Israel, which in turn distances itself from criticism, and seeks more favorable places for connections among extremist and even neo-Nazi elements – The European Union attempted to play a significant role in ending the war and promoting peace in the region, while criticizing the death toll in Gaza and the continued Israeli occupation. Western European countries provided Israel with political and security backing, but also pledged to uphold international law including respecting the ICC’s arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, as well as to reduce arms trade with Israel. Israel closed its embassy in Ireland and cooled its relations and cooperation with Norway, while government ministers Redirecting its diplomatic efforts toward building connections with Eastern European countries and far-right parties and candidates. With the replacement of High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell with Kallas, Israel successfully lobbied for convening a meeting of the Association Council.

9. The crisis with Turkey deepens along its growing regional dominance, while Cyprus and Greece provide Israel with strategic depth – Turkey moved to expand its restrictions on trade with Israel, including blocking trade through third countries and the Palestinian Authority. However, oil imports from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Israel continued, as did Turkey’s use of Israel’s Haifa port to ship exports to the Gulf. President Erdogan came out against Israel’s policy in Gaza and Syria, seeking to isolate it on the global stage as his country increased its regional dominance with the fall of the Assad regime. Meanwhile, (and perhaps accordingly), Israel bolstered relations with Greece and Cyprus. While both countries affirmed their commitment to international law and Palestinian rights, they have also promoted security cooperation and arms trade with Israel.

10. Israel benefits from US cooperation, full security support and a political umbrella in international institutions, while sidelining US demands regarding an end to the war in Gaza, the promotion of a hostage deal, and easing the humanitarian crisis as it waits for Trump’s comeback – The Biden administration continued to support Israel’s security, the IDF and the US Central Command maintained close cooperation, with the US deploying deterrence forces and air defense systems, and forming an international coalition against Iranian attacks. The US adopted Israel’s position regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court. While pressing for improved humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, it refrained from taking a firm stance when Israel only partially complied, and failed to advance a hostage deal and an end to the war, as well as a plan for the “day after” in Gaza. Despite Biden’s unprecedented support for Israel, members of the Israeli government openly supported Trump during the campaign and hailed his re-election.

11. The world distances itself from Israel and Israel distances itself from the world – Despite positive formal relations between Israel and many countries, faced challenges including a negative immigration balance, and its ranking in the global democracy indexes declined from a liberal democracy to an electoral democracy. The major credit rating agencies downgraded Israel’s rating and issued a negative forecast for the state of the Israeli economy, which was reflected in a significant decline in foreign investment. Human rights organizations and international tribunals in The Hague condemned Israeli actions in Gaza and the Occupied Territories, and global efforts grew to locate and arrest Israeli soldiers abroad. The world’s major airlines suspended services to Israel due to the security situation, and public institutions and groups increasingly called for an end to cooperation with the country. Activist campaigns advocating an arms embargo on Israel grew louder, while Israel’s arms sales continue to flourish. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, weakened by declining influence, another ministerial change, and the resignation of key diplomats, chose to adopt a mostly aggressive and confrontational approach vis-à-vis governments critical of Israel.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. The world wants to end the war and implement a two-state solution within a regional arrangement, while Israel firmly avoids presenting a plan for the day after the war. The U.S., Europe, and regional countries are pushing to end the war and build an alternative to Hamas in Gaza in the form of an independent Palestinian state managed by a revitalized Palestinian Authority, connecting this move to a regional arrangement. They have shown willingness to mobilize for this effort. However, the Israeli government expresses strong opposition to the two-state solution, refuses to promote the Palestinian Authority as an alternative to Hamas, and avoids presenting a vision for the post-war reality. Given Israel’s stance, countries have taken independent steps, including additional European countries recognizing the State of Palestine.

2. The hostage deal is stalled as Israel is unwilling to pay the requested price of ending the war, while Hamas benefits from the war’s continuation and the multi-dimensional damage Israel is experiencing because of it. The U.S., Qatar, and Egypt are making efforts to mediate a hostage deal that would end the war and secure the hostages’ release. Despite support from the Israeli public and security establishment for advancing a deal, and efforts by the hostages’ families in the diplomatic arena, the Israeli government opposes a hostage deal that would end the war, prioritizing political considerations.

3. Israel is coming to terms with an escalating and prolonged war of attrition with Hezbollah on the northern border, placing its hopes in deterrence and diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and France to prevent a full-scale war. Israel and Hezbollah continued to exchange fire, trying to understand the new rules of engagement and identify each side’s red lines to avoid escalating to a general campaign. Israel is cooperating with efforts by U.S. envoy Hochstein and French President Macron to achieve diplomatic solutions to the fighting in the north, while simultaneously threatening to launch a large-scale military operation.

4. Under the cover of the war in Gaza, Israel is deepening the annexation of the West Bank and working to weaken the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli government promoted Jewish settlement in the West Bank, supported the expulsion of Palestinian communities, fully backed settler violence, and transferred civil administration of the West Bank from the military to the Ministry of Defense. Simultaneously, the government acted to weaken the Palestinian Authority, particularly in the economic sphere, by stopping fund transfers. Sporadic decisions by the U.S. administration and other countries to impose sanctions on several prominent settlers and entities have not yet led to a change in Israel’s conduct.

5. The Israeli government is trying to stretch its relationship with the U.S. administration to gain greater freedom of action, without breaking it and risking the loss of crucial diplomatic and military support. The U.S. used the critical aid it provides to Israel to shape Israeli behavior and prevent regional escalation. It opposed massive action in Rafah and even delayed arms shipments, demanded more humanitarian aid, and criticized Netanyahu’s handling of the Gaza war and hostage deal as politically motivated. The U.S. also criticized the undermining of the Palestinian Authority and imposed sanctions on settlers for the first time. However, despite significant criticism of the Israeli government and pressure from internal opposition, the Biden administration and the Jewish community stood by Israel. The U.S. provided Israel with armaments, assisted in deterring Hezbollah, and led regional efforts to repel Iranian attack. Meanwhile, Netanyahu and his ministers blamed the Biden administration for preventing them from achieving victory, and Netanyahu promoted another speech in the House of Representatives with Republicans in an election year, against the wishes of the incumbent President, who had invited him to a meeting at the White House.

6. The legitimacy for the war against Hamas, and even for the State of Israel itself as part of the family of nations, has been damaged and is being challenged in international courts in The Hague and in international institutions. International support for the war against Hamas and for Israel’s right to defend itself has been replaced by sharp criticism. The war in Gaza has led Israel and its leaders to face accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in international courts in The Hague. Efforts to maintain international law, justify military action, and transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza have been undermined by Israeli statements and actions driven by political considerations and extreme ideology, leading to increased international criticism. This was further compounded by the government’s ongoing actions to weaken the Israeli judicial system, despite relying on it to deflect international criticism, and its failure to uphold the law in the war in Gaza and in the occupied territories.

7. Regional cooperation focuses on managing aspects of the Gaza campaign and preventing spillover to other arenas, relying on necessity and professional domains while distrust and tension persist at political levels. Egypt is assisting in the humanitarian effort, managing Gaza’s southern border, and mediating the hostage deal; Jordan and Israel cooperated in bringing Jordanian humanitarian aid into Gaza and in repelling Iran’s drone attack, despite open hostility towards Israel in Jordan; Qatar assisted in mediating the hostage deal, Morocco sent humanitarian aid to Gaza, and the UAE became the closest partner in providing humanitarian aid in Gaza, enjoying Israeli trust and cooperation that other players did not receive. The connection and cooperation were based mainly on contacts between the security and intelligence forces of the countries, while at the political level there was at least tension, and sometimes even open hostility.

8. The formal normalization agreements holds, but the war in Gaza has halted the expansion and deepening of the regional normalization process, and the continuation of the war challenges the regional cooperation needed to deal with Iran – Israel’s regional relations showed resilience and were not formally severed despite the images from Gaza and the associated pressures, but their nature changed. The momentum to advance these relations was replaced by suspension and waiting. While Israel supported the Emirati effort to become dominant in the humanitarian field in Gaza, both countries lowered their profile in exposing their relations, and economic projects were not advanced. Public relations with Bahrain and Morocco entered a freeze, the multi-lateral regional frameworks that established in the normalization process were not convened, and the advancement of normalization with Saudi Arabia, which was on the agenda before the war, now depends on Israel’s willingness to end the war and promote the two-state solution. On the other hand, the necessity and potential for regional cooperation were demonstrated in repelling Iran’s direct attack on Israel.

9. Europe stands by Israel, supports advancing the two-state solution, criticizes Israel’s management of the war and occupation, and seeks to play a significant role. Europe supported Israel in its fight against Hamas, but this support has been replaced by criticism of how the war is being conducted, concerns about violations of international law, and growing public criticism, including increasing calls for boycotts. Seeking a significant role, several European countries chose to advance recognition of a Palestinian state, supported Israel in its struggle against Iran, helped secure funding for the Palestinian Authority, and imposed sanctions on settlers as well as on Palestinian terrorist organizations. In response, the Israeli government acted to strengthen its relations with right-wing and Euro-skeptic elements on the continent, against the backdrop of widespread changes in public attitudes and voting patterns within national institutions and the European Union.

10. While the crisis with Turkey deepens to new levels, Cyprus and Greece serve as a strategic rear for Israel. The crisis with Turkey reached new heights when for the first time trade between the countries was deeply affected by the diplomatic dispute, with Erdogan conditioning the export of goods to Israel on a ceasefire in Gaza. In response, Israel reduced its exports to Turkey, leading to a notable decline in trade relations. Greece assisted in bypassing direct trade challenges with Turkey, and Cyprus participated in international efforts, serving as a channel for transferring humanitarian aid to Gaza and supporting intelligence, diplomatic, and military efforts related to the campaign in Gaza and the northern front.

11. Israel disconnects from the world / the world disconnects from Israel? Israel has not yet become a pariah state, and most formal agreements and collaborations have been maintained despite the images from Gaza and government actions prioritizing local politics over Israel’s global standing. However, Israel’s credit rating plunged, external investment funds withdrew their investments, airlines suspended resuming flights to Israel, and Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Trade relations with Turkey declined, France and Canada announced arms embargoes on Israel, Israeli participation in major international exhibitions was prevented, exhibitions of Israeli artists were canceled, and academic collaborations were affected. Additionally, Israel’s standing in global democracy indices deteriorated, reflecting a loss of its liberal character.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January-June 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.