Policy exchanges with a variety of unofficial Turkish counterparts emphasized that even at the height of Israel-Turkey tensions a few months ago – triggered by the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the escalation in Gaza – the two countries refrained from intensifying the crisis beyond a certain level. Thus, for example, despite sending the ambassadors home, they did not formally downgrade the level of relations. This fact will make it easier to solve the crisis, should there be political will to do so. It will be possible to present the return of the ambassadors as a largely technical step, not as one that heralds a new stage in relations.

But even should ambassadors’ return, Turkey is not likely to seek a significant improvement in ties due to its long-standing opposition to Israeli policies towards the Palestinian issue. In fact, the Turkish desire for increased influence on the Palestinian issue is a significant reason to seek the return of its diplomatic representatives to Israel. Without an ambassador in Tel Aviv and a consul general in Jerusalem, Turkey finds itself increasingly excluded from processes occurring in domestic Palestinian politics and from international diplomatic efforts regarding the Gaza strip.

The American angle also came up during Mitvim’s policy dialogue in Istanbul, especially in the context of the Jewish community in the US. Turks view with concern the links between Jewish organizations and Saudi and Emirati lobby groups in Washington. This is perceived as aimed at promoting a more negative American attitude towards Turkey. Turkey would be pleased if the Jewish lobby would use its influence on the Trump administration to enable more Turkish involvement in Iraq, also as a counterweight and block to Iran, which is seen in Turkey as also serving Israeli interests. Israel, from its side, is currently not inclined to make gestures towards Turkey, given Erdoğan’s policy and statements towards it. The expectation in Jerusalem is that Turkey should first enable the return of ambassadors, as it was the one who initiated the bilateral crisis.

Concerning Iran, the messages coming from Istanbul were that in contrast to common opinion in Israel, Turkey and Iran are not allies. They indeed conduct neighborly relations and trade, and cooperate on regional issues such as Syria, yet at the same time a significant rivalry exists between them. Similarly to Israel, Turkey too wants to limit the Iranian involvement in Syria, although this is of less importance for Turkey, and is not motivated by security fears but rather by hegemonic and economic concerns. Misperceptions in Israel about Turkey are mirrored by misperceptions in Turkey about Israel. For example, there is a widespread belief in Turkey that Israel secretly desires territorial expansion in the Middle East and is closely allied with the Kurds in northern Syria, which Turkey considers a serious threat.

It seems that Israel and Turkey can find a common language regarding Syria, and that they are not always on different sides of the regional divide. Initiating a strategic Israel-Turkey dialogue concerning Syria should be one of the concrete results of a future return of ambassadors. It will also be helpful to establish a coordination and conflict-management mechanism between the two countries, with the aim of preventing a further collapse of ties in the event of another round of violence in Gaza or renewed tensions in Jerusalem.

The ideological disparities between Erdoğan and Netanyahu are not likely to disappear in the near future, but the practical advantages of improved relations – mainly in the economic and strategic spheres – can lead both leaders to decrease the flames and intensity of their disagreement, as occurred in the past. Turkey and Israel are central countries in the region, which are impacted by developments in the Middle East and can benefit from a dialogue channel about them (even when they do not see eye-to-eye).

Recent progress in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza creates a more favorable context for carrying out diplomatic efforts to enable the return of ambassadors. But until official ties build positive momentum again, it will be mostly up to civil society actors to maintain and broaden channels of dialogue and cooperation between the people and policy elite of both countries. Mitvim’s Israel-Turkey policy dialogue, as well as the ongoing work of the Israeli-Turkish Civil Society Forum, show that this is very much possible and valuable.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey: Insights from a Policy Dialogue in the Midst of a Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.