Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been running in Turkish national elections for over 20 years, first as founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that challenged the existing political order, subsequently as a prime minister who reshaped the system of government and more recently, as an all-powerful president seeking another term.

Turkish elections have aroused interest in Israel over the years, whether due to Erdogan’s Islamist affiliation that initially prompted speculation about Turkey going the way of Iran or more recently, the impact of his continued hold on power for Israeli-Turkish relations and regional geopolitics.

A new aspect has informed Israeli discourse on Turkey in recent years: concern in Israel’s pro-democracy camp that democratic erosion processes in Turkey are similarly emerging in Israel under Netanyahu’s enduring rule. Seven years ago, the Israeli opposition sounded warnings against “Israel turning into Turkey,” and in 2020, Benny Gantz’s opposition Blue and White party adopted the campaign slogan “It’s Blue and White or Erdogan” (it rhymes in Hebrew).

Since the establishment of the current Netanyahu government and in the face of the legislative processes it is promoting, pro-democracy forces in Israel are increasingly turning to colleagues in Turkey (as well as in Hungary and Poland) to learn about the situation there and to seek tips for safeguarding democracy.

The political renewal that characterized Turkey’s opposition towards the recent election is resonating among Israeli opposition forces, who have an increasing interest in creating fresh, united and renewed political frameworks (see, for example, Labor MK Gilad Kariv’s recent call for unity on the political Left). Relevant insights that can be distilled from the Turkish opposition’s attempt to replace Erdogan touch mainly on issues of alliances and unification, momentum and hope.

Alliances and unifications

In the run-up to the 2023 elections, most Turkish opposition groups joined forces behind a single presidential candidate: the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP, founded by Ataturk), Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. This push to consolidate a united front began ahead of the 2018 presidential elections and bore fruit in the 2019 municipal elections with impressive victories by opposition candidates in major cities.

Ahead of the 2023 presidential elections, six parties from across the political and social spectrum ran a joint campaign, calling for the restoration of democratic order and a return to a parliamentary system of government. Along with Kılıcdaroglu, the heads of the other five parties ran as vice presidential candidates, as did the mayors of Istanbul (Ekrem Imamoglu) and Ankara (Mansur Yavas), who played a key role in the campaign.

The ideologically diverse front performed well during the campaign, although it ultimately failed to live up to expectations. In a sign that may be relevant to Israel’s fragmented politics, the Kurdish ethnic minority in southeastern Turkey provided Kılıcdaroglu with overwhelming support on Election Day, having reached agreements with the opposition front without joining it.

THIS IS an encouraging lesson for the prospects of forging constructive political alliances with Israel’s Arab citizens, even if formal cooperation under one political roof is unlikely.

The joint Turkish presidential campaign conveyed unity and determination and willingness to put differences aside in favor of achieving an overarching national goal. Preliminary agreements among the parties enabled opposition parties to formulate joint political moves vis-a-vis different constituencies in order to maximize their relative advantage on Election Day.

On the other hand, the bloc’s great ideological diversity undermined certainty regarding the policies the opposition would adopt if elected and the identities of political appointments that would follow. This was clearly evident, for example, in the foreign policy field. The opposition bloc included Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s former foreign minister, credited with boosting Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim sphere, as well as Namik Tan, a former Turkish ambassador to Israel and the United States, aligned with pro-Western views.

Which of the two would have set the diplomatic tone had the opposition won? Voters could not know this in advance and the opposition’s attempt to make up for this uncertainty by issuing a comprehensive election platform (unusual in Turkey) only provided a partial response to these concerns.

A seemingly more appropriate model in the Israeli context would be for parties of significantly different ideological stripes to run separately and parties more ideologically aligned to form unions, with a public commitment in advance to form a coalition after the elections.

On the parliamentary front, the bloc’s largest party, CHP, gave up some of its future representation in advance to allow for mergers with several smaller parties. The move was criticized in retrospect when election results indicated that the mergers had failed to increase the CHP’s power and the party was nonetheless forced to transfer seats to ideologically distant parties that had garnered negligible voter support.

When forming political consolidations, one must therefore consider not only how to maximize profits on Election Day, but also how to enable effective parliamentary action throughout a future term. In addition, the opposition’s reliance on key figures (mayors) who were designated for senior positions in the event of victory but not for parliament membership in case of defeat, risked a future weakening of their various factions.

The lesson for Israel is that entry into national politics must be wholeheartedly sincere, including the willingness to give up current positions to make way for opposition parliamentary activity.

Momentum and hope

Election Day in Turkey generated much optimism among the camp of change, especially as elections drew nearer. This was no small matter, given the repeated disappointments this camp has suffered in recent years and a sense of helplessness generated by Erdogan’s prolonged rule. This is an important lesson about the relative ease of inspiring hope and leveraging a thirst for change when the public feels that its leaders are acting responsibly and jointly to advance the bloc’s common interest.

THE FORMATION of a collective opposition alliance, the positive campaign it led, the unifying national discourse, the willingness to break social taboos and legitimize ethnic and religious minorities all harnessed the opposition’s supporters and conveyed a sense that change was possible. This, in turn, increased voter turnout and motivated voters to volunteer for polling station supervision – a central pillar of the opposition’s Election Day strategy.

The global dimension introduced by the opposition into the election campaign was also important, stressing that victory would position Turkey as a model for like-minded voters in other countries. The opposition also felt responsible in light of the global attention to its efforts.

The positive momentum and favorable polls ultimately dazzled and generated over-optimism, which may have led to missed electoral trends in the periphery and away from social networks, and to a lack of sufficiently appropriate responses for them in the campaign. This phenomenon has occurred in the past both in Israel and in other Western countries, requiring attention in the future.

The role played by mayors in the campaign indicated the power of the municipal arena. Given repeated losses by the opposition’s national leadership (such as those Kılıcdaroglu himself experienced since being elected head of his party, in 2010), the municipal leadership kept producing stories of success. Imamoglu and Yavas were regarded as winners, having cracked the code for defeating Erdogan’s candidates, in 2019.

Serving as mayors, they were also portrayed as leaders mindful of their residents’ daily needs and their presence in the campaign added a fresh spirit to a somewhat outdated party leadership. Both mayors also played a major role on election night. They appeared in public together every few hours to update on the state of affairs and try to uplift voter morale. This is relevant in the Israeli context ahead of the upcoming municipal elections in October 2023.

The extent to which the pro-democracy camp is successful in creating a compelling narrative of success and victory in these elections and producing young and promising leaders will also be particularly significant ahead of the next Knesset elections, towards which new political frameworks may take shape.

Since the advent of democratic protests in Israel, in January 2023, a growing Israeli openness has developed to international partnerships, to learn from the experiences of like-minded allies in other countries and to share insights from Israel with others. This is a welcome trend generating hope that the voices emerging from Turkey’s recent elections will indeed resonate in Israel and help bring about change.

This article is from “the Jerusalem Post“, May 23th, 2023.

הפוסט What lessons can Israel learn from Turkey’s elections? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to offer his mediation services, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was preparing for his own conversation with the Russian president urging him to end the war immediately, allow for a ceasefire and negotiations, and enable civilian evacuations. The Turkish president also offered to host a meeting between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu orchestrated a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Erdogan had offered to act as a mediator already in early February during his visit to Ukraine amid threats of a Russian invasion.

The Turkish mediation efforts are in line with policies Erdogan adopted at the end of his first decade in power, with Ahmet Davutoglu serving as his foreign minister. Turkey was branded as a state that aspires to play regional and global mediator roles, as this being a cornerstone of its new foreign policy. Although Turkish mediation did not yield many tangible results at the time, it remained in the toolbox of Turkish diplomacy, and currently serves to preserve Turkey’s important relations with Russia and Ukraine alike. Although Turkey is increasingly leaning towards Ukraine’s side and shows signs of distancing itself from Russia since the invasion, as expressed in public statements and in restricting warship passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Ankara seeks to maintain its relations with Moscow.

These ties are far from being exemplary for Turkey. Russia’s decision to intervene in the Syrian war in 2015 prompted concerns in Ankara and led to a crisis in relations following Turkey’s downing of a Russian military jet. The two countries differ on key regional issues, chief among them Syria and Libya. Turkey fears these differences could result in Russian moves, for example, military activity in Syria’s Idlib region that would send waves of refugees to its borders.

Despite their disagreements, Turkey and Russia maintain important cooperation. Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas and wheat from Russia. Turkey has also been talking to Russia about defense procurement (S-400 systems), despite its membership in NATO and US opposition. Turkey also relies heavily on Russian tourism, which constitutes a significant portion of its incoming tourism flows. Reflecting this reliance, tourism was one of the issues which Russia’s ambassador to Cyprus raised with his hosts in response to their opposition to the Russian invasion. “Summer is coming up, you’ve closed your airspace – you shot yourselves in the foot,” he said. “Where will Cyprus get its Russian tourists from? They won’t come, they will go to Turkey, is that what you want? For them to go spend their money over there [Turkey]?” Over 4.5 million Russian tourists visited Turkey in 2021, an asset which Ankara would not wish to relinquish.

Nonetheless, Turkey also values its relations with Ukraine and was quick to recognize its independence in the 1990s. Ukraine is also a significant source of tourism for Turkey (some 2 million in 2021), and their varied business dealings include Turkey’s sale of the Bayraktar drones that feature in Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian invaders these days. Turkey has been expressing its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursion began, supplying it with humanitarian aid and urging NATO and the West to upgrade their support for Kyiv. Turkey’s foreign and defense ministers held talks with their Ukrainian counterparts, and Turkey eventually acceded to Ukraine’s request regarding Russian naval passage through the straits. However, Turkey opposes sanctions on Russia, arguing that these would not help and simply delay resolution of the core problems between the sides.

Erdogan is gearing up for elections in 2023, facing complex political challenges and an economy in crisis. A crisis with Russia could further challenge Turkey’s economy and Erdogan’s prospects. A Russian tourism boycott of Turkey following the 2015 downing of the Russian jet demonstrated the repercussions of such a move and Erdogan is keen to avoid a repeat of that scenario. However, he also wants to demonstrate equity in NATO and the West, as well as foreign policy achievements following some tough years in that arena.

In the Russia-Ukraine context, Turkey’s mediation efforts are consistent with Erdogan’s other regional diplomatic moves, mainly promoting dialogue and seeking positive agendas. This is a different approach than the one we have become accustomed to seeing from the Turkish president, who in recent years tended to highlight divisive issues and raise tensions with neighboring countries. The new approach was recently reflected in Erdogan’s successful visit to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the warming of relations with Israel. This is a positive construct, which will enable Israel to derive more diverse benefits from restoring relations with Turkey than it could in the past, both at the bilateral and regional levels. And who knows, these developments might even encourage Israel and Turkey to promote their own respective peace processes, while trying to mediate the conflicts of others.

The op-ed was published in JPost in March 2022

הפוסט As Israel-Turkey relations shift, attention turns to Russia and Ukraine – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Merav kahana-Dagan and Burcu Degirmencioglu

SUMMARY

October 2020 marks the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security. This marks a fitting moment to assess the resolution’s challenges and achievements and to offer some suggestions for better implementation of the resolution in two Middle Eastern countries – Israel and Turkey. Two countries with shared bilateral and regional interests as well as disputes and critical roles in many of the area’s conflicts. Israel and Turkey responded to UNSCR 1325 positively, but did not implement it on the ground. UNSCR 1325 led many United Nations (UN) member countries to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) to implement the ideas and ideals of the resolution (Peacewomen 2020). Most of those countries are in Europe, while only a few of them are in the MENA region. There are eleven Regional Action Plans (RAP) around the world, but there is no formal RAP for the MENA region. Due to many barriers, such as political divisions between countries in the region, ongoing conflicts, and women’s underrepresentation in politics and in decision-making, the push for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the MENA region must be supported by the international community. Though the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through a regionwide framework is unlikely, due to political and cultural differences and the ongoing disputes between states, a push for its implementation could also originate from sub-regional cooperation and bilateral agreements.

The 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 should also serve as an opportunity to prioritize it on the agenda of Israeli Turkish civil society activities. Furthermore, international exchange amongst female diplomats and security services and gender trainings as well as leadership programs for women in such positions can support the acceptance and the career opportunities for women in foreign and security policy.

Jointly, motivated women from the region and a push from the international community together can achieve improvements for women through inclusion in peace building processes and regional cooperation. This needs long term commitment from young women, who can take up the issues and set the groundwork for the next generation of Middle Eastern women.

INTRODUCTION

Israel and Turkey are important powerful players in the MENA region with a complicated relationship and shared interests such as security, economy, and energy. They are both involved in local and regional conflicts while managing an ongoing dispute between one another, which is highly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both countries formally adopted National Action Plans in the spirit of UNSCR 1325. UNSCR 1325 touched upon two main issues – women are much more affected by conflicts, yet their voices are underrepresented in decision-making. Research shows that women’s participation in peace negotiations increases the sustainability and the quality of the agreements (UN Women 2019). However, for more women to be included in such processes, many steps need to be taken. Israeli-Turkish relations are unstable and complicated. In 2010, after the Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla clash, diplomatic relations reached their lowest point. Since then, the two countries reached a reconciliation agreement and for two years worked on normalizing their bilateral ties. These efforts did not last long when in May 2018 another political crisis occurred in the wake of the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, and ambassadors from both countries were sent back to their countries. During the past 10 years, NGO’s, think tanks, and civil society organizations worked in order to strengthen Israeli-Turkish relations. The work of NGOs touched upon many aspects of the Israeli-Turkish and regional relations but did not focus on women empowerment or women inclusion in particular. The attached paper argues that it should.

הפוסט UNSCR 1325: IMPLEMENTATION IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The relationship between Israel and Turkey in the last decade (since the Marmara incident in 2010) is in an ongoing slump. The signing of the normalization agreement in June 2016, which settled the Marmara affair, did not restore confidence between the countries or trigger a resumption of high-level dialogue. It’s been two years that diplomatic representation in the countries has been at the level of a Chargé d’Affaires rather than ambassador, a partial indicator of Ankara’s response to the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem and what Turkey defines as sharp Israeli measures during clashes with the Gaza Strip.

In the past few weeks, there have been reports of attempts to thaw the relationship, for example with regard to the issue of economic water demarcation in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. It is highly doubtful that these reports have a solid foundation, and in any case, the chances of advancing such a dialogue are quite low.

The main challenge lies in the fact that it is difficult for the two countries to find mutual interests. Their deep disagreements center around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel’s possible application of sovereignty to parts of the West Bank (which exacerbates tensions on the Palestinian issue), and Ankara’s support for political Islam, whether in the Palestinian arena (Hamas) or in the Middle East in general.

Moreover, Israel has tightened relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt around a wide range of political, economic, and energy issues, and they are conducting regular dialogues at the highest levels. A fascinating illustration of the current array of forces is the Libyan arena: Israel has common ground with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and even Saudi Arabia in support of General Haftar, while Turkey and Qatar back the Islamic-supported national consensus government.

An important and perhaps restraining factor is the impressive trade volume that has continued between the two countries through the years. But at the same time, the potential for Israel to export gas to Turkey is slim considering the deep mistrust between the two leaderships, the pandemic-induced collapse in energy prices, and Israel’s growing relationship with Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt.

The prospects for improving relations between the two countries are low at present, given their deep differences of opinion and the absence of common political-strategic interests. Yet it remains important to continue to look for ways to restore political dialogue.

הפוסט DEBATE: How Serious Is the Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(Originally published in ECONFO)

הפוסט Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the 1990s, Qatar was one of the first Arab states to open a diplomatic mission in Israel and allow Israel to open a commercial office on its territory. With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, relations were suspended, and even when operations of the Israeli trade office were resumed in Qatar in the mid-2000s and when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni conducted an official visit to Qatar, relations were no longer the same. Qatari media adopted a harsh and highly critical tone on Israel, and the regime feared warmer ties would undermine the united Arab stance against normalization with Israel absent an IsraeliPalestinian agreement. In the days of the Arab Spring, Qatar openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and significantly strengthened its links with Turkey, further exacerbating the distrust between Jerusalem and Doha.

The opportunity to improve Israel-Qatar relations arose, of all times, at the height of Israel’s deep crisis with the Gaza Strip. A strange deal was forged between Hamas – a number of whose leaders were being hosted by Qatar after leaving Syria during the civil war, the Qatari regime – which sought to extricate itself from regional isolation and improve its image in Washington, and Israel – which needed a mediator to restore calm and help alleviate the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Leaders in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were likely displeased with the arrangement. Egyptian and Gulf media devoted extensive coverage to news of a rare visit by the head of the Mossad to Doha in February 2020, as revealed by Yisrael Beitenu party Chair Avigdor Liberman, wondering whether Israel was seeking closer ties with Qatar. So far, this pragmatic cooperation between Israel and Qatar, based on the shared interests of all parties involved, has not undermined Israel’s growing rapprochement with other Sunni states.

Nonetheless, by allowing Qatar to play an increasingly significant role in the Gaza Strip, is Israel developing a dependence on the emirate and subsuming reality in the territories to Doha’s wishes? For now, there is no alternative to the Qatari funds keeping the heads of Gaza’s residents above water. However, it is important to realize that this money also perpetuates Hamas’ rule in Gaza, deepens the Islamist movement’s entrenchment in its unyielding attitude toward reconciliation with Fatah and, in fact, undermines domestic Palestinian unity. The Netanyahu government apparently believes that its current “divide and rule” policy serves it well. That explains why Israel has not returned to the negotiating table. Netanyahu believes that the Palestinian issue is no longer on the agenda and that relations with most Arab states can be advanced even without negotiations and compromises.

Reality proves the opposite. Israel is not an island, nor a villa encircled by walls in the middle of the jungle. Israel needs cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in order to advance its interests in the region. The Palestinian issue remains on the table and the absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still hampers establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of partnerships between Israel and most states in the Arab and Muslim world. Visits by Israeli athletes and diplomats in the Gulf are nice to have, but the potential for cooperation with the Gulf States, as well as with Israel’s immediate neighbors Egypt and Jordan, is far greater.

Israel needs a broad regional policy to guide it and enable the promotion of its interests not only in the short term, but in the long one, too. Relations with Doha are possible to have, but Israel must be cautious and approach them with its eyes wide open, given that Qatar’s foreign policy contradicts what Israel believes and would like to see in the Middle East. The Qatari gifts carry a price tag: Aid for Gaza is not just aid for Gaza – it is also a contribution to strengthening the regional Islamist alliance (Qatar-Turkey-Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya), and only a temporary solution to Gaza’s distress. Gaza does not require band aids. What is required is a complex and comprehensive solution, in coordination with regional states that are confronting Islamist terrorism, which will also eventually provide a channel for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar Focus on Shared Interests, Setting Aside Differences הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Eastern Mediterranean States and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump did not invent American isolationism, nor did he coin the “America First” slogan (that was down to Charles Lindbergh, the pilot who opposed Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pro-British leanings). However, Trump was the one who engineered its current, embarrassing implementation. Anyone amazed by the vanishing act of the US in Syria, forgets that the American DNA has been isolationist ever since President James Monroe conceived his namesake doctrine in 1823. The US generally goes to war in the wake of “unfriendly visits” to places such as Pearl Harbor or the World Trade Towers, but it does not rush into action following the bombing of Saudi oil fields or even the 1940 London blitz.

The abandonment of the Kurds should not have come as a surprise. Sadly, they are victims of serial desertion. The Soviet Union abandoned them (the short-lived Kurdish republic of Mahabad in western Iran) in 1946, and Iran abandoned them in 1975, followed by Israel. Erdoğan appears to have overcome his initial opposition to Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, with its capital in Erbil. He now sees a Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, with its capital in Qamishli and leadership by the PKK (the Kurdish People’s Party), which Turkey designates as a terror organization and thus as a catalyst for pan-Kurdish sentiment among the Kurdish minority within Turkey and a security threat to Ankara.

The shock in Israel is real and sincere, generating myriad reactions, beginning with Netanyahu’s (which admittedly should be viewed through the lens of Israel-Turkey relations), politicians’ condemnations, hard-to-watch footage, demonstrations, and a noble gesture by some 100 reserve officers. Some even raised their concerns that the frenetic US President would abandon Israel as he did his Kurdish allies. Indeed, in recent weeks Trump seems to be giving a lukewarm and even cold shoulder to Netanyahu, whom he may regard as a loser following two political failures.

However, Israel is not and will not be treated like the Kurds. Israel is a strong country, ranked by US News and World Report as the world’s eighth most powerful nation, immediately after Japan, the UK and France. Israeli-held territory was last invaded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and although it got off to a lame start, Israel overcame great odds and won (with US help). Even if Trump’s creative mind may toy with thoughts of abandonment, this is unlikely feasible with congressional Democrats and Republicans (including Trump’s evangelical base) already joining hands against his Kurdish policy – despite the fact that the Kurds do not have a US political base in the form of communities, federations and legislators. We, on the other hand, do.

Israel enjoys deeply rooted ideological and political support. It has always made an effort, whether under the leadership of the Likud or of center-left parties, to fortify, preserve and nurture bipartisan US support. Israel devotedly maintained strong brotherly ties with all US Jewish streams. Beyond the basic mitzvah of pan-Jewish unity throughout the ages and time zones, given that three quarters of US Jews are Democrats, this was also a wise political move, in hindsight.

However, in recent years, under Netanyahu’s leadership, the Israeli government has been blatantly supporting Republicans and paying homage to Trump. Israel is kicking in the teeth millions of Jews who want to continue supporting it but are hard pressed to do so in light of their continued humiliation at Israel’s hand. The government’s decision rescinding its own plan for pluralistic prayer at the Wailing Wall, its policies on conversion and declarations of territorial annexation, its offensive Nationality Law and backing for ultra-racist parties, and its stand on issues of marriage and divorce all combine to alienate them from the Jewish state. Israel has become a non-enlightened state, which often needs the support of the most enlightened (Jewish) elements in American society. Once Trump is replaced, even without impeachment, we will need our Jewish brothers and sisters vis-à-vis a Democratic administration and Congress.

We may not have crossed the point of no return with US Jewry and the US political system, yet, but nothing is forever. If there is one lesson to be learned from the Trump-Kurds affair, it is that beyond building up its power, Israel should never take sides in US politics or pull out the rug from under its unity with US Jewry.

Ambassador (Ret.) Barukh Binah is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He served as Deputy DirectorGeneral of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, in charge of North American Affairs, as Ambassador to Denmark, Consul General in Chicago, Press Officer in New York and Deputy Head of Mission in Washington, DC.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Lesson for Israel from the US Abandonment of the Kurds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On June 23rd, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu defeated the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), Binali Yildirim, in a historic repeat election for Istanbul’s mayoral seat. Imamoğlu surprised many in March when he narrowly bested Yildirim, handpicked and heavily endorsed by Erdoğan. After the initial results were challenged by the AKP, it was deemed that Imamoğlu would have to accomplish the feat twice in order to earn the keys to the city. Imamoğlu second victory – in which he expanded his margin from 13,000 votes in March to 777,000 votes in June – simultaneously ended the debate about Istanbul’s future leadership and opened a new discussion about the prospects for change in Turkey at a national level.

Israeli opposition voices like Lapid and former prime minister Ehud Barak were quick to praise Imamoğlu. But instead of only applauding Istanbul’s new mayor, they should also be learning from his campaign. There are less than three months until Israel’s repeat election. Although some have reported that the major parties do not plan on engaging the public until late August, there is no better time than the present for Israel’s opposition to study Imamoğlu’s strategies and adapt them to the Israeli electorate.

When it was announced in Istanbul that the first election results were being treated as invalid, Imamoğlu had every reason to attack the ruling party and the political system. Nevertheless, he told supporters, “They want conflict from us. But we, the people who don’t want this nation to fight, we will insist upon embracing each other.” This simple message was disseminated through Imamoğlu’s campaign slogan, “Herşey Çok Güzel Olacak” or “Everything Will Be Alright” and ran counter to the polarizing and often fear-based rhetoric employed by Erdoğan and the AKP over the last decade and a half. Rather than trying to divide the electorate, Imamoğlu emphasized the need for cooperation. In doing so, he successfully built bridges between Istanbul’s myriad communities.

Like Turkey, Israeli society is also fragmented and divided. Netanyahu has maintained his position at the top of the political circus largely because of his ability to take advantage of the existing fault lines within the electorate and create new rifts when the opportunity presented itself. He has also benefited from a rudderless opposition that is often more preoccupied on determining its own hierarchy than providing a meaningful alternative for Israelis. If opposition leaders like Gantz and Lapid are truly committed to bringing about change, then they must promote an inclusive campaign message, avoid mudslinging with the establishment, and publish a clear set of policy goals that reflect the shared values of Israel’s opposition parties.

The most impactful way for the Israeli opposition to assume a more inclusive approach is by targeting all potential voters and not settling for the comforts of their political base. In the previous two elections, Haredi and Arab voters accounted for somewhere around 25 percent of the total voting public (this number could be higher, however Arab voting percentages in recent years have been lower than the Jewish population). Both of these populations carry deep historical grievances. Many within these communities do not believe they are equal partners in the state-building enterprise. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that these glass ceilings are being shattered. Engagement with these minority populations is a challenging but necessary step towards gaining public trust and developing new partnerships. This proved to be a winning strategy for Imamoğlu, who crossed party lines and addressed audiences from the most secular and affluent neighborhoods to those traditionally religious strongholds within Istanbul. He openly courted the Kurdish vote, ignoring the existing political tensions in favor of his message of coexistence. What if an Israeli politician did the same?

Israel’s opposition can also borrow Imamoğlu’s positivist philosophy and abandon their doomsday predictions about the collapse of Israeli democracy. Israeli democracy has always been flawed, and without question the Netanyahu years have witnessed both a steady decline in institutional checks-and-balances as well as an increase in political corruption. However, if the democratic process has proven to be resilient a country like Turkey – where the slide towards authoritarianism has been much steeper and far darker – then Israeli opposition leaders should focus more on the policy issues that will draw public support away from the political center than campaigning for “anyone but Bibi”. Imamoğlu’s team was faced with a similar conundrum, particularly after the initial results in Istanbul were rejected. However, the manifesto that helped alter the tone of Imamoğlu’s campaign – a pamphlet called the Book of Radical Love – dissuaded supporters from attacking Erdoğan. Contrary to what has been the logic of Turkish politics for many years, the document called for an issues-based approach that avoided polarizing debate.

Finally, Israel’s opposition needs to decide what it stands for. In order to accomplish this, opposition parties should reach some consensus about their shared goals and then publish those goals for public viewership. Imamoğlu accomplished this by decoupling traditional identity politics from his campaign and focusing on economics, sharing public resources, and emphasizing the importance of good governance. And although many argued the election was about Erdogan, Imamoğlu did not make it personal. Lapid and Gantz should take note of this. Turkey is not only Erdoğan, and Israel is not only Bibi. If you succeed in changing the narrative, you expand the public’s imagination about what the future can be. Israelis have heard enough about Netanyahu’s illicit activities. What they must receive now are opposition party platforms that map out achievable policy goals in the areas of economics, security, and diplomacy.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. If Israel’s opposition is so inspired by Imamoğlu’s accomplishments, then it should borrow his message and reverse the trend of exclusionary and fear-based politics. Rather than crafting a platform that only addresses the country’s Zionist populations, Israel’s opposition should adopt an inclusive narrative that identifies common interests over identity politics. Instead of permitting the campaign to descend into a referendum on the prime minister’s personality, Israel’s opposition should focus on the policy issues and maintain a positive, conversational tone that welcomes discussion with all parties on the political spectrum. If successfully executed, such a strategy could put an end to the Netanyahu government and revolutionize the nature of Israeli politics in the process.

Upon news of Imamoğlu’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Istanbulites exited onto the streets to celebrate. Addressing the crowds, Istanbul’s new mayor said, “You have shown the world that Turkey still protects its democracy. And we have shown other countries who try to go down the road we were choosing that it is no road at all.” Perhaps what Imamoğlu and his campaign actually revealed was a strategy for thwarting the populist wave the world has witnessed in the last decade. There is arguably no better place to put those strategies to the test than in Israel.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Egypt have maintained close political and security ties at the highest level in recent years, which remains covert for the most part. In a rare move, Egyptian President a-Sisi revealed it in January an interview to the American program “60 Minutes”, referring to the close cooperation with Israel, including joint military efforts against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula.

The current convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt rests on several layers, that result from the dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent years: the turmoil during and after the Arab Spring; the regional threat posed by Iran, especially to the pragmatic Sunni states; terror activities in Sinai (that require Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, including a reassessment of the security annex to their peace agreement); and the Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Egyptian regime and military are still traumatized by the Muslim Brotherhood rule, which was in place from the ousting of Mubarak and until the overthrow of Morsi. This further explains the joint Israeli-Egyptian efforts to defy the threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic movements, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, the Egyptian and Israeli interests converge when it comes to the energy sector. Simply put, Israel wants to export part of the gas it discovered in the Mediterranean to its closest neighbors. An agreement to export gas from Israel to Jordan has already been signed. Egypt has recently discovered significant gas fields, but at least in the short term it still needs energy for its local economy, and Israel can help supply it. In the medium term, it will be possible to liquefy Israeli gas in Egypt (via two existing facilities there, which have not been in use for the last few years), and then to export it to more distant markets. Therefore, Israeli and Egyptian companies have held intensive negotiations during the recent years, which led to the signing of mutual agreements. However, both governments still need to give their consent, which will provide a legitimizing umbrella for strategic cooperation in the energy sector.

It seems that the warm ties described above should suffice to complete and implement these agreements signed by companies in the private sector. The level of trust between the Israeli and Egyptian governments is high, as exemplified by the recent visit to Cairo by Israeli Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz. Moreover, the gas forum that convened in Egypt, with participation of energy ministers from Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, illustrates the new international geometry that is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. The existing tripartite alliances – Israel-Greece-Cyprus and Egypt-Greece-Cyprus – are now joined by a new tripartite alliance – Jordan-Greece-Cyprus, and by the newly-established Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The existing and emerging alliances may expand and include additional countries, and the informal existing cooperation might institutionalize. Such developments would add positive Mediterranean dimensions to the complex dynamics in the region.

Turkey, an important regional player, is currently absent from these various geometric settings. The countries that are currently cooperating in the Eastern Mediterranean share an anti-Turkish agenda – Egypt, Cyprus and Greece (each to a different extent), and Israel – whose relations with Erdoğan lack trust and are characterized by harsh rhetoric, despite the realistic potential for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the gas sector. The chances to realize this potential were one of the catalysts to the signing in 2016 of the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement. Since, and following new crises between the two countries, these chances have steadily diminished.

Will Israel and Egypt be able to translate their warm ties and convergence of interests into formal energy agreements at state-level? The motivation for them to do so is clear. However, the public in Egypt still opposed any normalization of ties with Israel. After all, even during the Mubarak regime, the Egyptians did not welcome economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries, despite the beneficial cooperation that took place around the joint industrial zones (QIZ). The launching of a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process will clearly help to improve this situation. It will create a more positive atmosphere in the region, and above all a more favorable Arab public opinion. It can be assumed that the a-Sisi regime will succeed in overcoming domestic opposition. After all, energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt serves the interests of both countries, and perhaps Egypt will follow Jordan, who already formalized its energy cooperation with Israel, despite negative public attitudes in Jordan towards it.

The discovery of natural gas reservoirs in the Eastern Mediterranean creates an exceptional convergence of interests between a number of countries in the region, including Israel and its Arab neighbors. This opens up a wide range of additional areas of cooperation between, placing the Eastern Mediterranean on the “global map”. The visit of Steinitz to Cairo, and the unique regional gas forum launched there, may symbolize a significant step towards realizing the potential embedded in this region.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus between 2010 and 2015. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Will Energy be the Next Point of Israeli-Egyptian Convergence? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout the dialogue, there was a sense that Turkey and Israel can find a way to overcome their current crisis and to reinstate ambassadors. Nevertheless, such progress is not expected to lead to a significant breakthrough in the relations. The Turkish counterparts expressed hope that Israel and Turkey will resume talks on natural gas export from Israel; shared their concern over what they perceive as Israel’s support of the Kurds in northern Syria; and pointed out that Turkey and Iran should not be considered by Israel as allies, but rather as countries that cooperate at times regarding shared interest but are also competing with each other and adhering to different ideologies and beliefs. The dialogue also emphasized the importance attributed in Turkey to Jewish community in the US, and to the impact it has on the American discourse towards Turkey as well as on US policy towards the Middle East.

This paper highlights key insights from the meetings and discussions that took place throughout the policy dialogue. It does not reflect consensus among all participants

הפוסט The 2018 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The consequences of the “Arab Shaking” have yet to end. Each state that experienced these “winds of change”, withstands the emerging regional and international reality differently, based on the way it defines its current position. Egypt under a-Sisi, and in the post-Mursi era, has re-defined its aims and mode of action. The newly created Egyptian national security outlook prioritized two main objectives: to restore (both domestic and regional) security and to strengthen the Egyptian economy.

Regarding the security objective, as soon as Egypt defined “terrorism” (both domestic and international) as its biggest threat, it made sure to label the Muslin Brotherhood movement a terror organization and carried out severe measures against its members. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have occasionally accused the Hamas of carrying out terror attacks in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and intermittently with ISIS. No wonder that every now and then news surrounding military cooperation between Egypt and Israel battling ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula appear in the media.

In addition to this, the Iranian policy in the Middle East is perceived by Egypt as a threat (and so by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Both Turkey and Qatar are considered Egypt’s consistent and uncompromising rivals, due to their support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and based on their membership in the Middle Eastern axis opposing Egypt. A new reality has evolved that we have never seen before, in which the regional interests of Israel and Egypt, as well as those of other Arab states, have intertwined.

The long-standing Egyptian policy that strives to resolve the Palestinian issue relies, even to this day, on its ability to engage in what is happening in the Gaza strip. Egypt wishes to promote steps of reconciliation within the Palestinian wing itself (between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority), and to serve as a mediator between the Palestinians as well as between the Palestinians and Israel. All actors in this equation view Egypt as a trustworthy and influential actor. In this way, Egypt acts as the most significant mediator that negotiates understandings between Israel and Hamas, and that supports Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Egypt is expected to continue playing such a role in the future as well.

The meeting between Israel and Egypt’s leaders that took place during the 2018 UN General Assembly, was not the first meeting between Netanyahu and a-Sisi this past year. Among the issues discussed by the two leaders were the situation in Gaza, the Palestinian issue, security matters, regional developments and bilateral issues. The meeting reflected rather accurately the cooperative relations between the two countries over the past four years.

The second objective put forward by the Egyptian leadership has been to stabilize the economy. A strong sense of security and a steady economy may turn Egypt into a source for regional stability. This leads Egypt to be increasingly interested in promoting economic and trade cooperation with Israel. Egypt hold an important strategic location, on the maritime route from the Indian ocean through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the interest in Egypt’s stabilization is not limited to regional actors alone, but is also eminent for the US, the EU, Russia, India, and China. This generates international interest in supporting Israeli-Egyptian cooperation as a keystone for enhancing regional stability.

Broader cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the security and-political spheres may stimulate their economic relations and therefore work for the benefit of both countries. Nevertheless, there is still a significant gap between the high level of strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and their much lower level of civil cooperation. The number of Israelis touring Egypt is stable but rather low. Trade between the countries is taking place but to a limited extent, and the same is true regarding the field of agriculture, where there is far greater potential for cooperation than what is taking place today (at least in comparison to cooperation in the 1990’s). In addition to that, there is potential for Egypt to utilize technologies such as solar energy and water desalination, areas of which are widely known as Israel’s field of expertise, both as a manufacturer and as an implementer.

The field of energy, and in particular the production and marketing of natural gas, plays a central role in the Israeli-Egyptian economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, both countries can cooperate in traditional industry fields, in unique qualified industrial zones (QIZ, a three-way agreement that allows the export of free trade Egyptian goods to the US, in the condition they hold a certain percent of Israeli components), in agriculture, tourism and more. Such cooperation can promote both Israel’s and Egypt’s economies, and have a positive economic impact on the broader region.

The announcement made by the Israeli company “Delek Drilling” that it will purchase (together with the Noble Energy and East Gas companies) the Egyptian EMG company is a step towards achieving these goals. The natural gas pipeline owned by EMG connects Israel and Egypt, and will deliver natural gas from the “Tamar” and “Leviathan” reservoirs to Egypt. This is considered to be a milestone in transforming Egypt into a regional energy hub, as a major importer and as an exporter based on its liquefying gas facilities. According to Israel’s Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz, the rehabilitation of the Israeli-Egyptian natural gas pipeline, along with the construction of a Jordanian-Israeli pipeline, creates a regional foundation between the “peace countries”. It is rare to have a joint infrastructure project with geo-political significance take shape between Israel and its neighbors.

The positive nature of Israel-Egypt ties in recent years, together with evolving regional developments in the Middle East, Egypt’s role in mediating between Israel and the Palestinians, and the steps taken by Egypt to thaw the “cold” peace with Israel, may all point to the existence of an opportunity for further advancement in ties between two strategic partners in the region – Egypt and Israel.

Dr. Haim Koren, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, served as the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt between the years 2014 and 2016. This article is based on a research on Israel-Egypt relations, written as part of Mitvim Institute’s project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first time was in 1980, following the enactment of the Jerusalem Law by the Knesset. The international response to the Israeli move was harsh and included a UN Security Council resolution condemning it and calling on foreign countries to withdraw their embassies from Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was emptied of embassies and Turkey, whose embassy was in Tel Aviv, called its ambassador back. It took another 12 years for a Turkish ambassador to return to Tel Aviv, which was made possible only after the Madrid peace conference.

The second time was in 2011, following the failure of efforts to resolve the Israeli-Turkish crisis that erupted following the Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza. The flotilla incident occurred more than a year earlier, but only after the publication of the UN Palmer Committee Report and the Israeli refusal to accept the compromise agreement formulated by diplomats from both countries did Turkey decide to take measures against Israel, which included downgrading relations. This time, it took about five years before there was an ambassador again in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv.

Jerusalem and Gaza were the reasons for previous Turkish decisions to downgrade relations with Israel. These issues have also been at the basis of the disputes between Israel and Turkey in recent years. The current crisis combines both issues – the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the tension it creates in East Jerusalem, alongside the Palestinian demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and the large number of Palestinians killed therein.

In the past year, a pattern in Erdoğan’s behavior could be observed. In each of the relevant cases – the tension surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque in July 2017, the Trump Declaration on Jerusalem in December 2017, and the recent events related with the transfer of the American embassy and the March of Return in Gaza – the Turkish response included harsh statements against Israel, a call to a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul, and threatening Israel with a possible damage to the bilateral relations.

To date, these moves were mostly symbolic in nature. However, they eroded the trust – which was already poor – between Israel and Turkey, stirred anger among the masses, led to verbal clashes between the countries on Twitter, and slowed down the attempts to inject new content into the relations that took place following the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement of June 2016. The negative dynamic between the two countries was intensified, not only due to bilateral tensions and Erdoğan’s declarations, but also due to an inaccurate perception of Turkey by many in Israel as an ally of Iran, in light of the Russian-TurkishIranian partnership in the Astana process.

Erdoğan’s latest moves, as in previous cases in which he chose to raise the bar of tension with Israel, are also influenced by domestic and regional calculations. On June 24, elections will be held in Turkey, in which Erdoğan is re-running for president. Raising tensions between Turkey and other countries – not only with Israel (Erdoğan currently confronts some European countries as well) – is perceived as a move that may help his election campaign, certainly when it comes to issues that are important to many in Turkey, such as Jerusalem and Gaza.

In addition, Erdoğan’s behavior also helps his regional positioning. While he is reacting harshly to US and Israeli policy, most Arab leaders are keeping a low profile. Erdoğan is thus perceived by the masses as the only regional leader who is seriously challenging Israel. He did so in the past as well, for example when he confronted President Peres at the Davos Conference during operation Cast Lead in 2009, and was later accepted as a hero in Turkey and throughout the Arab world.

The current crisis is somewhat different from previous ones because this time Turkey took diplomatic action also against the US, and not only against Israel. This may serve as a softening factor. So far, the current American administration has not shown interest in Turkey-Israel relations, but it did invest efforts in blurring the significant controversies between the US and Turkey on Syria and in creating a framework for dialogue and coordination. This should be leveraged to create a tripartite Israeli-American-Turkish policy channel that will first address the current diplomatic tension and later focus on other regional issues in which the three countries have shared interests – primarily moderating Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel’s frustration with the Turkish behavior is great, and the anger at Erdoğan is skyrocketing. However, even in such times of crisis, it is worthy to remember the strategic, economic and diplomatic importance of the relations between both countries. It is not by chance that Netanyahu and Erdoğan decided in 2016, in spite of the bad blood between them and despite public criticism, to reach an agreement, and it is not self-evident for Israel to have full, even if problematic, diplomatic relations with a key regional state that has a large Muslim population. These relations should not be casually waived.

In the near future, action must be taken to contain the Israeli-Turkish crisis and prevent further escalation. This must be done through quiet, professional and efficient diplomacy while avoiding provocative measures intended to appease the public at home. There are many in both Israel and Turkey – including in the business, policy, research, and culture sectors – who value the relations between the countries and are willing to step up and help reduce the flames, as they did in the past.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Crisis and the Need for Containment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Others remain committed to a political resolution rather than an endless horizon of conflict and violence. But they have few answers for breaking down obstacles that are growing worse as time goes by. New ideas are badly needed; few are forthcoming.

In this bleak political landscape, the Mitvim Institute embarked on an effort to learn from the experience of other societies in conflict or facing related challenges. We believed that the experience of attempts to resolve conflicts in other places may serve as a source of policy options, lessons to be learned, or test cases in other regions, for assessing local developments and options in Israel-Palestine.

הפוסט Fresh Thinking for Old Problems: Comparing Conflicts to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The vote is expected to pass, and touch off negotiations with, or demands from, the central government in Iraq about future independence. The Iraqi Parliament has rejected the legitimacy of the vote, and its Supreme Court has ordered it suspended on suspicion of violating Iraq’s constitution. The stage is set for a clash that many fear will ignite yet another war in this tormented country.

But the vote raises another significant question: How are new states born? It is a vexing problem in the post-World War II international scene. Borders are not supposed to be changed by force, yet new states are mostly born in blood.

Lonely exceptions such as the peaceful “Velvet Divorce” of Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the 2006 independence of Montenegro, are far outnumbered by states born of war: the former Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and others fought bitter ethno-nationalist conflicts, the six (or seven, counting Kosovo) independent states to emerge from Yugoslavia’s breakup emerged amidst near-genocidal violence, which formed the backdrop to Montenegro’s later secession.

Even the 2011 establishment of South Sudan following a legal referendum, in agreement with the sovereign state of Sudan, has descended into murderous chaos. The presence of oil resources with disputed ownership in both South Sudan and Kurdistan’s Kirkuk region do not auger well for a peaceful process in Iraq.

This very real threat of violence is one factor that has led Western countries to oppose the Kurdish referendum. But their opposition is rife with self-interest. It is unlikely that the U.S. cares deeply about the effects of war on Kurdish and Iraqi people; they do however worry that such a war could dilute the fight against ISIS – fought largely by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Principles such as the right to self-determination – hardly disputable in the case of the Kurds – appear to be missing from Western governments’ approach. Not even “earned sovereignty”, showing that the state-hopeful has functioning, self-governing and even relatively democratic institutions as Iraqi Kurdistan already does – has dented the Western opposition to date.

Perhaps the one “ideology” driving America’s policy is a residual defense of its 2003 Gulf War, after which Iraq looked, and still looks, a lot like a failed state. Yet America wants the post-Saddam country it helped to create to look like a success, and dismemberment does not fit the picture; no matter that “Kurdish blood has not yet dried” from fighting ISIS, as Kurdish telecom engineer Mohammed Yusuf Ameen told me by phone from Sulaymaniyah.

Russia provides another stark version of international hypocrisy regarding independence movements. Russia has long been the chief obstacle to UN membership for Kosovo, after the latter unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and was recognized by most Western countries. But Russia was only too happy to recognize the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after a short war it waged with Georgia in the summer of 2008 – perhaps as a riposte to the West’s embrace of Kosovo. On the Kurdish referendum, Russia is being coy; a recent major oil deal with Rosneft indicates that financial/resource interests will drive its response.

Similarly, Turkey has no qualms taking part in the four-decade division of Cyprus, and recognizes the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; but of course completely rejects Kurdish secessionism from its own territory.

In this stark realist environment, Israel’s response is logical: It has taken the bold position of breaking with Western allies to support Kurdish independence fairly openly. The self-interest is clear: Israel has a precedent of favoring forces that weaken a “united” hostile Arab front, such as, back in the 1980s, tacitly nurturing Hamas as a counterweight to the PLO, and fighting two and a half wars in Lebanon. A smaller, weaker Iraq is consistent with this approach.

A Western-friendly Kurdish state that could erode or fragment the Iranian Shia and Arab Sunni power struggle in the Middle East poses an attractive potential ally for Israel – sweetened for public consumption by historic friendliness, illustrated in a recent New York Times article. Given Israel’s powerful international allies, its support could actually be meaningful in advancing Kurdish independence.

But the Kurds may also have another, lower profile ally in their struggle: Palestinians. As Bassem al-Wazir, a Palestinian businessman who lived and worked in Erbil for two years, told me: “I am totally for [Kurdish independence]. If this is their national liberation, let them do it! We as an oppressed people say – good for them, hurray. You cannot keep people in a cage.”

Official Palestinian figures are keeping quiet about the referendum, mindful of the tensions regarding Iraqi territorial integrity. But Ghassan Khatib, a professor of political science at Ramallah’s Birzeit University and former Palestinian Authority minister, was less circumspect. He told me that, despite Iraqi integrity being important, “I think the Kurds have the right to self-determination and they should be allowed this right. Supporting the right of self-determination for the Kurds should encourage people to follow the same principle and support the right of self-determination, independence and statehood for the Palestinian people. Although,” he added, “we Palestinians are used to double standards, when it comes to rights by the international community.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the Arab world rejected this term as an Israeli attempt to achieve dominance in the region through non-military means, Israeli diplomacy made progress toward this end by scoring substantial achievements in the region.

Today, however, it is not Israel’s contribution that has prompted the formation of the current New Middle East. It is a product of a number of developments, including the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the rise of Iran as a regional power seeking hegemony and nuclear power, and the wave of the Arab Spring revolutions that triggered chaos in several major (Egypt, Syria) and minor (Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain) countries.

The shattering of the Arab world has forced some of its elements to seek external allies to battle threats from within and without. Together, these developments forged a new architecture of alliances and coalitions based on shared interests.

One of the typical features of the New Middle East is that alliances are not based solely along religious or ethnic lines. For example, several Sunni states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are concerned by the expansion of Iran and Shi’ite Islam, and its allies, while the Sunni states of Qatar and Turkey maintain good relations with Iran. Furthermore, the Sunni Arab World is not only joining forces against Qatar, because of the latter’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and its pro-Iranian policy, but also against a range of different Sunni organizations that are considered terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State, the Muslim Brotherhood, and more.

Another indication of the divisions among Sunnis is the split among the Palestinians, who are divided not only geographically but also ideologically and politically between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. If this were not enough, the Iraqi Kurds (who are Sunni Muslims but not Arabs) announced a referendum on their independence, exerting pressure on the federal government in Baghdad and on neighboring Turkey, which has a large Kurdish minority.

The conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam and the conflicts among the Sunnis themselves are one of the reasons that major players in the Arab world are reaching out to countries outside the Arab system. Since the pragmatic Sunni Arab countries adopt a Western-oriented policy and their armies rely on Western technology, approaching Russia is not considered a real option.

However, the West in general – the US and Europe – and limit its role. Furthermore, external allies are needed to replace Iran and Turkey, which served as local allies on the margins on the Arab system and today have either become an enemy (in the case of Iran) or hesitate to cooperate (Turkey).

Thus, Israel has suddenly found itself by default courted by major countries in the Sunni Arab world. This development offers Israel several achievements: first, recognition as an important player in the Middle Eastern arena. Second, if cooperation in the past focused on the minorities (such as Druse, Kurds, Maronites, etc.) and periphery (Turkey, Iran), now Israel has penetrated the core Sunni Arab world. Third, while Israeli-Arab cooperation occurs mainly behind the scenes, some elements are currently rising to the surface. The new public visibility of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is intentionally designed to intimidate their common enemy, Iran.

If cooperation with Israel remained secret, Israel would not be able to be used as a deterrent card. For the PA or rather for PA President Mahmoud Abbas, public cooperation with Israel against Hamas is dangerous, although the new political configuration that firmly places Hamas alongside Qatar and Iran on the side of the “bad guys” seems to have mitigated Abbas’ concerns of public indications of collaboration with Israel.

Although today’s New Middle East poses greater security threats than the former New Middle East, it is more amenable for Israel, because the Arab countries do not feel that they are being coerced into cooperation with Israel. Rather, this new constellation represents a conscious decision based on a realistic analysis of interests, and the longstanding logic “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” – a motto that has served Israel well over the years.

Israeli decision-makers identified the emergence of this unique regional opportunity relatively late, although having discovered it, they pounced upon it like a treasure chest. It is, however, too early to celebrate: cooperation between Israel and the Arab states remained limited by an undeniable “glass ceiling” whose height and thickness may be difficult to determine but its central component is clearly the Palestinian issue.

In the 1990s, Israel was permitted to penetrate the Arab world and establish diplomatic and economic ties with countries in the Middle East and North Africa in line with progress on the Palestinian issue, but these ties dissipated with the collapse of the Oslo process and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. The lesson of this period is that a significant breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinian can remove barriers and dramatically increase Israel’s regional integration.

Most Sunni Arab states have abandoned ideology in favor of political realism. It is time for the Israeli government to do so too, and make progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After an arduous negotiation process of more than three years, Israel and Turkey reached a compromise on this particular issue. According to the agreement, the Gaza blockade will not be lied as Turkey demanded; however, it will be “softened” for Turkey. Essentially, Turkey will be able to ship humanitarian aid to Gaza through Israel’s Ashdod port, and will be allowed to build a hospital and a power plant in the Gaza Strip. In fact, immediately after the deal was sealed with Israel, Turkey sent its Lady Leyla ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza.

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Deal Could Benefit the Palestnians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After an arduous negotiation process of more than three years, Israel and Turkey reached a compromise on this particular issue. According to the agreement, the Gaza blockade will not be lied as Turkey demanded; however, it will be “softened” for Turkey. Essentially, Turkey will be able to ship humanitarian aid to Gaza through Israel’s Ashdod port, and will be allowed to build a hospital and a power plant in the Gaza Strip. In fact, immediately after the deal was sealed with Israel, Turkey sent its Lady Leyla ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza.

The rapprochement with Israel also allows Turkey to play a significant political role in the region. Most opinions suggest that Turkey could be influential in mediating between Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah, and thereby contribute to a long-term unity government in Palestine. Turkey’s potential role as a mediator between Palestinians and Israel is also widely discussed. Undoubtedly, Turkey will be able to play these roles after building sufficient trust with Israel following the agreement. However, the sealed deal between the two countries also offers Turkey a chance to play other structural roles in the region, in view of Turkey’s so power and image in the eyes of Arab and Muslim societies in the Middle East, together with its long experience of statehood and diplomacy.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Deal Could Benefit the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The trend continued in 2016. Terrorist attacks were carried out in central and symbolically significant places in Ankara and Istanbul, including the central pedestrian street, the airport, a soccer stadium and now a high-end nightclub. Turkey currently has the highest number of terror victims of any OECD country, and a solution to this issue is not yet on the horizon.

Terrorist attacks in Turkey in recent years have been carried out by two main perpetrators: the Islamic State group, in protest against the campaign Turkey is waging against it in Syria and Turkey’s cooperation with the international community on that front; and the Kurdish resistance, in a call for Kurdish independence and in protest against Turkey’s military efforts to distance the Kurds from its Syrian border. While the Islamic State attacks are mainly aimed at civilians and tourists, the Kurdish resistance directs its attacks mainly against members of the Turkish security forces.

The growing motivation of both these groups to carry out attacks against Turkey, alongside their easy access to the country in light of its long borders with Syria and Iraq, form the basis for the dramatic rise in terrorism in Turkey. Additionally, Turkey’s growing involvement in events in Syria, including in military operations that Turkey had avoided in the early years of the conflict, contributes to this situation and increases the desire and the sense of urgency among its enemies to carry out attacks against it, on its territory.

The Turkish defense establishment has had difficulty responding to this phenomenon so far. The consequences of the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last July, including the arrests of military and police officers, are not making it any easier to deal with the problem.

In a speech Erdoğan gave on December 31, before the nightclub attack, he stated that his country was facing a “new war of liberation” against the challenges of terrorism. After the attack, he stressed that terrorism in his country is also related to regional events, and that Turkey is determined to eradicate it.

Nevertheless, Turkey is required to deal with these challenges at a time of ongoing tension between it and its traditional Western allies. While Turkey enjoys security cooperation with these countries by virtue of its NATO membership, it seems this is not enough.

Given this reality, some in Turkey expect that the reconciliation with Israel will help with the war on terrorism. Although the Israeli government is highlighting natural gas as the central factor in its decision to normalize relations with Turkey, Turkish interests are also focused on renewed security cooperation with Israel, as revealed in a policy dialogue conducted in Turkey at the time of reconciliation by the Mitvim Institute and the Global Poitical Trends Center, think tanks focused on regional foreign policies.

The New Year’s Eve attack in Istanbul included Israeli victims, for the second time in the past year. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin offered condolences in Turkish. New ambassadors were posted in Turkey and in Israel about a month ago. The infrastructure for a new chapter in the relationship is already in place. Hopefully, this chapter will not be primarily characterized by shared bereavement and a war on terrorism, but by regional cooperation and the pursuit of peace.

הפוסט Terror Hits Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The risks and rewards of Israeli-Turkish energy cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout that long, wasted period of ups and downs, agreements, disagreements and various crises, both sides dug themselves into their respective positions and refused to budge an inch. When the me was right, and the strategic decision to normalize relationship was taken both by Turkey and by Israel, the heretofore “critical” stumbling-blocks became negligible. Proving that when there’s a will, there’s a way.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Path to Normalization between Israel and Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:

הפוסט Turkish-Israeli Relations: Crises and Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities in Greece, Israel, and Egypt, in the last few years. China is also building its first overseas naval station in Djibouti. These moves are part of Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road vision, and will allow it to further secure its crucial sea line of communications to Europe. China’s maritime actions in the region signal that it accepts the responsibilities of a rising world power. In the spring of 2015, its naval forces evacuated not only hundreds of Chinese citizens, but also hundreds of other nationals from war-torn Yemen. There are also early signs of a more direct Chinese military and naval involvement in the region. In August 2016, a Chinese admiral visited Syria, and a month earlier China completed the delivery of a third corvette to the Algerian Navy. The Chinese also conducted a joint drill with the Russians in the Mediterranean in May 2015.

Global superpowers like China and Russia are not the only ones to pose a challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Several sub-state armed groups share the stage. Back in 2006, the Lebanese Hezbollah damaged an Israeli naval vessel, killing four sailors, when it effectively fired a land-sea c-802 missile at the Israeli flagship Saar 5 Class corvette INS Hanit. In recent years, Islamist groups have attacked a merchant ship in the Suez Canal and Egyptian navy vessels on the Mediterranean coast. A senior NATO official expressed concern earlier this year that an even graver threat will evolve in the central Mediterranean, following the expansion of ISIS in Libya.

Yet, states are still important in the maritime regional security architecture. American engagement in the region has waxed and waned since their navy operated against the Barbary pirates in the early 19^th century. In the latest chapter of American naval power projection in the region, the 6^th Fleet presence declined dramatically. At least for the US and China, and to a lesser extent even Russia, the eastern Mediterranean is a peripheral region, far from their core interests. Unlike great powers, local actors will remain engaged in the region due to the dictates of geography. For the regional actors, defending their shores and their sea lines of communications is a core interest: Not only because they are here to stay, but the discovery of offshore gas beginning in the 1990s raises the stakes for Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and possibly other regional actors. Indeed, regional actors have been building their naval capabilities, including power projection abilities in the last few years. In 2016, Israel received its fifth (out of six) German-built diesel submarines. A year earlier it signed a deal with the same German shipyard to purchase four multitask corvettes.  In June, Egypt took delivery of the French-built Mistral class landing helicopter dock, and is expected to receive a second one by the fall. This year Egypt also began the local construction of the first of four French-designed Gowind Corvettes, purchased marine helicopters from Russia, commissioned a missile corvette donated by Russia, and a FREMM class French-Italian frigate. Talks of a possible deal for two more French corvettes commenced in 2015. Egypt also took delivery of two American fast missile boats during the summer of 2015, completing an order for four. Cairo also purchased from the United States submerged Harpoon missiles for its submarine fleet.

Similarly, the Turkish Navy, a nine-century-old institution – continued the expansion of its power projection capabilities. In April 2016, Ankara opened an overseas military base in Qatar, which will include naval units. A Turkish shipyard began in May the construction of a landing helicopter dock (LHD) to be completed by 2021. President Erdoğan hinted that his country would move to construct a fully-fledged carrier in the next decade.

Robust regional navies suggest both risks and opportunities. On the risk side, growing naval prowess enhances the chances that an escalating regional conflict can turn violent. Turkish self-confidence on the seas, for example, can lead Ankara to take an even more assertive position over Cyprus’ gas prospecting. In turn, this can affect great powers by forcing them into conflicts they would rather avoid. A possible Hezbollah-Israel clash, for example, might expose the American forces operating in the region to allegations that they support the Israeli effort by virtue of the American-Israeli alliance. Strong regional actors could also humiliate, and even constrain, great power activity. Back in 1968, The Israeli Airforce shot down Soviet jets over Egypt, and more recently it was Turkey that downed a Russian jet. Both events embarrassed Moscow, and in effect, presented a constraint of sorts on its freedom of action.

Effective regional navies also create opportunities. They can serve as allies. After all, three strong regional navies – Egypt, Turkey, and Israel – have solid (though at times, strained) relations with the United States. As such, they can offer a compensation of sorts to the limited presence of the US Navy in the region. Even if not fully-fledged allies of the United States on the waters, some of the regional powers, notably Israel and Turkey, surely share America’s concern over the anti-access/area denial “bubble” the Russians created on Syria’s shores. This is fertile ground for cooperation.

Therefore, although external powers are yet again active in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and despite being challenged by non-state actors from below, regional states still matter in shaping the maritime security environment. The increased capabilities, and expanded reach of the Egyptian, Turkish, and Israeli navies coupled with the Russian and American presence in the region, as well as Chinese ambitions there, all create a more complex environment. In a final analysis, this complexity presents opportunities for the United States, as most of the strong regional actors are closer to Washington than to Moscow. This remains the case, even with the current glitches between the United States and its traditional allies Turkey, Egypt and Israel. If Washington plays this new iteration of a maritime regional “great game” well, it has much to benefit. However, in order to exploit the potential benefits of the relationship with regional states, Washington needs to re-build trust with these regional actors. A clear signal from Washington that the East Mediterranean remains a high priority for the United States, would be a good start.

(originally published by the Hoover Institution)

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Policy Recommendations for Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the army legitimizes these moves is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of how the Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and how the Turkish political culture has taken root over the years. Indeed, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, the Turkish army succeeded – in different ways – to bring about regime change. However, in the last two decades, Turkey has developed significant immunity against recurrence, and the failed coup attempt of July 15 is an example of this.

The main change in the status of the army took place in the early years of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reign. One of Erdogan’s main objectives, after his party’s first victory in the 2002 elections, was to promote Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. One of the most prominent conditions the EU presented to the Turkish leadership was to strengthen democracy by making the military leadership accountable to the political one. This also served the goals of Erdogan, who feared that the military would attempt to end his rule, as happened in 1997 to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who also came from the ranks of political Islam.

הפוסט Why the coup in Turkey wasn’t successful הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the deal, Israel will deposit $20 million in a Turkish bank account as compensation to the families of those who died during the I.D.F. operation to seize the Mavi Marmara in 2010. In return, Turkey will drop the lawsuit against four senior Israeli officers deemed responsible for the operation. Turkey will also be allowed to play a more central role in supplying humanitarian aid to, and supervising the development of basic infrastructure projects in, the Gaza Strip. Shipments, however, will still be inspected at Israel’s Ashdod port prior to transport via the Erez Crossing—the first of which arrived this weekend. Finally, both sides agreed to exchange ambassadors in the coming weeks.

Analysis of the deal has been skeptical; rapprochement does not change the underlying fact that Turkey continues to support Hamas, an organization committed to Israel’s destruction. One does not need to be an expert in order to predict that the next round of violence in the Gaza Strip—more of a when than an if—will put the deal’s resilience to the test.

But the fact that the two sides reached an accord suggests that differences over Gaza are taking a backseat to more pressing matters. Many didn’t believe that the deal would happen, and yet it did.

For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel is the first step to reversing a failed foreign policy that led to its regional isolation. It is no coincidence that the final round of negotiations began shortly after Turkey downed a Russian jet along the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, or that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued an apology to Moscow shortly after signing the deal with Israel. Increased security cooperation, enabled in part by Ankara’s decision to lift its veto of a permanent Israeli mission to NATO, should contribute to Turkish efforts to contain ISIS as well as joint Israeli-Turkish interest in limiting Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel is also concerned with regional instability, yet its desire to export natural gas seems to be an equally dominant incentive. Of the multiple export options available to Israel, none are more financially viable than the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey. The obstacles standing before a project of this kind are many: a pipeline would run through Cypriot territorial waters and therefore requires Nicosia’ approval; the global energy market could continue to plummet thereby reducing investor interest; and, of course, bilateral ties could collapse again prior to a hypothetical pipeline’s completion. However, given the degree to which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the deal’s impact upon Israel’s future energy security, there can be little doubt as to its centrality in this story.

Deep distrust remains on both sides. Israel and Turkey share many overlapping strategic interests, but they prioritize them differently. Regional challenges such as the Syrian civil war, and the threat of ISIS are not necessarily a source of cohesion. Yet in the last few months, both sides engaged in a public relations campaign in order develop the necessary goodwill for reconciliation. This is likely to continue in the coming months.

Forging a new narrative requires the implementation of a multi-tier process that includes the diversification of official channels that enhance Israeli-Turkish strategic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Civil society actors will play an important role in bolstering these efforts and increasing people-to-people dialogue. Each country’s business community, indirectly responsible for keeping the possibility of reconciliation alive during this period of diplomatic tension, must also be vocal partners in defining the future of the relationship.

Most importantly, Israeli and Turkish leaderships must create a mechanism that will allow them to effectively manage future conflicts. Throughout the decades, Israel-Turkey ties have often been impacted by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But whereas previous Turkish support for the Palestinian cause was limited to diplomatic rhetoric, patronage under Erdogan and the A.K.P. became increasingly proactive, particularly in Gaza, necessitating a reevaluation of the relationship between Turkey and Israel.

As long as Turkey’s relationship with Hamas remains political, détente could provide a window of opportunity to rebuild the Gaza Strip. As revealed a few days after the signing of the deal, Turkey will be permitted to transfer funds to banks in the Gaza for the purpose of financing projects previously approved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Plans are already underway to build a desalination plant and power station. Basic infrastructure projects not only improve the daily lives of Gazans, but also could stave off future conflict between Israel and Hamas by creating a valuable channel of communication that runs through Ankara.

Why should the United States support this process? After all, Erdogan and Netanyahu are persona non grata at the White House these days. Neither has been particularly supportive of President Barack Obama’s Middle East policies, and that may not change after he leaves office in January. However, American security interests are dependent on Washington’s ability to cooperate with and lead its allies. Now that the reconciliation process has confirmed the sources of Israeli-Turkish tension and mutual interest, the next administration will be better positioned to incentivize cooperation over discord.

Rapprochement signals the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. But as emphasized by Israel’s lead negotiator with Turkey, Joseph Ciechanover, the deal only planted a “seedling”. Both parties come away from the reconciliation process with a better understanding of one another’s interests, and therefore will be better adapted to repair and cultivate this partnership going forward. The future of the relationship will be determined by how the two sides choose to care for and grow their partnership, hopefully with an eye toward not only their immediate interests, but also the long-term prospects for peace in the region.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Supporting Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Expectations are that a deal may be announced following the next round of talks, planned for the second half of June, and reconciliatory messages have been voiced in mid- June by the Turkish prime minister as well as by Israeli government officials.

The agreement is set to upgrade Israel-Turkey relations to full diplomatic ties, and enable a return to normal relations. Major differences will remain between the two countries (including on Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians), but the two countries will be able to return to constructive working relations, as was the case in the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power, starting in late 2002.

Israel and Turkey have been engaged in negotiations to try and mend relations for several years, since the flotilla incident occurred in May 2010. This process had many ups and downs, moving between progress and setbacks.

But the fact that despite the growing mistrust and harsh rhetoric the two sides have found their way time and time again to the negotiation table means that they both see value in improving the relationship.

A public opinion poll carried out by the Mitvim Institute in late 2015 showed that for the Israeli public, security cooperation is the most important reason to mend ties with Turkey. However, possible export of Israeli natural gas has become an important factor as well. While security and economics are important driving forces, the new chapter of Israel-Turkey relations should include more enhanced civil society cooperation among NGOs and think tanks, including in the fields of conflict resolution and democracy.

For example, over the past four years, the Mitvim Institute and GPoT Center have been working together to support the mending of Israel-Turkey relations, and this cooperation can be a positive model for others. There is also an initiative to launch a Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum, which can help fill a real gap in the field of cooperation between NGOs.

A key pillar in the agreement relates to Gaza. Efforts have been made to find a formula that will address Turkey’s concern about living conditions there, and Israel’s concern regarding security threats.

According to media reports, Turkey will be granted somewhat of a special status in regard to Gaza, which will enable it to support the people of Gaza through providing humanitarian aid, as well as water and energy. Such a formula can enable Israel to improve living conditions in Gaza, without having Hamas be able to claim credit for it. Turkey will be seen as the one to praise for this achievement.

Other regional actors are also of significance. Saudi Arabia, which is gradually becoming a more important factor in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, is also becoming more relevant to Israel- Turkey relations. Although Israel- Saudi relations do not formally exist, there is increased visibility to contacts between the two states (i.e. joint panels of Israeli and Saudi speakers in various conferences).

The Saudis have also stepped up their cooperation with Turkey, and the close relations emerging between Saudi Arabia and Egypt can be valuable for attempts to mend Turkey-Egypt relations. Efforts in this regards have reportedly already taken place. This is something that Israel should encourage, as a parallel Israel-Turkey and Egypt-Turkey reconciliations will shape a much more positive, and win-win, environment in the eastern Mediterranean.

A new chapter in Israel-Turkey relations seems to be quickly approaching, producing a set fresh of bilateral and regional opportunities that are waiting to be explored and acted upon. The Israeli-Turkish reconciliation should be seen as a first step in devising a new win-win regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean, and not merely as a way to increase security coordination and to better confront joint threats.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Turkey on the Verge of an Agreement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been 14 years since a coalition government ruled Turkey, and this is having visible effects. A political culture of compromise and flexibility has given way to an increasingly centralized regime, which is taking aggressive steps against political rivals and is working to silence critical voices in the media and civil society. Erdogan seeks full control over Turkey. He does not at the moment have the ability to change the governing system from parliamentary to presidential because of the absence of a parliamentary majority. But this is in fact already happening. The process led by Erdogan to replace Davutoglu is another step in a general change to the rules of the game that is Turkish politics.

No truly fundamental, ideological, or political disagreement erupted between Erdogan and Davutoglu and led to the prime minister’s stepping down months after leading his party to a clear election victory. Their disagreements, which began to sprout visibly over a year ago, centered on attempts – while very limited – by Davutoglu to give real meaning to his role as prime minister. One example was Davutoglu’s (failed) endeavor in 2015 to make Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, a member of parliament, against Erdogan’s wishes; another was Davutoglu’s recent, overly prominent role in the successful negotiations with the European Union on handling of the Syrian refugee crisis.

All this was not to President Erdogan’s liking, which was seen in the Justice and Development Party’s decision early this month to withdraw from the prime minister the authority to make appointments within the party. This was the signal that symbolized the beginning of the end for Davutoglu’s term. And yet, Davutoglu refrained in his emotional farewell speech from challenging Erdogan. He emphasized their years-long friendship and promised to serve the party as a member of parliament.

Even if he does so in the short term, it’s likely that the tensions between the two will overflow at some point. Davutoglu is not the first of Erdogan’s partners to find himself on the other side of the fence. Other former leaders in the Justice and Development Party, including some who helped found the party, have criticized Erdogan’s centralized behavior and his retreat from the path that characterized the party when it originated. Former president and foreign minister Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister Yaşar Yakış, and former deputy prime minister Bülent Arınç, have all come out at one point or another against moves championed by Erdogan. And yet, despite rumors in the past about the possibility of the creation of a new party out of those religious-conservative circles, not one of them has chosen so far to run against Erdogan in the political arena. It is possible that in the short term, Davutoglu’s resignation will further reinforce this group.

The Turkish plan: zero problems with neighbors

Davutoglu’s resignation also symbolized the end of an era in Turkey’s foreign policy. He joined politics after an academic career as a professor of political science, during which time he wrote extensively on his ideal Turkish foreign policy. His thick volume provided guiding principles and arrangement for Turkey’s desired conduct on the international stage. As foreign minister, Davutoglu worked to implement the paradigm he had developed. He steered Turkey’s foreign policy away from the conservative character that had characterized it for decades and towards a pro-active, ambitious approach.

Davutoglu worked to situate Turkey as a major country on the global stage, one implementing a multi-regional foreign policy. He worked to transform it into a leading actor in the Middle East, based on Ottoman heritage, and to create a reality in which Turkey has “zero problems with the neighbors”.

At the beginning of his term as foreign minister, Turkey indeed succeeded in attaining achievement on the regional and international stages. But later – particularly after the ebbing of power held by political Islam in the Middle East and the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from the Egyptian presidency – Turkey found itself more isolated and uninfluential.

What’s more, the aggressive policy towards Syria championed by Davutoglu, consisting of a commitment to topple Assad, did not yield positive results. Quite the opposite. Not only did Turkey fail to attain its stated goals in Syria, the ramifications of the Syrian war have exacted mounting security, economic, and social costs.

Just at the moment that Turkey’s foreign policy is seen as having failed, Davutoglu managed to supply his final diplomatic achievement, which may have helped hasten his downfall. Davutoglu, seen as of late as a likeable and respected dialogue partner (relative to Erdogan) by Western leaders – especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel – had a central role in arriving at the agreement with the European Union on Syrian refugees.

This agreement included a historic European commitment to Turkey to cancel the visa requirements for Turks traveling to EU nations. It was a commitment that Turkey did not receive even in the days of the great democratic reforms that Erdogan supported during the first half of the prior decade.

The irony is that Davutoglu, who as foreign minister was suspected by the West to be working to distance Turkey from its traditional pro-Western policy, is with his resignation receiving accolades from the West. And yet, the main concern in the West – and among many in Turkey – is not necessarily the change of prime minister. After all, Davutoglu is still seen as obedient to Erdogan, and so his replacement will be. The concern is over the additional erosion of Turkish democracy, which is guided by the nation’s president and is becoming more difficult to bring to a halt.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Erdogan keeps changing the rules of the Turkish political game הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet with king Abdullah’s passing in January 2015 it seemed that the two states were growing apart. The media was quick to point out disagreements on issues such as the countries’ approaches to Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria, where the Saudis demanded Assad’s departure as part of any outcome and the Egyptians saw Assad as part of the solution. In Yemen, too, despite expressing support Egypt was reticent about contributing troops. However, despite tactical disagreements, the two countries continued to share common strategic interests vis-à-vis regional threats and challenges.

Therefore, Salman’s visit is a testament to the strong relationship – one might even say the alliance – between the two countries. Historically, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been a permanent feature of the Arab state system despite short periods of rivalry and the occasional military confrontation (e.g. the 1962- 1967 conflict in Yemen).

The visit is consequential for the countries’ bilateral relationship, primarily for Egypt.

According to Egyptian media, no fewer than 36 agreements, worth $25b., were signed during the visit, including establishing a Saudi investment fund worth $16b. The headline is the provision of Saudi aid (perhaps even from the Gulf states) to rebuild Sinai, including creating a free-trade zone, building a university named after Salman and erecting a bridge to connect Sinai and Saudi Arabia. The bridge will allow countless tourists and pilgrims, as well as goods, to cross from one continent to the other. Like the Suez Canal expansion, this project will also contribute significantly to the Egyptian economy. That Sinai is the focus of governmental aid is not surprising, because it is meant to be part of Cairo’s response to the challenge posed by the radical jihadist organizations. The regime understands full well that the answer to the problems in Sinai is not purely military.

During the visit, it was announced that the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, located at the entrance of the Gulf of Eilat, would be handed over to the Saudis, who previously controlled them. In 1950, the Saudis decided to lease the islands to Egypt in order to facilitate the Arab boycott and maritime quarantine of Israel. The islands were conquered by Israel in 1956 and again in 1967 but returned to Egypt after the 1979 peace agreement. Therefore, the current agreement will return them to the rightful owners.

Israel was reassured by Saudi Arabia, as admitted by Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, of its freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran. This revelation indicates that in spite of the absence of formal relations, Israel and Saudi Arabia hold indirect open channels.

From Cairo, King Salman proceeded to Turkey, another regional ally. Apart from strengthening bilateral relations, the king may be mediating a possible Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. Relations between Egypt and Turkey deteriorated following the Turkish support of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Gaza. Salman might also be in a position to smooth the differences between Israel and Turkey, who are close, according to media reports, to finalizing their reconciliation over the Mavi Marmara incident.

In theory, Egypt, Saudi Arabia (and the GCC countries), Turkey and Israel stand on the same side of the fence against Iran and its proxy allies in the Middle East, as well the various Sunni jihadist groups. Yet, the existing antagonism between Egypt and Turkey, on the one hand, and Israel and Turkey, on the other, prevents the emergence of a viable regional axis. In this situation, Saudi Arabia has a unique place: it’s the only regional player that possesses the financial, religious and political clout to influence the other players’ roles.

Since King Salman’s accession to power in January 2015, Saudi Arabia began playing a more assertive role in regional affairs out of concern for its security and stability. In the absence of any meaningful Arab player, Saudi Arabia emerged as an Arab leader by default. It may now serve as the linchpin of a new Middle East grouping.

Though Israelis are customarily apprehensive of the Saudi kingdom because of its puritanical Wahhabi doctrine, recent developments should be welcomed by Israeli decision makers, as the Saudis consider Israel a possible partner in the struggle against Iran and the jihadist groups, as long as this partnership is kept behind closed doors.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Saudi Arabia: Lynchpin of the moderate axis in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Disaster diplomacy: The attack that brought Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In mid-December, officials from both countries met in Switzerland in order to finalize principles for an eventual agreement to normalize ties. Reports confirm that an outline and framework for the reconciliation agreement has indeed been reached, although some important issues – such as the blockade on the Gaza Strip – are still unresolved.  Israel and Turkey came close to sealing a reconciliation deal on several occasions since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, most recently in the spring of 2014. However, while diplomats managed to find formulas that would overcome the differences between the countries, political leadership in Ankara and Jerusalem was hesitant to put the agreement into practice. This time around, there seems to be a convergence of economic and geostrategic interests, as well as political will on both sides.

Signs of this steady and deliberate warming have appeared more frequently in recent months. Triggered by joint economic interests over Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries, as well as mutual concern over developments in Syria, Israel and Turkey committed themselves to a sequence of steps that would create a better public atmosphere, and expand upon preexisting areas of cooperation.

Days before the meeting in Switzerland, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Israel-Turkey reconciliation “would be good for us, Israel, Palestine and the entire region.” These sentiments were also expressed by Israel’s Foreign Ministry Director General, Dore Gold, who emphasized “Israel has always strived for stable relations with Turkey and is constantly examining ways to achieve that goal.” In the last five years, statements of this nature were virtually nonexistent.

Since reports of the meeting first aired, additional positive statements were voiced. Turkish Deputy PM Ömer Çelik’s stated that “without a doubt, the state of Israel and the Israeli people are friends of Turkey.” Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said, “There is a serious, meaningful chance for thawing and normalizing relations between Israel and Turkey,” and that this is a huge opportunity for cooperation regarding natural gas.

The leaders of Israel and Turkey should not let this opportunity slip away. Rather, they should capitalize on the current good will and positive momentum, move expeditiously to resolve their remaining differences, sign a reconciliation agreement and restore full diplomatic ties.

Such a deal will not only serve the immediate interests of both countries but it would also contribute to regional security and stability by countering the advance of violent extremism in the Middle East. Moreover, it may also enable Turkey to become a more significant and constructive player in efforts to reconstruct Gaza, support inter-Palestinian reconciliation and promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In his statement on the topic, President Erdoğan said, “I don’t believe the Israeli public is pleased with the current state of relations.” Indeed, an October 2015 public opinion poll conducted by Mitvim (the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies) showed that the Israeli public sees reasons for mending ties with Turkey, with prospects for security cooperation on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Syria topping the list. In Turkey too, there seems to be wide support for the move, as reflected by a statement of Turkey’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who welcomes rapprochement with Israel.

Signing this agreement is a crucial step forward but more efforts will be required in order to restore mutual trust and understanding between our societies and to develop a new narrative in Israel-Turkey relations. In particular, the two countries should work to restoring mutual trust, constructively market the reconciliation agreement to their respective publics, establish diverse official channels of communication, advance new economic initiatives, launch mechanisms for joint analysis and coordination regarding regional events, engage in mutual conflict resolution support and increase dialogue between civil society organizations and new elites.

In particular, civil society organizations – think tanks, universities, and NGOs – should be encouraged to engage in this process. As our experience working together over the last few years has proven, such independent efforts can make impactful contributions to the transformation of bilateral relations.

Turkey and Israel are on the verge of opening a new chapter in their relationship that will potentially contribute to peace, safety, and prosperity in both countries and within the region. Let’s seal the deal.

(originally published in Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Time to seal the Israel-Turkey deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara.

The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s anger with Assad and comparative ambivalence to the jihadist threat prompted many in the West to question this NATO ally’s commitment and value to regional security.

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Iran in recent years has undergone a major shift, as has its broader Middle East neighborhood policy. Ankara’s soft-power charm offensive throughout the region ran up against the so-called “Arab Spring” and hard power realities, falling short of its ambitions for a neo-Ottoman role in the region. Meanwhile, Tehran has been eagerly anticipating a final nuclear settlement that would once again open Iran up to international markets. During the days of Ahmadinejad, Turkey was Iran’s largest trading partner and a key international advocate. Ankara repeatedly called for lifting international sanctions, as they inhibited the economic growth of its own eastern provinces, many of which engaged in black market trading with their Iranian neighbors just across the border. The pinnacle of this relationship was the infamous Tehran Declaration that Brazil and Turkey proudly announced with Iran in 2010. Despite being quietly killed by Washington because of “miscommunications,” the deal in many ways set the parameters and precedent for subsequent negotiations and the final Iran deal.

So why aren’t more Turkish officials applauding the signing of the Iran deal and the ending of the sanctions regime? First of all, experts disagree on the extent that Turkey will benefit from Iran’s return to the global economy or how investment that once was destined for Turkey may begin to find its way to Iran as the hot new regional destination. But more importantly, the JCPOA threatens Turkey’s regional position, given both Iran’s use of proxies across the region and, specifically, Tehran’s tacit support of the PKK in recent months.

Look no further than Syria, where Turkey and Iran are visibly working at cross-purposes. Much to Ankara’s chagrin, developments in Syria appear to be working in Iran’s favor just as they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The shifting realities on the ground are precipitating the establishment of yet another Kurdish entity along Turkey’s border, stoking fears in Ankara that the Kurds could attain their long desired state.

Turkey established a healthy working relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Yet, the close association between the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK kept Ankara from developing a similar relationship with Syria’s Kurds. And although Erdoğan was in the midst of peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, he believed that bridging this divide would damage his reputation amongst nationalist voters. Direct cooperation with the PYD was a domestic political risk Turkey’s president was unwilling to take given that he has lost his once reliable Kurdish votes and now must appeal to his more traditional Turkish nationalist base. Instead, Ankara collaborated with those in the Syrian opposition who would pursue regime change in Damascus while respecting Turkish sovereignty.

The flaws of this policy were exposed during the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane last autumn. As the United States frantically launched airstrikes to repel the jihadist advance, Turkish tanks overlooking the battlefield stood idle. Little surprise that Turkish Kurds, feeling betrayed by the man who once depicted himself as a champion of the Kurdish peace process and Kurdish rights, cast their ballots against Erdoğan in June’s elections.

In response, Erdoğan has transformed himself into a wartime president.

Legitimized by the Suruc bombing, Turkey’s two-front military campaign against the Islamic State and the PKK reminded many in the West of its irreplaceable geostrategic value and was initially received with great fanfare. But American observers of the region largely ignored the intense media battle this operation has sparked between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian state media repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting the Islamic State, even going as far as to assert that Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye visited wounded jihadists in Syria, while in Turkey the pro-AKP media blamed Iran for instigating regional violence through its multifarious proxies, particularly the PKK. One pro-government Daily Sabah column went as far as claiming that the Iran deal emboldened Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations like the PKK while employing rhetoric similar to the Iran deal’s opponents in Washington. And on August 24 images circulated in the Turkish press of Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli visiting the Qandil Mountains where the PKK operates.

This isn’t mere propaganda. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara amidst speculation that Erdoğan refused him an official face-to-face meeting.

The revival of the Turkish–Persian balance of power — a narrative that dominated the Middle East for centuries — is just the first ripple caused by the Iran deal, and should deeply concern U.S. officials. By minimally satisfying American needs for the sake of their own, competing regional goals, both states are undermining U.S. strategy. Can Washington turn the dispute between Ankara and Tehran into an opportunity to develop a coherent Syria strategy? The odds are slim. But now more than ever the United States must be aware of these cross-purposes and factor them into its broader regional calculations.

(originally published in War on the Rocks)

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The working sessions of the dialogue included opening remarks by Prof. Mensur Akgun and Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki of GPoT Center, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Gabriel Mitchell of the Mitvim Institute, and Alan Makovsky, former top Middle East Advisor at the House Foreign Affairs Committee. These remarks were followed by a discussion among all participants, which is summarized in this document.

הפוסט The US role in Israel-Turkey relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli foreign policy is subordinated to the security establishment and focuses on public diplomacy (hasbara) efforts, rather than advancing diplomatic processes that would enable Israel a fresh start among the nations, regional belonging, and a future of peace, security and prosperity.

Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies is working to change that. In 2014-15, a multi-disciplinary task-team at the Mitvim Institute formulated a proposal for a new paradigm for Israel’s foreign policy. This paper presents its guiding principles and main points.

The new paradigm introduces a foreign policy that is pro-peace, multi-regional, outward-facing, modern and inclusive. It is based on several building blocks: cultivating relationships, taking initiative, identifying opportunities, and being flexible, multi-dimensional and value-based.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Syriza chose to form a coalition government with Panos Kammenos’ populist and farright (though often-referred to as centre-right) Independent Greeks (ANEL), that won 13 seats with 4.8% of the votes. Not only that, but Tsipras appointed Kammenos as the new Minister of Defense. Although leftist Nikos Kotzias, Syriza’s new Foreign Minister, is more cool-headed and pragmatist, if assertive, than Kammenos, the Ministry of Defense plays an important role in security issues and Kammenos might adopt a harder line that could challenge Greece’s overall foreign policy with particular respect to relations with Turkey and Israel. Overall, these developments may signal a new approach in Greek foreign policy on issues ranging from the EU, to Russia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

הפוסט Syriza’s Victory and Greek-Israeli Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations after the War in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט What is the role of Israel in Turkey’s political universe? A Q&A with Dr. Emre Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel Is Challenging America to Support Kurdish Independence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One can say that the Palestinian reconciliation process is also an outcome of the Arab spring. While in the Arab world the masses flocked to the streets and demanded the removal of tyrannous regimes, Palestinian city squares by and large remained quiet and empty. The only voices heard in the Palestinian public sphere were calls to end the intra-Palestinian division.

The failure of the Israeli government-PLO peace talks and the economic crisis in the Gaza Strip pushed the rivals into one each other arms. The announcement of future reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could be described as one more initiative in the process of achieving a way out of the Palestinian political deadlock.

Turkey has emerged as a regional super power in the Palestinian reconciliation process. Hamas sees Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule as a role model for a future Palestinian state. One should also remember that Turkey was the first country that recognized the legitimacy of Hamas to rule over the Palestinian territories after it won the election of June 2006 in a fair democratic process.

Chairman of Hamas politburo Khaled Mashal has a very good personal relationship with the AK Party leadership. On Sept. 30, 2012 Mashal was a guest of honor at the AK Party congress, alongside former Egyptian President Morsi. Since then, Mashal and Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ prime minister in the Gaza Strip, held several meetings with Erdoğan on the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process and on Turkey’s potential role as mediator.

Despite the strong personal relationship between Hamas and the AK Party leadership, the Erdoğan rule did not undermine Mahmoud Abass position as PLO chairman. The Turkish government declined Hamas’ request to open a representative office in Ankara. By doing so, the Turkish government gave Mahmoud Abbas legitimacy in the Islamic sphere. That comes as no surprise. Historically Turkey was also one of the countries in the world that recognized the status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1975.

As we stand days or hours from the establishment of Palestinian unity government, the stability of this government could function in more effective ways under Turkish sponsorship. There is a lot of sympathy in Turkey for the Palestinian street as Erdoğan has won the hearts and the minds of the Palestinians.

The Mavi Maramra incident, the crisis of the Israeli-Turkish relationship and warm hospitality that Turkey gave to ex-Palestinians prisoners that were released in the Gilad Shalit prisoners exchange deals make Turkey very popular among Palestinians.

If Turkey will be more involved in the Palestinian reconciliation process it can open a new window of opportunities in the region. The current state of Turkish-Israeli relations further hinders this position. Perhaps Turkey can play the role of mediator between Israel and Hamas. Even though Israel perceives Turkey as a dishonest broker, and as a hostile state, if Israel were to ask Turkey – which is a regional superpower – to play the role of mediator between them and the Palestinians, it could be the beginning of building a new trusting relationship between the parties.

There is a great a need for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation in these days of regional instability. Both countries are aware to the ramifications of the Syrian civil war and don’t want the violence to cross their borders. There are also new economic factors that can pave the way for renewed Israeli-Turkish relationships that will be based upon strengthened mutual interests. Israel is important for Turkey. The Turkish Industry and Business Association identified Israel as a priority investment partner. Turkey is important for Israel in terms of creating a sphere of regional stability. The discovery of the Israeli gas field and the Turkish need for this energy can boost ties between the sides and be the base for a new treaty that will combine all of the elements that were mentioned before.

The Arab Revolutions created a new Middle East and there are new challenges and opportunities. It is a time for a fresh start, for a period of hope, for a quiet and secure life. Israel and Turkey as regional powers should create a new and stable environment of peace, not only for its own citizens, but for all of the people of the era.

(originally published in The Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט Palestinian reconciliation process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The visit was carried out in light of progress made towards Israel-Turkey reconciliation. It was aimed at preparing for the day after an agreement is signed between the two countries. Yakış’s visit included a series of events and meetings with prominent politicians and diplomats, which focused on bi-lateral issues, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and regional affairs.

On 20 May 2014, H.E. Yakış spoke at a special event at the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), organized by the Mitvim Institute and the Knesset Lobby for Regional Cooperation headed by MK Nitzan Horowitz (Meretz). The event was attended by members of Knesset, diplomats, scholars, journalists, and businessmen.

The following day (21 May 2014), H.E. Yakış also gave a public lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he was hosted by the Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies, the Forum of Turkish Studies, the European Forum, and the Mitvim Institute. His lecture dealt with Turkey’s foreign policy and the future of Turkey-Israel relations.

During the visit, Israel’s Channel 2 News broadcasted an exclusive interview with H.E. Yakış, conducted by Arad Nir, the channel’s foreign news editor.

הפוסט Turkey’s Former Foreign Minister, H.E. Yaşar Yakış, Visited Israel to Promote Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Anadolu Agency (AA) that Israel desires positive relations with Turkey and hopes reconciliation will arrive in the near future, the circumstances under which those statements were given – while exposing an alleged Iranian arms shipment to the Gaza Strip – speaks volumes about his position toward rapprochement. For the two former partners to officially bury the hatchet, a creative solution must be found to solving Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s demand that Israel lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The blockade is an essential aspect to Israel’s security as long as Hamas or any other actor deemed a threat to the lives of Israeli citizens controls the area.

Those positions did not change because of the Gaza flotilla and in fact have only been reinforced by the Klos C’s March 5, 2014 capture.

However, Israel has shown remarkable flexibility on the Gaza issue since Netanyahu’s Obama-orchestrated- apology to Erdoğan one year ago. In that time, Israel oversaw a boost in Turkish humanitarian aid delivered via the Ashdod Port, in addition to signing off on the transfer of materials required to build a Turkish hospital in Gaza. The policy shift was impactful enough to garner the praise of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and will likely continue when diplomatic ties are restored.

Confidence building measures like these have the added benefit of playing a role in the rapprochement process and according to multiple sources, Netanyahu received a copy of a draft agreement in mid-February.

As reported, the deal would include a $20-23 million compensation package that Israel would pay to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who died aboard the MV Mavi Marmara in May 2010. In exchange, Turkey would pass a legislation that would nullify all ongoing lawsuits against the IDF soldiers and officers involved in the raid. Finally, the agreement would draw up a blueprint for normalizing ties between the two countries.

Netanyahu has now been mulling over the draft agreement (which is rumored to only lightly touch upon the Gaza blockade) for nearly one month, which likely prompted Erdoğan’s crabby one-liner that, “Nothing will happen without lifting the siege on Gaza.”

This, of course, only gives Israel’s premier more reason to pause and reconsider.

Netanyahu knows that even if he did sign off on the draft agreement, no consensus between the two parties would be reached until after the completion of Turkey’s municipal elections on March 30.

Erdoğan does not wish to reach a deal with Israel while his party is still campaigning for votes. Elections can’t impact rapprochement, but rapprochement could hypothetically impact elections. (There is a counterargument that Netanyahu doesn’t want to give Erdoğan a critical diplomatic achievement prior to elections.) And while reaching a deal is important to Netanyahu, it is secondary compared to the prevention of Iran’s nuclear program and the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Don’t forget, Netanyahu rejected a draft agreement in 2011 when the conditions were not deemed favorable. He is willing to let talks wither and die until the timing is better and has the support of his cabinet and the Israeli public.

Both Israel and Turkey are looking to end this period of agitation. Rapprochement serves each country’s national interests with the potential of regional influence, natural gas cooperation, and support for each other’s peace processes all on the table.

But in order for this to happen, the Gaza blockade must be negotiated separately. The alternative is for Netanyahu, whose critical worldview has only been reinforced of late by rocket fire and missile smuggling, to again walk away from a deal.

(originally published in the Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט For Netanyahu, security trumps rapprochement with Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Findings of a Mitvim Poll on Israel’s Foreign Policy, 2013 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two years later Erdoğan has become a persona non grata in Egypt. Following Morsi’s downfall, Erdoğan and other Turkish ministers lashed out at the Egyptian Army. Erdoğan considered Morsi’s ouster a blow to democracy and a betrayal of the popular will, and resolved that Turkey could not sit back as the violence in Egypt escalated.

Erdoğan sparks outrage in Egypt. He is perceived to be meddling in Egypt’s internal affairs and his conduct considered a breach of diplomatic protocol, aimed at further dividing Egyptian society.

As the tension mounted, Egypt also announced that it would deny Erdoğan access from its territory to the Gaza Strip. This supposed sanction may be a blessing in disguise for Erdoğan. Since 2011, Hamas leaders and residents of Gaza have been awaiting Erdoğan’s visit. Dates have been set, announcements made and plans approved – but the visit has yet to take place. Reasons vary, but Erdoğan’s inability to carry out his Gaza visit exemplifies the gap between Turkey’s foreign policy declarations and their implementation.

These recent tensions undermine one of the interesting post-Arab Spring coalitions. During Morsi’s term, Egypt and Turkey, two Western allies who, in the past, inhibited each other’s efforts to gain regional hegemony, began building an intimate relationship.

The rise of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was welcomed by Erdoğan. It was thus only natural for the AKP to invite Morsi to Turkey, as a guest of honor, at its September 2012 congress.

Turkey was delighted to lend a helping hand, promising Morsi’s Egypt unprecedented financial aid. The two nation’s militaries also began building closer relations. In November 2012, Erdoğan made another visit to Egypt; this time under the pretext of Israel’s operation; a crisis that also motivated Davutoğlu to visit Gaza while hostilities were still ongoing.

Davutoğlu coined the term “Axis of Democracy” to describe the emerging relationship between Turkey and Egypt. However, in a development evocative of the collapse of the strategic partnership between Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Turko-Egyptian partnership did not survive the upheaval in Egypt.

Erdoğan may have considered Morsi an ally, but he was not devoid of criticism of his policies. In his 2011 visit to Cairo, Erdoğan marked the path which he believed political Islam in Egypt should pursue, sparking resentment among Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. “I hope the new Egyptian regime will be secular”, he said, adding that while he personally was a Muslim, the nation which he headed was a secular one. “I recommend a secular constitution for Egypt,” declared Erdoğan, emphasizing that secularism was not an “enemy of religion.”

The roadmap that Erdoğan outlined was, in his opinion, the key to success, for a religious party aspiring to successfully rule over a country where the military establishment and a large portion of the public consider political Islam an enemy. Erdoğan’s attempt to do so in Turkey was successful. Morsi’s similar Egyptian endeavor was not.

In 2011, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood dismissed Erdoğan’s warning as an intervention in internal Egyptian affairs. “You cannot transfer the experience of other countries to Egypt,” responded the movement’s spokesman. Indeed, Erdoğan’s advice was not heeded and the policies Morsi implemented in its place contributed significantly to his ouster.

During his term as president, Morsi chose to follow in the footsteps of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister, who was overthrown in 1997 following a military ultimatum, after only one year in office. The perception of Morsi was that of a president with a decidedly Islamist agenda, who preferred to appoint members of the Muslim Brotherhood to key government positions and attempted to rapidly undermine the secular establishment.

Morsi was viewed as a president who had the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests and not those of the Egyptian people, at heart. This approach significantly contrasts that adopted by Erdoğan during his first years as prime minister. These days Erdoğan might miss Morsi, but he undoubtedly believes that had the Egyptian Prime Minister heeded his advice – his would have been a different fate.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט If only Morsi had listened to Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad.

Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.”

Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with Turkey, perhaps within a “new democratic axis of power” (the Turkish foreign minister’s phrase). Egypt has also come closer to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states that are deeply concerned (alongside Israel and Turkey) by the Iranian threat, as well as by the survival of the pro-Iranian regime in Syria.

With regard to Israel, despite hostile expressions by Islamic militants, Egypt’s President Morsi has appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas to end the IDF operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

To be sure, President Morsi has a vested interest to settle not only the Hamas-Israel conflict, but also the entire Palestinian-Israeli dispute. According to him, “The Palestinian issue is first priority for Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim States,” as he stated at the Islamic Solidarity Conference held in Mecca in August 2012.

Hashim Kandil, Egypt’s Prime Minister, noted at the Davos conference this January that his country expected that the new Israeli government would renew the peace process with the Palestinians for the sake of its own interests, and the interests of Egypt and the entire region. Like all Arab states and most Muslim nations, Egypt has continued to support, up to the present, the Saudi/Arab League peace initiative of March 2002.

As is well-known, this initiative, which has been recently approved again, offers Israel peace, security and normalized relations with all Arab countries, in exchange for Israel agreeing to the erection of a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as settling the Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. Resolution 194 (of December 1948). Israel has not yet accepted this unprecedented initiative, which has the potential to be a critical breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations.

Indeed, Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Towards Mending Israel-Turkey Relations
Summary of Mitvim’s Activities
August 2011- March 2013

In the summer of 2011, as part of Mitvim’s “Opportunities in Change” project in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Mitvim’s task-team acknowledged mending Israel-Turkey relations as one of the main opportunities for Israel revealed in the Arab Spring.

From that moment, at a timing in which negotiating teams from both countries worked to reach an agreement (which was eventually rejected), to March 2013, when an actual agreement was reached, Mitvim acted through different channels to enhance the relations between the Israel and Turkey.

This was not only because of the strategic importance in mending the relations, but also due to an understanding that ties with Turkey are crucial for Israel’s regional integration, for its ability to engage with political Islam, and for advancing peace.

We praise the agreement between the two countries and see it as an opportunity to share and review some of the major activities carried out by Mitvim on the subject.

1. In August 2011, prior to the Palmer Report’s publication and Netanyahu’s decision to reject the Israel-Turkey draft agreement formulated that summer, Mitvim submitted a policy paper (in Hebrew) to a number of relevant decision makers. It supported the agreement formulated with Turkey pointing at the advantages it held for Israel.

2. In early 2012, Dr. Nimrod Goren published an article in Insight Turkey, a leading policy journal in Turkey. The article reviewed Israel-Turkey relations in light of the Arab Spring, elaborated on the attempts to resolve the Flotilla crisis and analyzed Israeli responses to the further deterioration in relations in September 2011, following the publication of the Palmer Report.

3. In April 2012, in the midst of crisis between the countries and during an almost complete freeze in relations between the governments, Mitvim signed a cooperation agreement with the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) in Istanbul. Both think-tanks decided to conduct a joint policy dialogue in order to analyze the events of the Arab Spring, and indicate mutual interests for both countries and options for improving their bi-lateral relations.

4. In August 2012, Mitvim (together with the Rafi Smith Center) conducted a public opinion poll regarding Israel-Turkey relations. The poll showed surprising findings, according to which a majority of Israelis believed that Israel should take action in order to improve relations with Turkey, including the issuing of an apology on operational mistakes that took place during the Flotilla takeover, as part of an agreement between the two countries. These findings challenged the common apprehension in the Israeli political system that apologizing to Turkey would result in a high political cost for the performing leader.

5. In September 2012, Mitvim and the GPoT Center, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, carried out a policy dialogue in Istanbul. The meeting was attended from the Israeli side by Dr. Alon Liel, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi and Arik Segal. From the Turkish side it was attended by researchers, analysts, senior journalists, former ambassadors and retired generals. The meeting dealt with the consequences of the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, and the chances for mending Israel-Turkey relations. The meeting was widely covered by the Turkish media, and its conclusions were transmitted to key Israeli stakeholders.

6. In February 2012, Mitvim experts (Arik Segal, Dr. Ehud Eiran and Dr. Nimrod Goren) participated in an Israeli-Turkish civil society dialogue workshop, convened by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Tel Aviv. The workshop was dedicated to advancing the cooperation between non-governmental organizations in Israel and Turkey. This kind of cooperation was limited in scope even when the relations on the governmental level were normal, and the workshop assumed that increasing it can have a major contribution to the restoring of Israel-Turkey relations.

7. In late February 2012, just before the Israel-Turkey agreement was reached, Dr. Nimrod Goren published an op-ed calling for an overture to Turkey and highlighting a series of positive developments in Israel-Turkey relations that took place in the months before and that did not receive proper media attention. The op-ed claimed that the political atmosphere in Israel created a favorable environment for reaching an agreement between the countries, and indicated that President Obama’s upcoming visit to Israel will be a good opportunity to do so.

Aside from these actions, Mitvim experts kept in constant touch with various Turkish partners, participated in international and bi-lateral conferences and workshops dealing with the issue, published articles and op-eds in Israeli and Turkish media outlets, and held meetings and briefings with politicians and diplomats. .

Now, when the agreement between Israel and Turkey has been finally reached, Mitvim will act to assist in the process of mending the relations, and to support the opportunities to advancing peace and dialogue with the Arab world that it creates for Israel’s regional policies.

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The public opinion poll of The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (MITVIM) revealed that 54 percent of Israelis with an opinion would support Tel Aviv in ending its intransigence and apologizing for the killings of the nine aid activists.

But Nimrod Goren, the chairman of MITVIM, is cautious about whether the Israeli government will change its decision and apologize. “[Still], the findings can give backing to those who are trying to convince the government behind the scenes to apologize,” he told the Daily News in a recent interview.

One hears several reasons behind the Israeli government’s decision not to offer Turkey an apology for the killings on the Mavi Marmara. In your view, what is the overriding reason?

It was a political decision. One [part of it] was philosophical, ideological – the belief that Turkey eventually did not want to reconcile with Israel; that no matter what Israel does, relations will not come back to where they were.

Having said that, [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu sent a delegation to negotiate with Turks. They reached an agreement under which Netanyahu seemed to be ready to accept. He sent [Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs] Minister Moshe Ya’alon with the hope that he might give to the deal the legitimacy he was looking for [but it did not work out], because he came back opposing it.

And Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman opposed it. Having these two right-wing politicians against it, Netanyahu made a decision not to go ahead.

Where are we a year after, especially with the developments of the Arab Spring?

It seems that the government, as well as the public are more aware of what the Arab Spring means and the consequences of it. People saw the regime change in Egypt. They see the rise of political Islam. They see the chaos in Syria. They see that Israel has to confront some weak states around it. They feel suddenly without any balancing actor. How can we modify that? One way to modify was to look for allies outside the Middle East. That was the approach toward Greek Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania.

But these are not substitutes to difficult actors in the Muslim Ar ab world with whom Israel needs to deal with. Eventually you cannot escape from the region you are in. We have to find a way to conduct foreign policy within the Middle East. Whether the government will move toward that change or whether we will never reach that change, I am not sure.

So the government tried to find allies from outside the region as a response to the developments of the Arab Spring?

The government adopted the policy of trying to hang onto the status quo. But then came the changing of the priority of threats, the whole debate about Iran, the developments in Egypt and Syria. These put Turkey in a different place. People have a better understanding that Turkey is an ally of the West, a friend of the U.S., an actor that has leverage over several Arab countries [and has] significant means to shape developments in Syria. People now have a better understanding that we cannot remain isolated in the Middle East.

But it looks like the understanding among the public does not resonate with the government. Where exactly does Israel stand as far as relations with Turkey are concerned and about extending an apology?

It’s difficult to talk about it because it is a government of a coalition of different parties, and there are different voices, even within Likud.

[Ultimately], it’s a Netanyahu decision. When Netanyahu [entered into a] unity government with Kadima, one of the assumptions was that it would help to open the door with Turkey. But this unity government did not last long. We are back with a right-wing government that will take us to elections somewhere in the near future. It does not seem that this government is going for any major regional diplomatic initiative.

So it is fair to say that the Netanyahu government holds the same position on the issue of an apology.

But I think it is willing to reconsider it. We do not know exactly what is going on behind the scenes. There are frequent media reports that Brits and Americans are doing some talks here and there. There seems to be something happening.

But definitely the findings of the poll that shows that Israeli people are more supportive [of giving an apology] than before could give some backing to those that are willing to act toward it. In the past, it was seen as a counterproductive political action to do – as far as the public reaction was concerned.
What do you think is behind the change in the public view?

I don’t think the public really knew what the issue was really about. Last year, there was no public debate about the Palmer report [on the flotilla]. Everything was done behind closed doors. The whole debate was about an apology, yes or no. No one knew what we were expected to get out of the apology. The public was not educated, and that enabled the politicians to make a decision without having to engage with the public.

This changed during the year because so many people and so many institutions began to deal with the Arab Spring and its consequences. People are following Middle Eastern affairs [with concern], and when they look at the region, they spot Turkey. It is a country they know. But I don’t think the government is aware of it. People were quite surprised by the findings, including ourselves. We did not expect a majority to be in favor of an apology because last year it was unthinkable. Now they might start to think about the implications.

Is there any likelihood that the Israeli government will change its decision on giving an apology in the short term?

The decision and implementation could be very quick because the formula is known. The question is what will be the political point at which Netanyahu decides it is the best thing to do. Maybe this could be before elections in Israel if [Barack] Obama is re-elected as U.S. president. He might be afraid that Obama might pressure him on the Palestinian issue, and he is giving Obama something on the Turkish issue, which is important for Obama.

It could happen quite quickly. But I am not sure that as long as Lieberman remains as foreign minister, the political environment will enable it [to occur] very smoothly.

Who is Nimrod Goren

הפוסט Israelis readier than ever for raid apology, poll shows הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the potential threats form only part of a larger and more complex picture. As acknowledged by Israel’s President Shimon Peres, the Arab Spring also holds opportunities for Israel’s regional foreign policies and for its relations with the Arab/Muslim world. Such opportunities are often neglected in Israel, as they tend to be over-shadowed by the dominant discourse that focuses on potential security concerns. But among the opportunities that the Arab Spring did bring Israel, there seemed to also be an opportunity to mend relations with Turkey — relations that were significantly strained following the May 2010 flotilla incident. While many of the Arab Spring opportunities for Israel required some progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for their fulfillment, this was not necessarily the case regarding Israel and Turkey. Although the lack of a peace process does negatively impact Israel-Turkey relations, the major crisis between them at the time was a bi-lateral one, and could have been solved through a mutual agreement.

The crisis between Israel and Turkey, however, did not begin with the flotilla incident. It has flared up in light of Israel’s operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which started in late December 2008. Operation Cast Lead was a turning point in Turkey-Israeli relations. It put a halt to Turkey’s intense mediation efforts between Israel and Syria, and led to strong Turkish condemnation of Israel’s policy in Gaza and its consequences. Erdoğan’s clash with Peres in the Davos Summit, in January 2009, and his walking off the Davos stage with anger symbolized the beginning of a new era of crisis. This was further fuelled by the public humiliation of the Turkish Ambassador to Israel by Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, in January 2010, in an attempt to protest an anti-Israeli TV series that was aired in Turkey. It was in this context – of an Israeli siege on Gaza and of a highly visible Israel-Turkey crisis – that the flotilla incident took place.

It is thus clear that the Israel-Turkey crisis is not all about the flotilla. It already began before. However, once the flotilla incident happened, it overshadowed other pending issues between Israel and Turkey. Finding a formula that will enable the two countries to move beyond this incident became a prerequisite for any effort to restore normal bi-lateral ties between them and to move towards reconciliation. Not only at the official governmental level but also at the societal level. Early attempts at resolving the flotilla incident did not bear fruit. Israel’s Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Benyamin Ben-Eliezer met in late June 2010 with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to discuss ways of resolving the crisis between Israel and Turkey. This meeting, as well as other efforts held in the second half of 2010, did not lead to a breakthrough.

Things seemed to be stuck. But, 2011 brought a new opportunity for Israel and Turkey to mend their bi-lateral relations. The re-election of Erdoğan in the June 2011 Turkish general elections, coupled with the dramatic events of the Arab Spring, provided a new political and regional context in which the relations could be re-evaluated. This context contributed to Turkey and Israel, with US mediation, making progress towards drafting an agreement between them. However, this agreement was eventually rejected by Israel in August 2011 leading to the eruption of a new cycle of escalating tension between the two countries.

The aim of this article is to analyze the Israeli decision-making process and discourse regarding the crisis with Turkey in 2011. It will first examine the changing circumstances of 2011, including the impact of the Arab Spring and the different manners in which Israel and Turkey reacted to it. Afterwards, it will focus on the Israeli decision to reject the draft agreement with Turkey and on the different phases of the Israeli reaction to the new crisis with Turkey that followed. Finally, it will reflect on possible next phases in Israel-Turkey relations, and on conditions that may assist in providing yet another opportunity for making the two former allies less alienated.

An Opportunity for Reconciliation

During the first half of 2011, it was common to hear from Turkish and Israeli pundits that once the June 2011 elections in Turkey are over, Erdoğan may very well move towards mending relations with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel was not a major issue in the election campaign, this assessment was based on the assumption that upon being free from electoral considerations, Erdoğan would have more room and political will to manoeuver towards fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. Indeed, following the elections and AKP’s landslide victory, there was an effort by both sides to create some better atmosphere between the countries.

A few days after the elections, the Turkish organization IHH announced that it would not take part in another planned flotilla to Gaza. This was apparently decided upon due to pressure from Turkish government officials, and was regarded in Jerusalem (together with Turkey’s assistance to Israel regarding the December 2010 Mt. Carmel fire), as an indication that Turkey was pursuing a more constructive approach towards Israel. Netanyahu responded with a letter to Erdoğan, which congratulated him on his elections victory, and which stressed that the Israeli government “will be happy to work with the new Turkish government on finding a resolution to all outstanding issues between our countries, in the hope of reestablishing our cooperation and renewing the spirit of friendship which has characterized the relations between our peoples for many generations.”

Even Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon took part in the efforts to express renewed warmth between the countries. Ayalon met in Jerusalem with a group of Turkish journalists that decided to visit Israel, and claimed that he actually did not intend on humiliating the Turkish Ambassador in early 2010. Ayalon told the Turkish journalists that “the incident [in which the Ambassador was seated in a low chair] was a joke that was blown out of proportion,” that he has sent a letter of apology to the Turkish Ambassador, and that the cancellation of the second flotilla is a good opportunity for Turkey and Israel to restore their relations. He also posed for a Turkish journalist while sitting in a lower chair than her. Ayalon, though, did not change his hawkish position regarding the flotilla incident. He still hoped that the flotilla incident would be shelved by Turkey. This was unrealistic.

In parallel to these public diplomacy acts, the US had publicly encouraged the governments of Turkey and of Israel to work closely together. Reports began to appear claiming that the US was also mediating secret negotiations between Israeli and Turkish representatives. For the US, having its two major allies in the region at odds with each other was a strategic hardship it was willing to put strenuous efforts to resolve.

It was not only the Turkish elections that enabled this attempt at Turkish-Israeli reconciliation. While the elections did provide a more favorable political context for the sides to get closer together, it was the Arab Spring that provided a more favorable regional context. Turkey’s pro-active decision to side with the protesters in the different Arab countries and its aim at playing a central role in assisting peaceful transformations was of importance in this regard. It led to the collapse of the alliance between Turkey and Assad’s Syria, which was a key factor in Turkey regional foreign policies in recent years and which brought Turkey closer to the region’s radicals, such as Hamas and Iran; it led to a significant improvement in the relations and coordination between Turkey and the US in light of their mutual interests in the changing region; and it enabled Turkey to try and position itself as part of a new regional alliance of moderate (albeit critical of Israel) countries that work to prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. Turkey had to re-evaluate its ties in the region.

Turkey and Israel seemed to have more joint regional interests than before. Both countries aspire for regional stability and security (albeit holding often diverging views on the means to achieve this). The events in Syria brought the regional instability to the borders of Israel and Turkey, with some incidents of cross-border spillover already taking place – the flow of Syrian refugees towards Turkey, and the attempt by Syrian protestors to cross the border into Israel in the Golan Heights. In such a period of change and uncertainty, Israel and Turkey – the democratic and pro-Western countries in the region – could have benefitted from coordination and dialogue mechanisms enabling a joint look at the changing region, much like Turkey-US relations evolved for the better during the Arab Spring.

The improvement in Turkey-US relations, and the increased coordination between their leaders, enabled the US to have more leverage on Turkey to push it towards reconciliation with Israel. Moreover, Turkey’s continued interest to assume a mediator role between Israel and the Palestinians, as expressed by Abdullah Gül, also gave Turkey a reason to improve ties with Israel. In order to be a mediator, Turkey has to have good relations with both sides and open communication channels to them. These were assets that Turkey had in the past, and that previously helped it bring Israelis and Arabs closer together.

For Israel, the Arab Spring brought new reasons for mending relations with Turkey. In light of a region in turmoil, of fear from further isolation and from rising radicalism, of concerns from possible implications of the Palestinian approach to the UN and from the Iranian nuclear project – Israel should have been more interested in having at least normal relations with Turkey. Turkey is a significant regional power, one of the only Muslim countries willing at all to engage with Israel, a source of stability, and a country that can have a moderating effect on some regional actors and can serve as a channel between Israel and the new regimes in the Arab world.

However, the first year of the Arab Spring did not lead Israel to try and get closer to Turkey. Israel and Turkey differed in the way they viewed the changes in the Arab world. In contrast to Turkey’s pro-active and supportive approach to the Arab Spring, Israel adopted a passive approach that was preoccupied with threats and concerns. Israelis looked around them and saw the regional status quo, which they have grown to know and to feel relatively at ease with, collapse. They saw Muslim parties and movements grow stronger. They saw the fall of Hosni Mubarak, a strategic ally of Israel. They also saw demonstrations in front of Israeli embassies in Egypt and Jordan. Israelis began to doubt whether the existing peace agreements would survive the regional changes. They also feared that the Assad regime might initiate an Israeli-Syrian escalation in order to divert attention from the domestic unrest in Syria.

In light of this approach, the Israeli government decided to follow regional developments with a wait-and-see policy. It refrained from issuing statements of support to the Arab protesters and from calling on Arab leaders to step down. The Israeli government believed that until the region stabilizes – and even if this is to take several years – Israel should not initiate major diplomatic initiatives or take bold regional or pro-peace steps. By taking such an approach, Israel – unlike Turkey – gave up on the opportunity to play a role in the re-shaping of the region. It chose to try and dis-engage itself from Middle Eastern affairs and to seek new alliances in its periphery as a compensation for its lost regional alliances, including its relations with Turkey. Thus, Israel turned to develop increased cooperation with Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Netanyahu’s visit to Cyprus in February 2012, the first-ever visit of an Israeli Prime Minister to the neighboring island, was a clear manifestation of this policy.

These official Israeli attitudes and policies were echoed in Israel’s public opinion. In February 2011, forty-six percent of the Israeli public thought that Egypt’s revolution will have a negative effect on Israel-Egypt relations (while only nine percent thought the opposite); seventy percent thought that the chance for democracy in Egypt in the foreseeable future was low; forty-six percent though that there were high chances for an Iranian-style Islamic regime forming in Egypt; and forty-eight percent thought that Egypt’s revolution will strengthen Hamas (while only thirteen percent thought the opposite). Attitudes did not change for the better as time went by. In November 2011, sixty-eight percent of Israelis believed that their country’s national security situation was worse than it was before the process of change in the Arab world started.

These negative beliefs regarding the Arab Spring were coupled with a belief that Turkey is aspiring for leadership in the changing Middle East and that it is bolstering its popularity in the Arab world through criticism of Israel. This combination had a negative impact on prospects for mending Israel-Turkey ties, and it overshadowed the above-mentioned joint interests that the two countries shared in light of the regional turmoil. Israelis were skeptic as to whether Turkey is at all willing to have better relations with Israel at this point in time.

The opportunity that emerged in 2011 for Israel-Turkey reconciliation was eventually left unfulfilled. The two countries held secret negotiations under US auspice, and senior representatives sent by both governments joined these talks. The aim was to agree on a formula, on an agreement, that would fix relations and that would lead to the shelving of the Palmer report. The Palmer Report was drafted by an UN-appointed committee that was supposed to assist in fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. The report’s publication was postponed several times, in order to give the negotiators more leeway to try and reach an agreement.

With each delay, it became more apparent that the report – if and when published – would be used by both sides to reinforce a blame game between them. The report was gradually perceived as a verdict as to which side was guilty in the flotilla incident, rather than as a tool to promote a solution to the Israeli-Turkish crisis. Nevertheless, the fact that both sides came to realize that the report did not fully support their views became an incentive for progress in the negotiations. The report was to claim that Israel’s blockade of Gaza was legal – despite Turkey’s claims, while arguing that the IDF used unreasonable and excessive force in the takeover of the flotilla – despite Israel’s claims.

Eventually, the Israel-Turkey negotiations led to a draft agreement, which is said to have included an Israeli apology for operational mistakes that may have occurred during the takeover of the flotilla, Israeli compensation to the victims’ families, a restoration of full diplomatic ties between Israel and Turkey, and a guarantee by the Turkish government not to prosecute Israelis involved in the flotilla incident. Israel, however, decided to reject the agreement. In August 2011, following deliberations in the Israeli cabinet and despite US pressure, Netanyahu notified Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Israel would not apologize to Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the Palmer report was leaked to the press, putting a halt to any attempts for reconciliation and leading to a renewed escalation of tensions between Israel and Turkey.

The draft reconciliation agreement that was rejected by Netanyahu, did in fact address Israel’s major concerns and interests – it included only a low-key and conditional version of an apology, it protected to a significant extent Israeli soldiers from law suits, it did not demand any change of Israeli policy regarding Gaza (as was demanded by Turkey before), and it ensured normal diplomatic ties between the countries. If so, why was such an agreement eventually rejected?

The Israeli Decision

In major Israeli state circles there was support for the reconciliation agreement. Israel’s Attorney General, Yehuda Weinstein, has reportedly advised Netanyahu to reach an understanding with Turkey, even if that meant issuing a general apology for operational mistakes and misuse of force in order to prevent lawsuits against Israeli soldiers. Within the defense establishment there was increased support for resolving the crisis even at the price of an apology to Ankara, as “Israel has a major stake in improving relations with Turkey in light of Turkey’s standing in the region, its past economic relationship with Israel, and the opportunity to renew defense-related export to Turkey.” Also, among Israel’s diplomatic circles there was support for such a move.

However, the voices within the bureaucracy and the establishment that supported an agreement with Turkey were usually not voiced in the public domain, and did not spark a public discourse on the issue. The negotiation process with Turkey was conducted behind closed doors, and the eventual Israeli decision was shaped by only a few political leaders, based on political considerations as well as their personal beliefs and ideology. There was no real public pressure on the issue, although the possible reaction of the public was definitely part of the political considerations that were actually taken into account.

Israelis did not understand the significance of the flotilla event for Turks. While Davutoğlu labeled the flotilla incident as “Turkey’s 9/11,” Israel dismissed the incident as an event used by Erdoğan to humiliate Israel and to improve Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world. Israelis were offended by the fact that Turkey did not stop the flotilla from sailing. They did not grasp the intensity of public emotions in Turkey regarding the killing of the Turkish citizens (which was seen in Israel as a legitimate act of self-defense) and that the demand for an apology was a consensual issue in Turkey, also shared by Israel’s friends there. Israeli officials wanted to believe that an expression of sorrow, without an apology, would be enough to satisfy Turkey. This was not the case. Moreover, Israelis were not aware of the nuances of the proposed agreement. The public debate focused on whether or not to apologize to Turkey, while there was very little understanding of what the agreement called Israel to actually apologize about, of the broader context in which such an apology will be made, and of what Israel was about to get in return.

The prevailing attitude in Israel was that relations with Turkey are doomed and that further deterioration is inevitable due to Erdoğan’s policies and statements, especially as the crisis between the countries began before the flotilla incident. Thus, an agreement was seen as being of no use, as Turkey would later come up with other demands (such as the lifting of the blockade of Gaza, a demand made already at the onset of the crisis) and with other sorts of criticism. Turkey, in turn, did not do enough to address the Israeli concerns and to help convince the Israeli public that should Israel take the needed actions to repair the relations, then these will actually bear fruit and will lead to the restoration of normal ties between the countries.

Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman framed the debate about a possible Israeli apology around the issue of national pride. He claimed that national pride should be a guiding principle in Israel’s foreign policy making, and that an apology will undermine this pride and will thus weaken Israel’s strategic position in the region. This position was not shared by all members of the Israeli government. Minister Matan Vilani, who took part in the negotiations with Turkey, clearly stated that “whoever refers to the crisis with Turkey in terms of national pride does not understand the strategic reality in the Middle East”. Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor were also supportive of mending ties with Turkey. Netanyahu himself was reported to have already agreed on several instances to apologize to Turkey, before backing off due to domestic political reasons, namely the fear of criticism by major coalition partners or by key members of his government. It was the fierce objection by hard-liners Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon (who represented the government in the negotiations with Turkey) and Lieberman that eventually pushed Netanyahu to oppose the agreement, perhaps as an attempt not to alienate his right-wing constituency, in which Lieberman was enjoying increased popularity.

The Turkish response to the Israeli decision was extremely harsh. It was to serve as proof to those in Israel that opposed the reconciliation agreement that Turkey was in no way ready to once again actually become a friend of Israel. Erdoğan and his government, which promised in advance to sanction Israel should it refuse to take the actions Turkey has expected, embarked on a series of tough anti-Israeli statements and policies, In an interview to Al Jazeera, Erdoğan stated that the flotilla incident could have justified going to war if it was not for Turkey’s restraint. The Turkish Prime Minister announced a series of sanctions against Israel. Israeli diplomats were expelled and diplomatic relations were downgraded to second-secretary level, what has remained of the Israel-Turkey military cooperation was put on halt, official trade between the countries was frozen, Turkey tried to block Israel in multi-national institutions, Turkey announced that it plans to have a military presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to escort future flotillas and to challenge Israel’s natural gas drillings, that it will support lawsuits against Israeli soldiers, and that it will consider further sanctions. Erdoğan also declared that he is planning to challenge the Israeli blockade on Gaza by visiting the Gaza Strip in adjacent to a scheduled visit to Egypt. In a specific incident that was not included in the sanctions declared by Erdoğan, Israeli tourists were detained in the Istanbul airport, discouraging those Israelis who were still considering Turkey as a tourist destination. In early September 2011, not a day has passed without further escalation in the crisis. Turkey was trying to put a concrete, visible and high price tag on Israel’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement. There was concern that things might get out of control.

The Israeli Discourse

The Israeli reaction to the crisis that has flared up with Turkey had several phases and aspects to it. The initial public response was one of confusion mixed with concern, even fear. Israelis could not understand Erdoğan’s conduct. The Turkish Prime Minister was portrayed in the Israeli media as an irrational, extremist and radical leader, who does not play according to international diplomatic norms. Erdoğan was occasionally compared to Israel’s worst enemies in the present and in the past, and was depicted as someone who is inherently against Israel and with whom cooperation or reconciliation are impossible. Israelis were amazed at what they saw as a disproportionate over-reaction. Some sought to explain it with frustration by Erdoğan over the legitimacy given by the Palmer Report to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Questions started to pop up in the Israeli media about whether Turkey plans to carry out actual acts of warfare against Israel.

In light of the Turkish reaction, public opinion polls revealed a striking consensus within the Israeli public against any apology to Turkey. There were also public calls to boycott Turkish products, and to refrain from visiting the country. In the past, Turkey was a country that so many Israelis used to visit and towards which Israelis had such warm feelings. It was the only country in Israel’s neighborhood that embraced Israelis, and accepted them. Now it was seen in Israel as a country that changed course and that sided with Israel’s enemies. Israelis felt deeply betrayed by Turkey, claiming that it is Turkey that needs to apologize for enabling the IHH flotilla to set sail in the first place. While Turkey declared that its measures are directed against the current Israeli government and not against Israel or the Israeli public, this did not lead things to be seen more favorably in Israel. Reconciliation seemed far-fetched, with relations hitting rock-bottom.

In parallel, a different kind of Israeli discourse has begun to emerge. One that was critical of the Israeli government’s handling of the diplomatic crisis with Turkey, questioning Netanyahu’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement, and stressing the importance of having good ties with Turkey. Traditional supporters of the relations with Turkey spoke up once again, and new voices – that were not heard prior to the Netanyahu’s decision about the agreement – came forth. These included political opposition figures, as Tzipi Livni and Tzachi Hanegbi from the Kadima party, but also public figures as the Governor of the Bank of Israel Stanley Fischer, and former-Minister Prof. Amnon Rubinstein.

This trend, which by-far did not represent the mainstream Israeli discourse, was somewhat empowered by some op-eds in the media, and especially by a column published by Nahum Barnea of Yediot Aharonoth, one of Israel’s most influential journalists. In September 2011, Barnea published an account of the secret negotiations between Israel and Turkey, publishing for the first time the actual content of the draft reconciliation agreement. His column made clear what was on the table and what Israel had missed out on. “Very few in Israel asked what Israel actually has to apologize about,” wrote Barnea, adding that “if you ask the Israeli on the street he will say confidently: Israel is asked to apologize on the IDF operation. This is not true”. According to the draft agreement, Israel had to apologize only for the very same operational mistakes that it already acknowledged through its self-appointment investigation committee.

The official Israeli policy towards Turkey in light of the heightened conflict was one of containment. Israeli government members kept quiet and did not retaliate towards Erdoğan’s statements and policies. The logic was to let Erdoğan play his game on his own, without reacting to his provocations. Israel believed that time will take its toll, and eventually Turkey would move on to other issues. Moreover, there was the expectation that the Barack Obama administration would help Israel in containing Erdoğan and in limiting his anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions. The Egyptian decision not to facilitate Erdoğan’s request to visit Gaza in September 2011 was perceived in the Israeli public as a direct outcome of American pressure.

The Israeli policy of keeping a low profile regarding the Turkish sanctions did not hold for all. It was Lieberman, in an attempt to make political gain among Israel’s right-wing constituency, who was reportedly planning an Israeli diplomatic retaliation against Turkey. Lieberman wanted to prove that it is Turkey who has much to lose from its policy towards Israel, and to portray himself as taking care of Israel’s national pride. It was leaked to the press that he was assessing different ideas on how to embarrass Turkey on the Armenian, Kurdish, and human rights issues.

However, the Netanyahu government opposed this initiative. The official Israeli discourse was trying to devalue the crisis with Turkey, and it was doing so by using two contradictory arguments. One argument held that Israel-Turkey relations had already deteriorated so much in recent years that they could not get much worse. The second was citing the fact that economic relations between the countries surprisingly reached a peak after the flotilla crisis, meaning that political tensions between the governments do not have an impact on the actual conduct of relations between the two societies.

What Can Happen Next?

The last couple of months of 2011 have brought more calm to Israel-Turkey relations. The regional focus has been redirected towards Syria, where Turkey has assumed a leading role against the Assad regime. Erdoğan’s “megaphone diplomacy” against Israel has been put to a relative halt, probably also due to American pressure. Moreover, there have been some renewed positive public diplomacy moves – Israel’s acknowledgement of a supportive Turkish role in the reaching Israel’s prisoners swap deal with Hamas, Israel’s offering of aid following the October 2011 earthquake in Van and Turkey’s willingness to accept it (that made the top news in Israel), and Netanyahu’s conversation with Erdoğan (for the first time in ten months) following the passing away of Erdoğan’s mother. Nevertheless, the January 2012 visit of Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh to Turkey and the manner in which he was embraced by the Turkish leadership — reinforced the negative image that many in Israel currently hold towards Turkey’s policies.

In parallel to these political aspects, Turkey-Israel relations began to draw the attention of civil society organizations, which have been gradually trying to become involved in attempts to mend the relations. A growing number of think tanks, NGOs, and youth movements are seeking ways to bring together Israelis and Turks, something that was not sufficiently done even when the official relations between the countries were strong. In parallel, the US continues to express its support and desire for improving Israel-Turkey relations, with occasional media reports on discrete channels or on new bridging proposals.

These attempts at creating a better atmosphere, at establishing a new modus vivendi between the countries, and at preventing further deterioration are a positive step and should be encouraged. They will not be enough to normalize relations, but can help in defining what Israel-Turkey relations can look like given the current political and regional circumstances and in charting constructive paths to get there. By themselves, these efforts will not be able to dismantle the danger of further deterioration in the official relations. Events of near clashes, that used to take place in the Aegean as part of the Turkey-Greece dispute in the Aegean, might occur in the Mediterranean if things get worse. The reactivation of ties between the Israeli and Turkish air forces in December 2011 was an important step to try and prevent this from happening, especially as almost all official channels between the governments have been cut off. Israel and Turkey seem to be headed towards a period in which they will be engaged in fierce rivalry but within the context of some sort of diplomatic, economic, and social relations.

Normalization between Israel and Turkey can be likely in the event of a policy change in Israel regarding Turkey or of a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process. These do not seem feasible under the term of the current Israeli government, with Lieberman as Foreign Minister, but may become more plausible after the next Israeli elections, when a new coalition is formed. In the meantime, from the Israeli side, it is essential to educate the public and policy-makers that better ties with Turkey are both feasible and desirable, to maintain the existing level of economic and social ties, and to establish new channels for joint policy-dialogue between Israeli and Turkish scholars, policy analysts, and institutions.

Turkey-Israel relations have a long history of ups and downs. These were mostly linked to developments in Israeli-Arab relations, and not to bi-lateral crises resembling the flotilla incident. People tend to remember the Turkey-Israel “honeymoon” of the 1990s, but to forget the cold relations of the 1980s. As a new reality unfolds in the Middle East, with Turkey playing a central role in the re-shaping of Israel’s neighborhood, Israel and Turkey should strive to mend their bi-lateral relations. The 2011 opportunity for reconciliation was left unfulfilled, but the regional conditions that enabled this opportunity are still out there. It may not be long before another opportunity for reconciliation appears, due to a political change in Israel or to further regional realignments. Should this happen, Israel, Turkey, and their international allies should seize the opportunity and not let it sail past them, once again.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Israel Is Missing an Opportunity to Mend Ties With Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.