The new American administration wastes no time unmaking Trump’s legacy of indifference calling out loudly actors who violate human rights them, from Russia to Yemen. Several, though not all, of Trump’s decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian track were quickly revoked. The USAID will renew its humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, the U.S. consulate will open its doors again in East Jerusalem and the PLO offices will resume their work in Washington. And yet, it’s abundantly clear that the Israeli-Palestinian file is not in the top of new administration’s agenda, and there is no sense of urgency to try and fix things.

The old proverb says that if it ain’t broken, don’t touch it, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might now seem as the less urgent in comparison to regional disasters of Syria, Yemen or Lebanon. However, it is not going anywhere (despite the reassurances of the settlement lobby) and the situation is as explosive as ever. In absence of clear and consistent American policy, the unmaking of Trump’s legacy in Israel and PA might not be enough to salvage the two-states solution and to prevent the deterioration of the situation on the ground.

To be fair, the stalemate in negotiations between Israel and PA didn’t start with Trump. The leaders on both sides own the responsibility for failing many rounds of negotiations. However, it was Trump who made it crystal-clear which one of Abraham’s children was his favorite and which one will be left alone in the cold. His one-sided, cynical policy instilled confidence in settlement lobby leaders that not only will they have an upper hand in this century-long conflict, but they will do it while being cheered by the American president. At the same time, many Palestinians became completely disillusioned with the role of the U.S. as a fair broker, as well as with the ability of the Palestinian Authority to defend them and to promote their dream of independence. The PA became weaker than ever before, and in absence of direct cooperation with the IDF, the latter took a greater role in civil affairs in Palestinian territories.

The current situation presents us with serious challenges as well as rare opportunities. The situation in West Bank is fragile, the mistrust in the acting Palestinian leadership is immense, the frictions between the would-be heirs of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and their loyalists is growing. The Palestinian elections, set for May 22 and July 31 add even more uncertainty—the trauma of Hamas’s victory in 2006 is still fresh, even though it took place 15 years ago. Whether these elections will eventually take place or not, they are already a significant game-changer, as would-be heirs on both sides will come out and the fight for power will move into a next phase.

At the same time, normalization and peace treaties that were lately signed between Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco as well as the reconciliation between the Gulf states and Qatar had enhanced regional stability and created favorable atmosphere for advancing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Some of these states had indicated priorly that they are not interested in a broker role, while others insist on having on place around the negotiating table, but all of them formally support the two-states solution, notwithstanding the criticism against the Palestinian leadership.

Some might claim that the Abrahamic accords ensured that there will be less Arab pressure on Israel in regards to negotiation process, but this development can also prove to be a double-sword. If the American administration will become serious about reigniting the negotiations, it might work constructively with its allies in the Arab world in order to advance a peace process and to provide Israel with the necessary guarantees.

And finally, change might come to Israel as well. In mid-March, Israel is heading to the polling stations for the fourth time in 2 years, and for now, everything is open. Netanyahu is dreaming about a pure right-wing coalition that will inevitably find itself in confrontation with Biden’s White house. If this scenario fails to materialize, Israel might get a brand new prime-minister and a different government for the first time during the last 12 years. This government will not be significantly more dovish than the previous ones, as it will depend on pure right wing, pro-settlement parties And yet, there is reasonable chance that this new government will be more docile while trying to avoid a serious clash with an American administration.

**The article was published on News Week, 4 March 2021.

הפוסט The Two-State Solution Won’t Save Itself, Mr. President הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the plan published by the Trump administration contradicts the interests of the State of Israel, distances us from the two-state solution and is published during very problematic political times. As a result, it will likely do more harm than good.

The two-state solution is an existential interest for Israel. It is a necessary component of the Zionist dream, in which the State of Israel is both the state of the Jewish people and a democracy characterized by complete equality for all its citizens. Yet the two-state solution is unattainable while Palestinian interests are ignored and Palestinian leaders are excluded from the peace process. I would expect Israeli leadership to be capable of making that clear to an American president.

In the past, Prime Minister Sharon tried to convince the Bush administration not to force democracy on conflict-ridden Iraq; Prime Minister Olmert sought to influence the same administration not to push for Palestinian elections at that point in time. Neither succeeded, but in hindsight, both did the right thing, as an ally should.

The Palestinians are rejecting the Trump plan outright, so it will not lead to a settlement. But from it we must try to extract components that will help achieve a settlement in the future. Of importance is the fact that a Palestinian state will be established, even according to Trump’s vision, and that it must have a capital in East Jerusalem as well as an American embassy there.

Contrary to common perception, our ability to promote true peace is stronger now than ever before. In the Palestinian leadership of today, Israel has infinitely better partners for peace than it had in Oslo and Camp David. The leaders of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah understand that terrorism has hurt them just as it has done damage in Israel, and they are trying to achieve independence through non-violent means. The regional context is also more favorable than in the past; most Arab countries see Israel as part of the solution to the problems this region faces, rather than as the problem itself, as they have in the past. This is reflected in the Arab Peace Initiative, which is endorsed time and again at the summits of Arab states and which did not exist during Oslo and Camp David.

In addition, the majority of the Israeli public supports a two-state solution, as evidenced in polls conducted over the past twenty years, even though this wasn’t reflected in the election results in Israel, because our leaders have preferred to instill fear, suppress hope for peace, and remove the Palestinian issue from the agenda.

To the extent that the Trump plan leads to annexation, it will not only keep us away from a solution of two states for two peoples. It will also damage regional stability, our relationship with Jordan and security coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which has led to relative calm and a significant reduction in terror.

Consequently, those who come to power in the upcoming Israeli elections should take significant diplomatic steps that will provide for a real peace plan. They should do so in coordination with the international community, rather than allowing themselves to be dragged on by false initiatives that do not merit the support of most of the international community or the Democratic Party in the US. Israeli leaders must make it clear to our American friends that this is not the way to advance the long-term interests of the State of Israel.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Needs a Real Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US President Donald Trump is closely aligned with Netanyahu and is expected to give him leeway over such policies. The EU today is less united against Netanyahu’s policies than in the past. So it may need a Democratic US administration in 2020 to present and enforce some red lines, in part because Netanyahu will face no significant domestic opposition on foreign policy or national security issues.

The two major pro-peace parties (Labor and Meretz) together have less than ten percent of the Knesset. While Blue and White’s 35 seats is a major achievement for a first-time political run, it does not endorse a two-state solution, and includes some right-wing hard-liners on the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu has portrayed himself as a master-statesman and highlighted his relations with (mostly) populist and anti-liberal world leaders. This trend is set to continue, further eroding the democratic component of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite its weakness, Israel’s opposition must present an alternative vision based on advancing peace, increasing regional belonging in Europe and the Middle East, and anchoring Israel to the club of liberal democracies. This will not be easy, but Israel’s friends around the world need to know that there is more to Israel and its foreign relations than Netanyahu.

(originally published in the Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Trump Gives Israel’s ‘Master Statesman’ License to Carry On הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Towards the Renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been a busy month for Benjamin Netanyahu. For the third week in a row, Israel’s prime minister has journeyed outside of the Middle East in order to advance his country’s interests. But after enjoying high-profile meetings with British Prime Minister Theresa May and US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu’s world tour heads eastward, with stops in Singapore and Australia.

There is no denying that Netanyahu is making history. Operating as both prime minister and foreign minister, Netanyahu has expanded his international travel schedule, visiting corners of the globe familiar to Israeli backpackers but alien to most of their politicians. In the last year alone, Netanyahu’s passport has collected stamps from Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. His arrival in Sydney this Wednesday will mark the first ever visit by an Israeli head-of-state.

Netanyahu’s jet-setting is indicative of a shift within Israel’s foreign policy strategy away from the United States and Europe. Israel is cognizant that the geopolitical order is shifting away from a unipolar world and is making preparations that will compensate for America’s withdrawal from the world stage. Frustrated with European ‘interference’ in its relationship with the Palestinians, Israel is casting a wide net in search for international partners who are less interested in the conflict. As the aforementioned list demonstrates, this approach has worked predominantly with non-democratic states.

This is not the case with Australia, which boasts strong democratic values, a robust economy and is both culturally and strategically linked with the West. Membership in the anglosphere is yet another important distinction. As Netanyahu will undoubtedly reiterate during his stay, Australia and Israel are natural partners and there are tremendous opportunities for cooperation on a host of issues—including cyber security, counterterrorism, environmental and agricultural sciences and of course high-tech.

But in fact, it is because of these unique qualities that the Australian government can use the same platform it is providing Netanyahu to articulate its own interests.

If Australia wants to contribute to peace in the Middle East, it should reaffirm its support of the two-state solution. The two-state solution has come under heavy scrutiny of late and it is unclear how committed the current US administration is to ensuring that Israelis and Palestinians reach that goal. Still, it was perplexing how Foreign Minister Julie Bishop could support Trump’s damaging “two-state, one-state” remarks just days after joining the near universal condemnation of a controversial Israeli law that retroactively legalizes all West Bank settler homes constructed on private Palestinian land.

Trump’s comments have emboldened Netanyahu’s rivals. Many believe it is only a matter of time before he is ousted from office—he is currently under investigation in multiple police cases—and challenging his position on the settlements is an easy way to score points. Those close to Netanyahu claim that the prime minister still supports the two-state solution, yet such reports are difficult to believe when he always appears to be in a fight for his political life. So goes the game of thrones that is Israeli domestic politics.

When international actors send mixed messages on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it only strengthens the radical camps in both societies—often bearing deadly results. Rather than limiting its involvement to rhetorical statements, the Australian government should try to incentivize Israeli efforts towards peace, perhaps by offering to facilitate dialogue between Israel and ASEAN’s Muslim-majority member states that have historically been reluctant to normalize relations with the Jewish State.

Alternatively, Australia could lend its support for the kind of US-led regional peace initiative that was pursued by the Obama administration and floated during the Trump-Netanyahu press conference in Washington, DC.

Both countries should be thinking as big when it comes to strengthening bilateral ties. The Israel Trade Commission and the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce provide a strong foundation for commercial ties to grow, and their efforts should be applauded. Still, taking the Australia-Israel relationship to the next level requires investment in new bilateral initiatives—similar to the industrial R&D agreement signed by Israel and the NSW government in April 2016—as well as expanding existing scientific exchange programs, establishing joint energy and water management projects, and creating room for future military exchanges.

The future of Australian-Israeli bilateral relations will ultimately be determined by the tone and content of the dialogue between their respective societies. If the last decade is any indication, there is legitimate reason for optimism. Still, the gravity of official state visits such as these should not be overlooked. With Netanyahu finally ‘Down Under’, Australia’s government has a historic opportunity to clarify its own position on the two-state solution at a time when international support is at an all-time low. Such a demonstration from a trusted ally may pressure Netanyahu to clarify some of his own dubious remarks, but more importantly it would resonate with Israelis who are tired of opportunistic politicians and seek international partners that will ‘talk straight’ when engaged in a face-to-face conversation.

(originally published in the Australian Outlook)

הפוסט Why Australia Needs to be Straight-Talking with Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This issue is still being debated in Washington.

Meanwhile in Jerusalem, steps are already being taken to jeopardize such a move. The Netanyahu government sees President Obama’s final days in office as a source of concern. Netanyahu is asking the US administration to refrain from any final move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Foreign Ministry is discussing how to confront this new “danger.”

There are, however, benefits to be gained from the presentation of new American parameters for the two-state solution. While they are not expected to bring an immediate breakthrough toward peace, such parameters will convey a clear message regarding the American position on how the Israeli- Palestinian should be resolved, and will highlight the consistency of the American position over the years.

There are also more concrete benefits to be gained, on both the international and domestic Israeli fronts, as identified by the Mitvim Institute: Clarity regarding the final-status agreement – parameters would supply the clarity that is presently lacking regarding the way to resolve the core issues of the conflict. The deeper and more detailed they are, the more clarity they will provide regarding the path to a final-status agreement.

Without clear parameters, the chances for the success of any diplomatic move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral – are much lower. A presentation of parameters is important with or without the upcoming presidential transition juncture. Even if President Obama avoids such a move, the next president should present clear parameters, preferably in the first year in office.

Renewed momentum for the two-state solution – The stagnation in the peace process leads to skepticism regarding the feasibility of the two-state solution. The “two-state solution” concept becomes empty of meaning when different politicians assign substantively different meanings to it. Parameters will help instill renewed meaning into this concept, and assist in changing the tide against it. There is also a need to update the key international documents connected to the peace process, most of which are over a dozen years old.

Updating the Clinton Parameters can be an important first step in such a process, and can contribute to harnessing an Israeli and Palestinian young public that searches for invigorated new ways to resolve the conflict.

Provide support for future negotiations – Parameters can help bypass additional useless rounds of Israeli- Palestinian negotiations that involve empty words alone, devoid of meaning. Parameters can serve as an “entrance ticket” to future negotiations.

The parties will be required to demonstrate a positive attitude toward them before negotiations even begin, to demonstrate that they have serious intentions. True, this may make it more difficult to begin the negotiations. However, if both parties have the political will to resolve the conflict, then the creation of a framework, a conceptual “anchor” and an objective for the talks will support the negotiations once they begin.

Deepen international involvement in the peace process – The Clinton Parameters remained, in their time, a solely American plan. If President Obama should present his own parameters, it would be an opportunity to create international consensus regarding them which, in turn, would enhance the parameters’ legitimacy.

Over the past two years, various attempts have been made to create a new international architecture to advance the peace process. However, none of these has been followed through or found to be effective.

Parameters could help here – if they go beyond the speech of an American president and are ratified by the United Nations Security Council or a relevant international forum like the Quartet or an international peace conference.

Sharpen the Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution – The Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution includes contradictions and knowledge gaps. Positions regarding it in the large parties tend to be fuzzy and unclear, with general, abstract statements lacking clear political content.

Parameters could help change this. They would clarify what the US really means when it talks about a two-state solution. Israeli opposition parties could adopt the parameters as a clear alternative to the current government’s policy; peace organizations could benefit from the fact that the parameters would banish much of the existing public opaqueness regarding the gist of a future peace agreement; and the Israeli public, most of which is interested in being a part of globalization processes, will understand more precisely what the international community requires from Israel in order to enjoy a fresh start among the nations.

Advance the Israeli quest for recognition – Parameters can be an opportunity for Israel to gain recognition for its Jewish character. Even though the essential need for such a recognition is disputable, the majority of Israelis seek it. Senior US administration officials have already responded favorably to Israel’s quest for such recognition, and it can thus be assumed that the parameters will express this as well. In addition, parameters are expected to emphasize the option of international recognition of west Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (and of east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine) with the attainment of the two-state solution. In this way, the parameters will not only present demands of Israel, but also show Israel’s public some of the advantages embodied in achieving peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The benefits of ‘Obama parameters’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Should President Obama indeed decide to introduce parameters for a two-state solution, he has several options for doing so. He can deliver a presidential speech and leave it at that; or, he can bring the content of the speech to non-binding ratification in a multinational body or forum (such as the Quartet or an international peace conference). He can also bring those parameters as a proposal for a binding resolution in the UN’s Security Council. Also, the US president has at his disposal different options regarding the wording of the parameters themselves. President Obama can limit himself to a general text, or formulate a more detailed one; he can try to reconcile both sides by using relatively softened wording, or use more assertive wording to challenge the positions of the current Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.

הפוסט Possible Benefits of American Parameters for the Two-State Solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the possibilities discussed in this context is the more effective use of incentives to convince Israelis and Palestinians of the value of striving for peace. Incentives are a tool with great potential to advance the processes of conflict resolution, but it is a tool that has yet to play a central role in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process. Israel may have received American aid in the past in return for concessions it made in the peace process, but this aid was in the form of compensation, and did not serve as an incentive presented in advance to create a change in the positions of the public and its leaders.

The need for incentives was also unclear for years. The vision of peace was enough to enlist public and political support. But when the belief in the feasibility of peace and its value faded, a search started in Israel for alternative and concrete benefits that would justify making concessions to its neighbors. The United States, which in any case had already granted Israel almost all it had asked for, did not have much more to offer. The involvement of other countries and institutions was needed.

Security, normalization, upgrade

Precisely at this current juncture, at which the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in a deep freeze, for the first time in the history of this conflict Israel is looking at three separate incentives for making peace, presented by key players in the international community:

The first one is a commitment to American security guarantees. These were present in earlier stages of the process and were updated in a plan formulated by General John Allen during the last round of negotiations. The second is a promise for normalization of relations and an end to the conflict, as presented in the Arab peace initiative from 2002, which has been repeatedly ratified by the Arab League. The third incentive is a promise to upgrade Israel’s relations with the European Union to the highest non-member status possible, a “special preferred status,” which the Union proposed to Israel and the Palestinians in 2013.

However, these incentives have so far failed to melt the diplomatic ice, mainly due to opposition to and total disregard of this proposal by Israel, and also due to the decentralized manner in which these guarantees were presented by international players at different times.

In addition to the specific impediment in each incentive, there is a problem common to all, which hinders their ability to generate a change in Israeli public opinion Israel’s government contributes significantly to this state of affairs. The lack of response to the Arab League proposal since it was proposed over a decade ago; refusal to discuss the upgrading of relations with the European Union due to an opposition to linking relations with the Palestinians to relations with Europe; the disdain shown towards the efforts made by General Allen and the disqualification of elements he proposed as the basis of his plan – all of these helped conceal these initiatives from public awareness, thus harming their effectiveness.

New opportunity

Nevertheless, there is currently an opportunity for a further significant step with regard to these incentives, one which will make it difficult for Israelis to remain indifferent. Inspired by the negotiations conducted with Iran, the international community is now trying to establish a new mechanism that will accompany and promote the peace process. This involves a refreshing of the Quartet (UN, U.S., EU and Russia) and the establishment of an international support group that will also include Arab countries.

Such a new international framework could realize the potential inherent in the use of incentives. To do so, it will have to create and present a coordinated package of incentives, to be presented by the international community. This package will include upgraded versions of the incentives presented so far, while addressing the strengths and weaknesses of each individual one, an updating of previously proposed incentives in accordance with current regional realities, with the addition of components that are important to the two sides of the conflict.

Such a package could serve as a mega-incentive to achieving peace. It will demonstrate to the Israeli and Palestinian publics the attractiveness, feasibility and the tangible advantages of achieving peace. This should be done in a manner that will be endorsed by key players in the international arena, which will evoke a public discourse of hope, which will strengthen politicians who are interested in thawing the diplomatic freeze and promoting peace-pursuing policies. This kind of package will be hard to ignore.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Unknown Incentives for Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent months, representatives of the Quartet – from the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations – held a series of meetings across the Arab world. These occurred in Cairo (June), in Amman (July), and in Riyadh (September). The focus of these meetings was to identify and promote measures that will preserve the viability of a two-state solution, improve the situation on the ground, and will enable the restarting of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in the future. However, these meetings also had another purpose – to increase the involvement of Arab states and the Arab League in efforts to promote the peace process, while emphasizing the Arab Peace Initiative.

The meeting of the Quartet, which took place on September 30th in New York, was supposed to be the highpoint of these efforts and senior representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League were also invited to attend. And yet, the results of the meeting were far from a breakthrough. Issues raised included a need for the Quartet to consult on a regular basis with regional actors and to hear other voices in the international community; a call for both Israel and the Palestinians to implement previously signed agreements in a more complete manner, and to take concrete steps on the ground with the help of the Quartet. Moreover, it was decided that a diplomatic delegation of the Quartet is to be dispatched to both Jerusalem and Ramallah in mid-October in an attempt to create some sort of positive momentum.

The Quartet’s efforts do not occur in a vacuum. In the past year, the international community has devoted extensive energy to answering the question of what are the possible next steps it might take in order to promote a solution to the IsraelPalestinian conflict. While the United States is still in a phase of reassessing its policy, which it announced after the failure of the negotiations led by Secretary of State John Kerry, it has been mainly France that has tried to launch new initiatives. However, these efforts, chiefly among them an attempt to introduce a UN Security Council resolution outlining agreed-upon parameters for a two-state solution, were postponed again and again. This happened first because of the elections in Israel, later because of the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran about the latter’s nuclear program, and finally because of a lack of American support.

In the absence of progress on the content of an agreement, the international community began in the summer of 2015 to contemplate the possibility of the creation of a new mechanism – an International Support Group for the IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process. At its core, this initiative is an attempt to add a number of European and Arab countries to the Quartet. The French led this effort, it was supported by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and the European Union Foreign Affairs Council authorized its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to lead consultations on the matter. The impetus for this initiative was influenced by the success of the model of negotiations conducted by the P5+1 with Iran, which proved to them that an international coalition has the capacity to reach diplomatic achievements.

Unfortunately, it seems as though the meeting of the Quartet that took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly actually impeded the effort. The current members of the informal organization seem to wish to preserve its current standing and composition. However, if the Quartet wishes to create new momentum on the Israeli-Palestinian channel it must show a willingness to renew and reinvigorate itself while accepting additional countries into its fold (and not merely consulting and taking advice from them). The creation of a new international mechanism to advance the prospects of a two-state solution will not likely bring peace, but it is possible that it would assist the international community in executing new coordinated initiatives whose implementation has failed time and time again over the past year.

הפוסט Revitalizing the Middle East Quartet? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli foreign policy is subordinated to the security establishment and focuses on public diplomacy (hasbara) efforts, rather than advancing diplomatic processes that would enable Israel a fresh start among the nations, regional belonging, and a future of peace, security and prosperity.

Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies is working to change that. In 2014-15, a multi-disciplinary task-team at the Mitvim Institute formulated a proposal for a new paradigm for Israel’s foreign policy. This paper presents its guiding principles and main points.

The new paradigm introduces a foreign policy that is pro-peace, multi-regional, outward-facing, modern and inclusive. It is based on several building blocks: cultivating relationships, taking initiative, identifying opportunities, and being flexible, multi-dimensional and value-based.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There has previously been dramatic news about Palestinian reconciliation that has not amounted to much, and the road toward a unity government may be a long one. But for supporters of the two-state solution, this recent development should be regarded as an opportunity rather than a threat.

The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is one of the largest obstacles to the two-state solution. Even the Israeli peace camp cannot provide a convincing explanation of how a final-status agreement can be implemented with only the West Bank on board.

This obstacle was evident during the Annapolis peace process in 2007-2008. At the time, the parties acknowledged that given the Palestinian split, the most realistic goal was merely to reach a “shelf agreement” that would not be implemented until a later stage in the process.

The situation looks similar this time around. The current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were launched with the ambitious goal of reaching a two-state solution. Alas, recent statements from Washington are introducing a much more modest goal: either a framework for a final-status agreement or an agreement to be implemented in phases.

At this year’s Saban Forum, U.S. President Barack Obama was asked whether peace is possible when the Palestinian people are not united. His response was that if “we can create a pathway to peace, even if initially it’s restricted to the West Bank,” then the Palestinians in Gaza will also want to enjoy its benefits.

הפוסט Israel Should Support Palestinian Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The workshop, which took place at the residence of the U.S. Embassy’s Counselor for Press and Public Affairs, Ms. Hilary Olsin-Windecker, featured two speakers with extensive academic and practical expertise on the topic: Prof. Miriam F. Elman from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and Attorney Gilead Sher, former Chief of Staff to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and co-Chief negotiator at the 2000 Camp David Summit.

This publication, the first published jointly by Mitvim and the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC) at Syracuse University, features the lectures delivered by Prof. Elman and Attorney Sher at the workshop. It also consists of an introduction by Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University and Mitvim, which sheds light on some socialpsychological dimensions of the spoilers phenomena.

Past attempts at resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict have shown just how much negative impact spoilers can have on jeopardizing peace processes. In recent years, attempts have been made to bring new constituencies into the peace process. Engage them, moderate them, make them part of the process. These have not yet yielded the desired results, and must be broadened.

Currently, with no substantial Israeli-Arab peace process underway, we are facing a different type of spoilers. Not those using violent means to stop negotiations, but rather those preventing a process from even taking place. These spoilers are not the militant spoilers of the 1990s, but rather large segments of the Israeli and Palestinian mainstream, which have lost hope in peace, doubt its desirability and feasibility, and lack a sense of urgency regarding it.

Many of these current spoilers are acting within the marketplace of ideas—they shape mindsets, perceptions and paradigms. The popularity of the “no Palestinian partner for peace” notion, launched as a political spin by Prime Minister Ehud Barak following the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, is perhaps the most striking example for a spoiling paradigm.

In order to advance Israeli-Arab peace, the issue of spoilers of peace should be better understood and addressed. We at Mitvim hope that this publication will make a contribution towards this goal. We would like to thank the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv for partnering with us on this project, and especially Ms. Hilary Olsin-Windecker, Ms. Anne Walter, and Ms. Linda Slutzky. We are also thankful to Ms. Jenia Yudkevich, project coordinator at Mitvim, and to Ms. Nicole Audette, Master’s candidate in International Relations and Public Diplomacy at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, for their assistance; and to PARCC for providing funding to the “Spoilers of Peace” project, directed by Miriam F. Elman and Bruce Dayton (Associate Director of the Moynihan Institute for Global Affairs, Maxwell School of Syracuse University).

הפוסט Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

All other plans originated with third parties (mainly the US) or the Arab side. In addition, Israel missed several opportunities for peace (or at least for some serious negotiations). One such missed opportunity was the Arab Peace Initiative (API), presented in March 2002 by the Arab League. Israel has never officially responded to that initiative. The API is still on the table, as indicated by the most recent Arab summit, held in Baghdad in March 2012.

3. The continuation of the settlement activity undermines another target of Israeli foreign policy: the desire to be a Jewish state – and be recognized as such. This settlement activity – if continued without abatement – will eventually lead to a de facto one-state solution, which is considered a by many Israelis as the end of the Jewish state, taking into account the demographic trend among Jews and Arabs.

4. Israel supports the idea of a unified Jerusalem, which in reality means controlling and absorbing some 300,000 Palestinians in east Jerusalem – a policy that also contradicts the very essence of the desire to establish a Jewish state. In addition, it contradicts the Israeli refusal to admit more than a few thousand Palestinians refugees within a future agreement.

5. Israel recognized the international boundary as a mandatory border with Egypt and Jordan (and negotiated with Syria on its basis), yet it is unwilling to recognize the 1967 Green Line as a mandatory border with the Palestinians.

6. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring and the possibility that Arab regimes will become democratic because it fears the rise of Islamic regimes.

7. Israel fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalist regimes, but in reality Saudi Arabia – which twice in the past proffered peace plans (the Fahd Plan, 1981- 82; the API, or “Abdallah initiative,” as noted, in February 2002) – is “a fundamentalist Islamic state.”

Therefore, an Islamic state is not necessarily an immediate threat to Israel.

8. Israel claims that there is no Palestinian partner, but in reality PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are perhaps the most moderate Palestinian leaders to date and he is in favor of a solution based on the 1967 borders.

9. Israel is the strongest state in the Middle East militarily, with the possession of nuclear capability (according to foreign reports), yet it views the Palestinians, and certainly Iran, as existential threats.

10. The Jews came to Palestine to establish an independent Jewish state and in such a way to disengage themselves from the ghetto mentality they were subjected to in Europe and the Arab countries.

Yet, several generations later, they have managed – with the help of their neighbors – to establish a new ghetto in the Middle East surrounded by walls and fences.

Obviously, the question is what to do next. Well, the first step is to recognize these paradoxes in Israeli policy. Second, there must be an attempt to address them by initiating a major change in the thinking which guides the policy. The continuation of the more-or-less same policy will lead to the perpetuation of these paradoxes in the Israeli foreign policy. The entrance of the more moderate Kadima Party to the coalition creates an opportunity for addressing these paradoxes.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten paradoxes in Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.