הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Importance of Ties between Palestinian Citizens of Israel and Diaspora Jewry: A View from Britain הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The three titanic clashes of the 20th century – two world wars and the Cold War – ended with victory for the democratic camp, although often requiring alliances with non-democracies. The democratic advantage in war is not limited to democratic Great Powers. At the end of the 1990s, scholars Allan Stam and Dan Reiter showed that of the 297 wars between states in the years 1816 to 1990, democracies (most of which were not Great Powers, obviously) won almost all the wars they initiated and two-thirds of those imposed on them.

Elections are one explanation for the “democratic dividend” in war. Leaders of democratic states fear voters will depose them due to failed wars and therefore opt for wars they can win. Public trauma in the wake of war can unseat even a strong, established party. Such was the case with Israel’s Mapai/Ma’arach. In 1977, voter fury at the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about its downfall after 44 years of uninterrupted rule in the pre-state Jewish political entity (The Yeshuv) and later the State of Israel.

A nation’s participation in the choice of its leaders imbues government decisions such as a decision to go to war with an added dimension of legitimacy, generating greater identification among soldiers with the combat goals. It is true that non-democratic states, such as the Soviet Union, were successful in mobilizing public support during difficult times, such as World War II. However, the repressive nature of the Soviet state made it easier for the Germans to recruit to their side over 100,000 Soviet citizens (some of them prisoners of war they had captured). Moreover, in the final historic analysis, both of these political systems that challenged democracy – Nazism and Marxist-Leninism – were defeated.

Another explanation for the advantages democracies enjoy in war pertains to their institutional structure. Democratic leaders have less room to maneuver because constitutions, lawmakers and supreme courts provide checks and balances on their power. This results in tighter oversight over the executive branch of government, and, in turn, greater effectiveness of a decision to go to war, a decision on how to conduct a war and what lessons to learn from it.

Israel beat Egypt in 1967 inter alia because Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser undermined Israeli-Egyptian stability through a series of irresponsible declarations and measures, while his army was engaged elsewhere in a far-off war in Yemen. In a better-balanced regime, such declarations and steps would probably not be possible. The institutional balance is thus very important. As scholars Philip Potter and Matt Baum showed in a 2015 study, even autocracies in which constraints are placed on the ruler enjoy greater success in foreign policy and defense.

Democracies succeed in war because of not only elections and limits on power, but also because they are underpinned by values. A democratic culture that enables domestic and external criticism is a significant force multiplier. For example, writing in a 1982 opinion piece in Haaretz, Major Gershon Hacohen backed the right of a senior officer to resign in order to avoid leading his troops on a mission with which he disagreed. Hacohen’s unusual stand earned him a reprimand and a discharge. He was re-instated several years later, rising to the rank of Major General and contributing greatly to the Israel Defense Forces with his original thinking and outspoken views.

A true democratic culture empowers individuals, encourages their initiative and commitment, and makes them more militarily effective. On the other hand, nondemocratic states repress personal initiative, especially by military personnel, to prevent them directing it against the regime. In a comprehensive study in the 1990s, scholar Kenneth Pollack showed that lack of initiative on the part of military commanders in Arab armies was one of the main reasons for their persistent failures in wars against Israel. Similarly, non-democratic regimes divert significant intelligence resources to repressing their population at the expense of developing an effective an intelligence apparatus directed at the enemy. In this respect, too, Israel enjoys an advantage over its non-democratic neighbors.

Finally, open and democratic societies have been more successful in mining creative talents in high-tech, entrepreneurship and innovation, making the democratic West more prosperous and technologically and scientifically advanced, in terms of military effectiveness, too. True, non-democratic states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were able to reach some scientific achievements. However, only democracies managed to preserve their scientific and technological advantages in the long term. A technological edge is particularly important for Israel’s security. After all, it is this edge in technology that allows it to compensate for its limited human and material resources, when compared to its foes.

A strong democracy is therefore vital for Israel’s security. Fair elections and regime change, checks and balances with an emphasis on restraining the power of the executive branch, an open and democratic culture of criticism, and the ability to attract and retain the creative classes are the pillars of an effective Israeli national security. Undermining them means not only a different political order, but also a real threat to the security of the state.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and an Associate Professor in international relations at Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Democracy is Essential to Israel’s National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.