ארכיון UN - Mitvim

Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 11:09:30 +0000

The total stalemate in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires new thinking and weaning off of old paradigms. Currently as the result of the Hamas attack on October 7, the ensuring war in Gaza, and the deterioration of security in the occupied West Bank, the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians are at their worst since 1948 and seem the least conducive to a new a peace process. However, events have demonstrated to the international community that allowing this conflict to fester has had disastrous consequences not only for Israelis and Palestinians, but it has also had far-reaching implications across the region and the rest of the international community. This paper argues that an important step to break the deadlock is recognition of Palestinian statehood by individual countries and by international organizations, in particular the UN Security Council. Such recognition should incentivize both sides to negotiate peace based on a two-state solution, as it would overcome the asymmetry in the negotiations between a recognized state and movement representing its people. It will empower the pragmatic elements in both societies who are invested in peace, and will also send a clear message of sincerity from the international community that a two-state solution is the one it is behind and it will support.

הפוסט Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Impact of the Occupation on Israel’s Foreign Relations

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 05 Jan 2023 11:10:33 +0000

The UN General Assembly’s decision to seek the opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on whether the Israeli occupation is permanent or temporary should not surprise anyone. Israel has been occupying the West Bank for 56 years, persistently arguing that under international as well as Israeli law the occupation is temporary, a transitional situation accepted by international law and enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention. The territories (with the exception of East Jerusalem) have therefore not been annexed to Israel, not legally and certainly not in terms of international recognition, and that is why the military commander of the region is the sovereign power in the territories rather than the Israeli Knesset.

The current government has embarked on a fundamental clash with international law due to its intent to transform the occupation into a permanent reality de facto even if not de jure. Despite the claims of Israel’s political right that “a people cannot be an occupier of its own land”, and without denying the historical connection of the Jewish people to regions of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this is also undoubtedly the land of the Palestinians living in these territories. The Palestinians in the West Bank experience violent military occupation whereas Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem face discrimination in all aspects of life. In the West Bank, a different law applies to Palestinians and to Israeli settlers living there, and in East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents do not enjoy Israeli citizenship and are discriminated against in terms of municipal and social services and in the residency permits they are required to obtain from the government and municipality. In other words, Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are subject to different and discriminatory rules compared to their Jewish neighbors.

Israeli governments has nonetheless managed to avoid significant international sanctions over this clearly immoral reality unparalleled in Western democracies due to its claim that the situation is temporary in nature and that Israel is reaching out to the Palestinians in search of a peaceful solution to the conflict. These two claims have long since ceased to hold water, but nonetheless enjoy US backing and benefit from European inertia. Israel has thus been spared sanctions of the kind imposed on Russia since its 2014 occupation of Crimea, and even more so since its invasion and occupation of parts of eastern Ukraine.

Dr. Micah Goodman’s theory of “shrinking the conflict”, which was adopted by the previous government as unofficial policy due to its inability to seek an accommodation with the Palestinians, is nothing more than self-delusion. Anyone familiar with the situation in the Occupied Territories knows that the conflict cannot be shrunk and cannot be “managed.” The question is essentially dichotomous – Israel is either an occupying power or it is not. Vague definitions and hollow words cannot change this fundamental fact. In practice, the “shrinking the conflict” policy of the past year has failed to achieve its already limited goals. The Israeli presence in the West Bank creates a routine of violence against the Palestinian population,by Jewish settler violence intended to take over Palestinian territory and make Palestinian life a misery. Discriminatory laws, which allow Palestinians to be evicted from their homes and lands while their Jewish neighbors live comfortably in homes on land that belongs to Palestinians, are intended to thwart any solution that would divide the land between Israelis and Palestinians. Nonetheless, successive Israeli governments, including the so-called government of change (2021-2022), have succeeded in convincing the world that the occupation that begun in 1967 is temporary.

The new government, according to its declarations and the wording of the coalition agreements underpinning its formation, is about to expose this prolonged masquerade and thereby eliminate the international protective umbrella that allowed Israel to keep it in place. This government has announced its intention to continue building settlements in the Palestinian territories and even to whitewash the outposts considered illegal under Israeli law due to their location on private Palestinian land.

The new government also intends to significantly weaken the independence of Israel’s judicial system, which has served as a shield against international legal intervention by convincing the West that Israel should be allowed to deal with human rights violations in the Occupied Territories on its own.

Moreover, the new government intends to undermine the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, a move that would severely undermine the peace agreement with Jordan and damage Israel’s other agreements with Arab countries, not to mention the real danger of widespread violence as a direct result. It should be noted that, contrary to Netanyahu’s claim that the Abraham Accords proved that the Sunni Arab states are not interested in the occupation, all Arab states supported the December 2022 UN resolution seeking the International Criminal Court’s opinion on the Israeli occupation.

The new government’s policy reflects a disregard for international law and the norms underlying it. It is important to understand that most countries in the Western world, of which we claim to be a part, regard international law as the infrastructure for their foreign affairs policy. Therefore, once it becomes clear that the occupation is not temporary and does not comply with the rules governing transition periods, their policy towards us may change significantly. Without the US veto power in the Security Council, the Palestinians would have long since been accepted as a UN member. In fact, without the American diplomatic umbrella, most countries would have recognized a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The two-state solution, which the new government is renouncing, is accepted by almost all countries of the world except Israel, Iran and a number of other non-democratic states.

The longstanding American diplomatic defense on which we have pinned our hopes for decades is about to be eroded, and rightly so. The US administration will no longer be able to justify, either domestically to the majority of Democrats, nor externally to the international community, the protection it provides for Israel’s occupation once Israel’s new government exposes the fraud that enabled its existence. There are already increasing calls in the Democratic Party to stop providing Israel with financial and diplomatic assistance given the Israeli government’s contravention of the two countries’ shared values and interests. Younger American Jews no longer remember Israel as the small and week country extending a hand of peace to the hostile neighbors threatening its existence, which justified their parents’ mobilization to help the fledgling state at all costs. The younger generation rightly sees Israel as a military power making no move to end the conflict while continuing to expect American military aid.

The ultra-Orthodox right-wing government is causing the great majority of the American Jewish community and the Democratic Party to distance themselves from Israel, undermining not only the automatic defense of Israel, but also our ability to serve as the national home of the Jewish people in the Diaspora in accordance with the Zionist mission. The vast majority of American Jews and Democratic voters will be unable to adhere for long to a partnership with Israel cemented by shared values and interests when the State of Israel chooses to disengage from these values and turn itself into an ethnocracy based on Jewish supremacy. Israel’s position at the center of US political consensus has already been severely eroded by Netanyahu’s previous governments. If the State of Israel continues in the direction on which it has embarked, we will soon be left only with the support of Trumpist populists and evangelical Christians who hope for Armageddon in which they hope that most of us will be killed and that the rest of us will convert to Christianity with the return of Jesus Christ.

For years, there has been talk of a political tsunami. The fact that it failed to materialize no longer means it will not. For those like myself who fear the demise of the Zionist dream and its promise as the democratic homeland of the Jewish people, external intervention to halt such deterioration is not bad news. For all those who, like me, think that the eternal domination of the Palestinians is incompatible with our humane and Jewish values, removing the mask may actually be beneficial by exposing the obvious cost of the occupation and making it clear to all that we cannot be part of the enlightened world as an occupying people. My only hope is that the price we pay will not include bloodshed and the dangerous weakening of Israeli society and of the magnificent Zionist project established by our grandparents and parents.

This article is from “Haaretz“, from Janurary 5, 2023

הפוסט The Impact of the Occupation on Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Foreign Service Closing-Out Sale: Gilad Erdan’s Dual Appointment to UN and Washington

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 19 Jun 2020 15:29:35 +0000

The tumult over the installation of Israel’s 35th government and the division of 36 ministerial and 16 deputy ministerial portfolios drowned out news of Gilad Erdan’s dual diplomatic appointment. The veteran Likud politician and the State of Israel will be getting two for the price of one: Israel’s ambassador to the UN and the US rolled into one. No one has bothered to ask why or if this is at all feasible.

Erdan, who says he has long aspired to the jobs, reminded us that Israel’s iconic diplomat Abba Eban also served simultaneously in these two senior posts, and claimed he was certain of his ability to fulfill both. As the French would say, “He is proud of his humility”. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu had sought to distance Erdan from Israel for political reasons, he is obviously fully aware of the extent and demands of the two top Foreign Service jobs, having served himself in the US, first as DCM in Washington and then as UN Ambassador.

Representing Israel in the US is a demanding, fulltime job. The ambassador in Washington is in charge of the relationships with the administration and Congress as well as with politicians throughout the 50 states, and with the divided Jewish community. He is also tasked with Israel’s public diplomacy challenges, its security, strategic and economic ties with the US, and oversight over eight Israeli consulates spread all over the country .

The position of Ambassador to the UN is also a non-ending investment of hours and efforts, often in times of crises, of which we supply plenty. Part of the ambassador’s job is also to initiate and conduct ties throughout the year with the representatives of many among the 192 member states and with the organization’s numerous committees. That, too, is more than a full-time position.

I have known Erdan for years, and my appreciation of his skills notwithstanding, I do not believe he can fulfill all these complex tasks at the same time, for the simple reason that no one can do so fully and satisfactorily. Only unique figures, such as Abba Eban, who served at the UN when it was still in its infancy and consisted of only 33 states could have done so.

What, then, is the meaning of Netanyahu’s decision? Cost cutting was obviously not a consideration given the installation of Israel’s biggest and most spendthrift government at the height of an economic-social crisis. The real reason lies in Netanyahu’s consistent attitude and conduct over the past decade toward Israel’s Foreign Service, and the deep contempt he displays toward the ministry that safeguards the state’s essential interests and toward its professional staff.

This attitude has led Netanyahu to strip the Foreign Ministry of many of its traditional purviews, such as diplomatic strategy, the anti-BDS campaign, relations with the Diaspora and public diplomacy and to hand them out as “consolation prizes” to various party loyalists . These moves have deprived the Ministry of many of the key roles its staff carried out for decades on the front lines of Israel’s struggles to establish or renew diplomatic ties with the countries of the world, promote trade agreements and international investments, and defend Israel’s essential interests in international organizations. Some representatives were felled by terrorists in the line of duty. Netanyahu’s moves have demoralized the staff, deprived Israeli diplomats of their professional pride, transferred the handling of important issues to non-professional hands and generated confusion, lack of coordination and even embarrassment.

Last year’s dramatic budget cuts dealt an almost fatal blow to the Ministry and the Foreign Service. The work of the missions abroad ground to a halt due to lack of funding, wages were cut, Israel’s international foreign aid enterprise was suspended, the diplomatic campaign against Iran was stalled, public diplomacy and cultural activities were undermined and the promotion of Israeli economic activity abroad was significantly eroded. As an example of the absurdity of the situation, Israeli diplomats were unable to represent the state at important functions away from the city of their posting because they had no money for train tickets.

Tasking a person of legendary skills like Abba Eban with both positions in the 1950s was born out of necessity when Israel was a young, poor state. A similar move in 2020 reflects the continued systematic destruction of the Israeli Foreign Service even as significant developments are emerging on the horizon with a possible change of administration in Washington and international fallout from the Israeli government’s annexation intentions.

הפוסט Foreign Service Closing-Out Sale: Gilad Erdan’s Dual Appointment to UN and Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace?

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 May 2020 13:47:03 +0000

In March 2020, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued an appeal for a global ceasefire. “There should be one fight in our world today, our shared battle against COVID-19,” he said. In the weeks that followed, leaders, organizations and citizens from different countries have voiced their support for a global ceasefire. In some conflicts around the world, there were signs of reduced escalation and increased humanitarian cooperation. Israelis and Palestinians have also stepped up their cooperation these days, as both sides work to confront the health crisis and its domestic implications. However, the current political climate poses obstacles for additional progress. Statements about an upcoming Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories raise the likelihood of escalation over the coming months. In light of this background, the conference introduced the UN’s call for a global ceasefire, explored the impact it has made so far on international conflicts, assessed its relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and discussed ways to increase Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and to advance peace. This document sums up the main points presented by H.E. Nickolay Mladenov, Richard Gowan, Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Yael Berda, Huda Abuarquob, Prof. Dan Midownik and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

The recording of the conference can be watched here.

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 22 Apr 2020 14:06:10 +0000

In recent years, Israel, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Greece and Italy promoted the idea of constructing a long pipeline to transfer gas from Israel and Cyprus to Europe. It was argued that it would contribute to the European efforts to diversify energy sources. Discussing the project strengthened relations between the project partner countries, which are in the midst of creating a complex alliance.

(Originally published in ECONFO)

הפוסט Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The World Can Overcome the Coronavirus Crisis by Working Together

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 06 Apr 2020 12:50:11 +0000

Humankind is facing yet another crisis. The Coronavirus pandemic has stopped the world as we knew it. We are living through growing uncertainty about tomorrow, fear and anxiety about death. What is to be done about a challenge that appears larger than life? Square our shoulders and coordinate joint action. Throughout the ages, society has proven capable of dealing with challenges and this time is no different, despite the fact that international institutions have been starved and weakened in recent years.

The globalization processes of the past four decades, encouraging the movement of people, goods, capital, knowledge and services, have been intensive and unprecedented in scope. Under the auspices of the Western powers, the world has become one giant capitalist market – its borders opened, customs tariffs lowered, and free trade and competition turned into defining values. The interminable consumption culture greased the wheels of an economy based on competitiveness, the concept of endless resources and free movement.

And suddenly, Corona. The wheels have ground to a halt. Resources are insufficient, competition is of no use. Inequality strikes us all. Fear has vanquished freedom. There are those who suggest the time has come for a return to isolation, for locking the doors, for restoring borders, raising tariffs, banning foreigners, preserving existing resources for the use of the state and letting each country fend for itself.

However, despite the necessity of social distancing, what is currently required is cooperation in maintaining that distance. Competition does not help in this case. The climate change crisis, drug trafficking and transnational crime cannot be tackled alone, nor can the Coronavirus pandemic. Globalization cannot be halted. Epidemics were never stemmed by isolation. History teaches us that in ancient times pandemics wiped out significant swathes of humanity, even without intensive globalization and when the main weapon against them was isolation.

Such was the case in the 2nd century, when a plague spread through the Roman Empire and dismantled the world’s strongest army. Such was the case in the 6th century, when the Plague of Justinian spread throughout the Mediterranean Basin, killing 25 million people, annihilating half the population of Europe and signaling the end of the ancient era. Such was the case in the 14th century, when the Black Plague was consuming Asia, killing hundreds of millions and about one-third of the population of Europe. And this was also the case in the 16th century, when a series of epidemics imported by European settlers decimated the indigenous population of the Americas.

Plagues have been around since the dawn of history, but society’s ability to confront them has progressively improved. History taught successive generations that the most efficient treatment was based on cooperation and science. The eradication of smallpox virus is a telling example. After killing millions of people for over 3,000 years and bringing down kingdoms and empires, the virus was eliminated in the 20th century. Scientists had tried to find a vaccine for some 150 years. When it was finally developed, joint action by the world’s health organizations in testing, isolation, and vaccination, won the day. Science and cooperation were also successful in turning HIV that killed off 25 million people with AIDS into a manageable, less lethal chronic disease.

But not only epidemics have taught us the need for cooperation and joint mechanisms to tackle and prevent crises. For example, to deal with the religious wars that divided Europe in the 17th century, European rulers convened to sign the Peace of Westphalia. They agreed on the principles of a new political order that would end decades-long wars and prevent new ones. In 1909, the US led an international effort against drug trafficking and use amid the growing awareness of their repercussions, which culminated in the signing of the International Opium Convention. The agreement was designed to organize the cooperation between states in monitoring and controlling drug production and trafficking throughout the world.

The most telling and comprehensive example is the founding of the League of Nations and subsequently the UN. Following World War I, US President Wilson led to the founding of the League of Nations to settle conflicts through diplomacy. World War II, which broke out almost 20 years later, reflected the League’s weakness. It did not have the power and means to impose policy, and many states (chief among them the US itself) refused to join, and thus failed to prevent the looming crisis. With the end of the war, world states joined together once more, this time to establish the UN and achieve the same goals. Additional international institutions, international conventions, courts, aid organizations and more have sprouted up since then.

The world wars taught humanity a lesson, and significant measures were indeed adopted to ensure international cooperation in dealing with varied and numerous challenges. It seems, however, that many of these lessons have been forgotten.

International institutions have been scorned in recent years, undermining their capacities. “America First” was President Trump’s mantra, and he acted on it. Not only is he not leading any international efforts, he has slashed millions of dollars from US contributions to international organizations. In July 2018, UN Secretary General Guterres begged member states to pay their debts to the UN because it had run out of funds. In October 2019, only two months before the Coronavirus eruption, the Secretary General revealed that almost one-third of the UN member states had not paid their annual dues, and that the organization’s activity over the year had only been made possible by cuts in its emergency funding.

The State of Israel did not pay its membership dues, either. In January 2017, Prime Minister Netanyahu decided to cut 6 million USD from Israel’s commitment to the UN (which stood at 11 million USD) to protest UN Security Council decision 2334 which determined that settlements were illegal. In March 2017, Netanyahu ordered an additional 2 million USD cut because he did not like resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, and in July of that same year, he cut another 1 million USD following a decision by UNESCO. Yes, in 2019 Israel is also among the states in arrears to the UN.

Faced with the Corona threat, we are seeking strong, effective global mechanisms to manage the crisis – to ensure the dissemination of trustworthy information; generate joint, synchronous research; set international rules to regulate the crisis and have sufficient power to enforce them. However, the international institutions are in a bad way. At this point in time, would the citizens of Israel and of the world not want strong, functioning international organizations, with their emergency funding intact? Of course, they would! Would we be happy to have fully empowered international institutions to enforce joint policy? Obviously! This is well worth remembering once we are back to business as usual.

Israel must not wait until the Corona crisis ends. It should adopt a foreign policy that emphasizes cooperation. It must act with its face to the world, divert resources to strengthen its Foreign Service, which, in turn, will bolster ties between Israel and the rest of the world. It should invest additional resources in foreign aid; take up positions in international organizations from which to influence actions; place knowledge and technology at the disposal of international organizations and other states; grant legitimacy and recognize the authority of international organizations and proffer aid to the needy to the extent possible.

This crisis must engender stronger, more powerful international organizations, with greater enforcement capacity, institutions that can operate effectively in order to prevent the next crisis and/or prepare for it. Rehabilitation of the world from the Coronavirus meltdown should be at the top of the agenda, along with coordinated actions to deal with the repercussions of global warming, which unfortunately presage yet another epidemic. Let us hope we succeed.

הפוסט The World Can Overcome the Coronavirus Crisis by Working Together הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Gaza Helps Israel and Qatar Find Common Ground

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:30:11 +0000

According to Israeli media reports, the heads of the Mossad and of the IDF’s southern command secretly visited Qatar in early February. The visit validates comments made to me by a Qatari senior that is closely associated with the government whom I met on my visit there in 2018. The Qatari described the excellent relations between highly regarded figures in Israel and Qatar, and emphasized the successful cooperation between the two countries.

These events point to a change in Israel-Qatar relations, from mutual hostility to unusual cooperation. In recent decades, Qatar was an inciting agent that threatened to destabilize Arab regimes whose survival Israel sought to ensure. Qatar led a confrontational line encouraging extremism and supporting jihadist activity, nurturing ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. As well as being close to Turkey, Qatar supplied broad economic infrastructure for Hamas and conducted economic relations with Iran, positioning it alongside Israel’s biggest enemies.

However, the turbulent reality in the Middle East challenged the rivalry between Israel and Qatar and prompted a fundamental change in their relationship. Gaza required extensive and comprehensive rehabilitation following the destruction and devastation resulting from Operation Protective Edge in 2014, a time in which Arab states were refusing to provide financial support to the Hamas leadership. Officials in Jerusalem realized that the chaotic situation in Gaza was a powder keg, which, if not properly addressed, could result in an additional round of fighting with Hamas. In that sense, Israel found an ally in Qatar, which offered over one billion dollars in humanitarian aid for Gaza. Qatar viewed the investment in Gaza as a moral and ideological commitment as well as an opportunity to assume a key mediating role between Gaza and Israel, especially since the traditional mediators in this arena, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were hostile to Qatar, and were lowering their profile and focusing on their domestic affairs.

Qatar thus underscored and strengthened its regional standing, as well as tightening relations with the US administration. Israel would have undoubtedly preferred Saudi or Egyptian aid, but lacking other alternatives, the scene was set for unusual and rare cooperation between the two states based on a common interest. Israel also assumed that absent the Qatari alternative, Hamas would tighten its relations with Iran in an effort to obtain additional funding.

Israel is well aware that Qatar cannot bring about a diplomatic breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of its limited power and influence, but that does not negate its importance as a key player in mediation between Israel and Hamas. The mediation undertaken by Qatar’s envoy to Gaza Mohammed al-Emadi, alongside the contributions of Egypt and of the UN’s envoy Mladenov, were instrumental in postponing further bouts of violence, even at times when Israel seemed to no longer be willing to adopt restraint.

The mutual understanding over Gaza created a unique situation. While there is no solution on the horizon for the Palestinian problem, the Israel-Qatar dialogue is breaking through previous barriers and redefining relations. However, these are functional, relations aimed at achieving calm in Gaza by means of economic and humanitarian aid. The Qatari position has traditionally been, and continues to be pro-Palestinian. In other words, it demands full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and supports the right of the Palestinian people to their own state. As a result, as long as no progress is made on the Palestinian issue, relations between Doha and Jerusalem will remain limited in quality and extent, despite their promising potential.

To sum up, there is still a long way ahead until official diplomatic recognition between the states is reached, but that does not cancel out the shift in their relations. In just a few years, Israel and Qatar relations has evolved from enmity to strategic partnership regarding the Gaza Strip. This does not mean Qatar has abandoned its historic ties with Israel’s enemies, but its view of the Palestinian issue is no longer based on binary concepts of assailant and victim, but rather on recognition of the joint responsibility of the various elements for the Gaza crisis.

The Israeli leadership will presumably keep harboring suspicions of Qatar in years to come. However, unlike the past, this suspicion does not rule out relations with Qatar, it simply delineates them. While Qatar is not a natural Israeli ally, its great interest in Israeli science and technology could serve as the basis for extensive future cooperation in additional fields.

Dr. Michal Yaari is an expert on the Gulf states at Haifa University and the Open University, and a task team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. This article is based on a research she wrote at the Mitvim Institute on Israel-Qatar relations.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gaza Helps Israel and Qatar Find Common Ground הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Qatar’s friendship is good for Israel

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:42:07 +0000

The leak of a secret visit to Doha by Mossad Director Yossi Cohen and GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Herzi Levi last month to pressure Qatar to keep funding Hamas in Gaza confirmed what Qatari and Israeli officials have been claiming: There is a dramatic change in the nature of relations between the two countries.

In past decades, Qatar was seen as a threat to Israel and instigator of instability in the region due to its support of jihadist movements such as the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood.

In addition to forging close ties with Turkey, the Gulf state has also provided Gaza rulers Hamas with economic assistance and brokered Iranian financial aid to the terror group, positioning it alongside Israel’s worst enemies.

But Mideast politics they are a-changin’ and old enemies are taking a new look at their ties to Israel.

After the 2014 Gaza war and the destruction caused to the enclave, a massive rehabilitation effort had to be implemented, but many of the Arab countries – including Egypt and Saudi Arabia – shied away from assisting Hamas and turned their attention to domestic challenges.

The government in Jerusalem, having realized that a humanitarian crisis in Gaza posed a threat to Israel and could trigger another war, found an ally

in Qatar, which offered more than 1 billion dollars in aid to the besieged enclave.

The Qatari rulers saw an opportunity to assume a crucial mediation role between Israel and Hamas and as a result enjoyed a marked strengthening of ties with the United States.

Jerusalem, though reluctant at first, agreed to cooperate with Qatar primarily to keep Iran from tightening its grip on the Gaza factions.

And it is Doha’s actions, coupled with mediation efforts by Egypt and the UN special Mideast envoy Nikolay Mladenov, that have prevented more rounds of violence between the two sides.

Even so, the road to better relations between Israel and Qatar is a long one.

The emirate has not changed its position on the Palestinian right to an independent viable state that would see an end to Israeli control of the West Bank, and the likelihood that full diplomatic ties can be instated remains questionable.

But geopolitics have pushed religion and ideology aside, resulting in an unexpected strategic partnership between the two nations in the service of pragmatic interests.

Qatar now views the question of Gaza in non-binary terms and accepts that the responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians lies with all parties.

Israel remains suspicious of Qatar’s motives and behavior, but still find the way to cooperate with it within defined parameters.

Doha has shown an interest in Israeli science and technology and that too could become the basis of future cooperation.

The definition of good and bad actors in the Middle East is now in flux, which opens a window of opportunity for Israel.

Dr. Michal Yaari is an expert on Saudi Arabia at the Ben Gurion University and a contributing member of the think tank Mitvim – an institute for regional foreign policies

(originally published on YNet)

הפוסט Qatar’s friendship is good for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:37:01 +0000

Since President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, Israeli-Egyptian ties have been marked by defense-strategic cooperation, based on the shared perception of Iran and radical Islamist terror organizations as a threat, and the common interest in managing the Palestinian issue, in general, and specifically the Gaza arena.

In the permanent tension between ideology and interests, Egypt continues to strive for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and seeks to bring about internal Palestinian reconciliation beforehand. Its role as an important mediator between Hamas and Israel is crucial in ending periodic bouts of violence, is in line with Egypt’s standing as an important regional leader and is serving Egypt’s own interests as well.

Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven that it is resistant to changes and shock waves. The peace also provides a potential platform for strategic cooperation. Relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace,” an image based on the fact that as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, Egypt is unable to progress to full normalization with Israel despite crucial shared interests. Although this position has become somewhat muted in light of the growing defense-strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations.

Israeli-Egyptian links are an asset to the region, especially to the states of the Arab Sunni axis, as well as to the US and other powers. They regard the ties as a boost to regional stability after a period of great upheaval. Throughout 2019, Egypt was a pivotal component in ties between Israel and the Palestinians. It played a central role in all attempts at ceasefires with Hamas, which were also assisted by UN mediation and Qatari funds.

Israel and Egypt both seek to limit Iran’s presence in the Middle East, to advance increased sanctions against it by diplomatic means, and to fight its various proxies. Israel and Egypt also worked, each individually, to limit Turkey’s activity in the Eastern Mediterranean by nurturing alliances in the region. They also mounted campaigns against terror organizations, born of a joint perception of the threat they pose and the required responses. In addition, Israel and Egypt share a similar view of the US role in the region, resulting in Israeli-Egyptian coordination in some fields (such as the Qualified Industrial Zones – QIZ). Along with cooperation on the diplomatic front, 2019 also saw continued security cooperation between Israel and Egypt, which has underpinned relations between them in recent years.

Given the cooperation described above, a high-profile celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement would have been expected in 2019. However, while Israel held academic seminars and various other events, no similar events or ceremonies were conducted in Egypt. Ambassador David Govrin completed his term at the end of July 2019, and Israel currently does not have an ambassador in Cairo. The ambassador-designate’s appointment in October 2018 has not been presented for government approval.

ALONG WITH diplomatic-strategic cooperation, cooperation between Israel and Egypt on energy issues was also prominent in 2019. Significant steps were taken to promote cooperation allowing Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece (and perhaps Lebanon in the future) to form a regional hub of natural gas production as a basis for export to Europe. In January 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was launched in Cairo by seven Middle Eastern and European governments, among them Israel and the Palestinian Authority (but without the participation of Turkey and Lebanon).

Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz met with his Egyptian counterpart, Tariq al-Mulla, in full view of the cameras during the launch event. In January, a decision was made to upgrade the EMGF to a recognized international organization, which France asked to join too, and which will include the US, EU and World Bank as observers. Strengthening multilateral cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean helps boost Israeli-Egyptian ties.

In September, Israel’s state-owned Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company signed a contract with the owners of the Egyptian EMG gas pipeline to allow the flow of gas from Israel’s offshore Leviathan and Tamar gas fields to Egypt. The deal is expected to yield the Israeli company an annual commission of NIS 200 million. In addition, a compromise was reached between the Egyptian government and the Israel Electric Corporation, according to which the Egyptians would only pay the IEC $500m. of the $1.76 billion ruled in its favor in international arbitration several years ago. That compromise removed the remaining barriers to the supply of gas from Israel to Egypt, and in January, Israel began exporting gas to Egypt from the Leviathan reservoir. None of the above would have been possible without intensive contacts between the Egyptian and Israeli governments.

Nonetheless, there were no other significant changes in Israel-Egyptian economic cooperation in 2019. The QIZ initiative continued to operate in its current format, as did agricultural projects. Unfortunately, there were no new initiatives in the spheres of solar energy, water desalination or green energy, which could have been very beneficial to the Egyptian economy. No progress was reported in scientific, medical, technological or academic cooperation, either. Nonetheless, there was an increase in the number of Israeli visitors to Egypt, with hundreds of thousands visiting the Sinai Peninsula and a few thousand touring Egypt itself. Positive developments occurred in the other direction, too – with the growth of Egyptian Copt pilgrimages to Israel, especially for the “Great Sabbath” and Easter holy days. Their numbers grew to about 7,000 in 2019 from some 5,000 in 2015.

In addition, as part of Egypt’s efforts to display more tolerant and liberal attitudes, especially toward religious minorities, among them Jews and Copts, progress was made in terms of Egypt’s commitment to refurbish Jewish heritage sites. Cairo’s Bassatine Jewish Cemetery compound was renovated in 2019 with Egyptian government funding, the Eliyahu Hanavi Synagogue restoration in Alexandria was completed in January. Ambassadors from many countries were invited to the impressive synagogue ceremony, but the Israeli ambassador was not invited. The Egyptians framed the event as a Jewish rather than Israel-related occasion.

Over four decades of Israeli-Egyptian relations testify to continuity and change. The two states’ mutual interests constitute the basis for their peace, despite the obstacles, disagreements, and tensions over the years. The emerging regional and international reality (especially since Sisi’s rise to power) has increased cooperation but was not successful in thawing Egypt’s cool attitude toward the peace with Israel. A significant obstacle to the relationship continues to be Egyptian avoidance of cultural cooperation. The Mediterranean identity starting to take root in certain Egyptian and Israeli circles may generate a dialogue that will eventually yield more open cultural relations. Social media, which enable a direct and comprehensive discourse with young Egyptians, constitute another arena in which Israel operates and that holds potential for civilian rapprochement. Israel should quickly appoint a permanent ambassador to Egypt, one able to support and lead attempts to bolster ties and take advantage of existing opportunities.

The writer is Israel’s former ambassador to Egypt and South Sudan, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. Read a longer version of this article on the Mitvim Institute’s website.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:33:26 +0000

The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence.

The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening.

The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization could be perceived as a positive development. Research examining the effects of the global flu epidemic in the winter of 1957-58 clearly showed Cold War constraints on movement between East and West curtailed the spread of the disease in the West.

The fact that the virus broke out in China is of particular significance. The rising Eastern power plays a critical role in the global economy, inter alia as the production hub of most goods we consume. We hailed this global production chain and the cheap goods it provided. Now that the crisis in China is preventing production and export, many countries will presumably try to bring back home some of their essential production elements. The US under President Donald Trump was trying to do so anyway, albeit for different reasons. Not only that, weakened Chinese economic activity is expected to undermine the global economy and thereby further erode the achievements of globalization.

The second issue highlighted by the epidemic is US-Sino competition. The Trump Administration imposed restrictions on travelers from China on public health grounds. However, China, which has already warned against a global “over reaction” is presumably concerned that some of the restrictions stem from political and perhaps even racist motivations. The crisis is also creating fertile ground for injecting an ideological dimension into US-Chinese tensions. So far, the competition between Washington and Beijing has revolved around material aspects: Global status, economic capacity and military power, but the coronavirus crisis is a test for the regime and society in both China and the US.

On the one hand, the restrictive and hierarchical nature of Chinese society appears to have delayed the identification and treatment of the Covid-19 disease, challenging the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party. It will invariably serve the US in future arguments about the advantages of an open American-style society versus the (partially) closed Chinese one. At the same time, the handling of the disease pits the American model of personal freedom, free market and private and decentralized medicine against the Chinese model that prefers the collective, a partly government controlled economy and medical services shaped according to a public ethos, albeit with some of it privatized nowadays. China’s ability to impose harsh restrictions on its citizens probably helped block the spread of the virus within China, while the ability of the US system to tackle the challenge is unclear as yet.

Nonetheless, the crisis is also an opportunity to revive globalization. First, the crisis is a reminder of our underlining unity as humans. Beyond divisions, wars and hatred, the crisis shows that different people share rather similar anxieties. Second, international cooperation is crucial. A coordinated, cross-border international effort to monitor and treat the disease, and to speedily develop and disseminate a vaccine across national borders will end the epidemic. This is an important lesson in light of other global challenges, especially climate change. In both cases – climate and public health – mobilization to tackle them should overcome national boundaries. Specifically, the epidemic also highlights the importance of international organizations. Those who are critical of such organizations should be reminded that accepted international mechanisms (such as those being promoted by the World Health Organization) are critical for dealing with the challenges to public health such as the Coronavirus epidemic. Without them, things would be much tougher.

We – leaders, opinion setters, educators and citizens – hold the key to addressing the epidemic and later shaping its legacy: international isolation and competition or shared humanity and cooperation mechanisms. Two 20^th century novels – Camus’ “The Plague” and Saramago’s “Blindness” – include horrific depictions of human behavior in the face of epidemics. However, they also highlight heroes who act with compassion and humaneness towards their fellow wo.men. Let us hope that we follow their example of cooperation and humanity rather than alienation and disregard towards others.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 10 Mar 2020 15:30:44 +0000

No one in Israel was particularly surprised when the EU’s new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned that Israeli annexation of territories would not go “unchallenged”. Foreign Minister Israel Katz opted for an aggressive response (compared with accepted diplomatic parameters), but was it necessary to unleash such undiplomatic “ammunition”?

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 06 Mar 2020 15:24:47 +0000

So, what do we do about Gaza? Every new round of violence generates a marathon of media interviews with the usual suspects mouthing the usual platitudes – Israel must rehabilitate its deterrence, occupy Gaza or reach an arrangement with its leaders. Pessimists argue that nothing can be done to stop the violence.

Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature.

A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank.

Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology.

We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and encourage its non-violent, pro-diplomacy policies. From his first day on the job, Abbas sought agreement, if possible through bilateral negotiations, and if not, by appealing to multinational organizations.

We have turned his attempts at dialogue with Israel into pathetic overtures by continuing to build in the settlements and using negotiations to buy time and create facts on the ground. When the Palestinians tried to achieve their aims by taking multilateral steps, we dubbed their measures “diplomatic terrorism” and exerted pressure on the Americans to block them, even though the same measures – appealing to the UN – gained Israel its own independence.

While Abbas supports a two-state solution and recognition of Israel in its 1967 borders with land swaps, and even accepts the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state, we insist instead on dealing with Hamas, which rejects our existence. Whereas Abbas continues to instruct his security forces to cooperate with the IDF and Shin Bet in foiling terror attacks, and is therefore accused by many Palestinians of collaboration with Israel, we reward Hamas with benefits and payments from Qatar.

A strategic, long-term solution to the Gaza issue is linked to renewal of the diplomatic process with the PA, and to the encouragement of a technocratic unity government in Gaza with which gradual progress can be made on demilitarization and rehabilitation. A long-term solution must be diplomatic. All our previous attempts to create deterrence have taught us that there is no military solution.

We currently have much better Palestinian partners for peace than we had in the past. The terrorist Arafat has been replaced by Abbas, who reviles terrorism; the three “No’s” (no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel) of the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum have been replaced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The key message of that initiative is, “please move ahead with a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian issue so that we can normalize relations with you based on the understanding that Israel could constitute part of the solution to regional problems, rather than the problem itself”.

While all these positive changes were occurring around us, our leaders continued to explain why Israel has no Palestinian partner and to empower Hamas. That is why Israeli discourse keeps going back to the same tactical suggestions that resolve nothing. These solutions only sound logical absent of a strategic alternative. But such an alternative exists and it requires courageous and sober leadership rather than political slogans and hollow clichés.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 08 Feb 2020 14:59:22 +0000

A new international organization was born in the Mediterranean on January 15. In parallel to the joint statement by the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers on the start of Israeli gas exports to Egypt, representatives from Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Jordan, Italy, Greece and Cyprus met in Cairo. They decided to institutionalize the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – launched a year ago – turn it into a recognized international organization. France has also requested to join.

Given the protracted freeze of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and growing tensions generated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intentions, the Israeli and Palestinian willingness to jointly participate in establishing a new organization is a bright spot not to be taken for granted. The fact that the EMGF includes European and Arab states as full members, as well as the US, EU and other international organizations (such as the World Bank) as observers, further highlights the unique nature of this development.

The underpinning of the new organization is economic, with its members seeking to cooperate in maximizing the energy reserves discovered in the Mediterranean over the past decade. Israel is generally deterred by international groupings, fearing members’ pressure regarding its policy on the Palestinian issue. However, although it initially preferred that the gas forum remain a non-binding body, Israel eventually agreed to its institutional upgrading, probably at Egypt’s behest.

While Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Italy are discussing the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Europe – a project whose economic, technical and diplomatic feasibility is highly doubtful – the new organization positions Egypt as a regional energy hub with its gas liquefaction facilities that enable gas exports to Europe without a pipeline.

The make-up of the current forum is unique, but need not be finite. Lebanon and Turkey are two important regional players currently absent from the EMGF due to disputes and confrontations with forum members. However, in order to realize the cooperation potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the organization should seek to draw them into its ranks in the future. The UN, too, which plays a role in mediation tasks in the Mediterranean region – between Israel and Hamas, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Israel and Lebanon in marking their maritime borders – could also be represented as an observer.

The organization has diplomatic, not just economic, potential, including to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. In recent years, no multinational organizations have been active in this regard. Under the Trump administration, the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) lost whatever limited importance it had beforehand.

French-led efforts to set up an international support group for the peace process were unsuccessful. The absence of an influential multinational body makes it difficult for the international community, for example, to implement its plan to introduce a coordinated package of political and economic incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The EMGF could be an asset for a new Israeli leadership wanting to re-start the peace process and striving to link regional ties to the Palestinian issue. Until such time, and beyond constituting an additional channel to the PA, the new organization could advance Israeli peace ties with Egypt and Jordan.

ISRAELI GAS exports to Egypt and the visits by Israel’s energy minister to Cairo for meetings of the forum are already making a difference in relations. Nonetheless, Israel does not have an ambassador in Cairo, even though the foreign minister approved the appointment of Amira Oron to the post about a year-and-a-half ago. The government has repeatedly avoided approving the appointment and fixing this should be a high priority for the next government.

As for ties with Jordan, cooperation on the gas issue has yet to generate a positive momentum in the relationship. Instead, it has been met with public and political protests in Jordan against the backdrop of the harsh crisis of trust between the two. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently declared that the relationship was at its lowest ebb, and clearly, only a change in Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue as well as prioritizing the rehabilitation of links with Jordan could change that.

Benny Gantz has already issued messages in that direction when he addressed a ceremony in Naharayim marking the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty. The new organization could also help improve Israel’s relations with the EU following several tense years.

The EMGF links Israel and European states in a manner that has won EU approval and that is not viewed in Brussels as a move designed to split and weaken the EU – unlike the alliance Netanyahu forged with the Visegrad Group, especially Hungary. The participation of France in the new organization can also assist – given a new Israeli leadership – to overcome obstacles that prevent the renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the Association Council).

For Israel to effectively make the most of the opportunity provided by the new organization, it must learn the lessons of its conduct in other regional and international organizations. Budgetary difficulties – coupled with a general skepticism towards such organizations – limited Israel’s ability to take full advantage of similar opportunities in the past.

For example, Israel held the position of deputy general secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, which it gave up due, also due to its Foreign Ministry’s financial crisis. Israel also has financial debt to the UN, which casts a shadow over its activity there.

Strengthening the Foreign Ministry can help resolve such issues and realize the potential of Israeli membership in the EMGF. It is the Foreign Ministry that should play a leading role when it comes to Israeli participation in international organizations, unlike the current situation with the EMGF in which it is the Energy Ministry that is mostly in charge.

The establishment of the new organization in the Mediterranean is more than just an important economic development. It is also a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. The next Israeli government would do well to leverage the EMGF not only for the economic profit it can generate from the country’s gas reserves, but also for diplomatic gains that advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and broader regional cooperation.

The writer is the founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 19 Jan 2020 10:55:34 +0000

This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Academia is also turning its back on peace

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 14 Jan 2020 14:31:06 +0000

Tel Aviv University has decided to close its Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. Two reasons led to the closure, according to the university and the donor family: the fact that the subject of peace is no longer relevant, and the donor’s desire for public visibility, something that does not happen when researching a subject that is apparently no longer relevant.

The Steinmetz Center has existed for 27 years, and throughout this period it contributed greatly to public discourse about peace, especially on research about peace, in Israel and abroad. The center held conferences for academics and the broader public, assisted in the publication of books, provided scholarship for students and grants for researchers, collaborated and partnered with research centers around the world, initiated studies that advanced the understanding of the realities of conflict, and conducted workshops for researchers to advance knowledge in the field of conflict studies, conflict prevention, and possibilities for the peace process. All of this celebrated activity that was done with the great amount of knowledge that was assembled in the field of peace studies will come to an end with the closure of the Center.

For thousands of years, humanity has had a great deal of experience in war. Theory of war naturally became necessary study. Peace was perceived as perhaps a desired goal but not as a field worthy of study. Immanuel Kant’s book Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, was the opening shot in what would become peace studies. Since 1901, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize has contributed to the importance of the value of peace, although peace studies only really began to develop after the First World War.

This development was not only due to an academic objective to research the subject, but also to advance peace. Thus, for example, the founding of UNESCO after the Second World War, was intended, in part, to develop practical tools to prevent war and advance peace. It was not surprising that one of the fields in which UNESCO became active was the examination of school textbooks.

UNESCO pursued this in order to uproot the negative images that appeared in these books which lead, according to research, to violence and wars. Thus, for example, research was conducted on the relationship of school textbooks in Germany and Poland to Jews and Israel, and vice versa, and as a result, changes to those textbooks were made.

Concurrently, research institutes were founded at universities and in civil society organizations throughout the world that sought to advance the research and discourse of conflict prevention and the advancement of peace. Some institutes were founded in countries that are not involved in active conflicts (such as Sweden and Norway), and several were founded in countries deeply involved in conflicts (such as Pakistan, India, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and others).

These institutes sought to research the causes of conflicts that have heavy costs for their societies, and to investigate ways to advance peace not only out of academic interest, but also in an attempt to advance the achievement of peace in practical terms. Alongside these institutes, there are peace organizations of various types, in Israel as well, that deal with policy planning, dialogue meetings, advocacy and more. Together with academic research institutes, and frequently in cooperation with them, they serve as a community that places the advancement of peace at the top of its agenda.

IT IS DIFFICULT to measure the exact impact of the activity of these centers and organizations but it is possible to assume to a great deal of certainty that the absence of discourse and research on peace would naturally lead to the strengthening of an alternative discourse that deals with violence and wars.

The decision of Tel Aviv University to close the Steinmetz Center is worrying for several reasons.

First, because it was not decided in a vacuum; to a great extent the decision represents attitudes in Israeli society that do not see peace as a central value or goal in their worldview, or in life. In the last election, discourse around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict disappeared as if it had never existed. Campaign advisers of various parties recommended the removal of the word “peace” from the political lexicon because it lacks popularity and does not attract votes. In other words, politics has entered academia and are now dictating the contents of what is studied and what is researched.

Second, the decision is worrying because “Peace Studies” in Israel has never had many homes; with the exception of the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, there are no research institutes in peace studies at any university in Israel. Peace is also studied at research institutes for conflict management and resolution at the Hebrew and at Bar-Ilan Universities, however, as can be seen from their names, the center of their focus is on conflict, not peace.

Third, the decision is worrying because the Peace Center does not only deal with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, but also with Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, which are extremely relevant and important.

Finally, the decision is worrying because peace is a value, an idea and a deeply desired goal as well as a commandment in Judaism and Zionism. Its abandonment means a betrayal of these beliefs.

The role of the university is to lead and not to be dragged along by popular fashions. The importance of peace studies stands on its own. It is not connected to the degree of its relevance to society at a given moment, which is an extension of temporary political and ideological attitudes.

For many years, the Yiddish language had apparently lost relevance to modern society, but it was still studied and researched at universities throughout Israel. The comparison between Yiddish and peace studies seems out of place at first, but it shows that even if a language has (almost) disappeared from the world, it remains at institutions for higher learning.

Similarly, the language of peace, which is critical and relevant to the goings on of daily life between us and our neighbors, must be studied and researched in academic institutions in Israel. It is hoped that the administrators of Tel Aviv University and the donor family will regain their composure and reverse their decision. It is also hoped that they will not be dragged along by the need to remain “relevant,” or else they will decide to create an Institute for War Studies, as it appears the Jewish People are destined to “live by the sword.”

The writer is a board member at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies who teaches at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies. He is currently a visiting professor at the Middle East Center of the London School of Economics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Academia is also turning its back on peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

International Responses to Annexation: Lessons for Israel from Other Conflicts

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 19 Dec 2019 10:43:09 +0000

Over the last decade, Israel has accelerated a long-term process of annexation in the West Bank through legal, political, physical and rhetorical steps that are both explicit, and increasingly irreversible. What kind of reaction can Israel expect from the international community if these policies continue? This paper summarizes the annexationist trends in Israel, then examines cases of post-World War II annexation, to map the range of international reactions. The analysis shows that the international community (states and meta-state bodies) has responded with diverse tools, all designed to oppose and deter annexation. Yet such measures have only rarely stopped or reversed annexation. When annexation was stopped or reversed, the international pressure focused on violations of other major international norms or reflected state interests. Israeli annexation outright, but the international community can be expected to step up concrete policies of opposition. Not only would such responses not be unique to Israel – it would be an anomaly if the international community did not undertake opposition measures. The paper concludes by proposing that the international community develop a more expansive understanding of the concept of annexation to improve deterrence, and re-commit itself to the fundamental proscription against conquering territory by force.

הפוסט International Responses to Annexation: Lessons for Israel from Other Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 05 Dec 2019 12:58:46 +0000

The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 03 Nov 2019 12:45:54 +0000

Something good is happening in relations between Israel and the Arab world, as evidenced by more frequent visits of senior Israeli officials to Arab capitals and conciliatory remarks about Israel by Arab leaders in the Gulf. For the first time since the Oslo era, when several diplomatic missions of Gulf and North African states were opened in Tel Aviv, a real change appears to be taking place in the region’s attitude toward Israel, both on the leadership level and, to some extent, in public opinion. Absent progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, and given the deep freeze in efforts to resolve the conflict, the displays of hostility toward Israel have not vanished, but they have lessened.

In recent years, along with its moves to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, Israel has been seeking to expand its links with African states. For example, at a November 2018 meeting with Chad’s President, Netanyahu declared that “Israel is returning to Africa” and hinted at intentions to restore ties with Sudan. The very thought that Netanyahu considered meeting with a man like Omar al-Bashir, who has since been deposed and will soon stand trial for crimes against humanity, generates aversion and concern.

Improved relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East and Africa are undoubtedly a positive development, but does every end justify the means and is every regional leader a worthy Israeli ally? This question has been dogging Israeli foreign policy for decades, but has been underscored in recent years given the changes in Israel’s regional relations and their more public dimension.

What is Israel’s policy regarding the warming relations or rapprochement with countries in the region? Do the government and the Knesset conduct significant debate about the emerging ties between Israel and North African and Middle Eastern states?

Let us start with the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which is tasked with overseeing the government’s defense and foreign affairs activity. In practice, the Knesset’s most prestigious committee has turned into a unidirectional communications channel for senior defense and foreign affairs officials to the legislature, with those testifying before the panel generally failing to answer lawmakers’ questions or providing only partial answers.

In addition, foreign policy issues are relegated to the sidelines of the committee’s agenda with its perpetual focus on defense issues that always appear more important and pressing. The idea of splitting the panel into two separate committees has come up occasionally, but has been discounted.

The State Security Cabinet also appears to be sidelined often and excluded from the decision making loop. For most of the past four years, the Prime Minister has also served as Foreign Minister. His confidante, attorney Yitzhak Molcho often served as his special envoy to Arab states, but was not required to report to the Knesset or the professional levels of government since he was essentially a private individual. The Prime Minister’s power and authority in defense and foreign policy appeared unlimited.

Israel is proud (justifiably so) of being the only democracy in the Middle East. Human rights values are the pillars of Israel’s existence as a democratic state, and must be one of the most important and weighty considerations in formulating policy. What, then, is their weight in determining Israeli foreign policy?

There is no absolute morality in the conduct of foreign policy. Not only that, there is usually an inherent contradiction between morality and the practice of foreign policy since democratic states must maintain contact with non-democratic ones. They must also deal with the fact that such states will use all means at their disposal to promote their interests.

These days, many fans of “realpolitik” in Israel and the world believe that when a state seeks to promote its foreign policy, it should not be fettered by ethical considerations. Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly subscribes to this school of thought. He forges close ties with authoritarian heads of state, sometimes even appearing to prefer them to his colleagues in democratic states. Just as he is not deterred by close links with such leaders, he is not put off by weapons deals with states such as Burma, where authorities are conducting a genocide, according to UN reports.

The murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi provided one of the most obvious examples of Netanyahu’s belief in “realpolitik”. Although US intelligence flatly accused Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman of ordering the hit, President Trump did not sever ties with Riyadh and urged waiting for the findings of the Saudi investigation. Netanyahu convinced Trump to ease US pressure on Riyadh, arguing that the Saudis are an important strategic regional ally.

Much before Netanyahu, Israel conducted relations with “problematic” states, such as South Africa in the apartheid era. Up until the 1970s, Israel had condemned South Africa for the segregation of its black citizens, voted in favor of international sanctions and recalled its ambassador from Cape Town. In those days, Ben-Gurion rejected out of hand any possibility of closer ties with the South African government and adhered to the criticism of its apartheid regime. Following the Yom Kippur War, when many African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, Israel’s approach changed. Israel felt weak and isolated, shunned by the family of nations, and decided to tighten relations with pariah states such as South Africa.

Israel’s current situation is completely different. Everyone understands that Israel needs good relations with its neighbors in order to ensure its security and sovereignty. That is why policy makers should draw red lines clearly defining what Israel is allowed to do and what it must not do.

Israel must not remain silent in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This constitutes a severe violation of its identity and nature as a Jewish and democratic state. Rigorous judgment must be applied to consideration of arms deals. Clearly, certain states buy weapons not only to defend themselves, but also to kill, and that is why policy makers in the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and in the prime minister’s office must always consider not only financial interests, but also ethical ones. In particularly egregious and troubling cases, when journalists and human right activists are subjected to torture and sent to rot in jail, Israel can use its power and influence to urge the US administration to raise human rights and democracy issues in the region rather than blindly supporting the repressive violence of regimes in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministry has clearly defined red lines to which Israel generally adheres in its relations with radical right European parties. It should formulate similar guidelines regarding Israel’s emerging ties with Middle Eastern and African states, ascribing importance and value to democratic and moral components.

In the legislature, Knesset members must breathe new life into the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and insist on the centrality of Israel’s regional ties for the panel’s agenda. They must demand explanations from senior officials appearing before them and insist on getting answers. The Knesset must also anchor in legislation the Prime Minister’s authority in foreign affairs and defense issues and determine standards to which policy makers must adhere.

Israel is not simply another state in the Middle East. It is the only truly functioning democracy in the region. As a democratic state, Israel cannot shirk the human rights issue. There may not be absolute morality in foreign policy, but conducting a foreign policy devoid of all morality is not an option, either.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 25 Jul 2019 10:27:09 +0000

The route of the Separation Fence/Wall/Barrier in the area of Jerusalem generally follows the city’s municipal boundaries, separating East Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods from the West Bank. However, the fence has created two types of complex, anomalous situations. In some places, it has left certain Jerusalem neighborhoods (such as Kafr Aqab) outside the fence. In other places, the route of the fence has placed areas outside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries “inside” it – including parts of Area A of the West Bank under direct Palestinian Authority (PA) control. One such case is in Sur Baher, a Palestinian neighborhood included within Jerusalem’s southern boundary (in the 2018 municipal elections, a neighborhood resident tried to run for the city council), whose southeastern flank known as Wadi Hummus is not included within the city boundaries and is considered under PA control.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 09 Jul 2019 10:02:49 +0000

For those interested in promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, the current situation may be discouraging. Indeed, the misconception that there is “no solution” is gaining ground among growing audiences. Those who do not want to sink into despair and be misled by the belief that we have already tried everything, are invited to raise their heads, look around, and learn from other conflicts around the world that can give us new insights and hope. Although each conflict is different, we can still learn lessons and be inspired. Such is the peace process that was forged over the past year in the Horn of Africa.

The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced by negotiations and new connections.

How did the Ethiopians and the Eritreans succeed in moving within a few months from a state of protracted conflict to a hopeful peace process? It looks like several factors, that can serve as points of reference for Israelis and Palestinians, have helped the parties:

Bold political leadership: A reality-changing leadership is needed in order to change the course of the long-standing conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made a move which was contrary to popular positions, national mood and narratives that the parties have cultivated over the years, and reached out for peace. The leaders changed the public discourse rather than being led by it. They proved that the leadership must not submit to prevailing patterns and identity perceptions that have taken root over the years, but legitimize reality-changing actions.

External incentives: External incentives are another force that drives leaders and citizens to move toward reconciliation. Leaders can effectively use incentives to mobilize political and economic support in their quest for peace. In the EthiopianEritrean case, apart from achieving peaceful life, landlocked Ethiopia gained an outlet to the sea, renewed its commercial flights to Somalia, and attracted foreign investors who increased their investments in the country. Eritrea, which was in a difficult economic situation, gained economic, media and transportation cooperation with Ethiopia, and the international sanctions that made it one of the poorest countries in the world, were lifted. As a result, the international isolation that was imposed on the country ended.

International support of the peace process: Advancing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves the interests of many international and regional players that are involved in the Horn of Africa and are interested in promoting stability in the volatile region. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have mobilized to mediate, support and guarantee the peace process. The fact that the main intermediaries in the process – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – sided by the weaker Eritrean side, teaches us a lesson when choosing the mediators in our conflict. The Ethiopian diaspora in the US, which politically and economically supported the peace process, made a significant contribution too.

Adapting the peace process to the political reality: The design of the process should necessarily be adapted to the complex and changing political reality, while referring to the structure of negotiations, the pace of the process and its implementation, the coordination of symbolic trust building measures, etc. The parties in the Horn of Africa were able to properly adjust the negotiations structure to the existing political reality in order to reduce risks. For example, the relatively fast pace of the process prevented the formation of an organized and strong opposition, as well as extreme activities that might have harmed the process. Other factors that helped move the process forward were symbolic steps, meetings that are covered by the media, rapid changes on the ground, and leadership that is mobilized to communicate with civil society of the other side.

Promoting internal reconciliation processes, enforcing solidarity and establishing the political system: The transition from a protracted conflict to a peace process is a significant change that disrupts well-established perceptions in society and brings to the surface the internal tensions and disagreements. In order to support change, leaders should build on the resilience of society and the stability of the political system. The parties in the Horn of Africa realized that the in-country situation affected the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between countries. Abiy Ahmed has led extensive reconciliation processes in Ethiopia, including the disarmament of opposition groups and making them a legitimate political party, the establishment of a new and inclusive government that includes a Ministry of Peace that is entrusted with the internal process, and the consolidation of a new ethos for Ethiopia.

Switching back to the Middle East, the absence of a courageous political leadership entails a heavy exasperating toll. When examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict against the backdrop of the peace process in the Horn of Africa, there is a reason to be hopeful: in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Arab Peace Initiative and the promise of a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU, serve as incentives, alongside the security guarantees that the US may offer. Regional and global players who have a vested interest in achieving stability in the Middle East offer themselves as potential mediators and help the sides avoid violence. They can help us garner international support for the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian societies face many challenges related to the rule of law, democracy, human and civil rights, social cohesion, the reduction of violence, and the legitimacy of the leadership. Such challenges should be addressed with no delay in order to enforce solidarity, economic resilience, and trust in government institutions. Civil society and the Diaspora can also play a role since they can promote pro-peace cooperation even in the absence of political will to advance peaceful relations. Similarly, the business community, researchers and government agencies can take advantage of the deadlock in negotiations to examine opportunities and adjust the peace process to the changing political context. Above all, we must continue to believe that a solution is possible.

The case of the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not theoretical. Having a success story, in which leaders, civil society and the international community join forces to advance a peace process to solve a protracted conflict that seems hopeless, is politically powerful. It undermines the defeatist argument that “there is nothing that can be done”, and that we are condemned to “live by the sword”. Peace processes can be “contagious”, and the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example. Their peace agreement led to a series of peace talks and arrangements across the Horn of Africa. Being infected by the “peace virus” would certainly be beneficial for Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper he wrote on the subject, with the assistance of Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy”

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 23 May 2019 08:57:53 +0000

Prime Minister Netanyahu used foreign policy as major theme in the 2019 election campaign. Giant billboards depicted him standing alongside President Trump. His aides pointed to his diplomatic achievements, including US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the close ties he had forged with major world leaders. Once the voting was over, Netanyahu posed for a photo-op with close Likud party associates under a giant picture showing him meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jin Ping. Ahead of the elections, the Prime Minister also scheduled a series of visits and events to highlight his position as an arch-diplomat. These included inauguration of a Hungarian trade office in Jerusalem, the supportive statement by Romania’s prime minister for moving its embassy to Jerusalem, Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and a visit by the newly elected President of Brazil. Capping his activity was a meeting with Russian President Putin in Moscow prior to the return of the remains of Zachary Baumel, an Israeli soldier killed in the 1982 Lebanon war.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 02 Feb 2019 07:00:10 +0000

On Janury 28, 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced he was terminating the mandate of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), an observer force established in 1994 after the massacre of Muslim worshipers in Hebron by the Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein. In January 1997, an agreement was signed between the Government of Israel, headed by Netanyahu, and the PLO setting out terms of the TIPH mandate. The sides repeatedly extended the agreement for over 20 years. The observers do not have military or policing functions, and they do not bear arms. Their task is to monitor and report on events and convey classified reports to each side, and to the TIPH contributing states. Netanyahu’s decision, to a large extent influenced by domestic pressure in the runup to the April 9 elections, generated expressions of concern and condemnation by the international community, both by the force’s contributing states such as Norway and Italy, and by Germany, the EU and the UN Secretary General. The reactions noted that the observer force had been an element of the Oslo process and played an important role in the volatile and sensitive city of Hebron, warning against the repercussions of its removal. Changing and adapting the mandate of the observer force should be conducted in a dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and TIPH states, and not dictated as a unilateral Israeli political decision.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 25 Jan 2019 13:02:02 +0000

The situation in Gaza is horrific. Actually, worse than that. Gazans have been deprived of electricity, water, jobs and salaries; they were stripped off their self-respect and parental authority, and some Gazans say that hope for a better future has also been taken away. The humanitarian crisis is already here: two million people drowning in existential despair are on the brink of explosion.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Regional Opportunities to Improve the Situation in Gaza

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 02 Jan 2019 06:42:21 +0000

Israeli and Palestinian experts and activists – together with international diplomats – gathered on 31 October 2018 at the UN Headquarters in Jerusalem for a civil society roundtable discussion on “Regional Opportunities in Support of Current Efforts to Improve the Situation in Gaza.” The event, attended by some fifty participants, was initiated and convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and Israel-Palestine Creative Regional Initiatives (IPCRI). It included an opening address by UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov and explored how various regional actors can help improve the situation in Gaza, without jeopardizing chances for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. It also identified recommendations and possible courses of action. The event was held in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, IEMed, and the EuroMeSCo Network. This paper summarizes the discussion.1

הפוסט Regional Opportunities to Improve the Situation in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Holocaust Studies in Morocco?

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 01 Dec 2018 15:55:05 +0000

Recently, rumors have been circulating that Morocco has decided to introduce Holocaust studies into its educational curriculum. The reason for the confusion apparently arose from an innocent error in the translation of Morocco’s statements at the UNESCO summit which took place during the meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York at the end of September 2018. Saad Eddine Othmani, Moroccan Prime Minister and leader of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, approached the podium at the summit. He calmly read out a message sent by the king, a message of moderation, tolerance, and pride in the special model of relations woven between Jews and Muslims in Morocco. “The history we teach our children must include a pluralist range of opinions and stories, it must present humanity’s greatest moments, as well as its darkest ones,” he said. At the conclusion of his speech, he approached the Director General of UNESCO, Audrey Azoulay, and shook her hand. There is no doubt that she understood Othmani’s meaning. Indeed, her surname hints at her connection with Morocco, and Audrey is the daughter of André Azoulay, advisor of King Mohammed VI of Morocco, who was also previously advisor of King Hasan II. In light of Morocco’s positive image as a Muslim country seeking peace, which recognizes Jews as part of its heritage, the ostensible Moroccan decision to include Holocaust studies in the curriculum seemed highly logical, and not something inconceivable or unimaginable.

Whether or not the Holocaust will be introduced into the Moroccan curriculum, Morocco has a unique story as a Muslim state willing to acknowledge the Holocaust. Most Muslim states oscillate between avoiding taking a stance on the matter and Holocaust denial, because acknowledging the Holocaust is perceived as harmful to Palestinian interests. So how can it be that Morocco acknowledges the Holocaust? The answer to this, as in many other matters, is the king, in this case Mohammed V. According to the Moroccan narrative, which many Moroccans are familiar with, when the Vichy regime ruled Morocco at the beginning of the 1940s, King Mohammed V was asked to hand over the Jews of his country to the Nazis. The Moroccans relate with pride that the king refused to concede to this demand, arguing fervently that there were only Moroccans in his country. Of course, in reality the story was more complex, restrictive decrees against the Jews were imposed at the instruction of the Vichy regime and freedom of employment, movement etc. were limited. Until today, the issue remains a source of dispute, and despite the important role Mohammed V had played, he was not yet awarded the title Righteous Among the Nations. However, Mohammed V was and remains a hero who saved the Jews. Here lays the real meaning of the story and whether accurate or exaggerated, it allowed the Morocco to develop a positive national identity with regard to the events that took place during the Second World War and the horrors of that period. While in Europe the Jews were annihilated, the Muslims in Morocco helped save them.

But what has happened since Mohammed V’s gesture to the Jews of his land and how does Morocco relate to the Holocaust today? Until 2009, Morocco made almost no public statements regarding the Holocaust. Morocco did not officially acknowledge or deny it. Among the general public a range of opinions existed, but on the national level silence reigned. In 2009, UNESCO inaugurated the Aladdin Project, designed to serve as a platform for activities and educational and cultural initiatives that will bring closer Jews and Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. It was initially established by France, Jordan, and Germany; later on, other states such as Indonesia, Mauritania, Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt also joined. One of its endeavors involves the translation of literature and films about the Holocaust into the official languages of the UN, especially Arabic. The project even enables free digital download of the books, thus making quality content on the topic available. Morocco apparently liked the initiative and Mohammed VI, acknowledged the Holocaust in an official message to the initiators of the Aladdin Project. This was a rare official declaration by a leader of a Muslim country.

When the king speaks, his message begins to trickle downwards, even though obstacles are met along the way. In April 2010, André Azoulay, the advisor to the king, declared that the Moroccan Ministry of Education needs to introduce the Holocaust into educational programs in schools. This initiative elicited protest from pro-Palestinian groups: they called for him to pack up his belongings and leave the country. In response to the protest, an opposing campaign, supporting Azoulay and the message he sought to impart, ensued. Despite the opposition, various elements in Moroccan civil society have adopted Azoulay’s message with pride and organized lectures and conferences in higher education institutions, including testimonies by Holocaust survivors who came to Morocco to tell their stories. In September 2011, the Mimouna association, organized one of the first conferences in the Arab world under the title “Mohammed V: Righteous Among the Nations”. In addition, there are other initiatives in Morocco that seek to change and adapt the educational program, in order to increase the representation of all shades of Moroccan heritage, including Jews and Amazigh (Berbers), which at present are almost completely absent from the history books.

At the bottom line, although Holocaust studies have not yet been officially included in the Moroccan curriculum, it is possible that we will see this happen soon in light of the country’s special history. Morocco’s recognition and sensitive approach to the Holocaust is an additional sign of the special relationship between Jews and Muslims in Morocco and the way this relationship is being included as part of the broader Moroccan heritage.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and a strategic consultant specializes in Morocco.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Holocaust Studies in Morocco? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 08 Nov 2018 15:47:31 +0000

The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 28 Sep 2018 15:36:50 +0000

The attempts by officials in the Middle East and beyond to find the formula for a long-term ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, attest to the complexity of the problem that emerged over a decade ago, with the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The lack of open and direct dialogue between Israel and Hamas necessitates international mediation. While neither Israel nor Hamas are interested in a violent confrontation, such a confrontation can occur at any given moment. The continued hostility between them, alongside a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the inability of Hamas to deliver the economic and political conditions required to end this crisis, maintain prospects for violent outbreaks. The use of violence as a political tool helps Hamas raise the humanitarian crisis in Gaza on the regional agenda, as a means of preserving its status as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

Given that the current state of affairs continues, international mediation initiatives towards a ceasefire in Gaza are doomed to fail. Without an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and without the backing and active involvement of the Palestinian Authority, there is no real prospect to improve living conditions in the Gaza Strip.

In light of Israel’s decision to refrain from an all-out military attack to defeat Hamas, both sides are looking for interim solutions to the challenges posed by Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, which sees itself as the legitimate sovereign of the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which fears a spillover of violence that will undermine stability along the Sinai-Gaza border, are also parties to this charged relationship.

Due to Palestinian Authority’s historical semi-state status and to the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt cannot abrogate Mahmoud Abbas’ demands and ignore the Palestinian Authority’s needs while searching for a solution to Gaza. Abbas sees the recent indirect dialogue between Israel and Hamas as undermining the status of the PLO. The international mediation, led by the UN envoy and some Arab states, grants Hamas with increased political legitimacy, and Abbas, who has already lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, cannot afford a situation whereby the PLO’s political status is further undermined.

Attempts by Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement that does not involve the Palestinian Authority raise concerns among the PLO and Fatah leaderships. The PLO is therefore making efforts to thwart any initiative that does not give it a central role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This was said quite overtly during the recent PLO Central Council meeting in Ramallah (15-17 August 2018). It has also become a major source of contention in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation attempts.

The inability of Hamas and Fatah to unify the Palestinian political system also makes it difficult to reach a regional arrangement in Gaza. The disputes among the Palestinian movements obstruct efforts by the donor countries to extend assistance, since there is no agreed upon mechanism for transferring and managing the funds.

A ceasefire arrangement could serve as a temporary solution, but one that will continue to inflame the tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and between Israel and Hamas. Since Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in the summer of 2014, there have been cycles of violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas, that did not evolve to a comprehensive military conflict. The current year has seen another escalation, which was triggered by the Gazans’ “Return Campaign”, which included marches towards the border fence as well as arson attempts via kites.

These actions and the casualties involved were supposed to generate support of Hamas’ objectives in the Arab world and beyond. This campaign, however, failed. The marches led to escalation and to an increase in Palestinian fatalities, but did not generate the media response and political pressure on Israel that Hamas hoped for, not even on the part of Arab countries. The lack of political achievements of such a popular struggle strengthened Hamas’ military wing, at the expense of the movement’s political wing.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire are intended to produce a glimmer of hope for the residents of Gaza, but the political obstacles, primarily the split between Hamas and Fatah, reduce the chances of success. Moreover, Israel currently sees the developments in Syria (especially the Iranian presence there) as a more urgent challenge to deal with than that of Gaza. But leaving Gaza behind only raises the bar of violence there. It leads to renewed escalation and riots with the IDF along the border, with Hamas closely monitoring their intensity.

As long as the Fatah-Hamas rift remains unresolved, international mediation regarding Gaza can produce only temporary solutions. The socio-economic problems of the Gaza Strip and the division of power within Palestinian society will continue to create difficulties and to challenge the status quo. To counter this, permanent solutions are needed, and these can only be achieved under international auspices and with US support.

However, the current lack of trust between the PLO and the US administration prevents this. Trump’s decision to cut funding to UNRWA reflected once again that Gaza is not just an internal Palestinian issue. It is turning from a regional problem to a complex international one, in which there is a clash between American interests and those of other major countries.

While US President Trump aspires – unsuccessfully for the time being – to lead peace efforts under his own terms, the EU and other donor countries are looking for alternative short-term solutions that will significantly ease living conditions in Gaza. Such solutions, despite their importance, are not likely to solve the intra-Palestinian divide nor to produce a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

The road to an effective solution must include constructive US involvement that backs both sides to the conflict, and not just Israel. This is necessary for Israelis to feel that their security interests are taken care of, for the Palestinians to restore trust in the US, and for the US to once again be able to play the role of an accepted mediator.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 21 Sep 2018 15:33:05 +0000

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was once one of Israel’s crown Jewels. Managing Israel’s foreign relations and the exposure that the office of the foreign minister offered, attracted ambitious politicians. Moshe Sharett, Yitzhak Shamir, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon all served as foreign ministers before they became prime ministers. Benjamin Netanyahu paved his way to the prime minister’s office through a number of prestigious diplomatic positions. He then served (briefly) as foreign minister between his two tenures as prime minister. Thousands of ambitious Israelis competed every year for the few places offered by the ministry in its prestigious cadet course.

However, it seems that the glorious days of the ministry, if they ever truly existed, have long passed. Ever since the current government was formed in 2015, there has been no full-time foreign minister. The ministry, which – despite its prestige – has always struggled for a leading role in the decision-making process, is generally excluded from significant aspects of Israel’s foreign and defense policy. Salaries of the ministry’s officials are low, especially when considering the strict screening process and the job requirements. Moreover, some of the responsibilities it used to have in the past were transferred to other ministries such as the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs.

The crisis in the ministry is also radiating outwards, and in recent years there has been a sharp drop in the number of candidates for the competitive cadet course. In 2012, there were 2,773 candidates whereas in 2017 only 1,374 candidates started the screening process. In an attempt to change the situation, employees at the ministry decided to take measures and in 2014 they even shut down the headquarters and embassies for the first time in Israel’s history. In late August 2018, the support staff in the ministry (which accounts to some 60% of personal abroad), staged another strike, with little notice.

The crisis in our ‘diplomatic kingdom’ is not unique to Israel. Technology, especially the digital media, allows governments to interact directory, with foreign officials and publics, making diplomatic interventions almost redundant. The decline of the nation-state and the rise of other important non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international aid organizations, and even global cities, have weakened the need for conventional diplomacy.

But despite this state of affairs, Israel should not neglect its foreign service. In fact, it is needed today more than ever before. First and foremost, in order to prepare for global power transformations. The first change that requires strong foreign service is the rise of important new global players, such as China, but also India and in our region, Russia. We are transitioning from a world of American dominance to a world of multiple powers, that are likely to intervene in regional politics, such as ours. In such circumstances, small countries like Israel, will be required to refined diplomatic skills in order to navigate safely among the various foci of power. In recent decades Israel was in a convenient position: the US was the dominant player in the global system, and we were its closest allies. A vibrant Jewish community in the US has helped us and has been part of an effective pro-Israel lobby. It was often sufficient to appeal to Washington in order to achieve political goals in international forums such as the UN security council. However, in the new world, whereby Israel is required to maintain good relations with both the US and China (in spite of the tension between them), a more sophisticated approach will be required. Israel needs a corpus of skilled diplomats that will be able to cut the right alliances and lead Israel safely among nations.

The second change that requires a strong ministry of foreign affairs is the identity of the emerging powers. After five centuries of European and then American dominance, the 21st century is expected to be the Asian century. China has already overtaken or matched the US on a number of indicators, such as high-speed trains and supercomputers. This will require a significant shift in our mindset. The Euro-American scene is familiar to us, and to a certain extent we are part of it. For example, some of our prime ministers attended elite institutions in the US. The current prime minister (as well as the education minister) were even had American citizenship in the past. Our familiarity with the Euro-Atlantic powers is a result of demography. In the past few centuries, most of the Jewish people have lived in Europe, North America and the Middle East. As a result, we share – in spite of some extremely difficult episodes such as the holocaust – common cultural, religious and historical roots with the European world and its extension in the new world.

This is not the case in Asia. Despite the hectic backpackers’ travels and vipassana workshops that Israelis attend, Asian culture, values and history – are foreign to most Israelis. In order to conduct ourselves effectively in a world where Far-East countries are so important, a professional corpus of skilled and specialized diplomats is required. The foreign service is the natural place to build such a cadre of experts that will make it easier for Israel to face the rising powers. This will require the ministry to invest even more in training and in developing area specializations.

Finally, dispersing the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between various institutions and ministries leads to duplication, inefficiency and the absence of a clear and sharp message. Logically, there should be a concentration of powers in one ministry with a broad outlook and an accurate reflection of the positions of international players with whom the ministry is in continuous contact. One example is the current effort against BDS. Instead of the traditional leadership of the ministry on the matter, aspects of it were securitized. Recent reports indicated that the Israeli security Agency (Shabak) is guiding the security personal in Israel’s airports with an eye towards limiting criticism of Israel’s control over the territories. This lead to some counterproductive outcomes such as an aggressive questioning at the airport this summer of a leading Jewish philanthropist, Meyer Koplow, and a leading Jewish American journalist, Peter Beinart.

In the past, the Zionist movement coped well with global power transitions and was effective in dealing with the fall the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through the Balfour Declaration and all the way to the alliance with the US in recent decades. We are facing a similar moment now, and the Foreign Ministry is perhaps the most important player to help Israel cope with the change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, is very much needed.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 17 Sep 2018 15:29:25 +0000

Surprisingly for what is considered a failed peace treaty, the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Agreement received significant media coverage. Most of it, as can be expected, was onesided, emphasizing the Palestinian mistakes without attempting to see the wider, balanced picture of the reasons that led to its failure, including the Israeli responsibility.

At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement.

In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides.

The Israeli party is to be blamed for three failures: (1) For not stopping the building of new settlements in the occupied territories. On the eve of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, there were fewer than 120,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; by the end of 2016, the number had risen to 400,000 (not including East Jerusalem). This shows – in the Palestinian view – that Israel has never been sincere about implementing the agreement; (2) Israel has never indicated the end result, which is the building of an independent Palestinian state; (3) Israel – in spite of its military strength – has never been generous toward the Palestinians during the negotiations. Instead of treating the Palestinians with respect and honor, it continued humiliating and insulting them. After all, Israel received what it mostly desired – recognition – upfront, while the Palestinians’ most wanted demands – a state with recognized boundaries, control of East Jerusalem and resolution of the refugee problem – remained all unfulfilled.

The Palestinians, for their part, failed as well, on at least three fronts: (1) By not curbing the attacks of Hamas terrorists. It is debatable whether Arafat was capable of confronting Hamas militarily, but it is clear that he did not do his utmost to prevent these suicide attacks; (2) The Palestinian media, including the educational system, continued to delegitimize the Israeli side. This negative media campaign solidified the negative image of Israelis in Palestinian eyes and convinced Israelis that the Palestinians have not really changed their position toward them; (3) The Palestinians have never internalized that in spite of Israel’s military superiority, its psychological psyche needs continued assurance. Acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state would not be harmful to the Palestinians; in many ways it only reaffirms what had been already declared in the UN 1947 partition plan.

In spite of all these failures, the Oslo Agreement could have worked had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated in November 1995. History cannot tell us what could have occurred if Rabin had not been shot, yet in my research on missed opportunities in the ArabIsraeli conflict I reached the conclusion that Rabin – with his military background and political acumen – could have made the difference. It is important also to note that Rabin simultaneously negotiated with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; signing an agreement with him would have laid enormous pressure on Arafat to proceed as well.

We will never know whether Rabin could have succeeded, but his assassination removed from the field a major player who could have made a difference. This act was tantamount to the assassination of the Oslo track. The episode demonstrates that in spite of the importance of historical processes, the role of leaders in history is still paramount. This only accentuates the regretful conclusion that lack of leadership – on both sides of the conflict – is a major reason for the conflict’s endurance.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:44:28 +0000

Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership style always includes dramatic warnings about threats to Israel. For more than a decade now, Israel’s prime minister warns that Iran – in particular its nuclear program – are the chief threat.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:46:18 +0000

On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israel-Turkey Crisis and the Need for Containment

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 24 May 2018 12:22:21 +0000

The evolving crisis between Israel and Turkey has yet to lead to an official downgrade of official ties between both countries. However, it raises a warning sign against such a development, which will likely take long to repair, and which efforts should be made to prevent. Despite crises and ups and downs, Israel and Turkey enjoy continuous diplomatic ties since Turkey recognized Israel in 1949. These ties were never cut off, although twice in the past Turkey decided to downgrade them to a lower level of diplomatic representation.

The first time was in 1980, following the enactment of the Jerusalem Law by the Knesset. The international response to the Israeli move was harsh and included a UN Security Council resolution condemning it and calling on foreign countries to withdraw their embassies from Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was emptied of embassies and Turkey, whose embassy was in Tel Aviv, called its ambassador back. It took another 12 years for a Turkish ambassador to return to Tel Aviv, which was made possible only after the Madrid peace conference.

The second time was in 2011, following the failure of efforts to resolve the Israeli-Turkish crisis that erupted following the Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza. The flotilla incident occurred more than a year earlier, but only after the publication of the UN Palmer Committee Report and the Israeli refusal to accept the compromise agreement formulated by diplomats from both countries did Turkey decide to take measures against Israel, which included downgrading relations. This time, it took about five years before there was an ambassador again in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv.

Jerusalem and Gaza were the reasons for previous Turkish decisions to downgrade relations with Israel. These issues have also been at the basis of the disputes between Israel and Turkey in recent years. The current crisis combines both issues – the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the tension it creates in East Jerusalem, alongside the Palestinian demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and the large number of Palestinians killed therein.

In the past year, a pattern in Erdoğan’s behavior could be observed. In each of the relevant cases – the tension surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque in July 2017, the Trump Declaration on Jerusalem in December 2017, and the recent events related with the transfer of the American embassy and the March of Return in Gaza – the Turkish response included harsh statements against Israel, a call to a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul, and threatening Israel with a possible damage to the bilateral relations.

To date, these moves were mostly symbolic in nature. However, they eroded the trust – which was already poor – between Israel and Turkey, stirred anger among the masses, led to verbal clashes between the countries on Twitter, and slowed down the attempts to inject new content into the relations that took place following the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement of June 2016. The negative dynamic between the two countries was intensified, not only due to bilateral tensions and Erdoğan’s declarations, but also due to an inaccurate perception of Turkey by many in Israel as an ally of Iran, in light of the Russian-TurkishIranian partnership in the Astana process.

Erdoğan’s latest moves, as in previous cases in which he chose to raise the bar of tension with Israel, are also influenced by domestic and regional calculations. On June 24, elections will be held in Turkey, in which Erdoğan is re-running for president. Raising tensions between Turkey and other countries – not only with Israel (Erdoğan currently confronts some European countries as well) – is perceived as a move that may help his election campaign, certainly when it comes to issues that are important to many in Turkey, such as Jerusalem and Gaza.

In addition, Erdoğan’s behavior also helps his regional positioning. While he is reacting harshly to US and Israeli policy, most Arab leaders are keeping a low profile. Erdoğan is thus perceived by the masses as the only regional leader who is seriously challenging Israel. He did so in the past as well, for example when he confronted President Peres at the Davos Conference during operation Cast Lead in 2009, and was later accepted as a hero in Turkey and throughout the Arab world.

The current crisis is somewhat different from previous ones because this time Turkey took diplomatic action also against the US, and not only against Israel. This may serve as a softening factor. So far, the current American administration has not shown interest in Turkey-Israel relations, but it did invest efforts in blurring the significant controversies between the US and Turkey on Syria and in creating a framework for dialogue and coordination. This should be leveraged to create a tripartite Israeli-American-Turkish policy channel that will first address the current diplomatic tension and later focus on other regional issues in which the three countries have shared interests – primarily moderating Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel’s frustration with the Turkish behavior is great, and the anger at Erdoğan is skyrocketing. However, even in such times of crisis, it is worthy to remember the strategic, economic and diplomatic importance of the relations between both countries. It is not by chance that Netanyahu and Erdoğan decided in 2016, in spite of the bad blood between them and despite public criticism, to reach an agreement, and it is not self-evident for Israel to have full, even if problematic, diplomatic relations with a key regional state that has a large Muslim population. These relations should not be casually waived.

In the near future, action must be taken to contain the Israeli-Turkish crisis and prevent further escalation. This must be done through quiet, professional and efficient diplomacy while avoiding provocative measures intended to appease the public at home. There are many in both Israel and Turkey – including in the business, policy, research, and culture sectors – who value the relations between the countries and are willing to step up and help reduce the flames, as they did in the past.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Crisis and the Need for Containment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 15 May 2018 11:52:23 +0000

In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.”

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 14 May 2018 11:48:14 +0000

Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The History of Embassies in Jerusalem and Past Attempts to Relocate the U.S. Embassy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 10 May 2018 09:35:46 +0000

From the 1950s onwards, Israel invested much effort in convincing states to open embassies in Jerusalem. Until 1962, the U.S. actively opposed this Israeli policy, advising countries to refrain from opening embassies there. American involvement on the issue dissipated in the early 1960s in parallel to the development of the Israel-U.S. special relationship. By this time, Israel’s attempts showed signs of success. By 1967, almost 40 percent of the 54 diplomatic missions in Israel were based in Jerusalem. These were largely representatives of African and South American countries, to whom Israel promised aid allocations in return.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”. As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress. These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies. The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, until the May 2018 embassy relocation, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

הפוסט The History of Embassies in Jerusalem and Past Attempts to Relocate the U.S. Embassy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 05 Apr 2018 10:28:52 +0000

Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority’s chairman, appeared on February 20th before the Security Council and presented a new Palestinian peace plan, with a number of points: first, a request that an international conference be held until mid-2018, with the Security Council permanent members, the Quartet, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and other relevant regional players in attendance. The conference will have three resulting events: recognition of Palestine as a full member of the UN, mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders, and the establishment of an international mechanism that will help both sides discuss and resolve the open permanent issues defined in the Oslo Accords, i.e. Jerusalem, permanent borders, security, Palestinian refugees, in accordance with a pre-defined timetable and guarantees for implementing the agreed solutions.

Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem based on Resolution 194, formulated in accordance to the Arab peace initiative.

The timing of the announcement of the Palestinian plan is intended to preempt a possible upheaval that could stir the Palestinians upon the release of an American peace plan. Moreover, it is intended to signal, as the Palestinians have already stated more than once, that the US is no longer seen as a fair mediator in view of its unilateral stance on Jerusalem, the reduction of US aid to UNRWA and the threat of closing the Palestinian representation in Washington. From a Palestinian point of view, the imbalance created by an exclusive American mediation, can be mitigated with the involvement of international partners. In addition, the speech is intended to portray Abbas to his people as a leader who dares to challenge the US, thereby strengthening his unstable legitimacy.

In view of the thicket of corruption affairs in Israeli politics, it is no wonder that the announcement about the disclosure of the plan was accepted in Israel with indifference. The Israeli Pavlovian reaction, as expressed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response – “Abbas has not said anything new” – is a reminiscent of countless similar negative reactions by Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers, including the response to the Arab peace plan in 2002. Not only that, but to ensure that Abbas is not seen as someone who is willing to make concessions, Netanyahu stressed that Abbas continues to pay millions of dollars to terrorists. Danny Danon, Israel’s representative to the UN, echoed him and said that Abbas is not part of the solution, but the problem.

The importance of the Palestinian plan is not in its content; it is anyway very general and does not contain any details, which are planned to be determined during long and exhausting negotiations. Its importance is three-fold: first, it stresses – once again – Abbas’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and a possible exchange of territories, thereby refuting the claim that Abbas intends to demand the implementation of the partition boundaries of 1947. The fact that Abbas views the Balfour Declaration as illegitimate does not change the fact that he recognizes and willing to accept the existing reality. The Palestinian narrative that rejects the Balfour Declaration will not change even after a peace agreement is achieved.

Second, Abbas’s insistence on East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital shows, by inference, that Abbas recognizes West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Thirdly, his view of the Palestinian agreement as a milestone to an Israeli-Arab peace agreement and part thereof, as expressed in the Arab peace initiative, signals that the advancement of IsraeliArab reconciliation cannot replace or advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

In August 1981, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Fahd published his first peace initiative (the first Saudi initiative) – which was immediately rejected by Israel – Yoel Marcus, a senior Ha’aretz journalist, wrote that Israel had always been able to respond to Arab bomb-bearing missiles, but not to missiles bearing peace plans. His observation was correct, but not accurate. Israel has learned to intercept both bomb-bearing missiles and peace plans. It does so by simply ignoring, opposing, or announcing that they are a recipe for the destruction of Israel.

Abbas’s peace plan will probably enter the endless collection of peace plans proposed throughout the years of the conflict, which were faded into oblivion. The composition of the current government and the timing of the publication will not give it a chance. Historians will certainly wonder in the future whether a peace plan was ever proposed by an Israeli government. I will give them a hint: not even once.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Matzav Review)

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:18:17 +0000

After an Iranian drone entered Israeli airspace 10 February 2018, Israel responded by striking Iranian and Syrian targets in southern Syria. Anti-aircraft fire led to the downing of an Israeli F-16 warplane. This was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, and it has prompted concern over further military escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border. In order to prevent such an escalation, Israel cannot rely only on security means. It should also make effective use of diplomacy: to identify clear and feasible policy goals regarding Syria, to foster alliances with countries that can help advance these goals, and to mobilize these countries into constructive action. This document includes experts’ perspectives on Israeli interests at stake, and diplomatic channels that can be promoted with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Germany in order to prevent further escalation. It is based on a policy workshop convened by the Mitvim Institute on 15 February 2018.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 15 Jan 2018 08:12:02 +0000

A special conference of the Caucus for the Empowerment of Israel`s Foreign Service (led by MK Nachman Shai) and the Mitvim Institute took place at the Knesset on 15 January 2018. The conference was convened in light of a planned cut in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) budget, which is part of a systematic weakening of Israel’s foreign service. The speakers at the conference included MKs, MFA representatives, former diplomats, and relevant experts. The speakers highlighted the need for a strong and efficient foreign service, criticized the damage done to the status of the MFA, and suggested steps that can help strengthen Israel’s diplomacy. This document summarizes the debate at the conference.

הפוסט The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking?

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 11 Jan 2018 09:56:08 +0000

In December 2017, while the UN General Assembly voted against the American decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and while Palestinian leaders were seeking an alternative mediator to Trump, Israelis and Palestinians met in Beijing to discuss how to advance peace. Invited by the Chinese Foreign Minister, they traveled to China in order to understand whether China’s increasing interest in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be translated into a real contribution to the advancement of peace. China has a four-point peace plan, that is consistent with the internationally accepted positions regarding the two-state solution. Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the plan in 2013, and began promoting it again last summer. China also has a special envoy to the Middle East, who is promoting the Chinese plan and has tried in the past to assist reaching ceasefires in Gaza. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has previously initiated two IsraeliPalestinian meetings, one in China (2006) and the other in Jerusalem (2013), and announced last summer that it intends to convene Israeli and Palestinian peace activists in Beijing by the end of 2017. The meeting has indeed happened, in cooperation with the Geneva Initiative and Member of Knesset Hilik Bar (Zionist Union).

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Voting Patterns in UN Institutions Regarding Israel, 2009-2017

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 02 Jan 2018 07:54:32 +0000

The Mitvim Institute conducted a preliminary research that examined voting patterns in UN institutions regarding Israel. The research focused on the voting patterns of 35 countries in 16 votes that were significant to Israel between 2009 and 2017 at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, UNESCO, and the UN Human Rights Council.¹ The majority of the countries chosen were visited by the Israeli Prime Minister in recent years. We examined whether Israel’s efforts to strengthen its bilateral ties with these countries have also led to a change in their voting patterns in major international forums.

The examination was limited in scope and covered only a specific aspect relating to Israel’s global standing. However, it provides a comparative overview of Israel’s current standing in the UN. The findings are not sufficient to draw conclusions about all the votes in all UN institutions or about Israel’s ability to influence votes in other international forums (such as other UN bodies, the EU, the World Trade Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or FIFA). They also do not reflect Israel’s influence on other political and procedural processes that take place behind the scenes and not through voting (such as influencing the wording of draft resolutions and postponing the raising of a particular topic for discussion or voting). Furthermore, the research is not an index to assess Israel’s efforts to strengthen bilateral relations. Rather, it says that if indeed a certain relationship is strengthened, it has yet to yield results in respect of important resolutions voted in UN institutions.

The findings showed that in important UN voting on the Palestinian issue, Israel continues to be isolated, where out of 193 UN member states, it usually enjoys the support of only the US, Canada and a number of small island states. This has been the case for the past eight years. It is evident from the examination that in votes that do not relate to the Palestinian issue, there is a greater number of abstaining countries. This has been manifested throughout the years in the vote on the “Syrian Golan” proposal, which calls for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, with almost 60 abstentions in 2016 and in 2017 (a similar trend was observed in previous years, although in 2015 only eight countries abstained). Another example is the Security Council vote on Resolution 1701 (August 2006), which dealt with the conditions for ending the Second Lebanon War and was unanimously adopted, in accordance with the position advanced by Israel.

A certain change in favor of Israel can be discerned in the series of votes held by the UNESCO Executive Board in April and October 2016 and in May 2017 that condemned Israel over the Jerusalem issue and objected its municipal policy in that regard. The proposal was tabled for voting several times, with minor changes each time, and there was a diminishing trend in the number of countries supporting the proposal (from 33 countries in April 2016 to 22 in May 2017). A number of countries (including France and India) moved from support to abstention, and in May 2017 there was a slight increase in the number of opposing countries, from six countries in October 2016 to ten. The US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Lithuania opposed in all the votes. Estonia opposed both votes in 2016 and abstained in 2017. In May 2017, Greece, Italy, Paraguay, Togo (the only one in Africa that did so) and Ukraine moved from abstention to objection. The voting results are influenced by Israel’s diplomatic moves combined with the Trump government’s efforts (led by US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley) to change UN voting patterns against Israel, and internal election processes that took place within UNESCO for key positions, including that of the Secretary General.

On the other hand, Russia, India, China, African countries, and South and Central American states, consistently vote in the UN assembly in support of the Palestinian position and against Israel (apart from Paraguay, which in recent years has chosen to abstain and Mexico that abstained in a recent vote). This is also the case regarding Israel’s allies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus (which in fact express greater support for Israel in other forums, including in the EU). The Vishgrad countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – are traditionally closer to the Israeli position. This can be seen, for example, in the way these countries voted in 2009, when they opposed the Goldstone Report, in support of Israel’s position. However, this is not their usual voting pattern, and in many of the votes that have been examined since then, these countries also supported Palestinian positions against Israel.

Voting patterns in the UN are not only a reflection of the bilateral relations between Israel and the other states. They are influenced by many different considerations, including political and economic interests, perceptions of justice and identity, tradition and regional decisions. According to former ambassador, Eviatar Manor, who served until August 2016 as Israel’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, the decision of a country to vote one way or the other, is also based on regional voting. The EU, for example, sometimes decides to vote as a collective, and member states are expected to vote accordingly. The African continent has a similar mechanism for coordinating regional voting, but it is less binding than the European one, and countries can be persuaded to deviate from such a decision. Therefore, he says, Israel should attempt to influence the voting decision by regional multi-national bodies before it is formed, since after a decision has been made it is difficult to influence the voting in the UN institutions of the member states.

According to Manor, Israel should determine how it relates to UN resolutions based on their practical implications. In cases where a specific resolution contains operative clauses (such as imposing sanctions, setting up investigation commissions and referral to the International Court of Justice), it is important to make political efforts in order to transform the resolution into a declarative one. In general, Manor argues that Israel must also conduct political efforts aimed at reducing the number of anti-Israel resolutions in the UN institutions and increasing the number of countries that oppose or abstain in voting on such decisions. The smaller the majority that resolutions against Israel receive, the more firmly can Israel argue that such resolutions are illegitimate. And if more liberal democratic countries vote with Israel, Israel’s moral argument will be stronger when facing anti-Israeli resolutions.

In conclusion, the voting patterns in the UN institutions vis-à-vis Israel do not represent the complex reality in the global political arena and the complexity of Israel’s foreign relations. Rather, they underscore the challenging relations that Israel has with the international community. Israel’s Prime Minister recently asserted that the change in the attitude towards Israel in international forums may take several more years, but our understanding is that without progress with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process the chances for a real breakthrough in this regard are slim.

Israel’s policy on the Palestinian issue is central to Israel’s foreign relations and has a negative impact on Israel’s standing in the world. Past experience shows that a “diplomatic renaissance” – like the one that Netanyahu recently claimed that Israel is currently enjoying – occurs only when Israel shows a genuine commitment to advancing peace and takes steps in this direction. We experienced this in the 1990s, when the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords led to much more significant achievements than the decision of countries to abstain in a vote on a resolution against Israel at the UN. Progress in the peace process opened many doors for Israel in the region and in the world. Israel’s bilateral relations greatly improved, and the attitude towards Israel in multi-national forums had undergone a real shift. These are the real achievements that Israeli foreign policy should aspire to.

¹ Not all countries included in the research are members of all the international forums whose votes were included in the survey. The full information appears in the [Hebrew] data file accompanying this report. The research was featured in Itamar Eichner, “Despite PM”s foreign trips, Israel remains nearly isolated in UN,” Ynetnews, 27 December 2017.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute; Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute

הפוסט Voting Patterns in UN Institutions Regarding Israel, 2009-2017 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 26 Nov 2017 11:30:10 +0000

Israeli foreign policy should shift from contrarianism to integration, and work toward a more committed role in international institutions and increased share in foreign and humanitarian aid. The special relationship between Israel and the US is the most important strategic asset for Israel in the global arena. Israel should become a strategic asset for the US by promoting peace and cooperation. It should re-establish its position in the bi-partisan US consensus and foster relations with new audiences within the US, including minority communities. Additionally, Israel’s foreign policy must adapt to changes in the global balance of power, and increase its presence in Asia and its cooperation with China, while protecting its relationship with the US. Finally, Israel must take into account the world Jewry when weighing the impact of its actions; it should strive to enable genuine Jewish pluralism, and identify new common ground on which to build Israel-Diaspora relations.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel Should Deal with Criticism Better

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 23 Aug 2017 12:23:20 +0000

Israel finds it hard to deal with criticism. Everyone does. It is especially hard when someone else points out the sides of you that you do not like and do your best to conceal. Israel does not like being criticized for its occupation of the Palestinian territories and its rule over a civilian population deprived from equal rights. It is trying to conceal the occupation even from itself, in order to maintain its self-perception as right, moral, Jewish, and democratic. But eventually, the criticism it faces also leads Israel to pay attention to its less pretty sides.

Many states which see themselves as true friends of Israel, find themselves criticizing Israeli policies, especially regarding the continued occupation. Germany criticizes Israel’s treatment of peace organizations; consecutive American administrations, as well as growing circles among American Jewry, criticize Israel’s continued building in the settlements; the EU criticizes Israel’s policy in the occupied territories; as does the UN and many other states. And isn’t that what is expected from friends? To genuinely reflect on how we look and how we behave? After all, true friends are supposed to alert us when we behave in a way which they see as harmful to us.

In reaction to the criticism it faces, Israel chooses to attack the critic, delegitimize it and/or downgrade ties. When Senegal and New Zealand submitted resolution 2334 to the UN Security Council, Israel recalled its ambassadors from those states. Ambassadors of the countries which supported the resolution were called in to be reprimanded. When Germany expressed support of civil society organizations, Netanyahu chose to cancel his planned meeting with the German foreign minister. When Jews in the US criticized Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, elements in Israel acted to stain their right to do so. When the UN passed resolutions which criticized Israel, the Israeli response is often aggressive and includes decisions to cut the budget it is obligated to transfer to the UN. And when individuals who call for a boycott of Israel or the settlements, because of Israel’s actions beyond the Green Line, want to enter the country, their entrance may be barred in advance and then backed by legislation. Anything, just to avoid the need to face and deal with the critic itself.

Such actions do not serve Israel’s interests, and are not the way Israel’s diplomacy should be carried out. True, the role of Israeli diplomats is made harder due to Israel’s policy in the Palestinian territories, which is not accepted in the international community. It is hard for Israel to upgrade its relations with Arab states, while continuing its current treatment of the Palestinians. It is also hard to convince democratic countries that Israel is, after all, a liberal democracy, despite that fact that it is ruling over a population with infringed rights. It does not sit right. Even so, it would be good if Israel chose to continue to strengthen relations with its critics and face the criticism through dialogue and policy reassessment. Instead of slamming the door shut and close off, Israel must put its best face on and turn it to the world.

הפוסט Israel Should Deal with Criticism Better הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 26 Feb 2017 11:25:44 +0000

The developments during the early months of 2017 show that the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to prefer to express its opposition to Israeli policy through diplomatic means, including attempts to promote stronger international pressure on Israel. This is in line with the policy led by Mahmoud Abbas since the very beginning of his tenure. He recently elucidated the importance of this policy in a special speech he delivered to mark the fifty-second anniversary of the Fatah movement.

Mahmoud Abbas espouses the diplomatic struggle and the recruiting of international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders. His consistent stance is that institutionalized violent struggle harms Palestinian interests. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334, which was adopted at the end of 2016 and states that the settlements are illegal, encourages the PA to continue this policy and continue to view the diplomatic path as the central element of its comprehensive strategy.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena. This article describes and analyzes these challenges, and points to the possible courses of action open to the PA.

הפוסט The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 26 Jan 2017 11:20:08 +0000

There may not be a conflict-ending, two-state solution any time soon, or perhaps ever. But if there is one, John Kerry’s six principles will serve as its basis. Kerry’s six principles are an imperfect, underwhelming reaffirmation of well-established international consensus regarding a two-state solution. But just like Clinton’s parameters of 2000, Kerry’s principles can outlive their natural political lifespan. And herein lies the importance of understanding his vision: how it links to past U.S. positions, how it compares with the most advanced knowledge on IsraeliPalestinian final status, and what service it holds for future peacemaking efforts. This policy paper provides an assessment of the Kerry parameters for IsraeliPalestinian peace.

הפוסט An Assessment of John Kerry’s Two-State Resurrection Endeavor הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 26 Jan 2017 10:51:12 +0000

A resolution to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts is a vital national interest of Israel and must be a central goal of its foreign policy. The status quo is unstable and time is not on Israel’s side. Thus, Israel must take the initiative to change it, by promoting the two-state vision, honoring previous obligations towards it, refraining from unilateral measures, and working to determine borders that are defensible and recognized by the international community. Such a resolution will foster cooperation with moderate Arab states, improve Israel’s global standing and its ties with the West, and reduce anti-Semitism worldwide. As long as the conflict lasts, Israel must minimize the damage created by its continued control over the Palestinians, primarily by strengthening the Palestinian Authority and promoting Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. Israel’s foreign policy should emphasize that peace is both a strategic and moral issue.

הפוסט A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The UN Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlement

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 26 Dec 2016 10:38:09 +0000

UN Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted on December 23rd 2016, is not the first international decision against the Israeli settlements. It is aligned with previous criticisms voiced against the settlement enterprise – including in the Quartet report published in July 2016 – and with international efforts to maintain and promote the two-state solution. Nevertheless, the harsh Israeli response against the resolution, and the meaning attributed to the resolution by major international actors, indicate its potential importance. This document includes short commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts – Dr. Nimrod Goren, Dr. Ehud Eiran, Rebecca Bornstein, and Dr. Ido Zelkovitz – on various aspects relating to the resolution and its possible ramifications.

הפוסט The UN Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Turkish-Israeli Relations: Crises and Cooperation

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 26 Nov 2016 10:13:33 +0000

Several factors have always played an important role in Turkish-Israeli relations since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1949. First of all, both countries have been in the Western camp and have a special relationship with the United States. Turkey’s recognition of the importance of the Jewish lobby in US policies and Turkey’s contacts with this powerful lobby predated its diplomatic contacts with the State of Israel. When Turkey faced the expansionist threat of the Soviet Union just after the Second World War and wished to establish close military es with the United States, it also initiated contacts with the American Jewish lobby, and recognized the newly established State of Israel. Although Turkey voted against the Palestine partition plan of the United Nations and the division of Palestinian territories into Arab and Jewish states in 1947, it became the first regional power to recognize the Israeli State, just a few weeks before the Turkish foreign minister’s first official visit to Washington in 1949. Turkey joined the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and formed special diplomatic and military es with the US during the 1950s.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:

הפוסט Turkish-Israeli Relations: Crises and Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The benefits of ‘Obama parameters’

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 26 Oct 2016 17:23:41 +0000

US President Barack Obama is already in his final 100 days in office. When president Bill Clinton was in a similar situation, in the year 2000, he chose to present his parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then, the Clinton Parameters have become an integral part of any efforts to promote the peace process. However, in the 16 years that have passed, regional realities have changed, new policy issues have gained traction and reality on the ground has been altered. Peace has not yet been obtained. The Clinton Parameters need to be brought up to date, and President Obama may do so between the US presidential elections and the inauguration of the next president.

This issue is still being debated in Washington.

Meanwhile in Jerusalem, steps are already being taken to jeopardize such a move. The Netanyahu government sees President Obama’s final days in office as a source of concern. Netanyahu is asking the US administration to refrain from any final move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Foreign Ministry is discussing how to confront this new “danger.”

There are, however, benefits to be gained from the presentation of new American parameters for the two-state solution. While they are not expected to bring an immediate breakthrough toward peace, such parameters will convey a clear message regarding the American position on how the Israeli- Palestinian should be resolved, and will highlight the consistency of the American position over the years.

There are also more concrete benefits to be gained, on both the international and domestic Israeli fronts, as identified by the Mitvim Institute: Clarity regarding the final-status agreement – parameters would supply the clarity that is presently lacking regarding the way to resolve the core issues of the conflict. The deeper and more detailed they are, the more clarity they will provide regarding the path to a final-status agreement.

Without clear parameters, the chances for the success of any diplomatic move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral – are much lower. A presentation of parameters is important with or without the upcoming presidential transition juncture. Even if President Obama avoids such a move, the next president should present clear parameters, preferably in the first year in office.

Renewed momentum for the two-state solution – The stagnation in the peace process leads to skepticism regarding the feasibility of the two-state solution. The “two-state solution” concept becomes empty of meaning when different politicians assign substantively different meanings to it. Parameters will help instill renewed meaning into this concept, and assist in changing the tide against it. There is also a need to update the key international documents connected to the peace process, most of which are over a dozen years old.

Updating the Clinton Parameters can be an important first step in such a process, and can contribute to harnessing an Israeli and Palestinian young public that searches for invigorated new ways to resolve the conflict.

Provide support for future negotiations – Parameters can help bypass additional useless rounds of Israeli- Palestinian negotiations that involve empty words alone, devoid of meaning. Parameters can serve as an “entrance ticket” to future negotiations.

The parties will be required to demonstrate a positive attitude toward them before negotiations even begin, to demonstrate that they have serious intentions. True, this may make it more difficult to begin the negotiations. However, if both parties have the political will to resolve the conflict, then the creation of a framework, a conceptual “anchor” and an objective for the talks will support the negotiations once they begin.

Deepen international involvement in the peace process – The Clinton Parameters remained, in their time, a solely American plan. If President Obama should present his own parameters, it would be an opportunity to create international consensus regarding them which, in turn, would enhance the parameters’ legitimacy.

Over the past two years, various attempts have been made to create a new international architecture to advance the peace process. However, none of these has been followed through or found to be effective.

Parameters could help here – if they go beyond the speech of an American president and are ratified by the United Nations Security Council or a relevant international forum like the Quartet or an international peace conference.

Sharpen the Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution – The Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution includes contradictions and knowledge gaps. Positions regarding it in the large parties tend to be fuzzy and unclear, with general, abstract statements lacking clear political content.

Parameters could help change this. They would clarify what the US really means when it talks about a two-state solution. Israeli opposition parties could adopt the parameters as a clear alternative to the current government’s policy; peace organizations could benefit from the fact that the parameters would banish much of the existing public opaqueness regarding the gist of a future peace agreement; and the Israeli public, most of which is interested in being a part of globalization processes, will understand more precisely what the international community requires from Israel in order to enjoy a fresh start among the nations.

Advance the Israeli quest for recognition – Parameters can be an opportunity for Israel to gain recognition for its Jewish character. Even though the essential need for such a recognition is disputable, the majority of Israelis seek it. Senior US administration officials have already responded favorably to Israel’s quest for such recognition, and it can thus be assumed that the parameters will express this as well. In addition, parameters are expected to emphasize the option of international recognition of west Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (and of east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine) with the attainment of the two-state solution. In this way, the parameters will not only present demands of Israel, but also show Israel’s public some of the advantages embodied in achieving peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The benefits of ‘Obama parameters’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Possible Benefits of American Parameters for the Two-State Solution

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 23 Oct 2016 18:29:32 +0000

As US President Barack Obama’s term in office is nearing its end, he may choose to present parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement before departing from the White House, similar to what President Bill Clinton did in 2000. The window of opportunity for this is between the US presidential elections (November 8, 2016) to the inauguration of the next president (January 20, 2017).

Should President Obama indeed decide to introduce parameters for a two-state solution, he has several options for doing so. He can deliver a presidential speech and leave it at that; or, he can bring the content of the speech to non-binding ratification in a multinational body or forum (such as the Quartet or an international peace conference). He can also bring those parameters as a proposal for a binding resolution in the UN’s Security Council. Also, the US president has at his disposal different options regarding the wording of the parameters themselves. President Obama can limit himself to a general text, or formulate a more detailed one; he can try to reconcile both sides by using relatively softened wording, or use more assertive wording to challenge the positions of the current Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.

הפוסט Possible Benefits of American Parameters for the Two-State Solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli return to Africa

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 12 Sep 2016 16:21:16 +0000

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda in July 2016 was the highlight of intense diplomatic activity aimed at strengthening relations between the State of Israel and the 40 sub-Saharan countries with which the state has diplomatic ties.

It was also the first visit by an incumbent prime minister since Yitzhak Shamir’s visit to Liberia, Ivory Coast, Togo and Cameroon in 1987.

The State of Israel is also conducting extensive secret diplomatic activity in a bid to resume or establish diplomatic ties with Muslim states in Africa which it has no diplomatic relations with. As part of this activity, on July 20, 2016, the State of Israel signed an agreement to resume diplomatic relations with the Republic of Guinea, the first state in Africa to sever its ties with the State of Israel in 1967 following the Six-Day War.

After the agreement was signed, Foreign Ministry Director-General Dore Gold visited Guinea on August 21 and met with the country’s president, Professor Alpha Condé, and with 10 of his ministers. They discussed cooperation in different fields and agreed to complete the ambassadors’ appointment process.

At the end of his visit to Guinea, Gold paid a rare visit on August 22 to a Muslim African state with which Israel has no diplomatic relations and met with senior officials there. Before this, on July 14, he visited Chad and discussed the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel with its president, Idriss Déby. So far, the relations have not been restored.

The main goals of the extensive Israeli diplomatic activity in Africa are: An attempt to change the African states’ voting patterns at the UN, the African Union, and other international forums, as so far most African states continue to vote in favor of pro-Arab resolutions despite the fact that they have good bilateral relations with Israel; an attempt to win observer’s status or, at least, the status of an invited guest at the African Union; to expand trade relations between the State of Israel and African states; to aid African states in areas in which Israel has experience, such as agriculture, development, security and counterterrorism; and to curb the Iranian influence in Africa. At the moment, the State of Israel appears to be partially successful in reaching its objectives in Africa.

Are Sudan and Somalia also wooing Israel?

Israel has been successful in expanding its trade relations with African states which are experiencing fast economic growth, and is helping many African states in the aforementioned areas. In addition, the State of Israel has been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with Muslim African states who severed ties or had no ties with Israel in the past. In this regard, the agreement with the Republic of Guinea appears to be just the beginning.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which reached its peak when relations between the two states were cut on January 3, 2016, and when relations between Saudi Arabia’s allies in Eastern Africa – Somalia, Djibouti. Sudan and the Comoros Islands – and Iran were severed several days later, and with of the improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a result of the Iranian nuclear threat and the war on terror, Sudan and Somalia have reportedly begun wooing Israel. Israel has thereby practically succeeded in partially curbing the Iranian influence in the continent.

For now, the Iranian influence has been curbed in some states in the Horn of Africa and in Eastern Africa, and the route of Iranian arms shipments to Hamas – which passes through the Red Sea and Sudan to Egypt and from there to the Gaza Strip – has been blocked.

As a result of this activity, it is quite possible that other African states will change their voting patterns at the UN by abstaining in votes on pro-Arab resolutions on Middle Eastern issues, or distance themselves from them – as Nigeria did at the Security Council vote on December 31, 2014, when it moved from supporting a Palestinian proposal to abstaining.

An observer status at the African Union?

Nonetheless, the main challenge facing the State of Israel is its repeated attempts to gain observer status at the African Union. During Netanyahu’s visit to Africa, it was reported that Algeria and Sudan had worked to thwart his visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, although he had no plans to visit the place. South African objected to it too.

This is the result of attempts made by the Palestinians and Arab states to curb Israel’s activity in Africa, including its attempts to gain observer status at the European Union. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) received observer status at the African Union in 1974, when African states turned the Palestinian problem into an African problem. So after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Agreements in September 1993, African states – including Muslim ones – restored their ties with Israel. But some of those states, such as Niger and Mauritania, cut their ties with Israel again following the deterioration in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.

In the past, Egypt also played an important role in the attempt to limit Israel’s steps in Africa, but today, in light of its budding relationship with Israel, which has warmed up in the three years of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule, and in light of the many internal challenging faced by Egypt, it seems to prefer to keep a low profile and not disrupt Israel’s reentry into the continent.

Due to the centrality of the Palestinian problem in African states, it’s very likely that in the event of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian process, Israel would also be able to gain an observer status at the African Union alongside the PLO and almost fully implement the targets of its reentrance into the continent.

(originally published in YNet)

הפוסט The Israeli return to Africa הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Assessing the Quartet Recommendation to Increase Interaction and Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 21 Jul 2016 18:20:19 +0000

The recent report of the Middle East Quartet, published in July 2016, recommends that Israelis and Palestinians “foster a climate of tolerance, including through increasing interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields – economic, professional, educational, cultural – that strengthen the foundations for peace”. The Mitvim Institute’s policy workshop examined whether and how this recommendation can be effectively implemented under the current political conditions. It addressed critical questions over how Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation, in the absence of political leadership, can take place and strengthen the foundations for conflict resolution instead of reinforcing a destructive status quo. The workshop was attended by local and international experts and diplomats, and featured opening remarks by Amb. Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Ambassador of Norway to Israel and former Director of the Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program, Dr. Ned Lazarus, Scholar and Evaluator of Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Programs at George Washington University, USA, and Elias Zananiri, Vice-Chairman of the PLO Committee for Interaction with the Israeli Society. This document summarizes the different points and recommendations that were raised during the workshop.

הפוסט Assessing the Quartet Recommendation to Increase Interaction and Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An opportunity for the Obama parameters

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 30 Mar 2016 15:40:42 +0000

The recent Wall Street Journal report on the White House’s plans for reviving the stalled Middle East negotiations before President Barack Obama leaves office caught many people by surprise, for two reasons. First is the widespread assessment that following the failure of the Kerry mission in 2013-2014, Obama had lost any appetite for involvement in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations that show no indication of a likely breakthrough.

Second, the common knowledge that US presidents do not like to embark on new initiatives in their final year in office. There have, however, been exceptions to this rule: Reagan recognized the PLO in late 1988, Clinton published his parameters in late 2000 and Bush mediated between prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in late 2008. Therefore, the possibility that Obama is entertaining a Middle East initiative this year warrants exploration.

Whether leaders admit it or not, they are very much concerned with their legacy. To date, Obama’s legacy with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been disappointing, to say the least. The blame may be placed on the two parties – indeed, they should be blamed for their recklessness – yet even so, the overall assessment of Obama’s involvement in the peace process is very poor. It is true that he was preoccupied with pressing international and domestic problems, yet his inactivity and indifference have stood in sharp contrast to the expectations of him before he assumed office. Suffice to remember his high praise of the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in July 2008, saying that “the Israelis would be crazy not to accept this initiative. It would give them peace with the Muslim world from Indonesia to Morocco.”

Unfortunately, this initiative continues to lie dormant on Israel’s and the US’ doorsteps.

In light of Obama’s mixed legacy in this field, a new late-term initiative may not be a bad idea at all.

The question is what should and can be done? Since the prospects of resuming negotiations between Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are slim at best, Obama should not focus on bilateral issues. The ideas noted in the Wall Street Journal report include a possible UN Security Council resolution to replace UN Resolution 242, a statement by the Middle East Quartet and a presidential speech.

The floated ideas also include several that the US is probably not considering seriously, such as an international conference, which is advanced by France.

Since such a conference is a formidable task, as evidenced by James Baker’s Madrid Conference (1991) and Condoleezza Rice’s Annapolis Conference (2007), a one-shot event would be more expedient.

A presidential speech, declaration, or statement would not demand lengthy, debilitating talks with the conflicting parties and would allow Obama, unfettered by election considerations or the reactions of lobby groups, to lay out his vision for a solution to the conflict. He should not wait for the parties’ approval for his vision, as Clinton did. Such an initiative will hopefully serve as a practical guide for future administrations, and for Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Similarities to the Clinton parameters – in terms and substance – can be expected, but this is not necessarily a bad thing, as it will signal continuity in the American position that future leaders will not be able to dismiss lightly.

Obama’s initiative should, however, seriously consider departing from Clinton’s parameters on at least five points, in line with the developments in the Middle East in the past 15 years. First, emphasis on a structured time frame (today, the passing of time is working to the detriment of both conflicting parties as the possibility of a two-state solution is slowly fading away); second, reference to the fact that the settlements are an impediment to peace; third, reference to Israel’s desire for recognition as a Jewish state; four, emphasis on the positive role of Arab Peace Initiative, which will tie the Israeli- Palestinian settlement to an overall Israeli-Arab settlement, leading to the normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab Middle Eastern countries; and finally, it should be stressed that the parameters in principle also refer to the Gaza Strip although negotiations with Hamas will not take place until it changes its position toward peace and Israel.

Obama’s desire to sign the Iranian nuclear deal was driven by his conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” The same conviction should also guide his thinking in the case of the Middle East conflict.

In 2017, Israel will celebrate the centennial of the Balfour Declaration – the British promise to build a Jewish national home in Palestine. In early 2017, in his final days in office, Obama can define the precise boundaries of that state, which have not yet been conclusively defined.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity for the Obama parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 28 Oct 2015 08:04:18 +0000

As violence between Israelis and Palestinians escalated amid diplomatic stagnation, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies convened a roundtable discussion in Jerusalem. The discussion addressed questions concerning the way forward through the current crisis as well as steps that the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, along with the U.S. and the broader international community, could and should take to prevent further bloodshed, while preserving and promoting the possibility of a two-state solution. The discussion took place on October 28th 2015, with the participation of twenty-five experts, predominantly Israeli think tank and NGO leaders, but also including foreign diplomats, and USIP’s President Nancy Lindborg. This paper summarizes the analysis and recommendations voiced during the discussion. It does not reflect a consensus of all or even some of the participants or the hosting organizations.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and a possible International Support Group for the Middle East Peace Process

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 28 Oct 2015 07:53:43 +0000

The international community is currently exploring an initiative to establish an International Support Group (ISG) for the Middle East Peace Process, which is supposed to help create conditions for the return to meaningful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, the ISG initiative faces significant skepticism, and still lacks clear definition and goals. It is unclear whether the group will actually come to fruition or not. This paper analyzes the diplomatic context to this initiative, identifies potential benefits from forming such a group, and discusses how Israel should respond. It was written by Dr. Nimrod Goren, based on a roundtable discussion at the Mitvim Institute’s Foreign Policy Advisory Team.

הפוסט Israel and a possible International Support Group for the Middle East Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 28 Oct 2015 07:51:07 +0000

The stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was clearly reflected at the 2015 UN General Assembly. The speeches of Mahmoud Abbas and Benjamin Netanyahu lacked vision and hope, and Barack Obama’s speech ignored the Israeli-Palestinian issue altogether. The results of the Quartet meeting, held on the margins of the General Assembly, were far from a breakthrough. This document includes commentary and analysis on these issues by Mitvim experts: Dr. Ilai Saltzman, Colette Avital, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz, and Rebecca Bornstein.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Prophet of the Apocalypse

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 24 Oct 2015 19:08:30 +0000

The annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which occurs every fall, affords heads of state from across the globe the opportunity to lay out their vision and policies for the future of the world. While it was Russian President Vladimir Putin who stole the show this year, the speech given by US President Barack Obama was also revealing, pointing to the foreign policy priorities of the world’s only remaining superpower. This, however, was not the case with the Prime Minister of Israel, who addressed a half-empty General Assembly hall. As usual, Benjamin Netanyahu did not miss an opportunity to put his usual gimmicks on display. This time it was a 44-second long dramatic and deafening silence accompanied by an angry and incensed stare at the members of the few delegations who remained in the hall, its only purpose to determine what kind of impression his antics left on them.

The majority of Netanyahu’s monologue was devoted to listing the sins of Iran, as well as the dangers the Islamic Republic poses to the world. While it is true that this year we did not hear of Hitler and the Munich Agreement – although anti-Semitism did in fact feature in his remarks – Netanyahu seized the opportunity to attack and castigate the entire world, and particularly the United Nations that was hosting him, for its silence, as if the entire world is against us again.

In the past, Netanyahu has been able to captivate the world’s attention and focus it on the Iranian nuclear issue. There is no doubt that it is he who was able to raise this issue and place it at the top of the agenda of the international community. This time, however, now that the deal with Iran has been signed, the issue is one for the history books. No one is interested anymore. There is no doubt that Netanyahu is aware that he has failed in this regard. Moreover, he is cognizant of the fact that the manner in which he conducted himself vis-à-vis President Obama and his Administration precluded Israel from having any impact upon the nuclear agreement. Therefore, one must ask why the Israeli Prime Minister still devoted so much room in his remarks to the issue. Even if I were inclined to believe his apocalyptical prophesies, his empty slogans and talking points, which have been uttered so many times before, prevented me from doing so.

Just one day after Abu Mazen’s speech before the General Assembly, and the debate that the organization devoted to the Palestinian question, Netanyahu, too, should have given the issue the attention it deserves. Unfortunately, IsraeliPalestinian peace was but a secondary feature in his remarks. On this issue, too, Netanyahu said nothing new. He pointed an accusatory finger at Abu Mazen and again reminded his listeners of the Palestinian recalcitrance to reaching any agreement. The prime minister reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution. However, in all likelihood the goal behind doing this was to pave his path back into the good graces of the Obama Administration and to restart a positive bilateral dialogue. Other than an unconvincing call to resume negotiations “without preconditions,” Netanyahu did not present any new plan or vision. One must also ask: is the call to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people not a precondition?

In light of the deteriorating situation in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories in recent months, one would have expected a speech whose goal was to calm the situation and create hope in the hearts and minds of his audience – both in Israel and in the territories. Unfortunately, this section of Netanyahu’s speech was hollow and disappointing. What is more, one must wonder why Netanyahu chose to completely ignore the harsh reality of the unfolding events across the region – the ongoing, bloody conflict taking place on Israel’s northern border, as well as the Russian presence in Syria and the risks it carries.

Netanyahu’s speech was another eloquent, missed opportunity for it said nothing about the Israeli policy. This, of course, should come as no surprise: an Israeli foreign policy simply does not exist. And beyond that, it is hard to comprehend why Netanyahu chooses to confront the entire world time and again; why he castigates, protests and admonishes, if need be, exposing how isolated Israel is from the rest of the world. What precisely did he think we stand to gain from that?

הפוסט A Prophet of the Apocalypse הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Revitalizing the Middle East Quartet?

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 06 Oct 2015 08:00:16 +0000

The meeting of the Middle East Quartet, which convened in the margins of the annual debate of this year’s United Nations General Assembly, was part of an attempt to breathe new life into the multinational mechanism that was set up in 2002 and which has been quite dormant in recent years. Oddly enough, since the resignation of Tony Blair as the representative of the Quartet (May 2015) and despite the fact that a replacement for him has not been named, the informal group has begun to show signs of coming to life.

In recent months, representatives of the Quartet – from the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations – held a series of meetings across the Arab world. These occurred in Cairo (June), in Amman (July), and in Riyadh (September). The focus of these meetings was to identify and promote measures that will preserve the viability of a two-state solution, improve the situation on the ground, and will enable the restarting of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in the future. However, these meetings also had another purpose – to increase the involvement of Arab states and the Arab League in efforts to promote the peace process, while emphasizing the Arab Peace Initiative.

The meeting of the Quartet, which took place on September 30th in New York, was supposed to be the highpoint of these efforts and senior representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League were also invited to attend. And yet, the results of the meeting were far from a breakthrough. Issues raised included a need for the Quartet to consult on a regular basis with regional actors and to hear other voices in the international community; a call for both Israel and the Palestinians to implement previously signed agreements in a more complete manner, and to take concrete steps on the ground with the help of the Quartet. Moreover, it was decided that a diplomatic delegation of the Quartet is to be dispatched to both Jerusalem and Ramallah in mid-October in an attempt to create some sort of positive momentum.

The Quartet’s efforts do not occur in a vacuum. In the past year, the international community has devoted extensive energy to answering the question of what are the possible next steps it might take in order to promote a solution to the IsraelPalestinian conflict. While the United States is still in a phase of reassessing its policy, which it announced after the failure of the negotiations led by Secretary of State John Kerry, it has been mainly France that has tried to launch new initiatives. However, these efforts, chiefly among them an attempt to introduce a UN Security Council resolution outlining agreed-upon parameters for a two-state solution, were postponed again and again. This happened first because of the elections in Israel, later because of the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran about the latter’s nuclear program, and finally because of a lack of American support.

In the absence of progress on the content of an agreement, the international community began in the summer of 2015 to contemplate the possibility of the creation of a new mechanism – an International Support Group for the IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process. At its core, this initiative is an attempt to add a number of European and Arab countries to the Quartet. The French led this effort, it was supported by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and the European Union Foreign Affairs Council authorized its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to lead consultations on the matter. The impetus for this initiative was influenced by the success of the model of negotiations conducted by the P5+1 with Iran, which proved to them that an international coalition has the capacity to reach diplomatic achievements.

Unfortunately, it seems as though the meeting of the Quartet that took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly actually impeded the effort. The current members of the informal organization seem to wish to preserve its current standing and composition. However, if the Quartet wishes to create new momentum on the Israeli-Palestinian channel it must show a willingness to renew and reinvigorate itself while accepting additional countries into its fold (and not merely consulting and taking advice from them). The creation of a new international mechanism to advance the prospects of a two-state solution will not likely bring peace, but it is possible that it would assist the international community in executing new coordinated initiatives whose implementation has failed time and time again over the past year.

הפוסט Revitalizing the Middle East Quartet? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli Foreign Policy and the Modern Diplomacy of the 21st Century

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 28 Jul 2015 07:33:14 +0000

Israeli foreign policy must adapt to become compatible with the modern diplomacy of the 21st century. It must recognize the increasing role of new actors in the diplomatic sphere and create opportunities for these actors to interface with classic diplomacy, which revolves around embassies. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs must deploy new and innovate tools in order to use its resources more effectively and efficiently and to train 21st century Israeli diplomats; to create partnerships with Israeli civil society organizations that collaborate with their counterparts abroad and are increasingly playing a role in shaping the global agenda; and to create opportunities to work with Israeli companies that operate abroad. Israel must actively engage in economic diplomacy, which is becoming a central part of modern diplomacy. It should do so by increasing the budget of MASHAV – Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, and broadening its focus to additional countries. Israel must also protect Israeli companies that are the targets of boycott efforts.

הפוסט Israeli Foreign Policy and the Modern Diplomacy of the 21st Century הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Turkey: The almost mediator state

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 18 Jul 2015 08:45:19 +0000

Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 07 May 2015 07:22:35 +0000

In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s recent elections and the formation of its 34th government, and not long after a period of conflict with Gaza and heightened tensions amongst Israel’s Arab population, over thirty experts, diplomats, civil servants, journalists, and representatives of think tanks and NGOs gathered in Jerusalem on 7 May 2015 for a policy-planning workshop convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the International Crisis Group. On the agenda were possible next steps toward resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict. This paper summarizes the main points raised in the workshop. It focuses on the analysis of key players and the assessment of future options.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Relations

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 28 Mar 2015 07:15:36 +0000

The right-wing victory in the Israeli election is likely to have significant impact on Israel’s foreign policy, specifically on ties with the US and the Palestinians. Statements made in the immediate days after the election by major actors in the international community already indicate that future crises are looming. This document features initial reactions to the election results and their possible implications for Israel’s foreign relations by experts at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies – Dr. Nimrod Goren, Kamal-Ali Hassan, Dr. Ilai Saltzman, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, and Dr. Ido Zelkovitz.

הפוסט The Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:04:16 +0000

Following Benjamin Netanyahu’s surprise landslide victory in the Israeli general election, the new question that has swept the national scene is how the incumbent Prime Minister will compose his ruling coalition. In order to avoid forming a coalition that is unstable or ideologically unsound, he is left with one option: a hard right-wing government. Needing 61 Knesset seats to govern, this option would entail a combination of the Likud (30), his allies on the right (24), and the ultra-Orthodox parties (13).

Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States.

For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded.

With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process can even begin, Netanyahu is having to backpedal on his pre-election message that if he was reelected he would ensure that no Palestinian state will be created—a statement that likely helped him peel away precious mandates from the far-right Jewish Home party.

Although Obama may eventually need to take a more accommodative approach to Netanyahu to bring any progress toward resolving the conflict—or at least agreed-upon international parameters—comments from his administration in the post-election period so far indicate that he is committed to ramping up pressure. As some have noted, this pressure could come in the form of supporting a Palestinian state at the UN or simply refraining from shielding Israel from international pressure.

Then there are the Iranian nuclear talks. Having shown little if any remorse during the Congressional speech controversy, Netanyahu will doubtless continue to thwart a deal in any way he can. And yet, any more bold actions from him could again jeopardize the US government’s strong support for Israel at the UN, concerning intelligence sharing, and in other foreseeable ways short of withholding foreign aid.

Assuming a stable right-wing Israel government does not collapse within the next two years, Netanyahu will outlast Obama and find himself with a new American presidential counterpart. In either scenario of a Democrat or Republican taking office in 2016, Netanyahu would still find himself at odds with the White House.

If de facto Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton is any measuring stick, her comments during and after her service as Secretary of State reveal that Israel can expect more of the same regarding Obama’s views on Iran, as well as his and her husband Bill’s positions on both the conflict and on Netanyahu personally.

If a Republican is elected as president, history has shown the dynamic between the two nations’ leaders could be even more capricious. Even conservative hardliner George W. Bush—despite the nostalgia in Israel for his presidency—went so far as to counsel Netanyahu’s rival, Tzipi Livni, on how to beat the Likud in the 2009 general election, just as Hillary Clinton had soon afterward. Unconditional and hawkish Republican rhetoric domestically and in Congressional chambers apparently does not translate to the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

Beyond challenges from American presidents down the road, the policy direction that Netanyahu and a hard right-wing coalition would take will likely further erode the American domestic support base for the Israeli government in Congress and among the Jewish community that has long served as a critical component of Israel’s soft power.

The lack of Israeli diplomatic engagement with all sides of the pro-Israel spectrum—including the dovish lobby group, J Street—and staunch disagreements among the U.S. and Israeli governments will transform Israel even more into a divisive issue in the American political arena. Both problems could be significantly mitigated by earnest Israeli efforts to resolve the conflict, yet these would be out of the question for the coalition under discussion.

Netanyahu’s final decision on a coalition may still be weeks away, but if he makes that perilous of decisions to form an all-right-wing government, its probable course of action will risk leaving an indelible stain on ties with the American president, on the bipartisan domestic American support for Israel and on the US-Israel “special relationship” itself.

(originally published in The Hill)

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Kosovo and its Relationship with Israel

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 24 Feb 2015 07:04:28 +0000

In February 2015, Dr. Enver Hoxhaj, a Member of the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo, Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, and Kosovo’s former Foreign Minister, visited Israel. During his visit, Dr. Hoxhaj held a briefing at the Mitvim Institute, which focused on Kosovo’s current socio-political situation, its international standing, and Kosovo-Israel relations.

הפוסט Kosovo and its Relationship with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US Vetoes on UN Security Council Resolutions Dealing with the Israeli-Arab Conflict

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 26 Dec 2014 10:29:54 +0000

הפוסט US Vetoes on UN Security Council Resolutions Dealing with the Israeli-Arab Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Abbas Is on His Way to the UN Again

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 27 May 2014 19:41:55 +0000

A week after he was attacked in Ramallah, Israeli reporter Avi Issacharoff was invited by President Abbas to his office to condemn the attack and grant him an exclusive interview. Among the tidbits from the interview was Abbas’s assurance that, despite recently signing on to 15 international conventions and treaties, the Palestinians will not be going to the UN in the near future. Likely more an overture towards Israel and the international community than an actual policy decision, there is every reason to doubt this self-imposed moratorium will last past the summer.

For one, there are too many moving parts for the UN strategy to simply be abandoned in the long-term. A major sticking point from the Kerry talks’ April breakdown was that there are at least 63 international organizations, conventions and treaties on the current list for Palestinian acceptance. These 63 organizations, which have been grouped into ‘clusters,’ constitute the near-term aim of the Palestinian international campaign. Various officials have said that the holistic list of potential international organizations stretches closer to 550.

That’s not to mention the institutional support the UN campaign enjoys among the Palestinian leadership. Even before Abbas announced joining the 15 organizations in April there were calls from leaders of the other major Palestinian parties – such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian National Initiative party – to abandon the talks and begin signing on to international conventions and treaties. In an interview in Ramallah with one of these leaders, a member of the PLO Executive Committee told me that the Palestinians should have signed on to the 63 organizations from the moment of the General Assembly upgrade vote in 2012. This is not an isolated assessment; for years there have been various strategy groups sprouting up among Palestinian officials calling for increased international engagement at the UN.

There is also is little reason to believe that the Palestinian public will give Abbas and the leadership the political flexibility to stand idly by during the upcoming September General Assembly meeting of the UN. Abbas’s tenure has been characterized by a policy-roulette of negotiations, reconciliation, internationalization, and the oft-threatened disbandment of the PA. With reconciliation with Hamas in its implementation phase and the idea of disbanding the PA fading further and further into the periphery, it’s hard to imagine Abbas neglecting to pursue other policies, especially a policy that polls as high as the UN campaign.

The only situation where a significant delay is imaginable, however, would be with the commencement of another round of negotiations. Palestinian leaders have already demonstrated a willingness to halt the UN campaign in deference to the negotiations, as was the case this last round of talks. Palestinian officials have told me that were talks to be re-launched—something that appears increasingly distant in the realm of possibility—the Palestinian position for future talks includes a 3-month moratorium on the international campaign in exchange for a halt in settlement construction.

The unknown factor here is the recent reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas and what effect that will have on the international campaign. Palestinian leaders have been quick to praise EU acceptance of the reconciliation announcement, but that degree of support is not ubiquitous across the global stage, and there are certain to be more than a few red flags on the upcoming conventions and treaties. It may be hard to maintain international recognition for the Palestinians as a signatory to the 4th Geneva Convention if Hamas, a known purveyor of rocket attacks into Israel, is party to the PLO.

There are also questions about the logical end-game of this UN strategy. Palestinian leaders are the first to admit that international recognition and acceptance will not change the status on the ground, nor will it create a state for the Palestinians. Where they differ amongst themselves, however, is how far this international campaign should be pursued and at what cost. While going to the UN in some capacity enjoys near-unanimous support throughout the Palestinian leadership and public, there are those who caution against another confrontation at the Security Council a la 2011, when Abbas threatened to pursue a vote there only to be stymied by the prospect of a U.S. veto. There are still certainly elements within the leadership that prevailed then, and will argue again, for the value of promulgating their status in the future in the UN Security Council, with its greater resonance and prestige compared to the UN General Assembly.

It’s clear that the foreseeable future of Palestinian policy will involve the international campaign in some capacity. What’s not clear is at what point going to the UN will be the Palestinians’ primary objective or the secondary. If talks are re-launched, a prospect that appears bleaker and bleaker each passing day, expect some sticking power to this self-imposed moratorium on the international campaign. If talks fail, however, don’t expect the Palestinians to watch a UN General Assembly meeting come and go this autumn without doing anything.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Abbas Is on His Way to the UN Again הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Suicide by Statehood

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 02 Apr 2014 19:40:00 +0000

On Tuesday night, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, appearing live on television, signed the documents necessary for the Palestine Liberation Organization to seek membership in 15 international organizations. His speech was the culmination of hours of deliberation Sunday and Monday in Ramallah, as the Palestinian leadership mulled how to respond to Israel’s announcement that it would delay a long-scheduled prisoner release. Within minutes of Abbas’s speech, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry canceled his planned trip to the region — and today, the peace process appears, once again, near death.

But is it?

Certainly, the move to apply to a raft of international organizations looks confrontational, to say the least. At first glance, it’s a major move outside the Oslo parameters and is liable to sabotage the progress Kerry has made over the past year. What’s the Palestinian endgame? A vote for upgraded status at the U.N. Security Council? Many have speculated that the Palestinians will take Israel to the International Criminal Court, charging the country for war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.

But we’re not there yet.

Read the full article in Foreign Policy

הפוסט Suicide by Statehood הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Resumption of the Palestinian UN Campaign?

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 02 Apr 2014 10:09:18 +0000

Palestinians see the delay in prisoners release by Israel as a negation of their commitments to halt the international campaign; Abbas is looking to increase his leverage, but the US should be able to pull the Palestinians back to the table

הפוסט The Resumption of the Palestinian UN Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Palestine’s Plan for when Peace Talks Fail

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 17 Mar 2014 19:37:04 +0000

Despite the unshakable and quixotic optimism of John Kerry’s Middle East negotiating team, the prevailing prognosis in Jerusalem and Ramallah is that even an attempt to implement an interim Israeli-Palestinian peace framework—let alone a final status agreement—is doomed to fail.

If talks break down, observers including the New York Times’ Tom Friedman suggest that Israel will come under massive international pressure for its continued building of settlements. But what Friedman and others don’t understand is that the Palestinians will lead the way. They have a plan ready and waiting.

Palestinian politics are rarely covered in the United States. Nor, for that matter, are they given a great deal of thought in the Middle Eastern press. But Palestinian insiders are now indicating that there is mounting pressure on Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian leadership to produce something, anything, to alter the status quo. Even now, while negotiations are in full swing, Abbas increasingly appears to be ‘the little Dutch boy’—
as one Israeli reporter put it—struggling to rein in the demands coming from within his own party, Fatah. In light of these increasing demands and pressures, Abbas, who has led the Palestinian Authority well past his legal mandate (his term ended in 2009), is almost certainly set to renew the international campaign for recognition of Palestinian statehood. It’s a campaign known in Ramallah as the “Palestine 194” campaign.

This initiative had been in the works, with fits and starts, since 2005. That year, Abbas reportedly traveled to Brazil for a summit of South American and Arab states, and met privately with Brazil’s leftist president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. There, da Silva supposedly told Abbas that when he neared the end of his second term (which expired on January 1, 2011), he would help build a Latin American consensus for a unilateral Palestinian statehood declaration at the UN.

Between 2009 and 2011, Abbas and Lula made good on their plan, recruiting scores of Latin American and other non-aligned states to recognize the State of Palestine. The campaign also included European states such as France, Spain, Portugal and Norway. In 2010, at an Arab League meeting in Sirte, Abbas made one of his first references to the “Palestine 194” campaign. The name said it all: there are currently 193 member-states in the United Nations, and the Palestinians were unambiguous about their desire to become the 194th.

The international community was similarly unambiguous about its support for the campaign. By the end of 2010, almost one hundred countries had already recognized an independent Palestine. The effort to garner widespread international support was, to say the least, a new and evolved one. The Israelis tried to dissuade some friendly states from supporting the campaign, but the Palestinians clearly had the upper hand.

“Ladies and Gentlemen,” Mahmoud Abbas told the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2011, “…I submitted, in my capacity as the President of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, an application for the admission of Palestine on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif [Jerusalem] as its capital, as a full member of the United Nations.”

With that, Abbas made history. And while it can be argued that Arafat had already declared a Palestinian state in 1988, the Palestine 194 campaign felt distinctly different. The Palestinians had conceived, formulized, and implemented a concerted international policy, and it was, at least to this point, a diplomatic victory.

The only hitch, however, was that the U.S. was poised to veto their efforts at the Security Council.

Undeterred, Abbas brought the campaign home to overwhelming positive reception. As Al Jazeera reported, “A welcome party was planned at the Muqata, the presidential headquarters [in Ramallah], and a stage was set up next to the grave of the former president, Yasser Arafat.” The Palestinian government and schools closed early. Palestinians across the West Bank received text messages advertising “the official mass reception.” Palestine TV devoted its broadcast to Abbas, broadcasting photographs of the leader throughout the years as well as footage of him meeting ordinary Palestinians and international figures. For the Palestinians’ second president who has always been viewed as a rather bland and uncharismatic afterthought to Yasser Arafat, the reception was gratifying.

Abbas did not savor his victory for long, however. As expected, Palestine 194 was not well received in Washington. Led by efforts in the U.S. Congress, Washington withheld $200 million in financial assistance as a warning to the Palestinians not to return to the UN.

However, the Palestinians were not prepared to accept defeat. With more than one hundred countries in support of the “State of Palestine,” the Palestinians had leverage. Abbas and his advisers immediately made a play for membership at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

But this, too, came with consequences. According to a little-known American law passed during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, the U.S. is prohibited from giving funds to any part of the U.N. system that grants the PLO the same standing as member states. So, as the Palestinians pushed for full membership, they were effectively pushing for a $70 million per year (America’s 22 percent) slashing of the UNESCO budget, which operated on a $325 million per annum budget.

The vote took place in October 2011, with 107 of 173 countries voting in favor, 14 opposing, and 52 abstaining. Immediately thereafter, U.S. funds were slashed. The UNESCO victory was a pyrrhic one, at best. Meanwhile, the request for statehood had not led to a vote at the Security Council. Indeed, the bid had stalled when it became clear the US would not hesitate to use its veto.

Despite these setbacks, by early 2012, the PLO signaled that it was poised for another run at the UN. To be sure, not all Palestinians leaders were on board. Some were unconvinced of the benefits it would yield the Palestinians. Indeed, some believed that it was a campaign guided by pride rather than strategic interests. Among the most outspoken opponents was then-prime minister, Salam Fayyad.

Washington undoubtedly played a role in curbing Palestinian enthusiasm. In a June interview with the Saudi Okaz newspaper, Saeb Erekat said the U.S. threatened to suspend aid and close down the PLO mission in Washington if the Palestinians returned to the UN. In an apparent move to placate President Barack Obama, Al-Hayat reported that Abbas would postpone the UN bid until after U.S. elections in early November.

Over the course of the next few months, the Palestinians settled on November 29 as their target. Only this time, they planned to go directly to the General Assembly, where they had the numbers advantage, and Washington could not veto. The strategy proved successful. 138 countries voted in favor of the initiative. Only 9 voted against—eight, not including Israel.

In short, the Palestinians demonstrated that their campaign could not be deterred. Not even the United States could prevent their bid for recognition. And the leadership made it clear that it would not cease seeking recognition so long as Palestinian independence was not achieved.

This, in part, explains the urgency of the Obama Administration’s new peace process, launched in the spring of 2013. Led by Secretary of State John Kerry and managed by veteran diplomat Martin Indyk, Washington has labored to restart the peace process. And while the administration has placed significant pressure on Israel to make concessions on borders, Jerusalem and settlements, one of the major demands on the Palestinians has been to halt the international bid for recognition.

Skeptical of the entire process after decades of fruitless negotiations, the Palestinians have nevertheless abided by this demand. But they have also made it clear that they continue to study steps to join UN treaties and bodies. Even amidst the peace talks, the Palestinians have used the 194 campaign as leverage. In early November, for example, the Palestinian Monetary Authority announced that it had obtained full membership in the International Association of Deposit Insurers. Senior Palestinian official Nabil Shaath also warned that the Palestinians could use the “weapon” of taking claims against Israel in the International Criminal Court. Shaath added, “There are organizations that await our application, and ask us when are we applying.”

Abbas himself has threatened, “If we don’t obtain our rights through negotiations, we have the right to go to international institutions.” Palestinian official Hanan Ashrawi also warned that the Palestinian leadership was ready to join sixteen agencies beginning in April 2014. “Everything is in place and will be set in motion,” Ashrawi claimed. By late December, Saeb Erekat told Maan News Agency that there were no less than sixty-three member agencies of the UN that the PLO sought to join.

And while the exact strategy has not been released, on January 25, Maan News Agency reported that a PLO committee had reached an internal agreement on how to “take the Palestinian plight to the UN and its various bodies.” This included “signing international conventions and joining UN agencies and different bodies.” Among the most important of these bodies was said to be the International Criminal Court (ICC), “because that will enable the PA to sue the Israeli occupation over war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

Israeli officials quietly admit that the ICC is only one agency on a short list of international bodies that they view as red lines. They include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and INTERPOL. The concern for Israel is not that, not only would the Palestinians gain acceptance as a state through these agencies (and do so outside of the bilateral peace process), but that the Palestinians would also try to isolate Israel from these agencies, which are crucial to Israeli commerce, security and/or diplomacy.

Other Palestinian memberships would simply be insulting. For example, Palestinians seek to join FIFA and then disqualify Israel from the international soccer association. Indeed, Israel is growing increasingly concerned that the Palestine 194 campaign is about to become part of the larger strategy of Boycott, Divest and Sanctions (BDS). The campaign has scored some small successes in academia, with a handful of European businesses joining, too. But should the majority of UN member states embrace the strategy of shunning Israel from multiple international organizations, BDS could evolve into a real threat to Israel’s legitimacy.

The Palestinians, for their part, know that if they take new steps in this direction, it will open up a whole new front in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This explains, in part, why Palestinian officials have kept a lid on their strategy. However, Palestinian officials in the past have been quick to point out that they do not view the Palestine 194 campaign as antithetical to bilateral negotiations with Israel. Indeed, they see it as a means to enhance their negotiating position. But now that talks are ongoing, Palestinian officials will not discuss how this dual-track strategy works, particularly in light of U.S. opposition to the 194 track. Instead, Palestinian officials articulate their full-throated support of the Kerry initiative. At least most of the time.

For Washington, there is more at stake here than a Nobel Prize for Obama, Kerry and Indyk. Washington maintains its laws prohibiting the funding of UN agencies when the PLO gains membership. That law did not change following the UNESCO debacle. This, of course, means that the US could be forced to choose between the State of Palestine and sixty-three different UN agencies.

Some may not seem like a loss—such as the International Olive Council. However, others, such as the World Health Organization or the International Court of Justice, could be bruising.

Worryingly, despite the clear signs that such a campaign may be renewed with the collapse of the U.S-led peace talks Washington has given little thought to what happens next. State Department officials working on the peace track acknowledge that Palestinian plans may be in the making, but few will cede that a peace-process breakdown is even possible, let alone imminent. Other officials at Foggy Bottom note the potential threat of the 194 campaign to U.S. interests, in light of the fact that it could prompt Washington to break off from multiple international organizations. They insist that there is regular communication with the Palestinians and the relevant agencies on this issue, but it is unclear whether the U.S. government is in any way prepared for the moment the campaign gets underway. For example, Congress rebuffed the president when he sought waivers during the UNESCO battle, and it has since turned away the executive on multiple occasions when other waivers have been requested.

What this means for Washington is not yet clear. But it is clear that the Palestinians have a ready-made policy to pursue should the current talks break down. Unlike in 2000, when the collapse in diplomacy prompted a violent intifada, this failure will yield a diplomatic intifada, whereby the Palestinians pressure Israel using their leverage with the international community. It’s nonviolent, but its war by other means. And it’s likely that Washington will be caught in the crossfire.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Plan for when Peace Talks Fail הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 08 Nov 2013 19:22:56 +0000

About six months ago, I sat in a coffee shop in al-Tireh, a suburb of Ramallah, and interviewed a senior official within Fatah. The official, wanting to talk about the internal dynamics within the Palestinian leadership, wished to remain anonymous. In between flowery anecdotes about his meetings with Dick Cheney (“He always asked about my family”) the official began to shed some light on the Palestinian UN bid of 2011 and 2012. True to perception, various fault lines and rifts began to emerge between his description of how the UN campaign was formed and how other senior officials had described the process. Was Abbas pressured into the UN? Did close advisors convince him? Did he always have it in the back of his mind? If there was one thing the collective Palestinian narrative could agree on, it was that everyone was convinced their explanation was the only explanation for what would become the largest unilateral policy decision in the post-Oslo years.

In his new book, State of Failure: Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State, Jonathan Schanzer attempts to unravel these narratives and provide insight into how the Palestinian leadership navigates the rough seas of pseudostatehood. It’s a daunting task—as Schanzer acknowledges early on, the field is crowded with literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, much of that literature is written in a comparative light; it’s usually the Palestinians in relation to Israel, or in relation to the peace process, or the Arab League, and etc. In putting the internal dynamics of the Palestinian leadership as the focal point, “State of Failure” reveals some truly unsettling facets of how the Palestinians craft and implement their policies. In covering the recent tremors in the political structure, the book focuses on former prime minister Salam Fayyad and his rather inglorious fall from grace in the leadership. The internal disputes, the well-documented rifts and disagreements between Fayyad and the Fatah leadership, all are laid out cogently in the book.

The book isn’t likely to be on the PLO’s reading list anytime soon. And most certainly, if there’s one specific area of the book where Schanzer is likely to reach an impasse with the Palestinian leadership, it’s the description of the UN campaign. In the book, Schanzer takes a contemporary approach, detailing the roots of the campaign in 2005, when Palestinian diplomats began working in earnest with Latin American nations, developing a diplomatic strategy that would eventually lead to 2011. This diplomatic strategy was at times viewed as almost antagonistic to negotiations by some within the leadership, but by 2008 and 2009, when Tzipi Livni had failed to form a negotiation-centric government and Benjamin Netanyahu had ascended instead, the idea of this comprehensive and unilateral diplomatic campaign began to take hold. By 2010, with talks breaking down over settlement moratoriums and varying preconditions, the campaign became the predominant driving force of Palestinian policy. This is where things get murky.

If his approach is a pragmatic analysis of a clear-cut policy evolution, the history being touted by the Palestinian leadership is a little more holistic, a bit more nationalistic, and certainly much more paradigm-driven. In other words, Schanzer’s approach neglects a pre-Oslo history the Palestinian officials are incredibly defensive of. In a report I released this past summer, I interviewed nearly twenty Palestinian officials in search of some clarity on the campaign. Of the myriad narratives that emerged, one thing was clear: the UN campaign was not a recent phenomenon. In the historical waxing and waning of the methods of preference in Palestinian policy, internationalization at the UN has a history that precedes negotiations.

Indeed, Palestinian officials described a process that had roots as far back as the 1970s. One official has even written that the Palestinians first considered the UN track in 1969, at the suggestion of President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. By 1974, this track’s foundations were laid in the PLO’s Ten-Point Program, a political manifesto that, among other things, called for Palestinian autonomy of lands “liberated,” and didn’t explicitly rule out other forms of resistance. For a resistance-based liberation movement, the acknowledgment of partial territorial control in Palestine and alternative means of resistance was precedent-setting.

By 1988, the Palestinian position had evolved into two clear schools of thought regarding the UN. On the one hand, elements within the leadership argued against the UN track, insisting that applying for statehood status on the 1967 lines would jeopardize the PLO’s claim of representation over the Palestinian refugee diaspora. This group was led by Farouk Kaddoumi, and was also concerned over the potential hindrance international recognition would place on a resistance group. The second group, championed by Riyad Mansour (and supported by Mahmoud Abbas), argued for full engagement at the UN, claiming that statehood would not delegitimize the PLO’s standing, but rather enhance it. By the time the dust had settled, the former had won, and a hybrid option was implemented, with the Palestinians opting for an upgrade to ‘observer entity’ status. In the coming years, the US and PLO would open the lines of communication, the Madrid talks would commence, and the Oslo period would start shortly thereafter. The UN track, in short, would be sidelined.

Here, too, is where a historical background would have benefited the book. For even in its brief respite from the fore of Palestinian policy, the UN campaign was never far. Indeed, in 1999, as the end of the 5-year interim Oslo period neared, Yasser Arafat dispatched two deputies, Nabil Sha’ath and Saeb Erekat, to Europe in order to begin gauging support for a unilateral declaration of statehood at the UN. The US promptly countered this campaign, and pressured the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. At the time, President Clinton had managed to dissuade Arafat through several key areas: first, leveraging the well-known fact that a Palestinian unilateral action outside of the Oslo framework would threaten the peace camp in the upcoming Israeli elections, and second, that the US would be willing to host further negotiations if Arafat held off. After a frenetic diplomatic campaign, the US was able to stave off the Palestinian action and set the stage for the Camp David negotiations.

Acutely aware of this bit of history was one of its primary actors: Mahmoud Abbas. So when, in 2011, Abbas was faced with a similar moribund peace process and a lack of suitable alternatives, the UN bid was again moved to the fore. Here’s where the discrepancy in motivations arises within the Palestinian narrative. Was Abbas motivated out of a hope for renewed US brokerage of negotiations? Or was he always convinced of the merits of a UN campaign? Perhaps we’ll never know. But President Obama was not able to offer anything similar to Clinton, and Abbas had no choice but to pursue the UN.

Where does that leave the UN bid in the grand scheme of things now? The Palestinians have halted their campaign in lieu of recent negotiations, a compromise they made with John Kerry in order for talks to be restarted. Should the talks break down, however, or fail to yield an interim agreement by March, the Palestinians can be expected to again gear up for engagement at the international body this coming year. Their engagement, and specifically which entities to engage and to what degree, will be known only to the man at the top, Abbas.

Such is the clouded area of tasseography in the Palestinian Territories that State of Failure deftly interprets. Schanzer discards the rhetoric and nationalist storylines in lieu of the pragmatic, describing the recent leadership’s myopic nature in zero-sum terms. His prognosis is clear: the Palestinian leadership is struggling on two fronts: in negotiating a state’s existence and governing a state entity. In order to do the former, it must improve on the latter. It is not likely to win him many friends in the West Bank. But it is, however, a workman’s analysis of how Palestinian officials form policy and govern in one of the longest and most intractable conflicts of the modern era.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Putin Doctrine

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 08:57:28 +0000

For more than a decade — after he replaced Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin and even during the time he had to serve as prime minister under his protege, Dmitry Medvedev — Russian President Vladimir Putin has systematically and consistently pursued a policy that can be labeled the Putin Doctrine. In a nutshell, Putin seeks to renew Russia’s status and influence in both regional and global politics and make the Russian Federation a great power again. To achieve this goal, he challenges and subverts America’s posture and interests, relying on three main components.

First, Putin orchestrated a comprehensive buildup in the Russian armed forces, using the growing revenue from the country’s energy resources, primarily natural gas and crude oil. For most of the 1990s, Russian policymakers were overwhelmingly preoccupied with political and economic survival, and the defense establishment was one of the main sectors that suffered. Salaries were not paid, bases in the former Soviet republics were abandoned, training was scarce, critical equipment was left to rust and operational preparedness reached an all-time low. Since the early 2000s, when Putin first took office as president, however, Russia’s military budget has tripled and, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it currently constitutes 4.4% of Russia’s GDP, or more than $90 billion.

Second, Putin was able to use a number of institutional platforms to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives he considered harmful to Russian interests. In 2003, before the Iraq war, for example, Russia was successful in blocking the Bush administration from getting a U.N. resolution passed to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. Today, as the Syria crisis unfolds and President Obama is seeking congressional approval for a limited punitive strike against Syria, Russia actively uses its veto power at the U.N. Security Council to preemptively obstruct any American attempt to gain international legitimization for such an attack. Russia follows the same pattern of behavior at the International Atomic Energy Agency when the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is discussed.

Third, Putin crafted an association of states that share his basic anti-American strategic vision for the international system. China has become Russia’s chief ally in frustrating Obama’s foreign policy goals. Whether it is Iran or Syria, the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit or the global economic crisis, Beijing and Moscow see eye to eye when it comes to the United States. Russia and China are devoted to a multipolar global power configuration that essentially means the erosion of American hyper-power and political predominance.

Putin has also exploited diplomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. For example, in 2003, during the Iraq war, he met with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac numerous times to coordinate their antiwar moves within and outside the United Nations.

In the beginning of his presidency, Obama sought to “reset” relations between Washington and Moscow. He even revised some controversial plans to deploy missile systems in Eastern Europe as a trust-building measure designed to appease Putin. Yet the fundamental objectives of the Putin Doctrine made these American gestures ineffective and, in fact, only bolstered Putin’s determination and tenacity.

Putin believes that the U.S. is economically and politically declining and that it is socially degenerating. Indeed, Putin sees the wariness among the American people and their political representatives in the case of Syria and thinks that this is more proof of U.S. weakness and indecisiveness amid Russia’s growing power and influence.

Regardless of the prospects of the Russian proposal to dismantle the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile — an initiative some observers believe is designed to split the White House, Congress and the American public — Putin has shown his diplomatic craftiness and strategic interests in reclaiming Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics. By positioning Moscow alongside the Bashar Assad government and forcing Obama to blink first, Putin showcased his personal leadership, resolve and willingness to confront the United States. We should expect to see more of this doctrine in action, perhaps in the case of Iran.

The Cold War ended more than two decades ago, but Putin has revived some traits of the Soviet empire, and his doctrine is the key to his success. The Obama administration should realize that Putin’s objectives are diametrically opposed to most American interests and come up with a doctrine of its own to deal with him if it wishes to maintain U.S. national interests over time.

(originally published in the LA Times)

הפוסט The Putin Doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Palestine’s Plan B

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 30 Jul 2013 19:20:05 +0000

In the time it took John Kerry to announce that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would be starting again, a microcosm of the past couple years in the conflict played out. Initial leaks, clear-cut denials, clarifications about preconditions, expectations and the like burst out from all sides. Yet within the enigmatic, if not routine, vacillations that accompanied this announcement, the Palestinians began revealing different facets of their contingency plan. In an interview with a Jordanian newspaper, Mahmoud Abbas was quick to point out that “all options are open,” mentioning the possibility of returning to the UN and referring to the bid as the “greatest achievement” in recent Palestinian memory.

So what happens if negotiations actually renew and then break down again? What’s next for the Palestinian agenda?

Kerry has said that progress needs to be made by the fall, presumably to circumvent future Palestinian actions at the UN; it’s clear that one of the conditions for resuming talks was a halt in the Palestinian internationalization campaign while talks are ongoing. The common Israeli prediction is that the Palestinians could build off their 2011-2012 UN campaign and do something as drastic as going to the International Criminal Court to air their grievances. This battle of global public opinion is one of the few areas of Palestinian diplomatic strength, and a severe concern for the Israelis. Yet if that’s the next move in the eyes of the Israelis, the feeling isn’t mutual in Ramallah. Indeed, as one senior Fatah official pointed out to me, the ICC is the last organization on a list of organizations triaged in importance to the Palestinian internationalization campaign. What is more likely, then, is a renewed Palestinian diplomatic campaign at the international level, a campaign that starts with the Palestinians seeking to sign some of the less-threatening international treaties such as the UNICEF Rights of the Child. These treaties and conventions are referred to by Palestinian leaders as the “first clusters”; relatively minor organizations and treaties that escalate as the campaign continues. Becoming signatories to some of these treaties has two main benefits for the Palestinians: first, they show the Palestinian people a palpable engagement on the international level, and second, they do very little to antagonize the United States and Israel.

But where did these “clusters” and contingency plans come from? The shift in the Palestinian leadership was gradual but recent. Faced with a moribund peace process and a status quo that increasingly harmed their interests, the Palestinian leadership scrambled to find alternative tactical tracks to pursue. In 2009, this reached a head when Abbas was faced with roughly three main options: attempt to reconcile the Fatah/Hamas split, essentially condone an intifada, or go international and approach the UN. With less-than-overwhelming enthusiasm for reconciliation, and similar disdain for an intifada, Abbas was left with really only one realistic option: internationalization.

The justification, then, for this choice lay in the history of the Palestinian political movement. In interviews this past year in Ramallah, Palestinian officials were quick to align the recent international campaign with the historical movements of the Palestinians at the UN. This process, in their eyes, started in 1974, with the PLO’s release of the ten-point plan, a document that sought to reconcile the armed resistance, but also left room for political maneuverability. As the Lebanese war raged on, the local PLO leadership began to evolve, forming the institutions of a semi-state. This evolution continued in 1982, when PLO members began openly calling for the acceptance of Resolution 242, the UN resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from “lands occupied in the recent conflict.” Abbas’s own memoirs detail this evolution—as an advocate of accepting 242 in 1974, Abbas noted that by 1982 members of the PLO thought a shift towards the international community could ”break the siege [of Beirut] and preserve the PLO.”

By 1988, this evolution had reached a climax when the Palestinians issued their declaration of independence, a statement that was joined with supporting documents accepting Resolution 242 and the two-state process. Soon after, Arafat was invited to address the UN, the Palestinians’ status was upgraded to observer entity, and a few days later Arafat renounced terrorism in a teleconference. The evolution of Palestinian thought that had culminated in an international campaign was halted subsequently thereafter, as the United States and PLO began to form a tenuous, if not productive, relationship that would lead to Madrid and eventually the Oslo process. Not until this process broke down in the years following Annapolis would the Palestinians look back on their internationalization campaign. As one PA official told me, “it’s as if the stopwatch we started in 1974 and paused in 1988 was resumed in 2009.”

The beauty of the UN campaign was its flexibility. Unlike most options on the table for the Palestinians, the internationalization campaign had tremendous upside. Not only did it play to one of the last, great strengths of the Palestinian leadership, the UN, but it was able to reconcile internal Palestinian political camps, something very few policy agendas can claim in the West Bank and Gaza. For those that advocate the use of force, or at least a more stern approach to dealing with Israel, it had the advantages of appearing to antagonize Israel and the United States. For those that pledge themselves to bilateral negotiations, it had the upside of appearing to leverage the Palestinian hand, the clearest evidence of that being Kerry’s recent attempts to bring both sides to the table.

For Abbas, a man who wants to appear committed to the bilateral process, the UN campaign followed in the footsteps of his predecessor. In May of 1999, Arafat both publicly and privately mused about what to do after the five-year interim Oslo period ended. With his trademark style of pursuing multiple tracks to varying levels of effort at once, Arafat deployed two deputies, Nabil Shaath and Saeb Erekat, to lobby European countries at the UN to recognize a possible Palestinian declaration of statehood. It was a lobbying campaign that Dennis Ross countered with a campaign of his own, as described in his memoirs; Arafat was “coy” about the possible move. However, President Clinton was able to take advantage of his working relationship with Arafat and bring him back from the brink with the promise of renewed negotiations. It was a moment that undoubtedly had an impact on Abbas when he launched his UN campaign in 2011. Palestinian officials describe Abbas as a leader hoping for Obama to intervene with proposed negotiations, to bring both parties back to the table. With Obama either unwilling or unable to do so, Abbas had walked himself into a corner where the only option was to go to the UN.

If Israeli officials describe the UN campaign as unilateral because it breaks with the spirit of Oslo, and the Palestinians describe the campaign as multilateral because it engages the international community, then the truth is somewhere in between. For the Palestinian leadership, there is an emerging group of officials and policymakers calling for an integrated strategy, a usage of tactics such as ”smart resistance,” of lobbying international countries and signing on to the “clusters” of the global community. This group is not opposed to new negotiations with Israel—indeed they support it—but they have been laying the foundation for a backup plan to failed negotiations for years. If Kerry’s proposed talks do indeed break down, or if they are unable to even start, the backup plan for the Israelis is a perpetuation of the status quo. The backup plan for the Palestinians, however, is taking the conflict back to the international arena.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Plan B הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 18:55:27 +0000

The Arab Spring upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East started in Tunisia at the end of 2010, and subsequently spread into Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, triggering repercussions in a wide arc of Arab countries.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad.

Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.”

Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with Turkey, perhaps within a “new democratic axis of power” (the Turkish foreign minister’s phrase). Egypt has also come closer to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states that are deeply concerned (alongside Israel and Turkey) by the Iranian threat, as well as by the survival of the pro-Iranian regime in Syria.

With regard to Israel, despite hostile expressions by Islamic militants, Egypt’s President Morsi has appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas to end the IDF operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

To be sure, President Morsi has a vested interest to settle not only the Hamas-Israel conflict, but also the entire Palestinian-Israeli dispute. According to him, “The Palestinian issue is first priority for Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim States,” as he stated at the Islamic Solidarity Conference held in Mecca in August 2012.

Hashim Kandil, Egypt’s Prime Minister, noted at the Davos conference this January that his country expected that the new Israeli government would renew the peace process with the Palestinians for the sake of its own interests, and the interests of Egypt and the entire region. Like all Arab states and most Muslim nations, Egypt has continued to support, up to the present, the Saudi/Arab League peace initiative of March 2002.

As is well-known, this initiative, which has been recently approved again, offers Israel peace, security and normalized relations with all Arab countries, in exchange for Israel agreeing to the erection of a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as settling the Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. Resolution 194 (of December 1948). Israel has not yet accepted this unprecedented initiative, which has the potential to be a critical breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations.

Indeed, Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Why Won’t Israel’s Politicians Talk Seriously About Foreign Policy?

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 18:42:19 +0000

A pre-election foreign policy debate was held today on the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Candidates in attendance were from four of the major Israeli parties, and in many ways, their performances mirrored their party’s current position in the Israeli political spectrum. Naftali Bennett, the rising star of the Israeli conservative movement and leader of the HaBayit HaYehudi (Jewish home) party, was confident, charismatic and straightforward. Tzachi Hanegbi, of Likud, was comfortable and affable, making a joke at one point about using his time on the podium to begin coalition negotiations with Bennett. Yaakov Peri, of Yesh Atid (there is a future) — the new centrist party formed by Yair Lapid earlier this year — was aloof and scattered, at times simultaneously agreeing and disagreeing with Bennett and Hanegbi. Isaac Herzog, of Labor, provided a sound perspective, yet seemed desperate to stay relevant to the overall discussion.

Yet, in the course of the debate, where the candidates differed was as interesting as where they agreed. When asked what would be their most pressing foreign policy issue, both Peri and Herzog pointed to the Palestinian issue and restarting negotiations as a must. Herzog, cognizant of the growing demographic gap, went as far as to proclaim that the only way to keep a Jewish democracy afloat would be through establishing a neighboring Palestinian state. Peri presented a more pragmatic approach to the negotiations, criticizing Netanyahu for not building a professional working relationship with Abbas, and proclaiming his party as the only party prepared to re-establish that relationship. For Hanegbi of Likud, the most important issue on the table was Iran; indeed, Hanegbi asserted that no matter which issue the candidates thought was the most important, should they assume office, they would be forced to address Iran above all other issues anyway. Finally, Bennett declared that “the biggest issue is that the Palestinians are not the biggest issue,” re-emphasizing his party’s commitment to focusing on domestic issues such as integration of the Haredim and lowering the 20 billion dollar deficit.

The debate was divided into roughly three topics: regional security, the Palestinian issue, and Iran. On regional security, there was again unison between Yesh Atid and Labor, as both Peri and Herzog emphasized the opportunity presented by the revolutions in neighboring countries. Peri emphasized the peace treaty with Egypt, Herzog reiterated a desire to engage in conversations with local populaces, and both blamed the Netanyahu government for forcing the Palestinians to the UN. Hanegbi downplayed the threat of Syria, citing the instability there, and detailed how excited the Netanyahu government was at the start of the Arab revolutions. Bennett, already displaying the masterful art of question-dodging, compared his policy with that of Teddy Roosevelt’s, quoting the aphorism of speaking softly and carrying a big stick. As Bennett expounded on his Roosevelt tangent, he introduced his party as the only party against establishing a Palestinian state, and the debate shifted to the question of Palestine.

Both Herzog and Peri described the Palestinian U.N. bid as a failure of the Netanyahu government in maintaining a working relationship with the PA leadership, with Peri going as far as to describe the collective political right as “having their heads in the sand.” Both candidates warned against the possible dissolution of the PA, an oft-utilized threat as of late, while Bennett dismissed the threat, noting that there’s always someone to step up and fill the void. Bennett went on to detail his ‘stability plan,’ wherein Israel would exercise full control and sovereignty over its settlements in the West Bank, but would also remove checkpoints and restrictions on travel for Palestinians. Bennett noted that this equated the Palestinians to “something less than a state,” and also reiterated his argument against a massive return of Palestinian refugees to the West Bank, saying the influx of Palestinians from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon would have an overwhelming effect, and “put a lot of strain on the Green line.” Hanegbi, making his case to become the Joe Biden of Israeli politics, quipped that it was easy to follow Bennett, “as he makes me look reasonable.” Hanegbi’s views represented the outlook of a party in power that has for two years avoided direct negotiations. He disparaged the PA leadership and the failed negotiations, and quoted Abba Eban, Herzog’s uncle, in saying “the Arabs rarely miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”

The final section dealt with Iran, which equated to two out of the three questions being about Chuck Hagel. The candidates, acutely aware of the foreign media (read: American media), downplayed the Hagel nomination. Bennett called the nomination none of his business, while Hanegbi and Herzog echoed Bennett’s sentiments; only Peri went as far as to elaborate further, noting that he agreed with Hagel’s position in support of a Palestinian state. Getting back to Iran, Hanegbi and Bennett shared similar concerns. Bennett declared his willingness to accept Obama’s word on not accepting a nuclear Iran, while Hanegbi warned, “the centrifuges are spinning more and more each day.”

The debate was a unique opportunity for the public to get an insight into the similarities and disparities between the major parties’ foreign policies. Naftali Bennett, the conservative young major in the Army reserves, showed why his popularity has soared in recent months, providing an everyman’s approach to foreign and domestic affairs. Yaacov Peri, the elder statesman, seemed aloof at times and unsure of his party’s official position, and both agreed and disagreeing with the conservatives on stage at different points in the debate. Isaac Herzog was measured, eloquent and thoughtful, yet his remarks fell short of impacting the overall debate. Herzog was the only candidate to bring up the specifics of his party’s plan to re-engage the Palestinians, stating the Clinton parameters (67 borders, land swaps) would be his baseline for negotiations, and that the Arab Peace Initiative (so often ignored by the Israeli political establishment) should be on the table — yet the issues were not revisited. But perhaps, in what was a casual debate on Israeli foreign policy, it was Likud’s Tzachi Hanegbi who had the line of the morning, when he was asked about what it means to be a critical friend to Israel in light of the Hagel nomination: “every friend of Israel is a critical friend, even Micronesia.”

(originally published in The Atlantic)

הפוסט Why Won’t Israel’s Politicians Talk Seriously About Foreign Policy? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Much ado about something

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 19:16:21 +0000

As the celebrations commenced in Manara Square in Ramallah, and the votes were tallied in New York, the Palestinian delegation had done something almost entirely unique to the post-Arafat era: it had unilaterally altered the status quo in the conflict. The upgrade to nonmember observer status for the Palestinian Liberation Organization puts it on the same level as the Vatican, gains it wider international recognition, and grants it greater access to international organizations. Yet as the Palestinians celebrated, the Israelis brooded, chiding the PLO’s UN maneuver as going against the peace process and noting that 65 years ago a similar UN proposal was voted on, and Israel had readily accepted that one. Indeed, the US and Israel were right in their assertion that the vote would hardly change any of the realities on the ground – and it never appeared as if the PLO had any illusions otherwise – yet what has been altered is the political status quo, and a precedent has been set for future Palestinian initiatives.

The history of the PLO at the UN stretches back nearly 50 years when in 1964 the Palestine National Council sent formal notification to the UN regarding the establishment of the PLO. In 1974, the PLO was recognized by the UN General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people, and subsequently invited to partake in plenary meetings on the question of Palestine. In 1988, the General Assembly reaffirmed the Permanent Observer Mission status of the PLO to the UN in resolution 42/229 A & B, granting it rights to participate in debates in the General Assembly and co-sponsor resolutions. In 2011 the PLO took a more aggressive approach to the international governing body, seeking official member status through the Security Council. The motion was never voted on however, and a year later the PLO took their case to the General Assembly as a nonmember state, passing on Thursday by a vote of 138 to 9. The history with the UN suggests a learning curve within the Palestinian leadership, and the recent endeavors in international organizations suggest a paradigm shift within the PLO’s approach to the conflict.

For Palestinians, the UN bid was a glimmer of hope in an otherwise gloomy month; the war and subsequent ceasefire in Gaza was still very much prevalent in Palestinians’ minds, and even as celebrations in Ramallah were matched in Gaza City, pessimism loomed. According to a poll published in Ma’an earlier this month, an overwhelming majority (84%) of Palestinians supported the UN bid, but that was tempered with 90% believing Israel would enact policies to punish the Palestinians for the maneuver, and over 50% believing that the bid would have a negative effect on the Palestinians in the short-term.

The Israeli press was likewise divided in its reaction to the bid. In Israel Hayom’s print edition, the vote was labeled an “embarrassment for the State of Israel.” The Jerusalem Post was quick to address a newfound concern for Israeli leadership, running an analysis on the “overblown threat of the [Palestinian access to the] ICC.” In Ha’aretz, an editorial ran praising the Palestinian initiative, saying Israel had “no basis” for its fear of international recognition of Palestine, and that “a recognized Palestinian state will give Israel a responsible partner with international backing.” The variance in Israeli media reflected the spectrum of thought in the Israeli leadership, from Netanyahu roundly opposing the initiative, to former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s surprising support for the measure.

For the peace process, the success of the Palestinians reveals the uncertainty of future negotiations. Could the international recognition and backing of the Palestinian leadership create a stronger position in negotiations? Will the Palestinians having greater access to the International Monetary Fund and possibly the International Criminal Court change the relationship between Ramallah and Jerusalem? It’s too soon to speculate what impact the upgraded status will have in the peace process, but for now, the success at the UN has given the Palestinians something to celebrate in an otherwise bleak November.

(originally published in Times of Israel)

הפוסט Much ado about something הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Time to Impose a Plan

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 23 Nov 2012 19:18:09 +0000

AS the dust settles over the Israel-Gaza border, attention shifts to New York, where the Palestinian delegation will ask the United Nations next Thursday to upgrade its status to that of “nonmember state.” In short, to recognize Palestinian statehood.

The date, Nov. 29, is not random. On that late November day 65 years ago the U.N. General Assembly convened at temporary premises in Lake Success on Long Island, New York, and voted to approve the partition of British Mandatory Palestine into two states; one Jewish, one Arab. That vote was the legal basis for the establishment of the state of Israel six months later, and is the basis for the Palestinians’ claim to a state to this day.

The history of what followed will forever remain open for debate. Not so what needs to be done now.

Over the past 10 years there has been growing consensus that the only solution to the long conflict lies in the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip — areas that were under Jordanian and Egyptian control, respectively, during the 19 years that elapsed following the end of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and before the eruption of the Six-Day War in June 1967.

Yet the dilemma of many states on how to vote in the United Nations is real. For however morally right and historically overdue, a resolution recognizing Palestinian statehood might not only fail to advance the Palestinian cause, it might even set it back.

Both the United States and Israel have warned of retaliation should such a vote take place.

Following last year’s attempt by the Palestinians to gain full admission to the United Nations, the U.S. Congress has threatened to withhold crucial economic aid to the Palestinian Authority as well as to the United Nations itself. Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened to take retaliatory action as well, such as withholding Palestinian tax revenues, expanding settlement construction and even toppling the Palestinian Authority.

In contemplating how to respond to the Palestinian bid, therefore, the challenge for the international community is how to proceed in a manner that would advance the prospects of Palestinian statehood — a requisite element in the two-state solution — without driving a stake through the heart of the already moribund peace process.

One way out of this conundrum is the following: Between now and Nov. 29, the United States and other key members of the international community should seek to convince the Palestinians to suspend their bid at the General Assembly in return for a Security Council resolution that would, for the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, spell out the general parameters for peace.

What’s in it for the Palestinian leadership of Mahmoud Abbas is simple but compelling: trading symbolism for action.

After all, Security Council resolutions are binding, General Assembly ones are not. Hence, a Security Council resolution on the parameters for two states will enshrine Palestinian national goals in international law. A General Assembly recognition of Palestinian statehood, by contrast, will do little more than offer symbolic encouragement.

To be sure, formulating parameters that are acceptable to both the Palestinians and Israel is not easy. But it is enough that the parameters reflect the long-established view of the international community, which is also that of the one and only power broker that both the Palestinians and Israel respect, the United States.

Those parameters were first laid down by President Bill Clinton, then elaborated upon by President George W. Bush and underscored by President Barack Obama. Between the three of them, the full outline for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been sketched.

Such a resolution would require Israel to accept a territorial compromise on the basis of the 1967 lines and the Palestinians to concede on the issue of refugees. At the same time, the resolution could and should go a long way in easing Israel’s security anxieties and meeting Palestinian claims to the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.

In order to add teeth to the resolution, the Security Council should not satisfy itself with defining the parameters of a solution. It should also order the parties back to the negotiating table; set a time limit — say, one year — to the conclusion of the talks between them; outline a series of actions that the international community would immediately take to support the process; and, finally, declare what the international community would do should the parties fail to reach an agreement within the specified time period.

The failure of the Arab leaders to accept the 1947 partition plan has compelled the Palestinians to await their own Lake Success. A U.N. Security Council resolution that turns a potentially symbolic triumph for the Palestinians into concerted international action on the two-state solution could be that day for them. It will also be a victory for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

(originally published in the New York Times)

הפוסט Time to Impose a Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There Is No Israeli Partner

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 19:13:56 +0000

The claim that there is no one to talk to on the Palestinian side is a common one in Israeli discourse, seemingly an axiom. The Netanyahu-Barak-Lieberman government has managed to stick the “no-partner” label to the Palestinian leadership and thus has slammed the door on diplomatic negotiations. The credit for this slogan goes to Ehud Barak, who placed full responsibility for the failure of talks with the Syrians on Hafez Assad, and responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit on Yasser Arafat. However, scrutiny of the history of talks between Israel and its neighbors reveals that the no-partner claim has been a part of the Israeli-Arab conflict from its outset.

A study of statements by Israeli leaders David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, by pre-state Revisionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky and many others reveals that the concept of the “iron wall” led their actions. To their mind, there was no partner to talk to on the Palestinian or Arab side. The fact that most of the Arab leaders refused to speak to Israel’s leaders, at least until 1967, lent credence to this idea. But its dominance became counterproductive when leaders began to appear on the other side who did show willingness to talk to Israel under certain conditions.

That was the case, for example, when as far back as 1965 the president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, proposed recognition of Israel on the basis of the 1947 UN Partition Plan. That was also the case with Anwar Sadat, who was not perceived as a possible partner although he had proposed a peace plan even before the 1973 Yom Kippur War. So it was with Arafat, although in 1988 he declared his acceptance of Resolution 242 and his abandonment of the road of terror. The same thing happened with regard to the Arab peace initiative of 2002, which proposed a peace treaty with all the Arab countries in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Down through the years, the no-partner claim was criticized by researchers studying the Middle East. In the 1980s, Yehoshafat Harkabi, who had been the chief of Military Intelligence and was a renowned scholar of the Israeli-Arab conflict, said this claim was serving as a pretext for annexing territories conquered in 1967. Criticism has also recently come from Middle East expert Prof. Matti Steinberg, who saw the no-partner claim as a manifestation of Israel’s patronizing attitude that the worthiness of Palestinian partners is a function of their willingness to obey Israeli dictates.

The case of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is particularly interesting. Since he became president in 2005, he has called for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed-on adjustments. In fact, on both of the thorniest issues, Jerusalem and refugees, a moderate Palestinian stand can be seen from the minutes of secret talks in 2007 and 2008 between then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abbas and between then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and then chief negotiator Ahmed Qureia.

The minutes were leaked to Al-Jazeera. Since the participants had not imagined such a leak, we may assume that the minutes reflect their true positions. The Israeli public, which was not exposed to this information at all, is not aware that the gap between the two sides, including on key issues, had become significantly smaller.

Abbas’ consistency in his position, his reiteration of opposition to a popular struggle against Israel and his emphasis that the establishment of a Palestinian state does not mean a return to the borders of the Partition Plan or 1967, validates his statements. It is interesting that when the Arab-Palestinian side refuses to negotiate (for example the “three nos” of Khartoum in 1967, the Palestinian National Charter, the Hamas charter ), Israel’s leaders treat these declarations seriously and view them as credible reflections of Arab positions. However, when Arabs take a positive position, moderate or conciliatory (Arafat, Assad, the Arab peace initiative ), there is a tendency to belittle the importance of such declarations, which are perceived as an attempt to mollify the West or as worthless rhetoric.

The obvious conclusion is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s declaration that there is no Palestinian partner does not necessarily stem from the fact that there is no one to talk to, but more from the fact that Netanyahu and Lieberman have nothing to talk about. People who do not want to promote peace talks find it convenient to explain away the continued stagnation by saying that there is no partner, not by Israeli rejectionism.

There is a partner on the Palestinian side, and his name is Mahmoud Abbas. Perhaps after the elections an Israeli partner will emerge.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט There Is No Israeli Partner הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Continuing on the Path to Statehood: The Palestinians Following their Septmember 2011 UN Bid

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 26 Oct 2011 09:40:51 +0000

Mitvim representatives participated in meetings with a series of key Palestinian figures from Ramallah and Nablus. The meetings focused on the implications of the Palestinian UN statehood bid of September 2011. This paper summarizes the main points that were raised in the aforementioned meetings, and provide a glimpse into the state of mind of Palestinian officials from the West Bank.

Impressions from Meetings with Palestinian Officials from the West Bank, October 2011

At the beginning of October, prior to the Gilead Shalit prisoners swap deal, representatives of Mitvim participated in meetings with a series of key Palestinian figures from Ramallah and Nablus. The meetings were conducted in cooperation with Ronnie Shaked, from Yediot Aharonot and the Hebrew University’s Truman Institute, and focused on the implications of the Palestinian UN statehood bid of September 2011. This paper summarizes the main points that were raised in the aforementioned meetings. These points do not represent official positions and should not be attributed to all Palestinians; however, they do provide a glimpse into the current state of mind of Palestinian officials from the West Bank.

Abu Mazen returned victorious from the UN, despite the Israeli perception that the Palestinians had lost at the UN. The request for UN recognition of a Palestinian state, Abu Mazen’s speech, and his willingness to confront the United States, were all perceived at the time as major events within the Palestinian national struggle. They sparked a surge in Abu Mazen’s popularity on the ground. The Palestinian Authority held celebrations in parallel to the UN General Assembly, and Abu Mazen was portrayed as a national hero.

Abu Mazen is aware of his power. Despite the continued and repeated rumors regarding retirement from the political sphere, Abu Mazen has not appointed or trained any successors and has limited the power of the younger generation. He is focused on working towards the creation of his own legacy. Abu Mazen knows that he does not have a replacement at the moment, and that his only replacement could be Hamas, which remains unwanted by the United States, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Therefore, he allows himself to adopt a “take it or I leave” approach. Abu Mazen is aware that there is no desire for Hamas to take his place and therefore, various domestic and international actors will eventually accept the policies that he chooses to pursue.

Abu Mazen creates a new ethos, one that stands for non-violence. Abu Mazen has chosen a non-violent political struggle as his strategy and has taken steps to change the ethos of Arafat’s battle. This new policy emphasizes the Palestinian intentions to end the Occupation and acquire a state within the 1967 borders, without violent confrontation with Israel. The new approach is supported by most of Fateh’s figureheads and members. The level of support it enjoys among the Palestinian people, specifically the young generation, is unclear. The choice to follow the non-violent path contributes to a positive self-image among Palestinians, some of whom have compared themselves to India and Gandhi. This approach is perceived as a step that safeguards the Palestinian national interests and increases international support for the Palestinians and their struggle. It appears that in the meantime this is just a tactic, one which has not yet uprooted the ethos of the violent struggle. If they feel helpless or if they think there is a more beneficial path, it seems that the Palestinians will be ready to change course once again. .

The Palestinians feel that they are ready for and deserve a state. Abu Mazen rehabilitated the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) – the economy, the security, and the institutions. The Palestinians feel better about themselves than they have in the past. They are on the road to progress, taking initiative and promoting actions in the international arena. The Palestinians have achieved support (Turkey provided legal advice to the PNA prior to the UN bid) and highlight their readiness for their own state. Nablus, for example, was previously marked by instability and security chaos, whereas today the situation is totally different. The city has developed immensely: economic progress, stability, and civil order. Unemployment has dropped from 65% to 11%, tourism is beginning to pick up and more tourism plans are being created, there is commercial and real estate development, restaurants are opening up, a stock exchange is operating, and more. There is security cooperation with Israel, which everyone is aware of (also in regards to Joseph’s Tomb, which was refurbished by the PNA), and that has brought to the removal of checkpoints around the city and to increased freedom of movement.

First a state, then a permanent status agreement. It seems that today’s Palestinian discourse is focused on the establishment of a state and not on the achievement of a permanent status agreement, or a peace agreement with Israel. There is a lack of faith in the ability to negotiate with the Netanyahu Government. There is an operative plan for diplomatic progress towards statehood and a belief that it will be better (for Israel as well) to negotiate a permanent status agreement on a state-to-state level. It may then be easier for the Palestinians to make compromises on sensitive issues. At the same time, there is an understanding that the parameters of a future peace agreement, based on the 1967 lines, are already more or less known, that it will be possible to eventually reach an agreement on all core issues, and that should Israel adopt a pro-peace policy that a final status agreement can be achieved also before the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Following the UN General Assembly, the Palestinians are patient and realistic. The Palestinians do not expect that a state will be established tomorrow. They understand that there is a long road ahead, and they declare that they possess a great amount of patience. They point out that several states (including Israel) have turned to the UN multiple times until they were accepted as members, and the Palestinians plan to do the same. If America will use their veto, the Palestinians plan to submit another application, and so on and so forth, until they are accepted. They believe that this is an historical process that cannot be stopped and that September 2011 marked the beginning of a new era in the Palestinian political struggle. The Palestinians believe that momentum is on their side and they are not afraid of a political confrontation with Israel or the United Sates. They plan to maintain their tactic of turning to the international community and conducting a diplomatic struggle in parallel to non-violent protests. They feel that they have nothing to lose.

An international Intifada, not a Palestinian one. The Palestinians paid a heavy toll during the second Intifada and they are not searching for another round of violence. They believe that the UN bid will benefit them far more than another Intifada and that the Israelis are afraid of a third Intifada, regardless of the fact that Palestinian leaders have discounted this possibility. In fact, no significant violent confrontations broke out in September. Instead of Palestinians launching an Intifada against Israel, the World is doing it for them. Israel finds itself increasingly isolated by the international community and is losing support among the countries of the region (Turkey and Egypt) as well as among its allies in the West.

There is no point in negotiating with Netanyahu’s Government. Two years ago, Fateh’s convention concluded that there is no possibility of reaching an agreement with the current Israeli government and that the Palestinian struggle for statehood should thus be conducted in the international arena. The Palestinians do not have any faith in Netanyahu and they view his policy proposals as a right-wing political battle with Lieberman. The Palestinians feel that there is no reason to negotiate just for the sake of negotiations. They are waiting for the Israeli Government to say what it wants and to make clear where it is heading to. It hasn’t happened yet.

There are alternatives, and they are less desirable for Israel. If no progress is made in the Palestinian bid for statehood, and if there is no progress in negotiations, then the two-state solution will become less popular among Palestinians. They have warned that Abu Mazen may decide to dismantle the PNA and promote the call for one-state. If Israel will push the Palestinians into a corner, a violent confrontation is not unlikely. It may start with demonstrations similar to those of the Arab Spring – perhaps with organized marches on Fridays towards the fence. The Palestinians feel that Israel is trying to force them into an alliance with Iran, despite the fact that the Palestinians oppose Iranian and Shi’ite attempts to meddle in the politics of the region. However, some said that if all other doors close, then the Palestinians might even decide to “deal with the devil”.

The problem is Israel, and Israel is at a disadvantage. Israel does not understand the changes that are happening around it. These changes are serving Palestinian interests, and not the Israeli ones. Israel is losing friends in the region and is no longer a central figure in determining regional processes. The question is not how much patience the Palestinians have before they turn to violence, but how much time Israel will wait before promoting a solution to the conflict. The deterioration is within Israel. Israel is changing from a liberal society to a less democratic and zealous society. It finds itself increasingly isolated internationally. Today there is no Palestinian leader that can be labeled an obstacle to peace. There is no Palestinian terror. The problem is Israel. There is terrorism from the settlers, which Israel does not control. The settlers are the ones that will destroy Israel and cause a violent explosion. The Palestinians do not understand how it is possible that Israel has refrained from halting the settler violence. Israel does not need to be afraid of a Palestinian state. It should be concerned from Iran. The solution to the Palestinian problem will first and foremost serve Israel, and will improve its regional and global standing. The establishment of a Palestinian state is in Israel’s interest, and there is a belief that about half of the Israeli public understands it, in contrast to the Israeli government’s policies.

The road to Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still long. Some believe that the Fateh-Hamas crisis is temporary, that the reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo will soon be implemented, that democratic elections are near, and that the division between the West Bank and Gaza is not really an obstacle to peace (based on claims that Khaled Mashal respects Abu Mazen’s non-violence policy, and declared that he will accept a final status agreement brought forth by Abu Mazen). Nevertheless, there is an understanding that without including Gaza it will not be possible to implement any Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and that the true Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still far away. The Palestinian people want Palestinian unity and it is possible that they will take to the streets to promote this desire. Abu Mazen is working to maintain Fateh’s power in Gaza, and does so through paying salaries to approximately 60,000 Gaza residents every month without them actually working. A majority of Abu Mazen’s budget is transferred to the Gaza Strip. Fateh believes that it is currently more popular in Gaza than Hamas, and would have gained a majority there should elections take place today. During Abu Mazen’s speech at the UN, Hamas did not allow rallies in support of him. They also threatened to shoot anyone that would demonstrate. Fateh instructed their supporters in Gaza to stay home. They did not want to agitate the situation.

In contrast, Hamas is perceived as being strong in the West Bank. It is allowed to act there as a political organization as long as it operates according to PNA law. Fateh does not directly oppose Hamas (Abu Mazen even met Hamas leaders from Nablus), but it does work to erode Hamas’ power. For example, all of Hamas’ welfare institutions in the West Bank were transferred to the PNA, which currently provides the West Bank residents’ social needs. Fateh has a dilemma in the West Bank, which impacts their ability to gain popularity over Hamas. Fateh veterans that used to be among Israel’s “most wanted” and were responsible for many terror attacks, are now looked at by the younger generation as corrupt officials that drive luxury cars and enjoy VIP permits to enter Israel. The youth are not aware of the militant past of these people, and the Fateh veterans cannot boast about their past because it will not be accepted by the Israelis with whom they cooperate today.

הפוסט Continuing on the Path to Statehood: The Palestinians Following their Septmember 2011 UN Bid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.