The Trump administration is said to have adhered to Obama White House policy of gradual withdrawal from the Middle East, a correct assessment as far as it pertains to the US presence in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The same cannot be said regarding its diplomatic and economic involvement in several key arenas, among them Iran, the Gulf states, US-Arab relations, including the Palestinian problem, Turkey and Libya.

The Trump administration was deeply involved in the Iranian nuclear issue, pulling the US out of the agreement with Tehran, imposing economic sanctions and ordering the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

Israel and the Gulf states welcomed the aggressive US policy on Iran, rightly perceived as a success story, given the country’s economic difficulties. However, freed from the agreement that tied its hands, Iran moved ahead with its nuclear program, amassing additional enriched uranium and developing sophisticated enrichment centrifuges, thereby shortening its breakout time. That is bad.

Iraq, too, remained high on the US agenda, given concern over Iran’s influence there. Trump continued Obama’s troop withdrawal policy to a large extent, but Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi visited Washington in August 2020 and US economic aid continued to flow to Baghdad.

Despite the troop drawdown, local protests against the US presence have intensified, especially since Soleimani’s killing. The US has adopted a variety of diplomatic and economic measures to undermine Iran’s influence in Iraq, but the pullout, which appears to include vacating the US Embassy in Baghdad, does not augur well for reducing Iran’s influence. That is bad.

Trump promised to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The “Deal of the Century,” the pretentious name chosen for his plan, came into the world after prolonged labor in January 2020. It was a unilateral blueprint designed to address Israel’s security problems but offering the Palestinians very little: a mini state bound by impossible borders. Their refusal to consider the plan presented the Palestinians as serial rejectionists. Truth be told, the Trump plan could not have served as a real basis for negotiations, because of its one-sided nature.

In fact, Trump lost the traditional US role as an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians, after a series of moves that included closing the Palestinian mission in Washington, slashing US aid to the Palestinian Authority, suspending aid to UNRWA, declaring the Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria “not illegal,” recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the US Embassy there. In moving the embassy, the broker handed Israel an important bargaining chip for free. From the Palestinian standpoint, this was both bad and ugly.

Trump, unlike Obama, restored the historic US alliance with the Gulf states and Egypt in recognition of their political and strategic importance in the Middle East, especially in the campaign against Iran. Strengthened US military ties with the Gulf states enabled the breakthrough in Israel’s relations with the Emirates and Bahrain. The signing of the peace agreements regardless of the Palestinian issue (other than suspending the annexation plan that had become moot in any case) paved the way for peace with Sudan, and perhaps with other states once the Biden administration is installed.

The launch of maritime border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon was also a welcome US initiative.

This is all good. However, it turns out that there is something of the bad in this good: the concept that Israel can make peace with Arab states without resolution of the Palestinian problem. The Arab peace agreements with Israel could have strengthened the US hand in promoting a solution to the Palestinian issue. While the US still holds a full deck (with Saudi Arabia and others possibly joining the initiative), its ace has undoubtedly turned into a jack (or less) in the diplomatic poker game.

Trump did not strive for achievements in Syria other than crushing the disastrous Islamic State organization, which he did with considerable success, including the October 2019 killing of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, Trump’s zigzagging policy on Syria left a vacuum that enabled renewed Russian influence and provided Turkey and Iran with footholds there. The gradual US withdrawal and growing Iranian influence in Syria forced Israel to intervene in order to prevent Iran from turning Syria into a frontline post. Obama shares Trump’s failure in Syria, which in any case is bad.

Trump’s Turkey policy was schizophrenic. On the one hand, he hosted President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in November 2019, viewing him as a global partner and adopting his policy on the Syrian Kurds, including the military campaign against them. On the other hand, Trump ignored the growing ties between Russia and Turkey and the sale of Russian S-400 antiaircraft missiles to Turkey. The US did not respond to this challenge posed by Turkey as a NATO member state, nor did it act to counter Turkey’s aggressive moves in Libya – both its military involvement there and the marking of a maritime border between Turkey and Libya, moves that could threaten the Mediterranean gas energy ambitions of Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus. That is bad.

IN THE final analysis, Trump’s Middle East policy was a failure, even though some in Israel regard it as a great success. It was not the result of a clear strategy or deep thought, except, perhaps, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan – but the thinking behind that was biased and flawed.

The election of a new US administration raises concerns of an accelerated US pullout from the Middle East in favor of a US diplomatic and economic focus on Asia. Martin Indyk, a senior adviser on the Middle East in previous Democratic administrations, recently argued that the US no longer has prominent interests in the Middle East since it no longer depends on the region’s oil, whereas Israel is sufficiently strong to take care of itself.

If this concern is borne out, that would be bad news. However, such a development could also result in boosting relations between Israel and the moderate Sunni states, united by their fear of Iran. It could also provide an opportunity for an Israeli-Emirati-Saudi initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the blessing of the United States.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 30 November 2020

הפוסט Trump’s Middle East legacy: The good, the bad and the ugly הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Incoming American presidents tend to adopt policies diametrically opposed to those of their predecessors in order to convey a change in direction. Often, this comes across as forced and unnecessary from a policy perspective. This time, that is not the case. Trump strayed so far from traditional American positions that it will be incumbent on Biden to reverse policy on many issues. In terms of personality and moral compass, the next President is also Trump’s polar opposite. These differences will manifest themselves on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

To renew peace efforts, Biden will have to update U.S. policy quickly. This means pulling back from Trump’s “deal of the century”, expressing renewed commitment to the two-state solution, opposing steps that undermine it and incentivizing those that encourage it. Biden will also have to reverse decisions by Trump that weakened moderate Palestinian leaders. He will have to restore, and even increase, suspended U.S. funding to the Palestinians (including to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations), re-open the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem (and not subordinate it to the U.S. Embassy in Israel), and invite Palestinian representatives back to their Washington mission shut down by Trump. A change in policies and reversal of decisions will enable the Biden administration to build trust with the Palestinian Authority and heal the rupture that Trump has caused. The U.S. will once again have open and effective channels of communication to both sides, allowing it to resume the role of mediator that it had played (not always successfully) for decades.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Israeli-Palestinian issue will not be a priority for the Biden administration. Many in the peace camp are therefore convinced that they should not nurture much hope, especially given the multiple domestic challenges facing the new administration. That might well be the case, but it is not necessarily inevitable. Pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians have a duty to make clear to the Biden administration the paramount importance of this issue. The obstacles to peace are piling up. Severe damage was done in recent years to the prospects for peace, damage that must be repaired. Israel’s right-wing government seeks to make a two-state solution unviable, and domestic trends in Israel and among the Palestinians do not bode well for peace either. Faced with this reality, the White House must make it clear that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is important and urgent, that resolution of the conflict is essential and feasible, and that enhanced dialogue and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is vital to achieve that end. Such messages, even if not initially accompanied by significant policy moves, would empower Israeli and Palestinian advocates for peace and will help reshape public discourse in Israel.

Yet another accepted view these days is that Biden will advance a multilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy. In adopting such an approach, the Biden administration will restore the Obama administration’s style of foreign policy, respond to the need for joint action in the face of the Covid-19 crisis, and work towards healing the transatlantic rift created by Trump’s defiant attitude toward the EU and NATO. Such a multilateral approach could be advantageous for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, especially if implemented in a more effective manner than Obama did. Although the U.S. is central on the global stage, it cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone. Previous US administrations recognized this limitation, but were hard pressed to act accordingly. While the U.S. spoke about multilateralism, and took certain steps in that direction, it was unable to change its pattern of independent action and its aspirations for sole leadership.

To implement effective multilateralism that advances peace, the Biden administration should first and foremost promote the formation of a new multilateral mechanism, in essence an updated version of the Quartet (formed in 2002, and including the U.S., Russia, the UN and the EU). Key European and Arab states would be invited to join this mechanism, which would have to engage with pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians who can articulate the needs of both peoples to the international community. Such a mechanism could formulate renewed international understandings on the parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement. This would require adapting previous policy documents initially drafted in the early 2000s (such as the Clinton parameters, the Bush roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative) to current circumstances. The multilateral mechanism could also lead to the formulation of an international incentive package for peace that would impress upon both Israel and the Palestinians the fruits of peace. Making the benefits of peace tangible and specific from the outset will boost political willingness and public support for achieving it. The international community has expressed support in the past for such a package, but no attempts were made to devise one under the Trump administration.

What did occur during the Trump period was a change in Israel’s relations with states in the Middle East. The Trump administration contributed to a significant strengthening of Israel’s ties with Gulf states, but did so by circumventing the Palestinian issue and weakening the Palestinian Authority. Biden should help Israel manage its emerging ties with the UAE and Bahrain, but in a manner that ensures advantages for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Israel’s ties with Jordan and Turkey, two countries with a direct bearing on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, deteriorated under the Trump administration. American investment in improving these relations could pave the way for additional opportunities for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation track in the future. And finally, a new regional organization was formed this past year in the Eastern Mediterranean — the Cairo-based gas forum (EMGF), of which both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are members along with several Arab and European states. Biden could leverage US engagement in this forum to advance economic and diplomatic Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.

Biden’s move into the White House will generate opportunities and hope for the Israeli-Palestinian context and beyond. Renewed U.S. involvement in advancing the two-state solution should be viewed with optimism. Israel must greet it with open arms, rather than engineering provocations such as an expansion of settlements. The measures that the Biden administration can and is expected to take during its term will not in themselves yield the hoped-for peace, but with tailoring and precision, they could serve as a positive and significant turning point, injecting new energy into efforts to advance it.

**The article was published by the Middle East Institute, 30 November 2020

הפוסט Biden could generate momentum for Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some thirty years ago, the battle of the giants between the United States led Western democracies and the Soviet Union had ended in victory. We woke up to a unipolar world, a brighter world where the only superpower was a liberal democracy, the City on the Hill. Some thought, and wrote, that this was in fact the end of history. However, we had realized very soon, how wrong we were.  As Christopher Layne wrote in his article, “The Return of Great-Power War”, (Foreign Affairs,  November/ December 2020). The incoming administration will have to live in a triple-headed global reality, with another super-power and a half, namely, with China and Russia.

This is not going to be easy. Indeed, economically speaking the US has the upper hand with a GDP of some $20,544bn, compared with China’s $13,608bn (according to the Economist 2021 edition of the Pocket World in Figures). However, the average annual growth of China’s economy in 2012-2018 was 6.9% whereas the US’s growth was only 2.4% in the same period.

In and of itself this is not intolerable, especially if one is to combine the US, the EU, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan into a group of like-minded liberal countries. Most of these countries have advanced creative and well-educated societies with accumulated economies of some $50,000bn. Their joint military strength exceeds that of China or of Russia. Besides, given the West’s superior technologies, the US and the West should enjoy a Qualitative Military Edge.

However, this situation calls for sound and sensible leadership, the kind of which was lacking in the last few years. The US and the EU drifted apart.  The UK, which was promised by Secretary of State Pompeo that, after BREXIT, America would be there for Britain, “pen in hand” to sign an Anglo-American deal, found out that it would be neither quick nor easy. In the Middle East, we also learned once more that there is no vacuum and wherever the US vacates an arena, someone else will take over. Look in Iran penetration of Iraq, or how Turkey and Russia becoming masters of Syria or how Russian mercenaries operate in Libya, to name but a few examples. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has practically enabled Iran to dash towards attaining weapon-grade capabilities, while the “maximum pressure” provided no solution to Iran’s subversive activities in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. It also created a rift betwee the US and its European allies.

Most of these developments resulted from faulty American leadership. It is true that the Trump administration had a major achievement in the shape of the “Abraham Accords” between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, for which we should always be grateful. We had also reached the formal American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, very few believe that the status of the Golan will not be challenged in future Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In the meantime, in our jubilant run towards the “Abraham Accords” with distant countries that we never had a war with, Israel and the US trampled over the Palestinian situation. This conflict will probably come back to haunt us. A sound American – and Israeli – Leadership would have thought about it ahead of time.

Thus, what the world needs now is resumed American leadership, as Vice President Biden wrote in his piece “Why America Must Lead Again” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020). What the world need now is a resumed American leadership, generous and sober, clear-headed and resolved, inclusive and sharing.  What we need is a responsible adult in our chaotic political life.

I recall a speech by PM Tony Blair in the US Congress back in 2003. He referred to a letter from an Idaho farmer who asked, “Why me? And why us? And why America?’ And the only answer is, said Blair, ‘Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do’.

I hope that American voters, while solemnly casting their votes today, will also remember their global role and responsibilities as well as the scorching need to put their own society in order.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 3 November 2020

הפוסט Resumed American Leadership, Perhaps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the vast majority of the 27 EU member states are led by Center-Right parties, almost all are privately rooting for Biden, who represents Center-Left views. That is not surprising. The Trump years have traumatized transatlantic relations, turning the US from the staunchest supporter of the EU into a confrontational, aggressive opponent.

Trump publicly supported Brexit, scrapped the transatlantic trade negotiations (TTIP) with the EU launched by president Barack Obama, started a trade war with Europe and withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also significantly undermined NATO to the point that French President Emmanuel Macron declared the organization “brain dead.”

On the other hand, Trump’s attitude toward President Vladimir Putin and Russia, the adversary that prompted NATO’s establishment, has alternated between friendly and ingratiating. The liberal order and values so dear to the Europeans have been damaged severely.

A second Trump term can be expected to continue undermining dialogue and coordination with Europe on many issues, including those related to Iran, Israel and the Palestinians. Trump’s presidency accelerated the ongoing decline of global US hegemony. As the US withdrew inward, regional stability continued to deteriorate. This was particularly evident in the Mediterranean: Russia entered Syria, Turkey entered Libya, and Iran spread its tentacles farther in the region. None of these developments benefits Israel. Moreover, another Trump term could cripple or bring down NATO, further destabilizing the region. Israel has an interest in a robust, significant NATO, given Europe’s inability to fill the US defense vacuum now or in the foreseeable future.

The Netanyahu government has benefited from the transatlantic crisis and Trump’s unilaterally supporting its positions (e.g. relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the Trump plan, which deviates from the ’67 borders as the starting point for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the pullout from the Iran nuclear agreement).

While a Biden presidency is not likely to reverse the embassy move, it would restore traditional US support for the two-state solution. The US and Europe would likely renew their dialogue on the subject, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer high on their list of priorities. COVID-19 and the economic downturn have drawn their attention inward, but on the other hand honed growing external threats, such as China.

China is a focal point of US global competition concerns. While Trump treated Europe like the proverbial bull in a china shop, his policy reflected a set of American interests marking China as the key challenge to waning US hegemony – this challenge will remain under Biden. Thus, although a Biden presidency would restore transatlantic relations to their pre-Trump format of cooperation, the agenda of the relationship will change. Europe will have to decide whether to espouse the US containment strategy toward China or try to reap the benefits of trade and mutual investment with Beijing.

Israel is a negligible player in this global game. Israeli regulation tends to follow that of the EU, its main import-export market. The US is therefore expected to keep pressing Israel and Europe to avoid strategic Chinese investment in their territories. If Europe joins forces with the US versus China – a more realistic scenario under Biden than Trump – Israel would obviously go along. However, if Europe opts for a different approach than the American one, Israel may be forced to make political choices it finds economically inconvenient.

As for the Middle East peace process, Biden holds a traditional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He opposes settlements and unilateral annexation, supports full security for Israel, calls for recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and has taken firm stands against terrorism, incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders. Biden views the two-state solution as essential to Israel’s survival. In that sense, neither he nor the Europeans seem inclined to new or alternative solutions.

However, here too, Trump leaves behind a situation requiring a difficult choice for the Europeans. The welcome normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE and, hopefully, the future agreement with Bahrain, represent a different paradigm that does not link Israel-Arab normalization with resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paradigm the order is reversed: Normalization first, peace with the Palestinians (maybe) later.

Although most Arab states do not share this Emirati and Bahraini approach (yet), Biden will have to consider whether to adopt it, revert to the previous route of peace with the Palestinians first followed by Israel-Arab normalization later or combine the two. The Europeans, too, will have to examine whether to change track or remain stuck in the logic of the Oslo process. There is growing criticism within the EU regarding its rigid position on the issue, given that the conditions that gave rise to this logic have long since disappeared.

In this context, Trump’s unseating would banish some of the ill populist winds blowing from the US to Europe, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also fanned by tightening relations with a-liberal leaders in states such as Hungary and Poland. But a Biden victory would not significantly bolster EU foreign policy given its deep internal weakness of recent years.

This weakness stems from internal European divisions that impede every substantive decision (other than the semi-annual renewal of sanctions on Russia over its Crimean Peninsula occupation). A Biden victory is unlikely to mend this structural weakness. Although EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and foreign minister Josep Borrell recently proposed doing away with the consensus requirement on certain foreign policy decisions, a move that would enable the EU to adopt resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that it has been unable to adopt since 2016, such a move is unlikely anytime soon.

Therefore, even when the populist criticism of the EU no longer enjoys an American tailwind, and even once transatlantic relations are restored, European foreign policy is expected to remain reactive, divided and weak. Will that help Israel? As a strategic Israeli asset, a robust EU is important even if it is perceived as a critical partner on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Should the EU want its voice to resonate louder on these issues with the top echelons in Jerusalem, ahead of a possible Biden administration foreign policy change, the Israel-EU Association Council should reconvene for the first time since 2012.

Foreign Minister Ashkenazi is already working with his German counterpart, Heiko Maas, to make this happen, and a Biden victory could help. Renewal of the Israel-EU high-level political dialogue would improve relations and hand the Europeans a tool with which to influence developments in the region. Otherwise, it will likely remain an onlooker.

** The article was published on Jpost, 2 November 2020.

הפוסט How will the post-election Israel-EU-US triangle shape up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This issue has been highlighted since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States and as radical voices on the left grow in volume across the nation, which seems to have caused an irreparable rift between Israel and U.S. Jewry.

הפוסט Israel, American Jews and the Democratic dichotomy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some two years ago, Democrats harshly attacked Trump for withdrawing US troops from Syria and thereby undermining the alliance with the Kurds. However, Democratic leaders also favor a reduced US presence in the Middle East and understand the region’s declining relevance to US global policy.  It was Democrat Obama who withdrew US troops from the Iraqi bloodbath; Biden, if elected, will presumably continue a similar course. The US is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil, China is perceived as its greatest threat, and the defeat of ISIS has lowered the strategic terror threat level to US national security.

Biden, just like Trump and Obama, probably believes that the US can downscale its presence in the region and rely on its allies (the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, of course) and on the alliances being forged between its partners over the past two decades. The US could increase aid to a specific ally at a time of need (as was the case with the massive 2014 influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan) or Iraq (during the fighting with ISIS), but it is loath to continue meddling in local conflicts. What is more, the painful lesson of the intervention in Iraq has dissolved the Bush Administration’s messianic belief in the democratization of the Middle East. Concern about Russia or China filling the vacuum left by the US is also no longer deterring US leaders (like Obama and Trump) who are trying to score points with voters by troops drawdowns and free the administration up to deal with different matters, among them the “Pivot to Asia”.

As a Democrat, Biden is expected to be more sensitive than Trump to human rights violations in the Middle East. He condemned the conduct of the Saudi regime following the murder of exiled journalist Jamal Khashoggi in fairly harsh language several times and also called for curbing weapons sales to Riyadh.

However, if elected, Biden’s first order of business will be dealing with the biggest health and economic crisis the US has experienced since 1929. He will have to create jobs and deal with thousands of burning domestic matters. Those will be his flagship issues. He may have to set aside his moral repugnance and allow weapons exports to prevent job and profit losses for Americans. Trump, too, was harshly critical of Saudi Arabia prior to his election, but subsequently changed his tune and conducted his first overseas trip there as president.

One can cautiously assess that any change in US policy toward the Gulf would not undermine Israel’s rapprochement with those states. The strategic regional threats (expansion of Iran’s hegemony and its violations of the nuclear agreement, as well as Turkish activity in the region) will remain unchanged, and therefore the interest in economic and security cooperation between Israel and Gulf states will remain. Arab states that traditionally view Israel as a bridge to the White House could try to exploit this now official relationship to promote their standing with Congress and a new administration, if one is installed.

Biden’s position on the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) is of concern these days to both Israeli and Arab leaders, which could further cement their ties. Arab leaders are concerned about Biden rejoining and reviving the deal that Trump abandoned. They are relying on Biden’s criticism of the unilateral US pullout from the agreement and his declaration that he would make every effort to rejoin it. Nonetheless, Biden’s people seem to understand that they cannot simply turn back the clock. Blinken, one of Biden’s closest aides and potential future national security adviser, has said in interviews that the US would not return to the agreement until Iran fulfills all its commitments – meaning, until Iran walks back all its violations of the agreement. It is hard to predict just how Biden might draw Iran to the negotiating table, but as long as such an option is viable, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states will have sufficient grounds to close ranks.

Biden is a sworn supporter of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He is expected to re-open the US Consulate in East Jerusalem, restore US aid to the Palestinians and invite the PLO ambassador back to Washington. However, this does not mean that he will place the Palestinian issue on his list of priorities, especially given the domestic crisis and ongoing tensions with China. The Palestinian issue is unlikely to return to center stage following a change in the US administration. The Arab world is growing increasingly weak as the coronavirus continues to spread, the economic crisis deepens and unemployment rises. Arab states also fear that the major non-Arab states in the region – Turkey and Iran – will exploit this weakness. Should that happen, the Palestinian issue is unlikely to attract much interest from key Arab states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, which also dictate the conduct of the Arab League.

That said, should Biden decide to revive the Arab Peace Initiative and mobilize Saudi and other Arab support (perhaps in return for a more determined US stand on Iran, the supply of US strategic weapons, etc.), pressure on Israel over the Palestinian issue could re-emerge. If Israel chooses to respond with accelerated construction in the settlements, in defiance of US policy, states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE would likely toe the line of the US administration but would not cut ties with Israel as a result.

In conclusion, a Biden victory would not affect the strengthening relationship between Israel and Arab states, especially if he opts to focus on the Iranian issue and a US return to the JCPOA. The Middle East’s relevance to the US is expected to continue its decline, prompting cooperation among its partners in the region in order to forge a robust front and repel threats from the non-Arab states (Iran and Turkey). A changed US approach to the Palestinian issue could increase pressure on Israel slightly, but is not expected to substantially change the current dynamics.

**The article was published on Modern Diplomacy, 29 October 2020

הפוסט Israel, the Middle East and Joe Biden הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But whoever wins, Jerusalem can’t depend on a United States, in the process of withdrawing from the Middle East, to safeguard its strategic interests. Israel must find other ways to advance its goals, most critically in relation to an expansionist Turkey.

When, in mid-October, Israeli and Lebanese officials met for the first time in three decades to start resolving their ongoing Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary dispute, some overeager media outlets hinted that the two acrimonious neighbors were the next candidates on track for normalization.

But this was no Trump-initiated miracle or frantic pre-election political theater. Rather, the American-mediated talks were the fulfilment of persistent U.S. diplomatic efforts and engagement over the course of a decade.

No matter who sits in the White House, the U.S. remains committed to supporting eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation and the diffusion of maritime tensions. Facilitating such cooperation is a rare point of bipartisan consensus in Washington and is likely to continue regardless of who wins on November 3rd.

But America’s wider engagement and commitment to the region is fraying.

For Israel, compensating for a fading American presence requires a reboot of its regional policies and level of engagement, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, which now has unprecedented economic significance.

Over the last ten years, Israel has sought to maximize the economic and diplomatic potential of its offshore natural gas. In September 2020, Israel signed a charter alongside Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus to formally establish the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a multinational organization dedicated to boosting regional energy cooperation.

But a decade’s progress was scuttled in 2020 by the collapse of global energy prices following the coronavirus outbreak, and by rising tensions between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.

While the next U.S. administration can’t solve these commercial challenges, it can play a constructive role in conflict management, as the breakthrough in Israel-Lebanon negotiations demonstrates.

The primary dilemma for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean is Turkey’s challenge to the regional order. In an effort to expand its influence, Turkey has aggressively pursued its own, independent policies in the region.

Ankara’s confrontative agenda is partially driven by its need to push back against the success of the Gas Forum. From a commercial perspective, Turkey would have beeen a natural partner in this organization. But Ankara’s relationship with Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus is too strained for it to be a member.

Recent elections in Northern Cyprus saw an Ankara-backed candidate edge out a moderate incumbent president, which is almost certain to add to tensions with Cyprus and Greece.

And rather than pursue dialogue, Turkey has directed its navy to test the limits of EMGF member states and ensnare its neighbors in a cycle of maritime brinkmanship that will ultimately scares off foreign investors.

Over the summer, European countries, such as France and Germany, stepped up to address Turkey’s activities, but without success.

The Trump administration adopted an ambivalent position. On the one hand, it called Turkey out for violating Greek maritime space. Yet U.S. officials made no offer to mediate between the two parties, nor has there been an attempt by the White House to broker a grand bargain between Turkey and the region’s other actors.

This muted approach can be explained in part by the complex nature of U.S.-Turkey ties, and Trump’s desire to maintain a good rapport with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey is a NATO member whose actions are increasingly inconsistent with American and transatlantic interests.

הפוסט Will Biden Help Israel Take on Turkey? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US policy on the peace process was relatively consistent over the years, with certain shifts of emphasis by different administrations and differences in the extent of US involvement. The Trump administration, however, has adopted several decisions testifying to a significant shift and departure from traditional US policy since 1967, and especially since the start of the Israel-PLO peace process in the 1990s.

הפוסט What does the US election have to do with Middle East peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The U.S. Elections and the Future of the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.