Greenblatt was appointed shortly after Trump’s election victory and initially it appeared both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were willing to work with him. During his first months on the job, Greenblatt met several times with Palestinian President Abbas and other senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, even visiting a Palestinian refugee camp and meeting with Palestinian and Israeli students and religious leaders. At first, he also tried to promote cooperation between the sides and was involved in the contacts on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal that resulted in understandings between Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi and the Head of the PA’s Water Authority Ghuneim. However, these first steps were upended with a series of Trump Administration measures against the Palestinians, starting in late 2017. These included the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, aid cuts, shuttering the PLO office in Washington and departure from the twostate principle – all of which led to a complete and unprecedented rift between the US administrations and Ramallah. Greenblatt became the first US Envoy in the annals of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who lost contact with one of the sides and the ability to serve as a broker.

At that point, rather than taking advantage of his position to calm tensions and to try and restore trust and to facilitate dialogue with the Palestinians through back channels, Greenblatt actually sought to escalate the crisis and exacerbate the public verbal and media conflict with the Palestinians. He did so in contravention of the basic principles of mediation, which every first-year student of international relations learns. Greenblatt began facing off against various Palestinian representatives on Twitter, and tweeted blatant attacks on the Palestinian leadership. His remarks also disavowed the basic principles of the peace process. He spoke, for example, about Israel’s right to annex territories, and expressed disregard for the international resolutions on the conflict. The photos showing Greenblatt taking a hammer to breach an ancient tunnel under the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, at an inauguration ceremony of the “Path of the Pilgrims” that was organized by the Elad organization, was a jarring final note that faithfully reflected the direction in which Greenblatt had taken his role. The much-touted Trump peace plan (dubbed “the deal of the century), over which Greenblatt had labored with Kushner and Amb. Friedman, has yet to be unveiled, with its publication date put off repeatedly, whereas the economic component of the blueprint, which the US team presented in Bahrain, failed to leave its mark.

Despite Greenblatt’s inexperience when he took over his position, he did have several levers of influence he could have used, chief among them the personal ties and trust with President Trump. He also enjoyed the initial willingness of both sides to cooperate with him. However, his mission has come to a crashing end with the unprecedented rift between the US administration and the Palestinian side and his inability to play any significant role in the different issues and aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. We do not know, yet, the reason for Greenblatt’s decision to step down, but it undoubtedly illustrates the pointlessness of the measures to achieve the “deal of the century”, thus far. It will be interesting to see whether Greenblatt’s departure signals a change in approach and policy or whether the remaining Kushner-Friedman team will adhere to the current policy guidelines.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Resignation of Jason Greenblatt, the Peace Envoy Who Did Not Broker הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip is one of transferring the responsibility for the situation over to the “other side”: be it Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the international community. The argument’s essence is: “we are here and they are there”, and Israel therefore claims that it is neither its business nor its responsibility to find a solution. This kind of policy is certainly not appropriate for a country responsible for the humanitarian needs of Gaza, and in doing so Israel is burying its head in the sand. There is no escape from advancing a clear and courageous Israeli strategy towards the Gaza Strip. The guiding point of departure should be that the problem is at our doorstep and it does not really matter whether we are right or wrong. The reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which occasionally comes up as “a necessary alternative that demonstrates Israel’s heavy hand and preserves its deterrence”, is contrary to Israeli interests. It is not without reason that Israeli governments, including the outgoing one, refrained from using this alternative. After all, it is preferable to deal with a rival such as Hamas, even if it is a non-state actor with an extreme ideology, rather than deal with chaos or the rise of even more extreme groups. In the end, after an extensive military move, Israel will likely face the same dilemmas, only at higher cost.

Israel should essentially be interested in preventing a comprehensive escalation in the Gaza Strip and attain a long-term ceasefire, as part of an economic-humanitarian arrangement, while preserving the option to move forward with the peace process, eventually leading to a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement. The proper way to achieve these two objectives is through a broad international initiative, that also includes Israel and other regional actors, for rebuilding the Gaza Strip. This initiative should address the main problems involved: the lack of infrastructure, primarily the shortage of electricity, the water problem, the collapsing health system, high unemployment, and the isolation from the world. It is obvious that the familiar counter-arguments immediately emerge: such a move will strengthen Hamas, the PA will oppose and jeopardize the agreement, Hamas and other organizations will continue smuggling weapons, and finally, it is not clear who will pay for such an extensive rebuilding initiative.

While these arguments are indeed legitimate and correct, at least partially, we should not use them to block all initiatives, or else the problem will remain with us. Currently, the peace process is stalled, and both sides are deeply skeptical about the prospects for its renewal, also due to the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, it should not discourage us, and perhaps even serve as a catalyst for action. Even in the view of Israel’s right-wing government, which is not particularly troubled by the political deadlock and does not seem to be concerned with the renewal of the peace process, a move to rebuild the Gaza Strip must be a major interest.

The proposed outline should include the following components: (a) an Israeli initiative to formulate an international plan – a sort of “Marshall Plan” – for the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip; (b) a rehabilitation plan to be led by the international community, that will include an economic-financial mechanism to support Gaza and provide a political umbrella; (c) involvement of the PA in the implementation of the plan (but this does not need to be a precondition, should the Palestinian leadership refuse); (d) participation of Israel in the process, including in terms of allocating funds for its implementation; (e) formulation of an international supervision mechanism to prevent the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip.

The moral aspect should also lead Israel to take such action. Although Hamas is a non-state actor that is responsible to the serious situation on ground, Israel is facing a serious problem, for which it is partially responsible as well. The duty to protect Israeli citizens and the strategic security interests of the State of Israel are not in conflict with the need to acknowledge the harsh living conditions at our doorstep. Ignoring them seriously jeopardizes Israel’s long-term interests. Israel’s claim to be the only democracy in the region and an island of stability and pluralism obliges us to weigh the ensuing moral responsibility, and to initiate an urgent political-economic-humanitarian process to support Gaza. This will probably not be a perfect move, but a necessary one that serves a host of Israeli interests, and in any case its human and economic cost is lower than that of any other alternative.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Should Advance an International Initiative to Support Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements.

From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas – diplomatic, economic and civilian – haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and have not been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized.

In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries.

In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements – coupled with the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans – point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians.

The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan – in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas – serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given.

The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets.

According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market.

The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit She’an and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network.

This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing public relations efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing – economic and diplomatic – contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Crisis in Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.