Lebanon now has a leader after over two years of failed attempts to elect a president. Aoun is backed by the international bloc opposing Iran (primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France) and comes from the military establishment responsible for upholding the ceasefire with Israel. This is promising news – but realizing its potential depends also on Israel’s actions.

In the past year, Israel heavily struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s use of force during the summer and fall of 2024 – assisted by US mediation efforts – led the terror organization to agree in November to a 60-day ceasefire, relinquishing its commitment to continue fighting as long as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza. The weakening of Hezbollah also paved the way for the Syrian opposition’s successful campaign to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus, an ally of Hezbollah and Iran.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is one of the few diplomatic achievements that Israel has managed to secure since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack, and it bears significant importance.

Since the ceasefire began, rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has almost entirely ceased. Although many northern residents still do not feel secure enough to return home, public opinion surveys indicate that most Israelis support the ceasefire, support which is echoed by regional states and Israel’s Western allies.

Israel’s interest should be in making permanent this temporary lull in fighting and seizing the opportunities it presents – the weakening of Hezbollah within Lebanon’s internal politics and the gradual reshaping of Israel-Lebanon relations.

Doubts about the future

However, as the 60-day ceasefire period draws to a close, doubts are growing about Israel’s commitment to the agreements reached and to ending the fighting on the northern front. To achieve this, Israel must act wisely on both military and diplomatic fronts to best serve its long-term strategic goals.

Although Hezbollah has been defeated (in this round) by Israel, while weakened domestically, it has not been defeated in that arena and is working hard to maintain its assets and status. Hezbollah is an authentic representative of significant portions of the Lebanese population – as reflected in its representation and influence in Lebanon’s parliament. A survey published by an American think tank in early 2024 revealed that 93% of Lebanon’s Shiite population – about a quarter of the country’s inhabitants – held a positive view of Hezbollah at the time.

On the other hand, ahead of the recent presidential election, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate withdrew from the race to avoid a possible defeat, which would have signaled the group’s weakening.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon see an opportunity to shift the balance of power and have successfully worked to elect a new president since the ceasefire began, viewing it as a chance to establish new leadership in Lebanon that opposes Hezbollah and aligns with the West and moderate Arab states.

Despite its military strength, Israel has limited influence over Lebanon’s internal politics and should avoid actions that portray it as attempting to dictate processes or appoint leaders there – much as in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, Israel’s actions do create a context that impacts Lebanon’s internal developments. In the past, Hezbollah gained support beyond Lebanon’s Shiite community by presenting itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty against a powerful Israel. Now, Israel should use its military power cautiously to avoid reigniting dwindling public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should reduce its military footprint in Lebanon, including reported drone flights over Beirut. Israel should also make a special effort not to hit Lebanese army soldiers.

Formal apologies for any such hits, as Israel made in early December, are important signals to the Lebanese public.

According to the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army is supposed to play a key role in replacing Hezbollah, and Israel has an interest in empowering it. On a tactical level, continued IDF strikes on the Lebanese army would likely diminish its willingness to confront Hezbollah. Strategically, such actions could undermine Joseph Aoun’s position as he transitions from army chief to president.

In Lebanon, there are complaints about repeated Israeli violations of the ceasefire, with reports of over 1,000 such incidents since late November. This creates anger in Lebanon, portrays Israel as a heavy-handed aggressor harming civilians unnecessarily, and hinders the creation of mechanisms to promote shared interests between the two countries. Israel should stop these violations, in accordance with the self-determination clause mentioned in the ceasefire agreement, and cease the destruction of villages it has occupied in southern Lebanon. Israel’s current actions risk fueling support for Hezbollah and generating hostility among moderate factions in Lebanon, who could be crucial interlocutors in future efforts to demarcate the land border and redefine relations between the two countries.

Israel must learn from the experience of the First Lebanon War in 1982. Its swift military achievements then were gradually eroded when they were met with Lebanon’s complicated internal situation.

The Palestinian armed forces were exiled to Tunisia but were then replaced by an even stronger force, Hezbollah, which has become a strategic problem for Israel, partly due to its ties with Iran. We must not be blinded by Israel’s recent short-term military success. Lebanon is a complex and difficult country to influence, but the outcomes of the war have already sparked internal processes there that could align with Israel’s interests.

Israel must now avoid causing harm or disrupting Lebanon’s internal processes, express commitment to implementing the ceasefire – including withdrawing the IDF from southern Lebanon – declare its desire for a future peace with the Lebanese state, and invest diplomatically in expanding coordination and channels of communication with Lebanon, with the assistance of international actors such as the UN, the US, France, and Gulf states. This is even more important in light of the dramatic changes occurring in Syria, which are likely to shape the region’s future in the coming years.

Excessive and prolonged use of Israel’s military power against Lebanon could lead to the imminent collapse of the ceasefire, delay the return of northern residents to their homes, cause further harm to IDF soldiers, strengthen Hezbollah, increase hostility toward Israel among moderate elements in Lebanon, and erase Israel’s impressive military achievements.

Israel is now required to act wisely, both diplomatically and militarily, and not let the Lebanese opportunity slip away. The ceasefire must be implemented, preserved, and turned into a permanent arrangement.

The article was written by Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, and was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel Should Make the Ceasefire with Lebanon Permanent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Prime Minister Netanyahu devoted a significant part of the interview he gave on December 15 to Al-Arabiya, a Saudi television network, to explain that his main course of action will be to promote a move along the lines of the Abraham Accords, with Saudi Arabia.

He emphasized that an agreement of this kind will strengthen the firm regional stance against Iran, contribute to stability in the region, and even help advance a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It should be noted that this interview was done as part of an attempt on Netanyahu’s part – including in interviews he gave to American media – to calm regional and international public opinion about the composition of his new government. It is doubtful whether those efforts were successful, but the main and most interesting question is; can it be expected that such an ambitious move will actually take off?

Truth be told, the Abraham Accords, (it is likely that the UAE and Bahrain received a “green light” from Riyadh to sign) as well as additional steps on the part of Saudi Arabia (for example, giving permission to Israeli planes to fly over its airspace), will illustrate the changes that have taken place in the region in the last decade.

The main changes were: the consolidation of the perception of the Iranian threat toward the Gulf countries; a decrease of the Palestinian issue in the order of priorities among the countries of the region; and the feeling (whether accurate or more a perception) of erosion of the degree of American commitment to stand by its allies in the region.

It should be noted that a public opinion poll conducted in Saudi Arabia in November, published by the Washington Institute last month, brought up some very interesting findings. The survey included 1,000 respondents, who were all interviewed personally.

In relation to the US, for the first time in a decade, it was relegated to the third most important country for Saudi Arabia. Of the respondents, 57% rated relations with China as “important,” 53% thought the same about relations with Russia, and only 41% preferred to have a relationship with the US. At the same time, 73% of respondents defined the war in Ukraine as “having a negative effect on the region.”

The findings regarding Israel are no less interesting. 43% of respondents support ongoing contact with Israel (no details were given regarding this, but in recent times Saudi Arabia has hosted a senior banking conference with the participation of an Israeli representative, as well as hosting an Israeli team in an international sports event).

On the other hand, only 21% of the respondents believed that the Abraham Accords had a positive impact on the region. Furthermore, 90% of the respondents believed that the results of the elections in Israel would cause “negative results in the region.”

NATURALLY, PUBLIC opinion polls of this kind should be viewed very carefully, especially in a country like Saudi Arabia. Still, they do have the potential to give a sense of the general way of thinking on these matters. It should also be taken into account that the research institute in question is considered close to Israel.

It should be emphasized that Netanyahu highlighted in his interview with the Saudi television channel that he will work to strengthen US relations with its allies in the region. He also implied that he will take it upon himself, in one way or another, to work with the White House on relations with Saudi Arabia. It is no secret that the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has not been at its best in recent years, despite efforts by President Biden to restore it.

Either way, the questions which remain regarding the prospects for improving the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia are clear and understandable. From Netanyahu’s point of view, there is a great deal of logic in trying to promote this historic move, and to prove that it is possible to reverse the commonly held belief, that Israeli-Arab normalization can only be achieved in relation to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The Abraham Accords proved that this is possible, and an Israeli-Saudi agreement will provide the ultimate guarantee for this.

However, questions are focused, of course, on Saudi Arabia:

Will such a move indeed be perceived in Riyadh as serving Saudi interests?

Is there anything in it, in their view, to strengthen their position and deter the growing Iranian challenge?

Does Netanyahu have the ability to deliver to the Democratic American administration, as their relationship is not great to say the least?

And does Saudi Arabia feel that it has the ability to bypass the Palestinian issue once again, without harming its regional position, and especially stability in the internal arena?

Indeed, there are many questions, to which it is clear that there are no reliable answers, certainly not at this stage. By the way, Netanyahu was asked several times during the interview with Al-Arabiya, whether Israel would act against Iran, even without American backing or consent. He failed to provide an explicit answer, as expected, but mentioned the operation that brought the Iranian nuclear archive to Israel. The same was asked in relation to the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative, and not surprisingly, a clear answer was avoided.

It is worth mentioning in this context that in the past, during Netanyahu’s previous government, speculation abounded concerning Israel’s willingness to give a bigger role to Riyadh in Jerusalem and the Holy Sites. However, these questions during the interview illustrate the issues that both interest and trouble the Saudis.

FROM NETANYAHU’S point of view, there is solid logic in marking this as the main course of action in the “political plan” he is outlining for his new government. It can also be assumed that he sees Ron Dermer, who was a central figure around the Abraham Accords, albeit with the Trump administration, as an essential factor in this context.

Still, it is not clear how it will work, if at all, with a Democratic administration in the White House and especially after the damage Netanyahu’s previous government caused to Israeli-US relations.

As for Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, he would prefer to wait and see which policies the new government in Israel will implement, especially when taking in consideration its unprecedented character. It remains to be seen how the Palestinian arena will react, especially when Mahmoud Abbas’s PA is in crisis.

Moreover, King Abdullah of Jordan’s interview just a few days ago in which he emphasized his kingdom’s role in the Holy places in Jerusalem, indicates how sensitive and acute the issue of Jerusalem is, not only for Israel, but also for the Arab world as a whole, not least because of the Saudi ambitions for a central role there.

Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount on Tuesday only serves to increase tensions.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 8, 2023

הפוסט Is a formal Israeli-Saudi agreement achievable? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the expected steps for the day after, mainly to avoid a crisis of expectations on both sides of the border.

For Lebanon

In the immediate time frame, it should be expected that the agreement will make it possible to complete the gas supply, which has been discussed in recent months, from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon. As remembered, this step was not completed since Washington did not give adequate guarantees to the parties concerned (Egypt and Jordan) that the agreement does not violate the existing sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. Presumably, the U.S. delay in providing the appropriate guarantees served also as a means of pressuring Lebanon to complete the agreement with Israel. Although the deal will not solve Lebanon’s energy problems, it will alleviate the severe current crisis in the country concerning electricity supply.

The agreement with Israel sends a positive message for Lebanon but does not provide an immediate answer to its economic woes. It remains to be seen how the Lebanese government will handle with the IMF and the World Bank’s demands for reforms before approving vital loans to Lebanon. Significant reforms will oblige the ruling elite to take political-economic measures, which it can be assumed is not enthusiastic about doing so. The public should play a central role in Lebanon and the international community concerning the required reforms in the face of a corrupt and unpopular ruling elite.

In the near-medium term, Lebanon will seek to take advantage of the agreement to join the energy market. The French energy company TOTAL committed to start drilling in the Qana field immediately. It is essential to mention the other partnerships in this field: the Italian company ENI and the Lebanese government. The latter regained the share held by the Russian company NOVOTEK (estimated at 20 percent). According to various reports, the Qatari gas company is interested in entering the Lebanese market and acquiring this share (as well as some more percentages from the French and Italian companies).

It is extremely important to align expectations in these initial stages, on the part of the Lebanese government (and the French company). After all, it is a potential for gas and oil, but it must be found.

It can be assumed that following the agreement with Israel, Lebanon will seek to speed up energy activities in all its economic waters. Lebanon has completed the first round of tenders, but this has so far yielded only one drilling, which has not produced any proven resources. It is to be expected that Lebanon will seek to promote the second round of tenders, which has been postponed several times, and build on the positive atmosphere that the agreement with Israel projects. Either way, it is a long process, albeit one with more promising potential, given a more stable political climate.

For Israel

Israel is in a completely different situation. It has already harnessed the gas discoveries in its economic waters for significant political-strategic gains and at the economic-energy level. The agreement will remove the question marks hanging over the Karish field’s development – not concerning its being in Israel’s economic waters – but in removing a volatile potential of instability or escalation.

The question of the reserves that will be found in the Lebanese Qana gas field (which is shared by both countries) depends, as mentioned, on the drilling that will be carried out by the French company. Although future revenues for Israel should not be underestimated, this is not a significant economic element that will change the national situation from Israel’s point of view. Its political importance, which concerns the manner of implementation of the agreement with Lebanon, increases immeasurably.

An interesting and vital angle concerns the Israeli-Cypriot dispute over the joint Aphrodite-Yishai gas field. The failure of the two countries to reach an agreed mechanism still stands and more emphasized considering the Israeli – Lebanese agreement. This is a highly relevant point, precisely in view of the growing attractiveness of the East Med for Europe (following the war in Ukraine), and the regional dynamic following the Israeli – Lebanese agreement.

For the Regional Geopolitics

The agreement between Israel and Lebanon projects a regional calming, due to the potential for escalation that lay in the failure of the American mediation. The potential for Lebanon to join the regional energy system is complex and will take time. Lebanon will have to make difficult decisions in the face of the impressive regional array that was built in recent years thanks to the energy discoveries. There still stands an open invitation for it to join the regional gas forum (EMGF), but Israel’s membership is obviously a serious challenge. The first step could be to join as an observer. In any case, it is likely, or hopefully, that positive results of the expected drilling in its economic waters will force Lebanon to follow a constructive and beneficial path. It’s anticipated that Lebanon will move on to conclude agreements on its maritime borders with Syria. It should be expected that Syria will not adopt a speedy policy, partly (or mainly) to the Russian angle. The Lebanese – Cypriot agreement that Lebanon hasn’t ratified will need further discussion. It remains to be seen how the “new commers” will take a (positive) advantage from the proven regional potential of the last decade.

For the International Arena

The importance of the Israeli – Lebanese agreement for the international arena, and the U.S., in particular, relates to two key aspects: neutralizing a potential for escalation in the region; and a positive message regarding the formation of a Western energy front against Russia, even if the prospects for energy implementation look quite a few years ahead. The trilateral MOU between Israel, Egypt, and the European Union, signed last June in Cairo, illustrated the attractiveness of the Eastern Mediterranean for Europe. The Lebanese – Israeli agreement fits well into this.

Conclusion

It would be fair, even realistic, to exercise great caution concerning the positive potential arising from the agreement. Its main test lies in its implementation and the way the two parties, as well the U.S., which bears a responsibility that should not be overstated, will deal with difficulties that will obviously arise.

At the same time, both sides’ hard decisions are not self-evident. This is especially evident in the Lebanese arena, with so many players who have generally proven that they cannot overcome their different interests and needed an unprecedented political-economic crisis to bridge the gaps between them.

Similarly, Israel recognized this window of opportunity and made complex decisions, in difficult political circumstances (pre-elections), which produced restlessness in the domestic arena. The preference for the diplomatic path, and the recognition of the extraordinary meeting of interests with Lebanon, provide Israel with many meritorious points.

The United States has again demonstrated its great vitality in the region, precisely at a time when it is perceived as reducing attention to the region.

By the time it will be clearer if this agreement was a game changer in a complicated and challenging region, and what lessons could be taken for other players in the region.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in the Transatlantic Policy Quarterly.

הפוסט The Israeli – Lebanese Agreement: The Day After הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the deep crisis in Lebanon, which has been unable to establish a new government following the Beirut Port explosion, the relevant players, including Hezbollah, have now realized that talks must be renewed and an intensive effort must be made to reach agreements. This would convey a vital and positive message given Lebanon’s collapsing economy, although clearly it would take quite a few years before Lebanon could reap the benefits of maritime gas reserves in the currently contested area. For now, the coronavirus and its impact on the global energy market have put a dent in gas-exploration investment in the region.

The main obstacle to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement has almost always stemmed from Lebanon’s complex political arena with its multiplicity of domestic and foreign players. However, the Lebanese now understand that resolving the dispute with Israel is vital to tapping the energy potential of their economic waters, allowing international energy companies to proceed with gas-exploration plans, specifically in the area known as Block 9 adjacent to the contested waters.

Given Lebanon’s current severe crises, conditions are ripe to achieve agreement. The September 2020 signing of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) charter likely also made it clear to Lebanon – which is not a forum member – how far behind it is compared to the other states of the region, intensifying its desire to move ahead. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a figure acceptable to all sides, especially Hezbollah, is leading the negotiating process for Lebanon.

The Americans have in the past presented the sides with an informal proposal for resolution of the maritime dispute, which Israel agreed to accept, but to which Lebanon did not respond. According to various reports at the time, the proposal favored the Lebanese side in suggesting that more than 50% of the disputed area be recognized as belonging to Lebanon. The importance of an agreement for Israel, even if it means even greater concessions in the upcoming negotiations, would be to defuse an explosive issue in relations with its northern neighbor. It would convey a positive message to its partners in the Mediterranean Basin, although Lebanon is not expected to join the EMGF immediately even if agreement with Israel is reached.

Despit reports of imminent negotiations, it is too early to pop open the champagne. Negotiations by their very nature are rarely straightforward, even if the current circumstances appear promising. What is more, Lebanon is crippled by its fragmentation and abundant and harmful foreign influences. Nonetheless, the proactive US mediation and involvement of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are encouraging. The timing of the negotiations, on the eve of US presidential elections, would also be advantageous to the Trump administration, especially if significant progress is achieved in the coming month. Lebanon had consistently demanded UN involvement in the mediation, while Israel only wanted American involvement. The eventual decision to hold the talks at UN headquarters in Naquora, Lebanon, appears satisfactory to both sides.

It is essential to keep in mind at this point that the negotiations relate only to the maritime border, nothing else. Neither side intends to discuss land border disputes or additional issues. Nor are these talks linked to Israel’s recently signed agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and obviously not to an Israel-Lebanon peace accord. Israel would do well to avoid referring to such prospects that would only complicate matters for the Lebanese players and intensify domestic and external pressures to avoid agreement with the “Zionist entity.”

These developments are not directly related to the growing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon and Israel have always wanted to resolve the maritime border issue. Nonetheless, progress on the Israel-Lebanon front would likely have a positive effect on the climate in the region and could help efforts to ease Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey is presumably closely monitoring these “winds of reconciliation,” given its growing involvement in Lebanon in recent years, and examining the possible implications for its interests.

Thus, while discussion of peace is not on the agenda, a successful conclusion of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations is important. To that end, Israel would be wise to focus on professional energy discussions with Lebanon, in which agreement seems feasible, and avoid imbuing the talks with broader diplomatic dimensions as some political elements might be interested in doing.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israel-Lebanon negotiations: cautious optimism but no bells of peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The main challenge concerning a provisional government taking steps of this magnitude regards Israel’s fundamental definition as a parliamentary democracy. Israel’s government serves by virtue of the trust granted to it by a majority in the Knesset. Clearly, transitional governments which do not have a Knesset majority do not enjoy this legitimation of their power.

That is a point that opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has been trying to hammer home, in the context of his wider campaign against interim Prime Minister Yair Lapid before the November 1st elections. There is no doubt that both politicians are trying to maximize profits from their bases on the Lebanon border issue and to present the other party’s position as illegitimate.

As it stands, the maritime border deal helps Lapid to establish a public image as the confident prime minister who doesn’t shy away from confronting hard decisions for the sake of unprecedented gains – for example, Lebanon’s de facto recognition of Israel’s existence. Netanyahu, in response, frames Lapid’s negotiating tactics as a treacherous selling out to Hezbollah.

Even if it is crystal clear that Lapid is trying to leverage the emerging agreement with Lebanon to shore up his stature among the electorate, that does not undermine the contention that this negotiation is vital to Israel’s national interest. But Lapid must provide prove its necessity during this sensitive period, a month prior to the elections, both by public diplomacy, by cabinet ratification and by government legal advice.

Can a caretaker PM conduct international negotiations?

This article is from “Haaretz“, from October 9, 2022

הפוסט Does Israel’s Prime Minister Have the Right to Strike a Deal With Lebanon? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As is well known, Germany relies very significantly on the supply of gas from this pipeline. Simson warned that no further steps should be ruled out, even with immediate notice. All this was intended to sow uncertainty, contribute to instability in the European energy market, and concretely prevent Europe from filling its gas storage facilities.

It is especially important to emphasize the great effort that is now being invested in supplying the emergency storage facilities. Today the storage facilities stand at a level of 56 percent, a historic level that has not existed to date. Moreover, Simson warned that not all EU countries are acting with the same intensity, and therefore called on all to act vigorously. Obviously, the capacity to fill the storage facilities depends, to a critical extent, on the amount of gas that Europe manages to purchase and transport to its territory.

The most important player now in the European energy market is the USA. The latter provided a quantity of 12.8 billion cubic meters until last May, which accumulates to an annual quantity of 28 bcm(!). This means European dependence on American (liquified) gas. This is not necessarily problematic; however, it is clear that this is a new variable in the global energy market in general, and in the US-European one in particular, and it may have significant political-strategic implications. Clearly, what needs to be taken into consideration is the Biden administration’s interest in dealing with rising energy prices at home ahead of the mid-November elections.

It is essential to emphasize that European emergency measures are intended on one side of the equation to reduce, albeit gradually, dependence on Russian gas; and on the other hand, no less important, ensure enough energy for the winter. This is a complex equation, which Russia will do its best to disrupt.

In her remarks, Simson called for a series of measures designed to encourage gradual savings in gas use in preparation for winter, emphasized the importance of supplying storage facilities, and listed the steps taken to diversify gas sources to Europe:

• Norway – Reached a joint statement aimed at increasing gas supplies to Europe;

• Israel and Egypt – Mentioned the MoU signed recently in Cairo for the export of Israeli gas to Europe through Egyptian liquefaction facilities; Azerbaijan – Work is already under way with Baku regarding the possibility of doubling the amount of gas transferred via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

In conclusion it is essential to emphasize:

• European activity to make a strategic change of direction in the energy field is impressive. The EU is implementing extremely complex moves, in particular complicated circumstances;

• Dependence on American liquefied gas is intensifying and certainly significant. It has implications for the transatlantic relationship and, as stated, imposes a responsibility on both parties to meet this equation.

It is quite clear that Russia will try its best to disrupt these moves, perhaps in supply disruptions, and also that it is counting on the fact that energy prices are rising; moreover, Russia is counting on the uncertainty and instability for the winter, which will have an impact – i.e. perhaps crack down on Western solidarity, especially considering support (mainly weapons) to Ukraine.

Global energy prices will continue to be high under these conditions. Even though President Biden succeeded in persuading the Saudis and the Emirates to increase productivity, it is not a matter of being able to add insignificant quantities to the global energy market.

This article is from “Ekathimerini“, from August 19, 2022

הפוסט Europe’s efforts to quit Russian gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

This article is from “JPost“, from May 23, 2022

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics- energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

The op-ed was published in The Jerusalem Post on May 2022.

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics-energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If So, How Do We Proceed From Here?

First, it is crucial to remember that the two countries came to the intersection from different directions and with different expectations. The past few months, Turkey has initiated a series of moves aimed at improving relations with countries in the region, including Israel, Egypt, and Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. There are a number of reasons for these attempts, including a number of issues with the economy, its current regional status, considering increased cooperation within the region over the past few years, and upcoming presidential elections. Turkey has succeeded in warming up diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, to a certain extent, with Saudi Arabia, and now with Israel as well. President Erdogan’s comments at the joint press conference with President Herzog emphasized his desire to open up a new chapter in relations, but they also well reflected his expectations: cooperation with Israel and rapid progress in the energy sector, and, most concretely, Israeli gas exports to Turkey. Israel has reached this political crossroads from a different direction. As a result of the new regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean and the Abraham Accords with the Gulf states, Israel has a convenient position from a strategic and political perspective. In this regard, the agreements to export gas from Israel to Egypt and Jordan, as well as the establishment of the Regional Gas Forum (EMGF), are compelling examples. Israel has always seen Turkey as a very important regional player with whom improving relations is in Israel’s interest as well as in the interests of the region. During the last decade, there have been significant changes in the relations between Israel and Turkey: the mutual interests that used to exist have diminished and weakened, and trust between the two countries has declined substantially. As a result, President Herzog’s visit and the return of political dialogue at the highest levels mark a positive and refreshing step forward. This state requires careful and measured conduct, as well as the necessary coordination of expectations, to avoid disappointment, or crisis, from the beginning.

From an Israeli point of view, two non-trivial challenges are required at the political level: building trust between the two governments and re-formulating the meetings of interests between the two countries. This is a complex, but certainly possible, process that requires strenuous work in the near term. It is obvious to both parties that cooperation in the energy field requires agreements on the economic level (price of the gas, rout and other expenses), but more importantly: on the political-strategic level as well. In other words, this is not just an ordinary economic product, but one that is extremely important in its political foundation, some would actually call it a precondition. In light of the circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean, and in view of the deep disagreements, it seems that this is an issue related to sovereignty for key players in the region, including Turkey. It cannot be ignored. As part of Israel-Turkey’s political dialogue, it is important to discuss the recent institutional developments in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean in a serious, comprehensive, and honest manner.

Israel has already emphasized that its relations with Turkey won’t be developed on the expense of those with Greece and Cyprus. The same is considering its relations with Egypt. The inclusion of Turkey within the regional exercise is of a vital importance and necessity, but let us be honest, this is a real challenge, which requires a creative dialogue, and as stated, on the base of renewed trust. It is an achievable task.

The war in Ukraine poses a serious challenge to the international system in general. In our case, Israel and Turkey are each faced with complex dilemmas in this regard, and for the most part, there are considerable similarities in the way they deal with and debate it. It is of vital importance for both of them to analyze what kind of common understanding could arise for them facing this enormous crisis.

Thus, the two countries are at a crossroads of fascinating and promising opportunities. The renewed dialogue should be conducted calmly and sensibly, despite the troubling times and the urge to move forward quickly in order to avoid premature crises. By the way, returning ambassadors to the two capitals is a necessary first step, and one that doesn’t cost too much.

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in April 2022.

הפוסט President Herzog’s Visit to Turkey: How to Proceed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The most ambitious structure is, of course, the Regional Gas Forum, which was founded in January 2019 with 8 members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy, Palestine, and France, and two observers – the European Union and the United States. Lebanon was invited to take part in the creative project, but Israeli membership and the complex internal-external arena in Lebanon prevented the move, that was quite clear that the Lebanese had a genuine interest in. Truth be told, the player who was absent from this political-strategic process – Turkey – was, to a considerable extent, the “glue” that helped formulate this impressive architecture. Moreover, its uniqueness stems perhaps from two main aspects: one, pertains to substantial encounters of interests, identified between most of these actors; and the second, it is a regional framework that the initiative to establish was from the region and without linkage to any conflict, with an emphasis of course on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, at the beginning of 2022, the East Mediterranean is facing an improved base, with proven potential for cooperation, but at the same time is facing a double challenge: how to deepen cooperation between its members; and how to produce an open and positive dialogue with the missing player – Turkey. Initially, it seems an impossible task, especially given the fact that the Turkish policy in recent years is seen as provocative by most (if not all) other players in the region. On the other hand, it is now clearer for Turkey and its adversaries, that an intensive and creative effort needs to be made to create a mechanism or some framework, that will allow for a political-strategic dialogue contributing to stability in the region. Turkey has felt uneasy and resentful, in the face of its exclusion from regional frameworks, and in recent months has tried to improve its relations with few countries in the region – Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The difficulties at home, in the economic and political arena, play a significant role.

So, is it possible to find meeting points that will enable for a comprehensive process in the East Mediterranean, despite the deep disagreements between many actors? Clearly, this is a challenging task, one that may have been doomed to failure from the beginning. However, in view of the danger of escalation and miscalculation, in a region prone for that, it is necessary to try producing a political discourse that will help the dynamics that have already been cast in the region.

First, we should have in mind four main insights:

Many countries in the region have rightly recognized the promising potential that developments in the region have created and managed to produce close relationships. These now seem obvious, but this was not the case a decade ago. The Israeli – Greek – Cypriot Triangle is a clear example of identifying correctly the common interests arise, adopting the necessary policy to build a solid and close trust, and deepen their bilateral and as well trilateral relations. Similar process was taken between Israel and Egypt, bilaterally and regionally.

The regional process, described above, was largely led by the countries of the region themselves, in a way that showcased the potential and significance of the region for the International Arena.

The Abraham Accords have created a potential common denominator between (some) of the Gulf states and those of the eastern part of the Middle East. Although it is too early to judge whether it will be possible to find practical meetings of interests that will strengthen the cooperation between the two sub-regions, it seems that the potential exists. The arithmetic political framework in the East Med may be adopted to some extent: how about an Israeli – Emirati – Turkish triangle, not overriding bilateral channels, trying to build trust and identify common spheres for cooperation.

The discoveries of natural gas were a catalyst for the collaborations created but could equally drag the area into an escalating tension. However, what turns out, at least for the time being, is that the potential for energy cooperation is mostly regional. This can, albeit with immense difficulties, produce interesting interface points. Not to mention the great potential for cooperation on renewable, much needed field for creative and practical solutions, and less contentious.

Beyond that, it is worth adopting two main principles, which will help create an improved understanding:

The rules of international law as a main principle that should dictate the moves of all players in the region. A major point of contention between Turkey and all other players concerns the principles adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This will not be easily resolved of course. However, Israel, for example, is not a party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it agrees with its provisions and follows them, and was able to reach to agreements with its neighbors (though not yet with Lebanon) regarding their economic zones. In other words: even if it is (very) difficult to bridge the disputes in the region in this context, interim agreements, or informal understandings, should be found considering the overriding principle of respecting international law.

There is no a zero-sum game when it comes to relations between the countries of the region. Naturally, disagreements will remain in place at present stage, and meetings of strategic interests will also remain between some, or most, of the players in the region. This does not mean that one relationship should be conditioned, practically or rhetorically, on another. Israel has already made it clear that improving the political dialogue with Ankara will not come at the expense of the extremely close relationship and trust achieved with Greece and Cyprus. This will require considerable political maneuverability, but it is possible and achievable.  The key insight that emerges from the experience of the last decade in the Eastern Mediterranean is fascinating and challenging; it has been shown that countries in such a complex and multi-conflict region have been able to identify a strategic window of opportunity, overcome disputes and mistrust, and establish a promising regional framework, which is indeed at the beginning of its path. This challenge continues to be at their doorstep, creating a constructive discourse that develops paths for understandings and collaborations, even if not necessarily accompanied by the guise of a ” love affair.”

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in February 2022.

הפוסט Regional Architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities at the Current Crossroads הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Surprisingly, Washington clarified its position in the past few days. The United States (US) Embassy in Athens issued a statement on January 10th that confirmed previous reports in the Greek media regarding a US withdrawal from support for the project. The statement said the US was diverting its support towards the planned connection of power cables between Egypt and Greece (and Africa), as well as the cable between Israel, Cyprus and Greece: “These projects will not only connect vital energy sectors, but will also help prepare the region for a transformation to clean energy.” At the same time, “the United States has remained strong in its support for efforts to promote regional cooperation, including in a three-plus-one framework, which includes Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the United States.”

It is probable that the main reason is due to the obvious impracticality of the project. As well, it should contribute to reducing tensions in the region, given the Turkish position. At the same time, US economic interest should not be ruled out, since its preference might be to sell more liquefied natural gas to Europe than it does now.

As mentioned, there was not much enthusiasm for the pipeline in Europe either, even though the EU funded a feasibility study. Already at the end of October 2021, a source in the European Commission defined the project as complicated and inconsistent with the long-term goals towards green energy.

What are the implications of the current American position?

It is quite clear that at this stage, it means freezing the project. It should be remembered that the main importance of the pipeline was political-strategic all along. It was an illustration, albeit a very pretentious one, of the triangle formed between Israel, Greece and Cyprus, and the energy potential of the region for Europe. This potential has been a significant catalyst for multiple common interests in a variety of fields. The Israeli-Greek-Cypriot triangle has also made a significant contribution to the regional architecture built in recent years, especially with the establishment of the Regional Gas Forum in January 2019. Actually, the Cypriot Minister of Energy is the current president of the forum, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.

Moreover, the regional export alternatives of natural gas have been established in recent years in the region (export agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan) and through the liquefaction facilities in Egypt. In other words, the practical feasibility of the EastMed pipeline has diminished, even without the EU’s green agenda.

Will this undermine the political-strategic cooperation in the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot triangle? Will the American-Hellenic relationship, which has become very close in recent years, be damaged? The answer to both questions is no. In many ways, the pretentious project of the gas pipeline accomplished its strategic mission.

Presumably, of the three countries participating in the project, Israel, Cyprus and Greece, the latter is the most disappointed. Israel is at the most advanced stage in terms of utilizing its gas reserves and Cyprus has managed to sign agreements with Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon (although the latter was not yet ratified by the Lebanese parliament) regarding its economic waters and has discovered gas reserves in its territory. Cyprus is in a frontal and extremely complicated confrontation with Turkey; however, it is a complex issue that shall not be discussed here. Greece has not been able to settle its deep and complex disagreements with Turkey over economic waters and is not close to it.

Nevertheless, the alliance formed between Israel and the Hellenic states is immeasurably more important than the feasibility or discontinuation of a project of this magnitude. The common interests, values and trust built between the three countries are one of the cornerstones of the regional relationships of the last decade.

Admittedly, Egypt is not upset with the US clarification, since it emphasized its prime attraction as an energy hub.

Ankara is clearly satisfied with the US position. It will strengthen its position even though it faces challenging obstacles, mainly a lack of confidence with most of the relevant actors in the region.

Nevertheless, the challenge of stabilizing tense relations in the eastern Mediterranean basin remains. It requires a more assertive US policy, which does not appear to be so now. An interesting test concerning US policy concerns the Lebanese angle: Will the gas supply from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon actually materialize? It seems that it will, especially after the US guarantee in recent days that this deal will not be harmed due to the sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Will the US mediation in relation to the Israeli – Lebanese maritime borderline materialized? The question marks are much bigger. It remains to be seen in the coming few weeks.

**The article was published Jpost, 30 January 2022

הפוסט The EastMed pipeline accomplishes its strategic significance הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s alternative to two-state solution is apartheid regime הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

International energy companies comprehended the situation quickly, especially regarding the COVID-19 crisis and the shift in global priorities concerning the fight against the climate crisis. The Biden administration gave it a much higher priority once it entered the White House. The energy companies successfully branded the natural gas as transition energy and promised to divert significant budgets to renewable energy. Their conclusion is that it is imperative to develop alternative and clean energy sources for the benefit of future generations. However, until we reach a stage where we can rely on them to a safe extent, there is no escape from relying on transition energy, which pollutes less than other energy sources, such as oil and coal.

The new government in Israel is trying to embrace this change in global priorities. To the climate summit in Glasgow in early November last year, Israel sent a high-level large-scale delegation, which included Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, the energy and environmental protection ministers and a long line of representatives from the business, political, civil, and academic communities. Israel, whose environmental performance is not outstanding, to say the least, declared through the prime minister that it pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050 and gradually stop using coal by 2025. As well, Bennett called on the Israeli business community to mobilize its creativity and innovation in favor of innovative technological solutions to tackle the climate crisis.

Energy Minister Karine Elharrar has also adopted these latest highlights. Last month, the minister made it clear that new gas exploration will be frozen over the coming year in favor of investment in renewable energies. Her aim, she explained, is that 2022 would be the year of renewable energies. Truth be told, this does not materially change or harm Israel’s energy security. The existing reservoirs, the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, combined with the Karish and Tanin gas fields that are in development will meet the needs of the local economy for years to come. The change in emphasis in minister Elharrar’s remarks ensures a new, committed, and challenging direction of investing in renewable energy and in her words, “this year we will be centered in renewable energies in order to create the right energy mix.”

In this respect, the criticism leveled at the minister from various directions (energy companies, economic commentators, and so on) is out of place. This is a one-year freeze, designed to help the energy, business, and political attitude adjustment required. Presumably, the minister was exposed to the new regional architecture, and internalized its strategic importance and implications during her meetings with colleagues from the region (Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus). An important achievement should be seen in the tripartite agreement signed between Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, regarding the supply of desalinated water from Israel in exchange for solar energy to be produced in Jordan. Its test will be, of course, in its application.

Is it possible that Elharrar’s message suffered from unsuccessful branding? It is very possible and likely that her previous comment, “we have become accustomed to 100% gas, and that will not be the case now” did not sound positively in some relevant circles and to some degree of justice. Essentially, it is not a question of stopping the searches for new gas, but of promising a change in the dosages to which we have become accustomed. This is required and corresponds with the political-energy reality in the international arena. Time will tell if and how it will be realized. By itself, this is a worthy promise.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 17, 2022

הפוסט Is there room for coexistence between energy and safe environment? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The close relationship forged among Israel, Greece and Cyprus lies at the heart of this new regional architecture. The three countries correctly identified, with impressive speed, the emerging strategic opportunity and the bilateral and trilateral relationship has since developed at dizzying speed. The convergence of interests was translated into quick progress in forging relations at the highest levels. All three capitals were seized with a sense of urgency in striking while the iron was hot, both in light of tangible congruent interests, as well as concern that the window of opportunity opened by the chill between Israel and Turkey could soon close.

The flourishing Israeli-Greek-Cypriot relationship spans a variety of aspects. In terms of diplomacy, it facilitated the promotion of ties with the European Union (EU) and the US; in terms of security, it manifested itself in joint military maneuvers and defense contracts; economically, it resulted in the development of tourism, technology and innovation. It also manifested itself in energy-related issues with the development of offshore gas fields, a proposed gas pipeline to Europe and a link between their power grids. Cooperation on substantive civilian matters is just as important, among them education, research, and remembrance of the Holocaust and of the camps for displaced Jewish survivors on Cyprus prior to the establishment of the state, and more.

The successful Israeli-Hellenic model paved the way for other trilateral partnerships on the Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian axis and even on the Greek-Cypriot-Jordanian one. In January 2019 it served as a catalyst for forming the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which was an authentic attempt by its member states to form a regional cooperation framework. The forum consists of eight members – Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and France, as well as two observers – the EU and US. The potential for energy cooperation was obviously the driving force for the creation of this forum, but over time most of its members seem to have developed relationships of trust,

A look at developments in the Eastern Mediterranean also highlights the tightening relationship between Israel and Egypt. The convergence of Israeli strategic interests with those of Egypt has generated impressive cooperation at the highest levels, which has expanded from the traditional security relationship between the two sides to the economic one, as well. Israel supported Egypt’s efforts to establish itself as a leader in the regional gas forum and it continues to cultivate cooperation and constant contacts in managing the Gaza arena. Nonetheless, the successful diplomatic-economic cooperation has so far failed to trickle down to the public level of Egyptian society.

The continuing chill in Israel-Turkey relations has had a key impact on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. While economic ties between the two countries are unaffected, high-level diplomatic contacts have been severed and the embassies are headed by second-tier diplomats rather than ambassadors. Turkey perceives the Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance and regional gas forum architecture as confrontational frameworks aimed at its isolation. Ankara made a certain effort to improve relations with Israel before the Biden Administration took office, but the move failed mainly because neither Turkey nor Israel displayed true willingness to bridge their differences. There has been a marked deterioration over recent years in the shared interests that bound these two countries together in the past, and Israel does not feel the need to invest too great an effort in strengthening ties with Ankara given current circumstances.

To round out the snapshot of relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, we must look to two additional members of the new regional framework – Jordan and the PA. Israel’s relationship with Jordan has experienced serious tensions and crises in recent years. In a welcome development, the new Israeli government is clearly making an effort to turn the page in relations with Amman. The Mediterranean framework could provide an additional arena for Jordan’s inclusion in a comfortable regional architecture, especially given Israel’s natural gas export agreement with Jordan that has gone into effect.

The EMGF is a multilateral cooperation framework that also brings together Israel and the PA. It can be used to advance shared projects of mutual value, including but not limited to energy issues, which could contribute to long-term trust and ties between the sides.

The past decade in the Eastern Mediterranean is an Israeli foreign policy success story in many respects, providing many opportunities. Nonetheless, Israel must be cognizant of the challenges it faces in this arena.

• Tensions between Turkey and states in the region. Ankara is clearly displeased with the new regional architecture. Feeling isolated, it has adopted an assertive and even aggressive policy manifested mostly in its attitude toward Greece and Cyprus and intervention in Libya. Although the sides do not appear interested in an escalation, its potential exists. It is therefore incumbent on these states to explore how they can integrate Turkey in some manner in the regional network. After all, Turkey is a highly significant actor in the Mediterranean and even beyond. Bringing Turkey into the fold is a challenge for the US and EU no less than for Israel. A dialogue with Turkey that directs disagreements to the negotiating table remains a vital need.
• The climate crisis. The Eastern Mediterranean is defined as a global hot spot for climate crisis implications. The wildfires that swept throughout the region recently offer just one illustration of the challenges ahead for the region, along with water shortages, declining fish stocks, political instability, waves of migration, intrusive species and more. Along with the challenges, the climate crisis also offers a unique opportunity for vital cooperation between the states of the region. The EU and the Biden Administration have placed the struggle against the climate crisis high on the international agenda. This issue should also be placed high on the regional agenda, including the obvious focus on renewable energies.
• Lebanon’s instability. The severe unprecedented crisis in Lebanon appears intractable, with the country facing imminent collapse. The involvement of external actors, chief among them Iran, greatly hampers efforts to unravel the domestic entanglement. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on marking their economic waters could, perhaps, project favorably on the collapsing Lebanese economy and ease tensions, but current conditions clearly preclude any compromise. Israel would do well to consider use of the new regional system to help boost Lebanon’s stability, while keeping a low profile on the matter.
• Strengthening dialogue with the EU: The discovery of natural gas reserves and consolidation of the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct region have enriched the dialogue vis-à-vis Europe. The future of proposed gas exports to Europe is uncertain, but there is clear potential for boosting Israeli-European discourse and cooperation on a myriad of economic and civilian issues. It is important to take advantage of the new regional potential to improve the EU’s image in Israel, as well as Israel’s image in European public opinion.

Time will tell whether Israel is successful in taking optimal advantage of the emerging Mediterranean architecture on its doorstep. Israel, which struggles with multiple identities and affinities (Western-European, Middle Eastern) could perhaps feel more at home in its Mediterranean identity and use it to advance integration and cooperation for its own benefit and that of all the actors in the region.

הפוסט Regional architecture that should be promoted in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Without getting into the political-social complexities that await us and the new government, it is worth reminding Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and Defense Minister Benny Gantz of several foreign policy principles that even the polarized incoming government can accept. Several basic truths bear repeating:

1. Israel’s natural place is among liberal democratic states. In recent years, Israel has strengthened its relations with increasingly authoritarian regimes (in Hungary, Brazil and other countries) with which it appears to feel quite comfortable. Israel’s strength lies in a combination of shared values and long-term interests, and not in short-term interests alone. True, our liberal friends are often critical of us, but since when does Israel fear criticism.

2. Relations with our strategic ally, the United States, must be mended quickly. Israel’s intimate relationship with the Trump Administration damaged ties with the Democratic Party and undermined its standing in the American public arena where it had always enjoyed impressive bi-partisan support. President Joe Biden is a true friend, but he does not operate in a vacuum. So are the diverse streams of the American Jewish community.3. Now more than ever, Israel needs a diplomatic initiative, one that highlights the positive rather than the negative. Israel should strategize to peacefully integrate into the region and the international arena in general. The required initiative would be based on international principles and resolutions that have been acceptable to all Israeli governments, such as the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Bush Administration’s “Road Map”.

This initiative must take into account the dramatic changes in the region over the past decade, including the achievement of the former government in normalizing relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The Arab Peace Initiative, sponsored by our new unofficial friend Saudi Arabia, could provide a sound basis for reshaping the face of the region in a manner that serves Israel’s national security.

An iron principle guides Israel’s foreign and defense policies: initiative conveys power and foresight, even if the path is rough. Initiative preserves room for maneuver and favorable public opinion at home and abroad.

4. A diplomatic initiative that attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no matter how tough and complex, creates momentum. This in itself, if managed wisely and responsibly, creates hope, a vital component of any conflict resolution, and especially welcome on the international stage that cries out for positive signals relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Momentum does not mean naiveté, but rather a sober understanding of what can be expected of a state such as Israel. This translates into the launch of a diplomatic dialogue on all levels between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The prolonged absence of such a dialogue, and the deeply rooted narrative according to which Israel does not have a partner for dialogue, have generated a deep and understandable feeling of mistrust among Israelis. A change of atmosphere, the conduct of meetings and dialogues will ease this skepticism and boost trust. And who knows, it might even lead to agreements and concessions. The success of such a diplomatic process with the Palestinians is hardly guaranteed, but it is vital. The “Guardian of the Walls” operation proved yet again that the Palestinian issue is alive and kicking.

5. Strengthening the Foreign Ministry. The coalition agreement refers to the importance of strengthening the foreign policy component of Israel’s national security and it must be translated into action. The Foreign Ministry is a professional organization tasked with the conduct of Israel’s foreign relations. Diplomacy is a distinct profession, and diplomats are the unchallenged experts in dealing with the region and the international arena. Their voice must be heard, even ahead of the defense agencies’ voice. This principle has been eroded greatly in recent years, despite its crucial importance for Israel, given the unique and complex challenges it faces. Bolstering diplomacy and foreign policy must also be translated into budgetary allocations. We are talking about negligible sums, not to mention almost ridiculous, out of the state budget.

6.“Hasbara”, Hebrew for public diplomacy, is a corollary of policy. We tend to buck this basic truth: The State of Israel is a regional power – diplomatic, military and economic – but it is also a state that occupies Palestinian disputed territories. Rather than perceiving the high expectations of Israel as an unfair outrage, we should view them as a compliment.

Adopting these principles will bolster Israel’s standing and position far more than the many entities engaged in “Hasbara”, mostly without any coordination.

**The article was published on ynetnews, 20 June 2021

הפוסט A little friendly advice for Bennett and Lapid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) established in 2019 could be one such alternative. Its founding members were Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Jordan, Greece, Cyprus and Italy. France joined subsequently as a full-fledged member while the US and European Union remain observers. Lebanon was invited to join at the outset, but it rejected the invitation in light of Israel’s membership in the forum – despite the natural gas potential in its economic waters that has attracted the interest of some of the world’s biggest energy companies.

At the same time, negotiations between Israel and Lebanon have had their ups and downs, with Lebanon seeming to undermine prospects for progress. Is there a creative, practical measure that could appeal to Beirut and at the same time serve Israel’s interest? Its purpose would be to integrate Lebanon into the regional architecture taking shape in recent years in a manner conducive to stability. Could observer status for Lebanon in the EMGF be a feasible and desirable option?

The easiest and most immediate answer would seem to be “no”. How could Lebanon make such a decision given the complex political situation it faces? The multiplicity of actors, domestic and external, most of them driven by contradictory interests, cannot enable the (many) decision makers to take that path. On the other hand, observer status would allow Lebanon to keep a safe distance from membership in a forum of which Israel is a member but at the same time provide it with influence and benefits given the growing importance and relevance of this grouping.

Would this benefit Israel?

On the plus side, it would serve to connect Lebanon to a relevant and worthy regional framework, thereby drawing it into constructive activity vital for the region, in general, and for Israel. After all, Lebanese gas (and oil) reserves, if discovered, would contribute to the regional potential and aid in Lebanon’s rehabilitation. It would also constitute an addition, albeit indirect and partial, to the “wave of normalization” between Israel and Arab states created by the Abraham Accords, although this would have to be downplayed given the opposition of many elements in Lebanon to such an idea.

On the negative side, granting Lebanon observer status could introduce potential obstacles into a forum that has operated successfully over the past two years with almost no political landmines, except for the Palestinian veto of observer status for the UAE (and presumably this obstacle will soon be overcome through Egyptian pressure).

The key question pertains to the feasibility of such a move, and just as important to its potential effect on US mediation efforts between Israel and Lebanon. Given that Lebanon has not closed the door completely to renewed negotiations with Israel, and its interest in exploiting its economic waters, an invitation to join the forum as an observer could be perceived as serving the Lebanese interest. Some of the actors will try to thwart the move, presumably, but others could view it as beneficial, especially given the current circumstances.

Either way, sensitive and complex diplomacy is required, mostly behind the scenes. Washington could raise this alternative discretely. It could be tied to a desirable compromise over the maritime border, not necessarily as a stick or carrot, but as a complementary move serving the Lebanese interest. At the same time, Egypt and France, which holds significant sway in Lebanon, and perhaps even Cyprus, could contribute, each from its own perspective to this complex diplomatic undertaking.

As far as Israel goes, the potential advantages of such a move far outweigh the drawbacks. Israel should support the move – albeit quietly and discretely, as mentioned. The Lebanese will presumably have a hard time picking up the gauntlet, but who knows, they may surprise us all.

הפוסט Involving Lebanon in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanon, as we know, is mired in an unprecedented economic and political crisis. The political actors are unable to form a new government, given a complex web of interests and arm-twisting involving external actors, as is always the case in Lebanon. What, then, prompted the Lebanese decision to further complicate matters?

Several factors are involved. Complex interests, including (or especially) those of Hezbollah, compel Lebanon to present a tough, hawkish position vis-à-vis Israel, even one that contradicts its previous stand. Hezbollah pressure is reflected, for example, in the move by former minister of energy and foreign affairs, Gebran Bassil (President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law) blocking a compromise on formation of a government.

In the energy context, Bassil is unlikely to allow other actors to reap the fruit of an agreement with Israel, which could open up Lebanon’s energy market and send a positive message to the ailing economy (even if it takes years for economic dividends to materialize). Presumably, Iran is also reluctant to back progress in Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel in light of its attempts to renew the nuclear agreement with world powers and impending June presidential elections.

What is more, a somewhat noisy dispute has erupted in recent weeks between Lebanon and Syria over their maritime border. While the dispute is not new and has included appeals to the UN by both sides laying out conflicting interpretations of their rights, the issue has escalated recently over Syria’s contract with a Russian firm on oil and gas survey activities in an area Lebanon claims as part of its economic waters. The dispute has generated criticism of Syria in Lebanon and the foreign minister has insisted on negotiations with Damascus on the matter.

Some two weeks ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad reportedly called President Aoun to complain about the Lebanese criticism of his country. Given current circumstances, Lebanon prefers a “tough patriotic” stand vis-à-vis Israel than against Syria, especially since Russia has taken de facto control in recent years of energy rights in Syrian economic waters (and on land, too).

What does this all mean for Lebanese-Israeli negotiations? Is agreement between the sides still possible? Perhaps. An agreement remains of vital interest, especially for Lebanon. After all, Israel is already enjoying the economic and diplomatic fruit of the natural gas discovered in its waters, while Lebanon is facing a disastrous economic crisis. The latest confrontational move complicates things, but Lebanon might also see it as enhancing its room for maneuver in the no-holds-barred poker game with Israel.

Now, more than ever, US mediation must be restored in order to bring both sides into a more constructive framework. The Biden administration has already adopted an entirely different approach to foreign policy, prompted by its inward domestic focus. Renewing the shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Beirut is vitally important in order to avoid severing all contact and exacerbating tensions and, of course, in order to renew discussions albeit under less convenient and more challenging circumstances. But is this not the secret magic of negotiations?

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, April 28th 2021.

הפוסט Lebanon ups ante on maritime border with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The two countries leading this new mode of diplomacy are China and Russia, which are both trying to market their homegrown vaccines to, mainly, developing countries lacking the resources to obtain vaccinations or to countries that have yet signed agreements with western vaccine producers. China vigorously acts for obvious reasons: by delivering vaccines to developing African countries, and recently to developed countries also, china gains valuable credit points which will translate in the future to economic and political currency. Understandably, China also gains favorable public opinion coverage. China also joined the WHO’s COVAX initiative intended to assist in vaccinating developing countries. This comes at the backdrop of the US withdrawal from the WHO under Trump, and Biden’s announcement of its return. It was recently reported that Israel is harnessing the vaccines as a tool in its diplomatic toolkit, sharing the vaccines, according to reports, with a few countries. Among them, are countries that are intending to move their embassies to Jerusalem, such as Guatemala, Honduras and the Czech Republic.

The discourse of recent years, which weighs almost every issue in terms of utility, has pushed aside moral-social arguments and justifications which are perceived as testimonies for weakness instead of strength

However, what about the Palestinians in the West Bank? Does Israel need to ensure their supply of vaccines (not only to the Palestinian workers in Israel)? If so, after we established that “charity begins at home”, Israel must assist the Palestinians regardless of the vaccine diplomacy. Why is that you ask? For four main reasons: First, morally, after Israel ensured the needs of its citizens, it is appropriate that Israel helps its neighbors under its control, or at least under its influence, to deal with a global pandemic. It is in a time of need, that the true character of a country and a society is exposed. When it comes to the Gaza Strip, some have created a linkage between supplying vaccines in return for the Israelis held by Hamas. However, Aviram Shaul, the brother of the fallen soldier Oron Shaul who is still in the hands of Hamas, explained very well that Israel has a moral, religious and health-related interest in supplying vaccines to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip regardless.

Secondly, Israeli courts have clarified before that Israel has a legal obligation to take care of a population under its control. Once in regard to providing gas masks to Palestinians during the first Gulf War and second in regard to preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Some will also forcefully argue, with a great deal of justice, that the international law obliges Israel to do so.

Thirdly, from the point of view of ensuring the health of the Israeli public, it is necessary to vaccinate our neighbors with whom we interact. After all tens of thousands of Palestinian workers enter Israel and return to their family and environment daily and as we all know, the borders between us and Judea and Samaria are not sealed.

Fourthly, from a public relations point of view, it is clear that sharing vaccines with the Palestinians will serve Israel well in the international arena, both against public opinions and governments. The necessity of public diplomacy is well illustrated by the joke told on Saturday Night Live’s news parody, “weekend update”, that “Israel is reporting that they’ve vaccinated half of their population, and I’m going to guess it’s the Jewish half”.

The discourse of recent years, which weighs almost every issue in terms of utility, has pushed aside moral-social arguments and justifications which emphasize the necessity of values such as social solidarity, shared responsibility and the like. These, are perceived as testimonies for weakness instead of strength and righteousness. These notions are indeed discussed around the world, but it is precisely Israel – which often praises its capabilities and virtues to all of humanity to see – who must from time to time look at crises and epidemics with more humane eyes.

הפוסט “Vaccine Dealers” Have Forgotten Morality הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A key cooperation opportunity lies in the field of energy, and specifically alternative energy transportation methods from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the Mediterranean. On a December 2020 visit to Abu Dhabi shortly before leaving office, Former Trump administration Energy Department secretary Dan Brouillette met with his counterparts from the Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel to discuss energy security and the use of pipelines for gas exports. “If we can move natural gas to the coast of Egypt or the coast of Israel, then we’re moving it through the Mediterranean,” he said. He was referring both to the strategic aspect of such a move vis-à-vis Iran, and the importance of diversifying energy export routes from a sensitive region such as the Persian Gulf.

Following a visit to the Emirates in late January, Israeli Energy Ministry Director-General Udi Adiri issued a statement underscoring “the unique opportunity to develop the energy economy of both states and the entire region.” Adiri said his office was promoting a series of infrastructure projects designed to provide a connection to Europe, “and perhaps to Gulf infrastructure in the future. Electricity and natural gas projects will improve regional cooperation.”

It should be noted that the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company) signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2020 for the transportation of fossil fuel from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The fuel and oil products from the UAE will be shipped to a Red Sea terminal in Eilat and from there to the Mediterranean Ashkelon terminal for distribution to clients. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of the then-US Treasury Secretary and the Emirati Minister of Economy.

Reports and analyses have also emerged in recent weeks about plans for an overland pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. These plans have been denied, citing the high costs of such a project, but those involved in the plans appear to be seized with a spirit of creativity.

The diplomatic-strategic rationale is clear. Diversifying gas and oil export routes from the Gulf would reduce the total dependence on the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, strategic sea route considerably vulnerable to an Iranian attack. In other words, a pipeline running through Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian or Israeli coasts, as mentioned by the former US Energy Secretary, could change the regional energy map and the relationships between the countries involved.

For now, these ideas and plans are all only on paper. However, they have already generated clear concern in Egypt given their possible implications for the Suez Canal.

The head of the Canal Authority has expressed concern about linking the Europe-Asia pipeline to the Persian Gulf. In an Egyptian television interview (January 29) he noted that Egypt was examining ways to deal with the “Israeli-Emirati project” – as he defined it – that could significantly reduce traffic through the canal.

Income from shipping through the canal, it should be noted, is vital to the Egyptian economy, which has already been severely affected by the novel coronavirus crisis. Such plans could also undermine Egypt’s aspirations to become a regional energy hub.

AS PRECIOUSLY noted, the projects’ diplomatic-strategic rationale is sound. The congruence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel, largely based on fear of Iran, could be translated into the energy field.

Nonetheless, Israel has no interest in undermining its relationship with Egypt. Serious thought must be given to integrating Egypt or compensating it appropriately if that is not possible. From an American standpoint, diversifying export alternatives from the Persian Gulf fits its interest in energy security and does not appear to contradict the Biden Administration’s desire to return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

Nonetheless, these plans generate many challenges and question marks. Can the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia adopt such strategic decisions? Is the level of trust with Israel sufficiently high and stable? And if so, can it be preserved and survive future crises? What about the problematic implications for Egypt? And what about the tremendous costs of such an overland pipeline? And of course, what is the position of the new US administration?

In-depth thinking is required to examine the seriousness and feasibility of such plans. Clearly, the Gulf angle opens up a new horizon for relevant players.

Israel is at a strategic-energy crossroads, facing a new range of options. At a news conference (February 14)) alongside the visiting Cypriot president, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to regional cooperation in the post-Abraham Accords era, including energy cooperation. Netanyahu mentioned the UAE’s desire to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and reiterated the shared interest in the proposed East-Med gas pipeline to Europe. The Cypriot president presumably asked how the Gulf angle could be combined with the Hellenic one. As far as Israel is concerned, the two could be complementary.

At issue are strategic-scale decisions and projects. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated global economic uncertainty and cast a measure of doubt on the feasibility of these energy plans and the willingness of international energy companies to invest significant sums given the unclear post-pandemic economic picture.

Nonetheless, Israel is at a fascinating crossroads with significant room for maneuverability. It must ensure a close relationship with the Biden Administration, a necessary precondition for taking advantage of the maneuvering room it now has. The main obstacle for Israel is clear: to conduct itself in light of US plans to renew the nuclear deal with Iran, and to a lesser extent in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a manner that does not place it on a collision course with Biden’s Washington.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2021.

הפוסט Do the Abraham Accords open up new energy opportunities? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The US weakens and converges inward

The important recent change on the world stage was the American decision to reduce its international involvement and withdraw from its leadership position. This trend was evident in the past but gained momentum under Trump, who tended to adopt features of isolationism and who seemed to reject the burden of global leadership. Meanwhile, the international vacuum left by the US was filled by rival powers, chiefly Russia and China, pursuing a return to the multi-polar world order.

China’s global rise began before Obama took office, who respectively pivoted his foreign policy priority towards Asia, but it was Trump who lined-up China and the US on a collision path. Although economic in nature, Trump’s policy had far-reaching political and strategical implications. Meanwhile, Russia exploited the US absence in some areas to return its position to the days of yore. This is evident in the Middle East, more dominantly in Syria but also in Egypt and the Gulf.

What also allowed the illiberal powers to thrive was the EU’s economic and political decline, due to difficulties reaching the necessary consensus among the fragmented member-states to adopt a foreign policy, to the rise of populist leaders and to Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Additionally, the decline of America’s global standing and Trump’s heedless behavior in the multilateral arena, weakened international institutions built upon mutual values of cooperation and solidarity.

Geopolitical changes reshaping Middle East alliances

The events of the Arab Spring, which mostly failed to promote democracy, and the Arab world’s weakening as a collective, fractured the regional standings of most Arab countries and allowed Iran and Turkey to amplify their influence. Iran’s adoption of an aggressive regional policy in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, paved the way for most Sunni states to form an axis with Israel to curb Iran’s influence.

Although Turkey was not as successful in exploiting the Arab countries’ weakening, it remains an influential actor in several scenes and an important country that cannot be ignored. This is true in the Eastern Mediterranean, which attracted increasing global interests, and currently encompasses a battleground between Turkey and other countries but also a fascinating fertile ground for a weave of regional cooperation.

In light of the dramatic changes, the Palestinian cause was pushed aside and the Abraham Accords marked a paradigm shift for some Arab countries, no longer requiring a substantial advancement in the Israel-Palestinian peace process as a precursor for normalization.

Israel shows impressive political maneuvering skills

Israel internalized the regional developments and demonstrated considerable maneuverability in addressing them. It exploited the Arab world’s weakening and the Iranian threat, which also threatened the Gulf states, to improve relations with the Gulf states and even establish formal relations with some. The dialogue with Saudi Arabia has strengthened and at times was even publicly expressed. Simultaneously, Israel tightened its dialogue with Qatar, despite the bad blood between Qatar and the Gulf states, and institutionalized Qatar’s financial support for Hamas to prevent deterioration and preserve the status quo in the Gaza strip.

On the Syrian front, Israel established effective coordination with Russia which was essential after the US decided to withdraw its forces. With Egypt’s Al-Sisi, Israel established a close relationship based on mutual interests, despite the absence of normalization which stands out against the backdrop of Israel’s warming relations with the Gulf states and Morocco. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of an innovative framework for regional cooperation in the form of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, illustrates how much can be achieved with regional cooperation and the close relationships with Greece and Cyprus. Israel also tightened its economic relations with China, but it still needs to navigate the thin line between encouraging Chinese investments and American pressure.

Albeit, the Israeli government exploited the dramatic regional changes to distance the two-state solution, instead of advancing peace with its Palestinian neighbors.

Is there a vision alongside pragmatism?

The question is if Israel’s conduct infers a substantial, paradigmatic shift, or merely a successful “maneuvering skills” as it did before. It seems like it is too early to call Israel’s moves as a paradigmatic shift and much relies on how Israel conducts its relationship with the Biden administration. The entire international arena is gearing up for the new administration, the lion’s share, that of democracies of course, in a clear sigh of relief. Israel’s intimate alignment with the Trump administration and its clear stance on the Republican side, caused considerable damage to Israel’s position in American politics and internationally. The closeness and comfort that Israel felt with the outgoing president and his doctrine, and the publicity Israel gave it, severely damaged the value alignment that Israel shares with the Western-liberal countries, as well as with key parts of the Jewish community in the US. Now, Israel will be required to maneuver and change direction again.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, most central for Israel, the erosion of America’s global standing and its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, with Israel’s clear encouragement, raise many questions about Israel’s political sage in recent years. The international community is now required to renegotiate on an improved deal with Iran, which increased uranium enrichment levels, signaling a rigid bargaining position despite its difficult economic situation due to sanctions and the pandemic. A renewed and united international front against Iran will better serve Israel’s interests, than the sweeping opposition it has expressed to the previous negotiations between the powers with Iran.

The repression of the Palestinian issue and the ongoing creeping annexation do not eliminate the necessity for a solution to the conflict, rather they only distance it. It is precisely the improved regional and international circumstances in recent years, including some Arab countries’ inclination to promote normalization before resolving the conflict, or significantly advancing towards a solution, which should have been exploited by Israel to advance the peace process. Israel could have leveraged the improved regional understanding of its position to secure its interests, including security arrangements, territorial exchanges, or the refugee issue.

In recent years, Israel successfully adapted to the regional and international dramatic changes. But it is important that Israel’s sense of self-confidence, partially understood, will not delude Israeli decision-makers of Israel’s ‘natural size’. Israel should not be tricked into pursuing convenient policy goals and praiseworthy maneuverability, and instead, articulate a long-term vision based on peace agreements and regional cooperation.

הפוסט Israel Pragmatically Responds to Global Changes, <br> but Without a Vision הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The main obstacle to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement has almost always stemmed from Lebanon’s complex political arena with its multiplicity of domestic and foreign players. However, the Lebanese now understand that resolving the dispute with Israel is vital to tapping the energy potential of their economic waters, allowing international energy companies to proceed with gas exploration plans, specifically in the area known as Block 9 adjacent to the contested waters. Given Lebanon’s current severe crisis, conditions are ripe to achieve agreement. The September 2020 signing of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) charter likely also made it clear to Lebanon – which is not a forum member – how far behind it is compared to the other states of the region, intensifying its desire to move ahead. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a figure acceptable to all sides especially Hezbollah, is leading the negotiating process for Lebanon.

The Americans have in the past presented the sides with an informal proposal for resolution of the maritime dispute, which Israel agreed to accept, but to which Lebanon did not respond. According to various reports at the time, the proposal favored the Lebanese side in suggesting that more than 50 percent of the disputed area be recognized as belonging to Lebanon. The importance of an agreement for Israel, even if it means even greater concessions in the upcoming negotiations, would be to defuse an explosive issue in relations with its northern neighbor. It would convey a positive message to its partners in the Mediterranean Basin, although Lebanon is not expected to join the EMGF immediately even if agreement with Israel is reached.

Despite reports of imminent negotiations, it is too early to pop open the champagne. Negotiations by their very nature are rarely straightforward even if the current circumstances appear promising. What is more, Lebanon is crippled by its fragmentation and abundant and harmful foreign influences. Nonetheless, the proactive US mediation and involvement of Secretary of State Pompeo are encouraging. The timing of the negotiations, on the eve of US presidential elections, would also be advantageous to the Trump Administration, especially if significant progress is achieved in the coming month. Lebanon had consistently demanded UN involvement in the mediation, while Israel only wanted American involvement. The eventual decision to hold the talks at UN headquarters in Naqura appears satisfactory to both sides.

It is essential to keep in mind at this point that the negotiations relate only to the maritime border, nothing else. Neither side intends to discuss land border disputes or additional issues. Nor are these talks linked to Israel’s recently signed agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, and obviously not to an Israel-Lebanon peace accord. Israel would do well to avoid referring to such prospects that would only complicate matters for the Lebanese players and intensify domestic and external pressures to avoid agreement with the “Zionist entity”.

These developments are not directly related to the growing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon (and Israel) has always wanted to resolve the maritime border issue. Nonetheless progress on the Israel-Lebanon front would likely have a positive effect on the climate in the region and could help efforts to ease Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey is presumably closely monitoring these “winds of reconciliation”, given its growing involvement in Lebanon in recent years, and examining the possible implications for its interests.

Thus, while discussion of peace is not on the agenda, a successful conclusion of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations is important. To that end, Israel would be wise to focus on professional energy discussions with Lebanon, in which agreement seems feasible, and avoid imbuing the talks with broader diplomatic dimensions as some political elements may be interested in doing.

הפוסט Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Negotiations: Cautious Optimism but No Bells of Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The relationship between Israel and Turkey in the last decade (since the Marmara incident in 2010) is in an ongoing slump. The signing of the normalization agreement in June 2016, which settled the Marmara affair, did not restore confidence between the countries or trigger a resumption of high-level dialogue. It’s been two years that diplomatic representation in the countries has been at the level of a Chargé d’Affaires rather than ambassador, a partial indicator of Ankara’s response to the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem and what Turkey defines as sharp Israeli measures during clashes with the Gaza Strip.

In the past few weeks, there have been reports of attempts to thaw the relationship, for example with regard to the issue of economic water demarcation in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. It is highly doubtful that these reports have a solid foundation, and in any case, the chances of advancing such a dialogue are quite low.

The main challenge lies in the fact that it is difficult for the two countries to find mutual interests. Their deep disagreements center around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel’s possible application of sovereignty to parts of the West Bank (which exacerbates tensions on the Palestinian issue), and Ankara’s support for political Islam, whether in the Palestinian arena (Hamas) or in the Middle East in general.

Moreover, Israel has tightened relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt around a wide range of political, economic, and energy issues, and they are conducting regular dialogues at the highest levels. A fascinating illustration of the current array of forces is the Libyan arena: Israel has common ground with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and even Saudi Arabia in support of General Haftar, while Turkey and Qatar back the Islamic-supported national consensus government.

An important and perhaps restraining factor is the impressive trade volume that has continued between the two countries through the years. But at the same time, the potential for Israel to export gas to Turkey is slim considering the deep mistrust between the two leaderships, the pandemic-induced collapse in energy prices, and Israel’s growing relationship with Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt.

The prospects for improving relations between the two countries are low at present, given their deep differences of opinion and the absence of common political-strategic interests. Yet it remains important to continue to look for ways to restore political dialogue.

הפוסט DEBATE: How Serious Is the Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Now Is the Time for an Israeli Diplomatic Initiative, Not Annexation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious.

The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Development of the Marine gas field off the Gaza coast is a new element that could and should help in this regard. The development could take place under the auspices of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) established last year in Cairo. That would allow the sides to overcome the internal Palestinian political crisis stemming from the split between Hamas and the PA and hampering the development of the gas field. It could also resolve the severe crisis in the Palestinian energy sector and ease the economic hardship in the Gaza Strip.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious. The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas.

We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics.

An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism.

Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.”

The coronavirus crisis is a strategic crossroads for renewed solidarity, initiatives and cooperation in the regional and international arena. It therefore constitutes an opportunity for a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, which should be based on several layers.

1. Supporting others – Israel has achieved admirable progress in various fields. It is important to share the unique knowledge we have amassed and developed with neighboring states and with those further away. There is no need to keep boasting of Israel as a “start-up nation.” Instead, Israel should significantly expand its investment in foreign aid.

2. Highlighting opportunities alongside threats – The world appears to have internalized the “threat list” that Israel skillfully presented. Without making light of them, the array of opportunities presented in terms of joint interests with regional states in recent years should also be emphasized. There are numerous options for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, not only in response to threats but also in taking advantage of opportunities in environmental protection, water, health, immigration and energy, to name a few. The immigration crisis, for example, requires a joint effort to stabilize the situation, but also provides an opportunity for joint plans to address understandable concerns and help create a supportive rather than a threatening and argumentative climate.

3. Regional cooperation – Recent years have presented Israel with increased potential for regional cooperation. Israel took constructive steps to take advantage of this potential, but they must be deepened and extended to the broader region. While the Arab Spring did not generate the hoped-for democratization, it did create a more conducive foundation for cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as well as a sense of a shared fate vis-à-vis a variety of challenges.

4. Conducting an open dialogue with the Palestinians – Current events have underscored the necessity for tighter coordination and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the COVID-19 crisis to return to a format of broader dialogue – empathetic and deep – between the sides. Its outset is in facing the ongoing crisis; its aftermath is in examining ways to break through the impasse in the peace process.

5. Good neighborly relations with Europe – In recent years, Israel has focused on the criticism voiced by Brussels against its policies. The Israeli government took a confrontational approach toward the EU and regarded its weaknesses (prompted by economic, diplomatic and social challenges) as an opportunity. Israel must realize that the geographic, economic and cultural realities linking it to Europe are an asset and not a liability. Moreover, good relations with the EU do not contradict Israel’s strategic relationship with the US, even if they appeared to do so for a short while.

6. A foreign policy based on initiatives and vision – Perhaps most importantly, Israel must replace its defensive and blocking posture with a foreign policy that is proactive and that of an internationalist. Israel should present a vision of its own for regional cooperation and coexistence, based on positive common denominators, rather than being reactive and relying on negatives. By its very nature, the road to realizing a vision is difficult, but a vision-led foreign policy can contribute to a constructive and less threatening atmosphere, resulting in charging the regional climate with positive energies, with or without natural gas.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy and a former ambassador to Cyprus.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, formerly his country’s energy minister, noted that negotiations would be launched on May 7, at which point both sides will try to map out their points of agreement and disagreement in order to complete the talks by September. At the same time, a tripartite Lebanese-Cypriot-Greek summit is scheduled to take place in June. The Cypriot foreign minister added that a unitization agreement would send an important and calming message to international energy companies seeking to invest in the region.

The Lebanese side is clearly interested in speedy progress on the issue, realizing that their country is lagging behind in developing its energy potential, compared to Israel and Cyprus. Moreover, according to the Lebanese minister, Lebanon is planning to carry out an exploratory drill next year along or adjacent to its maritime border with Cyprus.

This significant development is the latest element in the diplomatic and energy-related shifts taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean in recent years, and several points should be pointed out in this regard.

A. Lebanon, it appears, understands the need to accelerate progress in the energy context if it wants to fulfill its economic potential, and the various actors in Lebanon that are involved in this are willing to overcome their differences to that end.

B. Cyprus is once again proving its vitality and centrality in the region. A CypriotLebanese agreement, as mentioned, would reassure energy companies and promote discussion of possible regional cooperation, which could enhance Cyprus’ position as a regional export center. After all, Lebanese-Cypriot cooperation is devoid of complex diplomatic issues for Lebanon.

C. If the trilateral summit does, in fact, take place in June, it would once again underscore the attractiveness of the tripartite alliance model taking root in the region in recent years (as attested to by the Israel-Cypriot-Greek alliance and the Egyptian-Cypriot-Greek one). In certain regards, we are witnessing a type of competition among additional elements in the region (such as Jordan and the Palestinians) seeking to join this accelerating “triangular game”, which is generating growing interest.

This is good news for Israel. A constructive Lebanese approach designed to achieve progress on the energy front is healthy. The more Lebanon moves forward with plans and agreements with neighboring states in the region, including joining the “triangular game”, the more it will have to adopt a pragmatic line toward Israel.

The regional gas forum launched in January 2019 in Cairo, which Lebanon has been invited to join but has yet to do so, could provide a framework to encourage regional cooperation, albeit not necessarily direct and bilateral. This may not lead to a speedy, formal resolution of the disagreements between Israel and Lebanon over their maritime border, but presumably, it would result in indirect and discreet understandings, for which such a framework would be particularly suited. Possible mediation by Greece and Cyprus between Israel and Lebanon, together with the UN and US, was recently reported.

Finally, the intention to achieve agreement on joint development of Lebanese and Cypriot gas reserves should encourage Israel to accelerate and complete its slow negotiations with Cyprus over a similar agreement. The first (and so far only) Cypriot gas field – Aphrodite – straddles Israel’s maritime border with Cyprus and is thus a joint field. Lack of a unitization agreement, the likes of which are common and routine in other parts of the world, conveys a negative message to the relevant international energy giants and Israeli energy firms.

The plans to export gas from this field to Egypt also require a speedy agreement. After all, it will be very difficult and unacceptable in the international business arena to promote such an export agreement without properly anchoring the issue between the two relevant states (Israel and Cyprus). This can be achieved through a specific agreement on the Aphrodite gas field or an acceptable framework agreement paving the way for relevant firms on both sides of the maritime border to calculate the percentage of each side’s ownership of the gas reservoir. Either way, Israel’s next government must act quickly to regulate this issue and fulfill the new opportunities and regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Amb. (Ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and the former Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus (2010-2015). He has held senior positions in the Foreign Ministry’s planning and research departments, and is currently a lecturer of political science at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Do Closer Lebanon-Cyprus Energy Ties Mean for Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip is one of transferring the responsibility for the situation over to the “other side”: be it Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the international community. The argument’s essence is: “we are here and they are there”, and Israel therefore claims that it is neither its business nor its responsibility to find a solution. This kind of policy is certainly not appropriate for a country responsible for the humanitarian needs of Gaza, and in doing so Israel is burying its head in the sand. There is no escape from advancing a clear and courageous Israeli strategy towards the Gaza Strip. The guiding point of departure should be that the problem is at our doorstep and it does not really matter whether we are right or wrong. The reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which occasionally comes up as “a necessary alternative that demonstrates Israel’s heavy hand and preserves its deterrence”, is contrary to Israeli interests. It is not without reason that Israeli governments, including the outgoing one, refrained from using this alternative. After all, it is preferable to deal with a rival such as Hamas, even if it is a non-state actor with an extreme ideology, rather than deal with chaos or the rise of even more extreme groups. In the end, after an extensive military move, Israel will likely face the same dilemmas, only at higher cost.

Israel should essentially be interested in preventing a comprehensive escalation in the Gaza Strip and attain a long-term ceasefire, as part of an economic-humanitarian arrangement, while preserving the option to move forward with the peace process, eventually leading to a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement. The proper way to achieve these two objectives is through a broad international initiative, that also includes Israel and other regional actors, for rebuilding the Gaza Strip. This initiative should address the main problems involved: the lack of infrastructure, primarily the shortage of electricity, the water problem, the collapsing health system, high unemployment, and the isolation from the world. It is obvious that the familiar counter-arguments immediately emerge: such a move will strengthen Hamas, the PA will oppose and jeopardize the agreement, Hamas and other organizations will continue smuggling weapons, and finally, it is not clear who will pay for such an extensive rebuilding initiative.

While these arguments are indeed legitimate and correct, at least partially, we should not use them to block all initiatives, or else the problem will remain with us. Currently, the peace process is stalled, and both sides are deeply skeptical about the prospects for its renewal, also due to the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, it should not discourage us, and perhaps even serve as a catalyst for action. Even in the view of Israel’s right-wing government, which is not particularly troubled by the political deadlock and does not seem to be concerned with the renewal of the peace process, a move to rebuild the Gaza Strip must be a major interest.

The proposed outline should include the following components: (a) an Israeli initiative to formulate an international plan – a sort of “Marshall Plan” – for the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip; (b) a rehabilitation plan to be led by the international community, that will include an economic-financial mechanism to support Gaza and provide a political umbrella; (c) involvement of the PA in the implementation of the plan (but this does not need to be a precondition, should the Palestinian leadership refuse); (d) participation of Israel in the process, including in terms of allocating funds for its implementation; (e) formulation of an international supervision mechanism to prevent the smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip.

The moral aspect should also lead Israel to take such action. Although Hamas is a non-state actor that is responsible to the serious situation on ground, Israel is facing a serious problem, for which it is partially responsible as well. The duty to protect Israeli citizens and the strategic security interests of the State of Israel are not in conflict with the need to acknowledge the harsh living conditions at our doorstep. Ignoring them seriously jeopardizes Israel’s long-term interests. Israel’s claim to be the only democracy in the region and an island of stability and pluralism obliges us to weigh the ensuing moral responsibility, and to initiate an urgent political-economic-humanitarian process to support Gaza. This will probably not be a perfect move, but a necessary one that serves a host of Israeli interests, and in any case its human and economic cost is lower than that of any other alternative.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Should Advance an International Initiative to Support Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Egypt have maintained close political and security ties at the highest level in recent years, which remains covert for the most part. In a rare move, Egyptian President a-Sisi revealed it in January an interview to the American program “60 Minutes”, referring to the close cooperation with Israel, including joint military efforts against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula.

The current convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt rests on several layers, that result from the dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent years: the turmoil during and after the Arab Spring; the regional threat posed by Iran, especially to the pragmatic Sunni states; terror activities in Sinai (that require Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, including a reassessment of the security annex to their peace agreement); and the Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Egyptian regime and military are still traumatized by the Muslim Brotherhood rule, which was in place from the ousting of Mubarak and until the overthrow of Morsi. This further explains the joint Israeli-Egyptian efforts to defy the threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic movements, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, the Egyptian and Israeli interests converge when it comes to the energy sector. Simply put, Israel wants to export part of the gas it discovered in the Mediterranean to its closest neighbors. An agreement to export gas from Israel to Jordan has already been signed. Egypt has recently discovered significant gas fields, but at least in the short term it still needs energy for its local economy, and Israel can help supply it. In the medium term, it will be possible to liquefy Israeli gas in Egypt (via two existing facilities there, which have not been in use for the last few years), and then to export it to more distant markets. Therefore, Israeli and Egyptian companies have held intensive negotiations during the recent years, which led to the signing of mutual agreements. However, both governments still need to give their consent, which will provide a legitimizing umbrella for strategic cooperation in the energy sector.

It seems that the warm ties described above should suffice to complete and implement these agreements signed by companies in the private sector. The level of trust between the Israeli and Egyptian governments is high, as exemplified by the recent visit to Cairo by Israeli Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz. Moreover, the gas forum that convened in Egypt, with participation of energy ministers from Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, illustrates the new international geometry that is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. The existing tripartite alliances – Israel-Greece-Cyprus and Egypt-Greece-Cyprus – are now joined by a new tripartite alliance – Jordan-Greece-Cyprus, and by the newly-established Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The existing and emerging alliances may expand and include additional countries, and the informal existing cooperation might institutionalize. Such developments would add positive Mediterranean dimensions to the complex dynamics in the region.

Turkey, an important regional player, is currently absent from these various geometric settings. The countries that are currently cooperating in the Eastern Mediterranean share an anti-Turkish agenda – Egypt, Cyprus and Greece (each to a different extent), and Israel – whose relations with Erdoğan lack trust and are characterized by harsh rhetoric, despite the realistic potential for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the gas sector. The chances to realize this potential were one of the catalysts to the signing in 2016 of the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement. Since, and following new crises between the two countries, these chances have steadily diminished.

Will Israel and Egypt be able to translate their warm ties and convergence of interests into formal energy agreements at state-level? The motivation for them to do so is clear. However, the public in Egypt still opposed any normalization of ties with Israel. After all, even during the Mubarak regime, the Egyptians did not welcome economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries, despite the beneficial cooperation that took place around the joint industrial zones (QIZ). The launching of a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process will clearly help to improve this situation. It will create a more positive atmosphere in the region, and above all a more favorable Arab public opinion. It can be assumed that the a-Sisi regime will succeed in overcoming domestic opposition. After all, energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt serves the interests of both countries, and perhaps Egypt will follow Jordan, who already formalized its energy cooperation with Israel, despite negative public attitudes in Jordan towards it.

The discovery of natural gas reservoirs in the Eastern Mediterranean creates an exceptional convergence of interests between a number of countries in the region, including Israel and its Arab neighbors. This opens up a wide range of additional areas of cooperation between, placing the Eastern Mediterranean on the “global map”. The visit of Steinitz to Cairo, and the unique regional gas forum launched there, may symbolize a significant step towards realizing the potential embedded in this region.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus between 2010 and 2015. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Will Energy be the Next Point of Israeli-Egyptian Convergence? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the atmosphere on the Gaza border has been heating up in recent weeks, the humanitarian crisis requires an urgent response. This is a clear Israeli interest, since the situation in Gaza encourages violence that affects life in Israel proper, leads to international criticism of Israel and stands in contrast to Jewish and human values.

There are several plans that outline ways to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, including the construction of a port in the El Arish area of Egypt, the construction of infrastructure facilities on an artificial island off the coast of Gaza, the development of the gas field opposite the Gaza Strip in favor of vital electricity generation and desalination projects, and the construction of a marine port in Cyprus.

The Cyprus option was discussed again recently at the initiative of Defense Minister Lieberman during the tripartite meeting between the defense ministers of Israel, Greece and Cyprus on June 22 in Nicosia. The proposed outline includes the construction of a seaport in Cyprus (or, in effect, the allocation of a number of docks in an existing port), which will serve as a conduit for the transfer of aid to the Gaza Strip under Israeli security supervision. The idea is not new, and the Cypriot response is generally cautious, although mostly positive. In the past, they tried to mobilize the EU in order to provide a sponsorship (mainly political) for the initiative and presumably this is what they will try to do now.

Nicosia, on one hand, attaches great importance to the close relationship with Israel, and hence the need for serious consideration of the Israeli request, which puts Cyprus in a power position as a significant regional player. On the other hand, the Cypriots understand that the Palestinian Authority is not enthusiastic about the idea, as generally they are fearful, and rightly so, to meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in view of the split between Hamas and Palestinian Authority.

In Cyprus, as well as in the EU, there is great understanding of Israel’s security concerns and presumably of Israel’s future demand for tight and efficient control of the goods to be transferred from a Cypriot port to the Gaza Strip. The idea of the Cyprus port, which can be part of a successful Israeli policy in the eastern Mediterranean, has several requirements: 1) serious Israeli-Cypriot (and perhaps Greek) dialogue; 2) discussion and arrangement with Egypt; 3) an international political umbrella with the participation of the EU, the US, and possibly relevant Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia); 4) an internal Israeli campaign to mobilize public support for such a move, including the support of the defense administration, which frequently warns against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The construction of a seaport for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus should be dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians; currently negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority do not seem feasible, therefore it should not be a precondition for advancing the initiative. However, there is a need to coordinate it with the Palestinian Authority, in order to neutralize any objection for such a move that could be seen as one that strengthens Hamas. There will also be a need for indirect coordination with Hamas (through the Egyptians) in order to ensure that conditions for a successful deal are in place.

The Israeli interest is to prevent a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip is not in sight, and therefore the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip is still the lesser of two evils in Israel’s view and certainly preferable to the takeover of a more radical Islamist groups.

Furthermore, Israel must initiate and even participate (including through a significant economic contribution) in such an extensive and ambitious effort to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. A sort of “Marshall Plan” is needed for the Gaza Strip, one that will mobilize the Arab states and the international community to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. Such a move would benefit everyone, including Israel, both politically and publicly. The latest round of violence in the Gaza Strip and the almost daily incidents illustrate the explosive potential of Israel-Hamas relations. Presumably, the current cease-fire will not last. The Cypriot initiative, however specific, can trigger a process that will help neutralize what appears to be an inevitable confrontation. Israel must seriously advance this initiative – the sooner the better.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Port in Cyprus Can Help Resolve Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although Iran’s move is considered an escalation, it should not come as a surprise. This is a step up in the exchange of messages between the sides, but we can safely assume that Israel anticipated that its actions, according to foreign and/or Syrian sources, would sooner or later provoke a counter-reaction. After all, the Syrian regime has reacted to attacks, presumably carried out by Israel, in a number of cases in the past. In this regard, Iran’s move may be seen as a Syrian-Iranian attempt to draw some red lines, indicating that the military freedom of action in Syria, long enjoyed by Israel, should not be taken for granted.

Either way, the Israeli interests remain unchanged and focus on two main levels.

The first interest relates to preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria, or at least weakening its hold on the state, especially in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel and Jordan. Therefore, we must focus on a series of diplomatic measures:

First, reaching some understandings with the relevant actors – Iran, and the Assad regime – in Syria. The tightening Iran’s grip on Syria is a reality that will be extremely difficult to uproot, at least in the short-to- medium term. The goal, then, is to limit or to prevent it from establishing itself in a way that is too threatening to the Syrian-Israeli border. This goal may be achieved with the intervention of international actors who enjoy open channels and a sufficient level of trust, vis-a-vis both sides.

Under the current circumstances, the most prominent actor is Moscow. The intensive dialogue between Israel and Russia allows for a sincere and deep dialogue, even if their interests are not aligned. The convergence of the Russian-Iranian interests is firm and tight, and it cannot be dismantled now. At the same time, Russia has a clear interest in preventing an undesirable escalation that will harm the strengthening of the Assad regime. Israel can leverage this situation in its dialogue with Moscow, while refraining from intense and unpredictable actions, in return.

Although the US has positioned itself in a less influential (albeit largely secondary) position in Syria, it is necessary to closely coordinate the Israeli-American positions. In addition, it is important to coordinate positions with Arab countries, with whom Israel has shared interests and close dialog. Jordan fears, just like Israel, the Iranian hold on Syria. Egypt is watching Iran with concern as it is becoming a stronger regional power, and Saudi Arabia adopted a most assertive policy vis-a-vis Iran. The Israeli message should be that this regional dynamic should be curbed in a coordinated regional diplomatic effort against the Syrian-Iranian axis.

Although Europe has ceded its premiership in Syria to Russia, it is still possible to recruit prominent European players to increase pressure on Iran. Germany can be a good candidate for that. The focus of the Israeli message, at this stage, should be the Syrian context, rather than the nuclear issue. Moreover, diplomatic levers should be used to make it difficult for the Iranians to further establish their presence in Syria. It is essential to expose to the international community the Iranian attempts to establish military bases, in a manner that will prove to the world Iran’s destructive conduct in the region, while establishing that an Iranian nuclear activity is prohibited before reaching a nuclear agreement.

Another Israeli interest, no less important, focuses on preventing an escalation in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Such a confrontation is not necessary as the deterrence that was achieved following the Second Lebanon War still stands and is manifested in the organization’s various public statements. Moreover, the organization is working to strengthen its political involvement in Lebanon and is looking forward to the elections for the Lebanese parliament. This trend could induce a more responsible conduct on its part, which could prevent a slide into violent confrontations to the detriment of Lebanon, as Israel repeatedly warns. Another round of violence will end with a renewed status quo, that is no different from the current one.

The strengthening of Assad’s regime in Syria continues vigorously. Currently, it is clear to all that the regime has been strengthened to such an extent that no one expects or desires to reverse the process, that was achieved thanks to the involvement of Russia and Iran (and Hezbollah). Israel must have an interest in strengthening the regime, who will, most probably, be able to deal more effectively with an excessively dominant Iranian influence. It should be emphasized again that this is a long-term process, since it is clear that Assad currently has neither the ability nor the will to challenge the tightening Iranian dominance in his country. At the same time, it is hard to ignore the moral consideration of the Assad regime. This is a murderous regime that committed war crimes against its own people. However, as Israel did not directly intervene during the civil war in Syria, it must now consolidate its interests in the face of the emerging reality.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Israel’s strategic balance with Syria, continues to be comfortable, even after the recent escalation. Syria is still in the midst of difficult fighting between the various forces, and Assad’s takeover of the entire country is still far from being over. It should also be remembered that the relationships and interests of the Russia-IranTurkey triangle are in no way smooth. In any event, it is imperative to acknowledge that the freedom of Israeli military action is not unlimited in view of the emerging reality, hence the importance of the political-diplomatic effort. This is a challenge that Israel can and must withstand.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.