הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Supporting Iran Deal Doesn’t Make J Street anti-Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While differences of opinions among allies on key policy issues are legitimate, the style in which these controversies are being handled – which includes personal attacks and meddling in domestic politics – has a negative impact on Israel-US relations. Support for Israel is not as consensual in the US as it used to be, also among the American Jewish community. Israel is increasingly becoming a partisan issue in American politics, and is losing support among key American constituencies.

These worrisome trends led Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies to hold a public symposium on US-Israeli relations. The symposium took place at Tel Aviv University on 19 May 2014, and in cooperation with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. The symposium, moderated by Yael Patir of J Street and the Mitvim Institute, featured three distinguished speakers: Dr. Ilai Saltzman, Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and Lecturer at Claremont McKenna College, USA; Jeremy Ben-Ami, President of J Street, and; Alon Pinkas, former Israeli Consul General in New York.

Dr. Ilai Saltzman argued that the US-Israel “special relationship” has come to resemble a more normal one. As the importance of the alliance has waned, America has adopted a more balanced, ambivalent and likewise critical approach while backing Israel. Jeremy Ben-Ami offered lessons on the Kerry-led peace initiative, and discussed the role J Street plays in fielding continued US involvement in the peace process as Americans grow weary of overseas entanglements. Alon Pinkas warned that Israelis should recognize the strategic asset of their US ally and save this key relationship by earnestly working to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. The following publication includes their lectures in full.

Dr. Saltzman posited that the shift in US attitudes of Israel can best be explained through the lens of the three levels of analysis in International Relations. At the international level, the end of the Cold War, American rapprochement with the Arab World, and reorientation of US foreign policy toward Asia have mitigated the US’ need for Israel as an unconditional ally. At the state level, American support for Israel has become more pluralistic, as observed by the rise of J Street. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between Israeli and American societies, a large stream of liberal Jews feel a duty to express open criticism of various anti-democratic practices in Israel. Finally, at the individual level we observe President Obama’s departure from his predecessors in taking a more distant, tempered approach toward Israel, allowing for more open criticism.

Ben-Ami outlined both the shortcomings and positive takeaways of Secretary of State John Kerry’s attempt to broker a peace deal in 2013-2014. Kerry’s zealous efforts in the negotiations should be seen as a reflection of shared US and Israeli interests, and continuing to pursue a solution keeps the two countries’ interests aligned. The same is true for shared values, which are being offset by Israel’s protracted occupation. Kerry mistakenly believed that he could convince Prime Minister Netanyahu that these shared interests and values were at risk, while again trying to play Israel’s lawyer. Nevertheless, the negotiations produced progress on recognizing mutually beneficial Palestinian security and economic needs, and incorporating the Arab Peace Initiative. As for American domestic politics, it is important to note the increasing isolationism, national rejection of neocon Republican policies and shift within the Democratic Party toward a more dovish worldview as contributors to a break in the consensus on Israel.

Pinkas described the “tectonic” changes in the US-Israel relationship as driving the countries apart, and claimed that Israelis must adapt to save these crucial ties. The US has served as Israel’s strategic asset for a long time, but with the Cold War and more recent post-9/11 period over, the once congruous foreign policies of both countries are gradually diverging. While echoing Dr. Saltzman and Ben-Ami’s analyses of America’s interest in disengaging from the Middle East, Pinkas charged that Israel needs to reinvent itself as an ally and strategic asset to the US by resolving rather than prolonging its conflict with the Palestinians. Otherwise, it may find itself having to deal with the Palestinian issue, and Iran, alone.

This symposium has been part of ongoing efforts by the Mitvim Institute to monitor and analyze US policies towards Israel, the peace process, and the Middle East. We invite you to follow The US and Us: The Mitvim-DC Monthly. Every issue of this publication series includes an analysis of recent developments, a roundup of commentaries by US think tanks and leading experts, and a profile of a relevant US policymaker.

We thank the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University for their partnership in carrying out the public symposium, and J Street, for their partnership in producing this publication.

הפוסט Cracks in the Special Relationship: Israel-US Ties under Obama and Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States.

For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded.

With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process can even begin, Netanyahu is having to backpedal on his pre-election message that if he was reelected he would ensure that no Palestinian state will be created—a statement that likely helped him peel away precious mandates from the far-right Jewish Home party.

Although Obama may eventually need to take a more accommodative approach to Netanyahu to bring any progress toward resolving the conflict—or at least agreed-upon international parameters—comments from his administration in the post-election period so far indicate that he is committed to ramping up pressure. As some have noted, this pressure could come in the form of supporting a Palestinian state at the UN or simply refraining from shielding Israel from international pressure.

Then there are the Iranian nuclear talks. Having shown little if any remorse during the Congressional speech controversy, Netanyahu will doubtless continue to thwart a deal in any way he can. And yet, any more bold actions from him could again jeopardize the US government’s strong support for Israel at the UN, concerning intelligence sharing, and in other foreseeable ways short of withholding foreign aid.

Assuming a stable right-wing Israel government does not collapse within the next two years, Netanyahu will outlast Obama and find himself with a new American presidential counterpart. In either scenario of a Democrat or Republican taking office in 2016, Netanyahu would still find himself at odds with the White House.

If de facto Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton is any measuring stick, her comments during and after her service as Secretary of State reveal that Israel can expect more of the same regarding Obama’s views on Iran, as well as his and her husband Bill’s positions on both the conflict and on Netanyahu personally.

If a Republican is elected as president, history has shown the dynamic between the two nations’ leaders could be even more capricious. Even conservative hardliner George W. Bush—despite the nostalgia in Israel for his presidency—went so far as to counsel Netanyahu’s rival, Tzipi Livni, on how to beat the Likud in the 2009 general election, just as Hillary Clinton had soon afterward. Unconditional and hawkish Republican rhetoric domestically and in Congressional chambers apparently does not translate to the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

Beyond challenges from American presidents down the road, the policy direction that Netanyahu and a hard right-wing coalition would take will likely further erode the American domestic support base for the Israeli government in Congress and among the Jewish community that has long served as a critical component of Israel’s soft power.

The lack of Israeli diplomatic engagement with all sides of the pro-Israel spectrum—including the dovish lobby group, J Street—and staunch disagreements among the U.S. and Israeli governments will transform Israel even more into a divisive issue in the American political arena. Both problems could be significantly mitigated by earnest Israeli efforts to resolve the conflict, yet these would be out of the question for the coalition under discussion.

Netanyahu’s final decision on a coalition may still be weeks away, but if he makes that perilous of decisions to form an all-right-wing government, its probable course of action will risk leaving an indelible stain on ties with the American president, on the bipartisan domestic American support for Israel and on the US-Israel “special relationship” itself.

(originally published in The Hill)

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For these reasons and others, an electoral victory by a new, left-of-center party, provocatively named “The Zionist Camp,” is considered by left-wing and many centrist voters as requisite for a fundamental change in the direction the country is going. The Zionist Camp — a joint list of the Labor party, with the technocratic Isaac Herzog at the helm, and the center-left party headed by Tzipi Livni — appears to be steadily neck and neck with Netanyahu’s Likud for the plurality of the vote typically needed to be chosen by Israel’s president to form a government.

Despite room for optimism of overcoming this deadlock, there are several glaring realities that render the Left’s road to victory exceedingly difficult.

For starters, The Zionist Camp will need to patch a broad and likely contradictory coalition if it ever hopes to achieve the majority in parliament needed to secure the premiership.

Achieving a 61-mandate majority will be difficult. Overall, 10-11 parties are expected to pass, with the two biggest parties receiving only around 25 seats. This large number of parties, often with sectarian platforms, is especially problematic for the Left. In years past, Labor governments have almost always had to sacrifice their agency for change by partnering with the Likud or religious parties — a classic case of “too many cooks spoil the broth.”

So how feasible would a Zionist Camp coalition be? Presumably, The Zionist Camp would choose those parties closest to it on the left, center-left and center-right  — Meretz, Yesh Atid, and Kulanu — for a combined (approximately) 47 seats, according to the most recent poll.

For the remaining seats, it will need a combination of the far-right Yisrael Beiteinu party (5), ultra-orthodox parties Shas (6) and United Torah Judaism (7), and the Joint List (12), an amalgam of Arab and Communist parties.

Compounding the difficulties for such a task, many of these would-be junior coalition partners are virulent polar opposites, both politically and religiously. Further dampening prospects, both Yisrael Beiteinu and the Joint List have ruled out (at least for now) joining a coalition led by The Zionist Camp.

Alternatively, there is the option of again partnering with the Likud, in order to avoid having to partner with far-right, Arab or religious parties. This “national unity government,” as such coalitions are called, would however be anathema to voters and candidates alike, who long for a change in the status quo.

Adding to these shortcomings, the Likud’s natural allies in the so-called Right-Wing Bloc include the far-right and religious parties who together could garner 57-61 mandates before courting the centrist parties.

Even if the Zionist Camp is tasked with forming a coalition, it will be a daunting endeavor. Supposing the painstaking compromises necessary are made, the likelihood of such an unevenly stitched coalition would constantly be under threat of unraveling.

Yet it represents the best chance for a moderate redirection towards greater economic justice, a genuine peace process with the Palestinians and the restoration of Israel’s image abroad. Otherwise, Israel looks set to continue down a perilous road. Its Prime Minister faces a potential boycott during an address to congress for the first time in recent memory and remains plagued by growing poverty and economic stratification. All the while, the Right diverts funds to the settlements and ignores warnings from its own military officials regarding the necessity of a two state solution.

The possibility of a Zionist Camp victory may be slim, but the necessity of a drastic change of course means that all of us who love Israel as a vibrant Jewish and Democratic state must not lose hope.

(originally published at The Hill)

הפוסט Hope for a left-wing victory in Israel’s election הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

What do the results reveal about the moods of the American people, as well as the Jewish community? What might they signal come the 2016 presidential elections? And how might the Republican victory in the midterm elections influence US foreign policy in the Middle East and relations with Israel?

Following an analysis on these three key questions, this paper concludes that Republican gains do not reflect a significant change in Americans’ (and American Jews’) perceptions of Middle East foreign policy, that Obama still wields enough authority and determination to prevent his visions for the Middle East from being derailed, and that voting trends look to favor Democrats in 2016.

הפוסט The US Midterm Elections: Projections for Mideast Policy and Relations with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

By voting to reduce aid to the PA, Congressional representatives jeopardize Abbas’ legitimacy, Israeli security and future prospects for peace.

The bill in question calls for the US to withhold funds “equivalent” to those the PA provides families of Palestinian terrorists, and to prevent dollars to any Palestinian government formed as a result of “an agreement with Hamas.”

Altogether, these restrictions would deny the PA some $70 million of the $400 million it receives annually—a figure less than a quarter of what it was in 2008. Unsurprisingly, the bill was chiefly backed by Republicans, and stands in marked contrast to the Obama administration’s support for continued aid to the “technocratic” government. The bill, however, also reflects a sentiment shared by many Democrats, AIPAC, and 88 of the Senate’s 100 members. The Senate Appropriations Committee is expected to approve a sister bill, after which the two chambers will put them to a general vote.

On the surface, the bill appears well grounded, especially in light of Netanyahu’s protestations and Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s charges that Americans are financing PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ stipends to Palestinian terrorists in prison. In practice, it would weaken an already beleaguered PA, undermining the legitimacy it has recently garnered for the first time in years. In so doing it threatens to collapse the very institution that was created for advancing the peace process and that is demonstrating its willingness against unbearable domestic pressure to cooperate with Israel for its security and against extremism in the region.

For starters, as Sec. Kerry’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, already pointed out, the Israeli government itself has maintained its security cooperation with the PA and in fact had transferred aid to the PA on the same day as the government was announced—a tacit admission that the lack of any actual Hamas leaders in the technocratic government permits continued relations with the PA.

Vindicating this latter point is the PA’s condemnation of the recent kidnapping and its active participation in the search for Israel’s “lost boys,” despite Israel’s mass arrests of Palestinians not connected in the affair, as well as Hamas and Israel’s own controversial MK Haneen Zoabi’s censure of the PA’s efforts as betrayal and a crime.

On a deeper level, the PA represents a moderate force among Palestinians, is often receptive to Western demands, and most of all is key to strengthening the Palestinian economy and infrastructure—ingredients widely accepted as conducive to Israel’s security. Even a partial reduction in aid, as Congress is proposing, would hamper the PA’s ability to pay for projects and employee salaries—a move that would further stall the economy and the Gaza Strip’s long road to recovery. These benefits far outweigh the PA’s less palatable practices, such as the stipends to the families of Palestinian prisoners.

Indeed, it is for these reasons that in a similar congressional climate in 2011, Brigadier General Nitzan Alon—at the time in charge of Israeli security in the West Bank—was prompted to write an article in the New York Times appealing to Congress not to cut funding to the PA. When Congress ultimately froze $200 million in annual funds, then U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta—who has been known to criticize Obama for not taking military action in Syria—also voiced that that it was a “mistake.” That aid, which largely paid for the 22% of the Palestinian work force that the PA employs, was not reinstated until 2013.

Congress as whole should learn from this fruitless episode and forego plans to dwindle the PA’s budget. If anything, it should be praising the PA for having managed to maintain a government of national consensus all the while fighting Hamas and combatting the glorification of terrorism. It should be offering moral support to Abbas in the face of domestic and Israeli critics.

If Congress were to do this, it would strategically position the U.S. to leverage the PA’s cooperative efforts and governing legitimacy, a legitimacy that Israel has long demanded, and to restart negotiations on a credible and durable path to peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Congress Shouldn’t Cut Aid to the Palestinian Authority הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.