Reef Itzhaki, Director of Impact at the Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies:
“President Trump’s recent visit to the Middle East stood out by skipping over Israel, while placing renewed strategic emphasis on Saudi Arabia and signaling interest in new partnerships with emerging actors like Syria. What are your main takeaways from this visit? And were there any aspects that surprised you?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Let me begin by saying: I come from a Saudi-centered perspective and I’ll stay within that framework – focusing on Saudi policy toward Israel and the Palestinian issue.

In my view, the avoidance of any reference to Israel wasn’t surprising. Unfortunately, Netanyahu has made engagement with Israel too toxic, and Trump knew it would be too much to ask other Arab countries – especially Saudi Arabia – to cooperate.

Even at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, where he spoke, Trump mentioned the Abraham Accords, but didn’t address Saudi–Israeli normalization. To me, this was a way to frame those agreements as part of his legacy, rather than as a genuine regional shift.

What stood out most to me was the loss of Israeli agency in the region. Netanyahu has led to Israel being seen as just another variable in a U.S.–Saudi deal, rather than as an independent actor.

Trump’s decision to bypass Israel highlighted a strategic shift toward players like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – who have greater purchasing power and regional influence. At the same time, Israel’s agency has become increasingly marginal in both the Saudi-American and Gulf-American discourse.”

Reef Itzhaki:
“As you mentioned, the focus did indeed shift to Saudi Arabia. From Riyadh’s perspective, what message did this visit send to the region and to Israel in particular?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Saudi Arabia is effectively becoming the regional center of gravity. You could even say that the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is taking on this role, with Saudi Arabia at its helm.

Trump’s announcement about lifting sanctions on Syria and his openness to normalize relations with it indicate that Saudi diplomacy has been both proactive and effective. There was a sense of a ‘ripe moment’ – this wasn’t accidental, but the result of quiet, strategic Saudi diplomacy.

This move helps reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold, and enables the GCC states to follow suit, while still exercising fiscal caution. Saudi Arabia won’t invest where there’s no political certainty.

Once sanctions are lifted, it becomes easier to channel financial aid – enabling Syria’s gradual return to the regional system.”

Reef Yitzhaki:
“Before the current government, Israel positioned itself as a proactive player in regional diplomacy. However, there’s a growing sense that it is now perceived as blocking rather than advancing regional initiatives. From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, is Israel now considered a partner or a hindrance?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Unfortunately, Israel is currently seen as a spoiler.
Once – especially in 2021 – even Mohammed bin Salman referred to it as a ‘potential ally.’ The Arab Spring was a turning point – it brought about a certain regional alignment, and Israel was perceived differently at the time.
But over time – especially due to Israel’s political volatility and Netanyahu’s effect – the Saudis have realized it’s far more complex.

After the Abraham Accords, there was hope that this was a constructive step. But the Accords were used negatively, especially by extremist elements, as proof that the Palestinian issue was being sidelined – and this deeply hurt Israel’s image.

Even before October 7, there was talk of normalization – but conditional on significant Israeli concessions. Today, peace and normalization seem worlds apart.
To many, normalization was portrayed as a way to bypass the Palestinian issue – and that’s what damaged trust.
I remember during the Second Intifada, Israel had an extremely negative image – that sentiment hadn’t returned until recent years.

Even in May 2021 there were clashes, but what’s happening now is far more severe. There’s also a deeper understanding now – that Saudi Arabia sees Israel not just as a party to the Gaza conflict, but as responsible for other regional threats as well.
Saudi public opinion has moved far away – one step forward, a hundred steps back.”

Reef Itzhaki:
“At the summit, regional stability was a central theme, especially following the meeting between Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, and President al-Sharaa, which gave renewed legitimacy to the Syrian government.
What is Saudi Arabia’s long-term vision for Syria’s role in the region and for stabilizing the area?”

Dr. Aziz Alghashian:
“Saudi Vision 2030 was conceived at the height of a wave of Saudi nationalism, with slogans like ‘Saudi Arabia First.’ Today, we’ve moved to the phase of ‘Saudi Arabia – and then others.’

There’s a clear understanding that the vision cannot be realized without regional stability.

The political conflicts have emphasized just how fragile the region is – and how vital it is for Saudi Arabia’s progress.

So the question isn’t just how Saudi Arabia can stabilize the region, but also how others can contribute to that effort.

We need to speak a pragmatic language, understand others’ interests and their fears. When interests are framed as shared, it becomes easier for Saudi Arabia to engage.
That’s also why it supported al-Assad – not out of coercion, but because the messages it heard aligned with its own positions.

When the vision is clear and tangible – support follows.”

הפוסט Saudi Arabia’s Status in the Regional Arena and Relations with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse.

As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected.

This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses.

Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace.

I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted.

The Iranian issue

The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting the idea that Saudi-Israeli normalization is the logical outcome of the shared Iranian threat. This idea is inaccurate to say the least. Netanyahu proposes that a major regional confrontation with Iran would lead the Saudi kingdom to move away from its traditional position, to set aside its grievances with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, and to base normalization on a logic of mutual enmity. This is too simplistic, and the Saudi ruling elite thinks in a far more nuanced way than that.

It is true that the Saudis still view Iran as its primary security concern. Equally true, however, is that both Saudi Arabia and Israel fundamentally differ in how they strategically address that concern. While the Saudis have concluded that working with Iran is the best way to address its security grievances, Netanyahu’s robust approach is something the Saudis wish to avoid.

What we Saudis truly fear is a region embroiled in conflict. Saudi anxiety over regional turbulence stems from our concern about the restructuring of our economy, which we consider an existential issue, and we know we cannot achieve our ambitious economic goals in a turbulent region.

What the Saudi ruling elite fears most is the radicalization that is almost certain to arise from this ongoing war.

The images of death, destruction, and the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli lives are painful for all. Some members of the Israeli government talk of resettling Gaza and annexing more territory in the West Bank. This is not only repugnant to us but has two additional effects: It increases the sense of grievance toward Israel and the potential for further extremism in the region.

This leads to the second issue that Netanyahu has misled you on – the notion that the Saudis do not care about the Palestinian issue. Your government has misled you, the Israeli people, into believing that Saudis will willingly abandon their historical stance and normalize relations with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue, which is now an inescapable reality.

Within Saudi Arabia, there is a sense of solidarity that perhaps has not been seen since the Second Intifada. What you will not see are pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli demonstrations taking to the streets of the kingdom, as that is not part of Saudi culture.

But I urge you not to measure the gravity of Saudi support by the absence of such demonstrations, which is about the fear of extremists trying to instrumentalize this pain. In that sense, I also want to communicate to you that October 7 was a barbaric atrocity that took the lives of innocent people. Too much innocent blood has been spilled in this conflict.

The Saudi-Palestinian relationship is not devoid of tensions. However, the reality is that sporadic tensions are part and parcel of deep, longstanding relations. I would suggest you avoid the perception that instances of tension with the Palestinians are signs of imminent Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Moving forward

How do we proceed? Our people have many interests in common, but there is nothing we share more, unfortunately, than the blood of our respective brethren spilled and mutual pain. We must empathize with each other and keep our eyes on the horizon of the necessary peace that will benefit us all.

There might be many possible points of departure, but I will present one: an Arab-Israeli “mid-level dialogue,” between analysts, think tanks, journalists, and academics with the aim of fostering healthier and more constructive Arab-Israeli discourse.

A discourse that speaks to the other, and not over or about the other. Mid-level Arab-Israeli discourse should be forward-thinking, presenting new, creative proposals that address the need for peace, while incentivizing political actors to remain invested in the process.

I know that there are people in Israel who desire real peace. We are ready to engage, but you need to help us by ensuring we jointly aim at solving this issue from its roots. Otherwise, and allow me to use a notion from the book From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020 by Elie Podeh: Israel and Israelis will once again become nothing more than the mistress of the region.

The Abraham Accords are indeed a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. However, history has shown that even mistresses out in the open are still viewed as illegitimate and unacceptable. This can be seen in a range of polls from Abraham Accords countries, which indicate the lack of support by many for relations with Israel.

It is time we enter a process in which Israel moves from being considered a “mistress” into an open and legitimate partner for peace – and that can only happen through a two-state solution.

The article was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.