Lebanon now has a leader after over two years of failed attempts to elect a president. Aoun is backed by the international bloc opposing Iran (primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France) and comes from the military establishment responsible for upholding the ceasefire with Israel. This is promising news – but realizing its potential depends also on Israel’s actions.

In the past year, Israel heavily struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s use of force during the summer and fall of 2024 – assisted by US mediation efforts – led the terror organization to agree in November to a 60-day ceasefire, relinquishing its commitment to continue fighting as long as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza. The weakening of Hezbollah also paved the way for the Syrian opposition’s successful campaign to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus, an ally of Hezbollah and Iran.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is one of the few diplomatic achievements that Israel has managed to secure since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack, and it bears significant importance.

Since the ceasefire began, rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has almost entirely ceased. Although many northern residents still do not feel secure enough to return home, public opinion surveys indicate that most Israelis support the ceasefire, support which is echoed by regional states and Israel’s Western allies.

Israel’s interest should be in making permanent this temporary lull in fighting and seizing the opportunities it presents – the weakening of Hezbollah within Lebanon’s internal politics and the gradual reshaping of Israel-Lebanon relations.

Doubts about the future

However, as the 60-day ceasefire period draws to a close, doubts are growing about Israel’s commitment to the agreements reached and to ending the fighting on the northern front. To achieve this, Israel must act wisely on both military and diplomatic fronts to best serve its long-term strategic goals.

Although Hezbollah has been defeated (in this round) by Israel, while weakened domestically, it has not been defeated in that arena and is working hard to maintain its assets and status. Hezbollah is an authentic representative of significant portions of the Lebanese population – as reflected in its representation and influence in Lebanon’s parliament. A survey published by an American think tank in early 2024 revealed that 93% of Lebanon’s Shiite population – about a quarter of the country’s inhabitants – held a positive view of Hezbollah at the time.

On the other hand, ahead of the recent presidential election, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate withdrew from the race to avoid a possible defeat, which would have signaled the group’s weakening.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon see an opportunity to shift the balance of power and have successfully worked to elect a new president since the ceasefire began, viewing it as a chance to establish new leadership in Lebanon that opposes Hezbollah and aligns with the West and moderate Arab states.

Despite its military strength, Israel has limited influence over Lebanon’s internal politics and should avoid actions that portray it as attempting to dictate processes or appoint leaders there – much as in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, Israel’s actions do create a context that impacts Lebanon’s internal developments. In the past, Hezbollah gained support beyond Lebanon’s Shiite community by presenting itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty against a powerful Israel. Now, Israel should use its military power cautiously to avoid reigniting dwindling public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should reduce its military footprint in Lebanon, including reported drone flights over Beirut. Israel should also make a special effort not to hit Lebanese army soldiers.

Formal apologies for any such hits, as Israel made in early December, are important signals to the Lebanese public.

According to the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army is supposed to play a key role in replacing Hezbollah, and Israel has an interest in empowering it. On a tactical level, continued IDF strikes on the Lebanese army would likely diminish its willingness to confront Hezbollah. Strategically, such actions could undermine Joseph Aoun’s position as he transitions from army chief to president.

In Lebanon, there are complaints about repeated Israeli violations of the ceasefire, with reports of over 1,000 such incidents since late November. This creates anger in Lebanon, portrays Israel as a heavy-handed aggressor harming civilians unnecessarily, and hinders the creation of mechanisms to promote shared interests between the two countries. Israel should stop these violations, in accordance with the self-determination clause mentioned in the ceasefire agreement, and cease the destruction of villages it has occupied in southern Lebanon. Israel’s current actions risk fueling support for Hezbollah and generating hostility among moderate factions in Lebanon, who could be crucial interlocutors in future efforts to demarcate the land border and redefine relations between the two countries.

Israel must learn from the experience of the First Lebanon War in 1982. Its swift military achievements then were gradually eroded when they were met with Lebanon’s complicated internal situation.

The Palestinian armed forces were exiled to Tunisia but were then replaced by an even stronger force, Hezbollah, which has become a strategic problem for Israel, partly due to its ties with Iran. We must not be blinded by Israel’s recent short-term military success. Lebanon is a complex and difficult country to influence, but the outcomes of the war have already sparked internal processes there that could align with Israel’s interests.

Israel must now avoid causing harm or disrupting Lebanon’s internal processes, express commitment to implementing the ceasefire – including withdrawing the IDF from southern Lebanon – declare its desire for a future peace with the Lebanese state, and invest diplomatically in expanding coordination and channels of communication with Lebanon, with the assistance of international actors such as the UN, the US, France, and Gulf states. This is even more important in light of the dramatic changes occurring in Syria, which are likely to shape the region’s future in the coming years.

Excessive and prolonged use of Israel’s military power against Lebanon could lead to the imminent collapse of the ceasefire, delay the return of northern residents to their homes, cause further harm to IDF soldiers, strengthen Hezbollah, increase hostility toward Israel among moderate elements in Lebanon, and erase Israel’s impressive military achievements.

Israel is now required to act wisely, both diplomatically and militarily, and not let the Lebanese opportunity slip away. The ceasefire must be implemented, preserved, and turned into a permanent arrangement.

The article was written by Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, and was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel Should Make the Ceasefire with Lebanon Permanent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While Israel has generally provided effective military response to threats in its immediate maritime domain, such as curbing armed Palestinian terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the 1970s, it has failed to provide a significant naval response in the distant areas of the Red Sea.

It did not resolve Egypt’s obstruction since 1947 of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal by maritime force, nor did it remove the Egyptian blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits during the Yom Kippur War, although such options were examined, at least in 1973.

At the same time, Arab threats to these shipping lanes have created a rare opportunity for Israel to mobilize international support over the years. The blockade imposed on the passage of vessels or goods through the Suez Canal (1947-1967), and the current attacks on vessels in Bab-el-Mandeb threaten not only Israel but the fundamental international principle of freedom of navigation and, in the case of the Suez Canal, the specific international treaty anchoring its operations. Moreover, damage to vessels imposes an economic burden on all commercial maritime activity in the area, not only on shipping to and from Israel, due to increased insurance costs and circuitous shipping routes.

These circumstances generated international support for Israel whenever threats emerged in the Red Sea maritime space. In 1951, for example, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling on Egypt to allow the passage of goods and vessels to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. In 1957, president Dwight D. Eisenhower provided Israel with what it interpreted as a commitment to employ US naval assets to protect the freedom of navigation if the Egyptians once again blocked the Straits of Tiran from shipping to and from Israel.

However, these diplomatic achievements proved insufficient in the absence of international enforcement. The UN Security Council’s firm 1951 support for Israel did not prevent Egypt from hampering the passage of Israel-related shipping in subsequent years, with the issue ultimately resolved only by the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The 1957 American commitment regarding the Straits of Tiran did not translate into the use of international military force to open the waterway in the May 1967 crisis.

THE RENEWED threats and attacks on Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea, this time by the Houthis from Yemen, have prompted international concern at this violation of the international freedom of navigation, with a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the rebels to stop the attacks, and condemnation by at least 40 countries. The two superpowers – the United States and China – appealed directly to Iran to exert its influence over the Houthis to end the attacks. Even Russia avoided imposing a veto on the Security Council resolution.

Hesitating to attack the Houthis

This time, the declarations were translated into action. In December 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian by an international coalition of forces to protect traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The United States and Britain also attacked targets in Yemen in a bid to force an end to the Houthi attacks at sea.

But even the US-led coalition’s effort to defend freedom of navigation is being overshadowed by the same kind of international hesitation demonstrated in the past. Many Operation Prosperity Shield partners provide only symbolic assistance, which usually includes the deployment of a limited number of staff officers.

Most US allies in Western Europe did not join the coalition, translating their concern over the infringement of freedom of navigation into the dispatch of limited forces that would not operate under the US umbrella. Even Spain, an important NATO partner with a proud maritime heritage, refused to send troops, citing the need to avoid undermining “international peace.”

So far, the coalition has not achieved its objectives and the Houthi attacks continue. The escalation of the US response, which included a large-scale attack on Houthi targets together with UK forces, also failed to achieve its objective.

Nonetheless, over a month since the launch of the coalition’s activity, several insights can be gleaned with relevance for Israel.

FIRST, DEFENDING its interests requires increasing Israeli dependence on its allies, especially on the US, in addition to the dependence it has developed since the 1970s for the supply of weapons and political backing in the international arena. The current coalition includes, for the first time since 1991, the use of international, and particularly American, military force to defend Israeli interests (inter alia). The US naval force in the region, while trying to protect commercial shipping, is also intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis towards Israel. In fact, the Gaza war appears to have deepened the Israel-US military cooperation not only at sea, with Pentagon officials reportedly involved in top-level military discussions in Israel immediately after October 7.

Second, as was the case in 1991, such direct military dependence could be used by Washington as a lever to advance its preferences, for example on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Even if Israel’s incumbent prime minister seeks to repel such pressure and a different US president is elected in November, the potential for US leverage remains significant, given Israel’s reliance on US munitions.

Third, while Israel finds itself attacked in terms of its “international legitimacy” in arenas such as The Hague, it enjoys military protection from the international system in the Red Sea, and its interests are consistent with the Security Council’s resolution.

Moreover, China, which prides itself on good relations with all sides, implicitly holds Iran responsible for the infringement on freedom of navigation. The Chinese stance and Russia’s decision to refrain from vetoing the anti-Houthi Security Council resolution highlight the limitations of Iran’s strategy of confronting Israel on multiple fronts (its so-called “unity of arenas” strategy), for example by creating a potential wedge between Tehran and Beijing.

Planners in Jerusalem should examine the current Red Sea challenge in the broader context of chess with Tehran, and not only through the lens of a boxing match with Hamas in Gaza. Such a review could identify additional opportunities for Israel given the breadth, not to mention overload, of Iranian activity.

Fourth, coalition action is also significant in terms of Israeli force structure and its deployment. Israel is not a formal member of the maritime coalition, but it presumably coordinates with the US on certain aspects of the use of force in the Red Sea. The more this coalition (and perhaps similar ones in the future) contributes to protecting Israel, the better the conditions for Israeli participation in future coalition frameworks, including regional ones. This would require some adjustment to improve the suitability of Israeli forces to coalition action. Questions are also expected to re-emerge regarding Israeli military engagement in missions other than those for its own defense, such as the Western expectation in the 1950s that Israel would assist the coalition fighting in Korea at the time.

Finally, Israel’s adversaries clearly understand the harmful potential for Israel of a naval threat. The sea has traditionally been a secondary arena in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but recent developments in Bab-el-Mandeb have led Iran and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to declare that, under certain circumstances, they may threaten Israeli maritime interests in other areas as well, especially the Mediterranean Sea and Israeli ports.

The sea, therefore, may develop into an arena requiring greater Israeli effort, but could also create additional opportunities for international cooperation, and not only in the Red Sea.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 14.

הפוסט What Israel can learn from the US-led coalition’s attacks on the Houthis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The entire project will be published on July 12th, 2022. 

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Haifa, and a Board member of Mitvim.

The state of Israel’s democracy
The state of Israel (excluding the occupied West Bank) is a democracy. Leaders are replaced in the polls; the judiciary is independent and there is protection of civil rights. Israel is defined as free with a grade of 76/100 in the 2020 Freedom House index; it received a 33/40 in political rights, and 43/60 in civil liberties. This places it above most states in the international community, and at the medium to low end of the OECD.  At the same time, Israel has ruled the West Bank under “temporary” military control since 1967. Currently, there is no indication that it is moving towards relinquishing control over the region or awarding the local population full citizenship. Many Israelis see this challenge as external to Israel’s body politic, and therefore not a democratic deficit. Others, in Israel and outside of it, argue that since the same government exercises its authority both in Israel and in the West Bank (albeit shared, to an extent, in the West Bank with the Palestinian Authority), the whole region should be analyzed as a single political unit. Seen from this perspective, Israel is no longer a democracy.

The state of Israel’s foreign affairs

Against the background of a challenged democracy, Israel’s stature in the world is probably at its zenith. After decades in which Israel was shunned by a large number of states, by 2021, it had diplomatic relations with 164 states, and is represented abroad by 108 embassies and missions. Israel is also well integrated into the global economy. As of 2018, exports and imports accounted for some 60% of its GDP. Since the late 1960s Israel has been a close ally of the US, the most dominant actor in the international system. Washington provided over the years military, financial, and political support for Israel. Indeed, Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid since the Second World War. The two countries’ close relationship does not include a formal treaty of alliance, but both countries signed dozens of agreements that have institutionalized various aspects of the relationship. Israel further maintains close relationships with major European actors, most notably, Germany.

Despite its close relationship with the US, Israel is effective in maintaining close relations also with America’s current global challengers, China, and Russia. The latter is particularly important, as since 2015, Russian forces have been based in Syria and are serving, in effect, as a potential check on Israeli military activity in the region. Israel also experienced improved foreign relations in its immediate environment. Massive gas discoveries in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean since 1999, serve as a basis for an Israeli “turn to the sea”. Israel developed a close alliance with the Hellenic states of Greece and Cyprus which includes, among other things, military cooperation, and plans for a joint gas pipe from Israel via Greece to Italy, though the plan’s feasibility remains unclear. Egypt also joined this axis, and indeed led the creation of a new regional organization, the EastMed Gas Forum. This is the first regional organization in which Israel took a leadership founding role. Joint concerns about Iran, the decline in the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coupled with pressures from Trump’s Washington, led to closer relationship between Israel and Arab actors that traditionally shied away from it. A portion of these relationship came to the public eye with the fall 2020 Abraham accords, in which Israel embarked on diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. This was followed by similar moves with Morocco and Sudan.

Israel’s democratic makeup and its foreign affairs

Although scholars highlight the significance of domestic factors in shaping Israeli foreign policy, It seems that its democratic makeup is not part of this effect. The Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) is generally left outside of the foreign policy process and does not even have a separate committee for foreign relations. Structurally, Israeli foreign policy making is rather centralized and much of it is handled directly by the Prime Minister and his staff. In the broader bureaucracy, core aspects of foreign relations are led by security organs: the Defense Ministry, Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, the Israel Defense Force, and the National Security Staff. These institutions are less exposed to public scrutiny compared to other elements of the executive. The foreign ministry, an organ that might have been more open to the public, has been marginalized in the foreign policy process. For example, for most of the years, the top diplomatic positions, such as Israel’s ambassadorships in the US and the UN, were political appointees by the Prime Minister and not professional diplomats. Members of Knesset have small staffs, and for many years, did not have an independent ability to assess information, until a small research center was set up to help them. Civil society also has a limited role in foreign policy. There are very few think tanks that challenge government policy, and the matter has rarely attracted public interest in a way that could lead to collective action. There are a few exceptions, such as activists Eli Yosef and Itai Mack that seek greater transparency, public oversight, and limitations on Israel’s largest export industry – arms. Both activists oppose arms sales to governments that oppress their population. To date, however, these efforts had no substantial effect.

The lack of any major effect of Israel’s democratic make-up on its foreign policy is further a result of Israel’s strategic culture and approach. While diplomacy was central to the early Zionist efforts, the reality of a security challenge, meant that diplomacy had become, in the words of scholar Charles Freilich, “an instrument of defense policy”. As such, much of the strategic considerations are realist, based on raw power, rather than a normative outlook. Israel was willing to support whoever assisted it in its defense. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Israel felt especially isolated in the world, it had cooperated with blatantly non-democratic regimes, such as Apartheid South Africa, Pinochet’s Chile, and Argentina under the Junta. Cooperating with these autocracies was justified by another feature of Israel’s foreign policy: its commitment to world Jewry. Argentina and South Africa had sizable Jewish communities, and their governments had a history of antisemitism. The rationale in Jerusalem was, therefore, that closer relations with these governments will allow Israel to better protect local Jews.

Even if one underplays the role of security in shaping foreign policy, Israeli diplomacy was driven by the need to work with whoever was willing to do so. Uri Bialer argued recently that the “supreme goal” of Israel’s foreign policy was to “build a state and secure its existence”. Under these conditions, normative considerations of advancing democracy, or including morality in foreign policy, were marginalized.

Interaction with democratic countries

What is the effect of the interaction with other democracies on Israeli policies? The pre-state Zionist movement and the state it beget have been highly sensitive to the positions taken by its great power democratic allies. This contributed to an Israeli commitment to democracy. In 1953, David Ben Gurion, said that “Israel historically, culturally and spiritually [is] part of the free world.” In the 1950s and 1960s Israel devoted many resources to supporting young African nations in their newly created free states. Yet, by the 1970s this streak of Israeli “norms-based” foreign policy, retreated. In part, as Israelis were disappointed with the behavior of African nations, who swiftly cut diplomatic relations with it under Arab threats and promises between 1967 and 1973. Israel also learned that its foreign relations were affected much more by material capabilities, as opposed to normative preferences. Only once it demonstrated its military prowess after the 1967 war, and in light of Soviet support to its Arab foes, did the US launch into a closer relationship. More recently Israel scored progress with a number of Arab states, based on its military and political power, and its strong posture against Iran. Beyond the internal drive for a democratic procedure, the pattern could also be understood as stemming from external power relations. When the Zionist movement and then Israel were weak, they sought support from the international system. As the international system was led by democratic countries and values, Israel highlighted its commitment to liberal democracy. Once Israel had become stronger, it could rely more on material capabilities to attract allies, and it was its foes — mostly the Palestinians – who needed secure international support and turned to liberal-democratic arguments in doing so.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Largely rejected by its neighbors for decades, Israel accepted its separateness; a “villa in the jungle” according to former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, or an “island state” to use Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s framing. Even the peace accords with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), as well as a short period of formal and open relations with a few other Arabs states in the 1990s, did not alter this reality. The flow of goods, people, and ideas between Israel and its neighbors remained nonexistent for decades. Israel was always an endpoint—a spoke—but never a hub or a place of transit; indicatively, as late as 2003, Israel’s main international airport did not have any infrastructure for transit passengers.

There were, of course, some breaches in the great wall between Israel and the region. In some cases, Israeli and moderate Arab leaders (in countries which did not have formal relations with Israel) communicated “under the table” (often a crowded place in Middle Eastern affairs) and, at times, openly. There was certainly intelligence sharing, even military assistance in some cases, and significant, albeit clandestine, levels of trade with the Gulf states, despite the prohibitions of the Arab boycott. Even Iranian goods ended up in the Israeli market, and vice versa, despite the Israeli law that disallowed “trade with the enemy.” A trickle of Israeli tourists did visit Jordan and Egypt after both countries signed peace accords with Israel, but even congressional incentives to encourage Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Jordanian joint business ventures (QIZs) could not produce intensive economic contacts.

Against this dismal background, the last few years, especially since the 2020 Abraham Accords, saw Israel connecting to the region as never before. The formal relations with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco led to an unprecedented flow between Israel and the three nations: national, military-to-military, and civil society agreements for cooperation, massive tourism (which in Morocco was significant even before the agreements), and multiple business and cultural interactions all took shape and left their mark despite the constraints of the pandemic. Even countries that did not “go formal” with Israel are helping to connect it to the region: Since 2020, Saudi Arabia has been allowing Israeli air traffic over its territory, after decades of blocking it.

Connectivity also evolved on Israel’s Western flank. The Mediterranean Sea, once an afterthought in Israeli strategic thinking, turned out to be an important space for new connections. Israeli gas from the sea is exported to Egypt and Jordan, and the three nations together with Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and the Palestinian Authority launched in 2019 a new regional organization, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which in 2021 was joined by France (with the US as an observer) and recognized as a regional compact by the UN. Gas is also one of the cornerstones for an Israel–Greece alignment that involves a wide spectrum of exchanges from education to security. This alignment also has an aspect of foreign direct investments: A Greek company owns some of the Israeli gas fields, and an Israeli company is part owner of a Cypriot field. The three nations have ambitious energy connectivity visions: laying a pipe that would connect Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe, or—as the US now suggests—an electricity project that would connect their grids to Europe, aptly named the EuroAsia Interconnector (a similar cable now connects Algeria with Southwestern Europe).

Israel now serves as a transit hub  as well. For the past decade, Turkish trucks have been shipped to the port of Haifa and then driven through Israel to Jordan and to Iraq, since the more direct land route between Turkey and the two Arab nations became blocked by the fighting in Syria and related disruptions in northern Iraq. Israel and the UAE agreed that Emirati oil is to be piped from Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat to its port on the Mediterranean near Ashkelon (using a pipeline originally designed to carry Iranian crude). Finally, the Chinese were looking into developing a train line on a similar Red–Med route to serve as an alternative route to the portion of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) that goes through the Suez Canal.

Encouraged by this opening, planners are already offering even more ambitious connectivity visions. In 2017, Israel’s Minister of Transportation Israel Katz proposed “tracks for peace,” the development of an advanced train network that would connect Israel to Saudi Arabia. Katz also proposed the development of an artificial island that would serve the Gaza Strip, as others floated an idea for an offshore international airport for Israel and a new pipeline that would deliver Israeli gas to the Gaza Strip.

This new reality is, in fact, a “back to the future” moment. After all, the land is dotted with postmarks attesting to the centrality of connectivity in its history. Prehistoric sites in Israel, offer glimpses into 1.5 million years of early human migrations out of Africa via the Levantine corridor into Eurasia. Later, ancient traders (dating back at least to the Bronze age, some 3,500 years ago) passed through the land on two ancient routes: Via Maris and the King’s Road. In the 13th century, the Mamluk Sultanate created the postal road, a vital artery of communication that stretched between Cairo and Damascus. The 20th century introduced modern forms of connectivity. Indeed, the “tracks for peace” initiative echoes older times. In the early 20th century, the Ottomans—who ruled over an open and connected Middle East—laid the tracks for the Hijaz train, which ran from Damascus to Medina, with a small offshoot to the now Israeli port cities of Akko and Haifa. By 1934 oil was piped from British-controlled Iraq to British-controlled Israel/Palestine, processed in the port city of Haifa, and exported to markets away from the region.

Connectivity was not confined to the transport of goods. In its day, it not only economic interactions but also ideational and human ones. Christianity was born out of a small Jewish sect in Israel/Palestine, and traveled far, becoming the dominant religion and culture by the middle of the first millennium in Europe.

Even local products carried the vernacular. Jaffa became nearly synonymous with oranges. As for gauze, the thin fabric now mostly used for medical dressing, it took its name from the Israel/Palestine region where it emanates: Gaza.

As late as the 1940s, the region was more integrated.  The Israeli construction company Solel Boneh operated in Iraq, Egypt, the Emirate of Transjordan, and even Bahrain. Jews from Palestine sought educational opportunities in the region. Russian-born Eliahu Eilat, Israel’s first ambassador to the US and later the president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, was a graduate of the American University of Beirut. European Jews who sought to immigrate to Palestine in the late 19th century, ended up in the larger centers in Egypt, such as Cairo and Alexandria, integrating into business and social life. Leia Nadler, the daughter of an Egyptian (Jewish-Romanian born) candy magnate family, married Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the famous Egyptian diplomat and former secretary-general of the UN. From today’s perspective, the old epithet “Levantine” has become a badge of honor, not an insult

These lessons of the past are encouraging. Connectivity offers multiple economic opportunities, as trade, energy, and people pass through the land. Past “connectors,” such as the Mamluks developed significant infrastructure in the 13th century to support their “postal road.” Two of the bridges that were built for this purpose, in Lod and in Yavne, still served local transport needs well into the 21st century, over 700 years after they were built. Being a connector also strengthens one’s status, as it creates leverage vis-à-vis the parties that are interested in the flow of goods. Connections can also create economic interdependence, thus decreasing the chances for violence between these former foes.

But the new connectivity comes with costs. Energy connectors can damage the environment. Indeed, despite the obvious geostrategic gains, Israeli activists warned against the delivery of oil from Israel’s Red Sea shore to its Mediterranean shore on account of the increased environmental risk. Their plea was heard, and for now, the Israeli Ministry for Environmental Protection is trying to stop the Israel–UAE oil connectivity deal.

Connectivity had also become a competitive arena in the great power’s strategic rivalry. The US perceives Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative as threatening to American global interests. Even if the construction of a Chinese rail in Israel would serve the latter’s economic interests, the securitization of connectivity may limit Jerusalem’s ability to move ahead as Washington is expected to oppose the move.

Looking into the future, the new connectivity raises at least three questions. First, how durable is it? As history shows, the area went through periods in which it was connected to the region, and moments in which it retreated inward. At times, leaders displayed both tendencies, by shaping the connectivity they desired. As noted, the Mamluks built an impressive ground route through the territory, but also took special care to destroy all ports on the Mediterranean, lest Western invaders would come again, like the Crusaders did on ships from Europe.

Second, how will this new connectivity affect Israel’s relations with its immediate Arab neighbors? Much of what was described above takes place between Israel and the Mediterranean states, and Israel and the Gulf and North African states. Can these new relations make Israel closer, more accepted, by the Egyptians and Jordanians, and maybe later by the Lebanese and Syrians? One glimpse of how this could unfold was the 2021 deal between Israel and Jordan with the UAE’s financing, for a solar powered desalinated water swap between the first two nations.

Finally, will the new connectivity affect Israel’s identity? Over the years, Israel developed a unique identity that mostly does not correspond with the characteristics of the region. Among its core aspects are a close cultural, political, and economic connection to Europe and North America, and a set of political institutions and norms that draw both on Judaism and democracy. Israel also defines itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people. With some half of the Jewish world residing in North America and Europe, Israel was bound to look West, not East.

The new connectivity bears with it the promise of change. It offers a more inclusive framework for engaging with a region that once rejected Israel. Trade, tourism, and investment will lead to greater interaction, educational exchanges, and the flow of ideas and people. Growing numbers of Israelis are now retiring to cheaper (and close-by) locations in Cyprus and Greece, while some Israeli businessmen are seeking residency in the UAE to avoid the heavy taxation at home. One appealing framework that has yet to take hold in Israel is its redefinition as a Mediterranean country: a liminal identity that offers a commonality between Christian-European nations such as Cyprus, Arab Muslim nations such as Egypt and Morocco, and the Jewish state. At a deeper symbolic level, such an identity could focus less on Israel’s specific locality and the weight of association with its holy sites, and more on mobility, movement, and exchange. Some Israelis think it is the only way ahead. Author AB Yehoshua wrote in 2014 that if Israel “wants to ensure itself a lasting existence . . . it must find a path of renewal by deepening its Mediterranean identity.”

Over the generations, Jews were highly effective in rising to the challenge of reshaping their identity. Will regional connectivity usher, not only riches and maybe security, but also a new ideational reincarnation?

This article is from “JSTribune“, from May 2022

הפוסט To the Middle East and beyond! Israel’s new connectivity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The order consolidated after World War II included aspects of power: The economic, technological, and military dominance of the United States and its democratic allies since 1945, and even more so, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. As well, the liberal order included a foundation of democratic values as guidelines for the conduct of international relations, including the protection of human rights, although the US did not always live up the standards it set.

China’s rise and the relative decline of US power are undermining the validity of this order. Furthermore, China is offering the world a successful state model, economically and in confronting the global health crisis, although it is not liberal, nor open like the western states, and its market economy is under government control.

Significant cracks have emerged at the core of the liberal world. The cradle of liberalism, Britain, has cut itself off from the European Union, the most ambitious liberal project of recent decades. Citizens of the US, the leader of this camp, democratically elected president Trump who expressed outspoken reservations about the domestic and international liberal projects, thus exposing the limits of American leadership of the liberal camp.

More deeply, some of the public in the West is expressing doubt about the ability of liberal democracies to deal with key global challenges, such as migration, economic disparities and health crises. Overall, the West failed to act against significant human rights crises, such as the civil war in Syria. Some of the most prominent democratic projects of the 1990s, such as the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa, have lost their moral conviction and shine, swept away in a tide of corruption and dysfunctional governance.

Some of the most ardent activists championing the liberal order in European and American civil society started devoting increasing time and resources to activity considered secondary in importance, not to mention esoteric, such as signage on bathrooms for various gender identifications and politically correct discourse to the point that many lost touch with the substantive global issues facing the international order. William Butler Yeats’ immortal lines are apt in this case: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”

The Ukraine crisis challenges the liberal order in at least two aspects. First, Russian moves, especially as they near a real invasion, are opposed to international norms that ban the declaration of war and the threat of force other than for self-defense, and territorial expansion through the use of force. Second, the very threat of war has bolstered Russia’s standing, for now.

THE UNDERMINING of the prevalent liberal order presents Israel with four issues.

irst, how to preserve the alliance with the US, leader of the liberal world, and at the same time conduct correct relations with the states challenging this order, especially Russia and China? The importance of this balance is heightened given the Russian military presence in Syria and the limitations it imposes on the freedom of action, which Israel reserves for itself in the skies over its north-eastern neighbor.

Additionally, this balance is required given the pressures Washington is exerting on Israel to decrease China’s economic footprint in Israel. The issue becomes even more complex since most Jews live outside Israel, especially in the US. Therefore, maneuvering among all these considerations will require advanced acrobatic skills, diplomatic juggling, and precise and sensitive navigation. This is a significant challenge that requires a strong cadre of experienced diplomats.

Second, Israel might enjoy the relaxation of pressure in the short run regarding its control of a disenfranchised population in the West Bank, but to the extent that this will be the outcome of the West’s decline, Israel could face long-term risks. The weakening of the US could weaken Israel, as well. A sizeable part of Israel’s material and symbolic power stems from its closeness to Washington. A US decline would project onto us, as well. It is hard to see Israel forging a close alliance with Beijing to replace the one with the US.

Third, a world with two competing focal power centers, Beijing and Washington, will be more closed. Israel has benefited from US-led globalization, an overarching process that enabled the flourishing of Israeli high-teach. A divided world will result in shrinking markets and offer fewer global opportunities for Israeli entrepreneurs. What is more, Chinese technological leadership, certainly a reasonable scenario, could challenge the access of Israeli technology experts and entrepreneurs who enjoy easy access to the US market.

Finally, global disagreements also resonate in Israel’s domestic arena. Contrary to the pervasive myth, Israel cannot dwell alone. Global divisions assume domestic dimensions, as well, and Israel’s divergent camps will find inspiration in such international developments. The weakening of liberal forces already echoes the weakness of the Israeli Left and the rise of nationalist right-wing parties in Europe is reminiscent of similar trends here.

A more nationalistic world will inevitably bolster national trends here because Zionism includes a dimension of domestic national Jewish response to external nationalist threats. After all, Polish antisemitism in the 1920s prompted the fourth wave of immigration to Israel and Nazi nationalism generated the fifth wave a decade later. A world in which everyone barricades themselves behind nationalist walls will presumably lead us to do the same.

In the final analysis, the tensions over Ukraine are the tip of a giant iceberg that will affect the most significant aspects of our lives here. It is important to follow developments closely. They are highly troubling and could constitute an initial indication of the type of challenges facing the international order and Israel in the years to come.

**The article was published on JPOST, 22 February 2022

הפוסט What does it mean for Israel to undermine the liberal global order? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean emerged in the last decade as a new focus of Israeli strategic interests. Traditionally, the region was an afterthought in Israeli thinking. It posed no major threat, nor did it hold a significant promise. However, This state of affairs saw a dramatic shift that accelerated in the last decade. The discovery of substantial gas depots in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and Israel’s newly acquired reliance on them for its energy needs turned Israeli attention West. Part of this turn to the sea includes a quasi-alliance with Greece and Cyprus and involvement in a nascent regional organization, the Cairo-based EastMed Gas Forum, founded by the Hellenic states, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority and grew later to include France. In part, with Israel’s encouragement, the US offers support, of sorts, to both the Israeli-Hellenic alliance and the Gas Forum, which it joined as an observer in March 2021. The EU is a natural ally; it extended support to the forum and entered it as an observer. With growing tensions between the Hellenic states and Turkey, the forum and the Israeli-Hellenic alliance may assume a more significant role. At a minimum, they offer European actors another framework to stabilize and possibly even benefit from the region.

הפוסט Israel’s Strategic Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel Must Restore Bipartisanship in the US Political System הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

True, Israel and the US enjoy a “special relationship” and personal proclivities do matter. Pro-Israel Jews around the president may indeed make a difference. However, US policy toward Israel will be shaped by broader American considerations. At least four come to mind.

First, the Biden administration is committed to reviving America’s global leadership through its alliances as ”force multipliers of our influence around the world,” in the words of incoming Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. To stress this point, White House press secretary Jen Psaki stated in the first briefing that the president will start his interaction with other nations by calling heads of allied states, beginning with Canada.

In the past, some of these allies, mostly the Europeans, had placed the Israeli-Palestinian issue on their common agenda with the US. Regional and intra-European realities have probably made the matter less urgent for Europeans. However, we should still expect a European nudge, at a minimum, to sustain the possibility of a two-state solution.

Second, the Biden administration will take a more internationalist approach toward global challenges, as opposed to former president Donald Trump’s America First vision. Hours after his inauguration, Biden signed executive orders that re-integrated the US into the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization. Therefore, an expected American return to a multinational negotiated approach toward Iran will not only be based on the merits of this specific case and American reluctance to go to war. It would also reflect a broader policy preference.

The failure of Trump’s strategy in slowing down Tehran’s nuclear project and senior incoming US officials’ involvement in the Iranian-American talks in the Obama era would further support a multinational negotiation goal.

In the past, an internationalist approach also included support for basic tenets of the international normative framework, such as the prohibition on territorial expansion by force. One potential implication would be a possible review of Trump-era policy stances that clash with international law, such as recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This, while taking into account that rolling back policies is not as easy as launching them.

Third, the Biden administration is committed to reviving the global march of liberal democracy. This will restore Washington’s strategic framework since the Cold War, which advocated for a more democratic world both on pragmatic and ideological grounds. In the Israeli context, that would mean a potential growing unease in Washington with the decline in the quality of Israeli democracy. In particular, Israel’s ongoing control of millions of Palestinians and public displays may seem to contradict liberal-democracy, such as the Nation State law.

True, the US overlooked democratic deficits in many of its allies, mostly during the Cold War. However, in our case, Biden may need to respond to voices from progressive circles that would like to end Israeli control over the Palestinians or award them full rights.

Finally, the US under Biden will probably continue viewing China as a rival. Beijing’s economic and political rise and its growing assertiveness under its current leadership challenge US hegemony and are bound to lead to an American response. This, regardless of who sits in the White House. US allies, such as Israel, who aspire to benefit from China’s economic expansion, would need to develop even more nuanced policies that would balance pressures from these two great powers. Israel was able to do so in the last few years, but its approach may be tested by heightened great power competition.

Taking this broader view regarding US-Israel relations is essential. It would provide not only a better understanding of American policy in the region on the issues that are already ongoing – such as the Iranian challenge – but will also offer new opportunities for American-Israeli engagement. For example, Israel is not a significant player in the global effort to deal with climate change. However, the incoming US administration promised to focus on the issue, creating new possibilities for joint projects with Israel’s innovation ecosystem that would benefit not just the alliance but also humanity.

**The article was published on Jpost, 27 January 2021

הפוסט The Broader Drivers of Biden-era Israeli-American Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As indicated by the normalization of relations with the Emirates, significant aspects of foreign policy have been farmed out to other nuclei of power. Indeed, even the foreign minister was excluded from the decision-making process regarding the deal with the Gulf state.

Some of the ministry’s authority has been poached by the prime minister, acting as a “king-diplomat,” while others have been handed to relatively new agencies, such as the Strategic Affairs Ministry.

The low pay of Foreign Ministry diplomats even prompted an unprecedented 2019 strike at all Israeli missions abroad.

The 2020 appointment of a new, energetic minister, Gabi Ashkenazi, has raised hopes of change. However, power struggles within the coalition signal the challenges he is facing in advancing the Foreign Ministry, and indeed may lead to his early departure from his position.

In the US and the UK, where once-glorious foreign ministries have also been weakened, legislators were the ones who pushed for the restoration of the foreign service. In the US, lawmakers blocked President Donald Trump’s proposed 30% cuts in the State Department budget in recent years. The Democratic minority in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations even issued a comprehensive report recently providing in-depth analysis of the difficulties confronting the State Department and proposing 10 concrete recommendations for its rehabilitation.

The parallel British parliamentary committee conducts relatively close oversight of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The committee is conducting eight probes these days (including the hearing of witnesses and study of documents) on issues such as UK-Iran relations and the foreign ministry’s response to the global health crisis.

The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2020

הפוסט The Foreign Ministry deserves support from the Knesset הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Ashkenazi revitalized the IDF, now he can do the same to Foreign Ministry הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The three titanic clashes of the 20th century – two world wars and the Cold War – ended with victory for the democratic camp, although often requiring alliances with non-democracies. The democratic advantage in war is not limited to democratic Great Powers. At the end of the 1990s, scholars Allan Stam and Dan Reiter showed that of the 297 wars between states in the years 1816 to 1990, democracies (most of which were not Great Powers, obviously) won almost all the wars they initiated and two-thirds of those imposed on them.

Elections are one explanation for the “democratic dividend” in war. Leaders of democratic states fear voters will depose them due to failed wars and therefore opt for wars they can win. Public trauma in the wake of war can unseat even a strong, established party. Such was the case with Israel’s Mapai/Ma’arach. In 1977, voter fury at the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about its downfall after 44 years of uninterrupted rule in the pre-state Jewish political entity (The Yeshuv) and later the State of Israel.

A nation’s participation in the choice of its leaders imbues government decisions such as a decision to go to war with an added dimension of legitimacy, generating greater identification among soldiers with the combat goals. It is true that non-democratic states, such as the Soviet Union, were successful in mobilizing public support during difficult times, such as World War II. However, the repressive nature of the Soviet state made it easier for the Germans to recruit to their side over 100,000 Soviet citizens (some of them prisoners of war they had captured). Moreover, in the final historic analysis, both of these political systems that challenged democracy – Nazism and Marxist-Leninism – were defeated.

Another explanation for the advantages democracies enjoy in war pertains to their institutional structure. Democratic leaders have less room to maneuver because constitutions, lawmakers and supreme courts provide checks and balances on their power. This results in tighter oversight over the executive branch of government, and, in turn, greater effectiveness of a decision to go to war, a decision on how to conduct a war and what lessons to learn from it.

Israel beat Egypt in 1967 inter alia because Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser undermined Israeli-Egyptian stability through a series of irresponsible declarations and measures, while his army was engaged elsewhere in a far-off war in Yemen. In a better-balanced regime, such declarations and steps would probably not be possible. The institutional balance is thus very important. As scholars Philip Potter and Matt Baum showed in a 2015 study, even autocracies in which constraints are placed on the ruler enjoy greater success in foreign policy and defense.

Democracies succeed in war because of not only elections and limits on power, but also because they are underpinned by values. A democratic culture that enables domestic and external criticism is a significant force multiplier. For example, writing in a 1982 opinion piece in Haaretz, Major Gershon Hacohen backed the right of a senior officer to resign in order to avoid leading his troops on a mission with which he disagreed. Hacohen’s unusual stand earned him a reprimand and a discharge. He was re-instated several years later, rising to the rank of Major General and contributing greatly to the Israel Defense Forces with his original thinking and outspoken views.

A true democratic culture empowers individuals, encourages their initiative and commitment, and makes them more militarily effective. On the other hand, nondemocratic states repress personal initiative, especially by military personnel, to prevent them directing it against the regime. In a comprehensive study in the 1990s, scholar Kenneth Pollack showed that lack of initiative on the part of military commanders in Arab armies was one of the main reasons for their persistent failures in wars against Israel. Similarly, non-democratic regimes divert significant intelligence resources to repressing their population at the expense of developing an effective an intelligence apparatus directed at the enemy. In this respect, too, Israel enjoys an advantage over its non-democratic neighbors.

Finally, open and democratic societies have been more successful in mining creative talents in high-tech, entrepreneurship and innovation, making the democratic West more prosperous and technologically and scientifically advanced, in terms of military effectiveness, too. True, non-democratic states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were able to reach some scientific achievements. However, only democracies managed to preserve their scientific and technological advantages in the long term. A technological edge is particularly important for Israel’s security. After all, it is this edge in technology that allows it to compensate for its limited human and material resources, when compared to its foes.

A strong democracy is therefore vital for Israel’s security. Fair elections and regime change, checks and balances with an emphasis on restraining the power of the executive branch, an open and democratic culture of criticism, and the ability to attract and retain the creative classes are the pillars of an effective Israeli national security. Undermining them means not only a different political order, but also a real threat to the security of the state.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and an Associate Professor in international relations at Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Democracy is Essential to Israel’s National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, it seems that the glorious days of the ministry, if they ever truly existed, have long passed. Ever since the current government was formed in 2015, there has been no full-time foreign minister. The ministry, which – despite its prestige – has always struggled for a leading role in the decision-making process, is generally excluded from significant aspects of Israel’s foreign and defense policy. Salaries of the ministry’s officials are low, especially when considering the strict screening process and the job requirements. Moreover, some of the responsibilities it used to have in the past were transferred to other ministries such as the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs.

The crisis in the ministry is also radiating outwards, and in recent years there has been a sharp drop in the number of candidates for the competitive cadet course. In 2012, there were 2,773 candidates whereas in 2017 only 1,374 candidates started the screening process. In an attempt to change the situation, employees at the ministry decided to take measures and in 2014 they even shut down the headquarters and embassies for the first time in Israel’s history. In late August 2018, the support staff in the ministry (which accounts to some 60% of personal abroad), staged another strike, with little notice.

The crisis in our ‘diplomatic kingdom’ is not unique to Israel. Technology, especially the digital media, allows governments to interact directory, with foreign officials and publics, making diplomatic interventions almost redundant. The decline of the nation-state and the rise of other important non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international aid organizations, and even global cities, have weakened the need for conventional diplomacy.

But despite this state of affairs, Israel should not neglect its foreign service. In fact, it is needed today more than ever before. First and foremost, in order to prepare for global power transformations. The first change that requires strong foreign service is the rise of important new global players, such as China, but also India and in our region, Russia. We are transitioning from a world of American dominance to a world of multiple powers, that are likely to intervene in regional politics, such as ours. In such circumstances, small countries like Israel, will be required to refined diplomatic skills in order to navigate safely among the various foci of power. In recent decades Israel was in a convenient position: the US was the dominant player in the global system, and we were its closest allies. A vibrant Jewish community in the US has helped us and has been part of an effective pro-Israel lobby. It was often sufficient to appeal to Washington in order to achieve political goals in international forums such as the UN security council. However, in the new world, whereby Israel is required to maintain good relations with both the US and China (in spite of the tension between them), a more sophisticated approach will be required. Israel needs a corpus of skilled diplomats that will be able to cut the right alliances and lead Israel safely among nations.

The second change that requires a strong ministry of foreign affairs is the identity of the emerging powers. After five centuries of European and then American dominance, the 21st century is expected to be the Asian century. China has already overtaken or matched the US on a number of indicators, such as high-speed trains and supercomputers. This will require a significant shift in our mindset. The Euro-American scene is familiar to us, and to a certain extent we are part of it. For example, some of our prime ministers attended elite institutions in the US. The current prime minister (as well as the education minister) were even had American citizenship in the past. Our familiarity with the Euro-Atlantic powers is a result of demography. In the past few centuries, most of the Jewish people have lived in Europe, North America and the Middle East. As a result, we share – in spite of some extremely difficult episodes such as the holocaust – common cultural, religious and historical roots with the European world and its extension in the new world.

This is not the case in Asia. Despite the hectic backpackers’ travels and vipassana workshops that Israelis attend, Asian culture, values and history – are foreign to most Israelis. In order to conduct ourselves effectively in a world where Far-East countries are so important, a professional corpus of skilled and specialized diplomats is required. The foreign service is the natural place to build such a cadre of experts that will make it easier for Israel to face the rising powers. This will require the ministry to invest even more in training and in developing area specializations.

Finally, dispersing the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between various institutions and ministries leads to duplication, inefficiency and the absence of a clear and sharp message. Logically, there should be a concentration of powers in one ministry with a broad outlook and an accurate reflection of the positions of international players with whom the ministry is in continuous contact. One example is the current effort against BDS. Instead of the traditional leadership of the ministry on the matter, aspects of it were securitized. Recent reports indicated that the Israeli security Agency (Shabak) is guiding the security personal in Israel’s airports with an eye towards limiting criticism of Israel’s control over the territories. This lead to some counterproductive outcomes such as an aggressive questioning at the airport this summer of a leading Jewish philanthropist, Meyer Koplow, and a leading Jewish American journalist, Peter Beinart.

In the past, the Zionist movement coped well with global power transitions and was effective in dealing with the fall the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through the Balfour Declaration and all the way to the alliance with the US in recent decades. We are facing a similar moment now, and the Foreign Ministry is perhaps the most important player to help Israel cope with the change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, is very much needed.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Segev – a former combat soldier, officer and medical doctor – was elected in 1992 as a member of the right wing Tzomet party. In 1994 he left the party. The following year he was appointed minister of energy in the second Rabin government. He also was made a member of the security cabinet, a group of select ministers that discuss and decide on the most important security matters. Although Dr. Segev served as a minister for less than a year, his vote allowed Prime Minister Rabin to secure a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on a crucial vote for the implementation of the controversial peace deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1996, Dr. Segev was ejected from politics.

Then followed a dramatic fall from grace. In 2004, he was convicted of credit card fraud. In 2005 he received a five-year jail sentence for an attempted drug smuggling operation into Israel. Following his 2007 early release, he left the country for Nigeria, where he relaunched his medical career, due in part to the fact that his medical license was revoked in Israel following his drug-related conviction.

Israeli authorities allege that he established contact with Iranian intelligence agents in Nigeria in 2012. According to the indictment, Dr. Segev provided information to Tehran’s agents and assisted them in trying to create relationships with Israeli business figures, mostly veterans of the security establishment.

Several Israelis were convicted of aiding Iran in the 1990s and 2000s, mostly businesspeople who sold Tehran dual-use or military products. Never before, however, has a senior Jewish-Israeli (former) establishment figure been convicted of spying for Iran, or indeed any other Middle Eastern country. Dr. Segev’s case highlights three issues regarding the current state and context of IranianIsraeli competition.

First, the episode highlights that Iran and Israel are engaged in a truly global intelligence struggle. Much of it is driven by Israel’s concerns over the militarized aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. This Israeli-Iranian competition includes, among other means, intelligence cooperation and alliances for both sides with regional and global partners. Former Israeli intelligence officials suggested that they warned

Dr. Segev in the early 2000s that Hezbollah was trying to make contact with him. It is highly likely that Hezbollah’s past efforts were the basis for Iranian contact with Dr. Segev a decade later. Israel, it seems, was assisted by Equatorial Guinea, which arrested Dr. Segev and repatriated him.

This is clearly a sophisticated struggle with bold moves on both sides. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted in a dramatic April 30 press conference of stealing the archive of the Iranian nuclear program; now, Tehran’s ability to recruit a former member of Israel’s security cabinet has been revealed. At the same time, however, one wonders how long Israel may have known about Dr. Segev’s Iranian connections. Perhaps he served (knowingly or otherwise) as a double agent before being arrested? While we cannot know what the next chapter in this spy saga will be, it is quite safe to predict that more is to come.

Secondly, the Iranian revelation came after a string of dramatic Israeli operational and intelligence successes against Iran and its allies. As noted, Israeli intelligence agents stole an entire Iranian archive, and further humiliated their foes by making the achievement public in an April press conference. On May 10, Israel conducted a massive attack on some fifty Iranian targets in Syria, demonstrating both operational and intelligence dominance. In June, word emerged that Israel was able to convince Moscow to pressure Iran to withdraw its forces and allies from the Syrian-Israeli border. All this took place against the backdrop of unprecedented coordination between Jerusalem and Washington.

Israelis have had to exhibit super-human humility in light of these achievements and the sense of invincibility they have invoked. In the past, Israel miscalculated and fell into strategic traps that led to exorbitant costs during the wars of 1973 and 1982 due to an inflated sense of relative military and intelligence prowess. In this respect, Tehran provided Israel with an important reminder about the limits of Jerusalem’s power and effectiveness.

Finally, responses in Israel to the affair show that Israeli-Iranian tensions are not simply a foreign and security matter, driven by the clash of two of the strongest countries in the Middle East. The Iranian threat also is being used to advance internal political positions.

Israeli right-wing politicians were quick to a make a direct connection between Dr. Segev’s vote in 1995 in favor of the peace deal with the PLO and the current spying allegations. The specific implication is to further delegitimize the Oslo peace process. There is also a deeper effort hinted at here: leftists are traitors, and what seems like an effort to reach peace is, in fact, an act of treachery. A hint of this came in the words of Justice Minister, Ayelet Shakked, who stated on June 18 that Dr. Segev started with “ideological treachery” and then moved to “treason against the state.”

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council) 

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

First, there is security-related anxiety. Many view the Arab citizens of Israel as a potential fifth column. Israel was born out of a civil war with the local Arab population, and is still around with a generally hostile Arab World. Yet, Israel is very strong and provides effective security, both domestically and externally. It can deal with such a challenge. Moreover, even if Palestinian citizens of Israel identify with the Palestinian people, their involvement in subversive activity against the state has been negligible. Even in the early days of the state, when the scars of the 1947-9 war were fresh, defense officials believed that Israel’s Arab citizens were sufficiently loyal to join the military (IDF). In 1953, then-Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon ordered that Arabs be drafted to the IDF. Thousands flocked to recruitment centers before the initiative was revoked. An interim response to the security-related fear could be forming a coalition in the Knesset that enjoys the prestige of security professionals but leads a mainly civilian agenda. That was the Rabin way: A revered IDF Chief-of-Staff and Defense Minister, who as prime minister was heavily involved in inherently civilian issues such as education and health. The current health challenge even creates an even easier framework for such an approach.

The personal anxiety over a coalition with Arab Members of Knesset (MKs) stems from the repercussions of cultural reservations and the desire to maintain separate spaces (as reflected in polls among Jews) in politics, too. In fact, many spaces, such as the health system, and some governing coalitions in local government are completely integrated. The century-old separation between the two populations is increasingly eroding even in its symbolic dimensions. In 2019, Dr. Haj Yehia was appointed as Chairman of the Board of Bank Leumi, an institution originally established to serve the Zionist movement.

The anxiety over national identity is perhaps the most significant. Many are concerned that inclusion of a non-Zionist Arab party in the coalition poses a threat to the state’s Jewish and Zionist identity. The March 2020 news conference at which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu counted the number of Zionist MKs versus the Arab non-Zionist ones touched on this fear. This is a bit peculiar. in most sectors of Israeli politics, ideology does not appear as central as it was in the past. Very few parties, if all, presented platforms in the last few elections. Under these circumstances, the insistence on ideological commitment should be downplayed. A potential, practical solution is to leave unresolved ideological issues out of any agreement with Arab parties.

Second, on the institutional level, a measure of creativity could alleviate the identity anxieties harbored by some in the Jewish public. For example, the Arab parties could support the government in Knesset votes but grant their MKs freedom to vote according to their conscience on certain issues, or they could decide that only some of the parties that make up the Joint List would vote with the government but not all of them. A strong arbitration mechanism would also help in this regard.

Third, Zionist institutions have a history of cooperation with non-Zionist elements. The Jewish Agency, for example, which was the central tool of Zionist development until the establishment of the state, was formed in 1929 as a partnership with non-Zionist forces (although they subsequently dropped out). In fact, most Israeli governments have included non-Zionist elements, i.e. the ultra-Orthodox parties. In recent years, it was Netanyahu who cooperated with the Arab parties on several political measures, such as mobilizing their Knesset support in 2019 for his appointee as State Comptroller.

Additionally, contrary to public perception, there are precedents for the inclusion of Arab parties in coalitions. In fact, up until the 1970s, almost all coalitions included Arab slates such as the Arab Democratic Party and the Progress and Development Party. Many tended to dismiss these parties as satellites of the powerful ruling Mapai party rather than authentic Arab representatives. Still, some of their members (such as Elias Nakhleh) took to arms against the establishment of the state in the War of Independence. But once the war ended, they were elected to the Knesset and led their parties to membership in coalitions. At the very least, this is an important symbolic precedent.

Finally, it should be recalled that great Zionist leaders, such as Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Yitzhak Gruenbaum were committed to minority coalitions in Russia and Poland, that would include Jewish representation. Jabotinsky foresaw the future Jewish state with Arabs among its top political echelons. A coalition consisting of Jewish and Arab MKs members would also be important for Israel’s foreign relations, for example in helping revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and fostering regional cooperation with Arab states. Such a coalition would even have public diplomacy value in deflecting accusations at international fora that Israel is a racist state.

The anxieties over the inclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the coalition are understandable. However, under current circumstances and given an orderly response to the real fears, the Blue and White party led by three former IDF chiefs must and can create a partnership with the Joint List.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Associate Professor of international affairs at Haifa University and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He is also a visiting researcher at Stanford University’s Political Science Department.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט In With the Arabs: The Joint List Should Be Part of the Coalition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

More broadly, the visit is part of the Israeli “pivot”, of sorts, to Asia. This is the Prime Minister’s second visit to China in three years. Only in February, he visited Singapore and Australia. Israeli President, Reuven Rivlin, traveled to India in November 2016 and to Vietnam in March 2017. The institutional framework that supports the “pivot” is also being expanded. In February, the Prime Minister (who is also the Foreign Minister) announced that the units responsible for China and India in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be upgraded.

However, this is not only a story about economic cooperation. The broader, global context of the “pivot” is the transformation in great power politics. Asia’s economic and technological rise is bound to lead Asian nations to expand their military and political power. China’s economic prowess already equals the US’ (according to some measures); while the West’s centuries-long hegemony is being shaken in the last decade as both Western Europe and the US faced a number of major political and economic crises, some of which are still unfolding. Israel, and the Zionist movement before, had always sought a great power ally. The “pivot” to Asia, is simply an adaptation of the old policy to new global realities.

However, three question are in order

First, can Israel get close to China without risking its “special relationship” with the United States? China’s rise to great power status and the specific challenges it poses to American hegemony – both in terms of power and in terms of norms – have already strained AmericanChinese relations. The Trump administration seems to further exacerbate the tension, mostly over trade issues. Steven Bannon, the President’s chief strategist, predicted (before the elections) that within a decade Washington and Beijing would go to war with each other. The Falcon deal incident, in which Israel canceled under American pressure (in 2000) an agreement to sell advanced surveillance aircraft to China, is a reminder of the difficulties of the balancing act required from Israel. For this reason, it is convenient for Israel to stress the economic dimension of its relationship with China, rather than a strategic agenda.

Second, will Israel ever be able to develop relations with China that are as close as its relations with the United States? Some of the fundamental building blocks of the IsraeliAmerican “special relationship”– a large Jewish community, an effective pro-Israel lobby – are simply not there. Israel and China further lack the deeper common Judeo-Christian tradition that oils aspects of Israeli-American affinity. Hence the Israeli effort to stress, when talking to Chinese, the similarities of modern states that reflect ancient traditions that both presumably share.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly: how would a close Chinese-Israeli relationship affect Israel’s own democracy, already under strain lately. After all, a state’s internal makings are also affected by the global structures of power, and the state’s alliance in the international arena. It seems that the Chinese stress power and historical rights as a source for legitimate action in the international arena, rather than universal norms. Those in Israel who prefer such an approach might use the example set by the new global power as a justification for a similar approach in Israeli foreign and security policy. Moreover, China traditionally prefers not to intervene in other states’ internal affairs, and is unlikely to comment on the quality of internal Israeli democracy and human rights the way Washington and Western European countries do. A growing role for China in the international community, and a closer alliance with China, are expected to diminish, therefore, the pressure Israel is facing – especially from civil society circles in the West – as it continues to control the Palestinians, and as its democracy is weakening.

Small states, such as Israel, do not always have much choice in the global competition between superpowers. Yet, as Israel reshapes its global alliances, we should be aware of the constraints and costs of getting closer to the rising power from the east.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Netanyahu Goes to China: Three Questions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UN Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities in Greece, Israel, and Egypt, in the last few years. China is also building its first overseas naval station in Djibouti. These moves are part of Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road vision, and will allow it to further secure its crucial sea line of communications to Europe. China’s maritime actions in the region signal that it accepts the responsibilities of a rising world power. In the spring of 2015, its naval forces evacuated not only hundreds of Chinese citizens, but also hundreds of other nationals from war-torn Yemen. There are also early signs of a more direct Chinese military and naval involvement in the region. In August 2016, a Chinese admiral visited Syria, and a month earlier China completed the delivery of a third corvette to the Algerian Navy. The Chinese also conducted a joint drill with the Russians in the Mediterranean in May 2015.

Global superpowers like China and Russia are not the only ones to pose a challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Several sub-state armed groups share the stage. Back in 2006, the Lebanese Hezbollah damaged an Israeli naval vessel, killing four sailors, when it effectively fired a land-sea c-802 missile at the Israeli flagship Saar 5 Class corvette INS Hanit. In recent years, Islamist groups have attacked a merchant ship in the Suez Canal and Egyptian navy vessels on the Mediterranean coast. A senior NATO official expressed concern earlier this year that an even graver threat will evolve in the central Mediterranean, following the expansion of ISIS in Libya.

Yet, states are still important in the maritime regional security architecture. American engagement in the region has waxed and waned since their navy operated against the Barbary pirates in the early 19^th century. In the latest chapter of American naval power projection in the region, the 6^th Fleet presence declined dramatically. At least for the US and China, and to a lesser extent even Russia, the eastern Mediterranean is a peripheral region, far from their core interests. Unlike great powers, local actors will remain engaged in the region due to the dictates of geography. For the regional actors, defending their shores and their sea lines of communications is a core interest: Not only because they are here to stay, but the discovery of offshore gas beginning in the 1990s raises the stakes for Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and possibly other regional actors. Indeed, regional actors have been building their naval capabilities, including power projection abilities in the last few years. In 2016, Israel received its fifth (out of six) German-built diesel submarines. A year earlier it signed a deal with the same German shipyard to purchase four multitask corvettes.  In June, Egypt took delivery of the French-built Mistral class landing helicopter dock, and is expected to receive a second one by the fall. This year Egypt also began the local construction of the first of four French-designed Gowind Corvettes, purchased marine helicopters from Russia, commissioned a missile corvette donated by Russia, and a FREMM class French-Italian frigate. Talks of a possible deal for two more French corvettes commenced in 2015. Egypt also took delivery of two American fast missile boats during the summer of 2015, completing an order for four. Cairo also purchased from the United States submerged Harpoon missiles for its submarine fleet.

Similarly, the Turkish Navy, a nine-century-old institution – continued the expansion of its power projection capabilities. In April 2016, Ankara opened an overseas military base in Qatar, which will include naval units. A Turkish shipyard began in May the construction of a landing helicopter dock (LHD) to be completed by 2021. President Erdoğan hinted that his country would move to construct a fully-fledged carrier in the next decade.

Robust regional navies suggest both risks and opportunities. On the risk side, growing naval prowess enhances the chances that an escalating regional conflict can turn violent. Turkish self-confidence on the seas, for example, can lead Ankara to take an even more assertive position over Cyprus’ gas prospecting. In turn, this can affect great powers by forcing them into conflicts they would rather avoid. A possible Hezbollah-Israel clash, for example, might expose the American forces operating in the region to allegations that they support the Israeli effort by virtue of the American-Israeli alliance. Strong regional actors could also humiliate, and even constrain, great power activity. Back in 1968, The Israeli Airforce shot down Soviet jets over Egypt, and more recently it was Turkey that downed a Russian jet. Both events embarrassed Moscow, and in effect, presented a constraint of sorts on its freedom of action.

Effective regional navies also create opportunities. They can serve as allies. After all, three strong regional navies – Egypt, Turkey, and Israel – have solid (though at times, strained) relations with the United States. As such, they can offer a compensation of sorts to the limited presence of the US Navy in the region. Even if not fully-fledged allies of the United States on the waters, some of the regional powers, notably Israel and Turkey, surely share America’s concern over the anti-access/area denial “bubble” the Russians created on Syria’s shores. This is fertile ground for cooperation.

Therefore, although external powers are yet again active in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and despite being challenged by non-state actors from below, regional states still matter in shaping the maritime security environment. The increased capabilities, and expanded reach of the Egyptian, Turkish, and Israeli navies coupled with the Russian and American presence in the region, as well as Chinese ambitions there, all create a more complex environment. In a final analysis, this complexity presents opportunities for the United States, as most of the strong regional actors are closer to Washington than to Moscow. This remains the case, even with the current glitches between the United States and its traditional allies Turkey, Egypt and Israel. If Washington plays this new iteration of a maritime regional “great game” well, it has much to benefit. However, in order to exploit the potential benefits of the relationship with regional states, Washington needs to re-build trust with these regional actors. A clear signal from Washington that the East Mediterranean remains a high priority for the United States, would be a good start.

(originally published by the Hoover Institution)

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Egypt-Saudi Agreements: Policy Analysis and Regional Implications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

First, the agreement between the parties is another testimony of the close relationship between Cairo and Riyadh as part of the anti-Iranian axis. Within this alliance, Saudi Arabia had provided massive economic support to General al-Sisi’s regime and is now using the leverage it has to bring this issue to a close.

The islands’ history serves as a further reminder of the depth of Riyadh and Cairo’s relationship. The islands were part of Saudi Arabia until 1950 when Egypt gained effective control over them with Saudi acquiescence, as part of Cairo’s campaign against Israel. Herman Elits, who was the US Ambassador in Egypt in the heyday of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, wrote in 2004 that Saudi Arabia refused to accept one of the islands from Israel, during the years in which Israel controlled the Islands (after the 1967 Six-Day War and until the implementation of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty). According to Elits, the Saudi position, which was based on commitment to the common Arab stance and to Egypt, was that the land should be returned to them only in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement.

Secondly, the peaceful resolution of this issue is part of a broader set of bilateral agreements that will benefit both countries. One such project is a joint initiative to build a bridge for transportation across the Red Sea that will connect southern Sinai and northwestern Saudi Arabia. This bridge, if it is built, will enable a flow of interaction between Arab Africa and Arab Asia. Such a bridge can also increase the volume of trade between the two continents, assisting the Egyptian economy.

Thirdly, both countries chose to resolve the issue bilaterally. The international system and international law in particular furnish disputing parties with multiple channels, fora, and norms to resolve conflicts. A similar approach is seen in some of the other regional disputes, such as the conflict between Israel and Lebanon over the demarcation of their respective international maritime boundary. This is another reminder of the limitations of international mediation – both in terms of substance and process – when coming to resolve inter-state conflicts in the region.

Finally, the agreement is the first formal territorial change in the Arab world since the beginning of the political instability in the region in late 2010. It is not a change in the full sense of the word, as the land was on a “loan” of sorts. And yet, it was significant enough for the numerous Egyptians that protested against the move. While a number of countries like Syria, Iraq and Libya are de-facto divided, the international norm of “border fixity” was strong enough till now to prevent any such formal change. The regional instability is likely to bring more territorial change, especially in disputed areas but perhaps also in formerly unitary states such as Syria.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s island diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But in a more nuanced analysis, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, chief of staff of Israel’s armed forces, admitted that while those risks are real, it is likely that for now, Iran will abide by the plan.

The deal reduces Iran’s danger in three ways. First, the existential threat Israel was about to face from an Iranian nuclear weapon is, at a minimum, delayed. It seems reasonable to accept greater Iranian regional reach in exchange for suppressing the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack. Moreover, the regime could divert little of the deal’s financial dividends from the domestic arena, where they would preserve its legitimacy.

Second, opening the channels between Washington and Tehran can facilitate joint action in cases where American, Iranian and indeed even Israeli interests overlap, such as opposing the Islamic State. After all, in the newly chaotic Middle East, there are no friends and enemies, just frenemies: states collide on one front, but cooperate on another. More broadly, talking is always better than shooting. Since the mid-1960s, Washington’s ability to talk to Israel’s foes has benefited the Jewish state and could do so yet again.

Finally, the agreement enhances the chances, small as they are, that Iran will fundamentally alter its posture. The agreement is expected to generate greater interaction between Iran and the world as Tehran is readmitted to global networks of trade and finance. If hardliners’ concerns about foreign infiltration are accurate, Iran’s expected participation in the global economic order might moderate, weaken or constrain the current regime.

Like almost all problems in the Middle East, there are no optimal solutions to the Iranian challenge: a gain on one side of the scales is bound to create some costs on the other. Yet, at least for now, the agreement reduces the immediate threat Israel, and perhaps the region at large, faces.

(originally published in the New York Times)

הפוסט The Threat From Iran Has Been Greatly Reduced הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Do not let a humorous President Obama (“John Boehner has already invited Netanyahu to speak at my funeral”) confuse you. The tension between Washington and Jerusalem is not simply about lack of chemistry between leaders. There are fundamental differences between the two countries over policy questions.

The Obama administration is about to place its trust (but verify) in an agreement with Iran over the latter’s militarized nuclear program, while Israel’s government does not believe this to be an effective route. Washington would prefer that Israel relaunches talks with the Palestinians with a view to a two-state solution, while Jerusalem has no intention to do so. But the countries faced policy differences in the past, and overcame them without eroding their strategic alliance. Israel will probably adapt to a P5+1 agreement with Iran, and may even secure some compensation for it.

President Obama may prefer a two-state solution, but he is unlikely to make it a priority in his remaining time in office. Moreover, some experienced civil servants — think Gen. Amos Gilad and Ambassador Daniel B. Shapiro for example — are handling in an effective way core aspects of the relationship.

But there are other concerns. First, support for Israel in the United States is slowly becoming a partisan issue. This threatens the bipartisan cornerstone of the alliance and can create damaging consequences. Some American Jews, for example, might be pushed to make the unpleasant choice between supporting their government or Israel’s.

Second, long-term trends in Israel suggest a weakening of liberal democracy, even without the continued Israeli control over the Palestinians. In the long run this will weaken the common values of our relationship. Washington’s true allies are those with which it shares not only interests, but also democratic ideals.

The combination of these two trends may explain why the Israeli public did not punish Prime Minister Netanyahu in the recent elections for his part in the deterioration of US-Israeli relations. In the past, Israelis voted against candidates who clashed with the U.S. But once these clashes could be explained in Israel as reflecting a different set of values, or the result of partisan positions, the political cost of a rift with our greatest ally went dramatically down.

(originally published in the New York Times)

הפוסט Israeli-U.S. Relations May Deteriorate at the Foundation, Not the Surface הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Engaging with Political Islam: In contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish.

2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma can, in the long run, bring to power a Sunni legitimate regime that may be more amenable to peaceful relations to Israel. In the more immediate future, it signals the weakening of the anti-Israeli axis, led by Iran and Syria. Iran’s ability to project power on Israel’s immediate environment has undoubtedly declined. The Syrian crisis also offered Israel opportunities to improve ties with Jordan and Turkey. These opportunities have already been partially exploited over the past months. Israel and Jordan are tacitly coordinating their policy vis-à-vis the Syrian front, while Israel and Turkey are in the midst of mending their relations.

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli officials have also recently divulged that Israel had already taken a number of preventative measures, including the erection of a new electronic fence along the existing Israeli-Syrian line (announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu at the beginning of January) and the deployment of elite ground forces there.

A week before the terror threat statement, on February 3rd, the British Sunday Times reported that the IDF has drafted a plan to create a 16 kilometer-wide “security zone” on the Syrian side of the current ceasefire line on the Golan, presumably to enhance security on the Israeli side.

But these two challenges – Lebanon and Syria – are not identical. For one, the Lebanon arena of the 1980s and 1990s never included the type of weaponry that could still plausibly be used on the Syrian front. Further, Israel’s 15 year-long deployment in the “security zone” should give us reason to pause, before Israel rushes to create a new one in Syria.

Most of all, it is far from clear if the “security zone” in Lebanon was indeed necessary. At least from the early 1990s, if not earlier, Israel’s main foe in Lebanon was Hezbollah, and not the Palestinian organizations that had triggered Israel’s initial drive into Lebanon. Hezbollah, unlike the Palestinians, did not try to infiltrate Israeli territory but rather focused its efforts on the Israeli military personnel deployed in Lebanon.

This is an important difference, because the “security zone” was designed primarily to defend against possible infiltrations into Israel, but it was maintained at the cost of some 20 Israeli fatalities a year on average, even when no infiltrations were attempted. Indeed, to date, Israel’s defensive posture against Hezbollah is based on deterrence, not on an actual presence in Lebanese territory.

The second cautionary note from Israel’s 1985-2000 “security zone” experience in Lebanon is that it benefitted Hezbollah far more than it assisted Israel. The organization gained legitimacy, status, and power in the domestic Lebanese political arena, by portraying itself as the only true opposition to the Israeli presence in South Lebanon. By the time Israeli forces left Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah had become the most dominant organization in Lebanon with its own “state within a state” apparatus.

Less than two decades earlier, when Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon, Hezbollah did not even exist; in effect, Israel created the rationale for a resistance movement to its occupation of Lebanese land.

The comparison to today’s situation is clear: If Israel has direct military engagements with the global jihad forces, such as al-Qaida offshoots active on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, Israel’s actions might once again indirectly lead to the creation of an effective and highly motivated opponent, such as it has not yet faced in earnest on this front until now.

The third lesson to consider is the broad strategic outlook for Israel. By helping Hezbollah, indirectly, to build itself in Lebanon, Israel handed Iran a real lever over Jerusalem’s freedom of action. Various reports indicated that in calculating possible moves against the Iranian nuclear program, Jerusalem is affected by the possibility that Hezbollah will shell Israeli territory as it did in the 2006 war. We cannot anticipate now, who might face Israel in Syria, but we should consider the effects of this possible friction on Israel’s future freedom of action.

All this is not to say that the challenges on the Golan should be treated lightly. Israel may indeed face new threats in the wake of the demise of the Assad regime in Syria and will need to deal with them. Yet, as Israel learned painfully in Lebanon, some solutions merely lead to new, and more menacing, threats. A solution based on a “security zone” in all likelihood falls into this category.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Why Israel Shouldn’t Consider a ‘Security Zone’ in Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Weak Neighboring States:<br> Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The public debate in Israel about whether Jerusalem should order a strike on Iran’s nuclear program is surprisingly frank. Politicians and policymakers often discuss the merits of an attack in public; over the past year, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have sparred regularly and openly with former Mossad director Meir Dagan, the most prominent opponent of an Israeli operation. But much of the conversation is focused on whether Israel should strike, not on what might happen if it does — in other words, the result on the “day after.”

Read the full article at Foreign Affairs

הפוסט What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.