As the dust begins to settle from the wars of the past decade, a growing realization emerges: From the ruins of Gaza, Bint Jbeil, and Aleppo will rise the new political order that will define the Middle East for the coming decades. Those leading the rebuilding efforts will be the ones shaping the region’s political future.

The struggle over the narrative of reconstruction places Israel at a critical crossroads – whether to remain in the role of a destroyer or take part in shaping the region as a builder.

The choice is between a future of instability, extremism, and chaos – allowing Iran to reenter the arena – or a future of Israeli-Palestinian partnership in a comprehensive reconstruction plan. In this vision, physical rebuilding could serve as a foundation for reshaping Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, its adversarial neighbors to the north, and the wider Arab world.

The western Middle East lies in ruins, on a scale reminiscent of post-World War II Europe. The devastation is concentrated in three key areas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

The cost of restoring basic life-sustaining infrastructure in Gaza alone is estimated at $20 billion, barely a third of what will be needed to fully rebuild Gaza over the next decade.

Yet, Gaza’s reconstruction pales in comparison to the enormous task of rebuilding Syria, where the destruction caused by the civil war is estimated at $500 billion.

In Lebanon, devastation is the direct result of governance failure – corruption and systemic inefficiency that led to economic and social collapse, with the war merely adding a layer of physical destruction.

What unites these three arenas is the dramatic political shifts brought about by war. All three are in transition between old regimes and new governments, whose capacity to rule will be determined largely by the reconstruction efforts.

This makes rebuilding a direct factor in Israel’s security, not just in terms of immediate threats but also in shaping Israel’s long-term security environment and its relationships with Palestinians and regional states.

For example, who rebuilds southern Lebanon will directly impact the security situation on Israel’s northern border for years to come. If Hezbollah leads the reconstruction using Iranian funds, it will retain, at least partially, its status among the Shi’ite population and their willingness to support it militarily.

However, if Lebanon’s new government takes charge, relying on international economic aid, it could restore its sovereignty and reduce the willingness of southern Lebanese communities to turn their homes into Hezbollah rocket depots.

Similarly, the way Syria is rebuilt will influence its future relations with Israel. If the reconstruction is led by a regional and international coalition, it could serve as leverage to push the new Syrian leadership away from conflict. More importantly, such an effort would prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold, as Tehran is a global expert in exploiting chaos for strategic gains.

The urgency of reconstruction

Regional actors are beginning to grasp both the enormous potential and the pressing necessity of large-scale reconstruction. The sheer scale of destruction has transformed rebuilding into a challenge of historic proportions – akin to a regional Marshall Plan but led by the region itself, primarily the Gulf states.

The regional interest in reconstruction stems from a clear realization: Leaving the wounds of Gaza, Aleppo, and Lebanon open will create the conditions for the next regional war. For Arab states, rebuilding is first and foremost a matter of regional stability.

The recent war demonstrated how quickly shock waves from Gaza and Beirut can destabilize governments and disrupt trade routes across the Middle East. This vulnerability has created a sense of urgency among Arab states to intervene.

The release of Trump’s plan only intensified the urgency for these countries to present an alternative. This set the stage for the regional emergency summit held earlier this week in Cairo, initiated by Egypt to coordinate a joint reconstruction effort.

While momentum builds and plans take shape, Israel remains entirely absent from regional reconstruction efforts. Securing a place at the table – ensuring Israel has a say in shaping the post-war Middle East – requires it to forge a new kind of strategic partnership with those leading the rebuilding efforts, namely the Gulf states and other key Arab partners.

Yet at present, Israel is seen as an irrelevant spoiler – a military power capable of destroying any long-term reconstruction effort, but one that lacks a strategic vision or the willingness to plan for the future.

Above all, Israel’s messianic political vision for Gaza and the West Bank positions it as an obstacle. These policies run counter to the regional understanding that the long-term success of Gaza’s physical reconstruction is inseparable from establishing a stable political future for Gaza.

This is not just about Saudi or Emirati diplomatic sensitivities – it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. There is no logic in investing billions in developing Gaza’s port and energy infrastructure or Lebanon’s economy if they are destined to be bombed in the next escalation.

Yet, instead of engaging with the serious regional discourse on reconstruction, Israel’s leadership remains preoccupied with fantasies about a Gaza Riviera without Palestinians and delusional visions that even Trump’s advisers have abandoned in recent weeks.

As of today, Israeli decision-makers are the only actors in the world clinging to Trump’s so-called reconstruction plan. It took Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states three hours to dismiss Trump’s statement and clarify that their involvement in Gaza’s rebuilding depends on transferring control to a Palestinian authority.

Ultimately, participating in the critical process of regional reconstruction and the reshaping of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors demands a price that Israel’s current government finds unbearable – giving up its messianic dreams of annexation and population transfer. It requires a fundamental shift from being a force of destruction to becoming a partner in designing the Middle East’s future.

The article was published on March 9th, 2025, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Gaza Reconstruction is Israel’s Chance to Shape the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has so far acted true to form, limiting its actions to the military sphere by creating a new buffer zone in Syria and destroying the offensive capabilities of Bashar al-Assad’s army, especially its missile and chemical weapons systems.

But if Israel is to have an impact on shaping this strategically positioned space, it must adopt a broad diplomatic initiative.

How can Israel reshape Syria?

At the current decision-making juncture, we must realize that the process of reshaping Syria is already underway. We must also recognize that in the emerging Syrian narrative, Israel is deemed to have played an integral part in liberating the country from the atrocities of the Assad regime and its Iranian patrons.

My conversations with Syrian colleagues clearly point to the perception that Israel’s victory over Hezbollah had a major impact on the Syrian army’s collapse and provides it with unique influence on future events.

However, resting on our laurels and reveling in the scenes of looting at the Iranian embassy in Damascus is a path fraught with risks. Anyone who thinks the Iranians have washed their hands of Syria probably does not understand the economic situation in Syria or does not know the Iranian regime.

As it has done in Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria itself at the end of the previous decade, Iran excels at exploiting political transitions. While currently perceived as a central pillar of Assad’s oppressive regime – having gambled on his survival and faced setbacks – Iran has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to shifting circumstances.

It has consistently demonstrated a talent for forging alliances, particularly in the face of domestic political vacuums and economic needs. The rebel takeover of Syria only deepens these needs. The Iranians have demonstrated impressive skills in building strategic ties with Syria’s non-Shi’ite population groups, such as the Sunnis and Druze in the south of Syria, and large Sunni tribes in the border area with Iraq.

Let us not forget, either, that the Iranians play a significant role in keeping Syria’s energy and electricity sector running. Iran therefore has significant cards to play against the forces trying to shape a new order in a devastated country despite the innate hostility between them and the rebels in Damascus. Iran’s leaders have, in fact, already expressed a desire to develop ties with the new Syrian regime.

ISRAEL MUST recognize that the current vacuum is temporary and therefore requires it to adopt a far more proactive approach than it did during the Syrian civil war. That includes two policy measures that point in opposite directions but seek to deal with the current uncertainty.

First, Israel must strengthen its relations with major political actors in Syria – the emphasis is, of course, on the Druze in the south, and on Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish state that has emerged over the past decade in the strategic space of northeastern Syria.

The ties should be enhanced through a quiet and cautious dialogue given both the sensitivity of building such ties while the issue of political unity is paramount in Syria, and Israel’s standing in the region is at an all-time low.

In the words of a Syrian-Kurdish friend: This is the worst time to have a public relationship with Israel, and the most important time to have a quiet dialogue with it. Tweets on this matter by reckless Israeli ministers are not helpful to this sensitive effort.

Israel has maintained an informal relationship with the Druze for years, based on a series of unwritten agreements. This was most recently demonstrated last week when the IDF defended the Syrian Druze village of Khader against attacks by local rebels.

The relationship with the Kurds is more complex, in part because of its implications for Israeli-Turkish relations. However, a model for an unofficial strategic relationship already exists in Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. It is rooted, among other factors, in the Kurds’ perception of Israel as a role model for nation-building, survival, and prosperity in a hostile environment.

At the same time, Israel should actively encourage and support the international and regional economic rehabilitation of Syria. This reliance on foreign aid could serve as leverage to shape the future regime, conditioning assistance on the new government’s adoption of moderate policies both domestically and internationally.

Europe and the GCC countries previously refrained from engaging in Syria’s reconstruction because they did not want to strengthen the Assad regime, but that argument is now void.

A large-scale reconstruction process could encourage a return of refugees from Europe and the countries of the region to their homes, easing the burden on their host countries. Western nations and moderate Arab states also share a common interest in removing Russian and Iranian influence from Syria.

ISRAEL’S ROLE in Syria’s reconstruction would be modest but meaningful. Initially, it would focus on guaranteeing respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a commitment to cease attacks as long as the new regime ensures Iran’s exclusion. In the second phase, Israel could help facilitate reconstruction by allowing the use of its air and land routes for logistical support.

The past two years have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between developments in Gaza or the West Bank and events in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.

Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza complicates its coordination with the Arab world on rebuilding Syria and undermines the legitimacy of local actors to collaborate with it, either publicly or covertly. Ending the destructive war in Gaza is therefore crucial for Israel’s ability to engage with regional partners in reshaping the future order in Syria.

The past two years have also taught us an important lesson about the failure of Israel’s “villa in the jungle” approach – the danger of burying one’s head in the sand and ignoring regional developments, leaving the initiative in the hands of meaningful and hostile others. This misguided approach resulted in Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.

Israel must seize the current opportunity to foster a stable and non-hostile relationship with its strategic neighbor to the north.

The article was published on December 18th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel has the chance to help reshape Syria and form stable ties הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Mitvim Institute’s 2024 Israeli Foreign Policy Index, compiled almost a year after the outbreak of the Gaza war, challenges the notion that the Israeli public moved sharply to the right. It reveals that when Israelis are asked to consider long-term strategies regarding Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Iran, a majority of them favor diplomatic solutions. This shift reflects not a leftward movement but rather a turn towards pragmatism. This emerging trend presents an opportunity for Europe to lead, together with Middle-Eastern partners, a bold, long-term vision for peace and stability in the Middle East. Outlining a vision becomes crucial as the region gradually transitions toward a regional conflict, with shockwaves likely to reverberate across the Mediterranean.

Mitvim’s survey reveals two main trends in the Israeli public – one of broad agreement and the other of deep polarization. The first trend is the rejection of the conflict management approach and the public ambition to seek decisive solutions. Only 12% said Israel should avoid strategic measures and adhere to the pre-war situation in its relations with the Palestinians. However, it is this recognition that strategic decisions can no longer be avoided that divides Israelis, leading to two radically different perceptions of what these decisions signify. Hence, the Index highlights polarization between two camps.

The pragmatists, comprising a small relative majority of about 40-50% of the public, support the setting of a political horizon with the Palestinians within a broad regional framework, recognize the limitations of military power, and seek diplomatic cooperation to solve Israel’s security problems. They back regional cooperation as a primary means of advancing an end to the war. They support a package deal that includes normalization with KSA, a US security umbrella, and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state (44%); see a regional coalition as the main solution to the Iranian threat (46%); and support the deployment of a multinational force as a temporary solution after hostilities in Gaza cease (46%).

The other camp, the fundamentalists, are a large minority (about 30%) that currently adopt positions which were the radical right domain prior to the war. This camp favors annexation of the West Bank and resettlement in Gaza (29%), independent Israeli military campaign against Iran (32%), and reliance on an independent military action.

While the survey was conducted before Nasrallah’s elimination and the escalation of the Iran-Israel war, it still reflects a significant preference among Israelis for diplomatic solutions. Even after 10 bitter months of Hezbollah’s shelling and failed diplomatic efforts to stop this unprovoked attack, not to mention the failure of the international community to fulfill UNSCR 1701 and prevent the armament of Hezbollah, a majority of the Israeli public still opt for a diplomatic solution if one could be found. 51% pavor a diplomatic solution whether in the form of an immediate negotiated withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani river, or a longer-term Israeli-Lebanese agreement. 60% opt for diplomatic options when examining long-term strategies to deal with Iran.

Mitvim’s index highlights that a majority of Israelis align with European policymakers on key issues, notably that the war’s end should coincide with broader Israeli-Palestinian-international efforts for a settlement. They also favor long-term diplomatic solutions with Iran and its proxies, provided Israel’s security remains intact. Most importantly – the public mindset in Israel is a mindset of decisive steps, offering a unique opportunity for the international community—especially Europe—to present a bold Middle East vision. As the U.S. approaches elections, the Biden administration is likely to avoid risky agenda-setting, making it crucial for Europe and MENA actors to lead a new coalition for peace and stability. At the brink of an uncontrolled regional conflict, Europe must lead the efforts to outline an alternative future for the Middle-East. It should channel this devastating year of warfare into an opportunity for generating new political momentum for long-term stability.

The article was publish on October 7th, 2024 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

הפוסט An Israeli Public Turn into Pragmatism a Year Into the War May Provide an Opening for a New International Vision for Ending the War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hezbollah’s opponents have been criticizing it for decades for  serving foreign interests and undermining the stability and security of the Lebanese state. The events of the last ten months underscore their criticism, as the Shiite organization threatens to drag Lebanon into a destructive war against the basic interests of the crisis-stricken country.

Indeed, it seems that the ongoing war with Israel sharpens the constant tension within which Hezbollah exists – the tension between its Iranian-Shiite identity and the national image it tries to project as the “defender of Lebanon.” This tension is Hezbollah’s most prominent weakness.

Since the beginning of the war, Nasrallah has tried to walk between the raindrops and reconcile the conflicting interests in the hope that the war in Gaza will end soon and allow him to continue holding the stick at both ends. Despite the clear consensus within Lebanon against a full-scale war with Israel, including among the Shiite community, and the harsh criticisms leveled at him, Nasrallah has so far managed to avoid serious challenges to the legitimacy of Hezbollah. However, the event in Majdal Shams may now threaten his ability to continue doing so.

Hezbollah’s swift denial of involvement in the attack, despite widespread evidence of its responsibility, reflects a familiar tactic. The group and its allies are using a classic strategy: diverting attention away from their actions by accusing others of trying to incite inter-communal strife within Lebanon. By doing this, Hezbollah is attempting to frame any criticism or blame directed at it as an attempt to destabilize the Lebanese state.

However, despite this denial of responsibility, genuine anxiety has spread among Lebanese in the last day about an Israeli response that could very well drag the Land of Cedars into a full-scale war and bring destruction on a catastrophic scale. Accordingly, the criticism leveled at Hezbollah is intensifying.

The internal pressure on Hezbollah is a unique opportunity to end the undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah on relatively favorable terms for Israel. Thus, the attack on Majdal Shams can have a similar impact to the attack on Qana Village during Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 – a game-changing event that leads to a cessation of hostilities. If Israel, with the help of the international community, leverages this pressure, it can push Hezbollah to end the fighting on terms that advance Israeli interests, particularly focusing on the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s forces from the south. Obviously, such an action would provide only a temporary solution, but it would allow for a significant achievement for Israel by enabling the return of northern residents and more effectively isolating the campaign in Gaza. In doing so, it can bring substantial issues back to the table, such as Hezbollah’s legitimacy to hold weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese state, and the question of its presence south of the Litani River. 

Cooperation with the international community has a significant role in promoting Israeli goals. The attack on Hezbollah came in response to the elimination of its field commanders in Kila village, a few kilometers from the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s presence and operations in the south are an affront to the international community and its decisions, standing in complete violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Majdal Shams massacre can be a turning point for the level of international involvement. This should include clear conditions for any economic or other assistance to the Lebanese state, requiring the enforcement of the Resolution.

It is clear and obvious that even ending the current round of fighting with a diplomatic solution will not resolve all the standing issues between Israel and Hezbollah, including territorial contentions along the land border. The likelihood of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming years remains high. However, it is better for Israel to act according to Sun Tzu’s ancient advice—to choose the arena and time for the war—rather than being dragged into a conflict without clear goals or an exit strategy, and less than optimal conditions.

Instead of trying to reshape “response equations,” Israel should act proactively to change the conditions in the north. The immediate goal should be providing security—albeit temporary—to the residents of the north and allowing them to return to their homes. Simultaneously, it should address the long-term necessity of preparing the state and the IDF for a military-political campaign against Hezbollah and Iran in the coming years. By doing so, Israel can ensure both the short-term safety of its citizens and strategically position itself for future conflicts under more favorable conditions. 

הפוסט The Majdal Shams Massacre – A Chance for a Diplomatic End to the War in the North on Favorable Terms for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Addressing a December 2023 forum in Doha, he emphasized what is obvious to anyone concerned about Iran’s growing influence in the region – Israel’s refusal to discuss a political solution with the Palestinians is a boon for the leadership in Tehran. It serves as a catalyst for expanding Iran’s influence and expelling Israel from the region.

This unwillingness poses a major obstacle to seizing the opportunity of the October 7 and April 13 attacks on Israel to forge a regional alliance against Iran.

Iran’s combined missile and drone attack on Israel should have dealt a significant blow to Iran and its regional standing. It could even serve as a turning point in regional and global determination to confront the threat it poses, as it stands on the cusp of nuclear capacity. The offensive provides a clear illustration for the United States and the countries of the region of the need for a joint stand against a more aggressive, violent, and destabilizing Iran. This is an opportunity to turn the Iranian proxy network from an asset into a liability for Iran in the regional arena – to further overstretch Iran on multiple fronts.

The Gaza war has exacerbated the clash within the commitment of Iran’s Arab allies to Tehran’s directives and the interests of these host/captive countries. The growing criticism in Lebanon of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and the Assad administration’s refusal to allow an Iranian attack on Israel from its territory clearly illustrate these countries’ growing recognition of the price they pay for Iran’s intervention in their affairs.

Thus, the April 13 attack should serve as an impetus for an Israeli-regional alliance against Iran with American and international, and especially regional, support. The Gulf states, whose airspace was grossly violated by the Iranian missiles and drones, were provided with strong evidence of the tangible nature of the Iranian threat.

At the same time, the risk of the attack to regional stability is being compounded by Iran’s threats to block the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes to the Red Sea. The Iranian threat thus directly affects the substantive interests of the international community. Iran has become, from an international perspective, a tangible regional threat with ripples that risk the stability in the Middle East and beyond. Ultimately, the attack increases the sense of urgency among the United States and Western countries of the need for a regional coalition.

However, the Gaza campaign has made clear that progress toward such a regional axis directly depends on Israeli agreement to discuss a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. Recent Saudi statements make clear that the price of forging public strategic ties with Israel has gone up and now includes political progress on the Palestinian front as a condition for normalization.

Israeli willingness to discuss a two-state political horizon could have dealt Iran a decisive blow, but Israel is at grave risk of squandering this opportunity. Instead of leveraging October 7 for open and enhanced security cooperation with Arab states, thereby turning Hamas’s cognitive victory into a strategic defeat for Iran and its proxies, the Israeli government is serving Iran’s goals. In a January article of rare sincerity, former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora noted that regional hands are now reaching out to Israel, but Israel refuses to hold them.

Israel’s regional partners came to its aid

Israel has celebrated the courageous regional participation of Jordan and other countries in the effort to defend it from Iran’s offensive. This rare moment of cooperation in the face of a common threat could create a false sense of renewed momentum in Arab-Israeli relations.

In fact, prospects of a renewed momentum are undermined by the deep frustration among current and potential partners in the region at Israel’s refusal to discuss the goals of the war. The April 13 cooperation obscured Israel’s deeply troubled relations with Jordan and the Gulf states and the implications for the future of cooperation vis-à-vis Iran.

It is important to distinguish between military-operational coordination under American auspices in the face of a specific attack, and the establishment of a regional, political, and public alliance against Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

A joint regional coalition cannot exist solely on the basis of a shared threat; it must be based on a convergence of interests to promote a common political vision, or at least agreement on the strategic direction of the partnership.

A wide chasm separates Israeli government positions and the vision of regional partners from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. The danger of sliding into this chasm has become more real for Arab leaders since October

Moreover, Iran’s attempts to erode the regional standing of Israel and the United States have deepened concern for the future relations between Israel and the region, let alone for a united front against Iran.

Thus, Iran’s April 13 attack coincides with its broad political-diplomatic offensive since the start of the war aimed at redefining the strategic balance of power in the Middle East by eroding Israeli and American influence in order to strengthen its own.

The Iranians are exploiting the war in order to roll back the assets Israel acquired through the Abraham Accords and reverse it to the status of a regional pariah. Iran’s move focuses on pressuring key countries to cancel or at least reduce diplomatic ties with the Zionist regime.

The intensive shuttle diplomacy by Iran’s foreign minister illustrates the map of Iranian interests. His schedule included a visit to India, a key component of the American-Gulf-Israeli alliance promoted by President Biden, ongoing contacts with the Saudis, frequent coordination meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a call to sever Ankara’s economic relations with Israel.

The Iranian effort has had very limited success so far. Specifically, there is no evidence that it has had a direct impact on Saudi motivation to halt normalization or on Turkey’s decision to limit the scope of trade with Israel.

However, combined with Israel’s inability to present clear goals for the devastating war in Gaza, Iran’s effort could bear fruit, as Israel’s status erodes and its short-sighted failures become apparent to all.

The solid foundation of the Abraham Accords for the UAE and Bahrain was Israel’s integration into a long-term regional process that would provide security and economic stability. The war exposed Israel as a regional power firing from the hip, driven by political compromises with the far Right, rather than by a long-term perspective. It exposed to the Emiratis, Saudis, and Bahrainis the gaps between their own long-term thinking and Israel’s inability to think beyond the tactical military level and short-term political maneuvering.

This is exactly the vacuum Iran is targeting. The first sign of Iranian success has emerged in the weakest link of the normalization countries – Sudan. On October 9, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s government renewed diplomatic relations with Iran in order to obtain weapons for its war against a rival faction. This is a classic Iranian method familiar from Yemen and Syria – Iran identified an opportunity, a political vacuum created by a civil war in a country of strategic value, and filled it.

Iran’s effort to exploit the Gaza war in order to expel Israel from the region is not only interstate-oriented. It also exploits public anger in the Arab world against Israel over the protracted war in Gaza and the worsening humanitarian crisis there. The return of the resistance narrative allows Iran to ride the wave of sympathy for its allies – especially the Houthis in Yemen.

In the face of the ineffectual response by Arab states, Iran and its allies are portrayed as the only supporters of the Palestinian struggle in the current destructive war. Its efforts are also fueled by a desire to portray Iran on the regional and global stage as a representative of the struggle against American colonization in the Middle East rather than a foreign Shi’ite interloper in the Sunni Arab world.

The April 13 attack – despite its failure – is likely to be accepted in parts of the Arab world as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this struggle.

Israel’s research institutes and policy planners have dealt for an entire decade with the question of which threat is more dangerous – the Iranian or Palestinian. As expected, we were all wrong. The threats are intertwined and inseparable.

By weakening relatively moderate Palestinian elements and bolstering Hamas; eroding the fragile relations with Jordan and Egypt; creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and fomenting public anger in the Arab world, and stubbornly refusing to present a political vision for the “day after,” we are opening the door to greater Iranian influence in the region.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and the Middle East is no exception. The Iranians are experts at seizing opportunities created by extremism and conflict.

As long as we keep moving without a strategic vision, we are providing the Iranians with optimal conditions for influence.

Thus, while we prepare for direct war against Iran and its allies, the far-right architects of Israel’s colossal October 7 failure serve Iran’s strategic interests. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi could not have hoped for such predictable and effective allies as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Throughout this damned campaign, Israel has demonstrated once again that it never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The article was published on April 21st in Jpost

הפוסט Israel’s lack of vision is a blessing for Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The participants – from the normalization states, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority, the United States and the European Union – would meet at the rehabilitated Kibbutz of Be’eri, a symbol of revival from the unspeakable Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023. The summit would also kick off a negotiation process with the Palestinian Authority in order to achieve what Hamas, Iran and its proxies sought to prevent: normalization between Israel and the Arab world, renewal of the political process with moderate Palestinians willing to live alongside Israel, and the establishment of a broad US-backed regional front against Iran.

The current discussions by decision makers, pundits, and self-appointed experts about the objectives of the war have thus far focused mainly on its military outcomes, on the minute Israel silence its guns. They have not dealt with the aftermath. Assassinating senior Hamas figures, destroying the organization’s vast tunnel network and other important operational targets all refer to exhausting a bank of targets, inflicting kinetic damage on Hamas instead of enhancing Israel’s strategic standing. When Israeli officials and top brass are asked about the day after, they mumble some inanity about civil-local control of the enclave, but decline to elaborate. And for good reason – it’s simply not their area of responsibility (or expertise).

The Israeli public has come to expect every war or military operation to culminate in the ultimate depiction of Israel’s victory (such as the historic photo of Israeli paratroopers arriving at the Western Wall in 1967), a visual representation responding to a deep-rooted psychological need for affirmation that personal and collective security have been achieved. That need is an uncompromising imperative in this war, which undermined Israelis’ sense of security at its most fundamental level. Yet we tend to forget that asymmetrical warfare against terrorist organizations rarely affords absolute decisiveness. When a weaker enemy can claim victory simply by its ability to remain standing once the fighting ends, a visual portrayal of victory is elusive.

Israel’s best chance of illustrating its victory therefore lies mainly in the political-strategic field, in defeating the idea that the enemy sought to snatch from its hands, advancing along the routes it tried to block, and providing Israelis with real security for the longest possible term. A look at Israel’s partial past victories demonstrates that the images of victory were never taken on the battlefield. During the second intifada (2000-2005), for example, it was the amnesty agreement that allowed thousands of wanted Tanzim activists to become toy dealers in the Nablus market that was considered the final chord of the uprising. During the Second Lebanon War (2006), it was the filled–to–capacity Israeli guest houses along the Lebanon border that testified to Israel’s victory.

The depiction of Israel’s victory in the current campaign should reflect a changed political reality, a game-changing strategic effect. As such, it cannot be limited to Gaza. It must affect regional and global circles. It must deal with the optimal conditions for shaping the day after based on two main parameters: ensuring Israelis’ security and blocking Iran and its so-called axis of resistance. A political decision at the present time should aspire to establish an Israeli-regional political-security alliance based on two pillars: a renewed political process with the Palestinians defining the future Israeli relationship with the successors of Mahmoud Abbas, and security agreements between the United States and the countries of the region. For this ambitious vision to be realized, work must be carried out simultaneously on three levels – global, regional and Israeli-Palestinian, with each level based on the other.  

Resolving the conflict with the Palestinians is necessary in order to mount an effective struggle against Iran. The events of Oct. 7 shattered the illusion that Israel’s integration in the region, or regional stability vis-à-vis the Iranian proxies, could be accomplished without resolving the Palestinian issue. The ability of a relatively small terrorist organization such as Hamas to set off a large-scale regional confrontation makes it abundantly clear that an effective struggle against Iran is only possible by neutralizing its influence in the Palestinian arena. This is a key condition for building defense alliances with the countries of the region, for ensuring the support of the Western world, and above all for defending the residents of Israel.    

The need for a diplomatic settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to fight Iran exposes the main obstacle to victory. The challenge lies not only in the Hamas tunnel system, its vicious captivity of hundreds of Israeli civilians, or the threat of Hezbollah’s intervention. It stems first and foremost from the current Israeli government’s inability to advance even the slightest progress vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Most Israelis want to bring down the government, justifiably so, because of its failure to govern and the societal divisions it sowedin the past. But the most egregious damage by the hard right government in the current campaign stems from the impasse to which it is leading. More than ever, this is the wrong government at the wrong time. Conducting a war without offering any reward on the strategic level is like waging a campaign with two hands and one leg tied. This government, which failed to consider even symbolic concessions vis-à-vis the Palestinians to promote normalization with Saudi Arabia, which preferred to bribe Hamas so as to avoid renewing the political process with the Palestinians, and whose messianic extremists are setting the West Bank on fire these very days, is the most fundamental obstacle to a real Israeli victory.

The article was published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 20th and in Hebrew in N12 on November 11th.

הפוסט The Be’eri Summit: A victory over Hamas lies around the negotiating table, not on the battlefield הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These practical steps include a unique set of tangible policies that have far-reaching significance for the gradual advancement of the two-state vision. In fact, support for these practical measures spans the political spectrum from the left to the center-right.

What did Mitvim’s survey show?

When Mitvim asked what policy the next Israeli government should implement vis-a-vis the Palestinians, only 36% supported actively promoting the two-state solution, compared to 39% who supported the status quo or refrained from expressing an opinion on the issue. Even on more specific issues, such as a long-term strategy vis-a-vis the Gaza Strip, the public is almost equally divided between the options of economic development, efforts to restore control of the Gaza Strip, and negotiations for a long-term arrangement with Hamas. A majority of respondents prefer the current stick-and-carrots policy vis-a-vis Hamas, at least as long as it yields effective results.

Some will say that the lack of decisiveness and commitment regarding long-term solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects an ideological shift within the public to the Right. But an in-depth examination of the public’s positions on policy measures toward the Palestinians presents a far more complex and nuanced picture. For example, more than 60% of those surveyed, including an overwhelming majority of Center-Right voters, support the establishment of a joint mechanism for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan to prevent escalation at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

Such a mechanism, if established, would have a direct impact on Israeli sovereignty in the Holy Basin, which was one of the core standing issues in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians regarding a two-state solution. Even if we assume that some of the supporters are not aware of or would not openly admit the full significance of this step, in practicality, a significant proportion of the public is willing to promote such a step in order to prevent escalation.

A similar willingness to accept measures that promote the two-state logic is also evident in the field of energy and the climate crisis. Mitvim’s survey reveals that more than half of Israelis (54%, including a majority of Center-Right voters) support Israeli aid for the development of independent energy and water infrastructure in the West Bank, which is a key tool for developing sovereign state capacities in the West Bank. Palestinian energy independence would have a significant impact, not only on the Palestinian quality of life but also on the power balance between Israel and the Palestinians.

How can we explain the public’s split personality regarding a political solution with the Palestinians, with skepticism and opposition to long-term solutions on one hand and support for practical steps conducive to a political solution on the other? One explanation could stem from the fact that practical steps do not require Israelis to develop broad trust in a Palestinian partner but only to address defined issues.

Another explanation relates to the growing awareness of the current political costs and structural obstacles of returning to negotiations, including the absence of political leadership in Israel willing to deal with such a hot-button issue, the crisis of legitimacy in the Palestinian Authority and the ongoing political split between the West Bank and Gaza.

At the same time, it can be argued that public awareness of the explosive nature of the Palestinian issue and the danger of it leaking into Israeli territory has increased since Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021), and even more so in recent months, with increasing security friction and erosion of Palestinian Authority control in the northern West Bank.

Israelis view Gaza and Jerusalem as possible focal points of escalation. They also support the need to prevent escalation and create positive dynamics on the ground, even at the cost of helping to build the infrastructure of a future Palestinian state.

Looking to the upcoming elections on November 1, the public’s distinction between skepticism over a solution to the conflict and support for practical measures is of political significance. An analysis of the findings shows that support for practical measures is a watershed between rooted right voters and the rest of the Israeli electorate. These measures enjoy clear support among Center-Right, Center, and left-wing voters, while those who describe themselves as right-wing voters reject them.

Practical measures of political significance enjoy broad support in exactly the same center field that can serve as a political game changer. They are supported by a large portion of the likely undecided or swing voters still weighing whether to vote for Likud or for the centrist parties.

Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s statement at the United Nations General Assembly on Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution is especially significant in light of these trends. Lapid has set a broad vision and public opinion suggests a way to implement it.

The establishment of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-regional mechanism to prevent escalation in Jerusalem and the promotion of energy independence in the West Bank are a good start. Additional practical measures with political implications, such as providing building permits and approving zoning plans for Palestinians in Area C and the Jerusalem area offer an additional direction.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israelis prefer practicality in promoting peace with Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the one hand, it adheres to its policy of rejecting any agreement with Iran, on the other, it faces the growing realization that no real alternatives exist to an agreement that would halt Iran’s nuclear race. In the meantime, the futility of military measures to stop Iran’s rush to nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear. Lacking new ideas, and consistently harping on the same policy messages formulated a decade ago, Israel’s bargaining position and its ability to influence the state of play have been deeply eroded.

Why name it after Menachem Begin?

The current crisis challenges the fundamental principles of Israel’s nuclear proliferation policy, named after prime minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981. The so-called “Begin Doctrine” has since served as the guiding Israeli principle dictating the use of “all means necessary” to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine mostly focused on two principles: independent Israeli action in the face of such threats, and kinetic military action as the main method to upend development efforts, even at the cost of possible military escalation.

Since the attack in Iraq, the concept has undergone some adjustments in accordance with changing reality. For example, political and operational US-Israel coordination has increased, but the doctrine’s principles are unchanged. Its credibility was further enhanced by the success of the 2007 operation “Out of the Box,” an Israeli airstrike that nipped in the bud a Syrian-North Korean effort to develop nuclear weapons.

The Begin Doctrine also underpins Israel’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, the political component – support for maximum international pressure and opposition to contractual solutions with Iran – is an essential component of Israeli policy. However, the policy also entails kinetic activity – intensive use of a variety of military means to physically halt the Iranian project. This is a large-scale and creative effort, one of the most extensive in the history of Israel’s national security, to identify vulnerabilities and develop operational capabilities to damage the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear project.

The effort has yielded a decade of operational successes using an array of tools, according to foreign reports, from the introduction of the Stuxnet malware into Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in 2011, through a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, to the sabotage of the enrichment facility in Natanz last year. These successful operations have created the illusion that the campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be a rehash of Israel’s success in quashing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear bids. Here, too, the Jewish (and American) brain, along with several hundred kilograms of high explosives, would put an end to Iran’s military nuclear fantasies.

However, although Israel has won many battles, it has lost this war. While its varied and imaginative operations delayed Iran’s progress, they did not change its direction. Iran is currently approaching the status of a “nuclear threshold state”; its ability to break through to nuclear weapons depends to a large extent on its leaders’ decisions alone, not on developing additional capabilities.

Should Iran choose to leap forward and enrich enough uranium for a bomb, it can do so at its leisure. Should it choose to hang back, it can seek to take advantage of its proximity to nuclear capability in order to enhance its geopolitical standing. In either case, the tangible Iranian experience of recent years – enriching uranium to high levels of 60% – has moved them through a conceptual point of no return, a point that the emerging agreement will no longer be able to turn around.

Advanced centrifuges can be shattered, and enriched uranium can be shipped for storage to a third country, but how do you obliterate the knowledge the Iranians have accumulated in high-level enrichment? How do you reverse the expertise gained in the construction of upgraded centrifuges?

The failure to halt Iran’s nuclear program has exposed the fundamental weakness of the Begin Doctrine – it is effective primarily in degrading enemy capabilities, not in changing conditions or motivations. When the doctrine meets a national-strategic effort of a powerful state, the most it can do is postpone the inevitable conclusion. A hint of this was clearly discernible in the Iraqi reactor attack: the facility’s destruction did not prevent Saddam Hussein from nearing nuclear capability less than a decade later, on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The current crisis point ostensibly presents Israel with a prime opportunity to reexamine its strategy against nuclear proliferation. However, criticism of existing policy on the Iranian nuclear project and discussion of shifting realities and their future implications are strictly limited at the political level.

Across the political spectrum, few are willing to admit the fundamental flaw of the Israeli perception and its failure, let alone, to offer alternatives. The people of Zion are not overly fond of prophets of doom, and the electoral price of such outspokenness is too high. Far more convenient to continue talking about military options (knowing they do not exist) and the tightening of sanctions (which do not achieve their ultimate goal).

And so, almost 50 years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli system is once again in cognitive dissonance, crippled by a political, professional and mental inability to challenge a concept that has taken root over four decades. How can we explain to the public and to ourselves why we have invested so much money and political capital and endangered human lives, in promoting a failed policy? It is easier to stick to the existing concept, introducing tactical improvements to current policy, rather than change the line of thinking outright.

What Israel needs now is nothing short of a conceptual overhaul of the fundamental assumptions underpinning its policy on the Iranian threat. It needs a new and different strategic forum that will pose new questions we must ask even if we do not wish to do so.

Topping the list is the most difficult question of all – what happens on the day after Iran achieves the nuclear threshold level? Along with last-minute attempts to scuttle this stage, we are required to ask what changes Israel should make to its strategic policy in case of Iranian nuclearization. A political-strategic discussion on Israel’s political moves in this grim but not impossible reality is imperative at this point. This does not, of course, mean that Israel should cease its attempts to block Iran from completing its advance toward an operational nuclear facility.

However, confronting the question of the day after is also essential for Israel in order to plan its actions on this day; the matter must be addressed despite the mental difficulty it provokes. Challenging assumptions requires discussing questions to which we think we already know the answers. Central among them is the question of whether Iran is one rigid and monolithic whole, or whether there are shades and differing interests among its influential actors.

An essential part of the discussion should be reserved to practical steps. It should examine the potential to incorporate international and regional systems as partners in a coordinated political campaign against shared Iranian threats. First, Israel’s strategic relationships with its strategic partners should be reexamined, with an emphasis on rethinking the concept of a strategic alliance between Israel and the US, as well as significantly upgrading the relationship with NATO. Second, the discussion must address the most significant development since the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement – the normalization agreements and the new potential for building a system of strategic security partnerships with countries in the region, whether above or below the surface.

Israel has already begun this discussion, mainly in the field of air defense, but there is still great untapped potential for expansion. In this context, a joint strategy is vital for outlining possible scenarios, such as an increase in Iran’s regional military activity or the threat of a regional arms race.

Establishing a new strategic discussion forum necessitates diversifying the circle of participants and injecting new and different knowledge into the mix. Shaping new concepts and thinking about Iran requires a different circle of experts that combines existing expertise with new voices and disciplines. Regional and international diplomatic expertise, as well as deep and multilayered knowledge of Iran’s society, economy and culture are essential components. Civil society should have a central place in the debate as a repository of thinking not limited by political or bureaucratic constraints.

The challenge facing Israel in rethinking and adapting its Iran policy to the new reality is one of the most complexes it has ever faced. The nation that demonstrated creativity in penetrating dozens of meters below ground into the centrifuge facilities at Natanz will now be required to demonstrate similar creativity in the political and conceptual spheres. The starting point is to admit to ourselves that the existing conception, the Begin Doctrine, is no longer relevant.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 2, 2022

הפוסט Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some would say that the Abraham Accords have not made a significant difference since intelligence cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states existed way before the accords were reached. However, the unveiling of those clandestine ties offers an opportunity for diplomatic cooperation and construction of “defense umbrellas” – multilateral security frameworks for Israel and its partners in the Gulf to cooperate against Iranian threats. Reflecting this significant change, Israel’s aspirations to promote a regional defense alliance resurfaced in recent talks between Israeli and regional leaders, with some even dubbing the ambitious undertaking “a Middle Eastern NATO.”

A strategic alliance between Israel and other Middle Eastern nations could undoubtedly bear significant fruits for Israel – not only in containing Iran’s regional influence, but also, and especially – in deepening Israel’s integration into the region and removing the concept of war from its relations with the moderate Arab states. However, it is absolutely clear that the talk of a regional NATO does not hold water.

The principle of collective defense in the foreseeable future is irrelevant in the relations between Israel and its partners in the Middle East because it would require the partners to respond to any attack on one of the alliance members as if they were attacked themselves. A scenario in which the Israel Air Force strikes Houthi targets in response to UAV attacks on the UAE or the Egyptian air force attacks Hamas targets in Gaza in response to missile attacks on Israel is highly unlikely.

Collective security is based not only on a confluence of interests but on elements of shared identity. Israel’s integration into the Middle East has made great progress in the past two years, but it is a far cry from a concept of shared identity. In any case, it is irrelevant as long as there is a fundamental disagreement between Israel and its potential partners on the question of where Israel’s borders should be drawn.

Although a collective defense alliance is currently irrelevant, the concept raises more modest possibilities for strategic security alliances. The emerging model consists of ongoing strategic dialogue, security-political coordination, intelligence cooperation, joint exercises, and the supply of advanced weapons systems. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s idea of air defense cooperation could constitute a first layer in such cooperation.

AT FIRST glance, this model appears to be applicable in the current state of relations between Israel and the Gulf states. The basis of such regional defense alliances is the existence of a common threat. In this regard, there is no doubt that Israel and the Gulf states face three shared threats: Iran’s efforts to develop military nuclear capabilities, its attempts to expand its regional influence – from Iraq through Syria and Lebanon to Yemen and Bahrain – and its military maritime operations, mainly in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

However, while Israel and the Gulf states face a common threat, their set of constraints and their modus operandi are very different. Israel tends to view the region as divided into clear camps, with rigid and uncompromising lines separating them. Thus, we tend to place the UAE and Saudi Arabia (alongside Egypt) on our “side” in a zero-sum struggle against Iran.

An in-depth examination of the Gulf states’ strategy towards Iran over the past year presents a far more complex picture reflecting their efforts to play both sides of the fence, maintain open channels with Iran, and even seek understandings with it. The Emirati national security adviser’s visit to Iran last December, and the resumption of dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year, demonstrate the key principle guiding the Gulf states’ strategy working with all the players on the field – including and especially Iran – to reduce risks to their own security.

One can understand the Gulf states. Given the current circumstances, they cannot afford to play Israel’s zero-sum game against Iran. Although the United Arab Emirates is a regional power with notable influence from the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa, it is also a small country with limited military capabilities, which shares a long maritime border with Iran. Its energy production facilities and maritime trade routes are very vulnerable. The Emiratis and the Saudis also recognize the limitations of American intervention in the event of an escalation with Iran. The Trump Administration’s limited response to the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia made it clear to the Gulf states that in the event of a military attack, the most they could hope for from the US are economic sanctions.

Entering into a security alliance with Israel will impair the Emirati ability to balance its risks and put an end to its multilateral juggling. It will place the UAE on a direct collision course with Iran. These considerations explain why many in the UAE (and even more in Saudi Arabia) would be reluctant to underpin the Abraham Accords with an overt security pillar.

These constraints highlight the importance of active American sponsorship as a precondition for a regional defense alliance between Israel and the Gulf states. The road to a regional security alliance runs through Washington, and US security guarantees are essential for any security partnerships between Israel and the Gulf states.

The US is the only actor whose strategic assets can provide the necessary incentives for the Gulf states to engage in overt security cooperation with Israel. These include CENTCOM forces in Qatar, the 5th Fleet, American sponsorship of the International Maritime Security Construct based in Bahrain and the symbolic but important presence of US forces in eastern Syria.

AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP of a regional alliance, however, would require a fundamental change and an almost complete reversal of Washington’s current approach to the Middle East. The past year has emphasized the waning US commitment to this arena, if not its actual withdrawal, as it shifts resources to the conflict with Russia and China.

The American approach occasionally seems to be intent on tying up loose ends in the Middle East in order to focus on more important goals. Its willingness to consider the removal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the list of terrorist organizations bolsters this impression.

Nonetheless, the impending nuclear agreement with Iran provides an opportunity to redefine US relations with the countries of the region. Since the nuclear deal will not address regional issues, the countries of the region, including Israel, should strive to obtain separate security guarantees from the US and the international community to contain Iran’s regional activities. The US interest is clear – an aggressive Iran will undermine regional stability and open the door to a broader regional conflict damaging energy production and global trade routes. It would also indirectly enable their major rivals, Russia and China, to expand their influence in the region.

Israel has a special role to play in creating a strategic relationship between the US and the region. Its strategic relationship and political influence in Washington have been proven as pivotal incentives for regional partners to establish relations with Israel, from the Camp David agreements with Egypt to the signing of the Abraham Accords.

The recent Negev Summit emphasized Israel’s unique role as a liaison between the Gulf states and the United States – especially in light of the cooling of US-Gulf relations in the Biden era. The roles have thus been reversed. Whereas the US previously enabled the development of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states through its sponsorship resulting in the Abraham Accords, Israel is now maintaining and bolstering relations between the Gulf and Washington, if not for their sake, then for its own.

The nuclear deal taking shape in Vienna is far from perfect – it is probably the lesser of the evils that Israel will have to accept given the Trump administration’s reckless pullout from the original agreement. But it opens the door to unprecedented strategic cooperation between Israel, the US and the Gulf states to complement the elements they view as glaringly absent from the deal.

The strategic dialogue that began last week in Sde Boker redefines Israel’s strategic importance for the region and the value of its integration. Israel should cement these ties, not in a confrontational move vis-à-vis the US, rather as an alliance that includes the United States as an integral part of the regional architecture.

The op-ed was published in JPost in April 2022.

הפוסט The road to alliance in the Middle East is through Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli decisions in the face of this dramatic and clear violation of another state’s sovereignty through the use of military force has substantive implications for the way it will be viewed by the international community. Events in Donetsk and Crimea should be viewed as opening maneuvers in a global development. The increasing friction between the liberal camp and its illiberal challengers, chiefly Russia and China will shape the international arena for years to come. The current conflict is a test of the West’s resolve to reaffirm its strong liberal credentials even if it comes at a cost. This camp stood on the side-lines in the face of past aggression with disastrous consequences; now it is clearly expressing its determination to stand up to Russia, with countries like Germany and the UK willing to pay the price.

The current conflict finds Israel’s brand in the liberal world under continued erosion, the product of 12 years of Netanyahu governments’ policies and internal changes. The 2018 Nation-State Law that prioritizes the state’s Jewish identity over its democratic one, the ongoing settlement enterprise, and above all, support for the Trump Administration and its illiberal allies, have undermined Israel’s position among its traditional, liberal allies in the US and Europe. The current crisis finds the liberal camp divided on Israel, pitting the traditional mainstream, i.e., the Biden Administration and European governments, which regard Israel as an important ally despite its drawbacks, against radicals, including parts of the progressive camp in the US and leading human rights organizations that cast doubts on the morality of Israel’s political model. Under these circumstances, clearly siding with the liberal camp is an opportunity for Israel to reaffirm its alliance with its friends in this camp.

The need for an unambiguous stance also stems from Israel’s rise as a regional power with global influence. A state’s ability to integrate values into its policies is a consequence of its position and international status. Israel instinctively feels it does not have the luxury of values-based considerations; as a small state surrounded by enemies it must focus on survival above all. The darkest time in Israel’s foreign relations – the ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1970s – followed its diplomatic isolation in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel is still small and enemies still surround it, but its global position has dramatically changed from those difficult days. It is now a central axis in the Mediterranean Basin, a leading member of a regional coalition confronting the Iranian threat, and its homemade surveillance technology affects the political reality in countries near and far. Israel, for better or worse, is a global-level actor. The government’s hesitation over its stance on the Russian invasion reflects the fact that unlike in the past, Israel now has the choice, and the obligation, to make a values-based decision.

However, a clear Israeli stance does not require sacrificing its interests on the altar of moral values. It is also the rational choice for long-term thinking.

First, given the common perception of an Israeli-Russian “honeymoon” in Syria, it is important to differentiate between long-term, values-based strategic alliances and ad-hoc interest-based relations. The welcome Israeli-Russian operational coordination in Syria is a temporary asset dependent on shifting short-term interests. It cannot serve as a strategic alternative to a substantive partnership with the US. Given the perceived US withdrawal from our region, it is incumbent upon Israel to ensure the sustainability of American assets for every scenario –continued US support of Mediterranean Basin partnerships, its military presence in Syria and its efforts to enhance the Abraham Accords.

Second, Israel must not be portrayed as the weak link in the liberal camp. We have already seen Russian strategy applying pressure on hesitant actors, for example the Baltic states. Israeli ambivalence could invite such additional pressure. The recent joint Russian-Syrian aerial patrols near the ceasefire line with Israel and the extensive sea and air drill the Russians conducted along the Syrian coast are clear indications of such potential.

When Kissinger said that Israel does not have a foreign policy, only a domestic one, he overlooked one salient truth – all foreign policy ends up shaping domestic policy. The values we choose to project to the world – whether Netanyahu’s policies or the approval of spyware sales to dictators – have substantive repercussions for the values that resonate with the Israeli public and the norms of our conduct. Israel’s stance in this crucial global test is an important domestic statement about our identity, especially in light of the challenges Israel faces both domestically and abroad. Therefore, Israeli decision-makers must not “ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee”.

הפוסט The bells of the liberal world toll for Israel: Why taking a stance against the invasion is both the smart and just move הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel can use Middle East partnerships in Palestinian peace talks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Having overextended its independent military capabilities in confronting Iran in its sphere of influence, Israel found itself in a vulnerable position. But while Israel might have erred in choosing the field of military engagement, Iran’s retaliatory moves offer a window of opportunity for an effective diplomatic campaign. They create a new catalyst for Israeli-regional-global cooperation against Iran to safeguard international shipping and freedom of navigation. They allow Israel to redefine the curbs on Iran’s regional activities as a global interest, and at the same time help build a long-term partnership with various regional states.

Iran’s attack on the Mercer Street tanker was another in a chain of maritime blows traded between Iran and Israel over the past two years, spanning from the Arab Gulf to the Red Sea and all the way to the Mediterranean. But while most of these attacks inflicted technical damage, the most recent one killed a British and a Romanian national. Deliberately or not, the attack signaled a significant escalation, not only in Israel’s view but also in the eyes of the world.

Iran tried to redefine the rules of the game in its campaign against Israel, retaliating against Israeli attacks in Syria and Iran by attacking Israeli-owned or operated shipping in the Gulf. But in so doing, the Iranians messed with the wrong issue at the wrong time.

Freedom of navigation is a rare principle of international consensus. Threats against global shipping lanes create surprising partnerships among rivals in the international arena.

A prominent example is a coalition formed to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa, unique cooperation among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council despite their ongoing international competition.

Protecting freedom of navigation is an accelerant for action by even the most cautious of international actors. In fact, the anti-piracy coalition led to the formation of the first naval task force in the history of the European Union. Freedom of shipping in the waters relevant to Israel – the Arab Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean – serves as a geopolitical confluence of regional and international interests.

Events in the Gulf do not remain in the Gulf. Even when the focal point of risk lies in the Straits of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab, its impact on global trade is felt in Shanghai, Hamburg, New Jersey and St. Petersburg.

The timing of Iran’s challenges to freedom of navigation is particularly sensitive due to the corona pandemic, given the drastic increase in demand for maritime transportation coupled with current limitations on seaport operations. These have resulted in heavy backlogs and a steep rise in international shipping costs.

The global system is increasingly dependent on maritime trade, but it also recognizes that its shipping lanes are increasingly vulnerable. This was demonstrated prominently in March, when a single vessel blocked the Suez Canal for six days prompting temporary shortages of goods and equipment around the world.

For the West, and first and foremost for the US, the importance of protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf area exceeds the Middle Eastern context. It has repercussions on the principles that the US seeks to promote in other arenas, such as standing up to China in the South China Sea or to Russia in the Black Sea. This was one of the reasons for the speedy August 6 condemnation of the Mercer Street attack by the G7, which pointed the finger of blame squarely at Iran.

THE IRANIAN attack joins a series of previous threats to block shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, and the increase in Iran’s military operations in the Gulf. It underscores that Iran’s threat to global interests is not limited to nuclear proliferation, and illustrates how Iran’s regional conduct projects on the entire international system.

This approach was reflected clearly in the joint G7 statement, which linked the attack with the broader context of Iran’s regional activity in declaring: “Iran’s behavior, alongside its support for proxy forces and non-state armed actors, threatens international peace and security.”

The main diplomatic opportunity for Israel lies in the regional sphere, in strengthening ties with the Gulf and Red Sea states.

Much has been said about the difficulty of establishing Israeli-regional cooperation against Iran due to the different priorities of each state in the region vis-à-vis the Iranian threats. Bahrain is concerned about domestic subversion, the UAE about Iran’s development of drones and cruise missiles, Saudi Arabia about Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen, and Israel about Iran’s activity in Syriaand Lebanon.

Freedom of navigation constitutes a shared interest for all involved parties. The Gulf States are wholly dependent on unfettered shipping for trade, energy exports and communications with the international system. The challenges posed by previous Iranian attacks in the Straits of Hormuz led in 2019 to the establishment of the Bahrain-based International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), bringing together regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Western naval powers such as the US and the UK.

Leveraging freedom of navigation as an issue for regional cooperation presents Israel with a double opportunity, first as a diplomatic framework for bolstering the partnership with the normalization states, and second, for improving the handling of Iranian threats. A main challenge in moving on to the next phase of the Abraham Accords involves identifying potential long-term frameworks for cooperation. Diplomatic and operational coordination to ensure freedom of navigation provides a solid foundation for exactly this type of strategic long-term collaboration.

Bahrain’s deputy foreign minister mentioned this very potential for cooperation last week on his visit to Israel. When referring to the Iranian attack, he underscored the concern of states in the region over Iranian actions in the Gulf in the same breath with the importance of multilateral action.

Looking ahead, cooperation on this issue could help advance “creeping normalization,” providing a platform for joint action with other states that Israel aspires to include in the normalization camp. These include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, near whose shores the latest Iranian attack occurred.

What can and should Israel do in concrete terms? First, intensify the level of its engagement with the IMSC, formally or informally. This framework is a meeting point between global and Gulf actors, and is therefore of double importance for Israel. Increased engagement could serve as a basis for deepening cooperation with Bahrain, which views the grouping as an important organ for protecting shipping lanes.

Second, define freedom of navigation as a central issue in the array of issues for strategic dialogue with multilateral fora in the Red Sea: the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea, and IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The Red Sea is a leading arena for international cooperation on freedom of navigation, and Israel has an opportunity to learn, contribute and strengthen ties there on formal and informal levels.

Cooperation on freedom of navigation could also constitute a launchpad for future regional dialogue, including Israel, on forging a joint diplomatic front against Iran’s regional campaign.

The maritime escalation gives Israel a chance to reexamine its modus operandi vis-a-vis the Iranian threat. So far, most of the creativity in this campaign has been invested in clandestine military operations. It is time to invest a similar measure of creativity in building a diplomatic coalition against the Iranian threat. It is time to create a different balance between joint diplomatic action with multilateral frameworks and independent military action.

Skillful Israeli integration in the international and regional campaign to ensure freedom of navigation would not only help protect its interests, but also serve as a tool for intensifying multilateral partnership with the region and the global system. As in the case of the Abraham Accords, Iran’s offensive actions provide Israel with an opportunity to improve its regional integration. Israel should ride this wave.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 2 September 2021

הפוסט Iran’s attacks on Israeli shipping in Gulf serves as lesson הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The latest round of escalation between Israel and Hamas illustrates that absent a diplomatic framework, this military strategy is greatly limited in shaping an endurable reality for Israel.

The “War between the Wars” strategy is underpinned by an assumption that Israel is destined to experience significant, temporary escalation every few years in its conflict with the Axis of Resistance – whether Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Its goal is to delay escalation as long as possible and shore up Israel’s strategic position in the interim in preparation for the next round.

However, this strategy has failed to achieve its far-reaching goals in recent years. Each round of fighting has eroded Israel’s position further.

Israel’s standing deteriorates with each new round of escalation as Hamas grows stronger in the domestic Palestinian arena, and Israel grows weaker on the international stage. This has become abundantly clear with the ICC’s decision to investigate alleged Israeli war crimes during Operation Protective Edge (2014). The recent round of escalation also caused a deep tear in the fabric of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel.

In addition, despite the Israeli military’s operational successes, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have upgraded their capacity to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, in terms both of quantity and quality. Instead of the “War between the Wars” shaping reality during rounds of fighting, the rounds of fighting are shaping the overall reality.

However, the main flaw of the “War between the Wars” does not lie in the strategy’s failure to achieve its operational goals, but in the adoption of its underpinning logic by Israel’s political leadership in lieu of diplomacy.

The “War between the Wars” dictates the logic of maintaining the status quo at all cost and accepting a chronicle of certain deterioration, while eschewing a real attempt to shape reality. It constitutes a desperate attempt to freeze reality with the best case scenario that things will not get any worse.

As a plan conceived by Israel’s security echelons in response to a change in the nature of the threat, the “War between the Wars” aims to limit the enemies’ capabilities and influence their short-term considerations rather than affecting their motivations. It is hard to blame the security echelons for this failure; as a military stopgap measure this strategy was never meant to change the systemic conditions of the conflict or provide long-term political incentives.

The “War between the Wars” was conceived by a security establishment subordinate to a political leadership that lacks the vision or the desire for long-term policy. Its adoption as a national work plan fits the anti-solutionism approach adopted by Israeli governments over the past decade to a tee.

The Netanyahu governments have turned the decision to avoid decisions into a strategy, studiously avoiding discussion of long-term solutions, and instead creating a creeping reality, whether Israel’s annexation of Area C, or its conduct vis-à-vis the Hamas or in the state’s relationship with its Arab citizens. Even the significant diplomatic developments of recent years, President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords, were not the product of an Israeli peace initiative. They simply exploited circumstantial opportunities.

The “War between the Wars” creates a false sense of proactivity. It is a policy that sanctifies military creativity and initiative in eliminating operational risks, but enables the political echelon to avoid diplomatic measures.

We have thus become a nation of terrorist hunters rather than of statespersons and foreign policy makers, excelling in the military act but repeatedly squandering its precious achievements in the absence of a strategic policy agenda or even of specific policy goals. This illusion of proactivity collapses with every escalation. While we are busy trying to preserve the status quo, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are learning, adapting and improving conditions for the next round.

The diplomatic paralysis finds Israel at a critical moment for the future of the conflict – on the one hand an unprecedented array of regional opportunities, on the other, a significant level of risk in the national-Palestinian arena.

Shared interests provide Israel with an opportunity to make use of its partnership with states in the region (especially Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as leverage to revitalize the negotiation process with the Palestinian Authority, and as a temporary conflict prevention tool through the economic development of Gaza.

However, Israel is also facing the twilight of the Mahmoud Abbas era and its unusual Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, which foiled the establishment of a terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and renewal of terror attacks from PA territory.

The new reality of a politically weak, divided Fatah, abandoned by its Arab partners and weakened by the Israeli government, casts a dark shadow on the continued security coordination with the PA and increases the odds of Hamas growing in power in the West Bank. The next round of fighting could present Israel with an active new front on the West Bank.

Following a decade of voluntary paralysis, Israel must now prioritize diplomacy once again, and renew its bid for peace with the Palestinians. Israel must provide a political alternative to the policy of repeated escalations, while still taking advantage of regional and local changes.

Israel must formulate a new political blueprint for its relations with the PA, including halting settlement activity and creating joint mechanisms to reduce tensions in Jerusalem and its surrounding communities. Such an initiative would stabilize the relationship with Abbas’ successors, offering Palestinians hope and ensuring continued security coordination with Israel. It could eventually constitute the basis for confidence building between the sides’ leaders and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In this regard, Israel should turn the Abraham Accords into a strategic tie-breaker, by integrating regional states into renewed diplomacy with the Palestinians. Such a move would also be beneficial for deepening regional cooperation to encompass additional strategic areas, such as forging defense alliances vis-a-vis Iran and its proxies, and roping Saudi Arabia into the normalization agreements.

Within the framework of a renewed political process, Israel must commit to a joint international effort for Gaza’s development.

Plenty of ideas and initiatives have been floated in the past decade. But Israeli and international attention to this issue usually lasts two or three weeks after each round of escalation, then receding with the shift in public attention. Linking improving the quality of life for Gaza’s residents with the political process would generate long-term Israeli, Palestinian and international commitment.

The “War between the Wars” has served over the past decade as the necessary minimum for a bearable existence for Israel, in a dynamic threat arena.

But the limitation of this military strategy in ensuring Israel’s security underscores the message resonating in recent weeks from Gaza all the way to the northern border: That along with a determined struggle against the Axis of Resistance and its proxies, the main campaign in which Israel should engage, to prevent further wars, is the campaign for peace.

**The article was published on Haaretz, 31 May 2021

הפוסט Israel’s Fatal Weakness Against Iran’s Axis of Resistance הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The war between the wars strategy is underpinned by an assumption that Israel is destined to experience significant, temporary escalation every few years in its conflict with the resistance axis – whether Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Its goal is to delay escalation as long as possible and shore up Israel‘s strategic position in the interim in preparation for the next round.

However, this strategy has failed to achieve its far-reaching goals in recent years. Each round of fighting has eroded Israel’s position further. Israel’s standing deteriorates with each new round of escalation as Hamas grows stronger in the domestic Palestinian arena and Israel grows weaker on the international stage. This has become abundantly clear with the ICC’s decision to investigate alleged Israeli war crimes during Operation Protective Edge (2014).The recent round of escalation also caused a the deep tear in the fabric of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel. In addition, despite the Israeli military’s operational successes, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have upgraded their capacity to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, in terms both of quantity and quality. Instead of the war between the wars shaping reality during the rounds of fighting, the rounds of fighting are shaping the overall reality.

However, the main flaw of the war between the wars does not lie in the strategy’s failure to achieve its operational goals, but in the adoption of its underpinning logic by Israel’s political leadership in lieu of diplomacy. The war between the wars dictates the logic of maintaining the status quo at all cost and accepting a chronicle of certain deterioration while eschewing a real attempt to shape reality. It constitutes a desperate attempt to freeze reality with the best case scenario that things will not get any worse. As a plan conceived by Israel’s security echelons in response to a change in the nature of the threat, the war between the wars aims to limit the enemies’ capabilities and influence their short-term considerations rather than affecting their motivations. It is hard to blame the security echelons for this failure; as a military stopgap measure this strategy was never meant to change the systemic conditions of the conflict or provide long-term political incentives.

The war between the wars was conceived by a security establishment subordinate to a political leadership that lacks vision or desire for long-term policy. Its adoption as a national work plan fits the anti-solutionism approach adopted by Israeli governments over the past decade to a tee. The Netanyahu governments have turned the decision to avoid decisions into a strategy, studiously avoiding discussion of long-term solutions, and instead creating a creeping reality, whether annexation of Area C or the conduct vis-à-vis the Hamas or in the state’s relationship with its Arab citizens. Even the significant diplomatic developments of recent years – President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords – were not the product of an Israeli peace initiative. They simply exploited circumstantial opportunities.

The war between the wars creates a false sense of proactivity. It is a policy that sanctifies creativity and operational initiative in eliminating operational risks but enables the political echelon to avoid diplomatic measures. We have thus become a nation of terrorist hunters rather than of statespersons and foreign policy makers, excelling in the military act but repeatedly squandering its precious achievements in the absence of a strategic policy agenda or even of specific policy goals. This illusion of proactivity collapses with every escalation. While we are busy trying to preserve the status quo, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are learning, adapting and improving conditions for the next round.

The diplomatic paralysis finds Israel at a critical moment for the future of the conflict – on the one hand an unprecedented array of regional opportunities, on the other, a significant level of risk in the national-Palestinian arena. Shared interests provide Israel with an opportunity to make use of its partnership with states in the region (especially Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as leverage to revitalize the negotiation process with the PA and as a temporary conflict prevention tool through economic development of Gaza. However, Israel is also facing the twilight of the Abu Mazen era and its unusual Israeli-Palestinian security coordination that foiled the establishment of a terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and renewal of terror attacks from PA territory. The new reality of a politically weak, divided Fatah, abandoned by its Arab partners and weakened by the Israeli government, casts a dark shadow on the continued security coordination with the PA and increases the odds of Hamas growing its power in the West Bank. The next round of fighting could present Israel with an active new front on the West Bank.

Following a decade of voluntary paralysis, Israel must now prioritize diplomacy once again and renew its bid for peace with the Palestinians. Israel must provide a political alternative to the policy of repeated escalations, while still taking advantage of regional and local changes. Israel must formulate a new political blueprint for its relations with the PA, including halting settlement activity and creating joint mechanisms to reduce tensions in Jerusalem and its surrounding communities. Such an initiative would stabilize the relationship with Abu Mazen‘s successors, present Palestinians with hope and ensure continued security coordination with Israel. It can eventually constitute the basis for confidence building between the sides‘ leaders and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In this regard, Israel should turn the Abraham Accords into a strategic tie breaker by integrating the states of the region into renewed diplomacy with the Palestinians. Such a move would also be beneficial for deepening regional cooperation to encompass additional strategic areas, such as forging defense alliances vis-a-vis Iran and its proxies and roping Saudi Arabia into the normalization agreements. Within the framework of a renewed political process, Israel must commit to a joint international effort for Gaza’s development. Plenty of ideas and initiatives have been floated in the past decade. But Israeli and international attention to this issue usually lasts two-three weeks after each round of escalation, receding with the shift in public attention. Linking improving the quality of life for Gaza‘s residents with the political process would generate long-term Israeli, Palestinian and international commitment.

The war between the wars has served as the necessary minimum for Israel’s bearable existence in a dynamic threat arena over the past decade. But the limitation of this military strategy in ensuring Israel’s security underscores the message resonating in recent weeks from Gaza all the way to the northern border – that along with a determined struggle against the resistance axis and its proxies, the main campaign in which Israel should engage to prevent further wars is the campaign for peace.

הפוסט The Defeat Between the Wars: Time for Diplomacy to Lead הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

They’re only one example of an exceptional level of international involvement in both this year’s Israeli national election campaigns, unprecedented in both scope and style. The posters, their iconography and their message have a significance beyond the intricacies of Israeli politics. They reveal the developing fault lines dividing two competing global camps – liberals and non-liberals – and their growing willingness to support allies and confront foes in a direct, unvarnished manner.

International support for Israeli political candidates engaged in competitive elections is not new. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit organized by President Clinton to support Shimon Peres’ failed 1996 campaign is a notable example. However, foreign interventions have generally been far more low-key than the explicit pro-Netanyahu lobbying we are now witnessing. Gone are previous campaigns conducted cautiously behind the scenes to back a candidate’s political agenda: these efforts mostly concern the personal rather than the ideological, part of an effort to elevate or to challenge Netanyahu’s image as a global leader.

One of Netanyahu’s main electoral goals is to convince voters that he is indispensable, by branding himself Israel’s only leader with the requisite international magnitude. International feedback is thus a central tool in cementing this play, and in diverting attention from Netanyahu’s pending criminal indictments towards his global prestige. Ahead of the first round of elections in April 2019, Netanyahu’s international allies – leaders of what one could describe as the global non-liberal camp – answered his call by providing both diplomatic gestures and concrete policy steps. The weeks before the election were saturated with international events carefully crafted by the Netanyahu campaign.

Official visits by global allies offered Netanyahu photo-opportunities to land his image as a global leader. Key support was provided by the two competing leaders of the global non-liberal camp: First, Putin, who met with Netanyahu and donated symbolic capital by retrieving Israeli MIA Zachary Baumel’s body. Secondly, and above all else, Trump’s explicit mobilization for Netanyahu’s campaign. Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro were also protagonists in the international re-elect Netanyahu campaign.

Trump’s finest electoral gift was his recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. This act appealed to a majority of Israelis who see the territory as an integral part of Israel. It also resonated with Netanyahu’s own right-wing base who made the annexation of occupied land a leading topic in the campaign. Trump’s declaration allowed Netanyahu to present a clear sense of achievement in the crucial last stretch, which even his opponents could not dispute. Netanyahu once again situated himself as the only Israeli leader capable of stepping onto the international stage and getting results. This, while the international activity of his main contender, Benny Gantz, was limited to speeches at AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference.

Ahead of the coming re-run elections, we already see Netanyahu attempting similar plays to exploit his interpersonal relations with prominent non-liberal leaders to brand him, as his slogan goes, as a leader “of a different league.”

The growing list of world leaders to meet Netanyahu before the election includes another close peer – India’s Prime Minister Modi. But the main campaign’s effort is focused on arranging a timely visit to Israel by Russia’s Putin, during which a monument to fallen Russian soldiers will be unveiled. This step is possibly devised to influence Russianspeaking voters, who are of special electoral importance for Netanyahu this time around. Trump is also reportedly planning moves that can boost Netanyahu’s chances for reelection, possibly including an announcement of new U.S. security guarantees to Israel.

This global support highlights Netanyahu’s status as a central figure in the global non-liberal camp. His domestic policy corresponds with its values, favoring the majoritarian aspect of democracy over liberal values. However, it also put forward a message that goes well beyond the Israeli context – in times of need, the non-liberal network also functions as a practical political alliance.

The liberal camp lags behind, but it too has shown some willingness to get involved in the Israeli election. In light of the global crisis of liberal democracy, there is a growing understanding that like-minded liberals and progressives – in various countries – should better coordinate and cooperate. Bernie Sanders has even called for an “international progressive front” to confront the “new authoritarian axis.” Civil society organizations were the first to take the lead in this challenge, and the Israeli election may signal the beginning of a spillover into the political field. Stav Shaffir, one of the founders of Israel’s left-wing Democratic Camp, has called on progressives to establish a “united movement.”

In this liberal democratic spirit of pushing back, a few days before Israel’s April 2019 election, U.S. Democratic presidential candidates voiced unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of endorsing racism and of being corrupt. Sanders said openly he hoped Netanyahu loses. This was a continuation of a gradual process, in which mainstream Jewish organizations and figures showed willingness to criticize Netanyahu and his domestic policies. This trend was motivated both by resentment towards Netanyahu, and by his overly-close alliance with Trump. Nevertheless, lacking a clear progressive alternative candidate to Netanyahu, liberals’ critical steps never amounted to a direct endorsement of his opponents.

In Europe, liberals have been even more cautious. They tend to refrain from intervening in domestic Israeli politics, partly because they too did not see an appealing alternative to Netanyahu they could wholeheartedly endorse. French President Macron was the exception. Four days prior to the previous election, he hosted Yair Lapid for a meeting, a move which the Blue and White party hoped would boost their international image. Macron’s step could be seen as a personal favor, grounded in pre-existing links with Lapid, but which also stemmed from his position as a central leader within the global liberal camp and as an alternative to Trump.

Despite their limited nature, these tentative steps by liberals indicate that a change may be underway to challenge the loud illiberal support for Netanyahu. But their insufficient nature can be seen by the fact that no further steps have been taken towards the September 2019 elections, and Israel’s center-left politicians have not yet acted to encourage their international allies to take action. That seems even more short-sighted, bearing in mind how global liberals will have no option but to get involved in Israeli affairs should the next Israeli government fulfil Netanyahu’s promise to annex settlements, and as the U.S. presidential election draw near.

Placing the Israeli election as one in a series of global events allows us to obtain a broader perspective of the ongoing realignment of the international system. It demonstrates the willingness of key liberal and non-liberal actors to adopt a more proactive approach in influencing what was until now considered diplomatically as sacred ground – national elections in friendly countries.

It may signal that the gloves are coming off in the global conflict between liberals and nonliberals. However, it also demonstrates the power asymmetry between the camps. The world’s liberals still have much work to do, before they can collectively succeed to turn the tide.

Dr. Gil Murciano is a foreign policy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Israeli Elections and the Global Competition between the Liberal and Non-Liberal Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.