The Palestinian leader’s first formal meeting with a top-level Israeli minister in more than a decade was held at a particularly sensitive political moment for both sides. The Palestinian Authority is consistently losing public support, President Abbas is perceived as an authoritarian leader holding onto power by dint of his ability to impose sanctions and his heavily armed security forces, and many Palestinians blame him for the failure of his strategy to achieve Palestinian independence by diplomatic means.

The Palestinian Authority failure in the diplomatic arena is particularly egregious given the Hamas movement’s challenge to its rule. In the absence of negotiations, Hamas has devised an alternative modus operandi, which while not advancing the quality of life for residents of Gaza, paradoxically bolsters popular support for the movement. Hamas is positioning itself successfully as the heir to Fatah in leading the armed Palestinian struggle against Israel, honing the message that armed struggle is the only way to achieve Israeli concessions. The Hamas policy proved effective during Operation Keeper of the Walls (May 2021), helping it link the distress of the enclave’s residents, which Abbas has tried to isolate, with developments in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and even sparking violence by Israel’s Palestinian population.

The attacks to which Abbas is being subjected by his domestic rivals in the Fatah movement and by Hamas require that he take action to bolster his standing as President of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has a vested interest in strengthening his standing, greatly eroded during the Netanyahu years, but the complex makeup of the government coalition are not conducive to renewed negotiations on a permanent status solution with the Palestinian Authority. Renewed negotiations would invariably result in a speedy dismantling of the Israeli coalition and renewed elections. This was the backdrop for the Abbas-Gantz meeting, which was to all intents and purposes political-diplomatic in nature although it was portrayed publicly as a discussion of civilian-economic issues. In fact, the discussion dealt with a series of security and diplomacy issues that take on special significance given the protests against Abbas and weakening PA control over certain areas of the West Bank. This unraveling control stems not only from the absence of a diplomatic horizon but also from the economic crisis undermining the Palestinian Authority.

The renewed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is also of significance to regional stability, especially at a time of growing security instability with Gaza and the ongoing campaign to stem the coronavirus spread. Renewed negotiations against the backdrop of the change in administrations in Washington are also important for generating fresh winds of hope. Israel’s willingness for a dialogue channel is manifested, inter alia, in its offer of a loan to tide the PA over a rough patch. Nonetheless, Abbas is aware of the heavy criticism against him on the Palestinian street, intensified since renewal of the dialogue with Israel, the ongoing security coordination with Israel and his refusal to undertake reconciliation measures with Hamas invariably resulting in elections to the Palestinian national institutions and parliament. In response to the criticism, Abbas has adopted an aggressive tone in the discourse on Israel both domestically and in international forums, led primarily by Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Abbas’s Fatah movement deputy and Tanzim leader Mahmoud al-Aloul.

The most effective way for Abbas to try nonetheless to enter into discourse with Israel involves a joint front with Jordan and Egypt, both troubled by the rise of political Islam and strengthened position of Hamas. Abbas is aware of the need to form a united front with King Abdallah and President al-Sisi. He does not want to find himself isolated once more, as he was by the signing of the Abraham Accords. Jordan and Egypt could open doors for the Palestinians with the international community, which has despaired of the Palestinian unwillingness to adopt more flexible positions on the launch of negotiations.

It is incumbent on Abbas to take pragmatic steps to ensure the stability of his regime in its waning years given the threats to the PA not only from the rise of Hamas but also from battles of succession within Fatah, its economic downturn exacerbated by the coronavirus, and the despair of the younger generations for all of the above reasons.

Forging a united Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian front to promote renewed dialogue with Israel and commit to unconditional support of the two-state solution could once again place the Palestinian issue on the desks of international decision makers. Such a course also serves Israel’s interests, with Egypt leading humanitarian and economic measures to ease the distress of daily life in Gaza and freeing it from having to adopt such measures itself and risk domestic criticism.

Such a move also serves the Palestinian interest and bolsters Fatah’s standing versus Hamas. Abbas is nearing the end of his rule and has nothing to lose. Having realized that the Arab world of the 21^st century is no longer committed to pan-Arab slogans and no longer willing to wait for resolution of the Palestinian issue as a condition for normalization with Israel, it is incumbent on the PLO leadership to make a difficult decision. Should it return to the negotiating table and try to achieve an end to the conflict and establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, or should it maintain the status quo, which could eventually sink the moderate Fatah forces and pave the way for others to replace them. Israel has an interest in bolstering moderate Fatah forces in the PA in the face of the militant, religious Hamas position. Continued confidence building measures with the PA, especially in economic and civilian areas, could encourage continued dialogue on diplomatic issues, too. This is clearly in the interests of the region because strengthening the PA at the expense of Hamas would help strengthen further the alliance with moderate Sunni states in the face of the Iranian threat and Iran’s entrenchment efforts in our region.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’s moment of truth: The road to renewed diplomacy traverses Amman and Cairo הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The announcement by Abbas, on 15 January 2021, of elections to the Palestinian parliament, presidency and PLO institutions, to take place between May and August 2021, surprised the regional and international community. Abbas and his associates viewed the leadership change in Washington as an opportunity to restore relations with the US. After being ostracized by Trump, the PA believed that announcing elections and undertaking a democratic process would build trust with Biden.

The intention to hold elections was also prompted by domestic needs. Since his term ended officially in 2009, Abbas has been running the PA using executive orders. The ongoing division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and absence of elections to the PA’s institutions have gradually eroded his legitimacy. Public support for Abbas has declined continuously, a situation exacerbated by the prolonged stalemate in negotiations on establishment of a Palestinian state and by the global coronavirus crisis that affected the PA, too.

The announcement of general elections was well received among Palestinians, especially by the young generation that grew up under an authoritarian political system and was deprived of the right to participate in national elections since 2006. The expectations Abbas created by setting election dates generated a sense in the Palestinian political arena that national reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas was also at hand and that Palestinian society was heading for a true process of democratization.

These sentiments were bolstered by the understandings reached between Hamas and Fatah on the elections, and the conciliatory messages emanating from talks led by Jibril Rajoub with the heads of the various Palestinian factions. These talks even included a September 2020 meeting in Turkey between Rajoub and Hamas leaders Salah Al-Arouri and Ismail Haniyeh, to discuss a joint campaign against normalization between the Gulf States and Israel.

Abbas felt that he was embarking on the election process from a position of strength. The PA had become increasingly authoritarian and centralized and its security agencies were mobilized not only to thwart the development of Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank but also to oppress Abbas’ political rivals at home and curtail free speech.

However, despite the power emanating from control of the Palestinian agencies in the West Bank, Abbas’ political party is plagued by splits and internal power plays. Unlike previous announcements of impending elections (that never materialized), this time Fatah found itself split into three different factions. Abbas’ inability to unite with supporters of Marwan Barghouti and of Nasser al-Kidwa, both of whom have decided to challenge him, attests to the de-facto launch of a war of succession undermining the authority of the 85-year-old leader. The challenge by Barghouti was a warning to the Fatah leadership, and Abbas’ failure to forge a unified coalition points to the weakening of his standing within Fatah and to the twilight of his rule.

The decision to cancel the elections stemmed from substantive concerns by all the Fatah factions over losing to Hamas. The divisions within Fatah and the personal rivalries within its factions contrasted with the united front Hamas presented ahead of the scheduled elections. To avoid embarrassment, Abbas chose to delay the elections, pointing an accusing figure at Israel for preventing the voting by refusing to allow the participation of East Jerusalem residents. Abbas is also blaming actors in the international arena, such as the EU, for not exerting sufficient pressure on Israel to allow voting in East Jerusalem. Abbas’ move and argumentation generated anger among European decision makers.

Unlike Fatah, Hamas learned the lessons of the 2006 elections, but it has also failed along the years to manage the Gaza Strip in the face of ongoing cycles of violence, a prolonged humanitarian crisis and the results of the coronavirus epidemic. Despite the desire to integrate into PLO institutions, Hamas is not keen to take on the running of daily life in the PA at this stage, and would actually be happy to drag the PA into the Gaza Strip in order to share with it responsibility for the ongoing crises there.

It should therefore come as no surprise that Hamas opted for a measured response to the election delay. It avoided direct attacks on the PA, but at the same time complained that the PA had gone back on previous agreements and warned that the Palestinian political arena could not remain subordinated solely to Fatah interests. Like Abbas, Hamas focused its reaction on Jerusalem. The movement urged young Palestinians to learn from the successful popular struggle they mounted in the city during this month of Ramadan and continue clashing with Israeli security forces, but at the same time to intensify political efforts to achieve internal reconciliation and unity. Hamas has responded differently to Israel and to the PA over the scrapping of the elections.

While billed as a delay in elections, no one is under any illusion that they have been scrapped. Abbas’ reluctance to introduce political reform and move toward reconciliation with Hamas has led the Palestinian political system to the brink of chaos. The elections delay and the events that preceded it signal that whereas most of the attention was focused until now on the Fatah-Hamas power struggle, the impact of the internal Fatah turf wars on decision making at the national level is just as significant. The developments clearly indicate that the entire Palestinian political system has begun staking out positions for the day after Abbas.

When that day arrives, Fatah will have to reorganize and institute reforms, to allow the return of key figures expelled from its ranks, such as al-Kidwa (who was banished from the movement during the preparation of candidate lists for the elections) and Mohammed Dahlan. The Palestinian public has thus far been silent over Abbas’ decision upending the voting, but this could be the calm before the storm, allowing anyone who wants to run for the presidency after the Abbas era to prepare his party and camp for the moment of truth.

Israel must familiarize itself with the in-depth processes affecting the Palestinian society and must respect the desire for change and the democratization process on the other side of the Green Line. These could legitimize efforts by the next Palestinian generation to resume negotiations with Israel and reach historic decisions in the future.

הפוסט Thoughts on the Postponement of the Palestinian Elections הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The entry of some Arab states into a process of accelerated normalization with Israel has led to the collapse of the PA’s concept of negotiations. The current round of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas can be understood against the background of the regional changes that have resulted from Israel’s agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

For more than a decade, there has been a mostly unsuccessful dialogue among the various Palestinian factions to unify their political system, which has been divided since June 2006, and Fatah and Hamas presently face a significant crisis of confidence. The current attempts at reconciliation, however, have different characteristics than past attempts. This time, the contacts between Fatah and Hamas are taking place when the Palestinian national movement is at one of its low points, as countries in the Arab world are turning their backs on it, and when it needs to rethink its overall strategy moving forward.

This political crisis occurs while Fatah and Hamas leadership are in a transition phase. Power struggles over the succession of PA President Mahmoud Abbas embroil Fatah, while Hamas is undergoing an election process intended to determine the leader of the movement for the next four years. As part of this process, there are power struggles between Hamas leadership in Gaza and its leaders abroad.

The reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas that have been taking place in Turkey, considered a member of the regional axis opposing Israel and a Hamas sponsor, reveal the extent of the crisis facing the Palestinian Authority, which suspects its traditional friends in the Middle East of turning their backs on it. The death in September of Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah – Kuwait’s leader since 2006, who was in charge of Kuwait’s foreign relations for some 50 years – is a symbolic illustration of the sense of loneliness felt by Palestinians due to Gulf abandonment. Al-Sabah famously repaired the relations between Kuwait and the PLO following the crisis of the first Gulf War in which PLO chairman Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein.

The younger generation that is taking over the reins of leadership in the Gulf states does not share the commitment of its parents’ generation to the Palestinian issue. The younger generation chose to abandon the “Three No’s” of the Khartoum Conference of 1967 (no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel) in favor of establishing civil and economic peace with the State of Israel. This peace also includes political and security elements, which create ample space for the Gulf states to maneuver regionally, particularly against Iranian threats of regional destabilization.

However, despite forging closer ties with Israel, the Gulf states have not entirely abandoned the Palestinian issue. The UAE stipulated the cancellation of Israeli annexation plans as a condition for signing the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia, the largest and most important of the Gulf states, which spearheaded the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 on the basis of a two-state solution, is gradually increasing its engagement with Israel, but continues to insist upon a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before full normalization can proceed.

As these dramatic changes take place in the region, the Palestinian leadership has dropped its guard. Had it not been for the normalization measures between Israel and the Gulf states, we would not have seen the renewed efforts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. In light of regional developments, the factions feel obligated to show Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that they are trying to provide a national and political solution to the many domestic and foreign problems facing Palestinian society.

The rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas, which is being sponsored by Turkey-Qatar-Iran axis, does not come naturally to the PA’s leadership. Abbas is hoping that a change of administration in the US on November 3 will allow him to break free from the dialogue with Hamas in order to rekindle the peace process. This would be done under the auspices of a new American leadership, based on a new peace plan crafted in the mold of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Against the4 background of the changes that have already taken place in the region, the leadership of the PA understands the Arab world is no longer waiting for its approval to forge agreements with Israel. This is a moment of truth for the old guard of the PLO. They must decide whether to return to the negotiating table with Israel and work to realize the two-state vision, or whether to allow for the continuation of the status quo. Choosing to preserve the status quo could end in the complete erosion of the scant legitimacy that the PA possesses and lead to the rise of Hamas as the dominant faction in the Palestinian national movement at the expense of Fatah.

This is not in Israel’s interest. Instead, the Israeli government would be well served to foster a new diplomatic horizon for the Palestinians and to advance the two-state solution. In so doing, it would help strengthen the moderates in the Palestinian arena and not the extremists.

**The article was published on Jpost, 4  November 2020

הפוסט Normalizations with Israel bring new challenge for Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shrinking the freedom of expression is a strategic move by the PA. Since its founding, the PA has used censorship as a tool to weaken oppositional voices from Hamas and the Left. At first, limitations on the freedom of expression were not anchored in legislation. The PA, through its security services, directly interacted with editors, journalists and newspaper editorial teams to dictate the limits of freedom of expression, without a formal censorship body. In June 2017 the PA announced – as a complementary step to older censorship laws – a presidential order preventing electronic criminal activity, adjusted to a zeitgeist where the Internet has replaced the city square. The order allows the PA to issue heavy fines and arrest anyone who expresses criticism of the PA online, including journalists and social activists. This order also allows the PA to mark anyone who shares or re-tweets critical content as a target.

The presidential order allowed the PA to begin waves of arrests, first against journalists identified with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, like Ahmad al-Halaiqah from the village of al-Shuyukh, Mamdouh Hamamreh from Husan, and Tareq Abu Zeid from Nablus. The order was also used to allow the arrests of social and political activists who focused their struggle against Israel, like Issa Amro from Hebron (who was arrested after he criticized the PA on social media). This reality stirs up criticism against the PA, domestically and abroad. International human rights organizations and the European Union have followed with concern the shrinking of freedom of expression, especially after the arrest of journalists, and they are not suppressing their criticism.

NEVERTHELESS, IT appears that the PA is not deterred, and is even increasing its measures due to the political circumstances.
The leadership of the PA in the West Bank is worried about a possible coup attempt by Hamas. Although Hamas lacks real military capabilities in the West Bank, it enjoys developed media capabilities. Hamas and Islamic organizations have a network of satellite television channels at their disposal through which they broadcast to the West Bank.

Moreover, they also have a significant number of propaganda outlets, news websites, and news agencies that they are identified with (for example, the Shehab News Agency, which boasts millions of followers), and which have wide exposure in the West Bank and the Arab world. In the age of social media and the fast exchange of messages, these are efficient tools for creating political power and influence. The PA is aware of the strength of Hamas’s media influence and is trying to damage it. The PA is even sacrificing the principle of freedom of expression within Palestinian society for the sake of this goal.

The shrinking of freedom of expression appears to be an organized policy of the PA, meant to help cope with the political challenges it faces in the waning years of Abbas’s presidency. These challenges include a lack of announcements about the identity of Abbas’s successor and the question of the continued existence of the PA in its current form. The expansion of measures limiting freedom of expression demonstrates the importance that the PA gives to the media as shapers of public opinion.

The voices emerging from the streets and the virtual city squares are worrying for the leadership of the PA, and the PA is acting to deepen its control over these spheres. From the perspective of the PA, this is a strategic process that is meant to entrench its control in the lead-up to a period of political instability.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, the director of the Middle East Studies Department at the Emek Yizrael Academic College, and an expert on Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The PA’s shrinking space for freedom of expression הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In effect, the government that is now dispersing is the second one Hamdallah has led. He was first appointed prime minister in 2013 and started his second term in 2015 after Abbas picked him to lead the Fatah-Hamas unity government. That government was comprised of technocrats and appointed not only to govern but also to prepare the groundwork for a Palestinian legislative election and to institute reforms that would allow the Palestinian political system to reunite.

The PA is managed as a presidential republic, in which the president holds most of the power and the government is basically an executive body that does what the president wants. Dismissing the government is one of the tools the president can use to send a message to the people, handle criticism from home or coordinate things ahead of actions required to make political change.

Abbas chose to appoint a new government as a way of dealing with political challenges at home and responding to current events in Palestinian society. The race for succession between various Fatah officials is creating considerable tension. One concern all senior officials in the movement share is that Hamdallah is coalescing political and popular power as prime minister and could become a serious rival in the battle to succeed Abbas. Even though Hamdallah, a former president of the al-Najah University in Nablus, is identified with the Fatah, he holds no official role in the movement. So paradoxically, the Fatah leadership took care to portray him as a political player who isn’t really one of them.

The Fatah succession race is playing out alongside the more than decade long struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA’s political system. As head of the unity government, Hamdallah is now having to pay a high political price for the decision by Abbas and the top Fatah echelon to put a cork in efforts to reconcile the two rival Palestinian factions. The main reason Abbas dismissed the government – which will nevertheless still exist and hold ministerial responsibility for forming a new government – is his need to prepare the groundwork for legislative and presidential elections. These elections are slated to be held in the West Bank only, and not in Gaza, and will effectively make the division between Fatah and Hamas into a permanent fact.

Shoving a serving prime minister aside is another signal from Abbas that he is still powerful. Abbas wants to lay down the outline for Palestinian policy in the future and ensure that Fatah stays in power after Gaza was lost on his watch. Despite the concentrated political power he has demonstrated in recent years, which sometimes took the form of limiting free speech, Abbas has decided – along with dismissing the Hamdallah government – to freeze a bill that would establish a Palestinian social security institution. That bill sparked an outcry in many sectors of Palestinian society, as people feared that money would be deducted from their salaries and put into the PA’s accounts.

Until a new PA government is appointed, Abbas and the rest of the Fatah leadership have some time to get a sense of how the public is responding to their political moves. The next PA prime minister will need to deal with less public backing for the Fatah government. The new Palestinian government will also face challenges in building a Palestinian state, given the lack of faith between the PA and the US administration; the lack of a peace plan; and a total freeze in negotiations between the PA and Israel.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in Yisrael Hayom)

הפוסט Where Are Palestinian Politics Headed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas.

In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a gun. In fact, since he was elected as the President of the Palestinian Authority in 2005, Abbas has not set foot in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, losing control of it is part of his legacy.

In contrast to Yasser Arafat, who had roots in Gaza and spoke like one of the people, Abbas was born in Tzfat, from where his family fled to Syria, and has no special emotional connection to the Strip. Throughout his period in office, he has focused on the project of building the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the diplomatic battle against the State of Israel, neglecting the Gaza Strip. He abandoned the people of Gaza to the hands of Hamas and the economic mercies of the international community and Gulf states, trusting them to add patch after patch to cover the desolation and wretchedness of the Gaza Strip.

After three rounds of warfare, with the Gaza Strip tired and beaten, Abbas has still not changed his strategic approach towards it. Since 2014, not only has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority failed to stretch out its hand to support the people of the Strip economically but, moreover, has imposed a long series of economic sanctions which affect the civilians. These include failure to pay for fuel sent to the Strip, thus increasing civilian pressure on Hamas and proving to the residents of the Strip that the Islamist movement cannot provide for their most basic needs.

Following Abbas’ clear political failure to advance the vision of a Palestinian state, the political struggle against Hamas has become more significant. Hamas of 2018 is looking to the future, and its leadership deems itself the proper heir to the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Abbas, who lost the Gaza Strip, is not interested in losing the political leadership and the historical status of the Fatah movement within the PLO.

The bloody battles since summer 2007 are etched into the memories of Fatah members; the decade-long isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank has increased the estrangement between the sides; Abbas’ despair at the political process, alongside the suspicion and ideological and political disgust he feels towards Hamas, has led him to radicalize his position, making it difficult to reconcile the dialogue between the two sides.

Abbas’ main demand from Hamas to enable an advance towards reconciliation is that the movement dismantle its military wing. Hamas without Jihad, Hamas without arms, will lose not only its ideological identity but also its political bargaining chips. Understanding that Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, Abbas’ only option is to continue putting economic pressure on the movement’s rule in the Gaza Strip. He hopes that these steps will lead to mass protests against Hamas, enabling him to return to the Strip as victor.

The continued economic decline and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip heighten the tension between Hamas and Israel. Hamas must direct its anger and frustration outside, away from itself. Military conflict between Hamas and Israel can result in the dismantlement of Hamas’ weapons following an Israeli military campaign. In the past, the Palestinian Authority ruled out this option, but it seems that now, from Abbas’ perspective, any path that can eventually lead to a unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under his control is deemed suitable. Indeed, a unified control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase the Palestinian Authority’s prestige and allow it to exert greater pressure on the State of Israel in the future, should the peace process between the two sides resume.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of open and direct dialogue between Israel and Hamas necessitates international mediation. While neither Israel nor Hamas are interested in a violent confrontation, such a confrontation can occur at any given moment. The continued hostility between them, alongside a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the inability of Hamas to deliver the economic and political conditions required to end this crisis, maintain prospects for violent outbreaks. The use of violence as a political tool helps Hamas raise the humanitarian crisis in Gaza on the regional agenda, as a means of preserving its status as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

Given that the current state of affairs continues, international mediation initiatives towards a ceasefire in Gaza are doomed to fail. Without an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and without the backing and active involvement of the Palestinian Authority, there is no real prospect to improve living conditions in the Gaza Strip.

In light of Israel’s decision to refrain from an all-out military attack to defeat Hamas, both sides are looking for interim solutions to the challenges posed by Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, which sees itself as the legitimate sovereign of the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which fears a spillover of violence that will undermine stability along the Sinai-Gaza border, are also parties to this charged relationship.

Due to Palestinian Authority’s historical semi-state status and to the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt cannot abrogate Mahmoud Abbas’ demands and ignore the Palestinian Authority’s needs while searching for a solution to Gaza. Abbas sees the recent indirect dialogue between Israel and Hamas as undermining the status of the PLO. The international mediation, led by the UN envoy and some Arab states, grants Hamas with increased political legitimacy, and Abbas, who has already lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, cannot afford a situation whereby the PLO’s political status is further undermined.

Attempts by Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement that does not involve the Palestinian Authority raise concerns among the PLO and Fatah leaderships. The PLO is therefore making efforts to thwart any initiative that does not give it a central role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This was said quite overtly during the recent PLO Central Council meeting in Ramallah (15-17 August 2018). It has also become a major source of contention in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation attempts.

The inability of Hamas and Fatah to unify the Palestinian political system also makes it difficult to reach a regional arrangement in Gaza. The disputes among the Palestinian movements obstruct efforts by the donor countries to extend assistance, since there is no agreed upon mechanism for transferring and managing the funds.

A ceasefire arrangement could serve as a temporary solution, but one that will continue to inflame the tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and between Israel and Hamas. Since Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in the summer of 2014, there have been cycles of violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas, that did not evolve to a comprehensive military conflict. The current year has seen another escalation, which was triggered by the Gazans’ “Return Campaign”, which included marches towards the border fence as well as arson attempts via kites.

These actions and the casualties involved were supposed to generate support of Hamas’ objectives in the Arab world and beyond. This campaign, however, failed. The marches led to escalation and to an increase in Palestinian fatalities, but did not generate the media response and political pressure on Israel that Hamas hoped for, not even on the part of Arab countries. The lack of political achievements of such a popular struggle strengthened Hamas’ military wing, at the expense of the movement’s political wing.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire are intended to produce a glimmer of hope for the residents of Gaza, but the political obstacles, primarily the split between Hamas and Fatah, reduce the chances of success. Moreover, Israel currently sees the developments in Syria (especially the Iranian presence there) as a more urgent challenge to deal with than that of Gaza. But leaving Gaza behind only raises the bar of violence there. It leads to renewed escalation and riots with the IDF along the border, with Hamas closely monitoring their intensity.

As long as the Fatah-Hamas rift remains unresolved, international mediation regarding Gaza can produce only temporary solutions. The socio-economic problems of the Gaza Strip and the division of power within Palestinian society will continue to create difficulties and to challenge the status quo. To counter this, permanent solutions are needed, and these can only be achieved under international auspices and with US support.

However, the current lack of trust between the PLO and the US administration prevents this. Trump’s decision to cut funding to UNRWA reflected once again that Gaza is not just an internal Palestinian issue. It is turning from a regional problem to a complex international one, in which there is a clash between American interests and those of other major countries.

While US President Trump aspires – unsuccessfully for the time being – to lead peace efforts under his own terms, the EU and other donor countries are looking for alternative short-term solutions that will significantly ease living conditions in Gaza. Such solutions, despite their importance, are not likely to solve the intra-Palestinian divide nor to produce a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

The road to an effective solution must include constructive US involvement that backs both sides to the conflict, and not just Israel. This is necessary for Israelis to feel that their security interests are taken care of, for the Palestinians to restore trust in the US, and for the US to once again be able to play the role of an accepted mediator.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trump’s Statement on Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The internal Palestinian split, manifested in the creation of two geographically and culturally distinct political entities – in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank – has continued for a decade. Throughout this period, the difficulty in bridging the gaps between Fatah and Hamas stemmed from disagreements in the political and social worldview regarding the character of the future Palestinian society and state. It was also a result of the violent circumstances in which the split emerged in 2007 – killings and violent struggle between the two movements in the Gaza Strip.

The cautious optimism among Palestinians following the signing of the Fatah-Hamas agreement is a product of the changing circumstances; first and foremost, the increasing Egyptian involvement in the reconciliation process. It was Egypt, which through a persistent struggle succeeded in creating the current path for the Palestinian dialogue. This has been accomplished after Egypt emphasized its crucial role to both sides and created a system of dependencies.

הפוסט A Look at the Palestinian Reconciliation Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From a historical perspective, this is one of the worst moments in the history of the Palestinian national movement. The political-geographical split is making it difficult for the PLO leadership to navigate through the diplomatic route toward the two-states-for-two-people solution, as it committed to in the Oslo Agreements. The alternative Hamas tried to present in the form of jihad collapsed too, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The crisis the two leaderships – the PA and the Hamas – are experiencing obligates them to find solutions that could give the young generation a sense of hope. Naturally, the weakness of the national system and party affiliation makes it possible to create political alliances based on alternative identities. So far, it seems the key for creating change in Palestinian society can be found in the creation of communal alliances around strengthening the regional-geographical connection while bolstering the national connection as well.

That’s the background for the recent Egyptian-brokered unnatural affair between Mohammad Dahlan, who was expelled from Fatah in 2011 but sees himself as Mahmoud Abbas’s future successor, and Hamas’s newly elected leader, Yahya Sanwar. Dahlan, the former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force, was described by the Hamas leadership on the eve of the military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007 as a corrupt person damaging the values of Islam.

The parties have surprisingly moved closer not just thanks to a political meeting of interests, but due to traditional cultural identity components, led by the interpersonal connection and the local identity. Sanwar and Dahlan grew up together in the Khan Younis refugee camp, share the refugee mindset and the same background. In addition, there is no history of bad blood between them. Dahlan and Sanwar’s ways parted in the beginning of the first intifada.

Since then, until their recent meeting in Cairo, there has been no animosity between the two, but perhaps yearning.

The personal acquaintance and the local identity shared by Dahlan and Sanwar is seen as an asset by Egypt too, which is interested in severing the ties between Hamas’s military wing and Islamist organizations in the Sinai Peninsula.

The creation of an economic-political dependence system, which passes through Dahlan and is backed by Sanwar, will make it possible for Egypt to achieve these goals. Thus, the local Gazan identity, which receives a lot of legitimization from Egypt, allows Hamas to find a formula that would make its political survival possible.

For Dahlan, the local identity could serve as a renewed stepping stone to a national leadership position. The purpose of the alliance between Dahlan and Hamas is to lead joint moves that would create a better day-to-day life for the strip’s residents, who are suffering from a shortage of electricity, water and basic civilian infrastructure. Dahlan and the donation money from the Gulf are supposed to fill the void left behind by Abbas. The Palestinian president chose to withdraw funds to harm the Gaza Strip’s bureaucratic systems and civilian infrastructure in an attempt to subdue Hamas, following Sanwar’s efforts to create an alternative government that would neutralize the influence of the Palestinian Authority’s government offices in the Gaza Strip.

Beyond the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, the internal Fatah battle between Abbas and Dahlan is personal and filled with bad blood. In the past, Abbas rejected Egyptian attempts to reconcile between the parties, and he is determined to block Dahlan’s way back into Fatah and prevent him from reaching an influential position in the future.

As part of his attempts to try to thwart Dahlan’s return to a political position of power, Abbas initiated last week a meeting with the Hamas leadership in the West Bank, led by Nasser alDin al-Shaer. The meeting between the Fatah and Hamas leaderships in the West Bank focused on the efforts to reach an intra-Palestinian reconciliation and a solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Abbas, like Dahlan and Sanwar, is using communalregional politics to advance issues of national importance and shape a political agenda.

From the West Bank, the message reached the Gaza Strip. One of the Hamas leaders, Salah al-Bardawil, in response called for a return to the reconciliation path. He said Hamas was willing to cancel the alternative government workers’ council in exchange for setting a general election date and implementing a reform in the PLO’s structure.

Fatah, Hamas and Dahlan are using the local identity to make some gains in the Palestinian national political arena. Local, clan and tribal identity components are usually seen as an obstacle to the national pattern of action. In the Palestinian case, the communal-regional politics is being painted in national and Islamic colors and serving as a future engine of growth, which will have a future key role in the inheritance battles in the post-Abbas era.

(originally published in Ynet)

הפוסט Sanwar and Dahlan: An Egyptian-Brokered Alliance against Abbas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Hamas’ New Policy Document הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Palestinian Prisoners’ Strike and Marwan Barghouti’s Race to the Top הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the lessons learned from the Arafat era, in which violence was encouraged and used as a political tool, Abbas wants to change the way Palestinians are viewed by Western eyes. Instead of Palestinians being viewed as peace rejectionists who adopt violence as what they think is a legitimate tool, Abbas wants them to be viewed as a nation searching for a diplomatic solution for its national tribulations, while receiving support from the global community.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena.

The new American administration does not bode well for the Palestinians. During the election campaign, Trump issued statements that he would give Israel a green light to expand settlements and that he would relocate the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also appointed a right-wing ambassador to Israel (David Friedman) who supports the settlement enterprise. All these actions aroused deep suspicion among the Palestinians. Even if Trump does not carry through on the embassy relocation, due to the sensitivity of the subject and concern over the great anger it would arouse in the Arab world – the very fact that the president supports such an idea teaches the Palestinians that they do not have a friend in the White House.

One of the paths taken by the PA to protest the emerging American policy was to accept a Russian invitation to attend a summit with all the Palestinian factions in Moscow in January 2017. The close ties between the PLO and Russia are natural, as they are based on a positive historic relationship. The socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO enjoy an ideological-historical affinity with the Russians. These groups include: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP; communists). Abbas himself was closely aligned with the Russian regime for many years. It was in Moscow that Abbas wrote his controversial doctorate. Also, Abbas served as chairman of the Russia-PLO Friendship Association for many years.

The goal of the discussions held between the Palestinian factions under the Russian umbrella was to try to promote an internal Palestinian reconciliation, and an actual timetable for its implementation. Following the summit in Moscow, Fatah and Hamas reached a new agreement about conducting municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in mid-May 2017. The discussions regarding the elections dates were held simultaneously with laborious talks between the various factions that attempted to create a formula for reforming the PLO’s political structure and integrating Islamic elements in PLO institutions.

But the growing Palestinian rapprochement with Russia does not only focus on attempts to achieve internal Palestinian reconciliation. It also serves to exert pressure on Israel and diminish US prestige in the region. Thus, the PA is sending out two messages, one to Russia and one to the US. They are telling Russia that the Palestinians are willing to give Russia a role in their internal reconciliation process, and they are sending a message to the US regarding the way the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should be conducted in the future. Abbas declares at every international forum that he accepts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to an Abbas-Netanyahu summit in Moscow. He reiterates that he is waiting for an answer from the Israeli government, to jump-start the peace process.

The fact that the Palestinians do not view the US as an “honest broker” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only heightens Abbas’ achievement in convincing the Obama administration to refrain from using its veto power to block UN Resolution 2334.

Resolution 2334 is one of the salient Palestinian diplomatic achievements in the Obama era. This resolution was warmly received by the PLO. More surprising was that it also drew positive reactions from Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, despite the fact that the resolution supports the two-state solution, calls for continued security coordination between Israel and the PA and is vague regarding if and how pressure will actually be placed on Israel.

The tightening relationship between the PA and Russia against the background of the change of government in the US shows that the Palestinians are trying to tell the Trump administration that there are additional power brokers in the global arena. And, according to the Palestinians, these other entities can counterbalance what they believe will be Trump’s pro-Israel policy.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is growing and is expressed by the active fighting of Russian forces alongside Assad’s regime in Syria against the rebels, and also by Russian provision of advanced weapons to Syria and Iran. This involvement, together with the Palestinian-Russian alliance, creates a sense of Middle East deja-vu. Are we returning to the diplomatic principles of the Cold War?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The future of Palestinian diplomacy in the Trump era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mahmoud Abbas espouses the diplomatic struggle and the recruiting of international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders. His consistent stance is that institutionalized violent struggle harms Palestinian interests. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334, which was adopted at the end of 2016 and states that the settlements are illegal, encourages the PA to continue this policy and continue to view the diplomatic path as the central element of its comprehensive strategy.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena. This article describes and analyzes these challenges, and points to the possible courses of action open to the PA.

הפוסט The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UN Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The split between Fatah and Hamas, the stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the violence in Palestinian society (both inwards and against the IDF and Israeli civilian targets) cannot overshadow the fact that the crisis between Fatah and Hamas will not be concluded until the two movements undergo internal processes of comprehensive reforms.

הפוסט The Postponement of the Palestinian Local Elections and its Ramifications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Revolt of the Young Palestinian Generation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Abu Mazen: A Man in Search of a Legacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a clear and loud voice, Mahmoud Abbas renounced the disgraceful crime of kidnapping three teens in Gush Etzion, and said in front of representatives of states which have no diplomatic relations with Israel that he was determined to continue the security coordination with it.

Abbas declared that the PA would do everything in its power to make sure that the kidnapped teens are located and returned safely to their families. He asserted that this was a Palestinian interest.

Abbas chose to face the populist atmosphere on the Palestinian street courageously. The criminal abduction was accepted by many groups there as a legitimate act. Campaigns celebrating the capture of “three new Gilad Shalits” began popping up on the social media. Not only in the Gaza Strip, but also at Birzeit University, the incident was marked by handing out candy to passersby.

Despicably, under false pretense, the Palestinian terror organizations even began claiming that “three Israeli soldiers” had been taken captive.

הפוסט By condemning abduction, Abbas proved he’s a statesman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One can say that the Palestinian reconciliation process is also an outcome of the Arab spring. While in the Arab world the masses flocked to the streets and demanded the removal of tyrannous regimes, Palestinian city squares by and large remained quiet and empty. The only voices heard in the Palestinian public sphere were calls to end the intra-Palestinian division.

The failure of the Israeli government-PLO peace talks and the economic crisis in the Gaza Strip pushed the rivals into one each other arms. The announcement of future reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could be described as one more initiative in the process of achieving a way out of the Palestinian political deadlock.

Turkey has emerged as a regional super power in the Palestinian reconciliation process. Hamas sees Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule as a role model for a future Palestinian state. One should also remember that Turkey was the first country that recognized the legitimacy of Hamas to rule over the Palestinian territories after it won the election of June 2006 in a fair democratic process.

Chairman of Hamas politburo Khaled Mashal has a very good personal relationship with the AK Party leadership. On Sept. 30, 2012 Mashal was a guest of honor at the AK Party congress, alongside former Egyptian President Morsi. Since then, Mashal and Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ prime minister in the Gaza Strip, held several meetings with Erdoğan on the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process and on Turkey’s potential role as mediator.

Despite the strong personal relationship between Hamas and the AK Party leadership, the Erdoğan rule did not undermine Mahmoud Abass position as PLO chairman. The Turkish government declined Hamas’ request to open a representative office in Ankara. By doing so, the Turkish government gave Mahmoud Abbas legitimacy in the Islamic sphere. That comes as no surprise. Historically Turkey was also one of the countries in the world that recognized the status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1975.

As we stand days or hours from the establishment of Palestinian unity government, the stability of this government could function in more effective ways under Turkish sponsorship. There is a lot of sympathy in Turkey for the Palestinian street as Erdoğan has won the hearts and the minds of the Palestinians.

The Mavi Maramra incident, the crisis of the Israeli-Turkish relationship and warm hospitality that Turkey gave to ex-Palestinians prisoners that were released in the Gilad Shalit prisoners exchange deals make Turkey very popular among Palestinians.

If Turkey will be more involved in the Palestinian reconciliation process it can open a new window of opportunities in the region. The current state of Turkish-Israeli relations further hinders this position. Perhaps Turkey can play the role of mediator between Israel and Hamas. Even though Israel perceives Turkey as a dishonest broker, and as a hostile state, if Israel were to ask Turkey – which is a regional superpower – to play the role of mediator between them and the Palestinians, it could be the beginning of building a new trusting relationship between the parties.

There is a great a need for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation in these days of regional instability. Both countries are aware to the ramifications of the Syrian civil war and don’t want the violence to cross their borders. There are also new economic factors that can pave the way for renewed Israeli-Turkish relationships that will be based upon strengthened mutual interests. Israel is important for Turkey. The Turkish Industry and Business Association identified Israel as a priority investment partner. Turkey is important for Israel in terms of creating a sphere of regional stability. The discovery of the Israeli gas field and the Turkish need for this energy can boost ties between the sides and be the base for a new treaty that will combine all of the elements that were mentioned before.

The Arab Revolutions created a new Middle East and there are new challenges and opportunities. It is a time for a fresh start, for a period of hope, for a quiet and secure life. Israel and Turkey as regional powers should create a new and stable environment of peace, not only for its own citizens, but for all of the people of the era.

(originally published in The Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט Palestinian reconciliation process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Intra-Palestinian Reconciliation Process and the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.