As Sino-American relations become more contentious, Israel has been quickly drawn into the crossfire given its close association with the US. Still, Israel’s technological exports to China and the challenges they pose for the US are not new. In the mid-1990s, for example, the Israeli government sought to sell China several Phalcon Airborne Early Warning (AEW) systems for an estimated $1 billion (NIS 3.5 b.). Under massive pressure from the White House and Congress, Israel eventually canceled the deal and had to pay back the $200 million (NIS 705.6 m.) down payment to the Chinese government, as well as $150 million (NIS 529 m.) in compensation.

Over the past decade, the American administration has become exceedingly apprehensive about China’s legal, as well as illicit efforts to boost its technological competency, and challenge the US’ advantage in innovative research and development (R&D). Beijing was frequently accused of engaging in extensive cyber campaigns designed to steal sensitive data concerning novel military technology from American governmental agencies, as well as private defense contractors.

FBI Director Christopher Wray publicly asserted in July 2020 that “The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and our economic vitality is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic security and by extension, to our national security.” This harsh rhetoric is reminiscent of the Cold War era and it implies there is an all-consuming Sino-American great power competition that does not allow US allies to flirt with adversaries even in the ostensibly innocuous economic realm, let alone when it comes to advanced technology with military applications.

THE TENSE technological China-Israel-US triangle is further complicated by American worries regarding the efforts of Chinese companies to gain access to and possibly ownership over Israeli critical infrastructure, including ports, railways and highways as part of Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative. In August 2021, for example, director of the CIA William Burns expressed his concerns regarding Chinese investments in Israel during a meeting with then-prime minister Naftali Bennett. A senior State Department official told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, “We know our partners and allies in the Middle East have trade relations with China and that’s OK… but we made it clear that there is a certain kind of cooperation with China we cannot live with.”

According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, China became Israel’s largest source of imports in 2021, topping the US, and Israel’s largest trade deficit was also with China, totaling $6.6 billion (NIS 23.3 b.). Given the clear imbalance, from the Israeli perspective expanding trade relations with China makes sense and it is all about the promise of a massive and lucrative market for Israel’s burgeoning tech industry.

From the American administration’s standpoint, however, the problem revolves around military technology and dual-use technology that can serve both civilian and military functions. Israel’s role in China’s economic and military rise in support of Beijing’s regional or global aspirations, albeit considerably modest as well as indirect, is something with which the US is growingly uncomfortable.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion had to make a difficult decision about Israel’s global orientation and choose between East and West despite previous efforts to remain non-aligned. Israeli leaders are about to face a similar pivotal moment, although this time the dilemma is less severe. The US-Israel special relationship and the diplomatic, military and economic reliance on the Americans do not lend any meaningful support to a keep-all-options-open Israeli approach.

As Sino-American relations continuously worsen, the fork in the road moment is fast approaching, and Israeli policymakers must be prepared and willing to take the right path. Ben-Gurion chose the West over the East, the US over the Soviet Union. There are short-term benefits to selling technology to China or allowing it to build or own parts of Israel’s critical infrastructure.

There may be a way to tactically come to an understanding with the American administration regarding certain aspects of the China-Israel relationship. In the long-term, however, Israel’s future is with the US and maintaining the bilateral special relationship is of the utmost strategic importance.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 7, 2022

הפוסט Israel remains caught between China and the United States- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Considering the fact that Israeli voters will go to the polls on November 1 for the fifth time in four years,  one would assume it is inevitable the Iran nuclear deal will play a major role in the public debate between the various candidates in the coming months. While attentive to myriad social and economic issues, Israelis tend to decide whom to vote for based on the national security situation they face.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in March 2019 found that although 45% of respondents believed the parties’ positions on social and economic will determine how they vote compared to 28% who argued foreign and security matters will affect which party they will support, 30% said it is the national security situation that would determine the outcomes of the elections.

Similarly, a more recent public opinion poll conducted by the IDI in early August 2022 found that a party’s position on the economic situation and the rising cost of living is currently the most important issue determining voters’ party preferences (44% of the respondents). Only 11% said the party’s platform on foreign policy and security will influence their vote but the survey concluded nonetheless that “if security threats increase, then this issue will return to the top of voters’ agendas.”

Beyond the impact the negotiations between Iran and the major world powers will have on Israeli voting patterns, we should also pay close attention to the policy implications of the current debate in Israel. In the past few days, Prime Minister Yair Lapid was engaged in a public brawl with the leader of the opposition and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the current government’s response to the negotiations in general, and the American position in particular.

Under such circumstances, Prime Minister Lapid is finding it extremely difficult to deflect Netanyahu’s efforts to politicize this critical issue and present his government’s practical and coherent policy position. Unwilling to be portrayed by Netanyahu as weak, submissive, and complacent, something that can damage his party’s chances in the forthcoming elections, Lapid is politically forced to display a more aggressive and rigid stance that tragically and paradoxically undermines Israel’s long-term national security.

When Netanyahu attempted to block the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal by publically bashing the European and American negotiators at the time, Israel was purposefully left isolated without any direct access to the content of the talks. Moreover, Netanyahu’s speech against the Iran deal and Barack Obama’s policies in the US Congress resulted in a major rift between the two leaders as well as between the Israeli government and the Democratic Party. To his credit, Lapid is fully aware of that precedent and genuinely seeks to address any disagreements with the Biden Administration discreetly.

However, Lapid is still unable to acknowledge publicly that the American return to the Iran nuclear deal is inescapable given the Biden Administration’s desire to focus on a resurgent Russia in Ukraine and a rising China in East Asia. Calls by the head of the Israeli Mossad David Barnea to impose more sanctions or intensify clandestine efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program are anachronistic since Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal and his “maximum pressure” campaign proved to be exceptionally counterproductive given Tehran was, in fact, able to install advanced centrifuges and enlarge its enriched uranium stockpile. Lapid is also reluctant to admit that having an imperfect agreement that addresses the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program but not Tehran’s destabilizing policies across the Middle East nor its conventional long-range missile program is far better than having no agreement whatsoever.

This article is from “Times of Israel“, from August 30, 2022

הפוסט On Iran, Yair Lapid is practicing domestic politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a result, the United States had reinstated all the sanctions it had waived as part of the nuclear accord, and it imposed additional crippling financial and diplomatic sanctions designed to exert “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was very content with this policy shift. He was a staunch opponent of the Iran nuclear deal throughout the negotiations and even publicly confronted then-President Barack Obama when he delivered a controversial speech to a joint session of Congress in March 2015 where he attacked the deal and declared it “will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. It would all but guarantee that Iran gets those weapons, lots of them.”

The “maximum pressure” campaign was an epic failure. Trump’s policies did not force Iran back to the negotiating table and sign a more restrictive and comprehensive agreement, nor did the sanctions curb Iran’s regional influence and involvement. Israel’s efforts to supplement American sanctions and derail Iran’s nuclear program through the assassination of leading Iranian scientists, most recently the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020 attributed to Israel, also proved quite futile.

The Iran nuclear deal was effective

After the news of Iran’s decision to resume the enrichment of Uranium broke, Prime Minister Netanyahu noted this move “cannot be explained in any way other than the continuation of realizing its goal to develop a military nuclear program,” and added, “Israel will not allow Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon.” Moreover, a member of Netanyahu’s cabinet called for Israeli action citing previous preventive military attacks again nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007).

It seems Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to have his cake and eat it too but one cannot relentlessly work to sabotage the Iran nuclear deal and then protest Tehran is not complying with its terms. The Iran nuclear deal was effective in monitoring Iran’s nuclear program through a robust system of inspections and verification activities, as evident from the numerous reports compiled and released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deal was never designed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program or Tehran’s regional policies that many find destabilizing; it was exclusively focused on the most existential threat-preventing Iran from developing and obtaining nuclear weapons. In fact, it was always considered to be a springboard that, in time, will enable solving the non-nuclear sticking points.

The prudent approach Netanyahu should have pursued would have been to leverage the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and expand the conversation between the signatories and Tehran to include other important issues such as Iran’s ballistic missile program and disruptive regional policies. Abandoning the Iran nuclear deal not only intensified the mistrust between Iran and the United States leading to several clashes between the two countries directly or by proxy, but it also enabled Tehran to drive a wedge between the United States and the Europeans, the Chinese and the Russians who remained largely committed to reviving the agreement.

President-elect Joseph Biden already noted throughout his campaign he would like to renew the negotiations between the United States and Iran and possibly rejoin the Iran nuclear deal should Tehran resume its compliance with the terms of the agreement. Iran’s recent decision to enrich uranium to 20% purity does not make Biden’s plans easier to implement but it is all part of a new conversation Iran is trying to initiate with the incoming president. Netanyahu must be cognizant of Biden’s different approach to the Iran nuclear deal and make every possible effort to be part of the negotiations rather than stay estranged and isolated. There are more benefits to Israeli security in a deal with Iran than without one, and working with rather than against the new American administration is of vital importance too.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 11 January 2021

הפוסט The fallacy of Netanyahu’s Iran policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel became a wedge issue in American politics during the presidency of Barack Obama, and this reality was further solidified during Donald Trump’s term in office. The shift reflects a change in the composition of the Democratic Party and the rise of its progressive faction and, in contrast, the growing influence of Evangelical Christians within the Republican Party. As political and social polarization in the US grew in the last few years, President Trump proactively and repeatedly attempted to make Israel an exclusively Republican commodity. He aligned himself with the positions of Obama’s nemesis, hardliner Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was fighting for his political future in a series of national elections and was also embroiled in several corruption scandals. Netanyahu’s domestic initiatives eroded Israel’s democratic norms and institutions, and his calls to annex parts of the West Bank to bolster his electability among right-wing voters threatened to undermine the democratic character of the State of Israel.

President Trump supported these initiatives directly or indirectly because they benefitted him politically and, to a large extent, replicated some of his own provocative domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, Trump openly assisted Netanyahu politically by withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, moving the American Embassy to Jerusalem, defunding the Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), closing the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Washington, recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and more recently facilitating the signing of the Abraham Accords.

Netanyahu, for his part, reciprocated by supporting Trump’s efforts to attract American Jewish voters and reaffirm the president’s staunch pro-Israel image. For example, at Trump’s urging, Netanyahu prevented Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, two Democratic members of Congress, from visiting Israel arguing they backed the anti-Israel Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Netanyahu also met Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a couple of months before the 2020 elections as part of the Secretary’s Middle East diplomatic tour, and Pompeo delivered an address to the Republican National Convention (RNC), recorded while in Jerusalem. Only a few days prior to the elections, Secretary Pompeo announced Jerusalem-born US citizens will be able to choose to enter Israel or Jerusalem as their birthplace. This was but another attempt to score political points for the president in a series of pro-Israel policy shifts.

The outcome of the elections shattered this idyllic and symbiotic relationship between the two leaders. Netanyahu was quite hesitant to congratulate President-elect Joe Biden at first and risk alienating Trump who still yields the power of the presidency. Even after Netanyahu congratulated Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris via Twitter, the Israeli prime minister did not address Biden as “president-elect” nor did he point out that Biden had, in fact, won the elections. To soften the blow somewhat, and hedge his bet on Trump just in case, Netanyahu immediately followed-up with a second tweet and thanked the president for his support for Israel and the prime minister personally.

To complicate things, Netanyahu and Pompeo’s meeting with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman in the city of Neom as well as the assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist attributed to Israel and possibly supported by the US last week were clear signals to the incoming Biden administration to refrain from rejoining the Iran nuclear agreement. Certainly, this is not the best way to engage the new administration, especially if there is already considerable tension between the two leaders.

It is difficult to see how Israel can resume its role as a partisan issue in American politics given the changes in the Democratic and Republican electorate and the policies introduced by the Trump administration in support of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his anti-democratic conduct as well as his hawkish agenda towards the Palestinians and Iran. However, repositioning Israel above any partisan politics in the US and working with both parties is an interest of all sides and, for the Israeli government, it is a vital interest. A strong US-Israel alliance built on renewed American leadership, and reinforced by bipartisan support, can potentially advance the efforts to broker peace across the Middle East and increase regional stability while placating any concerns Israel may have about the Palestinians or the Iranians.

Netanyahu must take the first step and work to untangle the partisanship associated with Israel in contemporary American politics by rescinding his objectionable domestic and foreign policies. If this transpires, Biden should respond in kind after taking office for the greater good of both countries. Resentment is not a substitute for pragmatic statesmanship and the restoration of Israel as a bipartisan issue will be a sign of genuine leadership on both sides.

**The Article was published on The Times of Israel, 8 December 2020

הפוסט Reclaiming Israel as a bipartisan issue in American politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The signing of the nuclear agreement will mark a new stage in Netanyahu’s anti-agreement crusade.

Regardless of the outcomes of the battle in Congress, one obvious casualty will be US-Israel relations.

Israel has become a partisan political issue, dividing Congress and the Jewish community, forcing people to choose between their president and their support of Israel, as Netanyahu’s speech in Congress vividly showed. Obama will do anything in his power to prevent Congress from interfering in what he believes to be one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of his administration. The crossfire will certainly take its toll and the only question is the exact price Israel will pay.

Netanyahu’s maximalist and uncompromising approach throughout the nuclear talks left Israel marginalized and disengaged from the negotiations. In the post-deal period, the Israeli government must engage the administration in good faith and regain access to the decision-making process, in order to influence the way the agreement is enforced and Iran’s nuclear facilities are monitored.

Moreover, in the long term, Israel should seek a reversal of Iran’s destabilizing policies in the region through encouraging US-Iranian rapprochement induced by the nuclear agreement.

Recently, Netanyahu began arguing in favor of a regional solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that involves other actors such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. He should apply the same logic to resolve the Iranian challenge to Middle Eastern stability. No doubt he will find an attentive ear in the White House if he chooses to do so.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the nuclear deal with Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While differences of opinions among allies on key policy issues are legitimate, the style in which these controversies are being handled – which includes personal attacks and meddling in domestic politics – has a negative impact on Israel-US relations. Support for Israel is not as consensual in the US as it used to be, also among the American Jewish community. Israel is increasingly becoming a partisan issue in American politics, and is losing support among key American constituencies.

These worrisome trends led Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies to hold a public symposium on US-Israeli relations. The symposium took place at Tel Aviv University on 19 May 2014, and in cooperation with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. The symposium, moderated by Yael Patir of J Street and the Mitvim Institute, featured three distinguished speakers: Dr. Ilai Saltzman, Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and Lecturer at Claremont McKenna College, USA; Jeremy Ben-Ami, President of J Street, and; Alon Pinkas, former Israeli Consul General in New York.

Dr. Ilai Saltzman argued that the US-Israel “special relationship” has come to resemble a more normal one. As the importance of the alliance has waned, America has adopted a more balanced, ambivalent and likewise critical approach while backing Israel. Jeremy Ben-Ami offered lessons on the Kerry-led peace initiative, and discussed the role J Street plays in fielding continued US involvement in the peace process as Americans grow weary of overseas entanglements. Alon Pinkas warned that Israelis should recognize the strategic asset of their US ally and save this key relationship by earnestly working to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. The following publication includes their lectures in full.

Dr. Saltzman posited that the shift in US attitudes of Israel can best be explained through the lens of the three levels of analysis in International Relations. At the international level, the end of the Cold War, American rapprochement with the Arab World, and reorientation of US foreign policy toward Asia have mitigated the US’ need for Israel as an unconditional ally. At the state level, American support for Israel has become more pluralistic, as observed by the rise of J Street. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between Israeli and American societies, a large stream of liberal Jews feel a duty to express open criticism of various anti-democratic practices in Israel. Finally, at the individual level we observe President Obama’s departure from his predecessors in taking a more distant, tempered approach toward Israel, allowing for more open criticism.

Ben-Ami outlined both the shortcomings and positive takeaways of Secretary of State John Kerry’s attempt to broker a peace deal in 2013-2014. Kerry’s zealous efforts in the negotiations should be seen as a reflection of shared US and Israeli interests, and continuing to pursue a solution keeps the two countries’ interests aligned. The same is true for shared values, which are being offset by Israel’s protracted occupation. Kerry mistakenly believed that he could convince Prime Minister Netanyahu that these shared interests and values were at risk, while again trying to play Israel’s lawyer. Nevertheless, the negotiations produced progress on recognizing mutually beneficial Palestinian security and economic needs, and incorporating the Arab Peace Initiative. As for American domestic politics, it is important to note the increasing isolationism, national rejection of neocon Republican policies and shift within the Democratic Party toward a more dovish worldview as contributors to a break in the consensus on Israel.

Pinkas described the “tectonic” changes in the US-Israel relationship as driving the countries apart, and claimed that Israelis must adapt to save these crucial ties. The US has served as Israel’s strategic asset for a long time, but with the Cold War and more recent post-9/11 period over, the once congruous foreign policies of both countries are gradually diverging. While echoing Dr. Saltzman and Ben-Ami’s analyses of America’s interest in disengaging from the Middle East, Pinkas charged that Israel needs to reinvent itself as an ally and strategic asset to the US by resolving rather than prolonging its conflict with the Palestinians. Otherwise, it may find itself having to deal with the Palestinian issue, and Iran, alone.

This symposium has been part of ongoing efforts by the Mitvim Institute to monitor and analyze US policies towards Israel, the peace process, and the Middle East. We invite you to follow The US and Us: The Mitvim-DC Monthly. Every issue of this publication series includes an analysis of recent developments, a roundup of commentaries by US think tanks and leading experts, and a profile of a relevant US policymaker.

We thank the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University for their partnership in carrying out the public symposium, and J Street, for their partnership in producing this publication.

הפוסט Cracks in the Special Relationship: Israel-US Ties under Obama and Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

First, Putin orchestrated a comprehensive buildup in the Russian armed forces, using the growing revenue from the country’s energy resources, primarily natural gas and crude oil. For most of the 1990s, Russian policymakers were overwhelmingly preoccupied with political and economic survival, and the defense establishment was one of the main sectors that suffered. Salaries were not paid, bases in the former Soviet republics were abandoned, training was scarce, critical equipment was left to rust and operational preparedness reached an all-time low. Since the early 2000s, when Putin first took office as president, however, Russia’s military budget has tripled and, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it currently constitutes 4.4% of Russia’s GDP, or more than $90 billion.

Second, Putin was able to use a number of institutional platforms to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives he considered harmful to Russian interests. In 2003, before the Iraq war, for example, Russia was successful in blocking the Bush administration from getting a U.N. resolution passed to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. Today, as the Syria crisis unfolds and President Obama is seeking congressional approval for a limited punitive strike against Syria, Russia actively uses its veto power at the U.N. Security Council to preemptively obstruct any American attempt to gain international legitimization for such an attack. Russia follows the same pattern of behavior at the International Atomic Energy Agency when the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is discussed.

Third, Putin crafted an association of states that share his basic anti-American strategic vision for the international system. China has become Russia’s chief ally in frustrating Obama’s foreign policy goals. Whether it is Iran or Syria, the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit or the global economic crisis, Beijing and Moscow see eye to eye when it comes to the United States. Russia and China are devoted to a multipolar global power configuration that essentially means the erosion of American hyper-power and political predominance.

Putin has also exploited diplomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. For example, in 2003, during the Iraq war, he met with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac numerous times to coordinate their antiwar moves within and outside the United Nations.

In the beginning of his presidency, Obama sought to “reset” relations between Washington and Moscow. He even revised some controversial plans to deploy missile systems in Eastern Europe as a trust-building measure designed to appease Putin. Yet the fundamental objectives of the Putin Doctrine made these American gestures ineffective and, in fact, only bolstered Putin’s determination and tenacity.

Putin believes that the U.S. is economically and politically declining and that it is socially degenerating. Indeed, Putin sees the wariness among the American people and their political representatives in the case of Syria and thinks that this is more proof of U.S. weakness and indecisiveness amid Russia’s growing power and influence.

Regardless of the prospects of the Russian proposal to dismantle the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile — an initiative some observers believe is designed to split the White House, Congress and the American public — Putin has shown his diplomatic craftiness and strategic interests in reclaiming Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics. By positioning Moscow alongside the Bashar Assad government and forcing Obama to blink first, Putin showcased his personal leadership, resolve and willingness to confront the United States. We should expect to see more of this doctrine in action, perhaps in the case of Iran.

The Cold War ended more than two decades ago, but Putin has revived some traits of the Soviet empire, and his doctrine is the key to his success. The Obama administration should realize that Putin’s objectives are diametrically opposed to most American interests and come up with a doctrine of its own to deal with him if it wishes to maintain U.S. national interests over time.

(originally published in the LA Times)

הפוסט The Putin Doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.