A series of indicators reflect heightened international attention to the conflict since the new government assumed power. The growing US involvement was manifested in visits by Secretary of State Blinken, National Security Advisor Sullivan, and CIA Director Burns, who met with the leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah, and in condemnations by senior US officials of the government policy on the settlements. This involvement includes unusual steps not seen in the past decade, namely mediation activity between the parties on formulating understandings (as a condition for withdrawing the Palestinian proposal to condemn Israel in the Security Council), and a decision to leave a team of administration officials in the region to monitor events and promote de-escalation. Until recently, the Palestinian issue seemed to be a very low priority for the administration, and it was only raised on the margins of President Biden’s visit to the region in July 2022. 

Similar dynamics are evident in the policies of other international actors. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain joined Blinken in issuing an unusual statement expressing “grave concern” over the government’s policy on the settlements; Senior officials from the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League initiated a special meeting in Brussels on the Palestinian issue; 94 countries signed a statement protesting the government’s punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA); and 15 Security Council members issued a presidential statement (for the first time in eight years) condemning Israeli policy.  

These developments complement steps by regional actors – chief among them Jordan and Egypt –conveying public and secret messages of concern over the new Israeli government’s actions and fear of escalation. The United Arab Emirates, Israel’s partner in the 2020 Abraham Accords, also plays an important role in this process and initiated, as an UNSC member, a few Security Council meetings on the issue and worked with the Palestinians on drafting a UNSC statement condemning Israel, and it also canceled a planned visit by Netanyahu. 

The Feb. 26 Aqaba summit with the participation of Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and American representatives was a prominent expression of increasing international involvement in the conflict. A public meeting of senior Israeli and Palestinian officials, under regional or international auspices, has not taken place since the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative (2013-2014). In fact, the Aqaba Document agreed at the meeting is the first Israeli-Palestinian political memorandum of understanding since the Kerry era.  

These developments follow a decade of distinct lack of international involvement in the conflict, and a decline in the degree of international interest in the issue. The world was discouraged by the rounds of negotiations that failed to yield agreement, and did not detect political readiness for a breakthrough on either side. Other issues and arenas attracted greater international attention – both in the region (Iran, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan) and on the global stage (China, COVID-19, the rise of populism and, more recently, of course, the war in Ukraine). Additionally, the Quartet – the international group (US, Russia, UN and the European Union) that was created to sponsor the peace process, has been paralyzed in recent years. 

But these days the world is increasingly recognizing alarming signs and pushing for increased engagement. In many cases of conflicts around the world, international intervention begins, or increases, when escalation develops, or when there is a sense that the parties are approaching a confrontation. The world identifies that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is particularly explosive and sensitive. Indications of this on the ground are numerous and already during 2022 we witnessed a sharp increase in violence in the conflict. The focal points of friction and confrontation are intensifying and accumulating: from the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, through the Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, Hawara (in the West Bank), the Palestinian prisoners’ protest in Israeli jails, and the recent increase in Israel-Hamas hostilities in Gaza Strip. 

In the new Israeli government coalition, actors who served as extreme “spoilers” from outside of the system, are now working within the government in key positions. Radical ideas, such as annexation and violating the status quo on Jerusalem’s holy sites, are being openly discussed by senior coalition spokespersons, and steps once considered beyond the pale, such as legalizing illegal outposts in the West Bank, are becoming official policy. Indications of growing instability have also emerged on the Palestinian side, against the backdrop of the weakening and illegitimacy of the PA, along with increased attacks against Israelis, and the ongoing internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Added to all this is the constant fear of escalation during the month of Ramadan (starting March 22), and especially on the days it coincides with Passover (starting April 5). 

Many feel that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a critical crossroads and is moving quickly towards an explosion. A dual policy is at play in Israel, with one government arm, led mainly by the security establishment, trying to calm tensions and strengthen the PA, while the other arm, led by representatives of the Religious Zionist party, contributes to unrest, backs up settler violence, and hopes for the dissolution of the PA and the opening it will provide to promote annexation. This duality was evident when National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi was dispatched to Jordan to sign the Aqaba document, while Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir publicly denied the Aqaba understandings. On the Palestinian side, the PA leadership is working to promote stability and improve governance. But it faces increased public opposition, including over its continued security coordination with Israel (as reflected in the growing Palestinian support for the Lion’s Den and the intensification of demonstrations), and efforts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to exploit its weakness in order to enhance their power. 

Under this backdrop, three main actors – the United States, Egypt, and Jordan – try hard to prevent a seemingly inevitable escalation and to create political and security understandings that will prevent deterioration. They identify a dangerous combination of elements generating the potential for a “perfect storm” and are trying to play the role of the child sticking its finger in the dam. This is an almost impossible task given the existing political conditions, the dangerous dynamics on the ground, and after many years of a prolonged stalemate in the peace process. We can hope that it is not too little, too late, and wish that the international efforts will move beyond ad-hoc preventive diplomacy, toward a more comprehensive strategy and the creation of a long-term political horizon. 

הפוסט On the Verge of an Abyss? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous escalations forced Netanyahu to conduct a diplomatic dialogue with Jordan and agree on arrangements emphasizing his commitment to the status quo, as well as restrictions on visits by Knesset members or Temple Mount activists (i.e. the 2015 Kerry understandings). But the balance in the emerging government coalition has shifted, with the members of the Religious Zionist bloc that advocate significant change in the status quo having greater influence and Netanyahu being more dependent on them, thus having limited room for maneuver.

Growing tension

Against this backdrop, Jordanian officials have been warning that an attempt by the new government to change the status quo at the site and allow provocative actions by Ben-Gvir as a future minister of national security, could threaten peaceful relations with Jordan and inflame the entire region. Netanyahu had reportedly sent reassuring messages to Jordan but this is unlikely to allay the serious concerns over the issue.

In view of the growing tension over this issue, and based on the long history of escalation and violent eruptions at the site, it is incumbent on all relevant actors to increase coordination and institutionalize communications channels to forestall crises. The recently published annual Mitvim Foreign Policy Index found that 61% of the Israeli public (including a majority of center-right voters) support the idea of establishing a coordination mechanism among Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to prevent escalation at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Only 20% objected, reflecting the Israeli public’s awareness of the issue’s sensitivity and of the need to strengthen coordination and dialogue among the parties involved.

After the Six Day War in 1967, a secret channel of communication was established between Israeli authorities and the Wakf administration under Jordanian auspices, which is tasked with the management of the Temple Mount site, and a modus vivendi was developed between the parties. Professor Yitzhak Reiter demonstrated in his research on the Temple Mount that the coordination mechanism and the quiet understandings formed between the sides collapsed following the 1996 Western Wall Tunnel affair and the severe rift following the second intifada and the escalation at the site.

Under Netanyahu’s rule, tensions with Jordan deepened and the contacts with the Wakf weakened. The rounds of violence during this period led to American involvement in a bid to fill the vacuum and end the crises. This was the case, for example, in November 2014 and October 2015, when then-secretary of state John Kerry shuttled between Jerusalem, Amman, and Ramallah, and formulated understandings to ease tensions.

Over the past year, the Bennett-Lapid government attempted to preempt escalation during Ramadan through intensive Israeli-initiated contacts with Jordan and the Palestinians, which included meetings between Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz, and Omer Bar Lev with senior Jordanian and Palestinian officials. This move was led by the parties, rather than by an external actor, and was made possible by the improved relations with Jordan and the PA, reflecting a desire to act before and not after escalation.

A model for a permanent framework

But the idea examined in the Mitvim survey suggests a different model. Instead of efforts by external parties to douse the flames after the fire has already broken out or ad hoc contacts between senior officials to ease the crisis, the model proposes a permanent framework of dialogue, coordination and cooperation on this most sensitive and volatile issue.

SUCH A mechanism would enable a constant channel of communications, serve as a tool for message and information exchanges and confidence building measures, promoting coordination and preparations for times of crisis, and agreed moves to calm tensions and restore order.

Public support for the idea shows that Israelis understand the special sensitivity of the Temple Mount and the need for coordination with other parties, and recognizes their role in managing the site, especially given the risks of escalation and loss of control. Such a step is, of course, politically sensitive and will likely be opposed by those seeking to change the status quo but the majority of the public appears to support it.

If this policy direction is agreed upon, the sides will be required to discuss the nature of the mechanism, the parties involved and its mandate. The mechanism must include those involved in the daily running and protection of the site, who are well acquainted with the ins and outs of the situation, as well as political representatives acting in coordination with the decision makers to ensure a civil-political dimension and not just a security one.

Mechanisms to prevent escalation are urgently needed

The parties will also be able to discuss the integration of other actors, including a possible dialogue with religious leaders and community representatives. The Geneva Initiative of 2003 proposed the establishment of an interfaith council to serve as an advisory body on the management of the holy sites.

At the same time, the participation of additional players at the regional or international level is also important. These players could include Morocco, which chairs the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Saudi Arabia, which bears responsibility for Islam’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina.

Similar proposals and ideas have arisen over the years regarding the establishment of special mechanisms for the management of the holy sites. Then-prime minister Olmert’s proposal in 2008, for example, included a framework consisting of five states: Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the US. The Amirav-Husseini plan (2000) proposed a composition of 11 states, including Israel, Palestine the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and four Arab states.

The Oslo process chose to postpone the question of Jerusalem’s future to the final stage of negotiations, consistent with Israel’s desire to delay discussion of the issue as much as possible. But the periodic tensions that erupt in Jerusalem make it clear time and again that the issue cannot be ignored.

Therefore, the construction of mechanisms to prevent escalation in Jerusalem should be an immediate and urgent move, not the end of the road. Moreover, a mechanism regarding the holy sites could also be a first step in laying the ground for cooperation on other issues, and perhaps even the start of political momentum in the future and the beginning of a real dialogue on the question of Jerusalem.

The combination of recent and increasing instability in the West Bank, the tensions in eastern Jerusalem and the fears of extreme and dangerous policies promoted by some members of the new government create a particularly volatile mix and any unusual incident on the Temple Mount could trigger a flare-up.

This state of play underscores the critical importance of preventing escalation at this sensitive site and instituting permanent and effective coordination and dialogue mechanisms between all parties involved.

This article is from “JPost“, from December 5, 2022

הפוסט As tensions grow, all eyes are on the Temple Mount הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Biden expressed his hope that such a moment will someday be reached. This statement reflects Biden’s approach to the Palestinian issue as expressed during his visit to the region: on the one hand, empathy and the outline of a long-term political vision, on the other hand, skepticism about progress in the short term and avoidance of discussing a tangible peace plan.

What can we learn from Biden’s visit about the administration’s policy on the Palestinian issue? Israeli commentators explained that the Palestinian issue had disappeared, while senior figures on the Palestinian side expressed disappointment with the visit. But the Palestinian angle of the visit requires a more complex analysis.

A discussion of the issue is, of course, influenced by the point of reference, whether we compare Biden’s policy to those of Trump or Obama or to the expectations of Israel and the Palestinians. A distinction must also be made between the declarative level of the visit and the measures discussed.

An analysis of Biden’s rhetoric shows that the administration reaffirms support for the two state solution and the importance of maintaining a political horizon. Biden emphasized, in his remarks in Bethlehem, that the solution should be based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps. In other words, he reiterated American policy that preceded Trump, which was supported by Presidents Bill Clinton, George Bush and Barak Obama. Biden expressed solidarity with the suffering of the Palestinians (referring, among other things, to restrictions on movement), and stressed that both sides deserve equal measure of freedom and dignity.

On the other hand, Biden’s statements made it clear that the US does not believe prospects for political negotiations have matured at this time, and in remarks he delivered upon landing in Israel, he said that while he advocated the two state solution, he was aware it would not materialize anytime soon. The lack of urgency of the issue was also reflected in the ambiguous wording of the Jerusalem Declaration, signed by Biden and Prime Minister Yair Lapid (with a commitment to “discuss challenges and opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian relations”). The Palestinians were discouraged by Biden’s failure to address the settlements and the occupation.

On the question of Jerusalem, Biden took a cautious stance and spoke of a city for all its people, central to both sides’ national visions. He noted that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but added that the division of sovereignty over the city would be determined by negotiations.

His visit to a Palestinian hospital in east Jerusalem, unaccompanied by any Israeli official, was unusual (he was preceded by a Blinken visit to America House in east Jerusalem), but Biden was careful to present it as a private humanitarian visit, and he did not repeat his promise to open the US consulate in Jerusalem, which served as the liaison with the Palestinians but was closed during the Trump era.

Therefore, given that the Biden administration clearly does not intend to advance any peacemaking effort in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in the near term, where is it going? Biden’s statements and actions suggest several policy directions. First, since taking office, Biden has renewed ties between Washington and Ramallah (after a rift created during the Trump era) and restored the economic aid that had been discontinued. In this context, on his visit Biden announced an aid package for hospitals in east Jerusalem, for UNRWA, and for food security.

These measures are part of an American policy aimed at improving Palestinians’ daily lives. Support for initiatives to strengthen the Palestinian economy are also mentioned in the Jerusalem Declaration, which is in keeping with the shrinking-the-conflict approach supported by senior Israeli government officials.

New economic and civil measures

IN THIS context, Biden took advantage of the visit to announce a number of economic and civil measures, with Israeli consent, including upgrading the cellular phone network in the West Bank and Gaza to 4G technology, opening the Allenby Crossing (between the Occupied Territories and Jordan) 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Committee (JEC). These and other measures were discussed in the past, but did not materialize.

Palestinians have been critical of Biden’s focus on the economic context, without promoting a structural change in the current situation. A Palestinian nurse who attended the president’s speech at Augusta Victoria thanked him for supporting the hospital, but added, “We need more justice, more dignity.”

In his remarks in Bethlehem, Biden tried to link these steps to a political vision, portraying them as measures that could feed the flame of hope, but they appear to be disconnected from a political context. This is compounded by Palestinian anger at the administration for failing to re-open the consulate in Jerusalem and the PLO’s offices in Washington.

Second, Biden pointed to an additional interim goal of steps to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer together. That includes measures to promote dialogue at the leadership level (such as between Lapid and Abu Mazen) and to encourage people-to-people ties. During his visit, Biden announced two additional grants within the framework of the MEPPA (Middle East Partnership for Peace Act) initiative for joint civil society projects in healthcare and technology.

Third, Biden presented another policy direction of using the normalization process in the region as a tool to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This was reflected in part by Morocco’s involvement in the contacts between Israel, the US and the Palestinians on expanding the Allenby Crossing hours of operation and in reported American efforts to integrate the Palestinians into regional forums being created in the wake of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit.

On the other hand, Mahmoud Abbas stressed to Biden that the process had to be reversed, starting with an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and then moving on to a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative (2002). Senior Saudi officials backed this position, despite the aviation normalization measures, and declared during Biden’s visit that normalization would be possible only after the two state solution was implemented. In doing so, Saudi Arabia reiterated its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative and made clear that its relations with Israel are limited by a glass ceiling.

At the same time, the administration has been drawing red lines regarding Israeli policy on the ground. While Biden did not refer publicly to the settlements, he made it clear behind closed doors to his colleagues in Jerusalem that he expects zero surprises on the Palestinian issue, including measures in east Jerusalem and the expansion of West Bank settlements.

This stance continues the Biden administration’s involvement in issues such as foiling the plan to build a neighborhood in Atarot or preventing the evacuation of Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The current administration is clearly acting quietly on these matters, avoiding public statements, apparently as a lesson from the Obama era. What is more, Biden does not want to politically hurt the current government and; therefore, prefers to deal with these issues behind closed doors.

In conclusion, the Biden administration has signaled from the start that the Palestinian issue is not a high priority on its agenda and while it boasts of reversing various moves made by Trump, in other areas it has not undone the changes he made. The administration has taken a two-pronged approach, promoting measured civil-economic steps and actions to prevent escalation, and offering a distant political vision of two states, and an equal measure of freedom and dignity.

With the visit over, the administration must work to connect the two components and formulate a strategy that connects the near-term steps to the long-range vision. Although we are under a transitional government and in the midst of another election campaign, the administration should take advantage of this stage to translate the declarations on a political horizon into an action plan for the day when hope and history rhyme.

This article was posted in “JPost” on July 26th, 2022

הפוסט Biden’s Israel visit reiterates his views on the two state solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In January 2001, US President Bill Clinton met with President-elect George W. Bush and presented him with a priority list of the most important global security issues. At the top were two issues – Osama bin Laden/al Qaeda and “the absence of peace in the Middle East.” The meeting took place shortly after Clinton’s intensive efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement had failed. Twenty years later, the position of the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the US priority list, and that of the international community in general, has changed dramatically. International interest and engagement have faded during the last decade while the peace process has been paralyzed since the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative in 2013–14.

The Biden administration has not appointed a special envoy on Israeli-Palestinian affairs and has shown only low-level engagement with the conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained at his confirmation hearing that the new administration supports a two-state solution, but added: “I think realistically it’s hard to see near-term prospects for moving forward on that.” There seems to be a lack of urgency and no clear international strategy on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, as evidenced by the fact that the Quartet (the US, Russia, UN and EU) is not playing an active role, despite broad expectations that the Biden administration would revitalize the group’s activity after its paralysis during the Trump years. The 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan are further proof that the prominence of the Palestinian issue in some parts of the Arab world has declined.

Many international actors criticized Trump’s policy toward the conflict, especially regarding issues such as Jerusalem and settlements. They also welcomed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans were shelved as part of the Israeli-UAE normalization agreement, and that the US, under President Biden, has returned to international consensus. The Biden administration has stressed its alignment with international law and the well-known parameters for resolving the conflict, renewed the dialogue with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah (after a three-year rift) and resumed US aid to the Palestinians (and to UNRWA). But it did not reverse some of Trump’s actions, and in particular, despite its promises, did not reopen the US consulate in Jerusalem, which conducted contact with the Palestinians over the years and was folded into the embassy by Trump. Most importantly, it has failed to pursue diplomatic initiatives to get the parties to the table.

Explanations for this lack of US attention are easy to find in the bigger crises occupying this administration: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, China, Ukraine, as well as more pressing regional issues in Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen. Yet the Israeli-Palestinian context itself offers ample reasons: the repeated failures of past rounds of negotiations tell a cautionary tale for any international actor hoping to advance talks, leading them to focus resources elsewhere. It is easy to conclude from the realities on the ground that the time is not ripe for talks. On the Palestinian side, the deep rift between the Hamas ruling Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA), with its own deficits in democracy, raise the question of who could credibly negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. While the international policy of isolating Hamas has not diminished its grip on power in the Gaza Strip, the PA’s approval ratings have reached historic lows, the 2021 elections have once again been postponed and a whopping 74% of respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip now say they would welcome the resignation of PA President Abu Mazen, who’s in his sixteenth year in office. On the Israeli side, four consecutive elections between Spring 2019 and Spring 2021 finally brought a “change” government to power. Yet this government, united only in its desire to end Benjamin Netanyahu’s long tenure, comprises coalition partners from across the ideological spectrum – and even includes a Palestinian party for the first time – and is thus not in a position to take any bold steps in possible negotiations. Furthermore, rightwing and hawkish positions continue to dominate the Israeli discourse on the Palestinian issue; both Israeli and Palestinian public opinions have gradually lost faith in the peace process and in the possibility of a two-state agreement. International hesitancy to invest political capital in attempts to kickstart talks under these conditions thus comes as no surprise.

The escalation of violence and war in Gaza in May 2021 briefly brought the conflict back into the headlines and social media channels, and to the forefront of international politics. Initially centered around evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police at the Damascus Gate and the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa compound, violence quickly escalated across towns with mixed Jewish and Palestinian populations throughout Israel proper and culminated in an 11-day war between Hamas and Israel. However, following international involvement in brokering a ceasefire, led by the Biden administration and Egypt, even this war failed to generate lasting international engagement.

Signals emanating from the new Israeli government, formed in June 2021, are mixed. While some of its leaders, such as Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, express support for a two-state solution and the resumption of the peace process, others, among them Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, oppose peace negotiations and a Palestinian state. After years of political disconnect, the new government renewed high-level dialogue among Israeli and Palestinian officials – including meetings between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and PA President Abu Mazen and between Lapid and PA Civil Affairs Minister Hussein Al-Sheikh – and agreed on certain confidence-building measures addressing civil and economic issues. Nevertheless, the situation on the ground has not meaningfully changed; the expansion of settlements proceeds; de facto annexation inches closer to reality; settler violence is on the rise; the eviction of Palestinian residents from their homes in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighborhoods continues apace; and the Israeli government has criminalized the work of Palestinian civil society groups.

The reluctance of international actors to get involved in attempts to renew Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is accompanied by a misleading sense of stability and calm. The world should pay attention to forces inherent in the status quo that are anything but stable. Ongoing settlement expansion and gradual de facto annexation undermine any prospects of a viable two-state negotiated outcome, which is still the official international consensus; tensions continue to rise at various points of friction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with settler groups’ increased use of violence and efforts to create new outposts; the deep political and economic crisis in the Palestinian Authority, together with continued Hamas-Fatah strife and Hamas’ efforts to ignite the West Bank, raises concerns over the stability of the PA and potential chaos in the West Bank; and given the explosive situation and humanitarian crisis in Gaza, another Israel-Hamas flare-up is always possible.

Against this background, the US and the international community cannot afford to ignore the conflict, nor focus only on small-scale de-escalation and economic measures; conditions call for addressing the structural and deep-rooted problems directly while working toward a long-term political vision that includes a real transformation of the situation on the ground. On Jan. 19 of this year, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland crystallized this point in an address to the UN Security Council: “Piecemeal approaches and half measures will only ensure that the underlying issues perpetuating the conflict continue to fester and worsen over time” and “efforts by the parties and the international community to stabilize and improve conditions on the ground should be linked to a political framework.” While it’s easy to surmise that the Biden administration is focused on preventing war and not brokering peace, history exposes the pitfalls of this short-sighted vision – short-term efforts at preventing escalations will not suffice to stop the forces at play, which over time increasingly mitigate against an agreement. Without a political vision, confidence-building measures and economic incentives aimed at “shrinking the conflict” are unsustainable. The war in May 2021 made clear that when they so desire, international actors can pressure Israelis and Palestinians and achieve results. The world should not wait for the next escalation to put this into practice.

Dana Landau is a senior researcher focusing on mediation and peace processes at swisspeace, the Swiss Peace Foundation. She teaches political science at the University of Basel.

The op-ed was published in The Security Times in February 2022.

הפוסט That other crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been locked in a stalemate since the 2014 collapse of the US mediation initiative led by then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The relations between the parties have been all but severed and characterized by a series of crises and tensions that peaked over Israel’s 2020 West Bank annexation plan. While the Israeli-Arab normalization agreements removed the annexation idea from the agenda, this did not change the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Developments in recent months in the Israeli-Palestinian arena pose challenges and risks but also new opportunities and possibilities. Special attention should be paid to the impact of the May 2021 escalation, the deep crisis in the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the establishment of a new government in Israel.

This paper maps the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current conditions, and constitutes a follow-up to the paper we published in April 2021. It is based on a series of dialogues held by Mitvim Institute experts in August and September 2021 with European, American and Palestinian diplomats and experts, as well as UN officials, and also on a series of discussions among a team of Israeli experts formed by Mitvim.^[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the feasible and desired measures that could be undertaken to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

^[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Gil Murciano and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

הפוסט One step forward, one step back: International discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The issue of negotiations with the Taliban ties in with a spirited debate taking place among scholars of international relations, around the dilemma of which Prof. Robert Mnookin describes as Bargaining with the Devil. The scholarship discusses the question of whether, and when, one should negotiate with terrorist organizations or “rogue states” and try to reach agreements with them. Scholars are divided on the issue, presenting a complex picture. They distinguish between tactical negotiations (e.g. on exchanges of prisoners) and strategic ones (on a long-term political agreement) and offer various distinctions regarding organizations that can be considered potential partners and those that cannot. Opponents argue that negotiations with such actors are both immoral and dangerous, legitimizing terror organizations and potentially encouraging the use of violence. They also contend that promises made by such organizations are not reliable, and even if their leadership accepts compromises it will be unable to enforce them on all the group’s activists. However, advocates of negotiations argue that certain circumstances require dialogue with terrorist organizations in order to end a conflict and bring an end to violence, and that such groups must be offered political alternatives in order to lay down their arms (as was the case with the IRA in Northern Ireland and with FARC in Colombia). Researchers advocating such an approach insist that it is particularly apt when dealing with organizations that enjoy broad public support, alluding to the adage that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.

Policymakers and scholars have struggled with the dilemma over whether to engage in dialogue with the Taliban throughout the war years in Afghanistan. Back in the Obama Administration, some officials (such as the special US envoy on Afghanistan Richard Holbrook) argued that even as the US was carrying out military activity in Afghanistan, it should undertake diplomacy to reach a political agreement that includes the Taliban and would enable a US pullout. Trump believed the Americans should get out of Afghanistan at almost any cost, and acted on this campaign promise by initiating public talks with the Taliban after he came to power. The 2020 agreement between the sides called for a 14-month withdrawal (ending in May 2021), release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners and lifting of sanctions on senior organization officials. The Taliban, for its part, committed to avoid attacks on US and NATO forces and prevent operations by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization in areas under its control.

The agreement did not include the government of Afghanistan, and while the Taliban agreed to talks with the government, the US withdrawal was not conditioned on domestic political arrangements (such as anchoring women’s rights and other constitutional issues). The agreement was designed to stop the attacks on international forces deployed in Afghanistan but did not prevent an escalation of Taliban terrorism and gradual takeover of various parts of the country. Critics of the agreement argued that once a pullout date was set, the Taliban launched preparations to retake control of the country, making peace talks with the government irrelevant. Supporters of the agreement argued that it would bring an end to 20 years of war.

The Afghan arena is particularly unique and complex, requiring a cautious approach when comparing it with others and drawing any conclusions. It is obviously very different from the Israel-Gaza arena. Nonetheless, let us examine, cautiously, what similarities can be found between Trump-Taliban agreement and the arrangements made by former Prime Minister Netanyahu and Hamas in recent years and how these cases relate to the debate among scholars over negotiations with terrorist organizations. In both cases one can point to a radical change in policy – from one of all-out war intended to bring down a regime to one of dialogue and search for accommodation. Both cases illustrate the limits of power and the process of learning in conflict arenas (by both sides). They also highlight the gap between government declarations against negotiating with terrorist organizations and de facto policy. In Netanyahu’s case, the gap was particularly wide given the deeply held principles he described in his books ruling out dialogue with terror organizations and his 2009 election campaign promise to bring down Hamas’ rule in Gaza. It should also be noted that the Trump Administration did not conceal its contacts with the Taliban. The meetings between senior representatives of both sides and the agreements they reached were made public (although claims were made of secret appendixes), unlike the Netanyahu government that kept the contacts and understanding reached with Hamas secret and never revealed their contents to the world (a policy that suited both sides).

The two cases reflect precisely the dilemma arising from the scholarly literature in this field: Trump and Netanyahu came to realize that Hamas and Taliban are an integral part of the conflict arena and cannot be ignored, and sought to formulate new game rules with them. However, their critics argued that the negotiations with these groups legitimized and empowered them, while the agreements reached with them failed the test of time. In conducting this discussion, one must also ask what alternatives were available to the sides at each stage, if any, and why these were not chosen.

Both the Biden Administration and the Bennett-Lapid government inherited arrangements with these organizations from their predecessors and had to decide whether to adhere to them once they came to power. The Trump Administration had already signed the deal with the Taliban and Netanyahu had maintained a framework of understandings with Hamas for several years. President Biden, as we know, made a decision. While he did delay the withdrawal from Afghanistan by several months, he completed it in full as determined in the agreement. The Israel-Hamas case is different. While Israel has not reached a long-term public agreement with Hamas, a certain set of expectations has been put in place over time. Following the most recent round of fighting with Gaza, elements in Israel and elsewhere urged a change in approach. While the Netanyahu governments sought to exploit the dialogue with Hamas in order to deepen the divide between Gaza and the West Bank and weaken the Palestinian Authority (PA), some in the new government and the international community are seeking to change the rules of the game in order to strengthen the PA and restore its involvement in the Gaza Strip.

The negotiating process between the US and the Taliban could teach Israel about the risks that inherent in such moves. Even when it becomes obvious that dialogue is required with such “rogue” players, the diplomatic strategy must not focus solely on this dimension; contacts with them must be part of a broader policy move that includes additional international and local elements and be guided by long-term political thinking.

הפוסט What lessons does the Trump-Taliban deal hold for Israel, Hamas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The dangerous game of the Jerusalem flag march הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Solving the issue of a divided Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Efforts to avoid discussion of the issue have been made repeatedly during the peace process. Authors of the 1993 Oslo Accord agreed the issue was volatile and would be best postponed for future discussion on a permanent status agreement. When talks began on a permanent status agreement, under the Barak government, negotiators were directed to delay discussion of the issue. It finally came up at the Camp David Summit (in July 2000), where it naturally became a major bone of contention. Israel also tried to evade the issue at the 2007-08 Annapolis talks with the Palestinians, with then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni under instructions not to talk about Jerusalem. Prime Minister Netanyahu also refused to engage in a serious discussion of Jerusalem during the US-mediated 2013-14 peace talks, insisting repeatedly that the matter was not up for negotiation. Repeated attempts to ignore and delay discussing this sensitive matter undermined negotiations even when leaders were willing to move toward an agreement.

The current round of violence in Jerusalem, just like previous ones, should be analyzed on two levels: The immediate triggers that set it off and the deeper causes arising from the situation in the city in the absence of a political solution to the conflict. The Israeli discourse tends to focus on the immediate causes, discussing tactical aspects and ignoring the structural problems that underpin this explosive reality. East Jerusalemites are orphans. Comprising some 40% of the city’s population, the Palestinian residents nonetheless have no political institutions or representation, no Israeli citizenship (except for a small minority, most of whom are Israeli Arab citizens who moved to the city) and no Palestinian citizenship, and they suffer from discriminatory policies in terms of services, infrastructure and planning. Due to their status as permanent residents, they are not entitled to vote for the Knesset, and while they are entitled to vote in municipal elections, most boycott them (arguing that participation in the election will legitimize the Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem) and therefore the Palestinians have never had representation on the Jerusalem city council.

Over time, an artificial separation has been made in the Israeli discourse on Jerusalem between discussion of “improving the lot of the residents” and dealing with the fundamental problems, but anyone familiar with the hardships in East Jerusalem realizes that the residents’ problems cannot be de-linked from the fundamental anomaly in the city. Much has been discussed over the past decade in Israeli media of the “Israelization” of East Jerusalem Palestinians following construction of the Separation Fence. One can undoubtedly identify a stronger affinity on the part of East Jerusalem residents to the city’s West in terms of employment, education, leisure and entertainment, but these processes are only part of the complex picture in the divided city. Since the events of summer 2014, the government has realized that ignoring East Jerusalem is dangerous, and a decision was made on a five-year plan to bridge gaps (Plan No. 3790). But while one hand is working to promote employment and improve infrastructure, the other continues with evictions, razing of homes and creating a “no man’s land” in the neighborhoods on the other side of the fence.

The case of Sheikh Jarrah is a good example of a dangerous situation stemming from the city’s structural problems. The eviction threat facing Palestinian families stems from a discriminatory legal framework formulated after 1967, which provides Jews with the “right of return” to East Jerusalem land owned by Jews prior to 1948. The Palestinian Jerusalemites, on the other hand, including those evicted from their homes, are barred from demanding a similar return of property owned by their families in the western parts of Jerusalem. This situation undermines the Israeli position against the Palestinian claims to a “right of return” and re-open the discussion on property abandoned in the 1948 war. As has become obvious in recent days, this situation severely undermines Israel’s international standing and threatens relations with its new allies in the Arab world. Right-wing groups, with government support, are taking advantage of the legal framework to promote a process of “Hebronization” in East Jerusalem with a view to thwarting any future solution.

The superficial Israeli political discourse on Jerusalem’s future has boiled the question down to the question of whether the city should be divided, yes or no. But this framing is misleading. The goal of finding a political solution to the city is to recognize fully both its Israeli and Palestinian residents, the existence of both Jerusalem and al-Quds, and to find a path to partnership in the shared city, ensuring political representation and equality for all residents.

A recently published biography of former Secretary of State James Baker (by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker) recounts Baker’s statement upon taking office that he would not deal with the conflict in the Middle East as his predecessor had done, to which diplomat Dennis Ross replied: “You can ignore the Middle East – but it will not ignore you.” The same applies to Jerusalem: Even if the parties to the conflict and the international community try to avoid dealing with this sensitive issue, the problem will not go away and will make its presence felt over and over. Resolution of the problem cannot be delayed further and addressing the situation in the city must relate to both levels – to the triggers of the unrest and to its underlying causes.

In the immediate term, calm must be restored, escalation avoided and dangerous provocations curbed. In this context, diverting the Jerusalem Day Flag Parade from Damascus Gate and the intervention of the Attorney General in the Supreme Court’s session on Sheikh Jarrah evictions were steps in the right direction. Efforts by international actors, including the Biden Administration, to restore calm at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and block the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah are also welcome. Previous US administrations played similar roles at times of crisis in the city. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton demanded a halt to the eviction of families in Sheikh Jarrah when the issue arose in 2009-2010, and Secretary of State John Kerry intervened to prevent escalation and preserve the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in 2014-15. But beyond management of the current crisis, in order to avoid finding ourselves in the same place next time, diplomatic efforts are required to achieve a more substantive change for the long term and an understanding that Jerusalem remains on the table and cannot be ignored.

הפוסט No, Jerusalem is not off the table הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The three other Quartet members refused, largely paralyzing the group during the Donald Trump’s term. Does the renewal of the Quartet’s activity indicate a renewed international interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Is the Quartet even capable of leading diplomatic efforts to resolve it?

The question of the role of the Quartet arose in a series of recent policy dialogue meetings facilitated by experts at the Mitvim Institute (Dr. Nimrod Goren, Victoria Solkovits, and I) with various European, Arab, American and UN diplomats and experts as part of an effort to map the international discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Participants emphasized that the Quartet is “the only show in town,” one that must be preserved and restored to operation. Additionally, the Quartet is perceived as a mechanism with broad international legitimacy and untapped potential that plays a crucial role as the center of gravity of international efforts related to the conflict.

The Quartet is designed to ensure coordination and alignment of the bodies involved and to prevent a variety of initiatives and uncoordinated moves lacking a common framework.

In the past, the Quartet has been criticized for its weakness and inefficiency, arguing that the group has failed in its mission and only continues to operate due to the international community’s ambivalence to design something new.

The Trump administration led an independent policy, which was opposed by the international community, and demanded that the Quartet base its work on the president’s “Deal of the Century.”

Some have proposed changing the group’s structure, such as adding Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan. Despite these criticisms, the diplomats and experts we spoke with expressed reservations about changing the Quartet, claiming it would harm its efficiency by making it difficult to operate and act, rather than rely solely on statements.

Instead, there is agreement that cooperation between the Quartet and the “Arab Quartet” (mainly Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) must be increased. Egypt and Jordan have emphasized their desire to demonstrate their status as key regional players and to be involved in any future Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Gulf states have expressed their willingness to assist as well if the parties want them to.

Additionally, the EU’s role within the group has occasionally experienced challenges arising from internal disputes between EU member states over the conflict; these challenges were exacerbated during the Trump administration. While these disagreements could damage the EU’s ability to play a leading role in the peace process, European diplomats argue that the member states are united in their positions on the fundamental issues of the conflict. This unity was reflected in sweeping opposition to Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the Israeli government’s annexation intentions.

Existing circumstances provide the Quartet a special opportunity given the greater US willingness for multilateral activity on the conflict. Whereas in the past the US insisted on an almost exclusive role in advancing the peace process, relegating other actors to the sidelines, the current administration seems interested in cooperation.

The Biden administration prioritizes a multilateral approach as a global strategy on other conflicts as well. According to European diplomats, the days of exclusive US mediation are over, as Washington has lost its traditional status of an honest broker. They argue that President Joe Biden will be unable to play the role that the US played in the Clinton or Obama eras, even if he wanted to, and a broader framework is required involving European and Arab actors.

After Biden assumed office, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the Quartet has been unable to convene for a long time, but he believes the changes in Washington set the path for the group’s activities to resume. Indeed, the Quartet resumed its meetings and announced at the end of its March session that it was discussing efforts to renew negotiations on the two-state solution and on measures to advance “freedom, security and well-being” for Palestinians and Israelis.

Three of the four Quartet representatives are ending their terms in the first half of 2021: The US representative was replaced due to the change in administration, Tor Wennesland has replaced Nickolay Mladenov as the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, and the EU representative’s term ended in April. The fresh members could introduce new motivations, ideas and directions for action.

In light of the Quartet’s paralysis during the Trump administration, Germany, France, Egypt and Jordan formed a new, informal group called the “Munich Group” in order to preserve the core principles of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the two-state solution vis-à-vis the Trump plan and annexation intentions.

The group’s foreign ministers continued to meet after Biden’s victory, working to promote confidence-building measures between Israelis and Palestinians. The diplomats we spoke to emphasized that the group was not meant as a substitute for the Quartet, but as an attempt to fill the vacuum created during the Trump era. They believe that once the Quartet resumes its regular activity, the new forum will probably no longer be needed.

International groups have operated in various conflict areas around the world. The “contact group” led diplomatic moves regarding the conflicts in the Balkans and the Minsk Group worked to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite hopes that the Quartet would play a significant role in Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, it turned to be a weak and insignificant force.

It is currently difficult to see any sense of urgency for a diplomatic initiative in the international community, especially considering the consensus that the chances of a breakthrough toward a permanent solution are very low in the current political conditions.

At the same time, there is a growing feeling in the international community that after years of stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, we are now experiencing a period of changes and developments at the domestic, regional and international levels that will affect the conflict.

These changes will require diplomatic adjustments and may provide new opportunities in peacemaking efforts. There is recently an international ripeness, that has not previously existed, for multilateral diplomacy and collaboration between international actors regarding the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and the Quartet could serve as a framework for this.

**The article was published on the Jerusalem Post, 12 May 2021.

הפוסט Is the Middle East Quartet still relevant? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper maps out the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current circumstances, based on a series of dialogues conducted by Mitvim Institute experts in February and March 2021 with various European, Arab, American and UN diplomats and experts.[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest diplomatic developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the measures the international community could undertake to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace that are feasible and desired.

[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Victoria Solkovits.

הפוסט Where Do We Go from Here? <br>The International Discourse on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over the years, various international actors have offered incentives for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace, to name a few: The Arab Peace Initiative (2002), the EU proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and a future Palestinian state (2013), and the American security package compiled by Gen. John Allen within the framework of US-mediated Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (2014). These incentives were presented at different stages in an uncoordinated manner and their efficacy fell short of their sponsors’ expectations. More recently, against the backdrop of the diplomatic freeze between Israel and the Palestinians, various parties, including the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, have pointed to the need for a package of diplomatic and economic incentives to help the sides achieve a breakthrough and a path out of the stalemate.

Against this background, the Mitvim Institute convened a team of Israeli and Palestinian policy experts to discuss the formulation of a joint proposal of international incentives for peace in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The resulting proposal seeks to respond to five key needs the experts identified as common to both sides: Security, recognition and legitimacy, religious rights, economic prosperity, and domestic demands. While these needs are common to both Israelis and Palestinians, they differ in substance and significance.

Security needs are key in any conflict and international security guarantees can help the sides accept compromise and take risks for the sake of a future arrangement. The US has played an important role in this regard in previous peace processes, for example in providing security guarantees within the framework of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement. The US could be similarly instrumental in an Israeli-Palestinian agreement by offering Israel security guarantees, such as security aid or the presence of US troops within the framework of special security arrangements in the Jordan Valley or other areas. Concurrently, international actors, chief among the US and the EU, could offer the Palestinians security guarantees to compensate them for agreeing to a demilitarized state and the presence of foreign forces. The neighboring states, Egypt and Jordan, could take part in an international security incentives package as well.

Additionally, recognition and legitimacy are of great importance. In this context, Arab states could offer Israel significant incentives, including regional normalization and recognition measures. At the same time, the Palestinian side seeks international recognition of an independent Palestinian state. Various international players, chief among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, could offer incentives responding to this need in tandem with progress toward a peace arrangement.

The religious aspect, including the issue of the holy sites, will also require incentives, having been a key obstacle to progress in previous peace talks. International incentives, such as involvement in a special regime in Jerusalem’s Old City, could respond to these sensitive issues. Muslim religious leaders and religious institutions around the world could offer incentives of recognition and legitimacy in the religious context and help tackle the symbolic dimension of the issue. UNESCO, the Vatican, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation could also contribute their share.

Economic incentives are a necessary and important component in efforts to promote peace, and various efforts have been made in this regard throughout the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. They were particularly prominent in the Oslo process in the 1990s, which included regional economic conferences, but the diplomatic crisis between the sides thwarted the economic endeavors. More recently, the Trump Administration proposed a series of economic incentives as part of its “Deal of the Century”, but it failed to link these incentives to peace negotiations and to a viable diplomatic horizon based on the two-state solution. Various actors could take part in an economic incentive package, chief among them the EU, the US, the Gulf States, and international financial institutions. The package could include aid for building a passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for creating an artificial island off the Gaza Coast and advancing regional tourism initiatives.

Furthermore, any incentives package must also provide a response to each side’s domestic needs, whether collective or specific to groups on each side. Thus, for example, incentives for Israel could address the issue of property Jews left behind when they were forced to flee Arab and Muslim countries, and incentives for Palestinians could address the status of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem or Palestinian refugees.

The process of formulating and presenting the incentives package should be led by a mechanism comprised of various international actors, among them states and organizations who are able to offer relevant incentives. The mechanism must also be effective, flexible, and dynamic, with the capacity to coordinate among all the players and promote the incentives package as a long-term process. Presentation of the package must also distinguish between different target audiences. It must address different parties on each side of the conflict – decision makers, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and the media – as well as various actors in the international arena. In order to be credible and effective, the incentives must be offered in close conjunction with a clear political vision and progress in the peace process.

Renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process does not seem to be on the horizon, and the issue is not high on the international agenda. Given the failed initiatives and efforts of past years, international actors are debating how best to proceed and are looking for new ideas to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The international incentives package proposed by the Mitvim Institute team provides one potential tool for breaking the deadlock, and discussion of the ideas it raises could help advance an optimistic, forward-looking discourse, empowering the actors and peace advocates and bolstering the sides’ willingness to entertain peace initiatives.

*This article is based on a policy paper he authored with Moien Odeh, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Huda Abu Arqoub based on Israeli-Palestinian deliberations held by the Mitvim Institute in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Changing the Equation: International Incentives <br> for Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Incentives are an important tool in peace processes and have the potential to contribute to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. A team of Israeli and Palestinian policy experts developed a joint proposal for an international package of incentives for peace. The proposal defines the central needs of the parties that the incentives package must address, focusing on security, recognition and legitimacy, religious rights, economic prosperity and domestic needs. It examines which international actors can be relevant in addressing those needs and should be part of an international incentives package, elaborating on the potential role of the US, the EU, and the Arab and the Muslim world. The proposal also discusses when and how a package of incentives should be introduced and delivered, and what should be the international mechanism required to promote it.

** The project was carried out by the Mitvim Institute, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Addressing Needs, Promoting Peace: A Proposal for an <br> International Incentives Package for Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US elections are held every four years at the beginning of November, and the inauguration takes place on January 20, leaving outgoing presidents with some two-and-a-half months in office. This is a unique period under a lame duck president whose days in office are numbered, but who still retains authority to make policy shifts while being less constrained by domestic political considerations.

Transitions abide by the “one president at a time” rule, meaning that incoming US presidents do not hold formal power until their inauguration. At the same time, administrations on their way out of Washington are expected to act cautiously and avoid dramatic policy shifts since they cannot follow through on them. Some outgoing administrations have therefore coordinated significant policy moves in their final weeks with the president-elect’s team. Others deliberately adopted policies designed to present the next administration with a fait accompli.

Presidential transitions have set the stage in the past for important developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such was the case in December 1988, for example, when the Reagan administration announced the launch of an official dialogue with the PLO weeks before George Bush Sr. took office. The conditions for direct negotiations had ripened after the PLO’s acceptance of the terms stipulated by the US (recognition of Israel, acceptance of UNSC Resolutions 242 and condemnation of terrorism). The move was based on consistent US policy promising recognition of the organization under set terms, and it was coordinated with the incoming administration (both presidents were Republicans) and Bush continued the dialogue with the Palestinians after taking office.

 The step had been prepared over months, not at the last minute, and the transition period provided the outgoing administration with broad room for political maneuver to advance it despite the strident objections of the government of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. Secret contacts toward the policy shift began prior to the November 1988 elections, but Reagan feared that the move would undermine Republican election prospects; he therefore suspended action on the matter and resumed it following the elections.

President Bill Clinton provided another example of transition-period action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as he prepared to leave the White House and hand power to George Bush Jr. The plan he presented in December 2000 was a last-minute attempt to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian agreement following prolonged, intensive negotiations (and against the backdrop of the start of the Second Intifada) and both sides gave a green light to the move. The Clinton administration was well aware of the timing and made it clear to the sides that unless they accepted the parameters within the allotted time frame, it would be taken off the table with Clinton’s departure from the White House.

The plan was presented to the sides orally, not in writing, in order to underscore that it was not a formal, public initiative but rather a limited-time offer. The Bush transition team was aware of the move and conveyed messages affirming its commitment to any agreement signed, although it indicated that the new administration will be much less involved in the peace process than Clinton had been should the sides fail to reach agreement. Clinton’s final effort failed to yield an agreement and Bush did not adopt it, but it remained a central element in international discourse on the issue.

The UN has been yet another arena of last-minute activity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for outgoing administrations. If it involves a vote on a Security Council resolution, it has international legal implications binding the successor administration. Such was the case, for example, in January 2009 when the Bush administration abstained in the UNSC vote which called for a ceasefire to end Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice supported the measure, while Israel rejected it. Bush had to decide whether he wanted to end his term with a US veto and a clash with Rice or support the resolution and face a confrontation with Israel. He opted for a compromise. He abstained, which allowed the resolution to pass.

Still harsher tensions between an outgoing administration and the Israeli government arose in the waning days of the Obama administration, which abstained in the December 2016 vote on UN Security Council Resolution 2334 condemning Israeli settlements. Some viewed the decision as a final move by Obama in the Israeli-Palestinian context, after he had avoided US support for similar measures throughout his two terms.

 Presumably, Trump’s election victory the previous month affected Obama’s attempt to legally anchor the international consensus against the settlements shortly before the changing of the guard in Washington. Contacts ahead of the vote gave rise to an additional transition period issue – the involvement of a president-elect in foreign policy prior to taking office. Transition teams of incoming presidents occasionally deviate from the no-interference rule, as was the case when Trump’s envoys tried to scuttle the UNSC settlement resolution by asking several member states to vote against it.

As opposed to international and multilateral moves, an outgoing administration can also promote symbolic unilateral measures in a bid to convey a last-minute message. Such was the case with the December 2016 speech by Secretary of State John Kerry, in which he underscored the Obama administration’s backing for a two-state solution and opposition to settlement expansion, and presented his peace plan’s main principles. It was a declarative measure devoid of long-term significance.

In analyzing Trump’s latest moves, one must examine whether they are symbolic and declarative in nature or will have a lasting effect after the presidential changeover. As we have seen, multilateral measures or those carried out in coordination with incoming administrations have had broader influence. Unilateral US measures, on the other hand, must be examined to determine whether they include formal procedures that deviate from the declarative dimension and if so, which administration bodies are involved. This can help determine their impact and the extent to which the incoming administration can overturn them.

The Trump-Biden transition period is unprecedented in US history. Trump has consistently refused to concede defeat. This is a sensitive point in time with the potential for a clash between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, international players, Israel among them, must act with caution. Netanyahu’s policy over the past decade has reflected clear preference for the Republicans, prompting tensions with the Democrats. Israeli efforts to squeeze final concessions from the Trump administration may serve Netanyahu in the short term but risks generating a crisis with the Biden administration in its early days in office. Israel would do well to focus instead on preparations for the incoming administration and on rehabilitating its relations with the Democratic Party upon its return to the White House.

**The article was Published on Jpost, 14 December 2020

הפוסט What are Trump’s last Israel policy moves before he leaves? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US policy on the peace process was relatively consistent over the years, with certain shifts of emphasis by different administrations and differences in the extent of US involvement. The Trump administration, however, has adopted several decisions testifying to a significant shift and departure from traditional US policy since 1967, and especially since the start of the Israel-PLO peace process in the 1990s.

הפוסט What does the US election have to do with Middle East peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

EU member states can decide independently whether to recognize a state, and sometimes there are internal disagreements on the subject (for example, on the issue of recognizing Kosovo). However, the EU can also decide on “collective recognition,” for example of states emerging from the collapse of a multinational framework (as was the case with Yugoslavia’s disintegration), or when independence is achieved by agreement (for example, in East Timor and South Sudan). The EU has also adopted collective decisions to withhold recognition, in cases like Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and Crimea.

Recognition as a diplomatic tool

As far back as the 1980 Venice Declaration, European states have consistently supported the Palestinian right to self-determination and a two-state solution. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Europe assumed that recognition of a Palestinian state would be a component of the final status agreement and an incentive to conclude a peace deal. However, following the collapse of the peace process and the diplomatic freeze that has ensued, the issue of recognition has come up once again, but this time as a possible diplomatic tool that can be used before an agreement is concluded.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched its campaign for international recognition of a Palestinian state in the late 1980s. Addressing a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria on Nov. 15, 1988, PLO leader Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. That was also the first time the PLO adopted the two-state principle and at the same time accepted UN Resolution 242 based on the 1967 borders. Following the declaration, over 100 states announced recognition of a Palestinian state, and both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation approved its membership. It should be noted that the states of Eastern Europe (including Poland and Hungary) that are currently members of the EU already recognized the Palestinian state at that stage as part of the Soviet bloc’s support for its independence. Many states subsequently upgraded the level of PLO representation in their countries to the status of an embassy, but beyond such moves, the recognition was mainly symbolic and declarative.

In September 1993, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition. The PLO recognized Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, while Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. However, the Oslo Accords did not include establishment of a Palestinian state, leaving the issue to future negotiations on a permanent agreement. In 2003, the Middle East Quartet — the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia — issued a road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which stipulated that an internationally recognized Palestinian state within temporary borders, bearing all the characteristics of sovereignty, would be established during the second phase of the plan, while the third phase would include negotiations between the two states on a permanent agreement. The UN Security Council approved the plan, but while both sides accepted it, the plan was not implemented.

Palestinian push for international recognition

In 2011, following failed attempts to reach a final status agreement in the 2007-08 Annapolis process and in the 2010-11 Mitchell talks, the Palestinians decided to focus their efforts on international recognition of a Palestinian state. In September 2011, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) applied for full UN membership, but the U.S. warned that it would veto such a resolution, blocking the move. In October 2011, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization approved Palestine as a member, and in November 2012 the UN General Assembly upgraded its status to that of a “non-member observer state.” Concurrently, many Latin American states — including Brazil, Argentina, and Chile — announced their recognition of a Palestinian state in 2010 and 2011, and opened embassies in Ramallah.

During U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s mediation efforts in 2013-14, the Palestinians agreed to drop their push for recognition, but following the failure of the negotiations in summer 2014, the effort was renewed and several European parliaments (among them those of the UK, France, and Ireland) called for the recognition of a Palestinian state. The European Parliament, too, adopted a resolution in that spirit. Nonetheless, only one European state — Sweden — officially announced de facto recognition, in October 2014, upgrading the status of the Palestinian representative office to that of an embassy and labeling the hosting of Abbas as a head-of-state visit. However, Sweden did not open an embassy in Ramallah, and Swedish representation remained at the level of a consulate in East Jerusalem. Various EU states have said they would promote recognition at the “appropriate” time and as part of an agreed Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In 2016, France launched a peace initiative and announced that it would recognize a Palestinian state should the plan fail. French officials subsequently withdrew that promise, and when the initiative failed France did not recognize Palestine.

Advocates of recognition — among them some in Israel’s peace camp — argue that such a move would advance the peace process and provide a more equal structure in negotiations between the two sides. They also contend that given the impasse in the peace process, the growing irrelevance of the two-state vision, and concern over escalation into violence, recognition would preserve the two-state principle, bolster Palestinian moderates, and offer the Palestinian public a political horizon. By contrast, critics claim that the tool of recognition should not be used at the wrong time, and that doing so without an agreement between the two sides would reduce the Palestinians’ incentive to progress with negotiations. Discussion of the issue also raises the legal question of whether the PA meets the required conditions for recognition as a state, and whether recognition would include a reference to borders or leave them to be determined in a future agreement (it is worth noting that Israel’s declaration of independence did not determine borders, either).

What next?

In conclusion, while recognition was discussed in the past as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian agreement, these days several European states are considering it as a response to annexation. A decision on recognition would not require consensus, and each EU member could decide for itself. Although recognition would be an expression of protest against annexation, it would not constitute a European sanction against Israel, and would be perceived instead as a balancing measure designed to preserve the feasibility of the two-state vision, and to bolster the PA against the threat of collapse and escalation. On the one hand, PA representatives appeared to advocate recognition in response to annexation. For example, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has urged EU member states to do so. On the other hand, PA officials have also spoken of a competing option, on the other end of the diplomatic spectrum: declaring the dismantling of the PA’s institutions and “handing the keys” over to Israel in the case of annexation.

Recognition is largely a symbolic measure that does not necessarily augur a de facto change on the ground, as was the case with past recognition declarations that did not result in substantive change. Nonetheless, a broad move by several EU members — especially by key states like Germany and France, as well as the UK, which has exited the EU — could have important diplomatic significance in terms of international legitimization of the Palestinians and affect the international response to Israel’s policy in the West Bank.

The article was published on MEI, August 5, 2020.

הפוסט To recognize or not to recognize: EU recognition of Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan also opined it was a mistake to use the term “Arab spring” and explained that “whoever coined the phrase drew it from events that occurred in Europe in 1848, when liberal ideas proliferated in the world. The truth is there is no liberal message.” Former head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin said “we understand today that the pair of words ‘Arab spring’ did not describe correctly the phenomenon that rocked the Middle East in 2011.”

The Israel Defense Forces’ intelligence branch discussed the issue and decided that the term “Arab spring” was unsuitable and decided to use the term “upheaval” as the official term describing the events.4 Many other people in Israel, as shall be described below, began using the terms “Arab winter” or “Islamic winter” as terms to challenge the original term and express a negative reading of the events. This article wishes to present an analysis of the Israeli discourse following the Arab Spring events as articulated by different parties in diverse forums of conversation. The article analyzes the public and media conversation in Israel and includes an analysis of statements, articles and public opinion surveys and refers to different players (politicians, public figures, journalists and military commanders) and different issues and questions that have arisen as part of the conversation on the subject.

הפוסט Egyptian Plague or Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse regarding the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Thus, for example, at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the spread of the disease spawned racism and xenophobia directed at Chinese people the world over. This was also reflected in the intensification of ethnic tensions in states with a Chinese minority. Unprecedented violence was recorded against the Chinese-Muslim Dungan minority in Kazakhstan, and representatives of the Chinese minority in the Philippines complained of incidents of discrimination and racism. Fear of the virus has also led to isolation and border closings, a sensitive issue in conflict areas that can raise tensions even further. For example, the border between the two parts of Cyprus, first opened in 2003, was closed at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, prompting protests.

Studies point to a link between the spread of disease and civil conflicts. A 2017 study found that exposure to contagious disease increased the risk of a violent civil conflict. An additional study, focused on the Ebola epidemic in western Africa in 2014-2015, pointed to a similar correlation. It should be noted that following the Ebola epidemic in western Africa, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to define the outbreak in this region as a threat to international security and peace. The study determined that in conflict areas, or countries recovering from internal wars, unusual government measures to deal with epidemics can serve as fertile ground for increased tensions and hostility resulting in unrest and violence. In areas where tension and mistrust prevail between various groups or regions and the central regime, such situations can be perceived as an excuse for the government to exercise its power, generating resistance and counter-reaction. In various central Asian states, among them Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, the Corona crisis prompted protests by residents against government measures.

The Corona crisis is monopolizing the attention of all the countries in the world, including the superpowers, making it difficult for the international community to deal with other issues and divert resources to other causes. The restrictions on movement also undermine such efforts. A report by the International Crisis Group argues that the Covid-19 pandemic undermines the ability of international institutions to deliver humanitarian aid, advance diplomatic initiatives and operate peacekeeping forces. It should be emphasized that areas of war and conflict are particularly vulnerable, raising deep concerns about the spread of the epidemic in such countries as Libya, Syria and Afghanistan. This is well illustrated in the difficulties experienced by international organizations in eradicating Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to fighting that prevented access to infected regions and also resulted in injury to medical personnel.

However, along with the risks and negative repercussions, disasters and epidemics can also demonstrate to rivals that they are facing a common enemy and must join forces to confront it, as President Rivlin argued. Agreement on such cooperation could spill over into other issues and serve as a confidence building measures and an eventual turning point in the relationship between sides to a conflict. Such events underscore similarities between rival parties and the immediate need for humanitarian aid, unrelated to politics, and the crisis can turn into an opportunity. Such situations have given rise to what is known as “disaster diplomacy” in which rival parties help each other in a time of crisis as a goodwill gesture. The United Arab Emirates, for example, recently transferred humanitarian relief to Iran, hard hit by Covid-19, despite the tension between these two states.

Such crises can also lead to ceasefires. That was the case, for example, when the “Guinea Worm” disease started spreading in Sudan in 1995, prompting six-month ceasefire between the north and south to tackle the deep crisis afflicting numerous villages. In the current crisis, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a call for a global ceasefire in order to combat the Coronavirus, and warring sides in various conflict areas, such as Yemen, Libya and the Philippines expressed support for the initiative.

The massive 2005 earthquake that hit India and Pakistan, including the disputed territory of Kashmir, provides another example of rivals helping each other. India transferred huge amounts of aid to Pakistan, whose President publicly acknowledged the assistance and offered his thanks. Shortly thereafter, the sides advanced initiatives on linking the two parts of Kashmir – initially, through phone lines connecting the two sides and then free passage in order to provide disaster relief. These moves generated hope, but violence eventually resumed and the “disaster diplomacy” failed to yield a breakthrough.

However, in some cases disasters did result in real, long-term change. A special case in point was the effect of the December 2004 Indian Ocean quake and tsunami on the conflict between Indonesia and the Aceh Province, which was an epicenter of the disaster that killed over 200,000 people. Following the quake, the President of Indonesia lifted the state of emergency imposed on Aceh, and the Free Aceh Movement declared a ceasefire. In early 2005, Indonesia called for negotiations, which were held in Finland and culminated in a peace agreement in August of that year. It cannot be argued that the disaster led to peace, and the breakthrough was the result of many other weighty elements (among them a political change in Indonesia and successful mediation efforts of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari), but the heavy disaster and the global attention it drew, affected the sides, pushed them to compromise and served as an opportunity for constructive diplomacy.

Turning back to our region, initial indications at the outset of the crisis pointed to encouraging cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. The sides established a special mechanism for close, ongoing coordination, Israel’s Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon met with his Palestinian counterpart Shukri Bishara to discuss economic aspects of the crisis, and Israel transferred aid and equipment to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov praised the cooperation between the sides. However, at the same time, the Palestinians complained on continued operations of the Israel Defense Forces in Palestinian cities and villages, and Israel complained about Palestinian declarations claiming Israel was working to spread the virus. In addition, Hamas leaders threatened that the spread of the disease in Gaza would lead to an escalation with Israel.

It is too soon to say at this stage how the Coronavirus crisis will play out and how it will impact conflict areas. Examples from around the world illustrate that the link between a humanitarian or health disaster and political tensions could be dangerous. Therefore, the Israel-Palestinian cooperation should be welcomed and the parties should make every effort to avert a deterioration into a harsh health or economic crisis that might increase the threat of escalation. Leaders in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority could learn from efforts made in the past by other rival parties to exploit such crises to advance conciliatory moves and a diplomatic breakthrough.

הפוסט War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Relations with Arab states

1. Israel is interested in bolstering the peace with Jordan and Egypt and achieving peace with additional Arab states in order to normalize relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. Arab leaders are invited to visit Israel.

2. Israel’s relations with Arab states should extend beyond the clandestine, security realm to include open diplomatic, economic and civilian cooperation.

3. Israel attaches importance to the thrice-endorsed 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and welcomes the willingness of Arab states to consistently ratify it over time. Israel views the proposal as an opportunity to promote negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel is also interested in launching a regional peace process with the involvement of both Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

4. Israel believes Arab states could play a significant role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such peace would also provide significant opportunities to fulfill the potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Israel calls for a regional conference to relaunch the peace process.

5. Israel seeks to cooperate with Arab states on people-to-people projects that could change negative attitudes and forge links of peace. Israel seeks to contribute its know-how in the fields of hydrology, climate, renewable energy and security for the benefit of the Arab states and their inhabitants.

6. Israel believes its unique geopolitical location enables it to assume a significant role in furthering connections and cooperation between Europe and the Middle East. This is already happening in the Eastern Mediterranean, and should be broadened into wide-ranging, institutionalized multi-regional cooperation beneficial to both Israel and Arab states.

7. Israel will give top priority to restoring relations with Jordan and trust with King Abdullah. These relations are of supreme strategic importance and must be bolstered and developed. Israel recognizes Jordan’s special status vis-à-vis Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. It will work to advance new joint projects with Jordan, fulfill past commitments and is ready to help Jordan deal with the refugee challenge and with threats of terrorism.

8. Israel recognizes Egypt’s key regional importance and the vital role it plays in promoting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and preventing escalation between Israel and Gaza. Israel welcomes the growing cooperation with Egypt on natural gas, and will also invest efforts in promoting civilian ties with Egypt. First off, Israel will immediately appoint a new ambassador to Egypt following a lengthy hiatus during which the position was not staffed.

Relations with the Palestinians

1. Israel is interested in peace with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution and will take steps to advance it. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only reaching an arrangement with Gaza, is a top priority for Israel.

2. Israel is extending its hand to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in a bid to renew dialogue and the peace process and is interested in creating a direct channel between leaders and top officials. Israel also attaches importance to promoting ties and dialogue between the two peoples and building mutual respect and trust.

3. Israel does not want the PA’s collapse. It views the PA as a partner for negotiations and a key partner in resolving the situation in Gaza. Israel chooses to engage with the PA, which recognizes it, rather than with Hamas, which rejects its right to exist.

4. Israel is interested in continuing coordination with the PA to prevent security deterioration and addressing joint challenges and opportunities in other fields. Israel will support the PA’s efforts to unite the West Bank and Gaza Strip into one Palestinian entity under its leadership and to hold elections.

5. Israel pledges to help improve living conditions for the Palestinians, not as an alternative to a diplomatic solution but out of a moral-humanitarian commitment. Israel calls on the international community to contribute to this effort as well as to diplomatic efforts to advance peace.

6. Israel is willing to enable the planned construction in Kalkilya to accommodate natural population growth, to avoid demolishing houses and public facilities in east Jerusalem and Area C, to increase the number of work permits for Palestinians, and ease freedom of movement and the transfer of taxes it collects on behalf of the PA.

7. Israel appreciates the efforts invested by the US administration in formulating its vision of peace, but emphasizes that resolution of the conflict must stem from direct negotiations between the sides, with regional and international involvement, taking into consideration the needs and aspirations of both sides to the conflict.

8. Israel will not undertake unilateral annexation measures in the territories. It will freeze construction in the settlements that risks the feasibility of the two-state solution and will preserve the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Relations with Europe

1. Israel wishes to turn the page on its relationship with the European Union. Israel regards the EU as a friend and partner with which it shares common values and wants to deepen and expand diverse and positive cooperation.

2. Israel will continue promoting bilateral relations with EU member states, viewing them as an effective tool to influence decision-making in Brussels. However, it will not take advantage of such moves to undermine the EU and deepen its internal divisions.

3. As a state committed to the values of liberal democracy, Israel attaches great importance to a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and will prioritize ties with European states that share those same values.

4. Israel will continue to criticize EU measures that it opposes, but will do so through open, honest dialogue and in as positive a climate as possible. The new government will cease the harsh rhetoric and incitement against the EU and express its criticism in a professional manner.

5. Israel will continue to boost its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and promote additional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the formation of regional frameworks with the participation of European and Arab states, and restoration of relations with Turkey to ambassadorial level.

6. Israel extends an invitation to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for an official visit. Israel’s foreign minister will conduct an official visit to Europe, during which he will seek to meet with EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

7. Israel seeks to renew the high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012, in order to update old agreements and discuss new ones.

8. Israel welcomes the 2013 European proposal of upgrading Israel-EU relations to the level of a Special Privileged Partnership once Israeli-Palestinian peace is achieved, and is interested in launching a dialogue on the proposal’s potential content.

9. Israel values the EU’s support for advancement of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation through civil society organizations and other channels and its efforts to promote peace and democracy in the region.

10. Israel would like to inform the EU that it seeks the renewal of the peace process with the Palestinians and will avoid unilateral steps that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Initial policy recommendations for Foreign Minister Ashkenazi – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the Oslo process, Israel had a two-track policy. It conducted talks with the PLO, which had officially and publicly recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” in the hopes of reaching a final status agreement, and at the same time Israel waged uncompromising war on Hamas, which refused to recognize both Israel and the Oslo Accords. That policy was shared by both the left-wing and right-wing Israeli governments through the 1990s. Suggestions by certain Israeli figures, among them Rabbi Menachem Froman and Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy to promote dialogue with Hamas were rejected out of hand. However, it became increasingly obvious over the years that ignoring Hamas and excluding it from the process would be very hard given its standing in Palestinian society, especially after its 2006 election victory and takeover of the Gaza Strip.

One way of understanding Israel’s dilemma is through the concept of “peace spoilers.” In the 1990s, there was a growing discussion among academics in the field of conflict analysis, about how to relate to actors, often non-state ones, who undertake concerted efforts to thwart peace processes or agreements that they view as a threat to themselves and their goals. One of the main examples discussed in those days were Hamas and Jewish extremists, both of whom sought to foil the Oslo process. Other peace processes in the 1990s encountered a similar phenomenon. In Northern Ireland, the Real Irish Republican Army split from the IRA and carried out terror attacks in a bid to prevent a peace agreement. In South Africa, deadly violence in the early 1990s threatened to undermine attempts of reconciliation. Scholars debated how best to deal with such actors – whether to fight against them or to communicate with them and try to integrate them into the process.

Even after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2007, Israel continued with its parallel policy: Security coordination and peace talks (until the 2014 collapse of negotiations led by US Secretary of State John Kerry) vis-a-vis the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, along with a blockade of Gaza and repeated rounds of fighting with Hamas, whom Israel saw as “peace spoilers” who must be fought.

Successive Israeli governments insisted that they would not conduct any dialogue with a Palestinian unity government if it included Hamas. In October 2017, the Netanyahu government’s security cabinet reiterated this stance in light of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation attempts, announcing that Israel would engage with such a Palestinian government only if Hamas recognized Israel, stopped its terrorist activity, disarmed and severed ties with Iran.

But over the last decade, the ground started shifting, gradually. In 2011 Israel and Hamas reached an agreement on releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners; the parties also negotiated indirectly on ceasefires to end several rounds of fighting. But these contacts were a precursor to a far more dramatic and significant move. Ironically, the most right-wing government in Israeli history, formed in 2015, which did not include representatives of centrist or left-wing parties, was the one that eventually led to a radical shift of Israel’s position. During 2018, Israel and Hamas launched indirect intensive negotiations, mediated by Egypt and UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov.

This shift has several reasons: Both parties were finally open to the idea of dialogue, after a decade of repeated and indecisive clashes, and a primed for a more pragmatic recognition of reality. But at the same time, it also stemmed from a mutual interest in managing the conflict rather than resolving it – and in weakening the PA under Abbas. The same dynamics are true today. The Netanyahu government is not interested in fostering a peace process that would entail territorial concessions in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Hamas is interested in preserving its power and standing. Netanyahu declared in March 2019 that contacts with Hamas were maintaining the split between Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank, thus scuppering the possibility of establishing Palestinian state. A close Netanyahu campaign aide, Jonathan Urich, boasted in an April 2019 interview that his boss had “managed to achieve a split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and in fact crushed the vision of a Palestinian state in these two areas. Part of this achievement is linked to the Qatari money reaching Hamas each month.”

This in itself constituted a turnaround in Israel’s position: for years, it had demanded that control over Gaza be restored to the PA. Looking at the Israel-PA-Hamas triangle, it appears that any real dialogue between Israel and the PA has collapsed; contacts between Hamas and the PA have reached a dead end; and only the channel between Hamas and Israel is still working. During the 2007-2008 Annapolis process, Israel’s goal was to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas and reach a final status agreement with him, which would be expanded in its next phase to include Gaza. However, Israel is now working to preserve the split between the two Palestinian entities, and no longer seeks to create any affinity between Gaza and the PA, or to push for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It’s worth taking a step back to see just how unthinkable (until very recently) Israel’s pivot has been, and how dramatically expedient, or pragmatic, its redefinition of an acceptable partner for dialogue has been. If, as recently as some two years ago, the Israeli government rejected the idea of talks with a Palestinian unity government due to its affiliation with Hamas, today the Israeli government is talking to Hamas, while not conducting any diplomatic dialogue with Abbas, and even adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward him and the Palestinian Authority. The emerging message is that Israel is rewarding Hamas, which uses violent means against Israel (firing rockets and incendiary devices at Israel), and punishing the PA, which has adhered to tight security coordination with Israel.

Lior Lehrs is the Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Peace-Spoilers or Negotiation Partners? Netanyahu’s Understandings with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Trump Plan: Not the Way to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quality of Israel’s Peace with Jordan is Dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greenblatt was appointed shortly after Trump’s election victory and initially it appeared both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were willing to work with him. During his first months on the job, Greenblatt met several times with Palestinian President Abbas and other senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, even visiting a Palestinian refugee camp and meeting with Palestinian and Israeli students and religious leaders. At first, he also tried to promote cooperation between the sides and was involved in the contacts on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal that resulted in understandings between Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi and the Head of the PA’s Water Authority Ghuneim. However, these first steps were upended with a series of Trump Administration measures against the Palestinians, starting in late 2017. These included the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, aid cuts, shuttering the PLO office in Washington and departure from the twostate principle – all of which led to a complete and unprecedented rift between the US administrations and Ramallah. Greenblatt became the first US Envoy in the annals of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who lost contact with one of the sides and the ability to serve as a broker.

At that point, rather than taking advantage of his position to calm tensions and to try and restore trust and to facilitate dialogue with the Palestinians through back channels, Greenblatt actually sought to escalate the crisis and exacerbate the public verbal and media conflict with the Palestinians. He did so in contravention of the basic principles of mediation, which every first-year student of international relations learns. Greenblatt began facing off against various Palestinian representatives on Twitter, and tweeted blatant attacks on the Palestinian leadership. His remarks also disavowed the basic principles of the peace process. He spoke, for example, about Israel’s right to annex territories, and expressed disregard for the international resolutions on the conflict. The photos showing Greenblatt taking a hammer to breach an ancient tunnel under the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, at an inauguration ceremony of the “Path of the Pilgrims” that was organized by the Elad organization, was a jarring final note that faithfully reflected the direction in which Greenblatt had taken his role. The much-touted Trump peace plan (dubbed “the deal of the century), over which Greenblatt had labored with Kushner and Amb. Friedman, has yet to be unveiled, with its publication date put off repeatedly, whereas the economic component of the blueprint, which the US team presented in Bahrain, failed to leave its mark.

Despite Greenblatt’s inexperience when he took over his position, he did have several levers of influence he could have used, chief among them the personal ties and trust with President Trump. He also enjoyed the initial willingness of both sides to cooperate with him. However, his mission has come to a crashing end with the unprecedented rift between the US administration and the Palestinian side and his inability to play any significant role in the different issues and aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. We do not know, yet, the reason for Greenblatt’s decision to step down, but it undoubtedly illustrates the pointlessness of the measures to achieve the “deal of the century”, thus far. It will be interesting to see whether Greenblatt’s departure signals a change in approach and policy or whether the remaining Kushner-Friedman team will adhere to the current policy guidelines.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Resignation of Jason Greenblatt, the Peace Envoy Who Did Not Broker הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The goal in presenting peace plans during a mediation process is to suggest a possible basis for an agreement and to push the various sides of the conflict toward it. Nevertheless, this is a sensitive process that holds many risks, and it requires appropriate conditions, careful and serious preparatory work, and a deep understanding of the positions of the parties and the situation on the ground.

According to media reports, the Trump administration is preparing to present the “Deal of the Century,” proposing an outline for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Very little is known about the plan, its release date, content, objectives, or how it will be presented. However, it is important to discuss the context and the conditions under which the plan has been formulated, and to highlight some basic elements that are required for a third party to promote a peace plan — which are absent in this case.

Third-party mediation

In the above-mentioned examples — Carter 1978, Vance-Owen 1993, Clinton 2000, and Annan 2004 — the plan was proposed by a third party (whether a representative of a state, international organization, or other international framework) that led a mediation process and was accepted by both sides (even if the mediator was not necessarily perceived as neutral by all parties), and engaged in continuous dialogue with them. In these cases, the plans were presented after intensive negotiations between the parties, with the involvement of the mediator, and they aimed to present bridging proposals for the remaining disagreements. In the case of Donald Trump’s “peace plan,” however, things are different.

The U.S. has been acting as the main mediator in the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the Oslo Accord of September 1993 (whereas in the Oslo talks, the parties were assisted by Norwegian facilitation). The U.S. has maintained this status over the years and throughout various administrations, as exemplified by its leading role in the Wye River Summit (1998), Camp David Summit (2000), the Annapolis process (2008), and the Kerry initiative (2013-14). The Palestinians never saw the U.S. as neutral, but accepted it as a mediator because it was understood to be the only international actor that could pressure Israel. In some instances, it was the Palestinians who pushed for American involvement, with the hope that it would reduce the power asymmetry between them and Israel.

The Trump era

At the beginning of the Trump era, it seemed that the U.S. could continue in this role, and President Trump met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in both the U.S. and Bethlehem. However, within a short period of time, the U.S. administration took unprecedented steps that led to a different outcome, one which changed the rules of the game. These steps included Trump’s decisions to relocate the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, close the PLO mission in Washington, cut aid to the Palestinians (including to hospitals in East Jerusalem and joint Israel-Palestinian projects), and close the American consulate in Jerusalem, which over the years has led the dialogue with the Palestinians. In addition, the current U.S. administration did not reaffirm its commitment to the two-state solution and decided to recognize the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights — a step that was perceived by the Palestinians as a renunciation of the fundamental principles of the peace process (UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338). These developments have led to a rift between the U.S. and the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. Instead of advancing the resolution of the conflict, the Americans have created new areas of conflict and tension between them and the Palestinians. The main “contact” between American mediator Jason Greenblatt and the Palestinian leadership has taken the form of arguments on Twitter.

In short, the current circumstances differ significantly from those in which peace plans were introduced by a mediator during a conflict mediation process. The Americans are not an agreed-upon mediator any more. The role and status of the mediator is not carved in stone and cannot be taken for granted. Rather, it is a position that an international actor must earn and preserve. It comes with responsibilities and requires building trust with both sides to the conflict. Thus, for example, the French peace initiative of 2016-17 encountered strong opposition from the Israeli government, which claimed that it was not balanced and described it as a conspiracy and a dictate. Another example is Turkey, which mediated between Israel and Syria in 2008. However, due to policy changes since then, along with negative developments in its relations with Israel, Turkey is no longer able to mediate between Israel and its neighbors.

A reversal of principles

In the run-up to the publication of Trump’s peace plan, he and his administration have been moving the goal posts and reversing basic principles of American mediation since Oslo. They have returned to the type of American diplomacy on the Palestinian issue that prevailed during the first Camp David Summit in 1978. At the time, the future of the Palestinians was discussed with an Arab state — Egypt — rather than with Palestinian themselves, and the proposed solution was Palestinian autonomy rather than an independent state. In a similar vein, the U.S. Middle East peace team is currently negotiating the fate of the Palestinians with Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia, and not with the Palestinians, and according to recent media reports, Trump’s plan would offer Palestinians autonomy rather than a state.

According to Jake Walles, a former U.S. diplomat, the Trump administration’s peace plan is not actually aimed at advancing negotiations, but rather at altering the basic parameters of the international consensus on the two-state model as the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If this is actually what the plan entails, it is likely to spark widespread international criticism. Indeed, such criticism has already been voiced by Arabs, Europeans, and Russians, including in a declaration from eight EU member states in December 2018 and another following the February 2019 meeting of European and Arab foreign ministers in Dublin.

Where next?

In light of this, what can the Trump administration do if it truly wishes to advance peace and resume the role of legitimate mediator? First of all, and before presenting an outline for a final status agreement, it must regain the trust of the Palestinians and take steps to balance its previous moves favoring Israel. Another possibility is that the U.S. recognize the need for a broader and more inclusive mediation structure, involving not only the U.S. but also other countries — including European and Arab states. This would be a stronger, better version of the Middle East Quartet, and similar to the Contact Group model that was used in the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. Such a structure would enjoy greater legitimacy, have more leverage with Israel and the Palestinians, and would thus be better positioned to promote short-term actions on the ground and longer-term pro-peace policy shifts.

Trump’s policy on the Palestinian issue has been welcomed by the Israeli government, but the consequences of his moves are damaging Israel’s interests and the prospects to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S.’s inability to act as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians is bad news for Israel. In Gaza, Israel has acknowledged the important role of UN and Egyptian mediation in efforts to avoid another cycle of warfare. Given the rift between Washington and Ramallah, the Israeli government should welcome broader international mediation with the PLO and view the addition of other actors to the mediation process — alongside, not instead of, the U.S. — as a step in the right direction.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Lehrs’ current research focuses on international mediators in conflict resolution processes, and the peace plans they proposed. The views expressed in this article are his own.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Is Trump’s “Deal of the Century” Really a Peace Plan? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quest for an Honest Broker in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trump’s Statement on Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There were three central points in Kerry’s plan that dealt with the question of Jerusalem:

The first issue raised in the speech concerns the principle that Jerusalem will be “the capital of the two states.” In addition, Kerry declared that “there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.” While Kerry was clear in his vision of Jerusalem as a shared capital of both states, he did not refer to the question of the division of sovereignty or the possible route for a border within the city. There is no reference to the principle suggested by Clinton, whereby Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would retain Israeli sovereignty, while the Arab neighborhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. It should be noted that the Clinton Parameters did not discuss the question of a “Palestinian capital” at all, but instead focused on the issue of division of sovereignty in East Jerusalem. However, in a speech delivered to the Israel Policy Forum in January 2001, on the eve of his departure from the White House, Clinton described the principles of a future agreement, stating that Jerusalem will serve as two capitals of two states.

The phrase “capital of the two states” was a major source of controversy during the recent round of Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2013-2014 led by Kerry to formulate a framework agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to discuss a compromise in Jerusalem and would not agree to recognize the principle of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians objected to the vague wording that Kerry attempted to promote. Kerry’s latest suggestion differs from Netanyahu’s position and incorporates recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states, but the ambiguous wording—which avoids delineating the territory in which the Palestinian capital would be established—is expected to arouse opposition amongst the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the wording of Kerry’s latest plan indicates that Jerusalem as the capital of two states will be internationally recognized. Indeed, the Kerry proposal emphasizes that this solution in Jerusalem will allow the international community to recognize, for the first time, the Israeli capital beside an international recognition of the Palestinian capital.

The second issue is the question of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Kerry’s proposal calls to protect the holy sites, to guarantee free access to them, and to preserve the status quo. These important basic principles have the support of the relevant parties and of the international community. However, even in this context, Kerry leaves several key questions unanswered and avoids outlining a solution for the Old City of Jerusalem. For instance, will an agreement entail joint management of this area, or an international regime? Kerry also does not address the question of sovereignty over the holy sites, one of the most divisive issues in the negotiations.

Kerry emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo in the holy sites, an issue with which he is deeply familiar. In October 2015, against a backdrop of tensions on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and increased violent incidents in Jerusalem, Kerry led diplomatic efforts between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan. These efforts facilitated a mutual understanding and a statement by Netanyahu, re-asserting Israel’s commitment to the status quo on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and to the policy that permits only Muslims to pray on the site, whereas non-Muslims are permitted to visit there but not to pray.

Kerry stated that the holy sites are sacred to billions of people around the world and asserted that the solution must take into account the needs of all three monotheistic religions, not just those of both parties. This wording stresses that the issue is important beyond the Israel-Palestine context and possibly hints at the need to integrate additional actors into a solution regarding the Old City and the holy sites. Indeed, this framework resembles Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 to establish an international framework for the administration of the “Holy Basin,” which would include not only Israel and Palestine, but also the US, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The third issue in Kerry’s speech was his declaration that “Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967.” This principle affirms that, alongside the agreement that the city would be shared as the capital of both sides, the agreed solution in Jerusalem would not include a strict physical division between the respective parts of the city, as was the situation prior to 1967, when a physical wall ran through the center of the city.

Two points may be made here. First, this position represents the long-standing American position, which has been presented consistently over many years. In December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a peace plan, which stated that Jerusalem should be a “unified city” within which there would be no restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. In addition, President Ronald Reagan’s peace plan in 1982 declared that “Jerusalem must remain undivided.” President Clinton voiced a similar position in a speech on the eve of his retirement from office. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State during the second Bush administration, also reiterated this position.

Second, this position overlaps with the idea of Jerusalem as an “open city,” which has been advocated by the Palestinians for many years. The Palestinians proposed this in the late 1980s and again during the Camp David process (1999-2001) and during the Annapolis process (2007-2008). President Abbas has spoken on many occasions about his vision of Jerusalem as an “open city” and a “shared city”. The Palestinian proposal suggests that, notwithstanding the political division of the city, Jerusalem would remain a single entity under a joint “umbrella municipality” with complete freedom of movement between both sides of the city. Over the course of previous negotiations, the Israelis rejected this proposal and stated that the two states needed to be separated by a clearly delineated physical border for security reasons, including within Jerusalem.

The issue of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Oslo Accords determined that Jerusalem is one of the core issues to be negotiated by the parties in the final status negotiations. It is impossible to achieve peace without an agreed solution to the question of Jerusalem, and every future serious diplomatic effort must address this issue. This will be a difficult endeavor considering the special sensitivities elicited by this question, as Kerry noted in his speech.

Moreover, the situation on the ground in Jerusalem does not remain frozen in time as one peace plan fails and new ones are presented. Since the Clinton Parameters, significant processes and moves have made the city even more complicated and explosive, ensuring that a negotiated solution to the problem of Jerusalem has also become more complicated and difficult. Nevertheless, the Jerusalemite poet Yehuda Amichai wrote that “In Jerusalem you should always hope for the good.” The positive vision presented by Kerry for the future of the city may encourage joint thinking about an alternative Jerusalem that may eventually translate into action.

(originally published in the Matzav blog)

הפוסט The Question of Jerusalem in Kerry’s Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

I believe that Israeli reactions to the Arab Spring can be categorized into three types.

The first type of reaction to the Arab Spring is visibly negative and pessimistic, as demonstrated, first and foremost, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (It should be noted, though, that other right-wing politicians, like Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon and Danny Ayalon, as well as other players from the security establishment, have also adopted a negative perspective on the Arab Spring.)

In his 1993 book “A Place Among the Nations,” Netanyahu argued that the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East is Israel’s lack of democratic neighbors. He asserted further that any party that wished to promote “Western-style” peace in the region must first pressure the Arab regimes to move toward democracy.

Yet, as prime minister, Netanyahu’s reaction to the Arab Spring was fundamentally different. Netanyahu’s comments to the Israeli public painted a harsh and threatening picture of the very developments he had once longed for. “Despite all of our hopes, chances are that an Islamic wave will wash over the Arab countries, an anti-Western wave, an anti-liberal wave, an anti-Israeli wave and ultimately an anti-democratic wave,” Netanyahu said in November 2011.

The second approach accepted the negative framing of events, but tried to introduce a more complex picture and offer a different reading of consequences and conclusions. For example, Amos Yadlin, former head of Military Intelligence, declared that the wave of protests in the Arab world was “more of an opportunity than a risk.” Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan argued that Israel’s military challenge had disappeared for the three to five years following the Arab Spring. And Yitzhak Levanon, Israel’s ambassador to Egypt until November 2011, presented a similar approach, arguing in an interview that “we must not look only at the empty half of the glass.”

The third outlook challenged the negative take on the Arab Spring and proposed an alternative, optimistic one. Two figures who shared Netanyahu’s “democratic peace” thesis from the 1990s, for example, maintained that position after the Arab Spring. The first was President Shimon Peres who wrote in an April 2011 in The Guardian: “We in Israel welcome the Arab Spring. Israel welcomes the wind of change, and sees a window of opportunity.” The second was Natan Sharansky, chairman of the Jewish Agency, who wrote in an article in the Washington Post in December 2011: “The West should bet on freedom in Egypt.” As in Netanyahu’s case, however, these positive voices were presented more often to the international media than to the Israeli press.

Public opinion polls in Israel also paint an intricate and dynamic picture. Figures from 2011 showed that half of Israelis viewed the Arab Spring events as positive for Israel and its neighbors, while almost half thought that Israel’s status in the region had worsened following these changes. As the turmoil continued in the Arab world, more and more Israelis viewed them as a threat to the country’s national security. Interestingly, after Mohamed Morsi’s victory in Egypt, the Israeli public’s fears abated in terms of the future of Israel-Egypt relations. After Operation Pillar of Defense, this sentiment increased, with two-thirds of Israelis saying they appreciated Morsi’s positive role in negotiating a ceasefire. Overall, though, polls showed that the Arab public in Israel had a more positive outlook than the Jewish public regarding the Arab Spring.

The Israeli public discourse regarding the Arab Spring must be deep and serious, and less one-dimensional and negative than that of the government. Israelis must distance themselves from generalized and simplistic conclusions that fail to recognize the differences between the various Arab countries and societies. They should also avoid the dichotomous view of “Islamists” versus “non-Islamists” and try to become more familiar with the wide array of groups and forces at play.

Let’s not forget that the media tends to provide a distorted and partial picture of societies undergoing transition and regime change, because it tends to highlight extreme events and does not provide equal coverage of complex processes that occur over time. As political Islamic movements become key players on the new Arab stage, it would be wise to adopt a broader and more nuanced approach, which would also consider how to pursue official – or unofficial – dialogue with them.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Blowing Hot and Cold: Israel’s Divided Reaction to the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.