In fact, under growing global friction, when fractures are clearly showing between the unpredictable and belligerent Trump administration and the rest of the West, the current far-right Israeli government finds itself in a more comfortable EU zone – that of interests and real-politic. The new Israeli foreign Minister, Gideon Saar, even said that some in Europe sees Israel as a potential bridge to the Trump administration.

Netanyahu was the first international leader to meet Trump at the White House and received more support than he could have expected. When EU’s new High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, visited Washington, secretary of state Marco Rubio canceled the meeting with her without explanation or apology. Later that day, at his first cabinet meeting, Trump stated that the EU was created “to screw the US” and that he intends to impose 25% trade tariffs on the bloc.

In the rapidly shifting transatlantic relationship—where a Trump administration appears to be disengaging from Ukraine and Europe — the EU must choose its battles. It is clear to everyone that Ukraine comes first and is linked to strengthening the defence of Europe. Gaza is not even third. Perhaps reacting to Trump’s tariffs on Europe are? The EU’s internal interest of repatriating rejected asylum seekers to the new Syria and elsewhere? Stopping Iran from turning nuclear? Much is on the list. Under the current ceasefire, Gaza and the Palestinian issue ranks low in priority.

Thus, while the EU formulates a normative language that largely reflects its liberal-democratic values, its bark has no bite. This is not new. We’re back to the EU simultaneously condemning Israel while also considering deeper cooperation with it in research and innovation, energy, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and other fields.

Critical engagement

It’s important to remember that the convening of the Association Council is a commitment under the EU -Israel Association Agreement, setting a routine and institutionalized political dialogue once a year. Nowhere in the agreement does it say that meetings will only occur if relations are good or improving. The purpose of the Association Council is to facilitate dialogue — whether critical, friendly, or a mix of both.

Actually, it is precisely in times of crises that it is essential for the parties to engage in an open and candid dialogue – what EU calls critical engagement.

More than anything, the latest Association Council meeting reflected the shift from the previous Commission, where the former foreign policy chief Josep Borrell led a strongly critical tone – even confrontational – toward Israel, to the second von der Leyen Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen had always a friendlier stance toward Israel.

Borrell’s successor, Kaja Kallas, does not have a particularly defined position on Israel. She adheres to EU’s “agreed language” and promoted the meeting for the sake of engagement. She is now scheduled to visit Israel in late March. Borrell only visited Israel once in November 2023, six weeks after Hamas’s murderous terrorist attack on Israel, when he was still using acceptable language.

Soon afterwards he returned to harsh rhetoric against Israel. Later he amplified the positions of Spain and Ireland, who pushed to invoke Article 2 of the Association Agreement. The article stipulates that the agreement is based on shared democratic values and respect for human rights.

By now, the position of Spain and Ireland aimed at downgrading relations with Israel has been dropped. Article 2 was only generally mentioned in the EU position paper for the Association Council.

The new Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, has been tasked to plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. Similarly to Kallas, she does not have a specific approach to Israel – neither as favorable as Várhelyi, the former Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, nor as critical as Lenarčič, the former Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid. Together with von der Leyen, this trio of women is relatively neutral or even supportive of Israel.

Criticism, cooperation and challenges

Kallas must also represent the position of all 27 EU member states. As a result, the EU’s statement on the eve of the Association Council meeting was drafted as a 1+1 formula: both political and normative criticism, alongside an expressed willingness for deeper cooperation with Israel.

It is mainly diplomacy and security which stands in the center of this real-politic approach. In a world where global friction and internal Western fractures are intensifying – as highlighted by the Trump-Zelensky disastrous meeting in the Oval Office – Israel is both a burden and an asset to the EU.

It is a burden because when the EU engages with Israel in what appears to be business as usual, it faces allegations of double standards from the Global South, human rights organizations and part of the public in Europe. About 120 organizations have signed a protest letter calling for a review of the Association Agreement with Israel because of its alleged violations of international and humanitarian law. The protest would have probably been even stronger if they would have added settlers’ violence and de-facto annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank.

Israel is an asset because, like it or not, it got the upper hand in its multi-front war against Iran and its proxies in the region. As the EU has to rebuild and strengthen its defence capabilities and military know-how, Israel has valuable assets to offer.

The Israeli government is a liability because of its refusal to plan for a political exit strategy from Gaza which could lead to a political solution of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Israel can become an asset if it brings about a desired normalisation with Saudi Arabia, which will also advance peace with the Palestinians. Such a 1+1 approach is a direction that the EU would be willing to advance and take part in.

הפוסט The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The European Union’s response to the war in Gaza has been widely criticized as irrelevant and incoherent, casting doubt on its ability to become a credible player in the region. While the EU is indeed incoherent, it is not entirely irrelevant. Its chief relevance lies in the civil sphere, mainly through its efforts to sustain and encourage reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and its role as a capacity builder. These EU actions and capabilities have political significance for the “day after” the war. The EU has many tools it can use in the region but has yet to show a collective willingness to fully employ them, because of internal divisions and the multiplicity of voices within it. The paper reviews these spheres of cacophony and maps the realignment of camps within the EU in response to the war in Gaza.

This article was published in the Strategic Assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Issue 27 (4), November 2024.

Introduction

Less than a week after October 7, some analysts were quick to argue that “the Israel-Hamas war exposed the EU’s irrelevance” (Karnitschnig, 2023). “No one cares what Europe thinks” continued the harsh assessment. “Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed but is otherwise ignored.” Many in Israel, Europe and around the world would agree, yet we wish to present a more nuanced picture. Unlike in Ukraine, Europe struggles to find a strong, united voice regarding the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The EU’s incoherence significantly reduces its capabilities as a credible player and prevents it from taking a meaningful role while the war expands. Yet Europe is relevant as a mid-level player in the reform of the Palestinian Authority, the rebuilding of Gaza, and in wider efforts to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

In 2018, then president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, asserted that it was not enough for Europe to exert its financial muscle. It also had to learn to act on the global stage: “The EU is a global payer, but must also become a global player” (European Parliament, 2018). Josep Borrell, the High Representative (HR) of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), argued in 2019 that Europe “must learn quickly to speak the language of power,” and not only rely on soft or normative power as it used to do (European Union External Action, 2020). Over the past three decades, the EU has been one of the main donors to the Palestinians. It became a significant actor in the civilian sphere, but not a meaningful political player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and certainly not in the realm of security (See Hollis, 1997, Bouris, 2014 for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the EU’s lack of actorness, see Toje 2008). What has changed (if at all) since October 7?

This paper focuses on the European response to the war in Gaza and the hostilities towards Israel in the wider region. Although it concentrates on the EU, there is also a brief discussion of actions taken by other European countries, mostly the United Kingdom (UK). It aims to give an empirical description and analysis of Europe’s responses, capabilities and actorness in this regional war. The article begins with the shifting European positions from strong support and solidarity with Israel after the October 7 massacre, to fierce criticism of Israel and its government. The second section maps where the EU is a mere payer and where it is a player. It reviews the EU’s decisions and actions in the humanitarian field, Palestinian state-building, the diplomatic arena, its employment of “sticks” and sanctions and the military sphere. The third section discusses the divisions afflicting the EU which have hampered its ability to act as a meaningful player in the region. It reviews the instances of discordant voices within the European Commission, between heads of EU institutions and mostly between member states on multiple issues, and maps the realignment of camps in Europe on the conflict. In the conclusions, the article evaluates the EU’s response to the war in Gaza, its capabilities and actorness in the Gaza war. It argues that the EU has been able to chalk up some accomplishments in less sensitive areas, most noticeably as a capacity builder in the Palestinian Authority. Its financial muscle has come to the fore in important humanitarian activity and especially in working to prevent the financial collapse of the PA. Europe has also carried out operations to enhance maritime security in the wake of attacks by the Houthis. Despite divisions which prevent it from becoming an effective actor in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, it still has an important role to play.

The EU and the War in Gaza: From Support to Criticism of Israel

Europe’s solidarity with Israel in the wake of the Hamas massacre of October 7 and kidnapping of more than 250 civilians and soldiers, was remarkable. It was immediate, extensive, and strong. Political support came from across Europe. There was fierce condemnation of Hamas from across the board. All EU member states supported Israel’s right to defend itself. The strong solidarity with Israel was demonstrated through numerous declarations, visits, and actions.

For a few weeks, the Gaza war took precedence over the war in Ukraine on the EU’s agenda. Manifold statements, speeches, Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) declarations, and European Council conclusions condemned the Hamas attack in the strongest terms (European Council, 2023). An unprecedented European Parliament (EP) resolution called for the elimination of Hamas with 500 votes in favor and 21 against (European Parliament, 2023a). These verbal expressions of support were important to Israel and gave it legitimacy for the war against Hamas.

Many heads of state as well as foreign and defense ministers from all across Europe visited Israel within a matter of weeks in an impressive show of solidarity. They travelled to the south of Israel to witness the devastated communities, they met with relatives of the hostages and restated Israel’s right to exercise self-defense. Among the first to arrive, on October 13, were the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron all visited Israel between October 17-24 to express their solidarity with the Israeli people. Several weeks later HR Josep Borrell visited. This was his first visit to Israel since he assumed his mandate in 2019 (Lis, 2023). Between October 7, 2023 and May 2024, about 80 out of 100 high level visits to Israel were from Europe (Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe Division, June 23, 2024). Israelis felt they were not alone.

Yet, as the war in Gaza continued, European support for Israel gradually declined. Support for Israel’s right to defend itself is on condition that civilians are afforded protection in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law (IL & IHL). Amid the growing number of Palestinians killed in Gaza and the increasingly acute humanitarian situation there, the mood in Europe gradually turned against Israel. In addition, the refusal of Netanyahu’s government to accept a cease-fire, or discuss plans for the “day after” the war, its outright rejection of a role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and its fierce opposition to the possible establishment of a Palestinian State in the long run, have created great difficulties for Israel’s friends in Europe, since both the EU-27, the UK and Norway support the establishment of a Palestinian State.

The international legal cases against Israel make it more difficult for Europe to support it, especially under its current extreme right-wing government. In December, South Africa petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is now investigating claims that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. In May, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant. In July, the ICJ published its advisory opinion on Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories (case opened in 2022). IL & IHL are normative pillars of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, in view of Europe’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war, where it has demanded that Russia adhere to IL & IHL and has imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow, and despite the major differences between the war in Ukraine and that in Gaza, the EU has been accused of applying double standards regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza. This harms the EU’s reputation and interests in the Global South.

Europe’s solidarity with Israel and its delayed call for a ceasefire have strained its relations with countries in the Global South. Europe has worked hard since February 2022, reaching out to these countries in order to mobilize support for Ukraine. The alarming death toll in Gaza and the severe humanitarian situation sabotaged Europe’s efforts. Equating these two wars is problematic (Navon, 2024), but this doesn’t prevent some in the Global South and in Europe from doing so. As Konečný (2024) points out:

Efforts to convince [the Global South] that Europe’s… support for Ukraine against Russian aggression was based on universal principles of international law rather than the West’s geopolitical agenda, were squandered when the West veered off those same principles in Gaza.

Borrell concedes that this is a problem for the EU, and that he is regularly confronted with accusations of double standards:

What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine… The perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same as in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed. The perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia. (EEAS Press Team, 2024a).

Europe’s credibility and its ability to forge a wide international coalition against Russia is undermined by the perception of countries in the Global South that Europe’s attitude towards the war in Gaza is an embodiment of its double standards. Support for Israel by some European countries exacts a price for the whole EU, impacting its relations with the Global South, and its case for and reputation as a supporter of Ukraine.

The EU’s Role—From Payer to Player? 

The EU has taken concrete steps in several fields in an attempt to transform itself from a mere payer in the conflict to an actual player. It seeks to intervene and influence by applying leverage on some actors, especially by exerting its financial muscle. In addition, the EU has conducted a defensive operation to intercept Houthi attacks on ships, and has taken steps to crack down on the financing of Hamas. It adopted sanctions against violent Israeli settlers aimed at impacting the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But its main intervention comes in its significant role in financially sustaining the PA and conditioning its contributions on substantial and comprehensive PA reforms, alongside agreed US-EU conditions for the PA to return to rule in Gaza (see below).

The Humanitarian Field: Significant Payer, Attempts as a Player

There is no doubt that the EU is a significant payer. Humanitarian aid provided by the 27 member states to the Palestinians from October 7 until September 2024 was more than quadruple its level in the equivalent period preceding the war, reaching €678m, while EU aid increased ninefold from €28m to €262m (European Parliament, 2023b; Reuters, 2023). For comparison, in the same period the US donated $1 billion to the Palestinians. (USAID, 2024b).

The European Commission and a number of EU member states also tried to become more actively involved, by forging a multilateral force which facilitated a new pathway for humanitarian aid. In March, the European Commission, Cyprus, the US and the United Arab Emirates launched the Amalthea Initiative, operating a maritime route for emergency assistance from Cyprus to the northern part of the Gaza Strip. The initiative was proposed by Cyprus less than three weeks after October 7 (Politico, 2023) but was implemented only in March 2024 amid an increasingly acute humanitarian situation in Northern Gaza. The US was the key player in implementing the project in Gaza, building the jetty, while Europe established the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Larnaca. Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK all participated in the operation ( ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2024).

The gap between expectations and implementation of the Amalthea Initiative was considerable. There were high expectations that at full capacity, the route could facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assistance for at least 500,000 people (USAID, 2024a), yet the quantities of aid delivered were very small (7000 tons, equivalent to only 350 trucks, or a day and a half of aid transferred by land). Between May and July, the jetty operated for only 12 days due to bad weather and the need for repairs, while its building costs were over $230 million. Several European ships delivered cargo to the jetty, which was distributed by aid organizations in the Strip. The jetty was eventually dismantled by the US at the end of July (Cleaver, 2024). The maritime route was diverted to Ashdod port and aid continued to enter Gaza via land crossings. In effect, the Amalthea initiative made only a cosmetic difference to humanitarian efforts and contributed little to Europe’s actual role.

Palestinian Statehood—Significant Payer and Possibly a Significant Player

The EU’s financial assistance to the Palestinians testifies to its potential to become a more significant player. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to the PA, with over €1.2 billion originally planned for 2021-2024 (European Commission, 2023). This gives the EU potential leverage over the PA. While it has been reluctant to use it in the past, this now appears to be changing.

The PA depends upon Israel to collect import taxes on its behalf, which constitute 64 per cent of the Authority’s total income. The EU’s increased payments to the PA are an attempt to counter the Israeli government decision to confiscate parts of Palestinian tax revenue. This policy, led by Finance Minister Smotrich, dates back to January 2023 and is justified as a consequence of PA payments that incentivize terror by rewarding families of Palestinians in Israeli jails and those who killed Israelis. After October 7, the part of the budget that the PA routinely transferred to Gaza was also confiscated by Israel (Times of Israel, 2023; Gal, 2024). The PA has been in a dire financial situation for many years and the confiscation of funds could bring about its collapse. This would destabilize the West Bank and the region even further. After the EU and its member states invested so much in building the PA as the institutional backbone of a future Palestinian State and enhancing systems of governance, their role as payer has come to the fore and heightened their significance as a player. 

In July, the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), which oversees support programs in Europe’s Eastern and Southern areas, signed a “Letter of Intent” to the PA, announcing a €400m emergency package of aid to it to be paid until September, conditioned upon reforms in eight fields (DG NEAR, 2024a,b). In addition to playing a significant role in preserving the PA, the EU is using its financial leverage to pressure the PA to carry out reforms by employing conditions to the funding (as it does with states seeking to join the EU). The EU has significant experience and expertise in state building in general and with the PA in particular. It could use its financial muscle to help restore the independence of the Palestinian judicial system and de-radicalize and reform its education system (Tzoreff, 2024); although the latter is best done in cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. If its efforts to revitalize the PA succeed, the EU’s credibility as a player in the region would be strengthened. Such careful conditionality can build trust with Israel and could therefore enable the EU to play a more meaningful role not only vis à vis the PA, but also in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Capacity Builder for the Day After the War—Established Player 

The EU has been advancing Palestinian statehood via capacity building for a few decades. A month after October 7, the US, EU and UK were aligned regarding the basic conditions for a ceasefire leading to a long-term sustainable plan for the day after the war in Gaza. It included the return of the PA to Gaza (Gal and Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024). To date, the Israeli government has not agreed to their proposals, but preparations on the European side have begun nevertheless. For example, on May 27, the FAC agreed in principle to reactivate the civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which operated out of Rafah until Hamas took over the Strip in 2007. The EU appeared to be willing to reactivate it, but needs the approval of and coordination with the PA, Egypt and Israel (FAC 2024). According to reports, Israel rejected this option (Barel, 2024). To gain agency, the EU needs to prove itself as a credible player, and to engage and build trust with Israel.

The mandate of the EU police and rule of law capacity building operation in the PA (EUPOL COPPS), already includes the Gaza Strip but it too has stopped operating there since Hamas took over. Its operative plans may be expanded as part of the PA revitalization process ahead of its possible return to the Gaza Strip (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a). Through such missions, the EU can function not only as a payer but also a mid-level player. These missions can be a core component of EU civil boots on the ground in the Palestinian arena.

The (Failed) Diplomatic Front

Europe has been active on the diplomatic front, proposing several initiatives, none of which was acted upon. Only one tool was adopted by the European Council. On October 27, Spain pushed to include in the European Council conclusions support for convening a peace conference (European Council, 2023). Although the move appeared disconnected from reality on the ground, it was in accord with Borrell’s diplomatic objectives. Indeed, Borrell was the source of several diplomatic initiatives. They should be viewed in the context of his Peace Day Effort Initiative—trying to incentivize the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—that was launched in September 2023 but halted by the war (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a).

In January 2024, Borrell put forward a twelve-point non-paper for “creating a comprehensive peace plan,” proposing to hold a preparatory peace conference which would involve the pragmatic Arab states (Psara & Liboreiro, 2024). On January 22, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of four Arab states, Israel and the PA for separate discussions at the FAC. His initiative was discussed, but did not progress. Facing internal objections by member states, the initiative failed to get off the ground. In addition, the Biden Administration stayed silent regarding the plan, probably in part due to Israel’s rejection of the initiative. It didn’t help that Borrell was perceived as being strongly pro-Palestinian to the extent that some heads of state told him that he did not represent them (Moens et al., 2024), while others described him as “obsessed” with the issue.

In another diplomatic initiative on May 27, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (known as the “Arab Quint”) to the FAC. The discussion focused on finding a political solution to the conflict and potential pathways of cooperation as a means to resolve it. Borrell used these meetings and initiatives to strengthen EU-Arab relations, seemingly to enhance the EU’s actorness, though it was clear in advance to all sides that nothing concrete would come out of these sessions.

The next meeting took place in Madrid on September 13. It aimed to discuss “the need to reinforce the engagement of the international community on peace and security in the Middle East, and the challenge of creating an international consensus on a way forward based on the Two-State solution” (EEAS Press Team, 2024c). In effect, it demonstrated the lack of consensus, as only four European foreign ministers participated (Spain, Ireland, Slovenia and Norway) along with the PA and five Arab countries.

More serious efforts were made to prevent military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. France played a leading role working for de-escalation. Europe has an interest in preventing Lebanon from becoming a failed state. It also wants to prevent the expected refugee flows resulting from a war between Israel and Lebanon. On June 13, President Macron said that France and the US had agreed in principle to establish a trilateral group with Israel to “make progress” on a French proposal to end the violence on the Lebanese border (Boxerman et al., 2024). Yet Israel has not always been willing to accommodate French or European diplomatic engagement in this sphere. Over the past year, Hezbollah argued that the key to ending the battle in Lebanon was the achievement of a ceasefire in Gaza, which in turn depends largely on agreement between Hamas and Israel on the release of all hostages. Later in the war in Lebanon, Israel sought to break this linkage. In summary, Europe is on the sidelines of diplomatic initiatives to resolve the war in Gaza and in Lebanon. What France and Europe did demonstrate was their financial role, gathering $1 billion for Lebanon in October 2024.

Employment of Sticks and Sanctions Regimes

President Macron’s proposal to build an international coalition against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along the lines of the coalition against ISIS, did not gain traction (France 24, 2023). Yet France hosted a multilateral meeting in Paris on December 13, to enhance the financial war against them, by targeting the sources of their funding, and took action to stem the spread of terrorist content online (France Diplomacy, 2023). After the EU designated Hamas and PIJ as terrorist organizations in 2003, on January 19, 2024, the Council of the EU adopted a package of additional sanctions against them, including a freeze on the assets of several of their military leaders, among them Yahya Sinwar (Council of the EU, 2024a). This decision allowed the EU to take actions against additional individuals and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and the PIJ. Yet enhancing its role through further intervention, for example, against straw companies in Turkey, did not ensue.

The EU did extend the sanctions list in June, adding six individuals and three entities (Council of the EU, 2024b). For the first time, sanctions were also imposed against violent Israeli settlers and some of their organizations in the West Bank. The process of imposition proved slower and more complicated politically for the EU than for its counterparts or its member states. The US imposed a first round of these sanctions on February 1, expanding them on March 14. The UK and France followed suit a couple of weeks later. It took the FAC until March 18 to cross the high threshold of unanimity and overcome Czech and Hungarian opposition. When the list of sanctions was published by the Council on April 19, it included four individuals and two organizations (Council of the EU 2024c,d ). The second round of EU sanctions came only on July 15, adding five individuals and three organizations (Council of the EU, 2024e). Those listed under the EU sanctions regime are “subject to an asset freeze, and the provision of funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to them or for their benefit, is prohibited.” Additionally, the EU imposed a travel ban on the sanctioned individuals. The slow pace of the sanctions adopted is indicative of the EU’s political difficulties in crossing what was considered a red line in its policy vis a vis Israel. Yet it was crossed.

The EU has considerable economic leverage with Israel as its largest trading partner. So far, the EU has shown little willingness to use its leverage vis à vis Israel inside the 1967 lines as the threshold of unanimity for such action in the FAC or European Council is too high (see disagreement regarding the Association Agreement below). The war has prompted the re- or over-politicization of relations in all areas of cooperation, in addition to the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes, including latent or vocal grassroots boycotts and lost opportunities. For example, it is unlikely that the EU would be able to sign a Partnership Priorities agreement with Israel anytime soon. It is also probable that a new UK-Israel trade agreement, currently under negotiation, would pose greater political challenges for the Labour government to sign.

The relative ease of taking decisions at the national level, in comparison to the EU level, is noticeable. Some European countries have shown greater readiness to impose bans on arms sales to Israel. In February, a Dutch court ordered the government to block the delivery of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft parts to Israel, over concerns they were being used to violate international law. Yet the government appealed, and meanwhile sent the parts to the US, where they were sent to Israel. Three European states took steps to fully suspend military exports to Israel: Spain, Italy and the Walloon part of Belgium. The UK, Denmark and Germany examine the export licenses on a case-by-case basis. Of the above, Germany’s stance is most significant: 30 per cent of Israel’s arms were imported from Germany and 69 per cent from the United States between 2019 and 2023 (Bermant 2024a; Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024d). Therefore, the damage caused by other European countries’ arms ban is felt less in the military-security sphere and much more in the political and diplomatic domain. This is illustrated by President Macron’s call in early October 2024 for a weapons embargo on Israel, although he referred only to the war in Gaza, not the one with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies. In addition, France prevented Israeli companies from participating in the June 2024 Eurosatory international arms fair, although a number of Israeli companies did participate in the Euronaval defense exhibition which took place in November 2024.

Defensive Military Role

To the extent that Europe is even playing a military role, there is a clear distinction between the UK and the EU. Right after October 7, Britain joined the US in dispatching military forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Israel and deter Hezbollah and Iran from a full-scale attack on Israel. In addition, both Britain and France were involved in the interception of Iranian attacks against Israel in April and later in October (Times of Israel, 2024).

The EU’s military role emerged in response to the Houthis’ trade route disruption in the Red Sea. Since the Houthis began their offensive on November 19, they have attacked over forty ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Targeted strikes by the US and the UK against Houthi bases began on January 11. The EU launched operation EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19. However, unlike the US and UK, the EU’s rules of engagement are defensive. They aim only to protect merchant shipping and restore freedom of navigation and exclude direct attacks on Houthi positions. This sea route from Asia through the Suez Canal to Europe accounts for twelve percent of global trade and is of special significance to Southern European Mediterranean countries. Alternative sea routes double shipment costs at a time when inflation has already been high in the EU and the cost of living is a sensitive social and political issue.

As of July, five European frigates had escorted over 170 merchant ships and intercepted nineteen Houthi missiles and drones (Al-Batati, 2024; EEAS Press Team, 2024b). By aiming to secure the Suez Canal route, the EU’s operation is also crucial for Egypt and the region’s economy. Through this operation, the EU enhances maritime security, furthers the protection of European, regional and international commercial interests, or at least mitigates to some extent the economic damage caused by the Houthis, while strengthening its joint military cooperation capabilities under EU command (Matoi & Caba-Maria, 2024). The success of the EU military operation as well as that of the US and the UK, is limited at best. Maritime traffic has stabilized since January at 50-60% of levels in equivalent months in 2023 (Gard, 2024).

Europe’s Tendency for Cacophony

Immediately after October 7, alongside the strong and widespread demonstrations of European solidarity with Israel and fierce condemnation of Hamas, there were many issues where the EU did not speak with one voice. The cacophony started within the European Commission, followed by open disagreement between heads of EU institutions and then between member states on issues such as funding for the Palestinians, calls for a ceasefire, recognition of a Palestinian state, South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel and the issue of payments to UNRWA. This cacophony hampers the ability of the EU to play a meaningful role.

Within the Commission, the difficulties started with the Hungarian commissioner for neighborhood policy, Olivér Várhelyi, who tweeted on October 9 that aid to the Palestinians would be cut. A few hours later, the Slovenian Commissioner for crisis management, Janez Lenarčič, tweeted that humanitarian aid would actually be doubled. He was echoed by HR Borrell who asserted that the EU should support the Palestinians “more, not less,” stating that this is the position of 95 percent of EU member states. Borrell stressed that the EU differentiates between terror organizations such as Hamas and the PIJ, and the PA and Palestinian civilians. Later that day, the Commissioner spokesperson clarified that there would be no aid cuts. Instead, the Commission decided to review its payments to the Palestinians, in order to ensure that no funding was reaching Hamas or the PIJ (Moens et al.2023). This review process ended in November 2023 with the decision to continue payments and, as mentioned, increase them (European Commission, 2023).

Between Heads of EU Institutions

The president of the European Council, Charles Michel, criticized the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for stating in her press conference with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 2023 that Israel had the right to defend itself, without adding that it must be done in accordance with IL & IHL. According to Michel and others, this failure to state the EU’s core values was a reflection of her pro-Israeli stance. She was accused of overstepping her powers, not representing the EU’s interests properly, “undermining the position of the EU as credible actor and honest broker between Israeli and Palestine,” projecting the image of double standards to the Global South (Borges de Castro, 2023). Also, in an unusual move, 850 employees of EU institutions published a letter complaining about von der Leyen’s omission (Agence Europe, 2023).

There are also significant differences between EU member states. On the issue of a ceasefire, on October 27, the heads of 27 member states in the European Council agreed on phrasing that called on Israel to allow “humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs” (European Council, 2023). It took them hours to reach an agreement on “pauses,” in plural, to avoid the impression that they were calling for a permanent pause. On that very same day, the EU member states split into three camps over a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, calling for an “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” and condemning terrorism. Eight member states voted in favor, fifteen abstained and four voted against the text, as it did not mention Hamas or the October 7 massacre (UNGA, 2023; Alessandri & Ruiz, 2023). These divisions demonstrated once again the difficulties for the 27 member states to speak with one voice on the details of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Analysis of the EU’s UNGA voting on the Palestinian issue shows unanimous agreement among the 27 member states and the UK on the end goal of the “right of the Palestinians to self-determination” and “on permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories” (two decisions adopted on December 19). Yet when it came to the more practical vote calling for a ceasefire on December 12, or the admission of Palestine as a UN member state on May 10, the EU was split again into three camps. Overall, on eight resolutions between October 7 and May 10 relating to the Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza, the EU stayed united on only three occasions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024b). As this analysis suggests, Europe is united when it comes to supporting the two-state solution, yet it is divided on the translation of that goal into concrete policy.

In the wake of Israeli charges that some of UNRWA’s employees participated in the attacks of the October 7 massacre (UNRWA, 2024), EU member states were also split on the question of whether to freeze UNRWA’s funding. The EU and eleven European countries (among them the UK) briefly suspended the funding, while eight did not (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024c). Further cacophony continued upon the resumption of funding. The EU attached three conditions to renewed UNRWA funding, which could have served to apply its normative power, or at least lead a united voice for all the funders of UNRWA. Yet, the EU was unable to put its own house in order, the conditions adopted by each member state were different, and most did not adopt any.

South Africa’s case against Israel in the ICJ is another example of division. Germany announced it would intervene on Israel’s behalf as a third party. Another five EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary and France) expressed their support for Israel. The UK joined them. Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain joined in support of South Africa. Other member states only called on Israel to comply with its rulings and with IL and IHL (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024c).

On February 14, the prime ministers of Spain and Ireland sent a letter calling on von der Leyen to carry out an urgent review of whether Israel was complying with its obligations to respect human rights, which constitute “an essential element” of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. They requested that appropriate measures be taken if Israel was found to have breached them (Lynch, 2024). The Association Agreement is the basis for EU–Israel relations in all fields: trade, economic, political dialogue and participation in different EU programs, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus. This was the first time such a demand had been made at the level of prime ministers. Nevertheless, differences of opinion meant that the request was shrugged off at the FAC which met on March 18.

On May 27, 2024 the FAC for the first time engaged in a “significant” discussion on steps against Israel if it didn’t comply with IHL (Weatherald, 2024). That was after the ICC submitted applications for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant on May 20, and the ICJ intermediate ruling on May 24 that Israel should adhere to IHL in its operation in Rafah. According to the foreign minister of Ireland, Micheál Martin, “there was a very clear consensus about the need to uphold the international humanitarian legal institutions,” i.e. the ICJ and ICC. Yet the FAC’s sole conclusion was to hold an EU-Israel Association Council meeting with Foreign Minister Katz to address the EU’s serious concerns and seek Israel’s response on ICJ compliance. Despite the calls from Ireland and other member states, no sanctions paper against Israel was drawn up. So far, the letter achieved little more than headlines and an unpleasant invitation to Katz.

The recognition of a Palestinian state is a major point of division in Europe. While there is consensus on the two-state solution, opinions differ on how and when to advance it. On January 30, British Foreign Minister Cameron was the first to publicly consider recognizing a Palestinian state since October 7. French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, and senior heads in Germany also indicated they were considering it, but no actions were taken. On May 28, Spain, Ireland, and Norway recognized Palestine, followed by Slovenia on June 5, making it the 147th state and the 11th in the EU to do so (excluding Sweden’s 2014 recognition, earlier recognitions date back to 1988 and were by former Communist states, and Cyprus which was not an EU member then). Belgium and Denmark chose not to recognize Palestine. While such recognition can yield domestic and international political benefits, it is largely symbolic for Palestinians and leave realities on the ground unchanged. This cacophony demonstrates again that Europe agrees on the concept of two states for two peoples, but remains divided on how and when to pursue this goal.

Realignment of Camps

A year after October 7, the Czech Republic and Hungary continue to express strong support for Israel. The UK, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, and some Central European countries, which offered firm support for Israel, adopted a more nuanced stance in the months that followed. All stressed the importance of complying with IL & IHL in the Gaza Strip. When Israel’s security was on the line, as happened in mid-April and again in early October, the UK and France actively participated in thwarting Iran’s missile attacks, underlining their position that Israel has the right to defend itself.

Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and Malta were quick to restate their critical position of Israel, with Spain and Ireland calling for a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Both formally recognized the Palestinian state with Norway and Slovenia.

Germany’s long-standing historic responsibility to Israel’s security, Germany’s Staatsraison or raison d’état, is being tested. This commitment has been inserted in coalition agreements in Germany since 2008, including by the current SPD-Green-Liberal government. Despite criticism of Israel, Germany has maintained support for the country. However, amid accusations that Israel has breached IL and IHL, Germany has shown a readiness to reexamine its continued sale of military exports to Israel, including the possibility of delaying the supply of certain items.

Ultimately, the normative traditions and narrow self-interests of the government in each European state are what count in the formulation of policy towards Israel and the Palestinians, rather than the need to maintain a united harmonious and coherent European response. Given the mix of normative and interest-based approaches, consensus has been hard to achieve in the FAC or European Council. This represents the “old” CFSP, in contrast to the brisk and assertive EU response to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Alignments may shift due to elections, as was seen in Belgium in June and the UK in July, where the new Labour government under the leadership of Keir Starmer has already dropped its opposition to an international arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Gallant. His government has also suspended 30 out of 350 arms export licenses to Israel (Bermant, 2024b). However, Starmer has ruled out a complete ban on UK arms exports to Israel, saying it “would be the wrong position for this government” (Hardman, 2024).

In the past years, under Netanyahu, Israel has strengthened ties with Greece, Cyprus, and some Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria, using these alliances to counter unfavorable EU votes. Netanyahu’s “divide and thwart” diplomacy harnessed the support of friendly member states to block or soften anti-Israel decisions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2021). This tactic has been effective when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured less prominently on the global agenda, or when initiatives with considerable implications come to the fore, such as reassessing the EU–Israel Association Agreement. However, during the war in Gaza, this strategy has been effective only up to a point. For example, it did not prevent sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The EU’s emphasis on IL & IHL is highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With the ICJ’s judgement on Israeli occupation, South Africa’s proceedings on Gaza, and the ICC request for warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, the EU and its member states’ room for maneuver vis à vis Israel in the Gaza war is shrinking.

* Change after general elections

The result, one year after the war is the following continuum, from the most critical of Israel to the most supportive:

The current realignment of camps regarding Israel is much more complicated than it was before October 7. It reflects not only the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israeli occupation and settlement building; but now encompasses Israel’s security, its right to defend itself against Iran and its proxies, and its struggle for legitimacy.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of October 7, the EU initially showed strong solidarity with Israel in its darkest hour. Yet as the civilian death toll in Gaza rose and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, most of Europe’s leaders began distancing themselves from the Israeli government and expressed increasing criticism. Despite general agreement on the two-state solution, the divisions on how and when to proceed in this direction paralyze the EU. The Gaza War demonstrated once again the difficulties of the 27 member states in speaking with one voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the need for consensus, the only agreed action by the EU was to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The rest of the moves were taken by small groups of member states: some joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, four countries recognized Palestine as a state and a couple requested a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The Gaza war has revealed once again the divisions, cacophony and ponderous decision-making characteristics of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In August, Borrell conceded that “the Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the most difficult issues to build EU27 consensus on, probably more than on any other issue” noting it as the stumbling-block to effective intervention (Scheindlin, 2024).

So what has changed (if at all) since October 7 in the EU’s actorness? Seemingly not much. The EU has a range of financial and civilian tools to offer today and for the day after the war. It is a considerable humanitarian payer, though less of a player on the ground. It is a significant actor in Palestinian capacity and state building, willing to reactivate EUPOL COPPS in Gaza and EUBAM at the Rafah border crossing. Their renewal could enhance the EU’s role alongside its participation in the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip the “day after”.

The EU is already playing a significant role in the West Bank. At a time when elements in the Netanyahu government are acting openly to bring about the financial collapse of the PA, the EU’s role as a stabilizer in funding the PA and preventing its collapse is vital. This is essential for preserving the two-state solution and helping to prevent a major conflagration in the West Bank.

Taking into consideration that the EU’s diplomatic initiatives have all failed internally and were usually ignored by the US, the EU should think anew about how to strengthen its actorness. The EU’s most significant potential leverage stems from being the largest donor to the PA. By using its financial muscle to revitalize the PA through conditionality, DG NEAR, which has the ability to act consistently, could strengthen the EU’s role and credibility. This is the EU’s main potential leverage asset, depending on the scope and depth of the implementation of PA reforms and could make the EU a more credible player in Israeli eyes.

It remains to be seen how powerful and effective this conditionality will be under the next European Commission. If successful, the EU could be viewed in time as a more significant player, which would prompt Israel to take Europe more seriously and pay more attention to European concerns, rather than dismissing them. However, for this to happen, the EU would also need to engage more positively and directly with Israel’s government. The new European Commission, which took office on December 1, appears better placed to do this.

The EU has potential leverage with Israel, as its biggest trade partner, yet divisions among member states have hampered its ability to use this effectively. The war caused a considerable realignment, and many European governments have distanced themselves from the current Israeli government. The proceedings in the ICJ and ICC are raising serious questions over whether Israel’s actions in Gaza comply with IL & IHL. Rulings against Israel would reduce Europe’s room for maneuver in supporting Israel, let alone advance relations. Indeed, this support is likely to shrink further as Europe’s normative emphasis on IL & IHL aligns with its geopolitical interests relating to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In the wider regional conflict, the EU is more than just a humanitarian actor or a payer. It also acts as a modest security provider, as in the EUNAVFOR Aspides operation, where the EU attempts to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation, operating as a defensive rather than offensive player, protecting its own economic interests and those of Egypt as well as other developing countries on this trade route.

This paper analyzed Europe’s attempts to develop its actorness in relation to the Gaza war and hostilities in the wider region. These efforts have been only partially successful, and have been achieved mainly on the sidelines of the Gaza war. As the EU navigates an increasingly unstable multipolar world, it is still searching for ways to align its political influence with its economic and financial weight. Unlike the geopolitical awakening prompted by the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza war has not triggered a similar response. Despite the region’s security challenges and the destabilizing actions taken by Iran, its proxies, and Israel, the war in Gaza does not pose a strategic threat to Europe as does Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The EU has sought support from the Global South for Ukraine against Russia, yet the war in Gaza has undermined these efforts, amid mounting criticism of perceived European double standards towards Israeli actions in Gaza. One way to restore credibility is by laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a future Palestinian state. By revitalizing the PA, the EU can also strengthen its credibility and regional influence. However, the EU’s incoherence regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict reduces significantly its credibility as an actor, yet accusations that it is an irrelevance in the Middle East are wide of the mark.

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USAID. (2024a, May 29). Administrator Samantha Power at a donor governments discussion on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. USAID. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/may-29-2024-administrator-samantha-power-donor-governments-discussion-humanitarian-crisis-gaza

-. (2024ba September 30). The United States announces nearly $336 million in humanitarian assistance to support Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-30-2024-united-states-announces-nearly-336-million-humanitarian-assistance-support-palestinians-gaza-and-west-bank#:~:text=This%20funding%20will%20also%20support,%241%20billion%20since%20October%202023.

Weatherald. N. (2024, May 27). EU foreign ministers discuss sanctions against Israel. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-ministers-sanctions-against-israel-micheal-martin/

הפוסט Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan.

The flood of Western countries stepping up recently to recognize a Palestinian state should not have come as a surprise. In fact, 143 countries have already recognized it, most of them when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat announced its creation in Algiers in 1988. A steady drizzle of other states have joined over the years, such as Sweden, in 2014.

Two months ago, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States said their governments were considering such recognition. Now, with the imminent declaration of recognition of a Palestinian state by Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia (with Malta and Belgium in the pipeline,) the trickle is starting to resemble a tsunami. Netanyahu’s political refusal to declare that at some future point he would be willing to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, subject to international security guarantees, isolates and weakens Israel, with potentially disastrous results.

In numerous debates over the past three decades in parliamentary plenaries around the world and at various UN assemblies, the Palestinians have recorded several key achievements: deepening their diplomatic and economic ties with the countries that recognized them, as well as with other Western countries, and gaining recognition in 2012 of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an observer state (although not a member) of the UN General Assembly. But with this recognition, the Palestinians cannot go to the bank and “cash” a state. An actual Palestinian state cannot be established without Israel’s consent.

What does recognition of a Palestinian state mean for Israel?

If recognition stops with the above four to five European countries, the move will remain symbolic, similar to Sweden’s recognition a decade ago. But in another scenario, which is not far-fetched, given strong global support for the Palestinians these days, the floodgates would open for the 50 countries that have not yet done so to recognize a Palestinian state. These would include the leading members of the Euro-Atlantic “moral majority” (France, Germany, UK, and, first and foremost, the United States,) with dire consequences for Israel.

There is a consensus among the member states of the European Union and the US on the need to establish a Palestinian state, and that the only solution to the conflict is two states that allow the two peoples to live side by side in security and peace (or at least without violence). This is a worthy vision. However, the states that are about to recognize a Palestinian state do not understand or do not want to see, that unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state will not result in a de facto Palestinian state and will not achieve security for Palestinians or Israelis.

With the PA at an unprecedented nadir and Hamas enjoying peak popularity on the Palestinian street, unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by Western countries risks creating a state of “Hamastan.” Such an outcome would contradict the interests of those very same countries that seek to promote security, stability, and peace in the Middle East.

The Biden administration has made clear that it will not recognize a Palestinian state and that the issue should be settled in negotiations with Israel rather than unilaterally by third parties. Negotiations would allow Israel to present demands to the Palestinian side in order to ensure security, demilitarization, de-radicalization, an uncompromising fight to counter terrorism, and security coordination. However, such negotiations are unlikely under the hardline Netanyahu-Smotrich government.

Netanyahu’s refusal to engage in any discussion of a political solution on the day after the war precipitated the Norwegian, Irish, and Spanish decisions to recognize a Palestinian state. Such a step promises domestic political gains due to the broad support for it among their voters. Some leaders are trying to enhance their chances of securing an international position.

The price tag that the Netanyahu government can exact from these countries is low: The recall of ambassadors erodes Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering precisely when it is needed most – since there are high-level meetings that only ambassadors can conduct. At this difficult economic time for Israel, it would be irresponsible to harm arms sales or mutual intelligence transfers.

We must not forget the tremendous and unprecedented support Europe demonstrated for Israel in response to the October 7 Hamas massacre, including those member states critical of Israel. The current right-wing government has completely wasted this goodwill and credit, its policies alienating these governments rather than mobilizing their continued support through positive statesmanship. Norway, Ireland, and Spain directed their decision mostly against the Netanyahu-Smotrich government, prompted by a desire for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side in peace and security.

Indeed, the idea of a Palestinian state is anathema for most Israelis. But with seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, separation from the Palestinians through political negotiations will make it possible to receive international guarantees of a demilitarized and de-radicalized Palestinian state. Such separation is vital to Israel’s national interest of remaining a democratic state and the home of the Jewish people.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan. Instead, Israel, the Palestinians, the states in the region, and the West must commit to a process of lengthy negotiations that will ensure the strengthening of the moderate camp that wants peace and security – and thwart the efforts of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to destabilize the Middle East.

The article was published on May 28th, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For 18+ weeks huge mass grassroots movements demonstrations coupled by civil society are taking place all over the country, outcrying the values of democracy, separation of power, civil, political, and social rights, human rights, and protecting minorities. The result of these demonstrations was halting the judicial “reform” to give time for discussions between the government and the opposition on a broad consensus solution.

If the Israeli liberal democratic camp prevails, this is the best chance for a future solution to the Palestinian problem. When Israelis fear for their own basic democratic rights it is much easier to acknowledge the horrors of occupation under which the Palestinians lack basic rights and even to identify with their suffering. More and more Israelis also understand the dangers of Israel’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories to Israel’s democracy.

Yet the heads of the EU have largely shied away from stressing the importance of preserving Israeli liberal democracy. EU’s low profile can be explained by a reluctance to interfere in the internal debate in Israel and by the convergence of interest between the EU and the current government of Israel when it comes to Ukraine, and the move to Real-politic foreign policy style declared and conducted by HR/VP Joseph Borrell.

When Iranian drones are used by Russia to attack Ukraine, on the border of the EU, Israeli military intelligence of Iran’s weaponry is valuable. Purchases from the Israeli defence industry is desired by some EU member states. Israeli gas is coming through Egypt to the EU or helping the Egyptians to export more of their gas to the EU.

Yet what has the EU received in return for ignoring to speak its values in the Israeli case? The Israeli Prime Minister Secretariat has allocated Itamar Ben Gvir, Minister for National Security, to represent the Israeli government on Europe Day this Tuesday (9 May). Behind creeping annexation and violent settlers are the same forces that have forged Itamar Ben-Gvir’s anti-democratic racist political party “Otzma Yehudit”.

Europe Day is annually celebrated by a reception hosted by the EU Delegation to Israel. A representative of the government always speaks. Last year it was Nitzan Horwitz from Merez, a year beforehand it was Meirav Michaeli from the Labour Party. If the PM Secretariat would have sent another minister, for example from the Likud party, the EU Delegation would probably welcome him/her politely.

This has been the EU’s  informal stance so far: to work with the moderate ministers in the government and ignore the radical right wing “Religious Zionism”. Now the messy conduct of the Israeli government made this stance a formal one.

Israelis do not wish the EU to try and interfere with the internal processes in Israel. Any EU attempt to interfere would also be counter-productive, as many Israelis view the EU as pro-Palestinian and have a negative image of the EU when it comes to political issues. Yet what about Israelis who have been demonstrating in the streets in the past 4 months? Most likely they would appreciate to hear the democratic values the EU stands for pronounced much louder and clearer by heads of the EU. Values do not necessarily contradict real-politic.

Convergence of interests can easily lead to yielding of values. But when yielding of values comes from the EU, is a not only disappointing, it also blows up in the EU’s face to an embarrassing mini-diplomatic crisis it now has to solve.

One needs to remember that it takes two to tango. Peace cannot be reached when the Palestinians are divided. Since 2006, Palestinians are split between two undemocratic regimes. Two million Palestinians are under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, and about 3.5 million under the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmud Abbas. Also, Palestinian public opinion is pro-terror and anti-peace.

Still, strengthening the pro-liberal-democratic camp in Israel is one answer to keep a better chance to one day resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. It is also a way to warm up Israelis public opinion on the EU. In the future these Israelis may support Borrell’s initiative to join the Saudi/Arab peace initiative with the EU’s Special Privilege Partnership proposed to Israel and the Palestinians in 2013.

At the time of writing this op-ed the EU had not taken its final situation on how to handle the diplomatic mini-crisis with Israel around the planned reception on Europe Day. Later, the EU Delegation in Israel decided to cancel the reception on Europe Day (but kept the planned public cultural event).

Beforehand, EU spokesperson said that the EU was consulting internally and with its member states. He underlined that the EU does not endorse the political views of Ben-Gvir and his party as they stand in stark contrast to EU’s values and principles. Europe Day has indeed become a chance for the EU to speak its liberal democratic values.

This article is from “The Brussels Times“, from March 8th, 2023.

הפוסט EU cannot receive racist minister Ben Gvir on Europe Day in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The EU’s Cross Border Cooperation Program in the Mediterranean (CBC Med/NEXT MED) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The publication prompted belligerent reactions, which appear to be part of an ongoing orchestrated campaign by the right wing and the settlers. National Missions Minister Orit Struck labeled it “a subversive plan to establish a Palestinian state contrary to agreements and against the law.” Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich argued that the EU was helping to establish “an Arab terrorist state in the heart of the Land of Israel, unilaterally.”

Shlomo Ne’eman, head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization representing communities in Judea and Samaria), said that “the takeover of Area C is the greatest strategic threat in our region.” Right-wing MKs banded together and drafted a letter demanding that the EU “immediately cease illegal construction in Israeli sovereign territory.”

Area C of the West Bank

Area C constitutes 60% of the West Bank’s area. Contrary to right-wing claims, the territory is not under Israeli sovereignty, since Israel never annexed it. According to the Interim Agreement with the PLO (1995), the area, which was occupied in 1967, is under “temporary” Israeli control, and with the exception of the areas left for negotiations on the permanent stage, most of Area C was to be handed over eventually to the Palestinians.

As the parties did not reach a permanent agreement, this ongoing conflict has a negative impact on developments in Area C. The PA, for example, cannot exercise the functional powers it was granted under the Interim Agreement, since Israel controls all movement, planning and infrastructure in the territory.

Along with violence, terrorism and crime, nature and the environment are severely damaged; Israel is torpedoing construction projects necessary for Palestinian living and livelihoods; and Palestinians are sometimes expelled from their homes and require international humanitarian assistance. The lack of coordination along a “zero-sum game” approach prevents construction and development according to a long-term spatial perspective, as the EU suggests.

Reviewing the EU Delegation’s proposal illustrates the extent to which the Israeli claims are unfounded and motivated by a political agenda. The EU’s vision has not changed in any way. Europeans have long supported the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and have been trying for many years to provide humanitarian assistance to the isolated Palestinian population in Area C, which Israel abuses.

The European vision is, in fact, in line with Israel’s long-term interest – to promote the two-state solution in order to ensure its existence as a safe, Jewish and democratic state. This differs deeply from the radical Right’s agenda, which wants to demarcate and isolate Palestinian cities, to annex most of Area C to Israel, and to perpetuate a bloody conflict between the peoples.

Contrary to right-wing claims, the delegation’s document adheres to the Oslo Accords and international law, and even recommends avoiding unilateral measures and implementing a nonconfrontational approach to Israel (“Do No Harm”). This constructive approach falls on the deaf ears of politicians in the right-wing government, who today see the PA and the international community as “enemies of Israel,” motivated by antisemitism to work against it.

The document is also based on a professional approach of spatial planning and environmental sustainability (green energy and green economy). Instead of adopting this approach for coordinating European-funded humanitarian and development construction, Israel is taking unilateral divisive measures, expanding settlements deep within the territory, and demarcating extensive “military zones” at the expense of Palestinian living space, taking over land that is not its own and harming the land and the population.

The extreme Right’s claims of an “illegal” Palestinian takeover of “our” territories, accusing the Palestinians of trying to delineate the borders of their state by stealing and defrauding the State of Israel, are astonishing. Blaming the Palestinians for “settlement-style” activism is like a hunchback who doesn’t see the enormous hump on his back.

The majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank (approximately three million people) lives in densely populated areas A and B. Without Israeli approval, the PA cannot expand the residential areas. The PA’s requests for building permits in Area C are denied in most cases. Only 0.5% of the applications are approved by the Civil Administration. Thus, Palestinians are unable to cope with natural growth without so-called illegal construction.

Since 1967, more than 460,000 Jews have moved to the occupied territories (not including the Jerusalem area). Settlement expansion at a dizzying pace leads to suffering for the approximately 260,000 Palestinians living in Area C, the destruction of structures and facilities, and the expulsion and confiscation of property, while Israel is the party violating international law.

The international community, including the EU, provides humanitarian and economic assistance for the development of the occupied Palestinian territory, with Israeli approval and in accordance with the agreements. The right-wing is reluctant to incite against other foreign elements (such as UN-Habitat, USAID) that also operate on the ground, under similar principles. Instead, it is treating the EU as a scapegoat.

CONTRARY TO the Right’s accusations, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not yet voted to adopt the document on the development of Area C as an official decision. EU resolutions require unanimous consent by the council, which includes representatives of the 27 member states and the European Foreign Service. Until it is accepted, this is a proposal, not an action plan.

The leak of the document has once again unleashed the far-right demon of anti-EU incitement. Right-wing politicians, especially those from the far Right, are no strangers to spreading vicious anti-EU incitement. However, its volume and speed this time suggest a potential new low in relations between Israel and the EU under the sixth Netanyahu government, after relations had been greatly improved by concerted efforts of the previous government.

The two agreements promoted by the Bennett and Lapid government, Creative Europe and the operational agreement with Europol, have already stalled and are unlikely to be advanced by the current government. The European Commission is also renewing its claim for financial compensation from Israel for the destruction of structures and facilities in Area C, damaging European taxpayer funds.

The excessive powers granted to Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir over maintaining security and managing Palestinian civilian life in the West Bank make clear what we can expect from now on – violent provocations, tacit permission to aggravate attacks on Palestinians, particularly in Area C, and activities to promote the de facto annexation of the territory to Israel.

It is therefore difficult to expect a positive change in the attitude of this most right-wing government. On the other hand, engaging the EU in battle at the present time is liable to harm Israel’s interests, and might result in a broad “counter-coalition” vis-à-vis Israel.

This is even as the EU has demonstrated its interest in increasing its partnership with Israel against the backdrop of the Russo-Ukraine war, and in view of Israel’s energy and security assets.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen have a responsibility to prevent Area C from becoming a new focus of escalation and further damage to the PA’s ability to survive, while at the same time maintaining intact relations with the Europeans. In view of the government’s makeup, they are expected to face a fierce containment battle even in meeting these basic goals.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 16, 2023

הפוסט EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Partnership Priorities with the EU – What (If Anything) Is Israel Missing? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Summary:

• What is the Association Council (AC)? It is the institutionalization of an annual dialogue at foreign ministers’ level between Israel and the EU (usually represented by its High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Council rotating Presidency). It is assisted by an Association Committee of senior officials. Since 2005, eight issue-specific sub-committees and two working groups have been formed within its framework. The AC was established by the 1995 EU – Israel Association Agreement and operated regularly since the agreement’s ratification in 2000 through 2012. The AC is authorized to advance and deepen cooperation between Israel and the EU. 

• From regular meetings to AC suspension: Between 2000-2012 the AC convened regularly despite difficulties in EU-Israel relations throughout the second intifada (2000-2004) and the faltering peace process with the Palestinians (since 2009). It even continued to convene when the EU decided in 2009 on a “linkage policy” and avoided upgrading relations with Israel (specifically refusing to ratify the second “Action Plan”) pending progress in the peace process. 

• In 2013, Israel declined to hold the AC meeting to protest the EU’s ‘differentiation policy’, which introduced a territorial clause stipulating that all its agreements with Israel would apply only within the 1967 borderlines, not in the Occupied Territories. In 2014, it was the Europeans who did not convene the AC, and the disconnect continued. 

• An Israeli effort to reconvene the AC: about five years ago a significant number of EU member states objected to the convention of the AC. Their number has decreased significantly since then. Upon his appointment in June 2021, Foreign Minister Lapid set the resumption of the AC meetings as a major foreign policy goal. 

• Following the Foreign Affairs Council decision to reconvene the AC, and its scheduling for October 6, the EU has to adopt a Common Position on the matter. Israel is also expected to issue a declaration. 

• The cost of suspending the AC’s activity can be divided to political and practical costs. Politically, the cost was a diplomatic one concerning image, perception, and public attitudes. Most Southern Mediterranean countries maintain regular ACs with the EU. Its absence with the only democracy in the Middle East, especially given the excellent practical relations between the parties and mutual value, was unusual. The loud and accusatory “megaphone diplomacy” that replaced dialogue and discourse in the decade of the AC suspension contributed to the deterioration of relations, to Israeli incitement against the EU and to the deterioration of the EU’s image in Israel, and vice versa. High-level political meetings between the two sides rarely took place. Since the Abraham Accords and Normalization Agreements were signed (in 2020), the EU has not taken part in leveraging regional peace relations. 

• In terms of practical cooperation, while other countries have signed new and updated cooperation agreements with the EU, Israel and the EU still work according to their 2004 Action Plan. During this period (since 2013), Israel has not joined new EU programs nor did the sides upgrade their trade agreement. 

• Convening the AC in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Convening the AC is an opportunity for the EU to rethink the framing of its policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the Abraham Accords indicate that the US and Arab countries do not condition their relations with Israel on promoting peace with the Palestinians, leaving the EU as the main body to insist on such a stipulation. The EU’s ‘linkage policy’ has not reversed Israeli governments’ unwillingness to restart the peace process with the Palestinians since its collapse in 2014, and currently excludes it from involvement in the regional peace processes. 

• The conclusion is that Europe must reexamine the path to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The EU will continue to support the two-state solution, to oppose the construction of settlements and any changes that jeopardize the two-state solution. Its differentiation policy is also expected to continue. However, the EU should examine its linkage policy, which harms trust between the parties. 

• One way for Europe to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace is by helping to link the Abraham Accords and Israel’s relations of peace/normalization with Arab countries in favor of promoting peace with the Palestinians. 

• Practical opportunities that may emerge once the AC is convened: Convening the AC is not just an end in itself; rather its success is in promoting practical cooperation between the sides. Specifically, the goal of reconvening the AC is to start talks on a Partnership Priorities agreement setting a number of common goals to advance in the next 3-5 years. Potential cooperation goals could include climate change (with an emphasis on energy, food, agriculture, water, and innovation in each), digitalization, cyber, artificial intelligence, health (including the handling of epidemics), as well as triangular/quadrennial cooperation between Israel, the EU, and an Arab peace/normalization state, leveraging the Abraham Accords in these and other areas. 

• In addition, Israel should conduct a more comprehensive and up-to-date review of the 20 EU programs for which it is eligible, decide which ones to join, and consider starting negotiations on a new trade agreement that will include the services sector as well as an investor protection agreement, or at the very least on removing barriers and an approximation of laws to facilitate trade. 

• Conclusion: The EU is Israel’s main economic partner, with which it has extensive strategic practical cooperation. Convening the AC would be the political highlight of the much-improved relations between Israel and the EU over the past year. For the EU, this is an opportunity to end the unhelpful and even harmful absence of regular high-level political dialogue with Israel. 

• The AC is not an instrument to goad the other side. It is a tool for dialogue, even if critical and harsh, to clarify the parties’ positions. Its renewal is both a constructive means and a symbol of the renewal of substantive dialogue between the parties. It is a tool to rebuild trust between two sides, as well as to strengthen the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements to encourage every opportunity to renew the Israeli – Palestinian peace process. 

• The renewal of the political dialogue should be leveraged for practical cooperation between Israel and the EU, which will also spill over into ties between Israelis and Europeans, between countries and citizens in the region, to promote prosperity and growth, peace, stability, and democracy, and to jointly combat regional challenges. Relations should be promoted for the benefit of both parties under any government. 

הפוסט The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The letter, instigated by Antonio López-Istúriz White, chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with Israel, protested the EU’s attitude toward Israel, noting that while the EU continues to hold annual Association Council meetings with Israel’s non-democratic neighbors, such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and even signs new agreements with them, it last convened the ministerial-level dialogue with Israel in 2012.

In 2013, Israel canceled the annual meeting to protest EU instructions excluding territories beyond its 1967 borders from all Israel-EU agreements. Borrell’s predecessor, Federica Mogherini, led several attempts to reconvene the Association Council, but failed due to reservations on the part of certain EU members during a freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and tensions in Israel-EU relations. The Association Council did not reconvene, and the regular high-level dialogue was halted.

The dialogue, which brought together EU foreign ministers with their Israeli counterparts, was launched within the framework of the 1995 Association Agreement between Israel and the EU. Its aims were to discuss issues of importance to each side and convey messages in a better, more precise and effective manner than those conveyed by so-called “megaphone diplomacy” (exchanges through media channels in times of tension, which tend to be aggressive and conflictual).

The high-level meetings allowed both sides to examine the state of their relations and to seek paths to advance them. Such meetings entail months of preparations by relevant government agencies in Israel and the EU to ensure an optimal outcome.

Cooperation between Israel and the EU is conducted on an unusually high level. It encompasses economic ties (a free-trade agreement on goods and even agriculture), science, innovation and development (the Horizon program), higher education (the Erasmus+ program), aviation (the Open Skies agreement), and more.

HOWEVER, ALONG with the flourishing economic ties, diplomatic relations have deteriorated under the previous Netanyahu governments to a low ebb, exacerbated by Netanyahu’s attempts to drive a wedge between EU members to scuttle resolutions critical of Israel.

Israel’s new government, which includes the centrist Blue and White Party and in which Gabi Ashkenazi serves as foreign minister, may enable improved ties with the EU and allow renewal of the beneficial high-level political dialogue between the sides. Initial positive exchanges between Ashkenazi and Borrell indicate that both sides are seeking constructive engagement.

Lopez and other signatories of the letter to Borrell (many of them members of the EP’s largest faction, the center-right European People’s Party, which includes supporters of Israel) believe the time is ripe for a new page in relations. However, their initiative is highly speculative.

If the Israeli government annexes even a small part of the West Bank, the Association Council will not convene any time soon. The Europeans view any annexation as burying the two-state solution and violating Palestinian rights and international law. Annexation would be a game-changer. Some 1,000 EP members from 25 states recently signed a letter condemning the planned Israeli move.

Should resumption of the Association Council meetings depend on the annexation issue? The demand for the EU to reconvene the council is a substantive one. Since 2014, the EU (and especially a number of members) have adopted a discriminatory attitude toward Israel in refusing to do so. If the EU supports high-level dialogue with other countries regardless of their democratic and human rights performance, it should not impose preconditions on Israel.

The Israeli government and the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council have grown accustomed to the absence of a regular, established diplomatic dialogue between them. Such a dialogue could well be tough for both sides and critical in nature, but it must take place.

Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and High Representative Borrell, who already agreed to meet each other in Brussels, should work together to reconvene the Association Council, and thus enable an annual high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU to take place.

This article is posted in “JPost” on July 17, 2022

הפוסט The EU and Israel should resume their suspended high-level dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

At a festive meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg to mark Europe Day (May 9), French President Emmanuel Macron – in the tradition of French presidents before him – raised a new idea to establish a “European Political Community.” To European history aficionados, the term may sound familiar from the 1950s, when it emerged to complement the establishment of the European Defense Community. Had the initiative been accepted at the time, the six founders of the EU would have formed a community with federal characteristics.

Macron’s current proposal is far more modest. Instead of strengthening the union inwardly, it places great hope on strengthening ties with the democracies in its environs. Such a community would serve as a kind of “club” for countries that – although not members of the European Union – share its values: democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. These values currently determine the European fault line in the war against Russia.

On the face of it, the proposal refers to a total of 12 countries: eight that want to join the EU (five in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), those uninterested in joining (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland), and those that left it (the UK, some would include Greenland). Turkey, which is no longer a candidate for accession, was not mentioned.

For the candidates, this political community would be a kind of “waiting room” during the protracted and difficult process involved in joining the EU. Macron estimated that it would take Ukraine many years or even decades to complete its accession. In the meantime, this community would allow its members to enjoy upgraded status and a political framework, including formally coordinated positions and responses to the needs of countries such as Ukraine, until they officially accede into the union. The community will enable stronger relationships with those left out, allowing them to enjoy some of the economies of scale of the EU without renouncing national autonomy.

The proposal

ACCORDING TO the proposal, community leaders would meet several times a year (at various levels) to make decisions. Macron noted that the community would engage in political and security cooperation (not in defense), and in the fields of energy, transportation, investments, infrastructure and the movement of people, with an emphasis on youth. Its goal would be to contribute to the security, stability and prosperity of its members.

How would such a European political community affect Israel? Would Israel be accepted for membership? Macron set two conditions for accession: a European state, and one that is a liberal-democracy.

Israel is a liberal democracy that shares the values of the EU within the 1967 lines. Outside these lines, however, it violates international law, for example, by building settlements and transferring population to occupied territory. This criterion distances it from its moral affiliation with this community, which aims to serve as a clear buffer line vis-à-vis Russia.

Indeed, formulas have been found in previous agreements between Israel and the EU that have differentiated between Israel within the 1967 borders and beyond, but when it comes to building a forum of values, Israel’s policy in the Palestinian sphere constitutes an obstacle.

Regarding the extent of Israel’s European identity, opinions are divided. The majority would support the geographical approach that excludes the State of Israel from Europe. Indeed, Macron’s proposal refers to the “Eastern neighborhood” of the EU, in which, for example, Georgia is located east of the Black Sea, between Russia and the northeastern part of Turkey. His proposal does not relate to the “Southern neighborhood,” south and east of the Mediterranean Sea, with which the EU associates Israel.

A minority would support the identity-cultural approach, allowing for Israel to be defined, at least in part, as a European state. Significant parts of the “DNA” of the State of Israel and its citizens are comprised of European human, cultural, traditional, conceptual, governmental and even moral and normative components. By virtue of these identities, about 55% of Israelis are eligible for a European passport.

The EU’s alliances

THE EU aligns itself with differing circles around it. These are not orderly concentric circles within each other, but rather a complex “variable geometry.” Some of these circles are closer to the EU, others more distant. The closest circle is the “European Economic Area” comprising Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which participate in large parts of the European Common Market.

This circle is followed by Switzerland, with its complex system of some 120-140 agreements with the EU, which are also part of EU legislation. The outer circle is reserved for the European Neighborhood Policy, which consists of 16 countries, from Morocco in the southwest, along the Mediterranean coast, through Israel, to Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus in Eastern Europe. Of these EU neighbors – minus the countries that are candidates for accession – Israel has the greatest number of agreements and the deepest level of practical/functional ties with the EU.

Israel and the EU have extensive ties in the fields of economics, research and innovation, aviation and tourism, agriculture, regulation and standardization and more. The energy sector has also been added to the list with last week’s signing of a memorandum of understanding on gas exports from Israel via Egypt to the EU. The laying of a power cable connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece (and Italy) is also under discussion.

Last week, the Israeli government voted unanimously to join the EU’s Creative Europe cultural program. Negotiations are underway on Israeli participation in other EU programs, too. In a wider European circle, Israel also recently signed its accession to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Human Trafficking, becoming the first non-European member of the Council of Europe to do so.

In recent weeks, a series of senior EU (and European) officials have visited Israel, reflecting its importance to the Europeans. The line of European officials queuing to visit Israel is long, forcing the Foreign Ministry to postpone some visits.

The first of these latest European visitors was Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi. He was followed by President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola on her first visit outside Europe since being elected, and the president of the European Investment Bank.

 The highlight was the visit of President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, the first such visit in a decade by a European Commission president. Waiting in line are Frans Timmermans, vice president and commissioner for Green Deal and climate change; and Margaritis Schinas, commissioner for promoting the European way of life (including oversight of the rule of law, immigration and security matters).

The European Council, which includes the heads of EU member states, will convene on June 23-24 to discuss Macron’s proposal to establish a European political community. The French are pressing for a decision on the matter by the end of the year.

If Macron’s proposal is accepted, should Israel apply for membership or would it be better off settling for observer status? Formal status in this community would constitute an important normative anchoring and an unequivocal statement about Israel’s membership in the community of liberal democracies, expressing values that the State of Israel aspires to project.

However, Israel is unlikely to apply because joining this political community would expose it to EU pressure on ending or managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given the currently complex political state of affairs, it is unclear whether there is a courageous or significant enough leader in Israel today to lead such a move.

This article is posted on “JPost” on June 25, 2022

הפוסט Is there room for Israel in the EU’s newly proposed political alliance? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When diplomacy fails to deter a bully, a big stick is required. Since the 1990s, European Union member states have hardly strengthened their armies and failed to translate their economic power into military might. They did not build a common European army, continuing to live peacefully and comfortably under the “perpetual peace” they created.

In recent years, when Russian President Vladimir Putin, the regional bully, bit off big chunks of his neighbors’ land (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine) and dispatched his soldiers to train in Syria and Libya, an angry EU mainly barked, but did not really bite.

Is this the hour of Europe? The EU insists on respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent country, and its right to chart its own course, foreign policy, and membership in international organizations, including NATO and even the EU. The 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea was a direct response to Ukraine signing an Association Agreement with the EU.

The EU does not have a military force, relying instead on NATO, which is under US leadership. But for the first time since the Soviet Union collapsed over three decades ago ending the Cold War, European leaders, including newly elected German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, agree that defense spending should be increased. They agree that the world order has changed, and that the EU must prepare.

While Merkel dragged her feet for years, Scholz announced an increase in Germany’s defense budget from 1.53% to 2% of its GDP for troop buildup and advanced rearmament.

Scholz also seemed to be aligning himself with French President Emmanuel Macron’s wish for the EU’s “strategic autonomy,” meaning the EU’s ability to act independently of NATO (i.e., the US).

Europe’s “hour” in terms of military power is not imminent. Strategic autonomy is a goal that, even if agreed on by the 27 member states, will take years to achieve. But EU consensus on this matter in response to Putin’s aggression will add a further dimension to the changing world order observed in recent days. For now, Europe continues to dwell under NATO’s US-led umbrella.

THE EU – which seemed to be limping from crisis to crisis over the past 15 years, with its foreign policy in disarray – is shaping up in front of our eyes over the past two weeks as a significant proactive body, capable of adopting tough diplomatic decisions despite the harm they cause to its member states. Foreign ministers and heads of member states have consolidated an array of increasingly harsh sanctions as the war in Ukraine has escalated.

These financial sanctions are a double-edged sword. They will undermine Russia, but also hurt EU-member states. Severing Russian banks from the international SWIFT financial transaction network, for example, means Europeans will have trouble paying for Russian gas and oil. The already high European energy prices will go up and governments (at least in Germany) have already pledged to subsidize the rising electricity and gas costs of low-income residents.

Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration, we have been living in a world run in accordance with the slogan Bill Clinton minted to defeat George Bush Sr., “It’s the economy, stupid.” This aphorism applies mostly to countries living in peace, such as the EU members. China seemed to have adopted it too, becoming a market economy (under the eagle-eye of the authorities).

Israel cannot afford to be governed by this dictate alone. It knows that without a strong, growing economy, it will be hard-pressed to maintain a powerful, advanced army. European leaders now realize that a strong economy alone is insufficient; military force is also required.

Since the end of the Cold War, global trade in goods and services has expanded significantly, as have foreign investments throughout the world. Interdependence among states has also grown substantially. According to certain international relations scholars, the greater the interdependence between states, the fewer the prospects of their waging war against each other.

Russia is not dependent on Ukraine’s economy, on the contrary. Putin expects to take Ukraine over as he did Belarus. But Putin misjudged the resolve of the EU, on whose member states he does depend economically, to use this mutual dependence against him.

Much of Russia’s export volume depends on EU energy purchases, chief among them Germany’s. Putin gambled that the states dependent on Russian energy would stand aside while he “gobbles up” Ukraine, as was the case (to a large extent) with his takeover of Crimea.

He miscalculated. This double-edged sword is turning against him. The Russian army, too, marches on its stomach and is reliant on economic resources to renew its ammunition. To maintain a significant military force, Putin needs a high-yield economy.

THE EU is not sending troops, but it is willing to pay the economic price for Ukraine’s sake. It coordinated the economic and financial sanctions on Russia with the US, proactively leading the charge rather than being dragged along by the Americans.

Putin – who for over a decade sought to divide the West, to turn the US and EU against the other, to throw a monkey’s wrench into the workings of the EU and NATO – has turned into a unifying factor.

How, then, is this Europe’s hour? Given the world’s democratic decline of the past two decades, the EU still has a potentially significant regional role to play. In the mid-1970s and 1980s, the European Community (precursor of the EU) helped Greece, Spain and Portugal stabilize their fragile democracies by conditioning its accession on such stability.

The current decision to side with Ukraine is a stand in favor of a country’s right to choose its friends, to choose the democratic-liberal model. The invasion of Ukraine brutally tramples the principles underpinning the EU, which seeks to propagate peace, democracy, human rights, and adherence to the rule of law, including international law.

This is where the theory of democratic peace comes in as the only theory of international relations that can be considered a “rule” and has withstood repeated tests: democracies do not fight each other. By inference, that means that the more democracies there are (especially adjacent ones), the fewer wars will be waged.

But researchers also have found that the most unstable stage, both domestically and in foreign relations, is the transition to democracy. This is the stage Ukraine is in. The EU’s assistance to Ukraine is assistance for the spread of democracy in a state that wants it and has chosen it (unlike states around Israel’s region that are not interested in such European intervention; and indeed, in the wake of the Arab “spring,” the EU’s democratic agenda in our region has been eroded in favor of an agenda of stability and good governance).

This is the hour of coordinated multilateral action by peace-loving democracies. This is the hour of Europe.

הפוסט Russia-Ukraine war is Europe’s hour to act הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During this period Israel perhaps could have reached an agreement with the EU to resume the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, which in turn could have advanced and upgraded the contractual relationships that are stuck since 2009. What were Israel’s achievements during Germany’s Presidency?

הפוסט How Israel-EU relations have been impacted <br> by Germany’s Council presidency הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The opening point seemed rather grim. The past decade includes the linkage policy by the EU, conditioning in 2008-09 the upgrading to a new contractual Action Plan with Israel to an advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The relationship took another blow in 2013 after the EU introduced the differentiation policy, explicitly excluding territories beyond Israel’s 1967 lines from all Israel-EU agreements. Since, no Association Council convened (first due to Israel, but since 2014 due to the EU). Labelling settlements products came next.

The Israeli government marked July 1^st, the first day of Germany’s Presidency, as the date the government can begin annexing territories in the West Bank. During the first half of 2020, the EU and about half of its member states, including Germany, were engaged in a diplomatic offensive against Israel to deter against any annexation. Some member states, excluding Germany, even threatened Israel that the annexation will result in punitive “sticks”, ordering the European External Action Service (EEAS) to prepare a list of possible measures to be taken against Israel if push comes to shove. While Germany warned Israel from the ramifications of annexation, chiefly the damage it will further cause to Israel’s relationship with the EU, the Israeli government relied on Germany (and others) to block the more severe measures against Israel.

The turn started on 13 August, when Netanyahu announced the postponement of annexation for singing a peace accord with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This radical shift from annexation to normalization came as a surprise to the EU. In its DNA, the EU supports regional peace processes, but the peace process it aspires for first and foremost is between Israel and the Palestinians, and based on the 1967 line, not on the Trump plan.

Netanyahu’s remarks in the Israeli media that the annexation was not cancelled but rather postponed, kept the EU’s suspicion towards Netanyahu’s government in place. And indeed, in November, before Biden’s inauguration, the Israeli government announced it will advance the construction of 1,257 housing units in the controversial Givat Hamatos (neighbourhood in south Jerusalem). The US and the EU had tried to prevent this construction over the last six years, believing it would harm the two-states solution. They consider such construction to be a de-facto annexation, which will also further drive a wedge between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, preventing a territorial continuum for the future Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Most of the Israeli public conceives the EU as a foe, not as a friend; as a critical body towards Israel, siding with the Palestinians. The political disagreements between Israel and the EU and the EU’s criticism of Israeli policy in the West Bank reach the headlines and receive most of the Israeli public attention, overshadowing the wide economic, research and innovation and civilian cooperation among the two. Israeli knowledgeable representatives are aware that in many areas the EU is of greater strategic importance, in some fields even more significant than the United States. The EU is Israel’s most important trading partner, the biggest external source of funding to Israeli research and innovation, most significant in FDIs and greatly contributes to Israel’s higher education, tourism, agriculture, culture and overall economic growth. Therefore, it is important to resume the high-level dialogue between the sides to open the way to upgrade the relationship.

Once in thirteen-and-a-half years, an EU member state receives a modest influential position for six months at the presidency of the Council of the EU. The position entitles chairing the member states’ ministerial summits (e.g. meetings between all the member states’ ministers of economy, or of tourism, or agriculture etc.). The presidency has the power to set the meetings’ agenda and is expected to be an honest mediator between the member states, to reach agreements and forward resolutions. The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, reduced the presidency’s importance in foreign policy. The foreign affairs council is chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Josep Borrell) and it is the European External Action Service who sets this council’s agenda.

Germany has a leading position in the EU and a great deal of influence over it, but despite its honest efforts, it ran into the EU’s structural limitation, unable to overcome the politically difficult Israeli-EU relationship. The formal procedures governing the EU foreign policy decision-making process require a consensus among all member states. Under these procedures, any state can veto a proposition and all states are equal, hence a vote by small member states, such as Luxemburg, Ireland or Sweden, is equal to Germany, Austria or the Czech Republic.

The special relationship between Israel and Germany was strengthened by the warm relationship that was forged between the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, and his Israeli counterpart Gabi Ashkenazi. Germany did a great service to Israel by inviting Ashkenazi to an informal meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers (known as a Gymnich meeting, which does not have the authority to make formal decisions). Ashkenazi was the only non-EU foreign minister invited to the summit. He developed good relations with other foreign ministers, including Borrell. The good personal relationships between Ashkenazi and his European counterparts, together with actions taken before and after the summit, had a positive influence on the tone of the relationship between Israel and Europe/the EU. Nevertheless, this did not translate into a formal decision by the Foreign Affairs Council to resume the Association Council meetings with Israel or opening the possibility of promoting and upgrading the relationship. Still, the Israeli foreign ministry deserves all the credit for attempting and partially succeeding to reverse the negative political tensions with the EU. Though no significant change occurred yet, important steps were taken and laid a much more positive infrastructure for the relations.

The Foreign Affairs Council always has a busy schedule, and it is difficult to put a topic that isn’t burning on the agenda, let alone a subject lacking consensus. Ashkenazi’s participation in the informal summit, held on August 27^th-28^th, was held only two weeks after Israel and the UAE announced their normalization agreement. Even the later normalization with Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco did not change the EU’s policy towards Israel. Among other things, the fact that Ashkenazi (and Minister of Defense Gantz) was kept in the dark regarding the talks with the UAE, made it much more difficult for the foreign ministry to utilize the historic achievement into further diplomatic achievements on the European front. Indeed, the EU is a tough nut to crack, cumbersome and slow to change, adhering to its principles and policies – advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The presidency’s baton has passed into Portugal’s hands at the beginning of the new year, and thereafter to Slovenia in July 2021. Ashkenazi already asked Portugal to act in favor of reconvening the Association Council meetings with no preconditions and said: “we identify a real need to adopt a new approach and model for cooperation between Israel and the EU institutions and we are convinced that Portugal, the current chair of the presidency of the Council of the EU, will act to do so”. The ball is in Portugal’s hands. Yet, bearing in mind Israel is entering another elections, a real change between Israel and the EU is not expected to happen before the second half of 2021. As things stand today, the almost complete erase of the Israeli peace camp from the electoral landscape, makes it is unexpected that even towards the end of Portugal’s presidency the next Israeli government will bring good news in this context.

In recent weeks, the EU passed its largest-ever budget (of €1.8 trillion) for 2021-2027. The budget is almost twice as big as the previous budget and it intends to help the EU market recover faster from the Coronavirus economic crisis. The budget may entail new opportunities for Israel that are not yet clear, but various government ministries in Israel are working on mapping them out. The Israeli government can find itself in a better position to take advantage of those opportunities if it continues the positive trend towards the EU that Ashkenazi initiated and expand it into a comprehensive government policy.

הפוסט How Did Israel-EU Relations Evolve During <br> Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the vast majority of the 27 EU member states are led by center-right parties, almost all are privately rooting for Biden, who represents center-left views. That is not surprising. The Trump years have traumatized transatlantic relations, turning the US from the staunchest supporter of the EU into a confrontational, aggressive opponent.

Trump publicly supported Brexit, scrapped the transatlantic trade negotiations (TTIP) with the EU launched by Obama, started a trade war with Europe, and withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also significantly undermined NATO to the point that French President Macron declared the organization “brain dead”. On the other hand, Trump’s attitude toward Putin and Russia, the adversary that prompted NATO’s establishment, has alternated between friendly and ingratiating. The liberal order and values so dear to the Europeans have been damaged severely.

A second Trump term can be expected to continue undermining dialogue and coordination with Europe on many issues, including those related to Iran, Israel and the Palestinians. Trump’s presidency accelerated the ongoing decline of global US hegemony. As the US withdrew inward, regional stability continued to deteriorate. This was particularly evident in the Mediterranean: Russia entered Syria, Turkey entered Libya, and Iran spread its tentacles further in the region. None of these developments benefit Israel. Moreover, another Trump term could cripple or bring down NATO, further destabilizing the region. Israel has an interest in a robust, significant NATO, given Europe’s inability to fill the US defense vacuum now or in the foreseeable future.

The Netanyahu government has benefitted from the transatlantic crisis and Trump’s unilaterally supporting its positions (e.g. relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the Trump plan that deviates from the ‘67 borders as the starting point for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the pullout from the Iran nuclear agreement). While a Biden presidency is not likely to reverse the embassy move, it would restore traditional US support for the two-state solution. The US and Europe would likely renew their dialogue on the subject, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer high on their list of priorities. Covid-19 and the economic downturn have drawn their attention inward, but on the other hand honed growing external threats, such as China.

China is a focal point of US global competition concerns. While Trump treated Europe like the proverbial bull in a China shop, his policy reflected a set of American interests marking China as the key challenge to waning US hegemony – this challenge will remain under Biden. Thus, although a Biden presidency would restore transatlantic relations to their pre-Trump format of cooperation, the agenda of the relationship will change. Europe will have to decide whether to espouse the US containment strategy toward China or try to reap the benefits of trade and mutual investment with Beijing.

Israel is a negligible player in this global game. Israeli regulation tends to follow that of the EU, its main import-export market. The US is therefore expected to keep pressing Israel and Europe to avoid strategic Chinese investment in their territories. If Europe joins forces with the US versus China – a more realistic scenario under Biden than Trump – Israel would obviously go along. However, if Europe opts for a different approach than the American one, Israel may be forced to make political choices it finds economically inconvenient.

As for the Middle East peace process, Biden holds a traditional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He opposes settlements and unilateral annexation, supports full security for Israel, calls for recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and has taken firm stands against terrorism, incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders. Biden views the two-state solution as essential to Israel’s survival. In that sense, neither he nor the Europeans seem inclined to new or alternative solutions.

However, here too Trump leaves behind a situation requiring a difficult choice for the Europeans. The welcome normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE and, hopefully, the future agreement with Bahrain, represent a different paradigm that does not link Israel-Arab normalization with resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paradigm the order is reversed: Normalization first, peace with the Palestinians (maybe) later. Although most Arab states do not share this Emirati and Bahraini approach (yet), Biden will have to consider whether to adopt it, revert to the previous route of peace with the Palestinians first followed by Israel-Arab normalization later, or combine the two. The Europeans, too, will have to examine whether to change track or remain stuck in the logic of the Oslo process. There is growing criticism within the EU regarding its rigid position on the issue, given that the conditions that gave rise to this logic have long since disappeared.

In this context, Trump’s unseating would banish some of the ill populist winds blowing from the US to Europe, which Netanyahu also fanned by tightening relations with a-liberal leaders in states such as Hungary and Poland, but a Biden victory would not significantly bolster EU foreign policy given its deep internal weakness of recent years. This weakness stems from internal European divisions that impede every substantive decision (other than the semi-annual renewal of sanctions on Russia over its Crimean Peninsula occupation). A Biden victory is unlikely to mend this structural weakness. Although Commission President von der Leyen and High Representative Borrell recently proposed doing away with the consensus requirement on certain foreign policy decisions, a move that would enable the EU to adopt resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that it has been unable to adopt since 2016, such a move is unlikely anytime soon. Therefore, even when the populist criticism of the EU no longer enjoys an American tailwind, and even once transatlantic relations are restored, European foreign policy is expected to remain reactive, divided and weak. Will that help Israel? As a strategic Israeli asset, a robust EU is important even if it is perceived as a critical partner on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Should the EU want its voice to resonate louder on these issues with the top echelons in Jerusalem, ahead of a possible Biden administration foreign policy change, the Israel-EU Association Council should reconvene for the first time since 2012. Israel’s Foreign Minister Ashkenazi is already working with his German counterpart Maas to make this happen, and a Biden victory could help. Renewal of the Israel-EU high-level political dialogue would improve relations and hand the Europeans a tool with which to influence developments in the region. Otherwise, it will likely remain an onlooker.

The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 2 November, 2020.

הפוסט How will the Post-Election Israel-EU-US Triangle Shape Up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the vast majority of the 27 EU member states are led by Center-Right parties, almost all are privately rooting for Biden, who represents Center-Left views. That is not surprising. The Trump years have traumatized transatlantic relations, turning the US from the staunchest supporter of the EU into a confrontational, aggressive opponent.

Trump publicly supported Brexit, scrapped the transatlantic trade negotiations (TTIP) with the EU launched by president Barack Obama, started a trade war with Europe and withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also significantly undermined NATO to the point that French President Emmanuel Macron declared the organization “brain dead.”

On the other hand, Trump’s attitude toward President Vladimir Putin and Russia, the adversary that prompted NATO’s establishment, has alternated between friendly and ingratiating. The liberal order and values so dear to the Europeans have been damaged severely.

A second Trump term can be expected to continue undermining dialogue and coordination with Europe on many issues, including those related to Iran, Israel and the Palestinians. Trump’s presidency accelerated the ongoing decline of global US hegemony. As the US withdrew inward, regional stability continued to deteriorate. This was particularly evident in the Mediterranean: Russia entered Syria, Turkey entered Libya, and Iran spread its tentacles farther in the region. None of these developments benefits Israel. Moreover, another Trump term could cripple or bring down NATO, further destabilizing the region. Israel has an interest in a robust, significant NATO, given Europe’s inability to fill the US defense vacuum now or in the foreseeable future.

The Netanyahu government has benefited from the transatlantic crisis and Trump’s unilaterally supporting its positions (e.g. relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the Trump plan, which deviates from the ’67 borders as the starting point for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the pullout from the Iran nuclear agreement).

While a Biden presidency is not likely to reverse the embassy move, it would restore traditional US support for the two-state solution. The US and Europe would likely renew their dialogue on the subject, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer high on their list of priorities. COVID-19 and the economic downturn have drawn their attention inward, but on the other hand honed growing external threats, such as China.

China is a focal point of US global competition concerns. While Trump treated Europe like the proverbial bull in a china shop, his policy reflected a set of American interests marking China as the key challenge to waning US hegemony – this challenge will remain under Biden. Thus, although a Biden presidency would restore transatlantic relations to their pre-Trump format of cooperation, the agenda of the relationship will change. Europe will have to decide whether to espouse the US containment strategy toward China or try to reap the benefits of trade and mutual investment with Beijing.

Israel is a negligible player in this global game. Israeli regulation tends to follow that of the EU, its main import-export market. The US is therefore expected to keep pressing Israel and Europe to avoid strategic Chinese investment in their territories. If Europe joins forces with the US versus China – a more realistic scenario under Biden than Trump – Israel would obviously go along. However, if Europe opts for a different approach than the American one, Israel may be forced to make political choices it finds economically inconvenient.

As for the Middle East peace process, Biden holds a traditional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He opposes settlements and unilateral annexation, supports full security for Israel, calls for recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and has taken firm stands against terrorism, incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders. Biden views the two-state solution as essential to Israel’s survival. In that sense, neither he nor the Europeans seem inclined to new or alternative solutions.

However, here too, Trump leaves behind a situation requiring a difficult choice for the Europeans. The welcome normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE and, hopefully, the future agreement with Bahrain, represent a different paradigm that does not link Israel-Arab normalization with resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paradigm the order is reversed: Normalization first, peace with the Palestinians (maybe) later.

Although most Arab states do not share this Emirati and Bahraini approach (yet), Biden will have to consider whether to adopt it, revert to the previous route of peace with the Palestinians first followed by Israel-Arab normalization later or combine the two. The Europeans, too, will have to examine whether to change track or remain stuck in the logic of the Oslo process. There is growing criticism within the EU regarding its rigid position on the issue, given that the conditions that gave rise to this logic have long since disappeared.

In this context, Trump’s unseating would banish some of the ill populist winds blowing from the US to Europe, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also fanned by tightening relations with a-liberal leaders in states such as Hungary and Poland. But a Biden victory would not significantly bolster EU foreign policy given its deep internal weakness of recent years.

This weakness stems from internal European divisions that impede every substantive decision (other than the semi-annual renewal of sanctions on Russia over its Crimean Peninsula occupation). A Biden victory is unlikely to mend this structural weakness. Although EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and foreign minister Josep Borrell recently proposed doing away with the consensus requirement on certain foreign policy decisions, a move that would enable the EU to adopt resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that it has been unable to adopt since 2016, such a move is unlikely anytime soon.

Therefore, even when the populist criticism of the EU no longer enjoys an American tailwind, and even once transatlantic relations are restored, European foreign policy is expected to remain reactive, divided and weak. Will that help Israel? As a strategic Israeli asset, a robust EU is important even if it is perceived as a critical partner on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Should the EU want its voice to resonate louder on these issues with the top echelons in Jerusalem, ahead of a possible Biden administration foreign policy change, the Israel-EU Association Council should reconvene for the first time since 2012.

Foreign Minister Ashkenazi is already working with his German counterpart, Heiko Maas, to make this happen, and a Biden victory could help. Renewal of the Israel-EU high-level political dialogue would improve relations and hand the Europeans a tool with which to influence developments in the region. Otherwise, it will likely remain an onlooker.

** The article was published on Jpost, 2 November 2020.

הפוסט How will the post-election Israel-EU-US triangle shape up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU’s differentiation policy seeks to maintain trade and cooperation with the State of Israel within its 1967 borders, in adherence to international law and Europe’s consumer protection laws – unlike the BDS movement that seeks to boycott and sanction the entire State of Israel. Recognizing the value of EU-Israel relationship, the EU’s differentiation policy aims to incentivize Israel to resume negotiations with the Palestinians. The BDS movement, on the other hand, sets goals (such as revoking the right of return and abrogating the Law of Return) that if fully achieved would mean Israel’s end as a Jewish state. The differentiation policy includes an element of normative condemnation but not delegitimization of the State of Israel as a whole, as espoused by the BDS movement. Whereas the differentiation policy implements existing international law, the BDS movement aspires to change the international perception of Israel even within its 1967 borders.

Currently, the economic implications of both the differentiation policy and the BDS movement are negligible. However, in the long term, the threat posed by the BDS activities is greater than that of the differentiation policy, since the BDS is not limited to the settlements. The UN recently issued a list of companies operating in the settlements, which could serve in the future to boycott the settlements and damage major companies that play a significant role in Israel’s economy. The EU does not see any connection between its differentiation policy and the BDS movement, to which some European states oppose.

הפוסט The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Relations with Arab states

1. Israel is interested in bolstering the peace with Jordan and Egypt and achieving peace with additional Arab states in order to normalize relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. Arab leaders are invited to visit Israel.

2. Israel’s relations with Arab states should extend beyond the clandestine, security realm to include open diplomatic, economic and civilian cooperation.

3. Israel attaches importance to the thrice-endorsed 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and welcomes the willingness of Arab states to consistently ratify it over time. Israel views the proposal as an opportunity to promote negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel is also interested in launching a regional peace process with the involvement of both Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

4. Israel believes Arab states could play a significant role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such peace would also provide significant opportunities to fulfill the potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Israel calls for a regional conference to relaunch the peace process.

5. Israel seeks to cooperate with Arab states on people-to-people projects that could change negative attitudes and forge links of peace. Israel seeks to contribute its know-how in the fields of hydrology, climate, renewable energy and security for the benefit of the Arab states and their inhabitants.

6. Israel believes its unique geopolitical location enables it to assume a significant role in furthering connections and cooperation between Europe and the Middle East. This is already happening in the Eastern Mediterranean, and should be broadened into wide-ranging, institutionalized multi-regional cooperation beneficial to both Israel and Arab states.

7. Israel will give top priority to restoring relations with Jordan and trust with King Abdullah. These relations are of supreme strategic importance and must be bolstered and developed. Israel recognizes Jordan’s special status vis-à-vis Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. It will work to advance new joint projects with Jordan, fulfill past commitments and is ready to help Jordan deal with the refugee challenge and with threats of terrorism.

8. Israel recognizes Egypt’s key regional importance and the vital role it plays in promoting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and preventing escalation between Israel and Gaza. Israel welcomes the growing cooperation with Egypt on natural gas, and will also invest efforts in promoting civilian ties with Egypt. First off, Israel will immediately appoint a new ambassador to Egypt following a lengthy hiatus during which the position was not staffed.

Relations with the Palestinians

1. Israel is interested in peace with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution and will take steps to advance it. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only reaching an arrangement with Gaza, is a top priority for Israel.

2. Israel is extending its hand to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in a bid to renew dialogue and the peace process and is interested in creating a direct channel between leaders and top officials. Israel also attaches importance to promoting ties and dialogue between the two peoples and building mutual respect and trust.

3. Israel does not want the PA’s collapse. It views the PA as a partner for negotiations and a key partner in resolving the situation in Gaza. Israel chooses to engage with the PA, which recognizes it, rather than with Hamas, which rejects its right to exist.

4. Israel is interested in continuing coordination with the PA to prevent security deterioration and addressing joint challenges and opportunities in other fields. Israel will support the PA’s efforts to unite the West Bank and Gaza Strip into one Palestinian entity under its leadership and to hold elections.

5. Israel pledges to help improve living conditions for the Palestinians, not as an alternative to a diplomatic solution but out of a moral-humanitarian commitment. Israel calls on the international community to contribute to this effort as well as to diplomatic efforts to advance peace.

6. Israel is willing to enable the planned construction in Kalkilya to accommodate natural population growth, to avoid demolishing houses and public facilities in east Jerusalem and Area C, to increase the number of work permits for Palestinians, and ease freedom of movement and the transfer of taxes it collects on behalf of the PA.

7. Israel appreciates the efforts invested by the US administration in formulating its vision of peace, but emphasizes that resolution of the conflict must stem from direct negotiations between the sides, with regional and international involvement, taking into consideration the needs and aspirations of both sides to the conflict.

8. Israel will not undertake unilateral annexation measures in the territories. It will freeze construction in the settlements that risks the feasibility of the two-state solution and will preserve the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Relations with Europe

1. Israel wishes to turn the page on its relationship with the European Union. Israel regards the EU as a friend and partner with which it shares common values and wants to deepen and expand diverse and positive cooperation.

2. Israel will continue promoting bilateral relations with EU member states, viewing them as an effective tool to influence decision-making in Brussels. However, it will not take advantage of such moves to undermine the EU and deepen its internal divisions.

3. As a state committed to the values of liberal democracy, Israel attaches great importance to a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and will prioritize ties with European states that share those same values.

4. Israel will continue to criticize EU measures that it opposes, but will do so through open, honest dialogue and in as positive a climate as possible. The new government will cease the harsh rhetoric and incitement against the EU and express its criticism in a professional manner.

5. Israel will continue to boost its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and promote additional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the formation of regional frameworks with the participation of European and Arab states, and restoration of relations with Turkey to ambassadorial level.

6. Israel extends an invitation to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for an official visit. Israel’s foreign minister will conduct an official visit to Europe, during which he will seek to meet with EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

7. Israel seeks to renew the high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012, in order to update old agreements and discuss new ones.

8. Israel welcomes the 2013 European proposal of upgrading Israel-EU relations to the level of a Special Privileged Partnership once Israeli-Palestinian peace is achieved, and is interested in launching a dialogue on the proposal’s potential content.

9. Israel values the EU’s support for advancement of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation through civil society organizations and other channels and its efforts to promote peace and democracy in the region.

10. Israel would like to inform the EU that it seeks the renewal of the peace process with the Palestinians and will avoid unilateral steps that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Initial policy recommendations for Foreign Minister Ashkenazi – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project?

The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination among the states was clearly lacking, as was the initial lack of solidarity, reflected for example in a halt to medical equipment exports to Italy.

When hospitals in Italy were collapsing, urgently needing life-saving protection equipment, Germany, France and additional member states where the epidemic had not yet spread suspended exports of these items. European solidarity was exposed as a hollow slogan, anchored in the Lisbon Treaty but not in European hearts. National instincts predominated. Even if Brussels thought in terms of Europe, EU member states thought of themselves and the competence was, as mentioned, in their hands. It was only several weeks later that manifestations of solidarity emerged, such as transferring Coronavirus patients on respirators from northern Italy to hospitals in Germany. The initial impression, however, was seared in the minds of Italians who desperately needed help and did not get it.

In addition to the absence of solidarity on health-related issues, economic solidarity was also lacking. Italy and other states asked the Eurozone’s finance ministers to approve “Coronavirus bonds”, meaning that the 19 members of the currency bloc would pool some of their debt. The Dutch and German refusal to share in the debt burden of southern European states generated anger, bitterness and disappointment in Italy, Spain and other countries. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen eventually apologized to the Italians on behalf of the other Europeans for failing to render assistance when their state’s health system collapsed. This was an unusual move, but perhaps too little, too late.

In April, the EU was able to cut back some of its losses and even record several achievements. The bloc was quick to regain its composure, quickly shifting to new and creative solutions. Lessons have clearly been learned from previous crises. The European Central Bank was quick to spend 750 billion euros in bond purchase, and the European Commission redirected 37 billion euros from the EU’s budget (which totals some 165 billion euro in 2020) to fighting the pandemic’s repercussions. Aid packages for the 27 member states and their 450 million residents total some 4 billion euros.

The Commission has also launched a joint procurement agreement of medical equipment for the member states and is working on EU-funded construction of joint medical equipment stockpiles. Moreover, the EU has allocated 140 million euros for Coronavirus research, to work on a vaccine and other interim solutions. In addition, the EU’s policy and legislation banning and limiting state-aid has been suspended, and a green light was given to EU member states (under the European Commission’s supervision) to increase their deficits in order to help business and citizens.

The Coronavirus crisis is not only a health crisis. It is a mega-crisis with harsh economic aspects. It is also a crisis of governance and a challenge to democracy. Changes to one’s lifestyle beget changes in perceptions, ideas and identity. The epidemic once again pits the skeptics and critics of the European integration project against its supporters, bolstering the populists and mainly the nationalists.

The Coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s weakness in dealing with member states not committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban pushed through emergency legislation made possible under the Coronavirus crisis that allows him and his government to take action and pass laws without parliamentary oversight. The legislation, with no stipulated deadline, is akin to suspending democracy in Hungary. Although the crisis entails intrusions of privacy in many countries, no democracy in Europe or elsewhere has adopted such harsh measures. The EU is based on values of democracy, the rule of law and human and civil rights, but Orban’s move generated only a feeble response on the part of the EU and its member states. This type of challenge has hovered over the EU for several years and demands a determined response. Weak actions undermine the EU and testify to its institutional inadequacy and its normative frailty.

The economic crisis will affect the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, too. China, where the epidemic originated, responded forcefully and blocked it relatively fast and effectively. At the height of the crisis in Italy, when its neighbors refrained from providing it with medical equipment, China sent tens of tons of medical equipment as well as medical teams. This gave China points in Italian public opinion, as the EU was losing ground. China’s economic activity has almost reverted to its pre-Coronavirus level; in Europe, the epidemic hit harder and the economy will take longer to recover. From a broader perspective, Europe, which has been experiencing an economic decline, is losing points to China in the global competition.

And what about Israel? The EU’s voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has faded in any case in recent years. Since 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been mobilizing his opportunistic European friends, who are interested to ram Brussels, in order to block EU resolutions critical of Israel. Instead, the EU has only been reiterating consensual decisions adopted in the past. When the number of Coronavirus fatalities in Europe soars, the foreign policy “guns” fall silent. The Coronavirus-induced crisis, weakening Europe and diverting global attention, may weaken the European response to Israeli annexation measures that will be presented as implementing the Trump plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Europe has been hit the hardest by the Coronavirus. Over 100,000 of the virus’ 180,000 known fatalities are EU citizens. For now, it does not appear the EU will be one of the epidemic’s victims, but public confidence in some of its systems has been substantially undermined and some of its “pre-existing conditions” have erupted and intensified. The EU has been weakened both internally and externally, but it is fighting back and the final word in the European integration project is far from being said.

An efficient, functioning international system is vital to confront surging nationalist sentiment. The cross-border Coronavirus does not distinguish between race and color and fighting it requires internal European cooperation. The EU has displayed resilience in bouncing back from its initial hesitant and uncoordinated response. However, the decisive question in the wake of the crisis is whether European leaders and citizens view the EU as a political or merely an economic functional project. In this context, it is too soon to chart the balance of EU losses and wins in the Coronavirus crisis.

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Trump Plan: Not the Way to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.