הפוסט The UAE’s Foreign Policy Anchors and Their Influence on Israel and the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As I’ve come to learn from other Israelis, my experience of flourishing friendship with Majid is not unique. After the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israelis and Emiratis took to meeting one another on Zoom in high numbers. These remote introductions that defined global communication during the pandemic offered a kind of soft initial encounter between the two peoples. Since that time, professional interactions between Israelis and Emiratis have taken on an uncommon level of warmth. One Israeli CEO opened up to me about how his Emirati colleague affectionately calls him a “long-lost brother found,” a striking reflection of the familial resonance of the 2020 Abraham Accords and its namesake’s two sons.

It all might seem rather counterintuitive. Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are far older. Yet they don’t exhibit anything close to the 120 business-to-business agreements and memoranda of understanding signed with the UAE. As a point of comparison, it was reported in 2022 that Egypt and Israel were aiming to achieve $700 million in annual trade by 2025. The United Arab Emirates saw $2.56 billion of trade with Israel in 2022, accompanied by investments exceeding $3.5 billion.

At 46 and 30 years, respectively, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan have also begun to show signs of aging. The official reactions of both countries to Israel’s war with Hamas have been quite critical of Israel, with Jordan recalling its ambassador and Egypt publicly threatening to nullify the Camp David Accords. The UAE, by contrast, has exhibited a more balanced reaction. Lana Nusseibeh, a Palestinian Emirati and the UAE’s ambassador to the United Nations, has indeed issued condemnations of Israel’s actions and successfully led the adoption of Resolution 2712, which called for increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, her public statements have also included a dimension of sympathy and understanding for Israel, referring to the October 7 attacks as “horrific.” And the only Israeli ambassador to a Middle Eastern country who has remained in office throughout the war without recall or expulsion is Amir Hayek, Israel’s ambassador to the UAE.

Why? Because Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates stands on a stronger foundation of emerging shared values and may well develop into a true national friendship.

In 2016, the UAE government established a ministry of tolerance. The UAE’s commitment to religious toleration is a function of a broader cultural evolution that has been taking place in the country for several decades. On February 5, 2019, over a year before the signing of the Abraham Accords, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Abdullah bin Zayed announced a plan to create the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi, an opulent complex containing the Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque, the St. Francis Church, and the Moses ben Maimon Synagogue — named in the spirit of interreligious dialogue. The announcement came during Pope Francis’s visit to the Arabian Peninsula, the first ever by a pontiff, when he referred to the UAE as “a land that is trying to be a model of coexistence, of human brotherhood, and a meeting place among diverse civilizations and cultures.” In keeping with the nature of the visit, the pope and Sheikh Ahamed al-Tayeb signed the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, also known as the Abu Dhabi Declaration. Worth noting is that despite the Egyptian heritage of both Maimonides and al-Tayeb (admittedly not exactly a philosemite), such an initiative was taken in the UAE rather than Egypt. Egypt has not had a chief rabbi since the 1972 departure of Rabbi Haim Moussa Douek for France and then New York. The UAE, by contrast, announced Rabbi Yehuda Sarna as the country’s first chief rabbi in 2019.

Founded 23 years after Israel, the UAE is swiftly establishing itself as a technological focal point in the Arab world, marked by substantial investments in knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurship cultivates a sense of curiosity about other points of view and an interest in learning from those who have similar drives. As is well known, Israel has long been recognized as a global hub for cutting-edge technology, contributing groundbreaking inventions and knowledge to the international community. It is therefore no surprise that both nations demonstrate pioneering advancements in space industries, renewable energy, and other advanced technological fields within the region. Even Israel’s entry into natural-gas production has not diminished its primary economic reliance on its intellectual human capital, a prioritization it shares with the UAE.

Another aspect of this cultural revolution has been educational. The Emirati government decided in 2021 to include Holocaust studies in its schools’ textbooks. In parallel, the organization Sharaka (Arabic for “partnership”), founded on the basis of the Abraham Accords, “is working to shape a new Middle East, built on dialogue, understanding, cooperation and friendship.” The organization has forged this path with its Holocaust Education Program, which brings joint Arab-Israeli delegations on an educational journey to Israel and Poland with the goal of learning the lessons of the Holocaust as an extreme expression of intolerance. The program aims to empower young leaders within these communities, nurturing them to become ambassadors of tolerance and coexistence.

As the first head of Middle East relations at the University of Haifa — a new position that would have been inconceivable a mere decade ago but emerged from the possibilities of the Abraham Accords — I can attest to the interest of scholars from both countries to work together. Nearly all Israeli universities have now engaged in some way with Emirati counterparts. The enthusiasm to join up with Israelis is even greater in Emirati think-tank institutes such as the Emirates Policy Center, the Anwar Gargesh Diplomatic Academy, Trends, and b’huth.

An Abu Dhabi workshop entitled “New Regionalism in the Middle East” in June of last year was a collaboration between four Emirati think tanks and Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, and was attended by researchers from the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. The discussions, in which I participated, were deep, honest, and intriguing, tackling sensitive issues — such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Israel’s current right-wing government, and social differences — head-on. My conversations with female colleagues from the region were among the most eye-opening and empathic I have experienced in an academic or professional context; they left me inspired to work together with them in regional sisterhood.

However, the educational and cultural evolution within the UAE is also reflected in political terms in ways that present opportunities as well as challenges to Israel. Careful observation of the UAE’s foreign policy reveals that the Abraham Accords are part of a larger campaign to promote regional reconciliation. Beginning with Syria under Basha al-Assad’s leadership before extending to Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar, the UAE has pursued normalization with Israel’s enemies as well. There are, of course, pros and cons to this. On the pro side, any initiative toward genuine regional peace might help create conditions of mutual understanding and advance Israel’s vision of being a country like all others with safe and secure borders. The UAE’s formal ties with Syria have already proven beneficial to Israel, particularly since they allowed the Emirates to play a role as mediator during the war.

On the con side, this collaboration might ultimately impose limitations on Israel in the future. Israel has constructed a narrative for its relations with the Arab Gulf states based on the concept of a shared adversary: Iran. Without this common enemy, history suggests, regional actors will return to traditional factional lines, and the current phase of reconciliation in the Middle East may prove unsustainable in the long term. Owing to the evolving regional dynamics, Israel must explore new narratives to reinforce the legitimacy of its normalization with the Gulf countries, especially in light of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year. Needless to say, these attempts at reconciliation and understanding are unprecedented.

More work remains to be done. The question is, who will do it? It is an open secret that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not widely regarded as the most trustworthy partner in the Gulf. The strained personal relations Bibi shares with Gulf leaders are evident in almost all discussions I’ve had with regional counterparts, and in the well-known fact that he has not publicly met with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. In contrast, bin Zayed has met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog twice, including once during the war, as well as with former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. During Bennett’s term as prime minister and Yair Lapid’s as foreign minister, they initiated the Negev Forum — a significant achievement for Israel’s integration in the Middle East. Under the renewed term of Netanyahu, the differences are widely felt within the Israeli government offices. UAE media portray the current government as “ultranationalist and ultra-Orthodox,” and a series of actions and statements by the Israeli government had already strained relations before October 7. The saving grace is that these primary tensions are quite possibly temporary.

The wellsprings of connection between the two countries run deep, deeper than some of those with whom Israel has enjoyed nonhostile relations for decades. The Israel-UAE partnership is still in its infancy, on a complicated journey toward maturity that holds known and unknown challenges. These challenges require ongoing commitment and collaboration. The partnership has proven durable thus far, weathering a perfect storm: the largest military conflagration for Israel in a generation. What has become clear is that both countries genuinely value prosperity for themselves and the other. Is there a stronger definition of regional friendship than that?

Moran Zaga is a policy fellow at Mitvim— the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.

הפוסט Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates is a model for a new Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To counter public claims asserting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had no actual intention of implementing annexation, the Emirati leadership has emphasized that the Abraham Accords were the result of a diplomatic effort for the sake of the Palestinian people. The UAE presented Israel’s decision to halt the annexation as a quid pro quo for the normalization agreements and as the result of pressure the UAE exerted on the Israeli government.

Senior Emirati officials emphasized in the Israeli media the importance of halting annexation and of the Israeli and American commitments to do so under their agreement. The UAE thus set a red line in its relationship with Israel regarding future annexation attempts. The linkage between normalization with Israel and an end to the threat of annexation of Palestinian land signals a new stage in the UAE’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previously, the UAE was passive on the issue, supporting the Arab Peace Initiative from the sidelines. Now, it is leading a significant move positioning itself as an active player in this arena, despite its rift with the Palestinian leadership.

However, while annexation was defined as a clear red line in Israeli-Emirati relations, other issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain a gray area, for example, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank. Along with positive relations and flourishing cooperation, the UAE has been implicitly critical of Israel over its activities in the West Bank. In December 2020, the Emirati media gave wide coverage of the shooting of a young Palestinian by Israeli soldiers, and in February 2021, it reported on the decision of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate whether Israel had committed war crimes in the Palestinian Territories.

Additionally, the two countries share new economic relations, with many Israeli delegations visiting the UAE, including one representing the Shomron Regional Council, the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in the northern West Bank. In December 2020, the Shomron Council signed an export agreement with the UAE’s FAM Holdings. Such cooperation, however, is limited to the private sector, and UAE officials have yet to present clear positions on the purchase of settlement-made goods, ties with the settlements and, in general, the settlement enterprise. Nonetheless, the developing cooperation with Israel will presumably force the UAE to formulate such a policy, or at least to respond to initiatives relating to the territories.

The Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif issue is also considered a gray area in the Israeli-Emirati relationship. On August 31, 2020, during the first official Israeli delegation visit to Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed declared his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem.

IN OCTOBER 2020, senior Emirati representatives visited al-Aqsa Mosque and encountered angry Palestinians who cursed them and shouted at them to get out, an incident that inflamed tensions between the sides and could result in rethinking the sovereignty issue at the holy site. The incident prompted Israel to strengthen security at the site for visitors from the Gulf, but once tourism from the UAE and Bahrain opens up, the site could once again provoke friction in the trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Gulf states relationship.

Those following the UAE’s diplomatic declarations and activities undoubtedly noticed that in the initial three months after plans were announced to normalize ties with Israel, the Emirati leadership went out of its way to express its commitment to Palestinian national aspirations. The many statements on the issue could attest to its importance to the Emirati leadership as well as the concern over criticism of the agreement with Israel.

Given the precedent it set among Arab and Muslim states by forging full diplomatic relations with Israel, the UAE invested heavily in public diplomacy vis-à-vis its own citizens, the Palestinian people, and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the absence of dialogue with the Palestinian leaderships deprives the UAE of significant leverage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and forces it to choose roundabout channels to exert influence, for example, through Jordan, Egypt and the UN.

Jordan and Egypt serve as a mediating channel between the Emirates and the Palestinians, given their close relationship and importance to both sides, but most of the activity within these channels remains classified. The UN, on the other hand, serves as a public platform on which the UAE demonstrates its support of the Palestinians by providing humanitarian aid, for example, by coordinating Emirati medical equipment delivered to the Palestinians during the pandemic. Israel has now also joined these Emirati channels of influence, which provide it with a certain measure of involvement in the Palestinian arena, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and possibly in a future negotiating process.

According to Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, despite Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords, the agreements could actually serve the Palestinian position in the conflict with Israel by:

1) Introducing a new paradigm for peacemaking.

2) Introducing new actors into the peace process, such as the Emirates, serving both Israeli and Palestinian interests.

3) Changing Israeli public opinion regarding the Arab world and the benefits Israel could derive from peace agreements, thereby boosting support for negotiations with the Palestinians. This narrative serves as the UAE’s main argument in explaining its influence on regional stability and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – in both practical terms and in raising awareness.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has sought to spotlight its direct humanitarian contribution to the Palestinians (though not via UNRWA), its relationship with the Palestinian community in the Emirates, its intention to develop new economic channels for the Palestinians and, as mentioned, its commitment to the Palestinian people and to the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

The Emirati leadership’s key message is that its decision to forge ties with Israel was designed to benefit peace, but not at the expense of the Palestinian issue. At a UN Security Council debate, the UAE urged all sides to harness the momentum created by the peace agreement with Israel for renewed negotiations with the Palestinians. With this message, the UAE is outlining its role within the new paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations and the new rules of the game it has defined.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 10th 2021.

הפוסט A look at UAE policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government.

הפוסט The UAE and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So far, these encounters have exposed significant differences between the Israeli and Gulf systems of higher education, requiring awareness and attention, and possibly some adaptations.

A top-down approach

The Emirati universities and research institutions are integrated into official governmental mechanisms at varying levels of ties and commitment. For example, the presidents of public (governmental) universities are generally cabinet ministers, too. Culture Minister Noura Al Kaabi is also the president of Zayed University; Minister of State Zaki Nusseibeh is the chancellor of UAE University. Even when the role is purely symbolic, it illustrates the affinity between the government and the academic sectors.

These structural and cultural characteristics directly affect the ways research ties could develop. Additionally, traditional barriers have not yet been removed. In this interim period between the signing of the Abraham Accords and the full realization of collaborations, there are still considerable hesitations. On the one hand, the individual researcher based in the UAE is relatively independent in conducting joint projects and maintaining research ties with Israeli scholars. For the most part, their collaboration might unofficially impact their social status in the department or university spheres. On the other hand, reaching out to the faculty or university administration level is far more challenging, as the higher administration levels await formal authorization. Until bilateral ministerial agreements on higher education will be achieved, most of the institutional initiatives from Israel will encounter significant obstacles. Within this state of affairs, some progress was achieved in very few cases, such as the MoU between Israel’s Weizmann Institute of Science and The Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence.

Mapping the research institutions in the UAE and Bahrain

The UAE and Bahrain have both public and private institutions of higher learning. Mostly, Emirati nationals are eligible to study at the UAE’s public universities, while most of the faculty are international. Studies are conducted separately for men and women. Women constitute a distinct majority in the UAE and Bahrain public universities, whereas most of those who go to study abroad are men.

The private facilities include universities, colleges, and research institutions, some locally owned and others branches of international universities. Absurdly, perhaps, the American and European university branches in the UAE are not as free to initiate ties with Israel as the Emirati ones. The reason is that their administrations, naturally, are not as closely affiliated with the local leadership as are government or privately owned local universities and therefore, their waiting period for a green light is longer. In other words, the management of public universities or locally owned, private ones would probably feel more comfortable taking some decisions independently, whereas NYU Abu Dhabi and Sorbonne Abu Dhabi will wait for official government approval. Within the private research sector, think tanks seem to provide fertile ground for high profile ties with Israeli research and policy institutes. This stems from their smaller size and relatively independent standing due to their affiliation with government leadership.

Fewer oriental scholars, more scientists

In the past, the image of Israeli research ties with the Arab World was associated mainly with Islamic studies. The Abraham Accords change this paradigm from research on the Middle East to research with Middle Eastern states. The launching of research opportunities with the Gulf countries to Israeli scholars opens broad mutual research interests. Humanities in the Gulf States are relatively marginalized, with most attention devoted to applied sciences, such as management, environmental studies, law, cyber, computers and digital sciences, artificial intelligence, engineering, economics, and the space industry. There was good reason that the first official collaboration between Israeli and Emirati research centers was in the context of the coronavirus, in a joint effort to develop vaccinations. Beyond the popularity of these research fields in the Arab Gulf States, the move highlighted the UAE’s ambition to position itself as a scientifically advanced state.

International affiliation

Unlike Israeli institutions of higher education, studies in the UAE’s universities and colleges are conducted in English. As mentioned, most of the teaching and research faculty consists of foreign nationals, which affords a diverse scientific environment with abundant research approaches.

The dominant international orientation in the UAE, Bahrain and other Gulf States is discernible not only in their domestic institutions but also in their outreach abroad. Most talented students with top grades will eventually study in the West, returning home with vast knowledge, diverse ideas and cultural influences. Usually, these students are granted government scholarships, and in most cases they will return to their home countries upon their graduation. Furthermore, the Gulf States invest heavily in international cooperation with various foreign research institutions. The endeavors to integrate into the global research arena are also reflected in the formation of research centers abroad, aligned to their research doctrines and interests. Therefore, scientific collaborations with Israel, even on the institutional level, will be among many others that these states conduct.

Researching research

The academic and political culture of the UAE and Bahrain is very different from the West’s, and despite the abundant presence of international scholars, the local system creates unique conditions and characteristics. As a result, in attempting to advance scientific and research ties with these states, we must do what we do best – study and research the higher education system in the Gulf to understand it better before approaching it.

הפוסט The Culture of Sciences: Bridging the Gaps<br> Between the Emirati and Israeli Research Systems הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Continuity

The drawing of Middle East borders in the 1920s had overridden traditional cultures and sociopolitical structures. The modern states introduced not only new divisions but also totally different political models, based on Western heritage. Some would claim that this decolonization process has left its remarks on the regional conflicts to this day. These conflicts, though, had never been part of the modern UAE.

The UAE’s federal structure is probably one of the most brilliant ideas in the region’s history. By drawing internal borders, each sheikhdom was able to preserve its own territory and identity. The national identity that was created in 1971 added another layer of identity and belonging. Yet, instead of overriding the primordial political and social systems, the modern country fully embraced them. The sheikhdoms continue to play an important role in the modern state structure and contribute to its stability.

Flexibility

From all of the Arab countries, the UAE has likely the most skillful ability to foresee the future, plan, and change over time. The 2030 vision that was initiated by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, aims to reduce the country’s centralised political and economic systems. The way to do so, according to that strategy, is through hybridic and diversified systems that decentralize the sources and power.

The federal system is one example of hybridity, but there are many more. The Federal National Council (FNC) brings democratic principles into a monarchic regime. The FNC itself forms a hybrid system in which half of its members are being elected and half nominated. The Emiratizaion project is another project that proves that local identity can be strengthened while the country continues to be an international hub. Hybridity and flexibility are also evident in the economic sphere. Various economic models were intertwined into the rentier state model much before the regional awareness to post-oil era. In the past two decades, new economic sectors and new domestic sources of income emerged, such as the VAT. The country developed a diversified  economy and built a civil nuclear plant that reduces the need for fossil fuels in its domestic electricity generation mix. The hybrid approach comprises an important tool for coping with changing realities. Diversification plays an important principle in major policy decisions and shapes the UAE’s self-sufficiency.

Legitimacy

Continuity and flexibility might sound opposites, but their combination is the key to achieve domestic and international legitimacy. According to the ASDA’A survey of 2020, the UAE is the country that Arab youth would most like to live in and it’s the no. 1 country they would like to emulate. This legitimacy affords a great deal of confidence for the country to act and and to make bold steps. These steps were seen both in soft power and hard power actions that the UAE initiated, mostly in the last 3 years. The Abrahamic Accords exemplify that confidence, that cannot be made without a solid legitimacy.

To conclude, continuity, flexibility and legitimacy are the three factors that make the UAE such a stable country in the Middle East. Instead of taking its economic advantages as granted, it planned a well-thought and long-term strategies. Those who understand this nature of the UAE, can see why the year of 2020 was named: Year of preparation.

On a personal note, I’d like to congratulate the United Arab Emirates for its 49 anniversary. May this new partnership open the minds and hearts of all peoples in our region for generations to come.

**The article was published on Qposts, 2 December 2020

הפוסט The UAE’s Stability from an Outsider’s Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Even prior to recent normalization agreements, Israel had a wide record of ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These ties intensified in recent years and created an infrastructure conducive to the normalization of relations, with multinational and multicultural platforms as the key component. Multilateral engagement on events and agreements or in organizations, agencies, drills, and forums has several advantages for states that do not maintain official diplomatic ties: It legitimizes cooperation by blurring direct contacts, forges collaboration through broad alliances with many players, and facilitates unofficial ties without having to formalize them.

Both the UAE and Bahrain regularly host a variety of multilateral events, reflecting their ambitions to become global hubs for diplomatic, cultural, and economic affairs. Within this framework, they expanded their engagement with Israel and increased the visibility of their ties. Each year, new breakthroughs in relations were achieved under the auspices of international umbrellas, challenging the opposition to normalization with Israel and presenting different interpretations of it.

In the early 2010s, the UAE began permitting Israeli participation in international sporting events hosted in the country. In 2015, Israel opened a formal mission in Abu Dhabi within the framework of the United Nations’ International Renewable Energy Agency. As a host country, the UAE clarified that the presence of the Israeli office did not alter the status of the formal diplomatic relations between the two. In 2018, the UAE allowed Israeli delegations to display national symbols at international events, taking yet another step toward the normalization of relations. Over the next year there was a strengthening of civilian ties, mostly through interfaith initiatives on the part of the Gulf Arab states and their increasing openness toward Judaism. The UAE declared 2019 its “Year of Tolerance.” Within this context, the county announced the establishment of the Abrahamic House, with a mosque, church, and synagogue together in one complex. Already, in 2017, a Bahraini delegation visited Israel to promote religious tolerance and, in 2019, Jerusalem’s chief rabbi visited Bahrain for an interfaith event. Then, in 2020, an additional aspect of direct, public ties emerged with the arrival of two Emirati planes in Israel carrying humanitarian aid for the Palestinians. In June, Israel and the UAE made a joint announcement on scientific cooperation on developing a coronavirus vaccine.

Moreover, ongoing ties reflect the stability of these relations. The UAE admits Israeli visitors bearing foreign passports, even those issued in Tel Aviv; a dual passport bypasses direct ties, by channeling them through an Israel-Gulf-third country triangle. And outside the UAE and Bahrain, international conferences in third countries provided a venue for senior Israeli figures to meet with top Emiratis and Bahrainis.

Multilateral and Bilateral Interactions Between Israel and the UAE or Bahrain

There has been a wide gap between multilateral and bilateral interactions. In the diplomatic sphere, numerous Israeli ministers have visited Bahrain or the UAE, usually for international events hosted in either country. Economically, trade and business deals occurred mostly through third parties, as did overt security deals and drills. And on the civil channels, sports and religion connected Israelis, Bahrainis, and Emiratis in joint platforms. While bilateral relations were covert for the most part and few in number, the international frameworks provided much more significant platforms for engagement, which included exposure and enabled a gradual warming of ties. These ties were a significant element helping to pave the way over time for formal normalization of relations.

Drawing from the experience of the building of ties with the UAE and Bahrain, Israel and other Arab countries can mobilize governmental and civil society players to cultivate relations. An initial step would include mapping multilateral platforms to identify potential opportunities, such as with international business collaborations, research institutes, sporting and cultural events, international forums, and humanitarian aid agencies. Then, proactive outreach could increase potential invitations and engagements. Further, Israel can invest in efforts to host multinational and multicultural organizations and conferences and invite Arab states to take part.

It will take time until such initiatives coalesce into warmer relations and potentially significant diplomatic ties between the states involved. Nevertheless, the “routinizing effect,” created by increased opportunities to engage, promotes ties and brings nations closer. The process requires a large degree of diligence and persistence. But it holds the potential to create a firm basis for stable, long-term ties and perhaps normalized relations.

The article was published on AGSIW.

הפוסט Multilateral Platforms Built Framework for Ties with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Diplomatic-Security Field

Israel’s most prominent interest in closer relations with the UAE stems from its desire for greater legitimacy within the Middle East, while the UAE wishes to strengthen its regional standing and role. Abu Dhabi is considered relatively moderate among the region’s Arab-Muslim states, allowing for a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach toward ties with Israel. It also enjoys a degree of political, economic and social stability that it unusual in the Middle East, enabling it to set in motion long-term processes.

The UAE’s decision to establish official ties with Israel, despite the absence of a regional peace initiative and progress in Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians, in return for only a suspension of Israel’s annexation plan, constitutes a new pattern that could encourage additional states to follow this example. Normalisation with Israel could enable the UAE to play a significant role in advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under changed political circumstances. The UAE’s regional alliance with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain also holds great potential for Israel, including the prospect of closer relations with these states. On an international level, the UAE devotes major efforts to expanding its diplomatic ties and branding itself as an important global centre of power, hosting international institutions, conferences, tournaments and so forth. The opening of the Emirates’ gates to Israeli participation in these events will provide Tel Aviv with further diplomatic and economic opportunities.

Israel and the UAE also share common challenges, chief among them Iran’s nuclear project, its regional influence and presence in various states, its training and arming of terror organisations, its maritime attacks on US-allied vessels, its use of military force through proxies, and the lifting of the international arms embargo on it. Also of great concern to both is Turkey’s growing standing as a regional power; the folding of the US defence umbrella in the Middle East and the ongoing threat to the UAE and Israel’s stability from terror organisations and radical factions.

The UAE is the most hawkish Gulf state in its attitude toward political Islam (especially the Muslim Brotherhood), which reflects Israel’s worldview. At the same time, Israel’s persistent struggle against Iran serves the UAE’s interests, and normalised relations between the states could help map out joint defence plans and even military operations in the worst-case scenario of a violent regional struggle. The establishment of relations will also enable the UAE to equip itself with advanced technology and weaponry and allow Israel to cooperate with an ally endowed with high-quality military capabilities.

The Economic Field

The UAE is an important economic hub due to its key position as a transshipment point to various parts of the world. Its resultant economic and diplomatic advantages are a magnet for states and companies worldwide and have therefore generated a great deal of interest in Israel, but also mean there will be significant competition to its integration into this circle of opportunity. The Emirati economy is heavily reliant on imports, and its Jebel Ali seaport is the most important in the region. Closer ties between the UAE and Israel would contribute to the opening of trade corridors for Israeli goods to the East and for Emirati goods to the West and the Mediterranean Basin. The two states also stand to profit substantially from establishing direct economic ties. Israel’s expertise in high technology and the UAE’s wealth of energy resources could provide a platform for joint activity serving mutual commercial interests. However, the size of the two countries’ economies in other commercial areas is quite limited compared to the competition posed by other states. Over the past decade, the UAE has started to develop its manufacturing capacity, meaning that its exports to Israel could gradually increase. The UAE tends to be a quick developer and has a history of initiating mega-projects. By focusing on their infrastructure, Israeli enterprises could enlarge their own knowledge and gain significant economic benefits. One of the most prominent collaborations could be Israel’s long experience with research and development centres that are now starting to grow in the UAE. These projects also provide many opportunities for broader international partnerships due to the Emirates’ open business culture.

The Civilian Field

Religion constitutes an integral part of daily life and politics in both Israel and the UAE, and both espouse norms of religious tolerance. Cooperation in this field would present additional opportunities for inter-religious ties, which already exist to some degree, such as Jewish-Muslim dialogue. In addition, Islam’s holy sites within Israel could draw religious tourism from the UAE. Nonetheless, the development of a tourism market would have more of a symbolic than economic value given the relatively small population of both countries. Another benefit, mainly for travellers, would be Abu Dhabi airport’s new status as a transit point for the many Israelis who travel to the East.

The medical sector also holds promising cooperation potential, as seen in the bilateral agreement between Israeli and Emirati companies to fight COVID-19 during 2020. Israel’s cutting edge medicine has drawn the attention of the UAE, which is itself engaged in efforts to advance its healthcare services. An exchange of knowledge and technology would allow Israel to benefit from the UAE’s prosperity and latest achievements in the space and energy industries, and the UAE to gain from Israel’s expertise in science and technology.

The shared desire for progress and interest in advanced technologies may allow for opportunities in other areas too, including environmental protection. The harsh climate conditions in the UAE have prompted a push for technological solutions to deal with the lack of potable water, desertification and heavy heat – phenomena with which Israel is familiar. Both states have built large desalination facilities and are continuing to seek creative solutions to harness solar energy and develop eco-friendly construction. The two states are gradually shifting to alternative energies and both strive to serve as models for global technological progress. A prominent example is the low-carbon, clean-tech Abu Dhabi city of Masdar, slated to become one of the world’s most sustainable urban communities.

Bilateral academic cooperation between Israel and the UAE, until now nonexistent, could also hold potential for both nations. Strengthening ties between researchers and scientists from Israel and the many branch campuses of international universities located in the UAE and other Gulf states could also contribute to the advancement of knowledge, especially in fields unique to the region. It would also provide researchers with access to archives and databases that are currently off-limits.

To sum up, Israel and the UAE have a stake in expanding cooperation in a variety of fields. Their focus lies in the field of diplomacy and security, in the contribution to their relative power and in deterrence against hostile forces in the region. For Israel, formal ties with the UAE will accelerate its integration in the increasingly powerful economic and diplomatic circles around it while strengthening its legitimacy in the region. The Emirati interest, for its part, centers on its regional standing, regional stability and Israel’s potential contribution to the fields of science, technology and security in the UAE. If Israel is an attentive partner for the Emiratis, progressing with them at their desired pace, and if any resolution of the Palestinian issue can provide political dividends for Abu Dhabi, Israel will benefit from a true ally and close partner on a long journey.

**The article was published on LSE blog

הפוסט The Potential for Israel–UAE Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the 2000s, a new generation of rulers came into power in four of the seven emirates that comprise the UAE. The new policies dictated by these leaders aimed to project influence far beyond the UAE’s borders, using both soft and hard power.

The hard power tactics, in particular, entailed a shift from the traditional rules of the Arabian Peninsula, such as “keeping the dirty laundry at home.” Years of UAE, Bahraini and Saudi enmity toward Qatar were kept largely under the international radar, with very few hostile public and official declarations. In 2017, the UAE broke the rule, issuing harsh, biting comments about its neighbor, blocking its land, sea, and aerial crossing to and from Qatar.

That relatively extreme step signaled a change in tactics throughout the Gulf region. At the same time, the UAE intensified its involvement in the fighting in Yemen and its armament with advanced weaponry.

The UAE also projected soft power in order to bolster its influence. It served as the main arbitrator between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and between the Taliban and the US. It was one of the first states to reconcile with Bashar Assad’s Syria when the civil war diminished, and has provided massive humanitarian aid to weak Arab countries, including to the Palestinians, as well as to other non-Arab states.

These measures attest to the UAE’s strong desire to become a regional power, a goal it has achieved to a large extent, as many have come to realize. The normalization blueprint with Israel provides an additional tool in the UAE’s soft power set of initiatives, and serves its desire for prominence.

The UAE was established nearly 50 years ago from a group of tribal coalitions living in a harsh, desert region. Its development is somewhat reminiscent of the meteoric breakthroughs achieved by the young Israel in science and technology, culture, regional security, a space industry, forming influential political lobbies in key world power centers and more. Global indexes (such as the Fragile State Index) point to the UAE as the most stable country in the Middle East.

The UAE continues to move ahead quickly, with very little bureaucracy and lots of ambition and capabilities. Its agreement with Israel constitutes another step forward in its move from the margins of the Arabian Peninsula to the center of the Middle East.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 12 September 2020.

הפוסט The United Arab Emirates: Profile of a state on the move הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The unusual route of the delivery expressed a sophisticated move of high-profile humanitarian endeavors, serving Emirati interests without entangling it in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, it displayed solidarity with the Palestinians at their time of need. Unlike its neighbor Qatar, with which it is waging a bitter struggle and which delivers cash shipments only to Hamas officials in Gaza, the Emirates could boast it was helping all Palestinians. On the other hand, it set another precedent move in the UAE relations with Israel that was happy to take part in the humanitarian chain. The aid delivery can be linked to the Emirati desire to elevate its international image by advancing “soft power” diplomacy such as medical assistance in this case, even as it faces a severe economic crisis induced by the dramatic global oil price decline. Such policy entails clear political advantages, as it is being translated into economic profit in the long term.

Once the plane landed, the Palestinian Authority (PA) announced it would refuse to receive UAE’s aid delivery, arguing that it has no interest in serving as a bridge for normalization between Israel and the Emirates. The decision came as no surprise given the crisis in the PA’s relations with Washington against the backdrop of the Trump plan and Israel’s intention to annex parts of the West Bank. The Palestinian excuse for rebuffing the aid was not far-fetched, but the exceptional Emirati move fell victim to a different ailment – inter-Arab rivalry, specifically the conflict between PA Chair Mahmoud Abbas and Mohamed Dahlan, the senior Fatah official forced into UAE exile in 2011 after being accused of trying to unseat Abbas. Since Dahlan took up residence in Abu Dhabi, Mahmoud Abbas has not set foot there and has not spared any expressions of repugnance with the state and its rulers.

Undeterred, the UAE continued to express support for the Palestinian people, conveying the message that the PA leadership is irrelevant for its genuine support for the civilian sector. Indeed, UAE humanitarian aid for the Palestinians has never stopped, going through third parties such as UNRWA or the Red Cross. If the PA received direct aid, it was clandestine. Aid for Gaza, on the other hand, was fully coordinated with Hamas through the Red Cross or directly through Dahlan’s wife, Jalila. There were times when Hamas was more receptive to the UAE aid, and others when it closed the door to such aid. The reasons for the shifting attitudes lie in the no less tense relationship between Qatar and the UAE over influence and patronage in Gaza. Whenever Qatar flexed its muscles, Hamas stopped accepting UAE’s support.

The UAE’s humanitarian aid that landed in Israel was coordinated with the World Health Organization by none other than the Palestinian-Emirati Ambassador to the UN Lana Nusseibeh, an Emirati citizen and the daughter of a prominent Jerusalem Palestinian family. She is the daughter of Zaki Nusseibeh, an Emirati government minister (the only one not of Emirati origin). Nusseibeh herself was certainly not keen on routing the shipment through Israel, viewing the Israeli channel, as do many Palestinians, as advancing normalization between Israel and the Arab world, at their expense. Like her, Dahlan, too, certainly did not encourage that route, especially because of the aid’s initial destination – the West Bank. Dahlan would have preferred to play the cards he has left in Gaza (Gaza was his original power base and his home) rather than bolstering his rival in Ramallah. In this respect, the PA’s refusal to accept the aid played into his hands in portraying Mahmoud Abbas as someone more concerned with politics than with the welfare of his people.

If additional proof was needed that Israel is part of the Middle East, the affair of the UAE aid to the Palestinians provides the evidence. Israel fell prey to the tangled rivalries besetting the Arab world and the personal rivalries within the Palestinian leadership. Both directly relate to Israeli interests. After all, Israel is interested in bolstering its relations – publicly, if possible – with the Emirates, nor is it simply a casual observer of the internal Palestinian struggle given that Dahlan is perceived by some Palestinians – and certainly by himself – as a legitimate heir to Abbas.

This tale ends, for now, with an interesting twist. The Emirati equipment and medicine appear to have found their way to Gaza, with Israeli assistance, of course. Meanwhile, on June 9, another Emirati plane, this one with clear national markings, landed in Israel carrying additional medical aid for Gaza. In this four-sided game among the UAE, Israel, the PA and Gaza, Abbas came out the loser – yet again, it should be said.

This article was published by The Jerusalem Post on 1 July 2020

הפוסט Israel Entangled in Arab Rivalries: The Case of the UAE Medical Aid for the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In his June 12 op-ed piece in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronoth, UAE Ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaiba enumerated the fruits of rapprochement with Israel. Among those that he neglected to mention are the thousands of Israeli tourists allowed to visit his country using foreign passports issued in Tel Aviv, hundreds of joint business initiatives, and dozens of official Israeli delegations participating in sports events and conferences in the Emirates. Some 2,000 Jews reside in Abu Dhabi, the Israeli and UAE air forces join annually in a multinational drill under US auspices, and the UAE buys millions of dollars in equipment from Israeli defense contractors, according to foreign reports. These numbers provide but a minor idea of the rich, flourishing relationship between Israel and the UAE. However, the greatest benefit for Israel does not lie necessarily in these direct ties but rather in the extent of the UAE’s influence in the region and other aspects harder to quantify.

Political influence: The United Arab Emirates is among the most powerful states in the Middle East, with influence far beyond its borders making it an important regional hub. It projects its foreign policy, including on issues related to Israel, onto its environs, thereby providing a quasi-seal of approval for other Arab states to approach Israel. Therefore, as al-Otaiba explains in understated diplomatic language, not only will annexation damage Israel’s ties with the Palestinians or the UAE, it would lead other Arab states to reject relations with Israel in keeping with the broader trend. Israel’s ability to improve its standing and expand its ties with the Arab world would be severely undermined.

Security and ideological influence: The UAE is on the “correct” side of the ideological map in battling religious extremism and terrorism, with far-reaching security consequences. Reflecting its worldview, the UAE is one of the leading states in battling Iran’s proxies in Yemen and is now aligning itself with the secular Haftar regime in Libya against the Government of National Accord backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey. It chose to sever ties with Qatar over its support of the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical tone adopted by Al-Jazeera not only against Israel but also against the UAE. Just as Israel is waging open war against Iranian nuclearization, so the UAE is fighting Israel’s war against radical forces in an internal Arab world discourse. Annexation will cost Israel this important resource of an unwritten ideological alliance and thereby risk the quality of security coordination between the states.

Cultural influence. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Qatar, considered developing nations within a rigid religious framework, the UAE is a developing nation within a relatively liberal framework. The tolerant climate provides foreign residents with freedom of worship; Emirati women have been allowed to drive since the UAE was constituted, and they serve in senior management positions, as government ministers and members of the Federal National Council. Many have established their own companies. Tourists and expats also enjoy broad cultural pluralism as regards behavior and dress. Israel apparently fails to realize the potential of the UAE’s moderating influence on stability in the Middle East.

Al-Otaiba defined the annexation as a provocation of “another order” and listed what Israel stands to lose from the move. His examples mostly included the inter-religious aspect of relations, but the most dramatic threat lies in his country’s widespread regional influence. If the potential deterioration of ties with the Palestinians is not strong enough to influence Israeli public opinion, then perhaps these mega-implications on the Middle East will affect decision makers’ risk management cards. The consequences of the Arab world slamming its doors in Israel’s face in response to annexation are hard to assess, but Israel must understand the broad picture of the risks on its doorstep.

הפוסט What Is the UAE Trying to Tell Israelis? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A research paper that was written on the subject in 2018, in the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab states, outlined how the UAE and Israel cooperate in four central areas: diplomacy, security, economy, and civilian affairs. The paper concluded that, at the date of its publication, there was a large and diverse array of partnerships in the economic sector. The paper also pointed to the fact that most of these partnerships are founded on ad hoc interests and temporary opportunities, and therefore the relationship between the countries cannot be described as consistent or deep. The majority of these collaborations are characterized by secrecy, due to the lack of formal relations or normalization between the UAE and Israel. At the same time, collaborations that take place in international platforms benefit from a higher level of legitimacy and exposure. Examples of this include the joint air force exercises of the two countries together with Greece, Italy, and the US; Israeli athletes’ participation in sporting events that take place in the UAE; and the gatherings of statespersons in various international fora that take place in the UAE. Most of these collaborations stem from the UAE’s desire to expand its role in the international community, and its wish to serve as a hub for international events and conferences. Within this framework, relations between the UAE and Israel have been tested a number of times in recent years, and were eventually strengthened, following the gradual removal of obstacles by the Emiratis.

In 2019, a series of events sharpened the UAE’s focus and priorities: the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen and its efforts to stabilize Yemen’s political system; its involvement in multiple regions, such as Libya and the Horn of Africa; the rising tensions around violent events in the Gulf and the diplomatic measures that the UAE took to pacify Iran; the ongoing crisis with Qatar; and the UAE’s focus on domestic issues, such as the Federal National Council’s elections and efforts to expand local workforce in the labor market. These changes of focus led, inter alia, to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in the UAE’s foreign affairs during the last year. The UAE’s involvement in the Palestinian arena was, in the last year, rather distant and symbolic, with continued humanitarian aid via UNRWA and the support of Mohammad Dahlan (believed to be a protege of Mohammed bin Zayed and the UAE’s main channel to the Palestinians). Additionally, the enduring participation of the Palestinian Nusseibeh family in senior positions in the UAE (Zaki Nusseibeh as a government minister, and his daughter Lana Nusseibeh as Permanent Representative to the UN) serves as another manifestation of the UAE’s solidarity with the Palestinians, though in their own territory.

The rather marginalization of the Palestinian issue was also manifested in a significant decline in statements of support for the Palestinian cause, and in decreased concrete involvement (or involvement attempts) in this arena by the UAE. The extent of the UAE’s support and commitment to the national struggle of the Palestinians is in dispute between researchers and policymakers. Though the decline in the UAE’s active involvement in the Palestinian issue does not necessarily attest to a decline in its commitment to the Palestinians. It may be attributed to its inability to exert influence in the Palestinian arena or to the increasing rapprochement between the UAE and Israel. The first aspect can be linked to the important role of Qatar and Egypt in the Gaza Strip, which restricts Dahlan and the UAE’s ability to exert influence in this arena except in unique cases, such as the months following the Qatar crisis in June 2017.

Turning to the second aspect, simultaneously and in contrast with moving away from the Palestinian arena, the UAE has shown greater openness to Israel and Israeli and Jewish audiences this past year. 2019 was characterized by improved informal relations between the countries, and these collaborations increased and became more diverse. The UAE’s decision to allow Israel to participate in Expo 2020 starting October of this year has become the driving force in shaping direct relations between the countries, and continues to shape them in various areas.

This paper examines existing cooperation between Israel and the UAE, and the changes that have taken place in the relations throughout 2019. The paper assesses these changes in four main areas: diplomacy, security, economy and civilian affairs, and briefly describes the main developments in each area in order to point to common denominators and indicate key trends.

הפוסט Israel-UAE Cooperation in 2019: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The interfaith rapprochement between the Gulf States and the Jewish world, including outreach efforts towards Jewish communities, has never been so strong. Bahrain was probably the pioneer of this process, as the only country in the Arab Gulf home to an indigenous Jewish community. Bahrain has emphasised its support for this community, often celebrates Jewish holidays, and appointed a Jewish woman to a leading diplomatic role in the United States. In 2017, another precedent was set when a delegation of Bahraini clerics visited Israel to promote interfaith tolerance.

In the same year, the Abu Dhabi Louvre Museum was opened in the United Arab Emirates, where several Judaic exhibits were displayed as the country declared its ‘Year of Tolerance’. These beginnings in the UAE also opened the door to intra-religious expressions of tolerance, such as the UAE’s inauguration of an official synagogue in Abu Dhabi, alongside a mosque and a church at a shared site.

This trend is also evident in Qatar which, despite its well-known affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood, announced that it would provide kosher food for Jewish visitors from Israel during the 2022 World Cup. Saudi Arabia, as part of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform programme, has also begun to interact with Jewish figures and institutions worldwide. In January 2020, Rabbi Marc Schneier was hosted by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tweeted about having ‘a unique Shabbat Experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’

What are the motivations behind this development, and why is it happening now? These actions, which are evident across the GCC countries with the exception of Kuwait (the only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel), reveal a combination of curiosity, openness and goodwill towards Judaism. While lauding these actions and statements by the Gulf States towards Jews as ‘Islam’s reformation’ – as some commentators have done – may be overstating it, they certainly reflect a changing socio-political reality in the region on two levels: an internal process of identity exploration and cultural development in the Gulf, and an external process of reaching out to the broader Muslim world and the international community. Both processes are driven by the motivation to produce, define and portray a distinct national character within which tolerance and openness towards ‘the other’ comprise important pillars.

While this trend certainly poses reputational benefits for the conservative and authoritarian Gulf States, it also entails deeper motivations, similar to those that led to the intra-Gulf rift in June 2017 in the name of denouncing ‘extremism’ and radical Islam. This boycott was part of a broader internal process of redrawing the imaginary boundaries in the Gulf, not along ethnic or religious lines but along ideological ones, particularly regarding the role of political Islam. Gulf scholar Andreas Krieg describes this process as a ‘war over narratives’ that is dividing the Arab world, and of which the Gulf states have become the main sponsors. Thus, promoting openness to other religions as a manifestation of ‘moderate’ versus ‘radical’ Islam is another aspect of this process of identity construction in the Gulf. Qatar, which is allegedly positioned beyond that imaginary boundary, plays with the same cards of soft power and religious outreach to deflect its opponents’ accusations of being a supporter of extremism.

Expressions of openness and tolerance towards Judaism carry no domestic costs for the Gulf States. In the absence of a significant presence of Jewish communities in their states, this approach does not threaten their internal political stability by risking demands for greater political rights by minority groups (unlike other marginalised groups in the Gulf, such as the Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia or the Bedoon in Kuwait). Furthermore, and most importantly, this trend does not entail normalising political relations with Israel. Yet, despite the separation of public opinion between the relationship with Judaism and that with Israel, the interfaith brand breaks cultural barriers and carries indirect benefits by warming relations between nations and peoples in the region.

In recent years, the Gulf states have taken on a more assertive leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Emirati academic Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla defined this process of the growing regional and international importance of these states as the ‘Gulf Moment’, a period in which the Gulf states assert themselves in the regional and international arenas as new centres of political, economic and cultural power. With this self-perception, these states are becoming more invested in grand strategies of social and religious reforms, and their advocacy for tolerance and interfaith dialogue comprises one prominent manifestation of this. Given these factors, we will probably continue to see these expressions in the near future – even if Israel is not explicitly mentioned in these discussions.

Adam Hoffman is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and Head of the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, a geostrategic analysis and business consultancy. 

Dr Moran Zaga is the academic coordinator of the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy at Haifa University and a policy fellow at Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal.

The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on appropriate responses to common challenges, this time with Iran. While Saudi Arabia took a public stance using confrontational language vis-à-vis Iran, the UAE remained vaguer in its media coverage of events and did not point an unequivocal finger of blame towards Iran. In the first attack against four oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on May 12, the UAE tried to diminish the significance of the attacks, claiming that the damage caused was minor. Some reports even claimed that Saudi Arabia preferred a military response towards Iran, while the UAE sought to smooth over the situation with a diplomatic resolution.

An additional dispute between the two countries relates to the war in Yemen. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have jointly led the campaign in Yemen against the Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels, who have been garnished with weaponry, advisors and money from Tehran. While the Saudi forces focused on air operations, the UAE army has played a more significant role on the ground, leading to several game-changing outcomes. Even though the Saudis led their allies to the war, it is now the UAE who is steering the wheels by gradually withdrawing from Yemen. In its cautious and sophisticated nature, the UAE had calculated its battles on the expanding fronts and realized that its focus should be granted to more immediate and close challenges. As tension with Iran increased, the UAE took a swift step to tackle the rising threat with greater attention and a reallocation of resources for any possible development.

The increasing international criticism over the humanitarian effects of the Yemen war was another catalyst for the Emirati withdrawal. The UAE’s pulling off from Yemen without a satisfactory arrangement acceptable to Saudi Arabia, is a probable source for a conflict between them and a death blow to the latter’s attempt to reach a victorious image in this arena.

Despite the increasing tension and apparent disagreements between the countries, their relationship is yet far from a crisis, as it is based on deep ideological and strategic partnership. The disagreements at this point mainly revolve around methods of action and degrees of force that each of the sides is interested in applying, whether in regard to military action, diplomatic decisions or social processes. Of the two, the UAE behaves like the “responsible adult” in its tactical choices, while Mohammed bin Salman has been portrayed as more reckless. Despite the open channel of communication between the two leaders, their continued proactive policies are increasing the likely challenges in the relationship between them.

The struggle between Iran and the Sunni Arab states has shaped the way researchers, journalists and intelligence analysts have understood and analyzed regional dynamics for many years. This struggle has geostrategic and ideological impacts on the region which affect many arenas. Alongside this struggle, however, another battle has been taking place for a while now which also has a significant impact on the character of the Middle East and beyond. Without standing out to a comparable degree, the competition between the Arab Gulf states, as we have seen in North Africa, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Palestinian arena, has made its mark on the region. This competition, which is driven by aspirations for influence and prestige in the Arab world, indirectly influences such issues as nuclear proliferation and regional arms races, thus bringing up new challenges for the security of the Middle East.

In the past, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia demonstrated restraint in conducting their foreign affairs. They stood in the shadow of others and made primary use of their comparative economic advantage. Today, they are the driving force behind many regional changes, and are key players in many arenas. However, with this power comes the weight of responsibility for maintaining regional stability. In this matter, it seems that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are implementing divergent approaches regarding the use of their power.

Yoel Guzansky is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served at Israel’s National Security Council and advised other ministries including the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.

Moran Zaga is a research fellow at the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy and a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in The National Interest)

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Among other outcomes, the Arab Spring led to the strengthening of the Gulf States’ standing in the Middle East, given the stability they displayed in the face of events that affected almost every country in the region. Consequently, the Gulf States leveraged the new balance of power to expand their international and regional influence, as was evident in Emirati-funded infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, Saudi-led high-level diplomatic moves, Oman’s call for regional mediation, the race for hosting international events in these countries, and many more soft-power displays. Kuwait has been the one exception, remaining virtually isolated. Thus, Israel must acknowledge these new nexuses of power in the Middle East, and draw up a corresponding map of alliances. Its integration into the expanding circle of opportunities emerging around the Gulf countries has the potential to be dually beneficial, since it does not only consist of bilateral or regional cooperation, but also of international opportunities.

The Expo events afford tremendous economic values for the participating countries, as well as the opportunity to shape their national image within the global community. The exposure to millions of visitors and the platform for establishing direct contacts among diplomatic representatives and key figures from around the world, generates a unique hub of diplomacy. Indeed, beyond its importance for Israel’s economy and image, Israel’s participation in this event, hosted by an Arab Muslim country it has no current and past diplomatic relations with, is a significant achievement, which reflects the nature of Israel’s current relations with the UAE.

On the one hand, the UAE, as the host of an international event, is expected by the international community to provide access to all countries, including Israel. As a result, the UAE and other Gulf countries have legitimized in recent years the arrival of Israeli nationals to international conferences and tournaments they hosted. In that sense, the UAE’s decision to invite Israel to Expo 2020 does not reflect a change in the status of ties between the two states, nor does it forecast the beginning of direct and formal relations. On the other hand, meeting this international code points to the UAE’s willingness to compromise on anti-normalization measures towards Israel.

Currently, the UAE government distinguishes between bilateral ties with Israel and international cooperation with it, leaving room to maneuver in the case of the latter. In the international realm, an Israeli representative office has been operating for the past three years in Abu Dhabi, the capital, under the auspices of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Israel and the UAE also conduct Air Force exercises and business cooperation in the fields of diamond trade and cyber technology, under international umbrellas. This demonstrates the warming relations between the countries mainly within multilateral frameworks, and is making headlines in the Israeli media mostly due to its public and symbolic nature. The UAE was a pioneer among the Gulf States in allowing an Israeli sports team to display its national symbols at the October 2018 international judo championship in Abu Dhabi. As part of the latter event, the Emiratis also hosted Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sports Miri Regev according to full ceremonial protocol. Additional sports events in the UAE, such as tennis tournaments, a car race and the Special Olympics have also included growing participation of Israeli delegations in recent years.

Conversely, the UAE strictly limits bilateral relations with Israel, conditioning them on a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Accordingly, the country has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel regarding measures it defines as unjust toward the Palestinian people. Therefore, it does not cooperate with Israel in areas such as culture, research, tourism, industry and media despite mutual interests in doing so. In the diplomatic arena, there are occasional reports of meetings between senior officials of both states, such as the September 2012 meeting between Netanyahu and the UAE Foreign Minister, and the recent January 2019 visit to the UAE by Labor Party leader Avi Gabbay who met with senior ministers. Nonetheless, such meetings are not intended for public knowledge (despite the occasional leaks) and are not considered official breakthroughs in official relations.

At the same time, we are witnessing a new phenomenon in which Gulf citizens express support for Israel on social media, and a growing number of senior Emiratis call for the establishment of direct ties with Israel. For example, Khalaf al-Habtoor, a leading Emirati executive, asked on twitter why the Gulf States are not signing a peace agreement with Israel “same as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan have done before”. Such voices do not regard Israel as an enemy, and view cooperation with it as a vital source of regional stability and development. While not reflecting an official government line, they signal a gradual shift from a formerly taboo subject to an increasingly acceptable opinion. These expressions of interest in bilateral relations create a crack in the traditional demand that has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key obstacle to normalization with Israel.

The gap between the official UAE policy toward Israel and the mutual courtship between the two nations demonstrates that Israel is on the cusp of a formative phase in these relations. At this point of time, Israel would do well to leverage the relative openness of the Gulf States towards it by expanding its involvement in the region. Just as Israel sought a formal invitation to Expo 2020, it should continue to identify opportunities, map scheduled international events in the Gulf and ask to participate. Israel should also invite Gulf countries to take part in international events it hosts.

One important issue that arises from increased interactions between Israel and Gulf States is the need to study the culture, values, sensitivities and local laws when preparing Israeli delegations for excursions in the Gulf. Such preparation should be overseen by a government agency, which will formulate a plan for ties with the Gulf States and will be put in charge of these ties through diplomatic, security, economic and civilian channels. By so doing, Israel’s presence in the Gulf could become more acceptable and even be expanded. However, if Israel seeks a more significant opening to the region, it must advance a resolution of the Palestinian issue through a genuine process that would also be of great benefit for its ties with the Gulf States.

Dr. Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a Research Fellow at the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This increasingly activist foreign policy approach also explains the growing interest of the UAE in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In its repeated declarations, the UAE has expressed its support for a two-state solution, but mostly stayed a passive supporter for international peace initiatives. Now, it appears that the UAE is striving to adopt an independent and proactive policy on the issue, with a greater involvement in internal Palestinian politics and in multilateral talks that include Israel.

The UAE is of much importance to Israel. The two countries share common interests and sometimes even similar worldviews, in parallel to the political and ideological gap that separates them. One of the prominent characteristics of the UAE is its moderate Islamic approach and its opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist organizations (Sunnis and Shiites). This worldview is at the center of the UAE’s dispute with Iran and Qatar, and this is where its values and interests converge with those of Israel. The moderate and liberal nature of the two countries, relative to other countries of the region, enables a pragmatic dialogue between them. Furthermore, the UAE enjoys strong political stability, which provides it with obvious economic advantages as well as with unique capabilities to shape long-term processes in the Middle East.

At the international level, the UAE invests considerable efforts and resources in expanding its diplomatic ties and in branding itself as an important global hub. As such, it hosts international institutions, conferences, competitions and events. However, this is a source for dilemma relating to its ties with Israel. On the one hand, the UAE faces domestic and regional criticism for hosting Israelis, and is accused of normalization with Israel. On the other hand, there is international pressure against boycotting Israel at international events, and an understanding in the UAE that such a boycott might lead to a loss of legitimacy. This often forces the UAE to accept Israeli participation in a variety of international events.

It is not far-fetched to imagine direct official contacts between the two countries in the future, but such relations seem unrealistic at this point. The UAE seems to currently prefer to avoid or limit any cooperation with Israel. For example, its official news agencies refrained from reporting on the opening of the Israeli representation to the UN’s International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi in early 2016. However, since there was significant coverage in Israeli and international media outlets about the topic, Maryam al-Falasi, the media officer at the UAE Foreign Ministry, issued an official statement clarifying that IRENA is an independent international agency with its own norms and laws, and that the opening of the Israeli representation does not indicate any change in the UAE’s position towards Israel or in the relations between the two countries.

Business cooperation between the two countries is no longer a secret. Nevertheless, the fact that they have to be covert and the scope of technical obstacles involved in carrying them out, make it difficult for Israel to compete with other countries in entering the desirable UAE markets. The potential for closer business, security, diplomatic and civilian ties is great. An example, is the international EXPO2020 exhibition, which will be held in Dubai in two years, and will be a hub for high level meetings between governments and private sector companies. Israel has not yet received an invitation for this exhibition and might miss out on this great opportunity.

The UAE is a partner in the waiting for Israel. Both Israel and the UAE are essentially pragmatic, and have leverage in the Middle East. The UAE has never participated in any war against Israel and there is no deep hostility between the two countries. The Gulf states, and the UAE among them, regard Israel as a regional player that must be dealt with. They all consider a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a source of regional stability and as a means to confront extremism in their own territories. The UAE Foreign Ministry’s website is full of references calling on Israel and the Palestinians to advance the peace process based on the two-state solution and the Arab peace initiative (2002).

In general, the UAE receives Jews of various nationalities in its territory and does not regard religious differences as the source of its conflict with Israel. Rather, it is Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. The regional influence that the UAE can exert, and its growing importance in the Middle East, position it as a country that can potentially play a significant role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whenever Israel will want to normalize relations with its neighbours and promote regional peace, it is likely to find a very willing partner in the UAE.

Dr. Moran Zaga researches social and geopolitical processes in the Gulf states. She is a Policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center at the University of Haifa and at the Forum for Regional Thinking. This article is based on her study on Israel-UAE relations, which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Opportunities on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not stand out in an empty void. In May 2018, an official Bahraini delegation participated in the Giro D’Italia bicycle race, which was held in Israel, and last December an interfaith group of from Bahrain arrived in Israel to promote a dialogue for coexistence and religious tolerance. But, of the events and declarations betweenIsrael and Bahrain in the past year, perhaps the most important was the declaration made by the King of Bahrain in September 2017 at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa condemned the Arab boycott of Israel and announced that Bahraini citizens are now allowed to visit Israel.

In the background of the latest visit of the Israeli delegation to the UNESCO conference, the Israeli media rushed to publish a quote from a “senior Bahraini official” who claimed that “the kingdom will be the first of the Gulf states to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel”. With this announcement, it appeared that the Israeli excitement over the warming of ties between the two countries had reached a new peak. However, this enthusiasm, like many others in the past, reflects to a great extent more of a wishful thinking than an actual rapprochement. In that case, the foreign minister of Bahrain hastened to shatter the illusion of normalization by issuing an official declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that categorically denied the senior official’s claim.

In light of developments described in the relations between the two countries recently, the question asked is why Bahrain took a step back to the traditional position of the Gulf states reasserting its “commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative.” The key issue for understanding that dualist attitude lies in the level of openness on the one hand, and the sensitivity on the other, which characterizes the relations between Israel and Bahrain, and to a large extent, Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. Bahrain’s unique openness towards Israel stems from a combination of security interests, as well as political and social-religious issues.

First, both Bahrain and Israel are against Iran’s armament in nuclear weapons and supported Trump’s pulling out from the nuclear deal. Following the civil protests that broke out in Bahrain during the Arab Spring (2011), Iran criticized the legitimacy of the Sunni regime in Bahrain and supported the political struggle of the Shiite population in the country. As a small country with about two-thirds of its population being Shiite, Bahrain feels threatened by Iran and could use any ally in its diplomatic efforts against Iran’s nuclearization and a strong coalition in a scenario of military confrontation. The location of the US’ Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is not coincidental in this context, nor is the recent hesitant rapprochement with Israel.

Beyond the political and security implications of such converging interests, the shared interests and allegedly common enemy had led in general to a less hostile dialog between the countries in the formal channels, as well as between citizens over the social media platforms. Although difficult to measure, the general atmosphere rising from these exchanges seems to shift from the automatically anti-Israel approach to a more focused criticism in the context of the Palestinian issue, despite the diverse circumstances of events. One of the interesting manifestations of that was in the various comments to the Bahraini foreign minister’s tweet about Israel’s right to defend itself. Along with many sympathetic responses, there were also some negative reactions, but most of them called for advocating the same rights for the Palestinian people and did not reflect the usual narrative of delegitimizing Israel.

Second, Bahrain’s interest in promoting interfaith cooperation can also be associated with its growing openness towards Israel. This track has shaped a unique relationship between the two countries. As a regime that is being criticized for representing the minority Sunni community in Bahrain, the king seeks to advance a pluralistic policy to meet with the needs of the various sectarian and religious groups living in the country. Among them is a small Jewish community of about 100 people that emigrated to the region from Baghdad at the beginning of the 20th century. The partnership between the political and religious leadership of Bahrain with the Jewish Wiesenthal Center led to a natural linkage with Israel; however, its importance is manifested in the moderate, tolerant, and multicultural message that the regime wishes to express internally – addressing the various communities at home.

Thirdly, Bahrain is known for its self-confident, active political mentality relative to its regional power. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to host an Israeli minister (Yossi Sarid in 1994) and the first country in the region to declare Hezbollah’s military and political arms terrorist organizations. Bahrain regularly appeals to NATO against organizations affiliated with the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Bahrain represents a moderate pro-Western line that promotes women’s rights and rights for the many expatriates living in the country. Thus, Bahrain is a convenient ally for Israel, both politically and morally. However, Bahrain also has a political responsibility to maintain the fundamentals of the regional policies under which it operates, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore it will not rush to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel before the greater powers of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates do so.

Carmel Shama-Hacohen, Israel’s ambassador to the OECD and UNESCO, who was supposed to head the Israeli delegation at the conference in Bahrain, said in a radio interview that he would not attend the conference for political and security considerations. These reasons are also indicative of the great sensitivity in these relations as well as the great distance that Israel faces from achieving normalization with the Arab states, even with the moderate and less hostile ones. Eventually, Israel was represented by Deputy Israeli Ambassador to UNESCO and another Israeli diplomat on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The delegation’s participation is an example of a move that can be interpreted as a rapprochement between the two countries, but the far-reaching announcements voiced in the Israeli media hinder the small and measured steps being taken in this direction. In fact, not only did the report cause uneasiness among the Bahraini government, it also threatened the continued cautious rapprochement between the two countries.

Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Persian Gulf Studies, Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Are Ties between Israel and Bahrain Warming? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.