The United States has lost influence in Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and seat of the African Union, whose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed overnight went from being a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Washington darling to the target of U.S. condemnation and sanctions. This turnaround stemmed from the U.S.’ decision to side with Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia over the issue of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile – the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, which seriously threatens Egypt’s water, food and economic security.

This was compounded by U.S. demands that the Ethiopian government end its raging civil war and cease the human rights violations that led to its November 2021 ouster from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (an important trade agreement aimed at helping African economies and improving their economic ties with the United States).

Against this backdrop, Ethiopia tightened its diplomatic relations with Russia, signing a military cooperation agreement with it and receiving strategic weapons for the defense of the Renaissance Dam. Prime Minister Ahmed was also assisted by drones from China to bomb the Tigrayans and their allies who are threatening his rule.

Sudan, meanwhile, was driven into Russia’s arms after the October 2021 coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, president of the provisional Sovereignty Council, against his civilian government partner. That prompted U.S. and Western opposition, and the suspension of $700 million in U.S. aid to the country. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemeti), al-Burhan’s deputy, visited Moscow on February 24 – the day Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine – and publicly expressed support for Russia’s right to protect its citizens in Ukraine’s separatist regions.

הפוסט Biden’s America Is Returning to the Red Sea Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States has lost influence in Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and seat of the African Union, whose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed overnight went from being a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Washington darling to the target of U.S. condemnation and sanctions. This turnaround stemmed from the U.S.’ decision to side with Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia over the issue of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile – the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, which seriously threatens Egypt’s water, food and economic security.

This was compounded by U.S. demands that the Ethiopian government end its raging civil war and cease the human rights violations that led to its November 2021 ouster from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (an important trade agreement aimed at helping African economies and improving their economic ties with the United States).

Against this backdrop, Ethiopia tightened its diplomatic relations with Russia, signing a military cooperation agreement with it and receiving strategic weapons for the defense of the Renaissance Dam. Prime Minister Ahmed was also assisted by drones from China to bomb the Tigrayans and their allies who are threatening his rule.

Sudan, meanwhile, was driven into Russia’s arms after the October 2021 coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, president of the provisional Sovereignty Council, against his civilian government partner. That prompted U.S. and Western opposition, and the suspension of $700 million in U.S. aid to the country. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemeti), al-Burhan’s deputy, visited Moscow on February 24 – the day Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine – and publicly expressed support for Russia’s right to protect its citizens in Ukraine’s separatist regions.

It is therefore possible that under these circumstances, Russian attempts to advance a deal for a 25-year lease of territory on the Sudanese coast to establish a logistics base there – which have so far been successfully torpedoed by the Americans – will eventually succeed.

Eritrea was pushed into China’s and Russia’s embrace after the United States imposed sanctions on the Eritrean army, the country’s ruling party and two senior government officials in November 2021, over the involvement of the Eritrean army in the Ethiopian civil war. As a result, Eritrea joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative that same month.

The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to the country last January resulted in a $15.7-million pledge of Chinese aid and an expression of Chinese readiness to develop Eritrea’s coast.

Eritrea was also the only African country to publicly side with Russia on Ukraine, voting against the March 2 UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia immediately cease its military activity there. Contacts are currently underway between Russia and Eritrea to establish a Russian logistics base off the coast of Eritrea.

China attaches great importance to the Horn of Africa, and has been promoting its status as a major player and conflict-resolution mediator within and between the countries of the region.

In January, Wang made his first visit of the year to countries on the Horn of Africa and East Africa. During this round of visits, he announced China’s readiness to raise the “Peaceful Development Initiative in the Horn of Africa,” and to support the region’s countries in tackling the trilateral challenges of security, development and governance.

In the security sphere, he suggested that the region hold a conference with in-depth discussions on peace in the Horn of Africa, reach a political consensus and coordinate joint actions.

In terms of development, he proposed expanding the railroads connecting the Kenyan port city of Mombasa with the capital, Nairobi, and the state of Djibouti with Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. He also suggested accelerating the development of the Red Sea and East African coasts.

At the governmental level, meanwhile, he proposed that ethnic, religious and regional conflicts be resolved in a way that would create a unified, stable and harmonious development environment in the Horn of Africa.

Last February, the Chinese government appointed senior diplomat Xue Bing as the country’s special envoy to the Horn of Africa, supporting its initiatives in the region. And last month, China held the first China-Africa Security, Governance and Development Conference, in Addis Ababa. During the event, Xue offered his mediation services for peaceful conflict resolution in the region and declared China’s readiness to support food security, agricultural, transportation, trade promotion and capacity building projects.

In light of these developments, and in an attempt to curb the spread of Chinese and Russian presence and influence in the region, the United States is taking two parallel steps in the southern and northern Red Sea.

Last May, immediately after the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president of Somalia, the White House announced it would be redeploying 450 to 500 U.S. troops in the country, to advise and assist Somali forces in their war against the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization (after the Trump administration withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia in 2020). The timing of the move was apparently dictated by Sheikh Mohamud’s cool relations with the president of Eritrea and prime minister of Ethiopia, both allies of China and Russia.

At the same time, the United States is investing considerable efforts in negotiations on ratifying the agreement between Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the return of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, with a Saudi commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships in the region. In return, Saudi Arabia will agree to the passage of Israeli flights over its territory to the Far East, and may also allow direct flights from Tel Aviv for Arab Israelis to pilgrimage in Mecca.

A number of developments on the eastern and northern sides of the Red Sea in the past two years have made it possible for the Biden administration to take these steps. The 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, with the approval and support of Saudi Arabia, has made it possible to bring Israel into the Red Sea Basin as a partner in an emerging Middle East alliance. And the Gulf reconciliation agreement signed on January 5, 2021, which ended a three-and-a-half-year rift between Qatar and its ally Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt, has brought all these countries closer together.

This rapprochement allows the United States to promote a regional security alliance. The U.S. Army’s transfer of Israel from the responsibility of the European Command to Central Command in January 2021 has facilitated military cooperation between Israel and other countries under that command. In November 2021, the naval forces of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and U.S. Central Command held a joint naval exercise in the Red Sea simulating a clash with Iran. And last month, a secret meeting was held in Sharm el-Sheikh between Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi and his Saudi counterpart, and between senior IDF officers and their counterparts from the armies of Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and Bahrain.

Finally, the cease-fire in Yemen, which is now entering its fourth month, allows the Biden administration to take these steps without facing domestic and external criticism of its cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

This U.S. activity contributes to restoring influence in the Red Sea Basin and to the continued construction of a new geopolitical space that extends from India to France, crossing through the Gulf states, the northern Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean Basin.

Israel is meant to play a central role within this space, stemming from its location between the eastern Mediterranean Basin and the Red Sea and Gulf states, and resulting from its military strength, its commitment to freedom of navigation and to dealing with the Iranian threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

There is no doubt that this American activity also raises the importance of the Red Sea Basin in Israel’s eyes – not only in terms of security, as part of its commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation against Iranian threats, but also politically and in terms of the potential it holds for environmental and economic cooperation.

הפוסט Biden’s America is returning to the Red Sea Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also the first visit by an incumbent prime minister since Yitzhak Shamir’s visit to Liberia, Ivory Coast, Togo and Cameroon in 1987.

The State of Israel is also conducting extensive secret diplomatic activity in a bid to resume or establish diplomatic ties with Muslim states in Africa which it has no diplomatic relations with. As part of this activity, on July 20, 2016, the State of Israel signed an agreement to resume diplomatic relations with the Republic of Guinea, the first state in Africa to sever its ties with the State of Israel in 1967 following the Six-Day War.

After the agreement was signed, Foreign Ministry Director-General Dore Gold visited Guinea on August 21 and met with the country’s president, Professor Alpha Condé, and with 10 of his ministers. They discussed cooperation in different fields and agreed to complete the ambassadors’ appointment process.

At the end of his visit to Guinea, Gold paid a rare visit on August 22 to a Muslim African state with which Israel has no diplomatic relations and met with senior officials there. Before this, on July 14, he visited Chad and discussed the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel with its president, Idriss Déby. So far, the relations have not been restored.

The main goals of the extensive Israeli diplomatic activity in Africa are: An attempt to change the African states’ voting patterns at the UN, the African Union, and other international forums, as so far most African states continue to vote in favor of pro-Arab resolutions despite the fact that they have good bilateral relations with Israel; an attempt to win observer’s status or, at least, the status of an invited guest at the African Union; to expand trade relations between the State of Israel and African states; to aid African states in areas in which Israel has experience, such as agriculture, development, security and counterterrorism; and to curb the Iranian influence in Africa. At the moment, the State of Israel appears to be partially successful in reaching its objectives in Africa.

Are Sudan and Somalia also wooing Israel?

Israel has been successful in expanding its trade relations with African states which are experiencing fast economic growth, and is helping many African states in the aforementioned areas. In addition, the State of Israel has been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with Muslim African states who severed ties or had no ties with Israel in the past. In this regard, the agreement with the Republic of Guinea appears to be just the beginning.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which reached its peak when relations between the two states were cut on January 3, 2016, and when relations between Saudi Arabia’s allies in Eastern Africa – Somalia, Djibouti. Sudan and the Comoros Islands – and Iran were severed several days later, and with of the improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a result of the Iranian nuclear threat and the war on terror, Sudan and Somalia have reportedly begun wooing Israel. Israel has thereby practically succeeded in partially curbing the Iranian influence in the continent.

  For now, the Iranian influence has been curbed in some states in the Horn of Africa and in Eastern Africa, and the route of Iranian arms shipments to Hamas – which passes through the Red Sea and Sudan to Egypt and from there to the Gaza Strip – has been blocked.

As a result of this activity, it is quite possible that other African states will change their voting patterns at the UN by abstaining in votes on pro-Arab resolutions on Middle Eastern issues, or distance themselves from them – as Nigeria did at the Security Council vote on December 31, 2014, when it moved from supporting a Palestinian proposal to abstaining.

An observer status at the African Union?

Nonetheless, the main challenge facing the State of Israel is its repeated attempts to gain observer status at the African Union. During Netanyahu’s visit to Africa, it was reported that Algeria and Sudan had worked to thwart his visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, although he had no plans to visit the place. South African objected to it too.

This is the result of attempts made by the Palestinians and Arab states to curb Israel’s activity in Africa, including its attempts to gain observer status at the European Union. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) received observer status at the African Union in 1974, when African states turned the Palestinian problem into an African problem. So after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Agreements in September 1993, African states – including Muslim ones – restored their ties with Israel. But some of those states, such as Niger and Mauritania, cut their ties with Israel again following the deterioration in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.

In the past, Egypt also played an important role in the attempt to limit Israel’s steps in Africa, but today, in light of its budding relationship with Israel, which has warmed up in the three years of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule, and in light of the many internal challenging faced by Egypt, it seems to prefer to keep a low profile and not disrupt Israel’s reentry into the continent.

Due to the centrality of the Palestinian problem in African states, it’s very likely that in the event of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian process, Israel would also be able to gain an observer status at the African Union alongside the PLO and almost fully implement the targets of its reentrance into the continent.

(originally published in YNet)

הפוסט The Israeli return to Africa הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.