Indeed, the last decade has witnessed a global trend of democratic backsliding. An array of populist and illiberal forces, and leaders has called into question and, in some countries, actively dismantled key institutions of liberal democracy, such as independent judiciaries and civil liberties.

What is more, the liberal international order has been under attack, not only by those who seek an adjustment of its governing institutions and rules for today’s balance of power but also by those who challenge its very foundations of international law and multilateralism.

This global trend has not spared Europe and Israel: right-wing populism has made inroads, liberal democratic values have been questioned, discourses focused on ethno-national identity and security have gained popular support, and official historiography has been politicized in the service of identity, sovereignty and security.

Democratic backsliding has also taken a toll on Israel-Europe relations, as alliances were formed – during the years of Netanyahu as prime minister – between populist and illiberal right-wing Israeli and European leaders, around shared interests in weakening the EU and in fostering divisions among member states.

Pro-democracy Europeans and Israelis – some of whom have reached positions in government over the last couple of years – have been trying to respond. But so far, they have done so in a limited and rather ad-hoc manner.

And the risk of further democratic backsliding is by no means banned: Israel is headed towards an election that might well bring to power a governing coalition dominated by the right-wing and incorporating extremist elements of the far-right. The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are likely to have massive socio-economic repercussions, fuel social strife and empower populist forces in Europe.

Liberal democracy

Progressive Europeans and Israelis should therefore join forces to jointly stop and reverse democratic setbacks, and strengthen liberal democracy. In that context, Europeans should, in their endeavor to strengthen ties with Israel, emphasize the relevance of strengthening Israeli democracy rather than turning a blind eye to domestic developments.

That should include intervening in case an Israeli government advances (de jure or de facto) annexation or anti-democratic legislation, and actively supports pro-democracy steps advanced by the Israeli leadership. In line with its more-for-more approach, the EU should spell out concrete positive benefits of democratic enhancement and negative consequences of democratic setbacks. Israelis should, in turn, go beyond purely pragmatic and transactional foreign policies emphasizing their interest in strengthening liberal democracy in Europe, rather than allying with non-liberal forces.

Peacemaking and shared society

Europeans should also highlight the interrelation between democracy, peacemaking and shared society – for without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and equality between Israel’s Jewish and Arab/Palestinian citizens, Israel will continue to suffer from a democratic deficit. Europeans should therefore seek a more active and effective role in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, not least as a means of supporting Israel’s democracy.

Even as hurdles are mounting on the way towards a two state solution and as more pressing issues dominate the European agenda, Europeans should increase their pro-peace engagement in a way that overcomes internal European divisions and addresses the real needs of both sides to the conflict, and cooperate with like-minded international actors.

They should also explore the potential inherent in the Abraham Accords to strengthen Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and support constructive steps in that regard. At the same time, they should try to mitigate negative side-effects of Israeli-Arab normalization on the Israeli-Palestinian arena and beyond.

Last but not least, to play an effective role in peacemaking, the EU will need to improve its image in Israeli society. It will thus have to invest greater efforts in public diplomacy, communicating its positions and the reasoning that underlies them to the wider Israeli public.

Empowering allies

This is also about – mutually – empowering pro-democracy actors. European parliamentarians and officials should regularly meet with pro-democracy actors, when they visit Israel and they should showcase their work by inviting them to speak at conferences, mention them in speeches and on social media, and act as their champions in Europe. A regular forum, convening high-level EU officials with Israeli pro-democracy actors could serve as an additional empowerment tool.

Israeli civil society organizations working to advance liberal democracy often lack institutional capacity to bring about the change to which they aspire. They need additional resources and financial support. Europe, being a key donor on democracy issues, can expand and diversify its funding schemes.

Funding should be made more easily accessible to new, small and innovative initiatives, in parallel to continued support for well-established organizations that effectively promote long-term positive change.

But this is not only about funds: Pro-democracy actors in Israel, such as organizations promoting shared society, Israeli-Palestinian peace and human rights, have been under pressure from the right-wing. The EU and its member states should uphold their funding for these organizations, back them politically and refrain from enforcing on them inappropriate conditionality.

At the same time, progressive Israelis should help strengthen pro-democracy actors in Europe, in particular those working to confront illiberal tendencies and replace populist leaders. This should include support by Israeli progressives for maintaining space for constructive, diverse debates in Europe on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Liberal democracy at the center of relations

Europeans and Israelis can also work together to strengthen their bilateral relations based on liberal-democratic values and they can do so by setting a new agenda. In March, the EU decided to extend its Action Plan with Israel, adopted in 2005, for another three years, to “give the parties the opportunity to take forward their cooperation for the coming years, including through the possible negotiation of partnership priorities.”

This step – together with the new EU Agenda for the Mediterranean adopted in April, 2021 – should be leveraged to chart new paths for Israel-EU cooperation, based on the pillars of democracy and peace. If new priorities are set, new implementation mechanisms put in place, new resources allocated and new actors mobilized – all with a focus on advancing cooperation on liberal democratic values – Israel-Europe bilateral relations will be on a better track moving forward.

That also means not to let security dominate ties between the two entities. While the war in Ukraine is likely to enhance security as a strong feature of Israeli-European cooperation, it should be done in a way that strengthens rather than compromises liberal democratic values.

Cooperation on science, education, environment, tourism and culture should therefore be prioritized by maximizing Israeli-European civilian cooperation through programs like Horizon Europe, Creative Europe and Erasmus+, which include territorial clauses that ensure that European funds are not diverted to settlements in occupied Palestinian territories.

A concentrated Israeli-European effort that puts liberal democracy at the heart of the relationship and empowers pro-democracy actors should be the way forward in Israel-Europe relations.

This article is from “JPost“, from July 13, 2022

הפוסט Democratic values: The heart of Europe- Israel relations – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Die Politik der Trump-Administration hat die israelische Regierung in ihrer Haltung bestärkt und die PA in die Defensive gedrängt. Der von ihr angekündigte »Jahrhundertdeal« dürfte diese Dynamiken weiter beschleunigen und könnte einer Zweistaatenregelung den Weg verbauen. Denn aufgrund der bisherigen Maßnahmen der US-Regierung ist davon auszugehen, dass die Initiative keine Konfliktregelung auf Basis zweier souveräner Staaten vorsieht, internationales Recht nicht als Richtschnur nimmt und palästinensische Rechte israelischen Interessen unterordnet. Israels Regierung könnte sich im Folgenden legitimiert sehen, dauerhaft die Kontrolle über strategische Gebiete der Westbank und über Ost-Jerusalem aufrechtzuerhalten.

Heruntergeschraubte Ambitionen

Angesichts dieser Entwicklungen haben die Europäer ihre Ambitionen bereits heruntergeschraubt. Ihr Ziel ist es nunmehr lediglich, die Option einer Zweistaatenregelung für künftige Friedensbemühungen auf dem Tisch zu halten. Allerdings ist es ihnen in den letzten Jahren keineswegs gelungen, die fortschreitende Fragmentierung des für einen palästinensischen Staat vorgesehenen Gebiets durch Siedlungsbau sowie die Fehlentwicklungen in der PA aufzuhalten. Lediglich sporadisch konnten sie Erfolge erzielen – etwa, indem sie dazu beigetragen haben, die Vertreibung der Beduinen aus Khan al-Ahmar zumindest vorläufig zu verhindern.

Für den geringen Einfluss sind die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten großenteils selbst verantwortlich. So haben sie die Position der USA als Hauptvermittlerin hingenommen und sich in Zurückhaltung geübt, sobald die Amerikaner die Initiative ergriffen – etwa mit Kritik an der Politik der Trump-Administration gegenüber der PA, durch die diese unterminiert worden ist. Auch haben sich die Mitgliedstaaten regelmäßig hinter der EU versteckt, statt gemeinsame Positionen resolut zu vertreten. Gemeinsame Beschlüsse – etwa das Anbringen korrekter Herkunftsbezeichnungen an Siedlungsprodukten – haben sie nicht konsistent umgesetzt. Und sie haben ihre Politik der Differenzierung im Umgang zwischen Israel und den von Israel besetzten Gebieten gegenüber Israels Regierung und Bevölkerung nicht entschlossen erklärt und verteidigt. Zudem haben sie sich nicht gegen die Angriffe der israelischen Regierung gegen die EU verwahrt und sich nicht hinter die Hohe Vertreterin der EU für Außenbeziehungen gestellt, als diese für die Positionen der Europäer von der Netanjahu-Regierung ins Abseits gestellt wurde.

Zunehmende Uneinigkeit

Vor allem sind die Mitgliedstaaten sich nicht darüber einig, welche Bedeutung der Nahostkonflikt in der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik haben soll und wie sie mit den Konfliktparteien umgehen wollen. Diese Uneinigkeit hat sich in den letzten Jahren deutlich verstärkt. Nicht einmal angesichts der US-amerikanischen Anerkennung Jerusalems als Hauptstadt Israels und der Verlegung der US-Botschaft konnten sich die Europäer auf eine gemeinsame Stellungnahme verständigen.

Die israelische Regierung hat Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten genutzt, um Allianzen mit subregionalen Gruppen in der EU zu schmieden und die Union zu spalten. Dabei geht es ihr vor allem darum, den Einfluss Brüssels und israelkritischer Mitgliedstaaten zu mindern sowie die Kopplung der Vertiefung der Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Israel mit Fortschritten im Nahostfriedensprozess aufzubrechen. Zugute kam ihr nicht nur die Uneinigkeit der Europäer in Bezug auf Nahost, sondern auch die Unzufriedenheit zentral- und osteuropäischer Staaten mit der Dominanz Deutschlands, Frankreichs und des Vereinigten Königreichs. In anderen Fällen konnte sie sich auf gemeinsame Interessen stützen, etwa mit Griechenland und Zypern im östlichen Mittelmeerraum. Profitieren konnte sie auch vom Aufstieg rechtspopulistischer und -extremer Parteien in Europa, die sich durch eine unhinterfragte Übernahme israelischer Positionen gegen Antisemitismusvorwürfe zu immunisieren suchen.

Einer effektiveren Rolle der EU in Nahost stehen zudem die Abstimmungsprozesse der EU – nach wir vor erfordern außen- und sicherheitspolitische Beschlüsse Einstimmigkeit – und aktuelle EU-interne Entwicklungen wie Reibungen über die Ausgestaltung »strategischer Autonomie« oder Brexit entgegen. Die Herausforderung für die Europäer wird daher sein, eine Koalition von Mitgliedstaaten zu bilden, die genug Gewicht hat, um einen Unterschied zu machen, die ausreichend einig ist, um klar Position zu beziehen und diese durch Maßnahmen zu untermauern, die aber gleichzeitig die anderen Mitgliedstaaten im bisherigen EU-Konsens über Prinzipien einer Konfliktregelung halten kann.

הפוסט Zunehmend gespalten – Warum es der EU nicht gelingt, ihre Positionen im Nahostkonflikt umzusetzen הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.