הפוסט Building Networks in the Shadows of War: Mapping Challenges and Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hezbollah’s opponents have been criticizing it for decades for  serving foreign interests and undermining the stability and security of the Lebanese state. The events of the last ten months underscore their criticism, as the Shiite organization threatens to drag Lebanon into a destructive war against the basic interests of the crisis-stricken country.

Indeed, it seems that the ongoing war with Israel sharpens the constant tension within which Hezbollah exists – the tension between its Iranian-Shiite identity and the national image it tries to project as the “defender of Lebanon.” This tension is Hezbollah’s most prominent weakness.

Since the beginning of the war, Nasrallah has tried to walk between the raindrops and reconcile the conflicting interests in the hope that the war in Gaza will end soon and allow him to continue holding the stick at both ends. Despite the clear consensus within Lebanon against a full-scale war with Israel, including among the Shiite community, and the harsh criticisms leveled at him, Nasrallah has so far managed to avoid serious challenges to the legitimacy of Hezbollah. However, the event in Majdal Shams may now threaten his ability to continue doing so.

Hezbollah’s swift denial of involvement in the attack, despite widespread evidence of its responsibility, reflects a familiar tactic. The group and its allies are using a classic strategy: diverting attention away from their actions by accusing others of trying to incite inter-communal strife within Lebanon. By doing this, Hezbollah is attempting to frame any criticism or blame directed at it as an attempt to destabilize the Lebanese state.

However, despite this denial of responsibility, genuine anxiety has spread among Lebanese in the last day about an Israeli response that could very well drag the Land of Cedars into a full-scale war and bring destruction on a catastrophic scale. Accordingly, the criticism leveled at Hezbollah is intensifying.

The internal pressure on Hezbollah is a unique opportunity to end the undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah on relatively favorable terms for Israel. Thus, the attack on Majdal Shams can have a similar impact to the attack on Qana Village during Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 – a game-changing event that leads to a cessation of hostilities. If Israel, with the help of the international community, leverages this pressure, it can push Hezbollah to end the fighting on terms that advance Israeli interests, particularly focusing on the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s forces from the south. Obviously, such an action would provide only a temporary solution, but it would allow for a significant achievement for Israel by enabling the return of northern residents and more effectively isolating the campaign in Gaza. In doing so, it can bring substantial issues back to the table, such as Hezbollah’s legitimacy to hold weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese state, and the question of its presence south of the Litani River. 

Cooperation with the international community has a significant role in promoting Israeli goals. The attack on Hezbollah came in response to the elimination of its field commanders in Kila village, a few kilometers from the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s presence and operations in the south are an affront to the international community and its decisions, standing in complete violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Majdal Shams massacre can be a turning point for the level of international involvement. This should include clear conditions for any economic or other assistance to the Lebanese state, requiring the enforcement of the Resolution.

It is clear and obvious that even ending the current round of fighting with a diplomatic solution will not resolve all the standing issues between Israel and Hezbollah, including territorial contentions along the land border. The likelihood of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming years remains high. However, it is better for Israel to act according to Sun Tzu’s ancient advice—to choose the arena and time for the war—rather than being dragged into a conflict without clear goals or an exit strategy, and less than optimal conditions.

Instead of trying to reshape “response equations,” Israel should act proactively to change the conditions in the north. The immediate goal should be providing security—albeit temporary—to the residents of the north and allowing them to return to their homes. Simultaneously, it should address the long-term necessity of preparing the state and the IDF for a military-political campaign against Hezbollah and Iran in the coming years. By doing so, Israel can ensure both the short-term safety of its citizens and strategically position itself for future conflicts under more favorable conditions. 

הפוסט The Majdal Shams Massacre – A Chance for a Diplomatic End to the War in the North on Favorable Terms for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to the civilians on both sides of the border, the most significant victim of Hezbollah’s decision to engage in conflict, which could potentially escalate into a full-scale and destructive war, is the state of Lebanon. The recent events highlight Lebanon’s inherent weakness and raise fundamental questions about its functioning as a state entity. However, Lebanon’s weakness is actually the most effective restraint against Hezbollah and could potentially serve as a catalyst for resolving the conflict without resorting to war.

Those following Hezbollah know that the Shia movement struggles with a series of dilemmas and continuously fights to justify its existence within the Lebanese arena. These dilemmas occupy the organization during normal times and seem to become even more crucial during these days.

Hezbollah was established by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of a vision to export the Islamic revolution. This means the organization was born within Lebanon but not as part of it, serving a broader revolutionary-theological vision where, in the end, Islam (Shia) would rule the world. The Lebanese state, with its political mechanisms and sectarian arrangements, had no place in this vision. However, over the years, Hezbollah gradually changed its nature. Along with blurring its revolutionary Islamist dogmas, the organization began to adopt a Lebanese national identity and even integrated into the country’s political system.

This process is often described as the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah, wherein its leaders emphasized their struggle as a national movement serving as “Lebanon’s protector” against dangers, especially from Israel. However, this “Lebanonization” is viewed with suspicion both inside and outside Lebanon. While some see it as a genuine process, many in Lebanon and abroad see it as a cynical facade meant to mask the organization’s true intentions.

This is the main dilemma occupying Hezbollah and troubling it, especially in these times—the dilemma between being an Iranian proxy and a patriotic Lebanese organization; and the dilemma between being a resistance movement committed to exporting the revolution and destroying Israel and being “Lebanon’s protector.”

Lebanon’s Internal Crisis

It seems that Hezbollah was caught off guard by Hamas’s attack on October 7 and was not prepared for its consequences. Indeed, the current time seems highly inconvenient for it to wage war against Israel. Over the past four years, Lebanon has been experiencing an unprecedented severe economic crisis. The local currency has undergone a historic collapse, GDP has plummeted, and inflation and unemployment rates are soaring. The economic crisis quickly translated into a real humanitarian crisis, with over 80% of Lebanese citizens living below the poverty line.

Moreover, Lebanon is in the midst of a complex and ongoing political crisis that exacerbates the economic collapse and fuels massive protests by desperate citizens. Since October 2022, Lebanon has had no sitting president, and since October 2021, a transitional government with no executive power has been in place. A destructive war with Israel is truly the last thing the Lebanese can afford.

Lebanon’s dire internal situation is closely linked to Nasrallah’s considerations and his choice to limit the conflict and avoid a full-scale war, at least for now. It is commonly believed that Hezbollah holds sway in Lebanon—that it dictates events, for better or worse. However, this statement is not entirely accurate. While Hezbollah is indeed the most powerful force in Lebanon, it is not omnipotent and is also subject to power limitations and restraining factors.

Internal Opposition

Even before October 7, Hezbollah suffered from a highly negative image within Lebanon. Alongside the perpetual suspicion towards it, the organization is seen by many as primarily responsible for the severe economic crisis and political stagnation, and as an obstacle preventing Lebanon from overcoming them. Since engaging in conflict with Israel on October 8, without any provocation from Israel, criticism of Hezbollah has been mounting. Public opinion in the country strongly opposes entering a war with Israel and fears its devastating consequences.

The opposition to war crosses sectarian lines and is also clear among Shias, Hezbollah’s base of support and power. As the campaign continues, criticism against Hezbollah grows for the severe damage caused by its policies and the high price Lebanon could pay if it doesn’t stop. The waves of refugees coming from the south and the growing destruction as Israel expands its attacks to more distant areas make the sense of fear increasingly palpable.

Various officials, including some considered Hezbollah’s allies, have clearly expressed their concern over the situation on the border and have not spared criticism of Hezbollah, opposing attempts to link Gaza’s events to Lebanon. More and more reports indicate that Lebanon’s official stance is to immediately return to implementing UN Resolution 1701, which includes, among other things, keeping Hezbollah fighters away from the border.

In civil society, the criticism is even harsher and more outspoken. This is evidenced by a popular campaign with the hashtag “Lebanon_does_not_want_war,” gaining significant momentum on social media. Every day, more and more statements are published criticizing Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into catastrophe for foreign interests without any logic or justification.

The situation is simple: the average Lebanese citizen may not hold much affection for Israel, but these days even Palestine is not a concern. The arguments about the necessity of the resistance’s mobilization alongside Gaza simply do not convince him, not when he is concerned about his family’s survival.

A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would essentially be a mutual destruction— a bloody and destructive stalemate. No one is under the illusion that such a war would lead to the disappearance of the other side, but the devastation and destruction that would occur in both Israel and Lebanon serve as a deterrent for both sides. Hezbollah does not hide this, and since the conflict began, Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that he does not want war, and once the “aggression” in Gaza stops, calm will return to the Lebanon border.

However, the sides are caught in a dangerous trap, and a complex dynamic has developed over recent months, where despite no one wanting war, it may become inevitable. Nasrallah hears the voices within Lebanon and knows that dragging the country into war could undermine his claim to be “Lebanon’s protector.” However, it is difficult to see how he can back away from his promise to stand by Gaza until the war ends completely.

On the other hand, while tens of thousands of its citizens have become refugees in their own country, Israel needs to present a convincing narrative to them that the threat from the border has been eliminated. It seems that among Israel’s political and military leadership, the view is growing that a change in the situation can only be achieved through military action.

Weakness as an Opportunity

Meanwhile, external actors, both regional and international, are trying to prevent the escalation. According to reports, the United States submitted a proposal to resolve the issue of the land border, which will be agreed upon after a ceasefire; France presented a similar initiative, and Qatar has also been mentioned as a potential player in the settlement. Hezbollah has expressed a willingness behind the scenes to discuss a formula that would end the conflict, and recently it was reported that one of Hezbollah’s senior officials even traveled to the United Arab Emirates, with one of his objectives being to explore the possibility of Emirati mediation to end the fighting, despite the strained relationship between the parties.

However, it seems that the path to a solution is still long, and at this moment, the possibility of a war breaking out seems more likely than reaching a political settlement. At this point, the state of Lebanon, with its weaknesses and frequent crises, becomes a critical factor in the ability to resolve the issue without resorting to war. The ongoing crisis in Lebanon and the growing internal opposition to Hezbollah are the Shia organization’s point of weakness and an important factor in restraining its activities. Nasrallah, as mentioned, is constantly trying to reconcile the existential dilemmas that occupy him, and it is likely that he would be willing to make concessions. For now, it seems there is no conflict between the interests of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s patrons in Iran, as Tehran is also not interested in expanding the war.

Israel would do well to take advantage of this point of weakness. In cooperation with the international community, Israel can work to create an “improved Resolution 1701,” which would include measures to rescue Lebanon from its economic and political crisis, and even lay the groundwork for resolving more complex issues in the future. Israel has much to offer the Lebanese, and many are willing to listen.

It must be acknowledged that the threat posed by Hezbollah will not disappear peacefully, and we must be cautious about falling back into the “deterrence” equation, the flaws of which were horrifyingly exposed in the case of Hamas. However, given the growing internal opposition to it in Lebanon, Israel and its regional and international partners have an opportunity to sharpen Hezbollah’s dilemma between its Lebanese and pro-Iranian identity. A challenging political move of this kind could give Israel more room to maneuver in dealing with the organization and, not least, a better position against its patron, Iran.

הפוסט Lebanon’s Vulnerability: A Chance for Israel Amid Anti-War Sentiment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.