Ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor gains momentum amidst geopolitical shifts and renewed diplomatic efforts.

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הפוסט Tomorrow’s Global Superhighway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Delivering his opening remarks during their joint press conference, Trump announced that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip” and refashion it as the “Riviera of the Middle East”. Key to Trump’s “long-term ownership” plan, which reportedly blindsided Netanyahu, would be the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to make way for American bulldozers and urban planners.

Trump’s declaration triggered strong international condemnation. British Foreign Minister Anneliese Dodds said that “there must be no forced displacement of Palestinians, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip.” French President Emmanuel Macron and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sissi issued a joint statement calling any “forced displacement” of Gazans “a serious violation of international law”. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to a Palestinian state. Germany, Russia, and China also took issue with the plan.

The criticism is justified. Trump appeared to unilaterally reject decades of diplomatic norms pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tabling the idea of a future Palestinian state. And while he may be right in insisting that the easiest way to end the intolerable cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas is by removing Gaza’s civilian population from the battlefield, international law on human rights and migration is clear when it comes to the forced relocation of civilians (except for military necessity). Without a cohesive plan for relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents, identification of countries willing to serve as hosts, and a commitment that Gazans will eventually be able to return to their homes, Trump’s declaration—made in the midst of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—may do more harm than good in the short run.

No wonder White House staff have been busy downplaying Trump’s commitment to employing US troops, permanently relocating Palestinians, or using US resources to finance the decades-long reconstruction effort.

Rather than disparage Trump’s vision, America’s partners in Europe and the Middle East should develop a feasible alternative that still captures its essence. This plan should prioritize replacing Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, designing an economically sound humanitarian model for international actors to host those Palestinians who wish to relocate, and establishing an international body that reimagines Gaza’s future and oversees the reconstruction process. These steps could eventually create the conditions for normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a coveted foreign policy goal for Netanyahu and Trump alike, and for future discussions of Palestinian sovereignty.

Like it or not, Trump has set the tone for negotiations on the future of Gaza and Palestine. If the United States’ partners truly desire an alternative ending, they must meet Trump in the middle with a vision of their own.

The article was published on February 11th on GMF.

הפוסט Don’t Like Trump’s Gaza Plan? Offer an Alternative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

That vision, known as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, was launched on Sept. 9, 2023, when the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, and Italy to advance the transcontinental infrastructure project. The Biden administration hailed it as a major diplomatic and commercial breakthrough — a project that could compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

But Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel and the regional conflict that it triggered just weeks after the G20 summit has damned enthusiasm for the project and led to uneven investment in its future.

With the first phase of the ceasefire deal gradually being implemented, and President Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor should enjoy a breath of new life. In order for that to happen, the Trump administration will need to tackle some of the region’s most complicated security challenges while simultaneously empowering partners along the economic corridor to take the lead in developing a cohesive commercial model. If performed successfully, the United States would both incentivize the establishment of a new regional architecture and take an important step towards reducing its role in the Middle East.

A 21st-Century Superhighway

When the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was first introduced, it was met with much fanfare. Sitting alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Biden told the G20 audience that the corridor was “a really big deal” and part of a collective effort to: “building sustainable, resilient infrastructure, making quality infrastructure investments; and creating a better future that represents greater opportunity, dignity, and prosperity for everyone.”

Few details about the corridor were shared at the time. From what can be understood from the memorandum of understanding, the project is meant to be composed of three elements: an eastern maritime corridor linking India and the Arabian Peninsula, a railway project designed to link all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, and a northern corridor connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Jordan and Israel. In addition to rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure, the corridor would incentivize the continued investment in undersea data cables and future energy projects such as green hydrogen pipelines and electricity interconnectors.

Each of the involved parties saw the corridor as a win-win scenario for its own reasons. For India, it offered a way to strengthen its role in global value chains and counter China’s growing influence. In Modi’s own words, “This corridor is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.” For the Gulf states, the project offered a way to execute a clear hedging strategy between the United States and China, support East-West trade routes that maintained their role as middle powers, and diversify their energy markets. For Europe, the corridor would buoy its economic security and establish critical energy links with the Gulf states. For the Biden administration, the project was seen as a logical counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an opportunity to facilitate greater interconnectivity and cooperation between key partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Trump administration might very well share the same view. For all the parties involved, establishing a land bridge across the Arabian Peninsula would reduce security risks for international shipping around the Horn of Africa as well as bottlenecking at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

Just weeks after the G20 summit, enthusiasm about the corridor was replaced with realism. Hamas’ attack — and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza and Lebanon — derailed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and strained ties between Israel and the other Gulf states. Houthi attacks forced international shipping vessels to reroute away from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Hamas, the prospect of Israeli-Saudi peace was seen as a threat to the Palestinian national cause. But for Iran, Hamas’ primary sponsor, the real concern was that Israel’s continued integration in the region and participation in projects like the corridor would further constrain the Islamic republic. As part of a televised address on Oct. 4, 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told supporters that America and its allies were backing Israel so that it could become “a gateway for exporting energy from the region to the Western world while facilitating the import of goods and technology from the West to the region.” Encouraged by Tehran, Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping lanes, damaging global trade and contributing to Egypt’s economic woes. Seen as a way to bypass the region’s unstable corners, the war raised serious questions over how a transcontinental corridor can avoid the interference of a regional power like Iran.

Iran is not the only regional actor who expressed concern about being excluded from the economic corridor. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan famously responded to the corridor announcement by saying “there is no corridor without Turkey.” In the last year, Ankara has been championing the Development Road Project, a land-based trade corridor from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Turkey. Since the fall of Assad, multiple plans — including energy pipelines — connecting the Gulf to Turkey via Syria have been floated.

Like Iran and Turkey, Egypt fears that the corridor will draw business away from the Suez Canal, which serves as a crucial revenue source for a country with limited foreign investment opportunities and an increasingly unstable economy. While Egypt’s limitations were part of the reason why it was left on the outside of the corridor looking in, many participating states appreciate the importance of Egyptian economic stability — both for the region as well as the corridor’s future.

Jockeying for participation in such a transformative mega project is not limited to Middle Eastern actors. While the war in Gaza dampened European interest in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the EU’s Global Gateway is still operational and southern European states like France, Greece, and Italy have positioned themselves as potential landing points for the corridor.

Beyond the question of who will take part in the corridor’s main artery, other challenges remain. Member states have yet to articulate how the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects associated with the corridor will be financed. There are also serious doubts as to whether an intermodal transportation network that combines maritime shipping, railways, and highways will be more cost-efficient and sustainable than existing transportation routes. Though energy projects and digital highways are touted as complementary but equally important components to the corridor’s future, no feasibility studies have been conducted to date that test the viability of these plans (e.g. green hydrogen pipelines).

But as Biden’s speech hinted, the corridor is far from dead. Bilateral trade between India and the United Arab Emirates increased by 93 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2022, and the diversification of trade beyond oil is keeping pace. The United Arab Emirates is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. In February 2024, India and the United Arab Emirates signed a bilateral agreement designed to support the corridor’s establishment. The same month, U.S. transportation giant FedEx inaugurated a $350 million facility in Dubai. Regional investment in infrastructure has also continued. In September 2024, the United Arab Emirates signed a $2.3 billion railroad agreement with Jordan. Saudi investments in its railway network have increased to well over $4 billion as part of the government’s plans for Saudi Vision 2030. The same could be said for diplomatic activity between member states. Any observer of Indian diplomacy at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil would confirm that the geopolitical disturbances of the past year have done little to dissuade Modi from advancing a front and center, corridor-friendly agenda.

In summary, the interests that helped establish the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor remain as prevalent today as they did when the mega project was first announced. What remains to be seen is whether enough trust and common interest required to achieve such a sophisticated degree of economic interconnectivity exists between the principal actors. This is at least partially dependent on how the United States chooses to engage the region under Trump.

Bridging East and West by Stabilizing the Middle East

If the United States is to continue supporting the corridor’s development, it will need to find a balance between supporting the construction of a new regional security architecture, empowering member states, and ensuring that certain regulatory and taxation policies are upheld. Trump, who ran on an America First agenda and will be occupied with a myriad of global issues, may not have the bandwidth to engage meaningfully in the corridor. Still, there are concrete steps his administration can take that would uphold the U.S. commitment to its international partners while directly and indirectly benefiting the corridor’s future.

First, the administration should articulate its continued commitment to the corridor, allaying any concerns that the United States will renege on past promises under Trump. One way of demonstrating this is by appointing a special envoy to the initiative. This would mirror the decision in February 2024 by French President Emmanuel Macron, who tapped energy industry veteran Gerard Mestrallet for the position. Committing a senior U.S. representative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor would contribute to the project’s gradual institutionalization — a necessary step to create common policies on regulation, taxation, and customs procedures. The special envoy would engage diplomatically with member states as well as support American companies who wish to take part in the corridor’s development.

Trump should become an “empowerer-in-chief,” entrusting his cabinet appointments like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent to advance U.S. foreign policy interests without him needing to be in the room. It would be unsurprising if the corridor attracted the attention of Jared Kushner, a trusted voice during Trump’s first presidency.

That doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a role for Trump himself. Arguably his greatest strength is the warm personal relations he enjoys with many heads of state who are involved in the corridor. From India’s Modi to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Trump would find himself in good company at a future India-Middle East-Europe Corridor summit. But rather than steal the spotlight, Trump should practice lateral leadership, empowering international partners with a readiness for the United States to step in when the project needs a bit of a nudge.

At the same time, the Trump administration should encourage the construction of additional East-West corridors if they benefit America’s international partners and are both economically and strategically viable. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East only strengthen the case for diversifying and multiplying economic corridors. The eggs of the global trade shouldn’t all be placed in one basket.

The most instrumental way in which the Trump administration can support the corridor, along with other potential East-West corridors, is by addressing Middle Eastern instability. That means stewarding the distinct ceasefire agreements brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas and gradually turning them into more lasting political arrangements.

It may sound far-fetched today, nevertheless there are scenarios where elements of the corridor’s development are used to support Gaza’s rehabilitation. A revitalized Gaza port under international supervision, for example, would be a boon for Palestinians. The port could also serve as a supporting spur to Haifa Port — purchased by Indian-owned Adani Group in 2023 — where many of the corridor’s plans currently hinge. In short, by drawing inspiration from the corridor, the Trump administration could incentivize the parties to reach a durable resolution to the war that would create a window of opportunity to revisit normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia and attract additional foreign investment to the region.

A similar logic could be applied when dealing with new governments in Lebanon and Syria. If leveraged in the right way, participation in East-West corridors could be a major incentive for new political actors to respect U.S. interests, maintain their commitment to keeping the peace, and further reduce Iranian, Russia, and Chinese influence.

In addition to these steps, the United States should devise a more effective mechanism for constraining Houthi aggression. The corridor is not a replacement for the Suez Canal, and therefore the secure passage of maritime traffic around the Horn of Africa and Red Sea should remain a top priority for America and its allies.

Last but not least, the Trump administration will need to identify the correct formula for containing Iran and severing supply chains between Tehran and its proxies. Without some kind of arrangement between the United States and Iran, it is safe to suspect that the Islamic regime will try to undermine efforts to develop an East-West corridor that leaves it out in the cold.

This would be a stiff task for the most competent of U.S. administrations, regardless of whether it had an interest in supporting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’s fortunes. Considering some of the other pressing global issues that will draw Trump’s attention, such as a potential trade war with China and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is difficult to see how the Trump administration could achieve this feat alone. Perhaps that is the point. The corridor cannot succeed just by sheer American will. The project has so many diplomatic and commercial components that no single administration — or global actor — can take on such responsibility alone. Completing the corridor will require a coordinated effort over the course of decades. What the Trump administration can try to provide, however, is a commitment to empowering regional partners in a way that serves long-term U.S. national security and economic interests.

The article was published on January 28th 2025 in War On The Rocks.

הפוסט Making Deals, Building Corridors: Trump’s Middle East Moment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel remains at the heart of the region’s energy discussions. Since 2020 it has been successfully exporting natural gas to Jordan and Egypt, the latter providing an important export route to the global energy market by way of its two LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta.

Through a combination of intentional diplomacy and structural changes to the international order, Israel has leveraged its position to strengthen bilateral ties with Greece and Cyprus, reach a historic maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, play a central role in the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and attract foreign investment from supermajors and the Gulf States.

Still, more heavy lifting is required for Israel to advance beyond its current achievements. Despite signing a joint MOU with Egypt and the EU in June 2022 to deliver more gas to Europe, Israel’s export options for delivering gas into the global energy market still remain constrained.

Israel enjoys cooperative ties with Cairo, but even with additional pipelines in the works there is a commercial and technical bottleneck when it arrives in Egypt. Past shortages in Egyptian gas supply often resulted in the consumption of gas delivered from Israel. But even if Israel’s gas was earmarked for export – as is intended – Idku and Damietta have limited capacity and it doesn’t appear as if Egypt’s LNG capacity will be expanded in the near term. In order to increase its energy security, Israel must therefore continue to seek ways of diversifying its export options and regional partners.

This explains why there has been so much diplomatic activity around Cyprus in recent weeks, where the newly minted Christodoulides government is trying to attract foreign investment and international interest. Christodoulides’s strategy is clear: create a pathway for Cyprus to finally become a meaningful player in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy architecture.

There are two distinct initiatives that Cyprus is pursuing to achieve this goal, both of which depend on Israeli cooperation. The first is resolving the outstanding Aphrodite-Ishai dispute. According to a recent MEES report, Chevron and the other invested partners in Cyprus’s Aphrodite field (estimated 129 BCM) are close to buying out the four firms with stakes in the Ishai license, thus removing a key obstacle that has prevented the field’s development.

The same report indicates that following recent meetings between Energy Minister Israel Katz and his counterpart George Papanastasiou, Israel and Cyprus’s ministries of energy are working on a parallel intergovernmental agreement that will help expedite Aphrodite’s development.

The second initiative underway is Nicosia’s push to develop a pipeline that would deliver Israel’s natural gas to a Cyprus-based LNG facility, either land-based or a floating LNG facility near Vasilikos port, which could then be sold on the global market. This “Plan B” version of the infamous East Med pipeline is attractive, especially as it falls within the EU’s broader ambition to diversify its energy sources (reducing its dependency on Russian gas) and earns Project of Common Interest status. Paired with the steady progress on the EuroAsia electricity interconnector project, Israel and Cyprus have multiple reasons to work together.

The creation of a new LNG terminal is a costly and time-consuming affair. And there is no clarity on who would fund such an enterprise, though as the operator of both Aphrodite and Leviathan Chevron would likely need to foot the bill to spearhead such efforts along with NewMed, Shell, and potentially newcomers like BP and Adnoc.

Will Israel, Cyprus cooperate to resolve gas crisis?

There are two questions here: Is Israel prepared to cooperate with Cyprus in such an intimate way, and is Cyprus really committed to becoming a hub? After all, the headlines out of Nicosia may be designed as a way of baiting Turkey into direct talks over the divided island. When push comes to shove, would Christodoulides pursue regional energy projects at the expense of restarting negotiations with Turkey, a much bigger geopolitical prize?

Turkey understands this, which is why it is almost guaranteed that the prospect of Israel-Turkey gas cooperation will be raised during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s anticipated meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan later this month. Turkey is the largest gas consuming market in the region, and like Egypt and Cyprus, wishes to become an energy hub. Despite all of the geopolitical disputes between Ankara and the EU, it has generally been a reliable partner for delivering energy from the Caucasus and the Middle East.

For strategic reasons, Netanyahu will neither rule out nor endorse this option, which is also paved with complications. How would cooperation with Turkey impact relations with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and other regional actors? If Erdogan utilized cooperation with Israel in order to sideline Cyprus, how would that serve Israel’s interests?

And who is to say whether Turkey’s foreign policy will be more predictable during Erdogan’s final term as president than it was in the past 15 years? International energy projects are dependent on trust. While Israel and Turkey are starting to turn a new leaf, pipelines aren’t going to feature in the relationship anytime soon.

Israel’s export problem isn’t going away. But between now and the end of the year, offshore drilling will continue, and bid rounds in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon may provide companies even greater incentive to invest. The region’s interplay of geopolitics, economics, and energy demand suggests that with the right balance of political and commercial interests a win-win outcome is still attainable.

If Katz manages to develop and execute a cohesive policy in that time, he could potentially see the fruits of his labor as foreign minister when he and Eli Cohen switch positions. The Eastern Mediterranean’s great gas game isn’t over. Quite the opposite is true.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on July 12th.

הפוסט The East Mediterranean great gas game isn’t over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These assumptions were momentarily suspended when Israel and Lebanon finalized a maritime boundary agreement after 12 years of sporadic and interrupted efforts. With Washington’s mediation, the parties reached terms that would allow them both to exploit the sea’s riches and encourage foreign investment. For two states who share a long history of violence, grievance, and distrust, it was a significant achievement.

Could Israel and Lebanon’s willingness to compromise set in motion a domino effect that unlocks the region’s stranded hydrocarbons? And could this happen quickly enough to help Europe deal with its current energy problems? Israel and Lebanon are hardly the region’s only quarreling parties. Greece and Turkey have a decades-long, multifaceted maritime dispute, and the Cyprus conflict has a maritime dimension as well. 

The combination of incentives, timing, and effective mediation that worked for Israel and Lebanon will be hard to replicate. Yet their path to compromise, particularly the decision to shift away from international legal arguments in favor of addressing core national interests, successfully demonstrated how other Eastern Mediterranean actors could find creative solutions to their own disputes. 

Path to Compromise

A confluence of events created uniquely conducive circumstances for Lebanon and Israel to reach an agreement. Economic conditions in Lebanon, exacerbated by the tragic 2020 blast in Beirut, compelled the Lebanese government and Hizballah to temporarily set aside their ideological opposition to Israel for the sake of brokering a deal that could potentially unlock valuable gas deposits and avoid open conflict. But this was not the only geopolitical development that made the agreement possible. The signing of the Abraham Accords also encouraged indirect talks, weakening Arab opposition to engagement with Israel. And the West’s commitment to finding alternative oil and gas supplies for Europe further convinced the Biden administration to continue mediating between the two sides. The timing of domestic political developments was also fortuitous. Due to pending elections in Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, each of the negotiating parties, as well as the mediating party, hoped that a deal would help their standing at the ballot box.

Crucially, this confluence of events over the last 18 months led negotiators to shift from international legal arguments toward addressing Israel’s and Lebanon’s core interests. For Israel, this meant emphasizing national security concerns such as stabilizing the Lebanese economy, establishing a deconfliction mechanism along its northern maritime boundary, enabling the safe development of the Karish gas field, and achieving de facto Lebanese recognition of the buoy line Israel installed after its 2006 war with Hizballah. For Lebanon, this meant overlooking its boycott of Israel in order to convince international oil and gas companies to explore and develop its waters. Indeed, even the potential of future development could be enough for Lebanon to improve its position with the International Monetary Fund and enable it to court investments from other countries. This shift managed to break the deadlock that had muddied past mediation efforts.

The decision by Israel and Lebanon to shift away from focusing on international maritime law is very much in the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was established as a guideline rather than a strict rulebook for delimitation agreements. The past decade saw a variety of potential maps with multiple, competing boundary lines representing each country’s rival legal arguments. Tellingly, the current agreement doesn’t include a map that domestic political opponents could challenge. This reflects the underlying reality that the benefits of an agreement outweigh the technical merits of any specific set of claims. 

Finally, the agreement reinforces the argument that an informed and invested mediator may be more effective at producing a breakthrough in certain negotiations than a neutral one. Historically, Israel has always relied on the United States to mediate between itself and its regional neighbors, in large part because Washington was the only party who could offer security guarantees in exchange for Israeli concessions. Lebanese negotiators — due to a combination of their own concerns about American neutrality as well as Hizballah’s combative stance — were often reluctant to rely on U.S. mediation. But in this case, they begrudgingly acknowledged that Washington was the party most likely to deliver an agreement. 

Still, the United States didn’t accomplish this alone. Supporting actors like France and Qatar encouraged the parties to reach the finish line. The United Nations, an observer during the mediation process, also played an important technical role that enabled the parties to meet on several occasions along the Israel-Lebanon border. Finally, energy companies Energean and Total demonstrated creativity and flexibility while advocating for pragmatism. 

And this collective effort may have still come up short if it wasn’t for the singular persona of U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein. Not only did Hochstein possess an intimate familiarity with the energy industry, the Israeli and Lebanese actors, and President Biden himself, but he also benefited from having previously tried and failed to bridge the gaps between the parties during his time in the Obama administration. The combination of experience, access, and personal investment enabled Hochstein to cut through the noise where others fell short and push the parties towards an accord. Simply put: Hochstein was much more than a messenger from the White House.

Replicating Results

Can these conditions be replicated elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? Early signs suggest that the international buzz surrounding the Israel-Lebanon agreement has encouraged more regional actors to thaw their own frozen negotiations. Lebanon and Syria reportedly attempted (but failed) to restart negotiations on their own maritime boundary dispute. According to various outlets, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority are also trying to advance talks on developing the long-ignored Gaza Marine field. More realistically, Israel and Cyprus have promised to put their outstanding issues over the Aphrodite-Yishai field to bed.

Each of these disputes has its own unique complexities, yet they pale in comparison to the Eastern Mediterranean’s true Gordian knot: the ongoing and often interconnected maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey and the divided island of Cyprus. Agreements on these issues would not only reduce the probability of regional conflict, but could potentially open the door to previously dismissed partnerships in the field of energy and beyond. The circumstances may be considerably less conducive here, but there are still useful lessons to be drawn. 

First, it was the prospect of exploiting offshore gas reserves that helped Lebanon and Israel see a settlement as being win-win. In the case of Greece and Turkey, their maritime dispute doesn’t promise an immediate economic bounty, thus eliminating the most obvious potential incentive for settlement. And while offshore hydrocarbons have been discovered in Cyprus’ waters, the stakes are also considerably higher, specifically as they relate to the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. 

The timing of domestic elections helped push Israel and Lebanon over the finish line. However, the elections being held in Cyprus in February 2023, Greece in July 2023, and Turkey in June 2023 are likely to have the opposite effect. With the economic benefits less imminent and the issues of sovereignty more prominent, elections will make it harder for decision-makers in Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara to compromise

Turkey’s approach will prove particularly pivotal. Like Lebanon, regional energy initiatives have left it on the outside looking in. Over the last decade it has frequently forced itself into Eastern Mediterranean energy politics, often by trying to change the legal or security realities at sea. The question is whether the lessons from the Israel-Lebanon agreement will embolden a more muscular or more compromising line from Ankara. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an October 27 press release welcoming the Israel-Lebanon agreement and stated that “this model, which reflects similar practices around the world, sets a good example for the region and in particular for Turkish and Greek Cypriots.” This might suggest a more moderate tack. But Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiadis countered by noting that Turkey has rejected past mediation efforts and declined to submit claims for international arbitration. 

It is naive to expect overnight results. Israel and Lebanon negotiated for a decade, suffering multiple setbacks before making a breakthrough. By comparison, many of the region’s other maritime disputes are further behind in the process. To make matters more complicated, Europe plans to have shifted considerably to renewables by decade’s end. On the positive side though, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus don’t have to deal with interference from a non-state actor like Hizballah.  

The Israel-Lebanon agreement suggests that the right balance of timing, compatible interests, and an invested mediator can yield a breakthrough. Resolving maritime disputes is not only about extracting resources, but also about removing sources of conflict and gradually developing trust between aggrieved parties. Even if the hydrocarbon age is slowly coming to an end, there are multiple reasons why the United States, Europe, and Eastern Mediterranean states should pursue similar types of maritime agreements in the months and years to come. The blueprint provided by Israel and Lebanon is as good a starting point as it gets.

This article is from “War on the Rocks“, from November 11, 2022

הפוסט Is the Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary agreement replicable? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The MOU articulates that Israel and Egypt will increase natural gas sales to EU countries, who in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are trying to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels. According to the agreement, Israel will deliver natural gas via pipeline to Egypt, where it will then be converted to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and sold on the European market.

There is good reason for the fanfare around the agreement. The EU is moving heaven and earth to replace the 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) that Russia delivered in years past (40% of its total annual needs). By committing themselves to exporting natural gas to Europe, Israel and Egypt reaffirmed their commitments to the West’s efforts in this conflict.

And after years of discussions that failed to produce fruit, the signing of this MOU is a particularly important achievement for Israel – albeit one that materialized as a byproduct of geopolitical developments beyond anyone’s control.

Successful energy diplomacy is as much about confidence-building and momentum towards the future as it is about any singular project in the present moment. This new agreement accomplishes both, addressing immediate concerns while presenting Brussels and Jerusalem an opportunity to diversify their energy relationship in the coming years.

Nevertheless, it is also important to be modest. The MOU’s language was vague, using terms like “endeavor” and “exploring possibilities” to reflect a shared interest in cooperation, without legally binding the parties to any contractual obligations. This was done intentionally. The global energy market is in tremendous flux and everyone is hedging their bets in the event a more affordable deal comes along.

The MOU doesn’t commit to investing in new infrastructure that would expand Israel’s capacity to export natural gas or Egypt’s ability to liquefy it. Presently, Israel can deliver somewhere between 7-10 BCM to Egypt via existing export contracts, where it could then be converted into LNG and sold on the global market. Future pipeline projects will enable this quantity to increase, however Egypt’s liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals can only convert around 17 BCM per year.

IN OTHER words, the MOU loosely weaves EU energy interests into Israel and Egypt’s current energy partnership, as well as the broader trend of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. This isn’t a game changer that will alter European energy security, rather a piece of a complex puzzle that Brussels is trying to tackle with a combination of short, medium and long-term policies on the import of fossil fuels and the development of renewable projects. It also means that future exports to Europe won’t dramatically weaken Israel’s energy security, as some have claimed. The quantities aren’t significant enough and the timeframe that the parties are discussing isn’t long enough.

To fully maximize the potential of this agreement, Israel should pursue additional methods beyond natural gas exports to support Europe’s efforts. Investing in renewable infrastructure and technology would both enable Israel to expand its storage capacity (which in turn would allow it to export more natural gas), as well as contribute to international efforts to transition from fossil fuels. Israel has yet to green-light the EuroAsia Interconnector, a proposed electricity interconnector or high-voltage cable that would link the electricity systems of Greece, Cyprus and Israel.

Unlike pipelines, interconnectors transfer electricity in both directions and are commonly viewed as one of the better vehicles to maximize the strengths of renewable energy. Imagine a scenario where Israel – alongside other Middle Eastern and Mediterranean states – supplied renewable-based electricity to Europe. And with the right dose of American mediation, Israel might find the right language to reach a maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, thus enabling international oil and gas companies to explore additional Mediterranean waters and discover more hydrocarbons.

When world leaders gathered at COP26 in Glasgow last November, the conversation focused almost exclusively on the transition to renewables and combating climate change. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically altered the short-term interests of Europe and its allies, those long-term goals remain unchanged.

Eastern Mediterranean states, such as Israel, that can adeptly navigate between these somewhat contradictory trends will not only play a constructive role in supporting Europe during this current crisis but help lay the foundations for a more interconnected and renewable tomorrow.

This article is from “JPost“, from June 21, 2022

הפוסט Exporting Israel’s gas to Europe: An initial but momentous step- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greece and Cyprus fill important roles in the gas forum, and over the last decade have strengthened their strategic relationship with Israel. If the Biden administration is intent on advancing a multilateral approach towards in international affairs, then it is worth examining how these two countries can support efforts to improve Israeli-Palestinian communication in advance of future direct negotiations.

The current policies of Greece and Cyprus on Israeli-Palestinian affairs are understandably nuanced. Both countries regularly engage with the Palestine Authority and are committed to the official positions of the EU (e.g., support for a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and opposition to unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement construction and annexation). Neither country, however, is a leading voice within the EU on this issue and Israel has relied on each of them – along with members of the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) – to soften (and sometimes block) European reactions to its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2015, for example, Greece defied European labeling policies on goods manufactured by Israeli companies in the West Bank. Despite PA efforts to convince Greece to take an official stance against Israel’s annexation ambitions in the summer of 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not publicly reference the matter during his visit to Israel in mid-June, focusing instead on other aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Greece and Cyprus do not require instruction from Israel to keep their distance from the conflict. Embroiled in their own ongoing disputes with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the divided island of Cyprus, both countries prefer to not meddle in the affairs of Israel. This approach should not be confused with a lack of interest. At an official level, Greece and Cyprus want to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Greek Orthodox Church remains a principal religious institution and landowner in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Both countries enjoy robust commercial and strategic relations with Arab countries in the region.

Still, the importance of the strategic relationship with Israel has compelled Greece and Cyprus to take a back seat on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Bilateral trade with the Palestinians – which was never robust – has decreased over the past two decades. PA officials now reference their strong ties with Athens and Nicosia in the past tense. Other regional players, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, and Qatar play a more central role in intra-Palestinian politics and delivering messages between various Palestinian factions and Israel.

Greece and Cyprus are limited both in their capacity and interest to perform a central role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. Under the right conditions, however, they could support a number of focused elements in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The recent news about potential Gaza Strip projects  suggests that Greece and Cyprus could play a constructive role in regional energy cooperation and Palestinian participation in the EMGF. The forum includes both Israeli and PA representation, a rare phenomenon considering the current nadir in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Energy security is a serious matter for Palestinians – especially in the Gaza Strip, where electricity shortages are commonplace – and initiatives that improve reliability and affordability of supply would help stabilize the Palestinian economy and raise the quality of life. As mentioned above, there is already momentum in this space, so Greece and Cyprus would not be taking bold positions by offering to play a facilitating role on energy-related matters that come up in the forum, encouraging foreign companies to look into supporting the development of Gaza Marine field, and making sure that their Palestinian counterparts feel heard. The current mission of the EMGF focuses solely on energy issues, but its mission is likely to expand with time. It is increasingly obvious that Eastern Mediterranean states need to be in dialogue on a litany of topics, both economic and environmental, and this is an area where Greece and Cyprus could ensure a Palestinian presence.

Second, Cyprus could play a role in supporting the reopening of the Gaza Strip. Gaza remains under a strict blockade – facilitated both by Israel and Egypt – and the humanitarian conditions remain dire. Israel’s restrictive list of banned import/export goods hampers economic growth and is easy fodder for anti-Israel criticism in the international community. There is some evidence that Israel wants to change that. In February 2021, Qatar announced that it – along with the Office of the Quartet – had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Israeli government and Delek Group to construct a pipeline between one of Israel’s natural gas fields and the Gaza Strip. Just a few days later, Egypt agreed to help develop the Gaza Marine field, a natural gas reserve located just off the coast.

As recently as 2018, Israel and Cyprus were in discussions about establishing a floating dock in Limassol to receive and monitor goods bound for the Gaza Strip. The concept of the floating dock was a creative one, but the conditions – that Hamas return Israeli civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed and the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war – were a nonstarter.

Despite promising proposals, the economic and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip remain the same (if not worse). The  floating dock may, however, be worth reviewing once more in light of recent announcements by Qatar and Egypt. A port solution would benefit all parties and should be delinked from the broader political process with the Palestinians. This would require significant coordination between Israel, Cyprus, and the PA, as well as other international actors like Egypt, the EU, and the U.S. If the project was revived under new U.S. and EU leadership, this would be a feasible, low-cost way to reduce Gaza’s isolation.

As member states of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have a major voice in the formulation and execution of the European Neighborhood Policy in the Mediterranean as well as the Southern Neighborhood which includes Israel and Palestine. Given their position, Athens and Nicosia could proactively identify regional projects in which Palestine and Israel can jointly participate as well as collaborate with initiatives that support the growth of trade opportunities, European investment in the Palestinian economy, and academic exchange. While it is commendable that Greece and Cyprus support Israeli positions within the EU, a neutral approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue could better ensure a sustainable, long-term relationship.

In the past, Cyprus functioned as a location for Israeli and Palestinian civil society engagement. Student programs brought together Israelis, Palestinians – as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots – to learn about one another’s narratives, and map the successes and shortcomings of conflict resolution methods in other countries. Resuming these activities would allow Cyprus to serve as a neutral venue and draw from the Cypriot community’s professional know-how. With US Congress approving 250 million USD in funding to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts in December 2020, there is an opportunity for third-party actors to take part in new initiatives.

Greece and Cyprus’ association to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in recent years, however they can play a constructive role in improving on-the-ground conditions in the Palestinian territories as well as supporting regional and international initiatives that encourage Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Resolving the conflict is not only about final status issues. There are countless, smaller matters concerning the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations that have yet to be resolved and could benefit from external engagement. Future mediators should include Greece and Cyprus amongst the select number of international actors that can play a modest role in advancing the cause of peace.

**The article was published on MEI, 21 May 2021.

הפוסט Greece and Cyprus can play a modest role in advancing<br> Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Historical Background
3. For the better part of Israel’s modern history, relations with Greece and Cyprus could be described as something between dormant and strained. Israel enjoyed full diplomatic ties with both countries, however Greek and Cypriot support for the Palestinian cause and Israel’s cooperation with Turkey were obstacles that prevented the parties from fostering meaningful relations. In the 1980s, the governments in Athens and Nicosia were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and frequently hosted PLO head Yasser Arafat. In 1988, Cyprus officially recognized the State of Palestine. Supporting the PLO was a red line for Israel, who was actively pursuing Arafat and trying to thwart his operations. At the same time, both Greece and Cyprus viewed Jerusalem’s strategic cooperation with Ankara from the lens of their shared conflict with Turkey. These positions only began to soften during the 1990s, following the interim agreements with the Palestinians (1993-1995) and the peace agreement with Jordan (1994).^[1] But even then, the continued partnership between Israel and Turkey in the 1990s and early 2000s seemed a bridge too far to cross.

It was only after 2009, following the collapse of the Greek economy, the Arab Spring, and the disintegration of Israel-Turkey relations, that a window of opportunity opened for the three countries to improve their ties. During this period of time, offshore natural gas reserves were discovered in the waters of Israel and Cyprus, further incentivizing cooperation between Jerusalem, Athens, and Nicosia. Today, the tripartite alliance is one of Israel’s most significant strategic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was not a welcome sight for the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose leadership had enjoyed positive relations with Greece and Cyprus for decades. Inter-Palestinian divisions between Fatah and Hamas had weakened the PA’s legitimacy and it had little leverage on the now pro-Israel governments in Athens and Nicosia. Despite the continuation of high-level meetings between Palestinian officials and their Greek and Cypriot counterparts, in 2015 the Greek parliament stopped short of fully recognizing Palestinian statehood.^[2]

Contemporary Greek and Cypriot Policies on Israeli-Palestinian Affairs

The current policies of Greece and Cyprus on Israeli-Palestinian affairs are understandably nuanced. Both countries regularly engage with the Palestine Authority and are committed to the official positions of the EU (e.g., support for a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and opposition towards unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement construction and annexation). This reflects public support for a resolution of the conflict and sympathy towards Palestinian national aspirations. However, neither country is a leading voice within the EU on this issue and Israel has relied on each of them – along with members of the Visegrad Group – to soften (and sometimes block) European reactions to its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2015, for example, Greece defied European labeling policies on goods manufactured over the pre-1967 lines.^[3] Despite PA efforts to convince Greece to take an official stance against Israel’s annexation ambitions in the summer of 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not publicly reference the matter during his visit to Israel in mid-June, focusing instead on other aspects of the bilateral relationship.^[4] Similar efforts were reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi vis-a-vis his counterparts in Nicosia.^[5]

Greece and Cyprus do not require instruction from Israel to keep their distance from the conflict. Embroiled in their own ongoing disputes with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the divided island of Cyprus, both countries prefer having a relationship with Israel that does not necessitate one party meddling in the affairs of the other. This approach should not be confused with a lack of interest. At an official level, Greece and Cyprus want to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Greek Orthodox Church remains a principal religious institution and landowner in Israel and the Palestinian territories.^[6] Both countries enjoy robust commercial and strategic relations with Arab countries in the region. Despite being separated by the sea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is never too far away.

Still, the importance of the strategic relationship with Israel, and the desire to marginalize Turkey’s regional partnerships, has compelled Greece and Cyprus to take a back seat on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Bilateral trade with the Palestinians – which was never robust – has decreased over the past two decades.^[7] PA officials now reference their strong ties with Athens and Nicosia in the past tense.^[8] Other regional players, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, and Qatar play a more central role in intra-Palestinian politics and delivering messages between various Palestinian factions and Israel. In sum, Greece and Cyprus have little incentive to involve themselves in Israeli-Palestinian affairs and are more likely to wait until international actors – or the Israelis and Palestinians themselves – renew their interest in negotiations and invite them to contribute to the peace process.

Potential Greek and Cypriot Contributions to Advancing Peace

Greece and Cyprus are limited both in their capacity and interest to perform a central role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. However, under the right conditions, they could support a number of focused elements in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

First, Cyprus could play a role in supporting the reopening of the Gaza Strip. Gaza remains under a strict blockade – facilitated both by Israel and Egypt – and the humanitarian conditions remain fragile. Israel’s restrictive list of banned import/export goods hampers economic growth and is easy fodder for anti-Israel criticism in the international community. There is some evidence that Israel wants to change that. In February 2021, Qatar announced that it – along with the Office of the Quartet – had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Israeli government and Delek Group to construct a pipeline between one of Israel’s natural gas fields and the Gaza Strip. Just a few days later, Egypt agreed to help develop the Gaza Marine field, a natural gas reserve located just off the coast. Both of these developments demonstrate that there are areas where regional actors can make an impact on the ground.

As recently as 2018, Israel and Cyprus were in discussions about establishing a floating dock in Limassol to receive and monitor goods bound for the Gaza Strip. The concept of the floating dock was a creative one, but the conditions – that Hamas return Israeli civilians Abera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed and the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war – were a nonstarter. It was also unclear whether the initiative was serious or just part of a public relations campaign to undermine Hamas’ credibility in the Gaza Strip.^[9] Cyprus had its own set of concerns at the time and was reluctant to interfere in Israeli-Palestinian affairs.

However, the economic and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip remain the same (if not worse), and the recent announcements by Qatar and Egypt suggest that this project is worth reviewing once more. As highlighted by Ambassador (ret.) Michael Harari, a port solution would benefit all parties and should be “dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians.”^[10] This would require significant coordination between Israel, Cyprus and the PA, as well as other international actors like Egypt, the EU, and the US. If the project was revived under new US and EU leadership, this would be a feasible, low-cost way to reduce Gaza’s isolation.

The recent news about potential Gaza Strip projects also relate to the second arena where Greece and Cyprus could play a constructive role: regional energy cooperation and Palestinian participation in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The forum is a regional body established in 2020 that includes both Israeli and PA representation, a rare phenomenon considering the current nadir in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Energy security is a serious matter for Palestinians – especially in the Gaza Strip, where electricity shortages are commonplace – and initiatives that improve reliability and affordability of supply would help stabilize the Palestinian economy and raise the quality of life. As mentioned above, there is already momentum in this space, so Greece and Cyprus would not be taking bold positions by offering to play a facilitating role on energy-related matters that come up in the forum, encouraging foreign companies to look into supporting the development of Gaza Marine field, and making sure that their Palestinian counterparts feel heard. The current mission of the EMGF focuses solely on energy issues, but its mission is likely to expand with time. It is increasingly obvious that Eastern Mediterranean states need to be in dialogue on a litany of topics, both economic and environmental, and this is an area where Greece and Cyprus could ensure a Palestinian presence.

As member states of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have a major voice in the formulation and execution of the European Neighborhood Policy in the Mediterranean as well as the Southern Neighborhood that includes Israel and Palestine. Within this framework, the Athens and Nicosia could proactively identify regional projects that include Palestinian and Israeli participation, increasing the engagement and interconnectivity between the two sides, as well as participate in initiatives that support the growth of trade opportunities, European investment in the Palestinian economy, and academic exchange. While commendable that Greece and Cyprus support Israeli positions within the EU, a neutral approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue could better ensure a sustainable, long-term relationship.

In the past, Cyprus functioned as a location for Israeli and Palestinian civil society engagement. Student programs brought together Israelis, Palestinians – as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots – to learn about one another’s narratives, and map the successes and shortcomings of conflict resolution methods in other countries. Resuming these activities would allow Cyprus to serve as a neutral venue and draw from the Cypriot community’s professional know-how. With US Congress approving 250 million USD in funding to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts in December 2020, there is an opportunity for third-party actors to take part in new initiatives.[11]

Finally, in the event that there is a genuine international effort to bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table, Greece and Cyprus can support those processes as comparatively neutral parties, knowing that Israel will trust its Eastern Mediterranean allies to have its best interests at heart. This is no small thing. Often in negotiations, there is a concern that international actors are trying to force a solution that is not in the interests of one or both of the conflicting parties. Having the support of friends goes a long way to easing those concerns.

Greece and Cyprus’ association to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in recent years, however they can play a constructive role in improving on-the-ground conditions in the Palestinian territories as well as supporting regional and international initiatives that encourage Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Resolving the conflict is not only about final status issues. There are countless, smaller matters concerning the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations that have yet to be resolved and could benefit from external engagement. Greece and Cyprus are likely to wait until Israelis and Palestinians demonstrate a readiness to resume negotiations, but future mediators should include them amongst the select number of international actors who can play a modest role in advancing the cause of peace.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government. A special thank you to Jenna Kaplan for her research on this report.

^[1] Gallia Lindenstrauss and Polykarpos Gavrielides, “A Decade of Close Greece-Israel Relations: An Assessment,” INSS, April 2019.

^[2] Raphael Ahren, “Greece officially starts using term ‘Palestine’,” Times of Israel, June 8, 2015 and Representative Office of the Republic of Cyprus to the State of Palestine, Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021 and Greek-Palestinian Relations, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021.

^[3] Raphael Ahren, “Greece to defy EU order on labeling settlement goods,” Times of Israel, November 30, 2015.

^[4] “Palestine urges Greece to oppose Israel’s West Bank annexation plan,” Middle East Monitor, June 19, 2020 and “PM Netanyahu’s remarks at the joint statements with Greek PM Mitsotakis 16 June 2020,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 14, 2021.

^[5] “Israel seeks Cypriot help in softening EU opposition to annexation,” Times of Israel, June 23, 2020.

[6] The Greek Orthodox Church is an important institution in Jerusalem’s religious landscape. In light of the Abraham Accords, one could imagine a scenario where Athen’s interests in Jerusalem’s interfaith balance results in a more proactive Greek role alongside the Gulf states.

^[7] “Greece (GRC) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” and “Cyprus (CYP) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed on March 13, 2021.

^[8] Nabil Sha’ath, “Will Greece betray the Palestinians?” Ha’aretz, January 27, 2016; “Greece has historical ties of friendship and solidarity with the Palestinian people, Ambassador Toubassi says,” ANA-MPN News, April 7, 2019.

^[9] Stuart Winer, “Israel reportedly agrees to set up seaport for Gaza in Cyprus,” Times of Israel, June 25, 2018 and “Cyprus mulling Israeli request for port to send goods to Gaza,” Times of Israel, June 26, 2018.

^[10] Michael Harari, “A port in Cyprus for Gaza’s humanitarian crises,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2018.

[11] Jake Epstein, “Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilders prepare for $250m US government injection,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2021.

הפוסט Greece, Cyprus, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the face of it, nothing about this encounter was consequential—security cooperation is the bedrock of Israeli-Egyptian relations.

However, what captured Israeli headlines was the fact that Cohen was reportedly accompanied by a large delegation of Israeli businessmen. Could the recently signed normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco be warming the “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt?

Possibly, as it is hard to argue that there has ever been a better period in Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in 2013, security cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo has reached unprecedented levels. The two countries share common goals in containing Iranian regional influence, countering Islamic radicalism, and maintaining peace in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Their 170-mile border—for decades a lawless frontier and hotbed for illicit trafficking and terror activities—now stands quiet. Understanding the need for flexibility in the post-2011 Arab Spring Middle East, Israel regularly permits Egyptian forces to enter Sinai’s demilitarized zones in numbers that exceed what was originally permitted in the 1979 peace treaty. There are similar reports of Egypt allowing cross-border operations by the Israel Defense Forces.

Nevertheless, security coordination has always been the relationship’s epicenter. So, while the depth of cooperation between Israeli and Egyptian forces is laudable, where is the relationship evolving?

Few examples are more demonstrative of that point than Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation. In the early 2010s, when offshore hydrocarbons were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was not assumed that Jerusalem and Cairo would buddy up. For years, Egypt supplied Israel with natural gas, but the collapse of their arrangement in 2012 resulted in an unpleasant international arbitration process. In 2015, the International Chamber of Commerce ordered Egypt to pay $1.8 billion in compensation to the Israel Electric Corporation.

This could have been the death knell for future Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation, yet both governments agreed that the commercial and geopolitical gains outweighed what Cairo owed. Israel’s natural gas reserves were trapped without an export route and Egypt’s dormant liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta were an ideal destination. The Eastern Mediterranean had become a breeding ground for maritime disputes—particularly with Turkey—and great power intervention, demanding more teamwork between friendly states. In 2018, an accord to deliver Israel’s gas to Egypt was signed to the tune of $15 billion. Then, a few months later, the parties reached a $500 million settlement on their old dispute.

Today, Israel and Egypt’s budding energy partnership is the foundation for the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), an international organization committed to advancing  energy development and cooperation opportunities between Eastern Mediterranean states. Based in Cairo and including Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, Egypt sees the EMGF as a vehicle to establish itself as a regional gas hub, which would create jobs, improve Egyptian energy security, and strengthen its geostrategic position. For Israel, membership in a forum with three Arab actors and four European actors is no small accomplishment.

Unsurprisingly, Egyptian Petroleum Minister Tarek El Molla and Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz are among the most recognizable and well-traveled politicians in the Eastern Mediterranean. In late February 2021, El Molla was the first Egyptian minister to visit Israel in the last five years. Their personal rapport is viewed as one of the linchpins of bilateral ties.

Security and energy cooperation has also borne diplomatic fruit. After repeatedly downgrading diplomatic ties during various low points of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egypt has maintained its ambassador to Tel Aviv since 2008. Israel’s new ambassador to Egypt, Amira Oron, is fluent in Arabic and has a personal bond with Egypt’s vibrant Jewish past. In 2018, Egypt asked Israel to mediate its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Those efforts fell short but presented an opportunity for Israel to offer technology to help mitigate Egypt’s water security challenges upon the dam’s completion.

There are other examples of improving Israeli-Egyptian relations. For years, the route between Tel Aviv and Cairo was flown by Air Sinai—a one-plane airline that did not even bear the Egyptian flag—and not EgyptAir. However, in March 2021, it was announced that EgyptAir would fly the route under its name and triple the number of daily flights. Egypt has also restored multiple Jewish sites in Cairo and Alexandria. The gesture mirrors a trend amongst several Middle Eastern regimes who have tried to alter the perception of their attitudes towards Jews in an effort to court Washington. This message is not lost on Israelis. Anecdotal as these stories are, in concert, they reflect a larger shift taking place at the official level.

In comparison to his predecessors, President Sisi’s stance towards Israel is pioneering. However, there are also clear limitations to Israeli-Egyptian growth.

The Egyptian public has been consistently opposed to normalization with Israel and that position is unlikely to change until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved. Even civilians, like Egyptian actor Mohamed Ramadan, are castigated by the press if seen socializing with Israelis. As a result, high-profile meetings with Israeli officials—like the one with Cohen’s business delegation in March—continue to be censored for fear of public reprisal. These contradictions aren’t exclusively Egyptian. According to reports, the Israeli delegation was organized without prior consultation with the Economy and Trade Minister and Ambassador Oron.

This shouldn’t prevent Israeli and Egyptian officials from thinking creatively about the future of their relationship.

Israel and Egypt should invest more in maritime cooperation. In 2021 alone, a leak aboard a vessel reportedly smuggling Iranian oil to Syria polluted the Israeli coast with tar, and the Ever Given—a massive container ship—was stranded on the Suez Canal, backing up international commercial traffic for days, if not weeks. While neither incident was a bilateral issue per se, they both highlighted areas where enhanced communication—on monitoring maritime traffic, environmental protection, and naval security—could pay dividends.

For the foreseeable future, Israel and Egypt will continue their security coordination on matters pertaining to Hamas—the Islamist movement within Palestinian politics—and the Gaza Strip. But this should also include efforts to alter the economic circumstances that enable Hamas’ grip on power. Egypt’s recent decision to help develop the Gaza Marine natural gas field is exactly the kind of project that could meaningfully improve the living conditions of Palestinians. Expanding the Qualifying Industrial Zones program first introduced by US Congress during the Oslo Peace Process is also an area worthy of review.

Across the region, there is rising demand for technology that will increase human security and food security. Egypt should find ways of bringing Israeli tech into the economy in order to enhance the quality and quantity of its annual harvest. Investment in desalination technology would increase public access to clean water. In a country that has more than once rioted over the price of bread, diversifying Egyptian cooperation with Israel could be the difference between stability and chaos.

Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace is not high on today’s agenda. Despite years mediating between rival Palestinian factions, Egypt appears fairly disinterested in the upcoming elections. Still, Jerusalem and Cairo will never be able to completely decouple their relationship from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and therefore must continue working together to prevent future rounds of violence and the deterioration of the status quo. A disturbance to this delicate balance—for example, renewed Israeli interest in annexing portions of the West Bank—could scuttle the progress of the last six years.

Normalization demonstrated the fluid nature of Israel’s relationship with Arab states, however, methods that work with one country shouldn’t be expected to work everywhere. In Egypt’s case, the strategy is clear: keep expectations low and prioritize steady progress over grabby headlines. That may come as an unsatisfactory answer to some, but it is likely to yield the greatest benefits.

**The article was published on Atlantic Council, 20 April 2021

הפוסט Lessons from Israel and Egypt’s lukewarm peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Strong Israel-Turkey relations make sense. Historically, both countries have been important partners in the Western alliance. Turkey is an original NATO member and Israel’s special relationship with the US and European Union goes back decades. In the heyday of Israel-Turkey ties, joint military exercises and intelligence cooperation were commonplace. Israel and Turkey also have complementary economies and continue to enjoy upwards of $6 billion in bilateral trade. Turkey operates as a conduit for oil from Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Regional Government to reach the Israeli market. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel has functioned as a land bridge for Turkish “roll on roll off” trucks delivering goods to Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Israeli and Turkish democracy may have witnessed better days, but the roots have not been completely uprooted.

Despite their obvious compatibility, Israel and Turkey have drifted further apart in the past decade than at any other point in their history. This is due to several factors, including the cycle of violence in the Gaza Strip and Turkey’s adoption of a hostile position towards Israel and its policies toward the Palestinians.

On the surface, this was not a radical departure from the past; while holding the distinction of being the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel, bilateral relations often reflected the peaks and valleys of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Turkish governments often expressed their disapproval of Israel’s policies by downgrading diplomatic ties.

However, Erdogan’s embrace of the militant group Hamas—along with other Muslim Brotherhood affiliates—proved to be a step too far. It is a decision that has haunted Turkey’s regional foreign policy, undermining its ability to be a constructive actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other disputes.

Still, the transition between US administrations is often a period of strategic realignment. Look no further than Qatar—arguably Turkey’s sole remaining partner in the Middle East, who managed to harness the positive energy of Israel’s normalization with the Gulf States in order to restore ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If that dispute—which included an embargo and painful economic sacrifices—could be resolved, then why can’t Israel and Turkey find common ground? Their shared opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and presence in Syria remain compelling strategic reasons to let bygones be bygones.

Erdogan understands that Turkey must evolve in response to the changing international conditions. His statement on December 25, 2020—“our heart desires that we move our relations with [Israel] to a better point”—was a deliberate effort to shake things up. Turkey has reportedly made similar overtures to Athens, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Brussels.

The bigger question is whether Israel is interested. Unlike the seemingly boundless potential of normalization with the Arab world, Turkey is a familiar space with clear limitations. Most investment opportunities have already been explored and global market conditions have dampened enthusiasm about potential natural gas cooperation (although renewables could be a worthwhile pursuit).

Over the past decade, Israel recreated its lost regional ally in the aggregate by strengthening ties with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt and pursuing the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. Normalization with the UAE and Bahrain was not about replacing Turkey, but, like so many of Israel’s new partners, they distrust Erdogan and his regional ambitions.

Further complicating the situation is Israel’s domestic landscape. Polls indicate that the majority of Israelis approve of future normalization with Turkey, but Erdogan is persona non grata. Embroiled in the fourth election in two years, beleaguered Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to approve such a consequential decision during the campaign for fear of giving his opponents on the left and right an opportunity to score easy points. Besides, Israel probably enjoys the rare opportunity to make Turkey wait for an answer.

Israel has indicated several measures that would demonstrate Turkey’s earnestness, but its demand that Ankara cease its support for Hamas is what stands above the rest. While Israel has no qualms with Qatar funding Hamas, the group’s rumored cyberwarfare and counter-intelligence operations in Istanbul are a thorn in bilateral relations (Turkish officials refute these allegations). If Turkey acquiesces to Israel’s request—it has demonstrated a willingness to do so in the past—it would indicate how far Erdogan is willing to go in order to reset ties with Israel, and the West.

If Israel and Turkey are committed to resolving their differences, it would be a welcome development for the Biden administration. President Biden is well acquainted with the two parties and the strategic consequences of their fallout. Erdogan’s infamous Davos outburst occurred just days after President Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009 and it required efforts over the course of almost two terms to mend those fences. Thus far, the only Turkish request is that Israel freeze West Bank settlement construction. This is something the Biden administration will likely request anyway, so it is in a good position to give the two sides a nudge.

The Israel-Turkey relationship no longer carries the same luster it once did and reconciliation is unlikely to solve Turkey’s troubles in Washington. Even if diplomatic ties were restored, it would only mark the first step in a longer process. The two sides need to reintroduce themselves, expand their communication channels, and create openings for dialogue between new elites. As simple as it is to exchange ambassadors, the journey forward is an arduous one and it is unclear whether either party is committed to making that investment. But, with the Biden administration’s encouragement, it could serve as a model for the route Ankara must take to rehabilitate its tarnished image in Europe and the United States. It would also provide the US the relative comfort of knowing that disputes between its regional partners won’t distract Washington as it pursues bigger, more pressing agendas.

**This article was published on the Atlantic Council, 10 February 2021

הפוסט The Biden administration can help<br> mend ties between Turkey and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**The article was published on Jpost, 4 February 2021

הפוסט Israel, Iran: Now is the time to test if détente can be reached הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One example to support this claim is the EuroAsia Interconnector, an ambitious infrastructure project that intends to connect the European electrical grid via undersea cable from Greece to Cyprus, and Israel. Few in Israel are familiar with the interconnector. Unlike the much-publicized EastMed pipeline, the interconnector garners little attention. Ironically, there is a greater chance that the interconnector – whose cable would run along a similar route as the EastMed pipeline – will successfully link Israel and Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean, and not the more recognizable natural gas project.

This paper attempts to outline the principal reasons why Israel is interested in the EuroAsia Interconnector (EAI) and why an undersea electricity cable may be a more feasible project than the EastMed pipeline (EMP). In the process, it hopes to contribute to current research on Israel’s engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as its transition from energy dependency to a new era of energy independence and interdependence.

הפוסט Supercharged: The EuroAsia Interconnector and <br> Israel’s Pursuit of Energy Interdependence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But whoever wins, Jerusalem can’t depend on a United States, in the process of withdrawing from the Middle East, to safeguard its strategic interests. Israel must find other ways to advance its goals, most critically in relation to an expansionist Turkey.

When, in mid-October, Israeli and Lebanese officials met for the first time in three decades to start resolving their ongoing Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary dispute, some overeager media outlets hinted that the two acrimonious neighbors were the next candidates on track for normalization.

But this was no Trump-initiated miracle or frantic pre-election political theater. Rather, the American-mediated talks were the fulfilment of persistent U.S. diplomatic efforts and engagement over the course of a decade.

No matter who sits in the White House, the U.S. remains committed to supporting eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation and the diffusion of maritime tensions. Facilitating such cooperation is a rare point of bipartisan consensus in Washington and is likely to continue regardless of who wins on November 3rd.

But America’s wider engagement and commitment to the region is fraying.

For Israel, compensating for a fading American presence requires a reboot of its regional policies and level of engagement, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, which now has unprecedented economic significance.

Over the last ten years, Israel has sought to maximize the economic and diplomatic potential of its offshore natural gas. In September 2020, Israel signed a charter alongside Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus to formally establish the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a multinational organization dedicated to boosting regional energy cooperation.

But a decade’s progress was scuttled in 2020 by the collapse of global energy prices following the coronavirus outbreak, and by rising tensions between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.

While the next U.S. administration can’t solve these commercial challenges, it can play a constructive role in conflict management, as the breakthrough in Israel-Lebanon negotiations demonstrates.

The primary dilemma for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean is Turkey’s challenge to the regional order. In an effort to expand its influence, Turkey has aggressively pursued its own, independent policies in the region.

Ankara’s confrontative agenda is partially driven by its need to push back against the success of the Gas Forum. From a commercial perspective, Turkey would have beeen a natural partner in this organization. But Ankara’s relationship with Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus is too strained for it to be a member.

Recent elections in Northern Cyprus saw an Ankara-backed candidate edge out a moderate incumbent president, which is almost certain to add to tensions with Cyprus and Greece.

And rather than pursue dialogue, Turkey has directed its navy to test the limits of EMGF member states and ensnare its neighbors in a cycle of maritime brinkmanship that will ultimately scares off foreign investors.

Over the summer, European countries, such as France and Germany, stepped up to address Turkey’s activities, but without success.

The Trump administration adopted an ambivalent position. On the one hand, it called Turkey out for violating Greek maritime space. Yet U.S. officials made no offer to mediate between the two parties, nor has there been an attempt by the White House to broker a grand bargain between Turkey and the region’s other actors.

This muted approach can be explained in part by the complex nature of U.S.-Turkey ties, and Trump’s desire to maintain a good rapport with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey is a NATO member whose actions are increasingly inconsistent with American and transatlantic interests.

הפוסט Will Biden Help Israel Take on Turkey? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum: Cooperation in the Shadow of Competition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s health care system was unprepared to handle COVID-19. Although as of this article’s submission there is a comparatively low death toll – 56 individuals (as for April 6), the majority of whom were senior citizens – the main concern is that Israel’s medical institutions will soon be overrun by coronavirus patients which will indirectly affect the mortality rates of non-coronavirus patients. Israel only possesses some 4,000 ventilators – a critical tool to aid those suffering from the worst conditions. Each day, more health care employees are being sidelined from their tasks due to possible exposure to the virus. Inventive solutions like converting vacant hotels into housing units for patients with mild symptoms may not be enough if government measures cannot flatten the curve.

Mass coronavirus testing – one of the most successful policies adopted by countries like South Korea and Taiwan – has yet to take off efficiently in Israel. Many patients who have been tested received incorrect results, further delaying the health system’s ability to provide a vital service in a timely fashion. An absence of essential chemicals has slowed the existing testing process.

But befitting its moniker as the “startup nation”, Israel has tried to employ technology in order to curtail COVID-19. One initiative is the Health Ministry’s app that permits citizens who download it to see whether their movement has overlapped with anyone with a confirmed infection. The government has also granted the Shin Bet – Israel’s internal security agency – permission to track the movements of coronavirus patients through use of their phones and credit card data. This controversial decision reportedly identified at least 500 individuals carrying the disease.

Not surprisingly, these efforts have proven both imperfect against the coronavirus. Israel’s national expenditure on healthcare is lower than the OECD average and a 2019 Taub Center report deemed the country’s acute care system insufficient for public demand. Ad hoc solutions rarely solve chronic problems. An increasing number of public figures are asking whether the Health Ministry should be the primary actor in this saga or whether the Defense Ministry should assume the lead.

Enforcing a rigid policy of social distancing and lockdown has also proven challenging. Since March 12, Israeli schoolchildren have been homebound but the Education Ministry has been inconsistent with its execution of nationwide distance learning. Air traffic has all but ceased and public transportation has been significantly reduced, but that hasn’t stopped many from seeing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s almost nightly addresses as merely a polite suggestion. Israel’s police – and, more worryingly, its military – now patrol public spaces (including beaches), fining and arresting those violating the government’s directives.

Since day one, communicating a single, clear message to Israel’s diverse population has been a serious challenge for the Israeli government. No case exemplifies this better than the ultra-Orthodox community. Ultra-Orthodox Jews (around 12% of the general population) observe a rigid set of customs that centers around mass religious education and communal participation in lifecycle events. They often live in distinct neighborhoods and cities, separate from mainstream Israeli society. Whether portions of the ultra-Orthodox community did not receive or were willfully ignorant to the Health Ministry’s directives remains unclear, however images capturing Haredim disregarding government policy seriously damaged the already frayed bonds between this community and mainstream Israeli society. Health Minister Yaakov Litzman, who represents one of the Haredi parties in the Knesset, also violated these public safety restrictions and contracted the coronavirus. Senior government officials, including Netanyahu, are now under quarantine. Haredi leaders are now instructing their devotees not to gather in large numbers, but it has taken longer for these communities to adapt and, unsurprisingly, about half of hospitalized Israelis with COVID-19 are ultra-orthodox. Major Haredi population centers are now under lockdown, cut off from the rest of Israel.

These manifold pressures, in addition to a ballooning unemployment numbers, have manufactured perhaps one, shallow ray of light: the end of Israel’s political deadlock. Publicly, Blue & White leader Benny Gantz claimed that the coronavirus threatened Israel’s future and required that he “put politics aside” after three grueling election cycles. But many see Gantz’s decision as capitulation. And it is difficult to overlook how Netanyahu and Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein strained an already tense political atmosphere to its breaking point by utilizing the coronavirus as legitimate cause for shutting down the legislature and refusing to follow a Supreme Court order to reopen parliament. The cost of establishing a unity government with Netanyahu is high; Gantz’s decision left Israel’s opposition movement in tatters. Firmly back in the driver’s seat, Netanyahu can refocus his attention on his legal battles – and of course coronavirus as well.

As the Passover holiday approaches, most Israelis are trying to look past the egg shortages and the looming economic fallout in order to count their blessings. There is good reason to believe that the national mortality rate will remain low. But similar to many other states affected by the coronavirus, the pandemic’s damage to public trust may require years of rehabilitation.

(originally published in IPSI)

הפוסט A Very Israeli Pandemic Response הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel, Energy, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Shaping a New Regional Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On June 23rd, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu defeated the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), Binali Yildirim, in a historic repeat election for Istanbul’s mayoral seat. Imamoğlu surprised many in March when he narrowly bested Yildirim, handpicked and heavily endorsed by Erdoğan. After the initial results were challenged by the AKP, it was deemed that Imamoğlu would have to accomplish the feat twice in order to earn the keys to the city. Imamoğlu second victory – in which he expanded his margin from 13,000 votes in March to 777,000 votes in June – simultaneously ended the debate about Istanbul’s future leadership and opened a new discussion about the prospects for change in Turkey at a national level.

Israeli opposition voices like Lapid and former prime minister Ehud Barak were quick to praise Imamoğlu. But instead of only applauding Istanbul’s new mayor, they should also be learning from his campaign. There are less than three months until Israel’s repeat election. Although some have reported that the major parties do not plan on engaging the public until late August, there is no better time than the present for Israel’s opposition to study Imamoğlu’s strategies and adapt them to the Israeli electorate.

When it was announced in Istanbul that the first election results were being treated as invalid, Imamoğlu had every reason to attack the ruling party and the political system. Nevertheless, he told supporters, “They want conflict from us. But we, the people who don’t want this nation to fight, we will insist upon embracing each other.” This simple message was disseminated through Imamoğlu’s campaign slogan, “Herşey Çok Güzel Olacak” or “Everything Will Be Alright” and ran counter to the polarizing and often fear-based rhetoric employed by Erdoğan and the AKP over the last decade and a half. Rather than trying to divide the electorate, Imamoğlu emphasized the need for cooperation. In doing so, he successfully built bridges between Istanbul’s myriad communities.

Like Turkey, Israeli society is also fragmented and divided. Netanyahu has maintained his position at the top of the political circus largely because of his ability to take advantage of the existing fault lines within the electorate and create new rifts when the opportunity presented itself. He has also benefited from a rudderless opposition that is often more preoccupied on determining its own hierarchy than providing a meaningful alternative for Israelis. If opposition leaders like Gantz and Lapid are truly committed to bringing about change, then they must promote an inclusive campaign message, avoid mudslinging with the establishment, and publish a clear set of policy goals that reflect the shared values of Israel’s opposition parties.

The most impactful way for the Israeli opposition to assume a more inclusive approach is by targeting all potential voters and not settling for the comforts of their political base. In the previous two elections, Haredi and Arab voters accounted for somewhere around 25 percent of the total voting public (this number could be higher, however Arab voting percentages in recent years have been lower than the Jewish population). Both of these populations carry deep historical grievances. Many within these communities do not believe they are equal partners in the state-building enterprise. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that these glass ceilings are being shattered. Engagement with these minority populations is a challenging but necessary step towards gaining public trust and developing new partnerships. This proved to be a winning strategy for Imamoğlu, who crossed party lines and addressed audiences from the most secular and affluent neighborhoods to those traditionally religious strongholds within Istanbul. He openly courted the Kurdish vote, ignoring the existing political tensions in favor of his message of coexistence. What if an Israeli politician did the same?

Israel’s opposition can also borrow Imamoğlu’s positivist philosophy and abandon their doomsday predictions about the collapse of Israeli democracy. Israeli democracy has always been flawed, and without question the Netanyahu years have witnessed both a steady decline in institutional checks-and-balances as well as an increase in political corruption. However, if the democratic process has proven to be resilient a country like Turkey – where the slide towards authoritarianism has been much steeper and far darker – then Israeli opposition leaders should focus more on the policy issues that will draw public support away from the political center than campaigning for “anyone but Bibi”. Imamoğlu’s team was faced with a similar conundrum, particularly after the initial results in Istanbul were rejected. However, the manifesto that helped alter the tone of Imamoğlu’s campaign – a pamphlet called the Book of Radical Love – dissuaded supporters from attacking Erdoğan. Contrary to what has been the logic of Turkish politics for many years, the document called for an issues-based approach that avoided polarizing debate.

Finally, Israel’s opposition needs to decide what it stands for. In order to accomplish this, opposition parties should reach some consensus about their shared goals and then publish those goals for public viewership. Imamoğlu accomplished this by decoupling traditional identity politics from his campaign and focusing on economics, sharing public resources, and emphasizing the importance of good governance. And although many argued the election was about Erdogan, Imamoğlu did not make it personal. Lapid and Gantz should take note of this. Turkey is not only Erdoğan, and Israel is not only Bibi. If you succeed in changing the narrative, you expand the public’s imagination about what the future can be. Israelis have heard enough about Netanyahu’s illicit activities. What they must receive now are opposition party platforms that map out achievable policy goals in the areas of economics, security, and diplomacy.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. If Israel’s opposition is so inspired by Imamoğlu’s accomplishments, then it should borrow his message and reverse the trend of exclusionary and fear-based politics. Rather than crafting a platform that only addresses the country’s Zionist populations, Israel’s opposition should adopt an inclusive narrative that identifies common interests over identity politics. Instead of permitting the campaign to descend into a referendum on the prime minister’s personality, Israel’s opposition should focus on the policy issues and maintain a positive, conversational tone that welcomes discussion with all parties on the political spectrum. If successfully executed, such a strategy could put an end to the Netanyahu government and revolutionize the nature of Israeli politics in the process.

Upon news of Imamoğlu’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Istanbulites exited onto the streets to celebrate. Addressing the crowds, Istanbul’s new mayor said, “You have shown the world that Turkey still protects its democracy. And we have shown other countries who try to go down the road we were choosing that it is no road at all.” Perhaps what Imamoğlu and his campaign actually revealed was a strategy for thwarting the populist wave the world has witnessed in the last decade. There is arguably no better place to put those strategies to the test than in Israel.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But Israel – or the “Little Satan” – plays no less central a role. Thanks to tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its proxy war involvement in Syria close to Israel’s northern border, for the first time, Iran and Israel’s relationship is showing signs of evolving from a cold war to a hot war.

Despite this, Iranians and Israelis are, surprisingly, communicating with one another more now than they have since the days of the Shah. And it is during this period of geopolitical uncertainty that civil society actors on both sides should buck the trend and encourage and participate in a new narrative of understanding and goodwill.

Every year, at the state ceremony marking Holocaust Memorial Day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws parallels between the murderous plans of the Nazis and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Islamic Republic. And like their premier, most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat.

Iran’s decades-long propagation of Holocaust denial, as well as arming of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reinforces this ingrained perception. When Iran test fires ballistic missiles decorated with Hebrew writing that calls for Israel’s destruction, it reaffirms popular opinion on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. According to a poll conducted in early May, 44 percent of Israelis support a unilateral strike in order to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The prospects of military confrontation between Israel and Iran have increased over Syria. Israel established two red lines on Iran’s entrenchment and transfers of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, and has responded to Iranian disregard for these red lines with a series of airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria. But Israel does not seek an expansion of this conflict, and is using two soft-power tactics in the hopes of forcing Iran’s hand.

The first tactic is diplomacy with Russia. While successfully lobbying the Trump administration to walk away from the JCPOA and reinstitute economic sanctions on Iran, Netanyahu has simultaneously prioritized his relationship with President Vladimir Putin.

Israel doesn’t have much choice. After Russia installed its S-300 air defense systems in Syria, Israel was compelled to develop a de-conflicting mechanism so that its planes could continue to overfly Syrian airspace without interfering with Moscow’s interests. Negotiations between Jerusalem and the Kremlin over an Iranian withdrawal from southern Syria are ongoing and according to reports, received a boost during Trump and Putin’s Helsinki summit and other recent high-level meetings.

The second Israeli strategy – and one that turns more heads – is a direct courtship of the Iranian people. In a series of videos published on YouTube aimed at the Iranian public, Netanyahu describes the travails of the imaginary 15-year old Iranian teen girl Fatehmeh; he longs for the day when Israeli and Iranian national soccer teams can compete against one another, asks Iranians to consider using Israeli agricultural technology to minimize the effects of drought, and congratulates Iranian protesters for questioning the allocution of state funds to military campaigns in the Middle East.

Israel may be executing this new approach in tandem with the U.S., which over the last year has frequently engaged Iranians and the Iranian government with different messages. Israel’s government seems to have accepted the notion that it can pressure Tehran’s ruling class by addressing the Iranian public. The game plan is simple: force the regime to justify its war-mongering policies to its own people, and force Iranians to ask what price they are willing to pay in order to pursue this ideological end-goal, to query whether the call for the destruction of Israel resonates beyond the Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guards cadre.

No Israeli leader has ever adopted this approach before, and Netanyahu knows full well that he is touching a nerve. The timing is no coincidence. Not only is Tehran under international pressure to rethink its regional agenda, but, domestically, anger over the regime’s disconnected foreign and economic policies is also growing. Slogans such as “Leave Palestine be, think about us [Iran]” and “Palestine, Syria are reasons for our misery” are now commonly used in protests taking place across Iran.

Netanyahu’s message is accurate, but there could not be a worse messenger. Rather than ceding the platform to Netanyahu – an unpopular figure in Iran – Israelis must seize this opportunity and develop their own dialogue with the Iranian people. Similarly, Iranians need to be ready to respond to their Israeli counterparts, and engage in a serious conversation about their vision for the future.

Creating successful mechanisms for Israeli-Iranian dialogue was the central question raised by a group of U.S.-based Israeli and Iranian policy analysts and scholars (including the authors of this piece) in Washington, D.C. in late 2017. While participants agreed that Israeli and Iranian officials would not be conducting direct negotiations to reduce bilateral tensions anytime soon, many felt that the Iran nuclear deal, to which at the time the U.S. was still a signatory, presented an opening for some limited people-to-people dialogue, especially if executed in coordination with Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities. Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, the discussion about how this people-to-people dialogue might develop is as relevant as ever.

Iranians at the meetings explained that, while their countrymen are protesting their government’s adventurism abroad, this should not lead Israelis to assume that anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments in Iran are merely skin-deep. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians over the last decades have strengthened negative Iranian attitudes towards the Jewish state. Moderate voices in Iran who recognize that hostility towards Israel does not serve their country’s interests do exist, however they lack clear incentives to advocate for a moderate approach.

Emphasizing cultural bonds between the two peoples won’t bridge political differences between the two governments, but they deserve more attention. As our meetings revealed, there are no shortage of stories from older generations who recall the once warm relationship between Tehran and Jerusalem. In a similar vein, the 2015 Israeli film “Baba Joon” was well-received by Iranian audiences because of its touching depiction of how an immigrant family from Iran retained their Persian identity despite relocating to Israel. Unsurprisingly, many Persian Israelis root for “Team Melli” during the World Cup.

A similar emphasis should be placed on social media initiatives. The 2012 “Israel Loves Iran” and corresponding “Iran Loves Israel” campaigns attracted the support of thousands to an anti-war message and revealed how many Israelis and Iranians refuse to accept their respective government’s worldview. These campaigns were particularly successful in targeting younger audiences, and breaking taboos – particularly in Iran, where until several years ago the media would never refer to Israel by name.

Above all, Israelis and Iranians need to be realistic about what a military conflict would mean and the role their governments play in perpetuating this antagonism. So long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, an Iranian U-turn on Israel isn’t in the cards. And it is even less likely that Iran will halt its support for other regional actors, such as Hezbollah, in the years to come. Top-down changes within Israel should not be anticipated either. Rather than wait for political elites to make rational choices, Israeli and Iranian citizens must be the ones to engage one another in dialogue, voice their concerns to their respective leaders, and explore every alternative to war.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA damaged the ability of third parties to effectively deescalate tensions between Israel and Iran. Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in Syria should be applauded, but the results may only serve a stopgap before the next chapter of hostilities. Despite this pessimism, the channels of communication have never been more accessible. People-to-people initiatives may not be able to reverse the narrative of conflict that pervades the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but it may thwart a descent into chaos.

Gabriel Mitchell is policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been a busy month for Benjamin Netanyahu. For the third week in a row, Israel’s prime minister has journeyed outside of the Middle East in order to advance his country’s interests. But after enjoying high-profile meetings with British Prime Minister Theresa May and US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu’s world tour heads eastward, with stops in Singapore and Australia.

There is no denying that Netanyahu is making history. Operating as both prime minister and foreign minister, Netanyahu has expanded his international travel schedule, visiting corners of the globe familiar to Israeli backpackers but alien to most of their politicians. In the last year alone, Netanyahu’s passport has collected stamps from Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. His arrival in Sydney this Wednesday will mark the first ever visit by an Israeli head-of-state.

Netanyahu’s jet-setting is indicative of a shift within Israel’s foreign policy strategy away from the United States and Europe. Israel is cognizant that the geopolitical order is shifting away from a unipolar world and is making preparations that will compensate for America’s withdrawal from the world stage. Frustrated with European ‘interference’ in its relationship with the Palestinians, Israel is casting a wide net in search for international partners who are less interested in the conflict. As the aforementioned list demonstrates, this approach has worked predominantly with non-democratic states.

This is not the case with Australia, which boasts strong democratic values, a robust economy and is both culturally and strategically linked with the West. Membership in the anglosphere is yet another important distinction. As Netanyahu will undoubtedly reiterate during his stay, Australia and Israel are natural partners and there are tremendous opportunities for cooperation on a host of issues—including cyber security, counterterrorism, environmental and agricultural sciences and of course high-tech.

But in fact, it is because of these unique qualities that the Australian government can use the same platform it is providing Netanyahu to articulate its own interests.

If Australia wants to contribute to peace in the Middle East, it should reaffirm its support of the two-state solution. The two-state solution has come under heavy scrutiny of late and it is unclear how committed the current US administration is to ensuring that Israelis and Palestinians reach that goal. Still, it was perplexing how Foreign Minister Julie Bishop could support Trump’s damaging “two-state, one-state” remarks just days after joining the near universal condemnation of a controversial Israeli law that retroactively legalizes all West Bank settler homes constructed on private Palestinian land.

Trump’s comments have emboldened Netanyahu’s rivals. Many believe it is only a matter of time before he is ousted from office—he is currently under investigation in multiple police cases—and challenging his position on the settlements is an easy way to score points. Those close to Netanyahu claim that the prime minister still supports the two-state solution, yet such reports are difficult to believe when he always appears to be in a fight for his political life. So goes the game of thrones that is Israeli domestic politics.

When international actors send mixed messages on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it only strengthens the radical camps in both societies—often bearing deadly results. Rather than limiting its involvement to rhetorical statements, the Australian government should try to incentivize Israeli efforts towards peace, perhaps by offering to facilitate dialogue between Israel and ASEAN’s Muslim-majority member states that have historically been reluctant to normalize relations with the Jewish State.

Alternatively, Australia could lend its support for the kind of US-led regional peace initiative that was pursued by the Obama administration and floated during the Trump-Netanyahu press conference in Washington, DC.

Both countries should be thinking as big when it comes to strengthening bilateral ties. The Israel Trade Commission and the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce provide a strong foundation for commercial ties to grow, and their efforts should be applauded. Still, taking the Australia-Israel relationship to the next level requires investment in new bilateral initiatives—similar to the industrial R&D agreement signed by Israel and the NSW government in April 2016—as well as expanding existing scientific exchange programs, establishing joint energy and water management projects, and creating room for future military exchanges.

The future of Australian-Israeli bilateral relations will ultimately be determined by the tone and content of the dialogue between their respective societies. If the last decade is any indication, there is legitimate reason for optimism. Still, the gravity of official state visits such as these should not be overlooked. With Netanyahu finally ‘Down Under’, Australia’s government has a historic opportunity to clarify its own position on the two-state solution at a time when international support is at an all-time low. Such a demonstration from a trusted ally may pressure Netanyahu to clarify some of his own dubious remarks, but more importantly it would resonate with Israelis who are tired of opportunistic politicians and seek international partners that will ‘talk straight’ when engaged in a face-to-face conversation.

(originally published in the Australian Outlook)

הפוסט Why Australia Needs to be Straight-Talking with Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The risks and rewards of Israeli-Turkish energy cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Listen to the TLVI Podcast Episode

הפוסט The cost of energetic independence: Israel’s natural gas challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the deal, Israel will deposit $20 million in a Turkish bank account as compensation to the families of those who died during the I.D.F. operation to seize the Mavi Marmara in 2010. In return, Turkey will drop the lawsuit against four senior Israeli officers deemed responsible for the operation. Turkey will also be allowed to play a more central role in supplying humanitarian aid to, and supervising the development of basic infrastructure projects in, the Gaza Strip. Shipments, however, will still be inspected at Israel’s Ashdod port prior to transport via the Erez Crossing—the first of which arrived this weekend. Finally, both sides agreed to exchange ambassadors in the coming weeks.

Analysis of the deal has been skeptical; rapprochement does not change the underlying fact that Turkey continues to support Hamas, an organization committed to Israel’s destruction. One does not need to be an expert in order to predict that the next round of violence in the Gaza Strip—more of a when than an if—will put the deal’s resilience to the test.

But the fact that the two sides reached an accord suggests that differences over Gaza are taking a backseat to more pressing matters. Many didn’t believe that the deal would happen, and yet it did.

For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel is the first step to reversing a failed foreign policy that led to its regional isolation. It is no coincidence that the final round of negotiations began shortly after Turkey downed a Russian jet along the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, or that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued an apology to Moscow shortly after signing the deal with Israel. Increased security cooperation, enabled in part by Ankara’s decision to lift its veto of a permanent Israeli mission to NATO, should contribute to Turkish efforts to contain ISIS as well as joint Israeli-Turkish interest in limiting Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel is also concerned with regional instability, yet its desire to export natural gas seems to be an equally dominant incentive. Of the multiple export options available to Israel, none are more financially viable than the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey. The obstacles standing before a project of this kind are many: a pipeline would run through Cypriot territorial waters and therefore requires Nicosia’ approval; the global energy market could continue to plummet thereby reducing investor interest; and, of course, bilateral ties could collapse again prior to a hypothetical pipeline’s completion. However, given the degree to which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the deal’s impact upon Israel’s future energy security, there can be little doubt as to its centrality in this story.

Deep distrust remains on both sides. Israel and Turkey share many overlapping strategic interests, but they prioritize them differently. Regional challenges such as the Syrian civil war, and the threat of ISIS are not necessarily a source of cohesion. Yet in the last few months, both sides engaged in a public relations campaign in order develop the necessary goodwill for reconciliation. This is likely to continue in the coming months.

Forging a new narrative requires the implementation of a multi-tier process that includes the diversification of official channels that enhance Israeli-Turkish strategic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Civil society actors will play an important role in bolstering these efforts and increasing people-to-people dialogue. Each country’s business community, indirectly responsible for keeping the possibility of reconciliation alive during this period of diplomatic tension, must also be vocal partners in defining the future of the relationship.

Most importantly, Israeli and Turkish leaderships must create a mechanism that will allow them to effectively manage future conflicts. Throughout the decades, Israel-Turkey ties have often been impacted by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But whereas previous Turkish support for the Palestinian cause was limited to diplomatic rhetoric, patronage under Erdogan and the A.K.P. became increasingly proactive, particularly in Gaza, necessitating a reevaluation of the relationship between Turkey and Israel.

As long as Turkey’s relationship with Hamas remains political, détente could provide a window of opportunity to rebuild the Gaza Strip. As revealed a few days after the signing of the deal, Turkey will be permitted to transfer funds to banks in the Gaza for the purpose of financing projects previously approved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Plans are already underway to build a desalination plant and power station. Basic infrastructure projects not only improve the daily lives of Gazans, but also could stave off future conflict between Israel and Hamas by creating a valuable channel of communication that runs through Ankara.

Why should the United States support this process? After all, Erdogan and Netanyahu are persona non grata at the White House these days. Neither has been particularly supportive of President Barack Obama’s Middle East policies, and that may not change after he leaves office in January. However, American security interests are dependent on Washington’s ability to cooperate with and lead its allies. Now that the reconciliation process has confirmed the sources of Israeli-Turkish tension and mutual interest, the next administration will be better positioned to incentivize cooperation over discord.

Rapprochement signals the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. But as emphasized by Israel’s lead negotiator with Turkey, Joseph Ciechanover, the deal only planted a “seedling”. Both parties come away from the reconciliation process with a better understanding of one another’s interests, and therefore will be better adapted to repair and cultivate this partnership going forward. The future of the relationship will be determined by how the two sides choose to care for and grow their partnership, hopefully with an eye toward not only their immediate interests, but also the long-term prospects for peace in the region.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“If there is something that frightens me,” he said, “it is identifying horrifying processes that occurred in Europe…and finding evidence of their existence here in our midst, today, in 2016.” The ensuing media firestorm grew so large that, by comparison, reports of mounting tensions along the Gaza border felt like second page news.

Holocaust memory is a sensitive and often politicized subject in Israel. One could construct a pretty articulate dissertation that analyzed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated references to the Holocaust when discussing Iran throughout his political career (including this year). On the opposite pole of Holocaust discourse, President Reuven Rivlin’s apology to Holocaust survivors on behalf of the state for not providing them with enough care and services was a compelling moment in its own right. But whether by design or default, Golan’s statements made headlines, and in the process raised an interesting point about the relationship between the Holocaust and the IDF.

The IDF was founded on May 26, 1948, just days after Israel declared its independence. Forged by fire against an enemy that promised to finish what Hitler had started, half of the Jewish fighting forces in the War of Independence were Holocaust survivors, many of whom had arrived by boat to Haifa port in 1948 only to be conscripted and marched to the frontlines. As a result of this founding legacy, almost no institution in Israel boasts such a demonstrative embodiment of the “Never Again” spirit. Israeli military flyovers above Auschwitz have become legendary amongst IDF veterans. Even during the national Yom HaShoah ceremony held at Yad Vashem (the World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Jerusalem), IDF soldiers more often than not assist survivors as they light torches for each of the six million. As former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi reflected during his 2008 visit to the Warsaw ghetto, “The State of Israel and the IDF are the answer to the Holocaust, and they will ensure that such an event does not take place in the future.” It should come as no surprise that the IDF has consistently received high levels of public trust throughout the decades. After all, the IDF has long been perceived as more than just a civilian army, rather as the force that stands between the Israeli public and a second Holocaust.

This has been a resilient narrative over the last 68 years. However the IDF’s relationship with the Holocaust goes well beyond rhetoric. The IDF Code of Ethics, which declares all human beings as equals, “regardless of race, creed, nationality, gender, status or role” contains meaningful post-Holocaust language that prioritizes morality. Not only does it state that soldiers must “preserve human dignity” at all costs, but the Code of Ethics also includes a clause that demands soldiers “disavow manifestly illegal orders” – a sharp contrast to those Nazi soldiers and bureaucrats who chose to blindly obey. While some may find it difficult to believe, the IDF speedily and soberly serves justice upon those within its own ranks who violate these principles. The Holocaust is seen in the IDF not merely as a cautionary tale for what happens when Jewish power is absent, but as the ultimate example of what happens when power is abused.

All of this is to say that the IDF’s identity is deeply connected with the memory of the Holocaust, and is therefore guided by a powerful moral compass. In this context, that a high-ranking IDF commander would refer to the Holocaust when discussing worrisome trends in Israeli society is not quite as shocking as it seems at first glance. Perhaps Golan was speaking on behalf of a larger institutional frustration with the status quo? From a military perspective, biannual operations into Gaza (yes, that means Israel and Hamas are due for another round of violence) and the continued monitoring of the West Bank yield no strategic victories or paradigmatic shifts. But more consequentially, preserving the status quo damages Israeli democracy and challenges the IDF’s ability to retain its moral authority. Golan was not suggesting moral equivalence between Israeli and Nazi Germany, but issuing a warning about the wider lessons that must be absorbed from the Holocaust and the necessity of maintaining moral vigilance when employing military force.

Golan is one of many outspoken military officials who have challenged the Israeli government’s positions of late. Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot’s swift condemnation of the shooting of a neutralized Palestinian terrorist in Hebron on March 24 was lambasted by several right-wing MKs, including Jewish Home party leader and Education Minister Naftali Bennett. And last November, IDF Intelligence Chief Herzi Halevi challenged Netanyahu’s claim that Palestinian violence was due to increased incitement, arguing that despair and frustration with the status quo were more prominent drivers.

Are we witnessing a new chapter in the history of the IDF’s relationship with the state? Would a more vocal military leadership balance out the incendiary rhetoric of some politicians on the Israeli right? Or is the meddling of military elites in political affairs a breach of Israeli democracy? The answers to these questions cannot be answered immediately. There is a long history of IDF interference in social and political issues over the years, so the current tension between Israel’s political and military leaders is not unprecedented.

However, Golan’s statements should serve as a reminder that while the IDF may not hold a monopoly over the memory of the Holocaust, it remains an influential voice within Israeli public discourse whose warnings should be taken seriously by politician and citizen alike. If one is to properly understand the IDF’s ethos and moral code, understanding the IDF’s relationship to the Holocaust is a necessary place to start.

(originally published by Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט There’s a reason for Yair Golan’s Holocaust talk הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first truth is that despite obvious differences between Obama and Netanyahu, the bond between the United States and Israel remains strong. This should not be taken for granted; even in the days leading up to Biden’s visit a developing story about an alleged scheduling miscommunication between the two heads of state began to overshadow his tour.

Still, reducing the nuances of the U.S.-Israel relationship to the dynamics between their leaders is limiting. Obama and Netanyahu aren’t the first American president and Israeli prime minister to endure a difficult partnership, and they won’t be the last. In the end, regardless of the intense disputes that may poison personal relationships, the success of U.S.-Israel ties depends on shared values and common interests.

This was unexpectedly and tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of Taylor Force’s murder at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist in Jaffa on March 8. Force, a former US army officer and Vanderbilt graduate student, died just a few hundred yards away from Biden’s family, who were spending their evening on the Tel Aviv promenade (the terror attack in Jaffa was one of three that took place that day, leaving another 14 wounded).

“The kind of violence we saw yesterday, the failure to condemn it, the rhetoric that incites that violence, the retribution that it generates has to stop,” Biden told reporters during his press conference with Netanyahu. Although he would later add that terror couldn’t be thwarted by “physical force” alone, Biden’s comments were reassuring to an Israeli public concerned that a chasm has grown between them and the United States.

“You never need to doubt,” Biden reiterated, “the United States of America has Israel’s back.”

The second truth is that the Obama administration will not be leading future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many speculated Biden would push for a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during his trip, which included a brief stopover in Ramallah. According to reports, Biden floated a number of proposals during his meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, notably a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement freezes in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and abandoning the demand for a Palestinian right of return.

However, how serious were Biden’s overtures? Considering that prior to his arrival in Ramallah, Biden critiqued Abbas for failing to condemn the Jaffa terror attack, it is fair to ask how sincere these efforts were, and to what degree the vice president was given a mandate to bring both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table. In the end, Biden’s meeting with Abbas was unproductive.

To Abbas’ credit, acknowledging Biden’s proposals would have only further stained his public image. And though his current political situation is tenuous at best, Abbas (and Netanyahu, for that matter) knows that come January 2017 there will be a new administration in the White House hoping to make its own mark resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, Biden’s visit confirmed what we already knew: that any Obama-led peace initiative would, at best, lay the groundwork for serious negotiations under the next administration, but is unlikely to produce meaningful results.

Finally, Biden’s trip served as a reminder to both sides that Iran will continue to test the mettle of their alliance for years to come. It was no coincidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ testing of ballistic missiles marked with the phrase “Israel must be eliminated” coincided with Biden’s visit. And while it did manage to prompt a direct reassurance from the Vice President that the United States stood behind its Middle Eastern ally, the incident also dredged up their bitter dispute over how to counter the Islamic Republic’s threat to regional stability just as officials in Washington and Jerusalem negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that will determine American military aid to Israel in the coming years.

In light of the fact that Biden is a longtime supporter of Israel, and nearing the end of his political career, perhaps the impact of the vice president’s visit shouldn’t be overstated (even though the U.S. Embassy in Israel entitled its video summary of Biden’s visit, “Friends Forever”). Nevertheless, he succeeded in reminding Israelis that although tensions exist within the U.S.-Israel relationship, a deterioration of ties is preventable so long as there remains an open channel for honest dialogue. Regardless of what occurs during the remainder of the Obama presidency, Biden’s message needs to be internalized by American and Israeli politicians going forward in order to ensure that the U.S.-Israel alliance weathers inevitable future storms.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט Biden in Israel: A reset in diplomatic ties? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In mid-December, officials from both countries met in Switzerland in order to finalize principles for an eventual agreement to normalize ties. Reports confirm that an outline and framework for the reconciliation agreement has indeed been reached, although some important issues – such as the blockade on the Gaza Strip – are still unresolved.  Israel and Turkey came close to sealing a reconciliation deal on several occasions since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, most recently in the spring of 2014. However, while diplomats managed to find formulas that would overcome the differences between the countries, political leadership in Ankara and Jerusalem was hesitant to put the agreement into practice. This time around, there seems to be a convergence of economic and geostrategic interests, as well as political will on both sides.

Signs of this steady and deliberate warming have appeared more frequently in recent months. Triggered by joint economic interests over Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries, as well as mutual concern over developments in Syria, Israel and Turkey committed themselves to a sequence of steps that would create a better public atmosphere, and expand upon preexisting areas of cooperation.

Days before the meeting in Switzerland, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Israel-Turkey reconciliation “would be good for us, Israel, Palestine and the entire region.” These sentiments were also expressed by Israel’s Foreign Ministry Director General, Dore Gold, who emphasized “Israel has always strived for stable relations with Turkey and is constantly examining ways to achieve that goal.” In the last five years, statements of this nature were virtually nonexistent.

Since reports of the meeting first aired, additional positive statements were voiced. Turkish Deputy PM Ömer Çelik’s stated that “without a doubt, the state of Israel and the Israeli people are friends of Turkey.” Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said, “There is a serious, meaningful chance for thawing and normalizing relations between Israel and Turkey,” and that this is a huge opportunity for cooperation regarding natural gas.

The leaders of Israel and Turkey should not let this opportunity slip away. Rather, they should capitalize on the current good will and positive momentum, move expeditiously to resolve their remaining differences, sign a reconciliation agreement and restore full diplomatic ties.

Such a deal will not only serve the immediate interests of both countries but it would also contribute to regional security and stability by countering the advance of violent extremism in the Middle East. Moreover, it may also enable Turkey to become a more significant and constructive player in efforts to reconstruct Gaza, support inter-Palestinian reconciliation and promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In his statement on the topic, President Erdoğan said, “I don’t believe the Israeli public is pleased with the current state of relations.” Indeed, an October 2015 public opinion poll conducted by Mitvim (the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies) showed that the Israeli public sees reasons for mending ties with Turkey, with prospects for security cooperation on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Syria topping the list. In Turkey too, there seems to be wide support for the move, as reflected by a statement of Turkey’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who welcomes rapprochement with Israel.

Signing this agreement is a crucial step forward but more efforts will be required in order to restore mutual trust and understanding between our societies and to develop a new narrative in Israel-Turkey relations. In particular, the two countries should work to restoring mutual trust, constructively market the reconciliation agreement to their respective publics, establish diverse official channels of communication, advance new economic initiatives, launch mechanisms for joint analysis and coordination regarding regional events, engage in mutual conflict resolution support and increase dialogue between civil society organizations and new elites.

In particular, civil society organizations – think tanks, universities, and NGOs – should be encouraged to engage in this process. As our experience working together over the last few years has proven, such independent efforts can make impactful contributions to the transformation of bilateral relations.

Turkey and Israel are on the verge of opening a new chapter in their relationship that will potentially contribute to peace, safety, and prosperity in both countries and within the region. Let’s seal the deal.

(originally published in Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Time to seal the Israel-Turkey deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara.

The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s anger with Assad and comparative ambivalence to the jihadist threat prompted many in the West to question this NATO ally’s commitment and value to regional security.

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Iran in recent years has undergone a major shift, as has its broader Middle East neighborhood policy. Ankara’s soft-power charm offensive throughout the region ran up against the so-called “Arab Spring” and hard power realities, falling short of its ambitions for a neo-Ottoman role in the region. Meanwhile, Tehran has been eagerly anticipating a final nuclear settlement that would once again open Iran up to international markets. During the days of Ahmadinejad, Turkey was Iran’s largest trading partner and a key international advocate. Ankara repeatedly called for lifting international sanctions, as they inhibited the economic growth of its own eastern provinces, many of which engaged in black market trading with their Iranian neighbors just across the border. The pinnacle of this relationship was the infamous Tehran Declaration that Brazil and Turkey proudly announced with Iran in 2010. Despite being quietly killed by Washington because of “miscommunications,” the deal in many ways set the parameters and precedent for subsequent negotiations and the final Iran deal.

So why aren’t more Turkish officials applauding the signing of the Iran deal and the ending of the sanctions regime? First of all, experts disagree on the extent that Turkey will benefit from Iran’s return to the global economy or how investment that once was destined for Turkey may begin to find its way to Iran as the hot new regional destination. But more importantly, the JCPOA threatens Turkey’s regional position, given both Iran’s use of proxies across the region and, specifically, Tehran’s tacit support of the PKK in recent months.

Look no further than Syria, where Turkey and Iran are visibly working at cross-purposes. Much to Ankara’s chagrin, developments in Syria appear to be working in Iran’s favor just as they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The shifting realities on the ground are precipitating the establishment of yet another Kurdish entity along Turkey’s border, stoking fears in Ankara that the Kurds could attain their long desired state.

Turkey established a healthy working relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Yet, the close association between the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK kept Ankara from developing a similar relationship with Syria’s Kurds. And although Erdoğan was in the midst of peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, he believed that bridging this divide would damage his reputation amongst nationalist voters. Direct cooperation with the PYD was a domestic political risk Turkey’s president was unwilling to take given that he has lost his once reliable Kurdish votes and now must appeal to his more traditional Turkish nationalist base. Instead, Ankara collaborated with those in the Syrian opposition who would pursue regime change in Damascus while respecting Turkish sovereignty.

The flaws of this policy were exposed during the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane last autumn. As the United States frantically launched airstrikes to repel the jihadist advance, Turkish tanks overlooking the battlefield stood idle. Little surprise that Turkish Kurds, feeling betrayed by the man who once depicted himself as a champion of the Kurdish peace process and Kurdish rights, cast their ballots against Erdoğan in June’s elections.

In response, Erdoğan has transformed himself into a wartime president.

Legitimized by the Suruc bombing, Turkey’s two-front military campaign against the Islamic State and the PKK reminded many in the West of its irreplaceable geostrategic value and was initially received with great fanfare. But American observers of the region largely ignored the intense media battle this operation has sparked between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian state media repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting the Islamic State, even going as far as to assert that Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye visited wounded jihadists in Syria, while in Turkey the pro-AKP media blamed Iran for instigating regional violence through its multifarious proxies, particularly the PKK. One pro-government Daily Sabah column went as far as claiming that the Iran deal emboldened Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations like the PKK while employing rhetoric similar to the Iran deal’s opponents in Washington. And on August 24 images circulated in the Turkish press of Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli visiting the Qandil Mountains where the PKK operates.

This isn’t mere propaganda. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara amidst speculation that Erdoğan refused him an official face-to-face meeting.

The revival of the Turkish–Persian balance of power — a narrative that dominated the Middle East for centuries — is just the first ripple caused by the Iran deal, and should deeply concern U.S. officials. By minimally satisfying American needs for the sake of their own, competing regional goals, both states are undermining U.S. strategy. Can Washington turn the dispute between Ankara and Tehran into an opportunity to develop a coherent Syria strategy? The odds are slim. But now more than ever the United States must be aware of these cross-purposes and factor them into its broader regional calculations.

(originally published in War on the Rocks)

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט What is the role of Israel in Turkey’s political universe? A Q&A with Dr. Emre Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel Is Challenging America to Support Kurdish Independence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Anadolu Agency (AA) that Israel desires positive relations with Turkey and hopes reconciliation will arrive in the near future, the circumstances under which those statements were given – while exposing an alleged Iranian arms shipment to the Gaza Strip – speaks volumes about his position toward rapprochement. For the two former partners to officially bury the hatchet, a creative solution must be found to solving Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s demand that Israel lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The blockade is an essential aspect to Israel’s security as long as Hamas or any other actor deemed a threat to the lives of Israeli citizens controls the area.

Those positions did not change because of the Gaza flotilla and in fact have only been reinforced by the Klos C’s March 5, 2014 capture.

However, Israel has shown remarkable flexibility on the Gaza issue since Netanyahu’s Obama-orchestrated- apology to Erdoğan one year ago. In that time, Israel oversaw a boost in Turkish humanitarian aid delivered via the Ashdod Port, in addition to signing off on the transfer of materials required to build a Turkish hospital in Gaza. The policy shift was impactful enough to garner the praise of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and will likely continue when diplomatic ties are restored.

Confidence building measures like these have the added benefit of playing a role in the rapprochement process and according to multiple sources, Netanyahu received a copy of a draft agreement in mid-February.

As reported, the deal would include a $20-23 million compensation package that Israel would pay to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who died aboard the MV Mavi Marmara in May 2010. In exchange, Turkey would pass a legislation that would nullify all ongoing lawsuits against the IDF soldiers and officers involved in the raid. Finally, the agreement would draw up a blueprint for normalizing ties between the two countries.

Netanyahu has now been mulling over the draft agreement (which is rumored to only lightly touch upon the Gaza blockade) for nearly one month, which likely prompted Erdoğan’s crabby one-liner that, “Nothing will happen without lifting the siege on Gaza.”

This, of course, only gives Israel’s premier more reason to pause and reconsider.

Netanyahu knows that even if he did sign off on the draft agreement, no consensus between the two parties would be reached until after the completion of Turkey’s municipal elections on March 30.

Erdoğan does not wish to reach a deal with Israel while his party is still campaigning for votes. Elections can’t impact rapprochement, but rapprochement could hypothetically impact elections. (There is a counterargument that Netanyahu doesn’t want to give Erdoğan a critical diplomatic achievement prior to elections.) And while reaching a deal is important to Netanyahu, it is secondary compared to the prevention of Iran’s nuclear program and the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Don’t forget, Netanyahu rejected a draft agreement in 2011 when the conditions were not deemed favorable. He is willing to let talks wither and die until the timing is better and has the support of his cabinet and the Israeli public.

Both Israel and Turkey are looking to end this period of agitation. Rapprochement serves each country’s national interests with the potential of regional influence, natural gas cooperation, and support for each other’s peace processes all on the table.

But in order for this to happen, the Gaza blockade must be negotiated separately. The alternative is for Netanyahu, whose critical worldview has only been reinforced of late by rocket fire and missile smuggling, to again walk away from a deal.

(originally published in the Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט For Netanyahu, security trumps rapprochement with Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.