ארכיון Mitvim - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/writer/mitvim/ מתווים Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:44:00 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Mitvim - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/writer/mitvim/ 32 32 Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/renewed-partnership-with-the-southern-neighbourhood-implications-for-israel/ Sun, 25 Jul 2021 15:52:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6904 On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu. This document summarizes the key points raised in the discussion. Mr. Michele Merloni, Policy Officer – Relations with Israel, The European External Action Service: The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood comes 25 years after the initiation of the Barcelona Process, with its main themes being human development, peace and security, migration and mobility, the strengthening of resilience and new themes of digital and green transition. Israel has a strong bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the EU. The EU is the first trading partner of Israel, and in the region Israel is the second or third partner of the EU. In the field of investments Israel is no. 1. Israel also engages in regional programs on various sectors, including climate, environment, and transport. By the end of 2021, we expect the implementation of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (for those who complete the procedural adoption), which can help the economic integration of Israel in the South-Mediterranean region and with the EU. In the Joint Communication on the Renewed Partnership between the EU and the southern neighbourhood, the Commission proposes to mobilize up to EUR 7 billion under the Neighbourhood and Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Israel is mentioned

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu. This document summarizes the key points raised in the discussion.

Mr. Michele Merloni, Policy Officer – Relations with Israel, The European External Action Service: The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood comes 25 years after the initiation of the Barcelona Process, with its main themes being human development, peace and security, migration and mobility, the strengthening of resilience and new themes of digital and green transition.

Israel has a strong bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the EU.

The EU is the first trading partner of Israel, and in the region Israel is the second or third partner of the EU. In the field of investments Israel is no. 1.

Israel also engages in regional programs on various sectors, including climate, environment, and transport. By the end of 2021, we expect the implementation of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (for those who complete the procedural adoption), which can help the economic integration of Israel in the South-Mediterranean region and with the EU.

In the Joint Communication on the Renewed Partnership between the EU and the southern neighbourhood, the Commission proposes to mobilize up to EUR 7 billion under the Neighbourhood and Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Israel is mentioned in the Joint Communication regarding digital transformation and research and innovation, in light of its great added value in those sectors.

In the same document, the EU mentions that it is willing and ready to explore regional, sub-regional or trilateral cooperation and joint initiatives, also in the light of the recent normalization agreements.

Now is the time to reflect and exchange ideas on how to operationalize the Normalization Agreements, how the EU can support the process, the ways in which Israel can contribute and receive economic and political added value from the Renewed Partnership and the areas that can be explored. We attach importance to P2P and initiatives between municipalities, SMEs, schools, universities, associations, etc. Climate change and digitalization are also of importance. It is time to come with initiatives. The participation of experts from Israel and the region is also welcomed.

Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Research Fellow, Center for European Reform: The Renewed Partnership is an effort to broaden the EU agenda and give greater prominence to green and digital issues, while emphasizing a people-centered agenda on youth and women, rule of law, and democracy.

The question remains to which extent what the EU is offering to its partners is an incentive for them to undertake reforms. This is also because the European model is becoming less attractive and less visible in the region given that there are emerging alternatives such as Russia and China, and the Gulf model.

The Renewed Partnership points to the EU’s wish to play a bigger role in regional conflicts and in the field of security. But the EU has hardly been an influential security actor in the region. Member States have been divided in their positions, which hinders EU action. The EU is unwilling to take on hard security challenges and to think strategically about them. This also comes at a time when the EU is more likely to be focused on internal matters rather than on an external agenda.

Regarding implications for Israel, the Renewed Partnership does not bring major changes in EU policy. The EU will keep looking with Israel for ways to deepen the economic and other frameworks of cooperation. There is much potential to cooperate in the Green and Digital fields. The EU will try and preserve the two-state solution. This is explicitly stated in the document. This will amount to attempt to foster more democracy and accountability in the Palestinian Authority, and member states might want to take a look at the differentiation agenda in response to Israel’s settlement building. The legal framework is there, but it’s not fully implemented, so there might be gradual moves in that direction, but it’s not a priority for the EU, partly because of the internal divisions. If more member states become convinced that what emerges is a one state reality, that gradually would shift and undermine Israel – EU relations and cooperation.

Ms. Noa Ginosar, Political Counselor, Mission of Israel to the EU: The EU worked in partnership with its neighbours in producing the Renewed Partnership document. Foreign Minister, Gabi Ashkenazi, participated in the discussions that Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi (DG NEAR) and High Representative Joseph Borrel conducted with the Southern neighbourhood countries in order to better understand their priorities and challenges. This process was undertaken in order to engage in dialogue with the partner counties, and better understand their challenges and their ideas of projects they would like to advance The Covid-19 crisis has shown that we share joint challenges that cross borders, and those regions need to enrichen and deepen the dialogue and cooperation between them. The EU has a clear interest in tapping into this discussion and can utilize its leadership to foster better relations between different partners that can benefit from cooperating in order to address these challenges. Energy, climate and also defence and security are no longer phenomena which happen in separate countries. These are all regional issues that require dialogue.

From the perspective of Israel, it was significant that the EU’s approach to the Renewed Partnership recognized the most important development in the region in recent times – the normalization of Israel’s relations with new regional partners. In this way, the Renewed Partnership brings forth a tangible connection between regional developments, and EU-Southern Neighborhood relations. Normalization has brought a change of paradigm for the region, for Israel, for the Arab and Muslim world. We see in this process positive implications for the EU both internally and from a regional perspective.

Europe can strengthen its role in the region by tapping into these new developments. We’re looking forward to further exploring with our European partners how to take this forward, by looking at more operational elements and concrete ideas. This process should advance in parallel to the signature of a Partnership Priority agreement between Israel and the EU.

Normalization has already brought forward a myriad of concrete initiatives which are already occurring, with or without Europe. We wish to see the EU and the member states as a very clear partner in this. This would serve to embolden European relevance in the region, as well as in the context of bilateral Israel-EU relations, which can only benefit from cooperation in this area of mutual interest for Israel, the EU and the greater Southern Neighborhood.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: The normalization agreements bring hope for expanding regional stability and economic cooperation and development. They can serve as a new trigger for a renewed MEPP.

Within the Renewed Partnership, Israel and the Arab countries it has relations with (Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco and possibly also the PA) should decide what regional and inter-regional projects to suggest to the EU. Many projects can be envisaged under the goals the EU set, be it infrastructure to enhance economic relations, or the green and digital transition, climate change, etc. The indirect opportunity is the improvement of EU – Israeli relations if such regional process would take place also under its auspice.

The next Israeli foreign minister should take advantage of the options in the Renewed Partnership, adopt a positive attitude towards the EU, and visit Brussels instead of visiting member states capitals only.

The EU, meanwhile, should consider renewing the Association Council with Israel. It is a commitment the EU and Israel took upon themselves in the 1995 Association Agreement. It will improve the relations with Israel and domestic public opinion on the EU. The EU’s model is to advance through dialogue. From all the countries in the region, not holding the Association Council with Israel is imbalanced.

The EU should also sign Partnership Priorities with Israel, as it did with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the past years.

Israel should also evaluate whether it desires to start negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area that deals with services, investments and removal of non-trade barriers.

However, even if no Partnership Priorities is signed, the Joint Communication allows to develop these priorities on the basis of “equivalent policy documents”. In 2005 Israel signed an “Action Plan” with the EU, which is the old generation of the Partnership Priorities. It is not updated but it is very elaborate, and can serve as the basis on which to further develop the relationship.

To watch the conference on the EU’s “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood”, click here.

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute 2020 Annual Report https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-mitvim-institute-2020-annual-report/ Tue, 25 May 2021 10:37:20 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6740 This report highlights the Mitvim Institute’s activities in 2020. These activities were centered on our three program areas: improving Israel’s foreign policy; promoting Israel’s regional belonging in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean; and advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. 2020 was a year of tremendous disruption. Israel, like the entire world, was shut down by the coronavirus pandemic. Elections were held, the new government weighed the possibility of pursuing annexation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, only to pivot towards signing normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Throughout the year, Mitvim generated new progressive foreign policy knowledge for fast-developing situations. Mitvim applied this knowledge to foster change in the policy world by engaging with Israeli and international actors in politics, diplomacy, and civil society. Mitvim executed its mission by producing original research, developing policy recommendations, organizing public online events, participating in regional and international policy dialogues, conducting Israeli public opinion polling, and giving briefings to Members of Knesset (MKs), government officials, and foreign diplomats. In addition, Mitvim experts regularly appeared in leading media outlets to provide commentaries and spell out possible paths forward regarding a variety of foreign policy issues. To improve Israel’s foreign policy, Mitvim worked in 2020 to highlight foreign policy issues throughout the general elections, impact the new government’s foreign policy priorities and conduct, monitor developments and assess trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy, study Israeli public opinion, convene its fourth annual conference, strengthen the democracy component in Israel’s foreign policy, and empower Israel’s

הפוסט The Mitvim Institute 2020 Annual Report הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This report highlights the Mitvim Institute’s activities in 2020. These activities were centered on our three program areas: improving Israel’s foreign policy; promoting Israel’s regional belonging in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean; and advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace.

2020 was a year of tremendous disruption. Israel, like the entire world, was shut down by the coronavirus pandemic. Elections were held, the new government weighed the possibility of pursuing annexation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, only to pivot towards signing normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

Throughout the year, Mitvim generated new progressive foreign policy knowledge for fast-developing situations. Mitvim applied this knowledge to foster change in the policy world by engaging with Israeli and international actors in politics, diplomacy, and civil society. Mitvim executed its mission by producing original research, developing policy recommendations, organizing public online events, participating in regional and international policy dialogues, conducting Israeli public opinion polling, and giving briefings to Members of Knesset (MKs), government officials, and foreign diplomats. In addition, Mitvim experts regularly appeared in leading media outlets to provide commentaries and spell out possible paths forward regarding a variety of foreign policy issues.

To improve Israel’s foreign policy, Mitvim worked in 2020 to highlight foreign policy issues throughout the general elections, impact the new government’s foreign policy priorities and conduct, monitor developments and assess trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy, study Israeli public opinion, convene its fourth annual conference, strengthen the democracy component in Israel’s foreign policy, and empower Israel’s Foreign Service after several years in which it was constantly marginalized. Mitvim regularly engaged with Members of Knesset (MKs), ministers, and senior government officials, and its experts appeared before relevant Knesset committees.

הפוסט The Mitvim Institute 2020 Annual Report הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How to Improve Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies? Summary of the Mitvim Institute’s Pre-Election Conference https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-to-improve-israels-regional-foreign-policies-summary-of-the-mitvim-institutes-pre-election-conference/ Sun, 21 Mar 2021 08:07:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6570 Ahead of the general elections, the Mitvim Institute held a conference on March 9, 2021, which assessed Israel’s current foreign policy and presented goals and directions for future action. The discussion focused on ways to empower Israel’s Foreign Service, promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, and advance Israel’s relations in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. Speakers included Emilie Moatti from Labor, MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair of Meretz, MK Orna Barbivai from Yesh Atid, Dani Dayan from Tikva Hadasha (New Hope), and MK Aida Touma-Suleiman from the Joint List. The event was moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren and Dr. Roee Kibrik from the Mitvim Institute, and this document includes its key points. Emilie Moatti, Labor: Since Rabin’s assassination, the leadership of the Israeli left has internalized its own delegitimization perpetuated by the right, and it has tended to seek confirmation of its positions from the right-wing mainstream. People with liberal views generally refrained from expressing unpopular positions, and this has prevented the left’s leadership from speaking out on the Palestinian issue, despite the fact that the majority of the Israeli public supports negotiations and the two-state solution. Despite the delegitimization against the left, the majority of Israelis still believe that peace is the correct path and that conflicts are not resolved by war. The pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is first and foremost an Israeli interest, which concurrently pursues justice for the aspirations of our Palestinian neighbors. This is important both strategically and morally. The right’s claim that the

הפוסט How to Improve Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies? <br> Summary of the Mitvim Institute’s Pre-Election Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ahead of the general elections, the Mitvim Institute held a conference on March 9, 2021, which assessed Israel’s current foreign policy and presented goals and directions for future action. The discussion focused on ways to empower Israel’s Foreign Service, promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, and advance Israel’s relations in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. Speakers included Emilie Moatti from Labor, MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair of Meretz, MK Orna Barbivai from Yesh Atid, Dani Dayan from Tikva Hadasha (New Hope), and MK Aida Touma-Suleiman from the Joint List. The event was moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren and Dr. Roee Kibrik from the Mitvim Institute, and this document includes its key points.

Emilie Moatti, Labor:

Since Rabin’s assassination, the leadership of the Israeli left has internalized its own delegitimization perpetuated by the right, and it has tended to seek confirmation of its positions from the right-wing mainstream. People with liberal views generally refrained from expressing unpopular positions, and this has prevented the left’s leadership from speaking out on the Palestinian issue, despite the fact that the majority of the Israeli public supports negotiations and the two-state solution. Despite the delegitimization against the left, the majority of Israelis still believe that peace is the correct path and that conflicts are not resolved by war.

The pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is first and foremost an Israeli interest, which concurrently pursues justice for the aspirations of our Palestinian neighbors. This is important both strategically and morally. The right’s claim that the Palestinian issue can be ignored is childish and dangerous, despite the Abraham Accords. Even if Arab countries let go of the Palestinian issue, we must not do so. Labor has a clear interest in turning every stone to find a solution to the conflict, based on separation and the 1967 borders, to promote a vision of a secure Israel.

Labor has never abandoned the quest for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, and our entire list is in sync and share the same vision. In the next government, which hopefully will be an alternative to Netanyahu’s rule, Labor will lead a return to negotiations. Today there is not much cooperation with Jordan and Egypt, hence we will cultivate our peace with them, especially economically and culturally, as even a cold peace needs a nurturing hand and a caring shoulder.

We should stop claiming that the whole world is against us and that Israel’s existence is in doubt. It is in Netanyahu’s interest that we feel persecuted, but in practice, Israel is a significant player in the international arena and cooperates with many countries. Israel’s global reach should be expanded, but without aligning with non-liberal leaderships, such as Brazil, Poland, and Trump. The Americans were able to say goodbye to a populist president, who was bad for both them and us.

The powers of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have been dispersed to countless other ministries, and in recent years more and more professional diplomats left the ministry. This requires change. Professional diplomats should be preferred over political appointees, especially in major capitals around the world. Israel’s diplomats should represent the country, regardless of the political identity of the foreign minister, and feel part of an influential and meaningful Foreign Service.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair of Meretz:

The Israeli MFA is very weak as its powers have been stripped away for many years to form new, unnecessary ministries. This has ultimately harmed Israeli interests. The MFA has the knowledge and experience to lead Israeli diplomacy, and it needs to be strengthened. This can be done by passing the Foreign Service Act, which will solidify the status of the MFA and will prevent any political whim to weaken it. Israel’s foreign relations must highlight democracy and human rights. Israel must be on the side of democracy, as democracies around the world are deteriorating. Israel should not prefer countries that erode democracy, as Netanyahu does.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is very relevant and the recent decision by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) shows how crucial solving the conflict is for Israel’s future. Meretz opposes the prosecution of Israeli soldiers and we are in favor of Israel and Israelis, but it is the right-wing government’s policy that drags Israel to the ICC. It is impossible to control millions of Palestinians, deny them basic rights, reject any international involvement, and then say that anyone who criticizes Israel is anti-Semitic and an enemy of Israel. Israel has a responsibility. We must take our destiny into our own hands and make a change in Israel’s policy that works towards solving the conflict. This will resolve the issue of the ICC.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is frozen and the situation on the ground is getting worse. We need to return to dialogue and negotiations, and leverage the renewed American support for a two-state solution under President Biden. The two-state solution will lead to breakthroughs in Israel’s relations with other actors, including in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is in Israel’s best interest. To realize and maximize the potential of normalization with Arab countries, we must concurrently move forward with the Palestinians. As long as there is a stalemate in the peace process, relations with the region will remain limited.

The situation in the Gaza Strip is severe. It is in our interest to allow the Gaza Strip to be developed and promote political unity between Gaza and the West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority’s rule. The Palestinian Authority is an ally of Israel and anyone who says that Palestinian President Abbas is a terrorist is detached from reality. The Israeli right has not repealed the Oslo Accords, which it likes to slander, because the accords serve Israel. It would be good if there were elections in the Palestinian Authority and if a democratic society prevails there. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem should also participate in the elections if they wish to, and the decision as to which parties will participate and in what way is an internal Palestinian matter.

The EU is a friend of Israel and is enormously important to Israel, also because of its commitment to democracy. The political right’s claim that the EU is hostile to us and persecutes us, just because it criticizes the settlements, is simply not true. The EU is a strong ally, and relations between Israel and European countries, such as France and Germany, are a tremendous asset to Israel.

MK Orna Barbivai, Yesh Atid:

The MFA is significant to Israel’s national security, as diplomacy is a strategic tool for maximizing Israel’s qualitative edge. Our national resilience lies not only in security, but also in foreign affairs. The erosion of Israel’s democracy also affects our diplomacy, as the latter has become synonymous with populism because of one man’s monopoly to determine with whom we build relations and with whom we destroy. Legislation is needed to regulate the status of the MFA and give it more legitimacy to influence policy.

Israel must strive for normalization and peace. Israel’s power, which occasionally needs to be demonstrated, is meant to be used to achieve peace with our neighbors. The discourse on peace and the two-state solution must be returned to the agenda. The normalization agreements with Arab states must be leveraged in favor of promoting dialogue with the Palestinians. Leadership is the ability to analyze risks and identify potential collaborations.

I welcome the normalization agreements, but they lacked transparency, which is not how foreign relations should be conducted. The accords were brought to the Knesset’s approval before Members of Knesset even knew what they included. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee needs to deal more with foreign affairs. The parliaments of many countries separate between security and foreign issues, and Israel should take a similar approach to increase the importance of foreign affairs.

In my opinion, the ICC’s investigation has no legitimacy. Israel does not, in any way, commit war crimes. It makes a great effort to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Every effort should be made to repel the investigation, beginning with leading a transparent procedure that will legitimize the Israeli position.

The EU is a friend of Israel and it preserves Israel’s interests. One-third of Israel’s trade is with the EU. We need to improve our dialogue with the EU, and advancing these ties should be defined as a policy objective. There are many differences of opinion between Israel and the EU, including on the lack of European condemnation of the BDS movement, which require change. But in order to bring change there is no escape from having a dialogue with Europe and promoting cooperation with it. A different approach is harmful to Israel and reinforces negative perceptions of Israel.

The Iranian threat is vital and Israel’s deterrence is an important tool for dealing with it. Iran is making a great effort to harm us. It should be shown to Iran that it is not worth provoking Israel. Israel must be involved in formulating the new nuclear agreement and ensure that the agreement addresses its interests. This requires a well-oiled decision-making system that is not based solely on Netanyahu’s interests. We will also have to work hard to rebuild the bridges Netanyahu burnt and the damage he has done to Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party.

Dani Dayan, Tikva Hadasha:

Netanyahu clipped the MFA’s wings due to a fundamentally wrong assumption that the ministry serves a political agenda. When I was appointed by Netanyahu to serve as the Israeli Consul-General in New York, I found a financially depleted ministry with very professional and stately staff. Crucial information should not be hidden from the MFA, which must also be empowered by abolishing unnecessary ministries.

It is blatantly irresponsible and inconceivable to me that we have a part-time ambassador in Washington DC, who simultaneously acts as Israel’s ambassador to the UN. It is an impossible task for one person and disrespectful to both the US and the UN. It is another symptom of a political system that has a state, and not a state that has a political system.

During my tenure in New York, I felt that Netanyahu did not back me on the three issues I devoted most of my time to, and which in my view were the most important to Israel’s foreign policy: (1) the need to maintain bipartisan support in the US. The spirit coming out of Netanyahu’s office, and of our embassy in Washington DC, was one of complete identification with a single party, not just with their president. Many ties were severed, and unnecessary rivalries were created; (2) We greatly missed an opportunity to address minorities in the US. We demand that the Americans understand us, but we did not make an effort to understand the Democratic Party. This requires a comprehension of the African-American narrative and the issue of immigration. If we continue this path, we will lose the Democratic Party; (3) We neglected the Jewish community and acted indifferently, or even worse, towards them.  For five years, there has been no meeting between Netanyahu and the president of the US Reform Movement. Gideon Sa’ar [the chair of Tikva Hadasha] will take a fundamentally different approach and will welcome all Jews with open arms.

We do not see eye-to-eye with the Biden administration regarding the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of the disagreements revolve around the settlement issue, but it is still important to maintain a dialogue with the administration. The Biden Administration is the friendliest Democratic administration we could expect, and it will not force us and the Palestinians into a peace process. Everyone realizes an agreement is not feasible at the moment. On the Iranian issue as well, we can reach a fruitful dialogue with the White House. The administration wants to return to the nuclear deal. Dialogue with the administration can influence the way things are done, and perhaps it could even prevent a return to the nuclear agreement altogether.

Lastly, I am glad that we have recently forged diplomatic relations with three countries in Latin America, with which we have not had diplomatic relations before. I believe that we should now try to renew relations with Cuba as well.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List:

Israel does not conduct its foreign relations as a state of nine million people, but as a superpower because of its relationship with the US, which also affects other regional states’ foreign policy towards it. Israel will not integrate into the Middle East as long as the occupation continues. The prolong occupation impacts Israel domestically and diplomatically, especially with Europe, the US, international bodies, and the Middle East. If Israel is interested in normalizing its foreign relations, it must end the occupation and treat its Arab minority equitably. Thereafter, Israel will be better accepted in the world.

The Joint List’s attempt to explain to the world what is happening in Israel from our experience, as those who are fighting the occupation, is often considered in Israel as sabotaging its foreign affairs. In fact, the Israeli government wants to hide what is happening in Israel. When this is revealed to the outside world, it is considered sabotaging and a crime according to Israeli law. Only countries that have something to hide legislate such laws. Israel must not base its international relations on lies and lack of transparency.

We are asked “why have you not joined Israel’s Foreign Service?” First of all, until recently there was not a single Israeli political leader who said that the Arabs were legitimate partners in the government. Indeed, most Arab citizens have a problem representing Israel abroad, as Israel continues to occupy our people. A person with opinions like mine cannot fit into the Israeli Foreign Service and be happily accepted. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee already had Arab members, but I do not see myself sitting in a committee that almost completely discusses security issues. If we do participate, it will be a game of cat and mouse, as they will surely move the important issues to be discussed in subcommittees to avoid us.

Israel’s agreements with Gulf states are part of a power struggle in the Middle East. Israel instils fear in everyone regarding Iran, to preserve its hegemony and nuclear supremacy in the region. The agreements are meant for bilateral cooperation and have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause. They were promoted as part of the Trump plan, which did not promote peace. On the contrary, the agreements exclude and isolate the Palestinians. They are an attempt to impose a process and decisions on the Palestinians, to suit Israel’s goals. The normalization agreements do not contribute to peace but rather distance it.

הפוסט How to Improve Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies? <br> Summary of the Mitvim Institute’s Pre-Election Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-annexation-and-the-eus-research-and-development-program-horizon/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 21:18:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5421 The EU is examining how to respond to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. One of the measures reportedly under consideration is to limit Israel’s participation in the EU’s “Horizon” research and development (R&D) program scheduled for renewal in 2021. This might be a significant blow to Israeli R&D, which has enjoyed substantial EU grants in recent years through the previous phase of the “Horizon” program. This paper provides background about the “Horizon” program and its importance for Israel. A. What is the “Horizon” Program? • “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion. • Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch. • To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions. B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel? • Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU is examining how to respond to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. One of the measures reportedly under consideration is to limit Israel’s participation in the EU’s “Horizon” research and development (R&D) program scheduled for renewal in 2021. This might be a significant blow to Israeli R&D, which has enjoyed substantial EU grants in recent years through the previous phase of the “Horizon” program. This paper provides background about the “Horizon” program and its importance for Israel.

A. What is the “Horizon” Program?
• “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion.

• Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch.

• To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions.

B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel?
• Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance for Israel in strengthening and advancing research, development and innovation. It enables cooperation among research, industry, high-tech and academic groups from various states in all major study areas, from the basic research level, through applied research, and all the way to development and product enhancement.

• As of the end of 2019, the acceptance rate of Israeli proposals submitted to the “Horizon” program reached 13.5 percent of all proposals submitted, higher than the 11 percent European average. This reflects, both domestically and externally, the Israeli excellence and leadership in research, development and innovation.

• Participating states are expected to cover their respective part of the “Horizon” program budget. They can reimburse the investment back (and possibly more) through winning research grants. Within the framework of FP7, the predecessor of “Horizon 2020”, Israel contributed €535 million from 2007 to 2013 and received grants at the sum of €875 million. Israel has invested some €1 billion in “Horizon 2020”, receiving to date €1.2 billion in grants (the total is expected to increase by the time the program ends).

• Participation in “Horizon” also benefits Israel in non-quantifiable terms: (1) Opportunities to develop significant international cooperation, strengthen Israeli research capabilities, and build knowledge and advanced technologies; (2) Development of economic ties and a business presence in Europe, Israel’s largest trade partner and natural research partner; (3) EU research grants are a high-level expression of trust in a project and could help attract foreign investment; (4) Formulating research proposals and setting them in motion creates jobs, economic growth and innovation, contributing to Israel’s competitiveness, which, in turn, affects economic performance.

C. What Are the Implications of Curtailing Israel’s Terms of Participation
in the “Horizon” Program?

• Preventing Israeli participation in “Horizon Europe” over the coming seven years does not require a consensus decision by all EU member states. The program can bypass the veto power used by certain EU states to scuttle measures deemed critical of Israel, which require full consensus. That is why measures related to the R&D program are under consideration in response to Israeli West Bank annexation moves.

• Preventing or curtailing Israeli participation in the “Horizon Europe” program would deal a severe blow to Israeli research, industry and academia. It would undermine Israel’s international cooperation and its access to research infrastructure (e.g., specialized labs and facilities) and scientific databases. In a broader context, it would mark a significant setback to Israel’s relationship with the EU.

• In 2013, ahead of the “Horizon 2020” launch, the EU published new guidelines that forbade Israeli entities beyond the 1967 Green Line’s eligibility of benefiting from program grants. The Israeli government opposed these guidelines and considered not joining “Horizon 2020”. This set off a storm among academic and research bodies in Israel that feared being left out of this vital program. The government, realizing the extent of the potential loss and the risk it was taking, relented and joined the program on the EU’s terms.

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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