הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current standing of American diplomacy shows the flaws of Trump’s approach. The U.S. is publicly at odds with Canada over trade, and with European allies over climate, defense spending, and Iran. Transatlantic unity has been frayed by unpredictability and withdrawal from international agreements. As Trump met Kim, many supporters of a substantive deal on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula considered a new hurdle: that counterparts will no longer see the U.S. as credible or capable of implementing a nuclear agreement. Denuclearization is a lofty goal in ideal times, and the current climate makes it even less probable for a nuclear state to voluntarily surrender its capabilities.

In this context, it is unsurprising that the Trump-Kim meeting did not result in a tangible ‘win’ for nonproliferation. North Korea made no new commitments. Kim gained positive publicity surrounding the meeting and a new U.S. commitment to suspend a large-scale military exercise with South Korea. It is unclear what comes next, and the potential for disagreement is high. While disputes with Canada lead to angry tweets, disputes with angry nuclear weapons states have far greater risks.

Trump’s talks with Kim are juxtaposed with his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and lack of a viable strategy. Direct and implicit threats are insufficient to meet long-term challenges, and they exacerbate tensions by empowering Iranian hardliners. Secretary Pompeo’s recent speech on Iran was not a strategy, but a demand for full submission that unilateral U.S. sanctions are unlikely to achieve, especially as European partners advance financial blocking regulations and exemptions from reimposed nuclear sanctions.

In the immediate term, U.S. threats coupled with European efforts may prevent Iranian nuclear escalation. But while the deal’s opponents feared regulations that would ‘sunset’ in the mid-2020’s, we are now in a shakier environment in which those provisions may collapse well before 2020. As a result of JCPOA withdrawal, the international community is less prepared to address a potential collapse, or an ambiguous action by Iran. Prior to the JCPOA, Iran’s strategy was based on developing its nuclear program in the grey area between technical compliance and clear violation. If Iran again began to operate in the margins, without committing a clear violation, how would the world respond?

A viable strategy should emphasize diplomacy wherever possible. It should consider that all other JCPOA parties, including China and Russia, remain committed to the deal. It should deploy threats of force sparingly and wisely, and promote smart diplomatic processes towards both North Korea and Iran when the chances of success appear realistic. Otherwise, the Trump administration risks placing the U.S. in a more isolated position, with less insight into Iran’s nuclear activities, and a diminished ability to leverage the powers of alliances and diplomatic credibility when engaging with rogue regimes. These are important tools that the administration should not turn away from.

Rebecca Bornstein is Director for External Relations and Researcher at the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump’s Policies on Iran and North Korea Are Weakening U.S. Diplomatic Power הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trump’s Statement on Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If Iran’s compliance continues, the deal serves the security interests of the US, Europe and Israel. More broadly, it contributes to global stability by strengthening the nonproliferation architecture and dissuading other countries from rushing toward a bomb. The deal does not rely on trusting Tehran: it significantly lengthens Iran’s potential breakout time, and provides increased visibility into its nuclear program. Under JCPOA conditions, it is easier for the US and its partners to respond to any serious violation, as it contains mechanisms for a coordinated global response.

This reality is clear, even to former critics of the deal. Trump’s bombastic rhetoric toward Iran is not backed up with fact: there is no case in which unilateral withdrawal serves US interests. If Trump withdraws, one of two scenarios would unfold: 1) The P5+1 and Iran continue to enforce the deal, marginalizing US influence. Absent a true Iranian violation, Europe would not follow a US exit, and the US would find itself with very little leverage to negotiate any future deal on Iran. 2) Iran also leaves, and the deal falls apart. Iran’s breakout time is reduced, and international inspectors are barred from facilities. The nuclear threat re-emerges as a primary global security concern, and policymakers again prepare for worst-case military scenarios.

Trump’s motivations are unclear.

JCPOA withdrawal may be part of his quest to erase the legacies of the Obama administration, whatever their merits.

The second option is that this is a strategic decision, to create a credible threat of leaving to pressure Iran to fold to US pressure on another issue (such as ballistic missiles). Pressure could take the form of additional sanctions, threats to leave, and dissuading American and European companies from developing business ties with Iran, as Trump is reportedly already doing.

Policy “wins” are in short supply for the Trump administration, and in this case, a “win” is the ability to say that he pushed Iran into a better deal. This approach has some potential, and an inherent cost.

The potential rests on Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who was just reelected on a platform of engagement with the West. Unlike his conservative competitors, Rouhani’s personal legacy is tied to the nuclear deal, and if any Iranian president can lobby Ayatollah Khamenei to accept additional restrictions, it is him.

But putting the JCPOA on the line risks nuclear security progress for an unclear end. Trump’s vision of a “better” deal might include only a minor change to the JCPOA, or symbolic concession on Iran’s regional activities. Is there a potential gain that is worth the risk to the nuclear deal, and the harm to American diplomatic credibility? While the US certified Iran’s compliance in July, Trump said that he expects Iran to be declared noncompliant at the next 90-day review, and that “if it was up to me, I would have had them noncompliant 180 days ago.” Trump has reportedly tasked White House staffers with preparing for a noncompliance possibility.

Preparing for contingencies is the job of a president. But predicting noncompliance without evidence of a meaningful violation is wrong and dangerous.

Leaving, or threatening to leave the JCPOA weakens the image of the US as a power that stands by its agreements. This has long-term implications for American diplomacy, and short-term costs for our ability to use diplomacy to constrain Iran on other issues. Confronting Iran’s destabilizing activities – without sacrificing the progress of the nuclear deal – is one of the great policy challenges of our time.

By threatening to leave, Trump is risking a great deal of global stability for very little gain.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump Should Not Play Politics with the Iran Nuclear Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding Trump’s visit to the Middle East and its outcomes: (1) Regional security, not the peace process, tops Trump’s Middle Eastern agenda, by Dr. Nimrod Goren; (2) Trump chose Saudi Arabia; Israel did not object, by Prof. Elie Podeh; (3) The Arab media was happy about Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, by Khader Sawaed; (4) The US adopts a multi-lateral approach to peacemaking, and the Palestinians are on board, by Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (5) Trump was in Israel and Saudi Arabia but attention is focused on America and Iran, by Rebecca Bornstein; (6) Trump passes a low bar, by Gabriel Mitchell

הפוסט Trump’s Visit to the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UN Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The U.S. Elections and the Future of the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The scope of the deal and its provisions on missile defense funding demonstrate a strong commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge. But a strong aid deal is not all the US can do to enhance Israel’s security and standing in the region.

Following the November elections, the Obama administration will have the opportunity to advance progress on another crucial issue – the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The MoU constitutes the largest bilateral military aid package in American history.

It includes $500 million per year in missile defense funding, which until now has been determined separately during an annual congressional appropriations process. The benefit of incorporation is that funding is guaranteed until 2028; the figure does not mark a significant increase in the amount of support that has been provided by Congress.

Once missile defense is accounted for, the increase in aid totals $200m. per year – just under seven%. For reference, 10 years ago the US added $600m. per year, an increase of 25%. This is perhaps reflective of the security situation Israel faced 10 years ago, in the aftermath of the disengagement from Gaza.

The deal’s provisions on missile defense funding allow Israeli strategists to rely on a healthy budget over the next decade.

While guaranteed funding is provided in exchange for Israel’s pledge that it will not lobby Congress for additional funds for the duration of the deal, there is a qualifier: Israel may request additional funds in the event of an emergency such as war.

Israel’s longstanding state of emergency and periodic operations in Gaza and neighboring countries, coupled with support among congressional Republicans for additional funds, calls into question the effectiveness of the anti-lobbying provision. It is very possible that Israel will successfully lobby for additional missile defense funds before the deal ends in 2028.

It does not appear that political and diplomatic initiatives played a significant role in negotiations, despite speculation that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have enjoyed greater leverage if he had concluded the agreement prior to the Iran nuclear deal.

Negotiations did not seem tied to progress on the peace process, despite Washington’s focus on a possible end-of-term effort to lay out the parameters of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.

Concluding the deal now, however, provides more leverage should the Obama administration deliver a set of parameters that addresses settlements and other Israeli obstacles to peace.

There are two final points worth noting: first, provisions in the Iran deal on Tehran’s enrichment, and enrichment research and development, are set to expire in 10 years, around the time that the Israel-US MoU will end.

This is not cause for alarm: Iran will remain bound to enrichment restrictions enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will, however, lend leverage to Israel as it negotiates the successor to this deal.

The final point is that the MoU marks a worthy investment in Israel’s military security that should be met with policies designed to improve its regional security by finally moving toward a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The months after the November election will provide the Obama administration with a chance to advance its vision of a final-status agreement. It is clear that such a move would need to address the destructive role of Israel’s settlement enterprise in the peace process.

The MoU is a worthy deal designed to ensure Israel’s security. It should empower the Obama administration to advance a vision of a two-state solution that transforms Israel’s regional standing and further bolsters its regional security.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Israel-US MoU as a prelude to Obama peace parameters? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.