MITVIM
The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies

Opportunities and Challenges for Israel-UAE Economic Cooperation

Katie Wachsberger*

January 2021

Israeli-Emirati economic ties have been developing continuously since the 1990s, setting the stage for the recent Abraham Accords and the partnerships that have begun to flourish as a result. Since the signing of the Accords and the abolishment of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) boycott laws against Israel, many opportunities have presented themselves for both countries to benefit from the new trade partnership, in realms such as investment, tourism, real estate, and education. However, there are many cultural, structural, and political challenges that remain. This paper delineates the economic relationship as it existed before the signing of the Accords in terms of private sector security collaboration, technological partnerships, and the export of various goods, noting the opportunities that present themselves with the establishment of direct and legal ties. It then explores the various obstacles that have proven themselves problematic thus far, and goes on to investigate challenges that Israeli businesses will face when attempting to scale regionally, especially in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A. Introduction

Economic relations between Israel and the UAE have been developing since the early 1990s, expanding into the realm of security cooperation and cyber technology sales in the 2010s, and diversifying significantly over the past 15 years, deeming the UAE Israel's most significant trade partner in the Gulf. Prior to the recent diplomatic Abraham Accords, which signify aspirations for a new era of peace and cooperation between the two nations, various mechanisms and strategies have been developed to unofficially execute transactions, while certain sectors have warranted government participation on both sides.

As the new Abraham Accords now permit legal commercial relations between Israel and the UAE, the potential for economic partnership is immense, and expands beyond the Emirates to other markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, the economic opportunities may remain limited or unstable in light of the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. This paper will roughly delineate the existing relations in terms of the sectors that have flourished before the normalization agreement, examining various opportunities that are rapidly developing, as well as various challenges, including structural and cultural obstacles, and the ways in which the lack of a peace agreement with the Palestinians hinders the growth and development of regional economic ties.

---

* Katie Wachsberger is an expert in GCC affairs, working for years in UAE social and cultural sectors, currently leading several trilateral initiatives that present opportunities for collaboration among Israelis, Emiratis, and Palestinians. She has an MA from Ben Gurion University on movements of reform in Oman.

B. Prior to the Abraham Accords

After the UAE's disengagement from the Arab League's secondary and tertiary boycott of Israeli commercial ties in 1995, the UAE law[1] only prohibited direct business transactions with Israeli entities.[2] Between 1995 and 2020, when the law in its entirety was formally abolished, deeming direct trade relations between the two nations legal, a variety of sectors have managed to flourish between the two countries, either with the facilitation of government entities, in the context of security or strategic national interests, or through third party entities. Ventures that serve government agendas, or operate within the digital realm, have had an advantage in advancing within Emirati and other Gulf markets, but this phenomenon is not exclusively limited to virtual or security-oriented realms.

The sale of advanced and offensive weapons to the UAE began in 2010 after the assassination of senior Hamas official, Mohammad al-Mabhouh,[3] coinciding with the rise in prominence of shared security threats, such as Iran's nuclear capabilities and the Muslim Brotherhood's regional influence. Israel is the eighth largest exporter of weapons in the world, with a 55 percent increase of arms exports over the past 5 years.[4] The UAE, and other GCC nations, represent a growing market for arms sales, and has become the third largest consumer of US weapons. Most of these sales happen through private companies, allowing for this industry's marketing strategy to remain unmonitored and unofficial.

Security-related commerce also includes surveillance and cyber, with Mati Kokhavi acting as the sector's leading pioneer, after Swiss based company Asia Global Technology (AGT) received its first contract for over 800 million USD with the Abu Dhabi government's Critical National Infrastructure Authority in 2008 to provide security technology for "vital facilities" in the UAE. Cyber security has since become an increasingly desirable sector, as the desert nation grows as a central hub of commerce, finance, and manufacturing, dealing with a variety of potential threats in both political and non-political realms. Because of the significance of this industry, many Israeli companies have been able to function openly in the UAE without an intermediary, such as Cybereason,[5] the primary investor of which, Vision Fund, is managed and supported by Saudis.[6] Similarly, Israeli companies CyberArk, InSights, and Checkpoint are open about their presence in the UAE. Checkpoint has been employing people in the Gulf for over a decade, using the UAE as its base through which to access markets in the region. The majority of their clients are governmental and financial entities, as well as large companies.[7]

Given its relative prominence and legitimacy, the security realm was able to act as intermediary for other kinds of transactions serving both governments' interests. In early July 2020, before the declaration of the Abraham Accords, Group 42, a leading technology

---

[1] Cabinet Resolution no 462/17m of 1995, H.E. Sheikh Hamdan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

[2] Martin Weiss, "Arab League Boycott of Israel," *Congressional Research Service*, 25 August 2017.

[3] "Report: Israel selling advanced military gear to UAE for over 8 years," *Middle East Monitor*, 26 August 2020.

[4] Adi Pick, "Israel is the Eighth Largest Arms Exporter in the World," *Calcalist*, 3 August 2019.

[5] Sophie Shulman, Hagar Ravet, and Meir Orbach, "Deals under the radar: These are the Israeli tech companies already operating in the UAE," *Calcalist*, 18 August 2020.

[6] "SoftBank seeks $10 billion to aid Saudi-backed Vision Fund companies," *Bloomberg*, 22 March 2020.

[7] Ruti Levy, Sagi Cohen, and Amitai Ziv, "Israeli High-tech Firms Make Good Money in Dubai but Don't Want to Talk About It," *Haaretz*, 19 August 2020.

company in Abu Dhabi, signed two memoranda of understanding with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries to collaborate in combating covid-19.[8]

Similarly, other digital services and products have had no trouble accessing the UAE market, especially those with an international client base and reputation. For example, Israeli Monday.com, a task managing digital tool that is available to consumers worldwide, has been extremely successful in various GCC markets including the UAE. Other digital and IT services from Israel are able to reach UAE markets, such as Cato Networks, an Israeli cloud service, JFrog Inc, a DevOps platform, and Redis Labs, a database management system. However, the majority of these ventures were unable to establish a physical presence.

Before the agreement, a range of startups that address the nation's pressing social and economic needs and aspirations have been doing business in the UAE for several years, many of which were invited by the UAE government. For example, Insights: Powering Collective Thinking Ltd. has been working with the Dubai government over the past several months to engage with the city's residents and provide feedback to authorities regarding sentiments and needs. The UAE government similarly approached Cann-Eden in 2014 through an American intermediary, inviting Itzhak Ayalon to set up greenhouses to grow vegetables using Israeli agritech.[9]

There has also been a significant amount of unofficial commercial transactions flourishing over the past two decades outside the virtual realms, indicating a more developed transactional relationship beyond tech and security. One of the first export markets to flourish between the UAE and Israel was the diamond bourse, which has been thriving since the early 1990s through Swiss and Belgian third parties.

According to Eliran Malul, the General Manager of Arab Markets company, both Israeli and Emirati government entities have also been significantly involved in facilitating technology transactions in the realms of finance, education, and artificial intelligence (AI), purchasing products from private Israeli companies and selling them to the UAE government. This has also been the case with agricultural products and services.

Exports and imports have increased over the past ten years; before the agreement, trade between Israel and the Gulf totaled around an estimated 720 million USD per year, with exports to the UAE at around 300,000 USD a year.[10] Indeed, the Manufacturers' Association claims that 200 Israeli companies were already exporting products to the UAE prior to the agreement. According to Malul, Israeli companies have been exporting goods such as chemicals, solvents, communication equipment, and tech hardware, sometimes independently. B2B imports included telecommunication technology, such as phones and cables, cosmetics, mechanical parts, plastic products, and raw materials for manufacturing, all of which are purchased from the UAE but with varying origins. Exports have also included non-perishable foodstuffs or agricultural products, like dates, or other consumer products from well known Israeli manufacturers such as Netafim, AHAVA, Moroccan Oil, Vivo, Max Brenner, Soda Stream, Sabon, Mogador, Nevo,[11] some of which appear on the BDS list of

[8] Dan Zaken, "Pact with UAE opens entire Arab world to Israeli business," *Globes*, 14 August 2020.
[9] Shoshana Solomon, "As Israel, UAE ties come out of closet, businesses are abuzz with excitement," *Times of Israel,* 18 August 2020.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Katie Wachsberger, "Israel and UAE Doing Business: Law Versus Reality," *The Forum for Regional Thinking*, 16 April 2019.

companies that work in the occupied territories (which, according to the UAE, were officially prohibited before the abolishment of the boycott law).[12]

Before the cancellation of the boycott in August 2020, exports were carried out through third party countries, especially Holland, Germany, Jordan, Cyprus, Belgium, and the US, as well as Spain and Italy, albeit to lesser degrees. These transactions often included the addition of a label that would present the product as being made or manufactured in the third-party country, or a white label that would be devoid of any specified country of origin. As such, these hosts would often facilitate financial transactions as well, as UAE-based consumers were unable to transfer money to Israel. Many GCC countries continue to use these third country bypass methods, although the UAE has always been Israel's most significant trade partner in the Gulf.

Many of the transactional ties that flourished before the peace agreement were often based on critical needs or interests of the Emirati state, frequently initiated or bolstered by governing entities. Additionally, Israeli companies operating in the UAE were able to do so virtually or through third party entities, with special permission from official entities, or in the context of security and cyber technology.

C. Post-Abraham Accords

Since the deal and the subsequent cancellation of the boycott laws, Israeli and Emirati officials have signed agreements for the protection of investments, direct civilian flights, and visa-free travel to bolster business and tourism. The UAE has also established mechanisms that will invest large sums of money in the Israeli economy, announcing in September the establishment of an Abu Dhabi Investment Office branch in Tel Aviv.[13] Various Israeli government ministries have also been working to solidify and bolster these relations, offering public and private assistance to Israeli companies looking to reach regional markets, as well as to Emirati investors looking to identify opportunities. Multiple entities, such as the Israel-GCC Chamber of Commerce and the UAE-Israel Business Council, have been established by private individuals but with the support of state infrastructure in order to bolster the commercial relationship. Additionally, the US has facilitated the creation of the Abraham Fund, a 3 billion USD investment fund to support Israel, Emirati, and American collaboration, focusing on energy and infrastructure programs.[14]

Indeed, the UAE's top-down manner of introducing new trends and ideas is also manifest in the private sector, with government investment influencing the ability or willingness of private companies and funds to follow suit. For example, following official delegations and the green light from leading investment branches of the government, Israeli VC Ourcrowd signed an agreement with Emirati business development company Phoenix, presenting a platform for entities and individuals in the Gulf looking to invest in Israeli tech and to help Israeli startups penetrate the GCC markets.[15]

---

[12] BDS List: http://bdslist.org/full-list/.
[13] "Abu Dhabi Investment Office to Open in Tel Aviv," *Reuters*, 16 September 2020.
[14] Tal Shneider. "Israel, UAE, and US set up $3b investment fund," *Globes*, 20 October 2020.
[15] James Sprio, "Israel's OurCrowd signs MoU with Phoenix, a UAE-based business development company," *Calcalist*, 10 October 2020.

The gold rush mentality in Israel does not consider the practical interests behind these public displays of collaboration, which often represent more than just economic opportunities. They shed light on the importance of demonstrating the tangible benefits of the agreement to the UAE public, influencing popular sentiments, providing material for pundits and public intellectuals, and generating confidence among the business elite.

Beyond the realm of investment there are many opportunities that are made available when any new market presents itself. Some of the low-hanging fruit – which are already being rapidly capitalized on – include exports, real estate, and tourism. The export of Israeli agriculture and foodstuffs to the UAE has already reached prominent, high-end supermarkets.[16] Additionally, the real estate market offers opportunities, especially for Dubai where the property sector makes up over 7 percent of the Emirate's GDP,[17] and has already witnessed an influx of potential Israeli buyers who could help absorb the city's surplus real estate inventory. Additionally, large UAE real estate developers have already begun eyeing beachside property in Tel Aviv and Herzliya.[18]

"This whole relationship was essentially about bringing capital into a stagnating economic situation," asserted a partner at a Dubai-based investment fund.[19] Dubai has been in an ongoing financial crisis since the beginning of the pandemic, especially given its reliance on tourism and foreign residents, many of whom have returned to their countries to work remotely or to explore other opportunities.

There are also important, albeit less concrete, opportunities to be explored considering the UAE's income tax-free environment, which many local Emiratis believe could provide an incubation platform for Israeli startups that struggle from the heavy tax policies at home. Similarly, Israel's human resources, knowledge capital, education models, and innovation culture offer significant opportunities for long term engagement in R&D, training, and mentorship. Additionally, normalization with the UAE and Bahrain presents potentially-rewarding opportunities for collaboration with Jordan and Egypt, with which Israel already enjoys legal business relations, albeit limited by social and cultural norms. Indeed, business meetings and transactions can now be held outside of the local hostile milieu, although they could simultaneously threaten Jordan's role as a commercial intermediary between Israel and the Arab market.

D. Structural and Cultural Challenges

Despite the rapidly expanding opportunities, many challenges remain, specifically pertaining to the differences between the two economies' structures and cultures, the role of government in the private sector, the various social structures that influence the economy, as well as popular sentiments regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For instance, some of the more formal delegations were perceived internally in the UAE as unequal in rank and influence, as explained by a prominent Dubai-based real estate developer. "Prominent Emirati businesspeople were disappointed when they met their alleged counterparts from Israel, because they realized that these delegates did not have

[16] See for example: Ofir Gendelman on Twitter.
[17] Muzzafar Rizvi, "UAE-Israel treaty will boost trade, drive real estate market," *Khaleej Times*, 30 August 2020.
[18] "UAE-Israel peace deal ushers in real estate investment & business partnerships," *CityScape*, 24 September 2020.
[19] Personal Interview, Dubai, 25 October 2020.

the same kind of influence that they have here."[20] This phenomenon is likely a result of the differences between the role of political power in the private sector in Israel and the UAE, as large banks or influential enterprises in Israel do not have the same relationship with government as they do in the Emirates where they are often formally connected.

This sort of confusion can easily sow seeds of distrust and skepticism, which, if fueled by inappropriate cultural behavior, could have unfortunate effects on the ecosystems' collaborative intentions. As such, many efforts are being carried out internally within Israel to prepare businesspeople for the kinds of interactions they may encounter when attempting to make deals and to make recommendations about appropriate etiquette. Among these recommendations is the importance of demonstrating commitment to and seriousness toward investing time, resources, and capital in the region by opening a local entity or branch.

The different business cultures in Israel and the UAE extend beyond etiquette and norms, as the capabilities and trends of each economy and society differ greatly. Indeed, Israelis and Emiratis share the familiarity with challenges facing a small market that relies on multinational scaling, however Israeli businesses are generally smaller, more risk averse, and aim to exit by selling a specific service or product to a larger international company. The UAE, on the other hand, acts as a hub for various sectors of trade and finance, accompanied by expectations that businesses arrive in a highly-developed form and capable of functioning on an international scale. "The startup nation meets the scale-up nation," remarked Thani al-Shirawi, Vice Chairman of Oasis Investment Company, "And they still need to learn each others' strengths and weaknesses." As Omar Al Busaidy suggested at the end of November during the Israel-Dubai Conference, Israeli startups should refrain from attempting to enter the UAE market without significant investment, a clear plan for scaling, and appropriate services or products.[21]

Similarly, it is important to note that beyond the capital of sovereign funds and government entities, the investment opportunities regionally and in the Gulf are not vast, and that the investment culture is less concerned with startups than with established technological ventures.

Another significant challenge is the fact that Israeli companies have been able to find their way to the Gulf and the MENA region through third parties and through government partnerships way before the Accords. Indeed, the UAE has had access to the world's most cutting-edge technological solutions for decades, and Israeli companies have serious competitors. "Gulf countries have been able to acquire what they've wanted from Israel way before the agreement," said a partner at a UAE-based venture capital firm. "While there are important opportunities, the reality on the ground is unlikely to change significantly. Israel will become another player in an advanced international market."[22] As such, many funds are already investing in Israeli companies that have a presence in the US or Europe. Indeed, Israeli products may not be better than technology from the US or Europe, and may not be worth risking a reputation or relationships with stakeholders. In order to be disruptive, Israeli companies will need to offer cheaper solutions than those currently being purchased from Europe or the US, or unique innovative solutions that address specific market needs.

[20] Personal Interview, Dubai, 2 November 2020.
[21] Irit Avissar, "'Israeli who want to operate in Dubai should come up with a clear plan and not go round in circles'," *Calcalist*, 25 November 2020.
[22] Personal Interview, remote, 25 November 2020.

Additionally, the lack of synchronization between the publicity and the practicality of these collaborations remains a challenge to entities that have already begun doing business in the UAE. Several months following the signing of the Accords, the export of devices, materials, and other products remains to be organized and facilitated, with tech companies still exporting through third party entities despite the new economic agreements. As such, financial transactions between Israel and the UAE still require a third party. While private sector leaders predict that these kinks in the system will soon be worked out, their lag behind the official statements of cooperation demonstrates the role of such large-scale governmental deals in influencing public opinion, and are seen by many in the business community as representing efforts to create hype and acceptability regarding the new agreement, or to maintain control over the scope and nature of these ties for the time being. “Many people here are uncertain regarding the extent to which Israelis are looking for a photo-op, or a long-term partnership based on trust,” explained the owner of a medical technology supplier, explaining that Israelis will need to prove their seriousness.[23]

In the UAE, the majority of the economy is government owned, and so the economic opportunities would be congruent with official policies, but this is not necessarily the case in many economies regionally. In exploring partnerships beyond the UAE, a whole new set of challenges – related to the ongoing status of the occupation – arise.

E. Challenges to Regional Scaling in Light of the Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

It is possible to envision this new economic relationship with the UAE as presenting opportunities regionally that could extend beyond low-hanging fruit such as tourism and real estate in the UAE, the investment of sovereign funds in Israeli tech companies, and the partially-symbolic largess between governments. In acknowledging the small nation’s important role as an export hub and financial center for the region, as well as for Africa and Asia, these new ties present the potential for creating a regional ecosystem that will allow Israeli companies the opportunity to scale in the MENA markets, offering alternative growth to American, European, or Asian markets, for companies looking to expand beyond Israel’s small economy. However, the potential for the Israeli economy to benefit from expansive new regional partnerships depends on the development of sentiments regarding Israel and normalization, among popular discourse and business elite, as well as tangible benefits that Israel’s economy has to offer the region in return for engagement.

On a practical economic level, popular sentiments have remained an influential factor, especially as the commercial MENA market is largely regional as opposed to local, with the majority of successful ventures expanding to neighboring countries. Thus, if regional support for normalization remains low, or the diplomatic trend proves unable to spread geographically and beyond the official discourse, prospects for Israeli businesspeople in the UAE and Bahrain could remain limited, especially as the two small economies are intimately tied to the surrounding markets. This is evident in that many Israeli companies operating in the Gulf choose to remain under the radar despite the Accords, fearing that exposing their Israeli identity will affect their popularity among consumers, media, and public opinion.

Similarly, many Israeli products being marketed in the UAE continue to use white labels or intermediaries, especially as the minority Emirati population relies on a foreign workforce, among which many are originally from countries that are still hostile toward Israel. “People

[23] Personal Interview, Dubai, 1 November 2020.

here feel it is too soon to know whether this phenomenon is here to stay," explained a fintech entrepreneur of Syrian origin. "People originally from the Levant, many of whom still harbor anger and frustration regarding Israel's policies, occupy significant positions in the economy here, especially in media, education, and marketing, and play a big role in ushering in or rejecting new trends."[24] Many Palestinians residing in the UAE, however, fear that their loyalty will be questioned, and often feel the need to support the Accords as a means of self-preservation. Regardless, many of the UAE-based interviewees for this article asked to remain anonymous, expressing hesitation to be identified as communicating with Israelis, and many businesspeople approached declined to be interviewed or to comment on the topic citing its sensitivity.

Although the business community functions according to financial incentives rather than political leanings, the apparent unpopularity of the agreement beyond the UAE could jeopardize many transactions regionally, specifically those that are consumer oriented such as tourism or the import of consumer goods. According to various reports, over 90 percent of social media users from around the MENA region mentioning the Abraham Accords reject the diplomatic agreement,[25] and thorough surveys following the normalization with Morocco show that less than 10 percent support the phenomenon,[26] thus representing a vast majority of public sentiment that make up large consumer markets. Whether this will remain the case as normalization spreads to Morocco, and possibly other GCC nations, will only become evident with time. However, the majority of Israel's exports are technological and enterprise oriented, meaning that the sentiments of the business elite would be more influential than popular political leanings.

There are vast opportunities when viewing the MENA market in terms of its potential growth and consumers, and while it is currently considered small in comparison to other global markets, it is extremely malleable and experiencing rapid transition and growth. The longer-term opportunities lie in possibilities for joint ventures, real estate, tourism, logistics, specialized industrialization, and even joint knowledge production in academic contexts or energy and environmental collaboration. Some of these sectors – specifically tourism, real estate, and education – are easily influenced by popular sentiments and discursive trends, and will be subject to the continuous unpopularity of Israel's policies in the West Bank and Gaza.

Many investors and potential business collaborators expressed a sense of hesitance that they assume will continue until Saudi Arabia joins the normalization trend, given its influence regionally on economic, political, and social levels. The Saudi government, unlike other ruling entities in the Gulf, must lead a shift in mentality among the country's elite regarding Israel before joining the normalization trend, a development that is unlikely without a solution to the Palestinian issue. The Saudis' central position in the development of these relations in evident, for example, in the necessity of the Kingdom's permission for flights between Israel and the UAE.

A central concern is the lack of stability of the normalization trend, which could easily be shaken by the reignition of the conflict in the West Bank or Gaza, as was the case in the 1990s. "It is not obvious to many people that the whole thing will not fall apart at the first sign of organized Palestinian resistance, regardless of how unlikely that may seem now,"

---

[24] Personal Interview, remote, 10 December 2020.

[25] ברק רביד, "90% מהשיח ברשות החברתיות בערבית על הנורמליזציה עם ישראל – שלילי," *וואלה*, 11 באוקטובר 2020.

[26] "Taking Arabs' Pulse on Normalization of Ties with Israel," *Arab Barometer*, 11 December 2020.

expressed a young Egyptian tech investor currently working at a new Saudi-based fund. As such, many regional investors and business elite expressed interest in working with Israeli entities that actively engage the Palestinian population and bring capital flow into the West Bank and Gazan economies, which would help them to justify the partnership to their stakeholders and play a role in bringing the conflict closer to a solution. “A positive result of normalization would be engagement with economic entities within Israel that are actively working with Palestinian partners or alleviating the challenges faced by Palestinians,” explained Gaith Abdulla, an Emirati Gulf Studies specialist.[27]

Similarly, many actors from political and economic realms in the Gulf are looking to engage in projects that are led by or include Palestinian citizens of Israel. In a recent trip to Dubai, Palestinian Israeli entrepreneur Zada Hajj was approached by high-level figures looking to invest in her projects, some of which engage with Palestinian companies from the West Bank. “People are concerned about being perceived as too political, and working with Arab Israelis is a safer and morally sound way to support Palestinians while acknowledging the importance of this community,” she explained. “This development has created a new interest in the Palestinian population in Israel, that has not existed in the Arab world prior.”[28]

Effectively, several entities have adopted policies that allow for a narrative of joint Israeli-Palestinian ventures, or promote Palestinian citizens of Israel as central actors within the company. Initiatives such as DANA (Desert Alliance New-era Accelerator) that assists women-led Israeli and Palestinian startups enter the GCC and MENA markets, and raise money from regional investors, is an important example of such joint ventures. Similarly, the Arava Institute has promoted the establishment of a joint consulting firm that assists Palestinian companies in accessing Gulf markets, and helps Israeli companies engage with the Palestinian economy in order to establish trilateral regional ventures.

F. Conclusion

With a plethora of economic opportunities around the corner, and abundant hesitance among the regional business communities, many challenges still limit Israel’s ability to access the true potential of Gulf and regional markets. The romanticization of the UAE and its perceived endless access to petroleum revenues is not the right path to proper and sophisticated engagement with the desert nation. Instead, the right path is a nuanced understanding of the economy and society’s needs, as well as a willingness to invest time and resources in partnerships.

Most significantly, when examining the economic opportunities on a regional level, the possibility for true partnerships and expansion lie in Israel’s ability to bring the conflict with the Palestinians to an end. Israeli businesses would then be able to engage freely in the region, especially as Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign and existing nation is becoming less debatable. Companies that engage with the Palestinian economy, employ Palestinians (citizens of Israel or under Palestinian Authority control), bring opportunities to Palestinian companies for working in the Gulf, and demonstrate clear strategies for challenging the political status quo, will have access to more stable and authentic partnerships in the UAE and beyond.

[27] Personal Interview, Dubai, 13 October 2020.
[28] Personal Interview, remote, 10 December 2020.