



Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2023

Findings of the Mitvim Institute Survey



September 2023

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The Mitvim Institute's Eleventh Annual Public Opinion Survey on Israeli Foreign Policy was conducted in late July 2023. The survey was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, among a representative sample (both politically and demographically) of the adult population in Israel (800 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a sampling error of 3.5%. This document presents the findings of the survey, divided into five areas: Israel's foreign policy apparatus, Israel's foreign relations, the implications of the Judicial Reform for Israel's foreign relations, Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians. This year the survey included, among other topics, questions about the implications of the "full-fledged right-wing" government's policies on Israel's foreign relations, both in regard to the Judicial Reform as well as its policy in the West Bank; the future of the Arab-Israeli normalization process, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia, and the potential of leveraging it to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking; Iran's growing nuclear threat; international cooperation on the climate crisis; Israel's policy in Lebanon; China's growing involvement in the Middle-East; and Israel's stance on the war in Ukraine.

Israel's Foreign Affairs Apparatus

- The public gives **the government's foreign policy performance a score** of 4.82 out of 10, a sharp decline from 2022 (5.53), and the lowest grading of the past seven years. Almost one quarter of respondents gave it a score of 1 (the lowest).
- The public gives the **state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a score** of 5 out of 10, with 46% of respondents describing it as good or moderately good. This is a decline compared to 2022 (5.4).

Israel's Foreign Relations

- The public gives **Israel's standing in the world a score** of 5.03. This is a sharp decline from last year (5.85), and the lowest score of the past seven years. Only 18% of respondents described Israel's standing as good.
- The survey found an increase in the importance the public attaches to **foreign policy issues as a whole**. The findings that stood out in this regard were the **increased importance** the public attributed to: **strengthening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (a score of 7.84 compared to 7.3 in 2022), and to **improving international cooperation on the climate crisis** (7.31 vs. 6.81). The public also attributed greater importance to improving relations with the EU (7.51 vs. 7.16) and promoting peace with the Palestinians (6.08 vs. 5.73). Nonetheless, as in previous years, the Palestinian issue was rated as being of least importance in the public perception by a significant margin compared to other issues.
- The public gives the **state of US-Israel relations** a score of 5.3 out of 10, a sharp decline from 2022 (6.85), and the lowest score of the past eight years (and the second lowest since we began conducting the survey). This is significantly lower than the ratings of the previous two years of the Biden Administration. Almost half the respondents described the relationship as "not good" or "not so good".
- An overwhelming majority of the Israeli public (73%) agrees with the statement that **the United States is, and should remain, Israel's main ally**, compared to only 19% who disagree with it.
- On the question of **which country is the most important to Israel** besides the United States, **Russia lost** its top position (which was decisive in previous years) to **Germany**, for the first time in years. Russia continues

to lead by a slim margin in the cumulative index of the three most important countries, but even in this index, the choice of Russia has dropped from 40% last year to 32% this year. After Russia and Germany, the following countries are ranked similarly to previous years (in descending order of importance): **Britain, China, Egypt and France**. Jordan rose from 7% last year to 12% this year. There is almost no change in the public's assessment of Saudi Arabia's importance (from 11% in 2022 to 12% this year). As was the case in 2022, a relative majority (44%) of respondents support the policy of "walking between the drops" as Israel's preferred strategy on the conflict in Ukraine. However, the size of this group has shrunk compared to last year (53% in 2022) and the rate of those in favor of full support for Ukraine and the position of the liberal-democratic camp has risen (33% compared to 28% last year). Only 3% supported Russia in full.

- A relative majority of the Israeli public (40%) sees **China's growing involvement in the Middle East as a risk to Israel**, compared to only 13% who see it as a positive development and 18% who do not believe it is significant to Israel's interests. Almost 30% of the respondents have yet to formulate a position on the issue.
- The Israeli public is almost evenly divided on the question of whether **the type of government in a particular country should influence Israel's decision to maintain relations with it**, with 44% believing the type of government should not impact Israel's decision. In contrast, 42% believe that Israel should prioritize relations with countries with democratic regimes. This represents an increase in the influence of the democratic component compared to 2022, when half of the respondents did not attribute importance to the type of government compared to 36% who preferred a connection to democracies.

Judicial Reform Implications for Israel's Foreign Relations

- 45% of the public noted that **the criticism expressed by Western leaders about the judicial reform in Israel** has had a great or very great influence on their position on the issue, compared to 40% who noted that the criticism had little or no effect on their support/opposition to the reform.
- Almost half of the public believes that there is a connection between **the government's efforts to change the judicial system and its efforts to promote annexation and sovereignty in the West Bank**. In contrast, 34% believe that there is little or no connection between these efforts.

Israel and the region

- On the question of **Israel's regional identity**, 34% of the public feels that Israel belongs most of all to the Middle East, 24% to Europe, and 20% to the Mediterranean Basin. This is a slight increase in the sense of belonging to the Middle East compared to last year.
- The public attaches great importance (7.56 out of 10) to establishing a **regional framework for cooperation on the climate crisis in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin**. This represents a slight increase in support compared to 2022 (7.21), with 57% of respondents defining this initiative as important.
- There has been an increase in the high importance given by the public to **strengthening relations with Jordan** (a score of 7.82 out of 10 compared to 7.46 last year), with 63% of respondents defining this goal as important.
- In light of **Iran's advances over the past year toward nuclear-military capability**, a significant majority of the public views the diplomatic track as the main means of curbing this threat. Almost half the respondents believe that Israel should focus its efforts on diplomatic cooperation with the international community and countries in the region in order to delay Iran's nuclear efforts. Only a quarter of the respondents support a military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, while 16% see Iran's attainment of nuclear capability as a fait accompli and believe Israel should now focus on preparing for this reality.

- Given the restoration of **Israeli-Turkish relations** in 2022, a relative majority (38%) think the relationship should be leveraged above all to improve security coordination on Iran, Syria and Lebanon, 20% think it should focus on Israeli gas exports to Europe via Turkey, and 18% on de-escalation vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Only 11% said relations should focus on cooperation to tackle the climate crisis and promote renewable energies.
- A relative majority of respondents (33%) thinks that the most important focus of **Israeli-Moroccan relations** should be on building economic and business ties between the countries, while 24% said the focus should be on security cooperation and 19% on partnership with Morocco in building ties with Africa and Europe. Only 12% of the respondents favored a focus on forging cultural, interfaith, and civic ties between the countries.
- The public is divided on the question of **Israel's desired strategy vis-à-vis Lebanon** given Lebanon's socioeconomic collapse on the one hand, and increased friction with Hezbollah in recent months, on the other. 26% favor increasing military activity vis-à-vis Hezbollah, while 22% focus on reducing friction by advancing additional interim agreements with Lebanon (similar to the recently achieved maritime border agreement). 20% believe Israel should not interfere in the Lebanese situation, while 19% think Israel should actively assist the international effort to stabilize the country.
- A relative majority of the Israeli public (39%) continues to **perceive the EU as more of an adversary of Israel than a friend** (33%). A significant portion of the public - 28% of the respondents - have yet to form an opinion on the issue. Among those who perceive the EU more as an adversary, the EU's positions on Israeli-Palestinian peace (69%) and on the settlement issue (42%) were by a decisive margin the two main reasons for this perception (32% mentioned the EU's positions on the Iranian nuclear issue). Of those who perceive the EU more as a friend, 48% mentioned the EU being Israel's main trading partner, 44% cited the EU's liberal-democratic values, and 34% mentioned the academic-scientific cooperation with the Union. Only 19% cited the EU's positions on Israeli-Palestinian peace as one of the two reasons for viewing it as a friend.

Israel and the Palestinians

- 36% of the Israeli public sees the pursuit of peace based on the two-state solution as the **desired Israeli government strategy on the Palestinian issue**. 28% support annexing the West Bank and establishing a single state in which Jews enjoy privileged status. 11% support annexing the West Bank and establishing a single state with full equal rights for all. A significant portion - about a quarter of the respondents - have yet to form an opinion on the issue.
- 61% of the public think Israel should **leverage its ties with the normalization countries to promote peace with the Palestinians**, compared to only 24% who think it should not. This is a continuous upward trend in support for leveraging normalization for peace since the signing of the Abraham Accords (57% in 2022 and 53% in 2021).
- Against the backdrop of growing criticism from leaders of the Abraham Accords countries, the public is divided on the question of **whether Israel's policy on the West Bank should take into account its goal of maintaining and developing normalization with the Arab world**. 39% think Israeli policy should take this goal into account, compared to 37% who think it should not. Almost a quarter of the respondents have yet to form a position on the issue.
- A small relative majority of the Israeli public (41%) **supports stopping construction in the settlements and evacuating illegal outposts in exchange for normalization with Saudi Arabia**, compared to 40% who oppose such a deal.
- Against the backdrop of the government's challenge to **the continued existence of the Palestinian Authority**, a relative majority (43%) thinks its continued existence serves Israeli interests, compared to only 13% who think its continued existence runs counter to Israeli interests. 17% believe that the continued existence of

the PA is insignificant to Israeli interests. More than a quarter of the respondents have not yet formulated an opinion on the issue.

- Similar to last year, a majority of the public (61%) supports the **establishment of a joint mechanism to prevent escalation in Jerusalem in cooperation with the Palestinians and Jordan**, compared to only 17% who oppose it.
- The public remains divided on the question of the **government's desired strategy on the Gaza Strip**. The leading option is a continuation of the status quo - that is, an effort to maintain military deterrence along with economic relief, in return for quiet (27%). 24% think the international community should be mobilized for extensive economic reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, 17% think the effort should be focused on restoring the control of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, and 15% think negotiations should be conducted with Hamas on a long-term arrangement.
- Similar to last year, almost half of the respondents support **cooperation with the Palestinians to deal with the climate crisis**, compared to 31% who oppose it.
- Also in similar findings to last year's, a majority of the Israeli public (52%) supports **Israeli aid for the development of independent energy and water infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority**, compared to 34% who oppose it.

Multi-Year Trend

Average ratings between 1 (low) and 10 (high)

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| Israel's standing in the world | 5.12 | 3.96 | 5.01 | 5.49 | 5.82 | 6.10 | 5.63 | 5.58 | 5.85 | 5.03 |
| Government's foreign policy performance | 5.29 | 4.00 | 4.55 | 5.05 | 5.22 | 5.99 | 6.05 | 5.29 | 5.53 | 4.82 |
| Strengthen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 4.80 | 4.03 | 4.31 | 4.81 | 5.01 | 5.37 | 5.69 | 5.23 | 5.4 | 5 |
| State of US-Israel relations | 6.09 | 5.01 | 5.56 | 6.88 | 7.75 | 7.75 | 8.05 | 6.46 | 6.85 | 5.3 |

* From 2014-2018, the question about the state of the Foreign Ministry was phrased differently.

Sample background variables

Sample Size: 800

Gender: 50% men, 50% women

The Arab public constitutes about 15% of the total sample

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union constitute about 15% of the Jewish sample

The survey was conducted at the end of July 2023

Age

| | Total |
|----------|-------|
| Up to 34 | 36.3% |
| 35-54 | 39.6% |
| 55+ | 24.0% |

Extent of religious belief (among Jews)

| | Total |
|----------------|-------|
| Religious bloc | 22.5% |
| Traditional | 31.5% |
| Secular | 46.0% |

Political views (among Jews)

| | Total |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| Very right wing + right wing | 46.2% |
| Right-leaning center | 23.2% |
| Center | 16.6% |
| Left-leaning center, left wing | 14.0% |

Income level

| | Total 97% (3% non-response) |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| Below average | 47.3% |
| Average | 24.9% |
| Above average | 27.9% |

A. Israel's Foreign Service

- How satisfied are you with the government's foreign policy performance over the past year? Rate it from 1-10 with 1 indicating "not satisfied at all" and 10 indicating "very satisfied"

| 1-10 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|
| (Not satisfied at all) 1 | 15.1% | 14.1% | 23.2% |
| 2 | 5.9% | 4.2% | 6.2% |
| 3 | 7.4% | 6.3% | 7.4% |
| 4 | 5.9% | 7.6% | 8.9% |
| 5 | 14.1% | 13.0% | 10.5% |
| 6 | 11.5% | 12.2% | 10.0% |
| 7 | 16.5% | 15.1% | 12.9% |
| 8 | 14.6% | 15.3% | 8.5% |
| 9 | 5.1% | 7.2% | 5.2% |
| (Very satisfied) 10 | 3.8% | 5.0% | 7.2% |
| Average 1-10 | 5.29 | 5.53 | 4.82 |
| Percent of those expressing an opinion | 88% | 96% | 93% |

- Government foreign policy performance - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|-----------------|-------|------|-------|
| Not good 1-3 | 37% | 37% | 37% |
| Not so good 4-5 | 29% | 18% | 19% |
| Quite good 6-7 | 22% | 23% | 23% |
| Good 8-10 | 12% | 22% | 21% |
| Average 1-10 | 4.39 | 4.89 | 4.82 |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Average score | 4.80 | 4.03 | 4.55 | 5.05 | 5.22 | 5.99 | 6.05 | 5.29 | 5.53 | 4.82 |

- How do you rate the current state of the Foreign Ministry?
Rate it from 1-10 with 1 indicating "not good" and 10 indicating "very good"

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--|-------------|------------|------------|
| (Not good at all) 1 | 10.5% | 10.6% | 16.6% |
| 2 | 4.6% | 5.4% | 5.5% |
| 3 | 7.5% | 6.5% | 8.7% |
| 4 | 8.3% | 7.1% | 10.4% |
| 5 | 21.2% | 17.4% | 12.3% |
| 6 | 15.4% | 14.2% | 14.2% |
| 7 | 17.0% | 19.6% | 13.3% |
| 8 | 10.7% | 13.1% | 10.3% |
| 9 | 2.8% | 4.1% | 4.5% |
| (Very good) 10 | 2.0% | 1.9% | 4.2% |
| Average 1-10 | 5.23 | 5.4 | 5.0 |
| Percent of those expressing an opinion | 85% | 93% | 92% |

- State of the Foreign Ministry - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| Not good 1-3 | 30% | 31% | 31% |
| Not so good 4-5 | 30% | 22% | 23% |
| Quite good 6-7 | 29% | 27% | 27% |
| Good 8-10 | 11% | 20% | 19% |
| Average 1-10 | 4.66 | 5.05 | 5.0 |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Average score | 5.69 | 5.23 | 5.4 | 5.00 |

B. Israel's Foreign Relations

- What is your general sense of Israel's current standing in the world?
Rate it from 1-10, with 1 indicating "very bad" to 10 indicating "good"

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| (Very bad) 1 | 5.9% | 5.1% | 13.7% |
| 2 | 2.9% | 2.8% | 5.7% |
| 3 | 7.4% | 5.6% | 9.0% |
| 4 | 10.0% | 8.7% | 13.0% |
| 5 | 17.7% | 15.8% | 14.4% |
| 6 | 19.3% | 17.9% | 12.6% |
| 7 | 21.8% | 23.3% | 13.3% |
| 8 | 9.6% | 15.4% | 11.1% |
| 9 | 3.0% | 3.4% | 2.9% |
| (Good) 10 | 2.4% | 2.0% | 4.3% |
| Average 1-10 | 5.58 | 5.85 | 5.03 |
| Percent of respondents who expressed an opinion | 97% | 99% | 98% |

- Israel's standing in the world - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Not good 1-3 | 34.4% | 27.4% | 28.4% |
| Not so good 4-5 | 38.5% | 25.5% | 27.4% |
| Quite good 6-7 | 12.5% | 28.2% | 25.9% |
| Good 8-10 | 14.6% | 18.9% | 18.3% |
| Average 1-10 | 4.44 | 5.12 | 5.03 |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| 5.12 | 3.96 | 5.01 | 5.49 | 5.82 | 6.10 | 5.63 | 5.58 | 5.85 | 5.03 |

- How important is it for the Israeli government to do each of the following, with 10 signifying “very important” and 1 being “not important at all” (total in each row is 100%)

| | Average score | Score | | | |
|--|---------------|-------|-----|-----|------|
| | | 1-3 | 4-5 | 6-7 | 8-10 |
| Strengthen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 7.84 | 5% | 10% | 22% | 63% |
| Advance peace with the Palestinians | 6.08 | 24% | 16% | 23% | 37% |
| Improve relations with the EU | 7.51 | 6% | 13% | 25% | 56% |
| Improve relations with Arab and North African states | 7.23 | 7% | 12% | 30% | 51% |
| Improve relations with Mediterranean Basin states like Cyprus and Greece | 7.40 | 7% | 12% | 26% | 55% |
| Improve cooperation with other states on dealing with the climate crisis | 7.31 | 9% | 14% | 23% | 54% |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|
| Strengthen the Foreign Ministry | 7.41 | 6.66 | 7.10 | 7.30 | 7.84 |
| Advance peace with the Palestinians | 6.18 | 5.83 | 5.64 | 5.73 | 6.08 |
| Improve relations with the EU | 7.26 | 6.66 | 6.99 | 7.16 | 7.51 |
| Improve relations with Arab and North African* states | 7.12 | 6.80 | 6.83 | 7.23 | 7.23 |
| Improve relations with Mediterranean Basin states like Cyprus and Greece | 6.96 | 6.69 | 6.99 | 7.22 | 7.40 |
| Improve cooperation with other states on dealing with the climate crisis | | | 7.03 | 6.81 | 7.31 |

*North Africa - only from the current survey

- How do you rate the current state of Israel-US relations?
Grade from 1 signifying “bad” to 10 signifying “very good”

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|-------------|-------------|------------|
| (Bad) 1 | 5.0% | 2.2% | 10.7% |
| 2 | 1.0% | 1.3% | 5.3% |
| 3 | 4.0% | 3.6% | 7.6% |
| 4 | 6.6% | 4.5% | 12.1% |
| 5 | 13.8% | 11.5% | 13.6% |
| 6 | 13.2% | 14.1% | 15.6% |
| 7 | 21.7% | 18.7% | 16.2% |
| 8 | 18.7% | 25.4% | 11.3% |
| 9 | 8.8% | 11.6% | 3.9% |
| (Very good) 10 | 7.3% | 7.1% | 3.7% |
| Average 1-10 | 6.46 | 6.85 | 5.3 |
| Percent of respondents who expressed an opinion | 92% | 98% | 96% |

- Current state Israel-US relations - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| Not good 1-3 | 25% | 23% | 23% |
| Not so good 4-5 | 29% | 25% | 26% |
| Quite good 6-7 | 31% | 32% | 32% |
| Good 8-10 | 15% | 20% | 19% |
| Average 1-10 | 5.12 | 5.33 | 5.3 |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Average Score | 6.09 | 5.01 | 5.56 | 6.88 | 7.75 | 7.75 | 8.05 | 6.46 | 6.85 | 5.3 |

- To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “The US is and must remain Israel's main ally in the future?”

| | Total | Grouped |
|---------------------------|-------|------------|
| Agree to a large extent | 40% | 73% |
| Agree to a certain extent | 33% | |
| Don't quite agree | 12% | 19% |
| Don't agree at all | 7% | |
| Don't know | 8% | 8% |

- The US as Israel's main ally - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|-------------|-------|------|-------|
| Agree | 51% | 77% | 73% |
| Don't agree | 32% | 16% | 19% |
| Don't know | 17% | 7% | 8% |

- What in your opinion are the three countries with which Israel's relationship is the most important these days, in addition to the US? This was an open question. Only countries with a 5% score and up are included. The results add up to over 100% in each column because respondents were allowed to mention three answers.

| | First country | additional states 2 | Total of 3 states |
|--------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Russia | 14.2% | 17.6% | 31.8% |
| Germany | 14.6% | 16.8% | 31.4% |
| UK | 11.5% | 16.7% | 28.2% |
| China | 9.1% | 16.7% | 25.8% |
| Egypt | 8% | 13.3% | 21.3% |
| France | 4% | 16.2% | 20.2% |
| Saudi Arabia | 4.6% | 7.2% | 11.8% |
| Jordan | 1.5% | 10% | 11.5% |
| UAE | 2.9% | 7.6% | 10.5% |
| Turkey | 2.3% | 7.1% | 9.4% |

Multi-year trend

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Russia | 36.6% | 39.7% | 31.8% |
| Germany | 28.4% | 28.7% | 31.4% |
| UK | 25.6% | 24% | 28.2% |
| China | 21.9% | 23.4% | 25.8% |
| Egypt | 16.3% | 18.6% | 21.3% |
| France | 11.8% | 16.3% | 20.2% |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.6% | 10.8% | 11.8% |
| Jordan | 11.6% | 6.7% | 11.5% |
| UAE | 7.2% | 9.7% | 10.5% |
| Turkey | 5% | 10.6% | 9.4% |

- Regarding policy on the war in Ukraine, Israel should:

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Avoid taking sides so as not to anger Russia even at the expense of angering the West | 34% | 46% | 44% |
| Fully support Ukraine and the position of the liberal-democratic world | 25% | 35% | 33% |
| Fully support Russia | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| Don't know | 38% | 16% | 20% |

Comparison to previous survey - entire sample

| | 2022 | 2023 |
|--|------|------|
| Avoid taking sides so as not to anger Russia even at the expense of angering the West* | 53% | 44% |
| Fully support Ukraine and the position of the liberal-democratic world | 28% | 33% |
| Fully support Russia | 1% | 3% |
| Don't know | 18% | 20% |

*The 2022 question was "avoid angering Russia and/or the West"

- China has increased its involvement in the Middle East, including in the Gulf States and vis-à-vis Iran. How do you view China's growing influence in Middle Eastern politics?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| China's growing influence endangers Israel | 33% | 41% | 40% |
| China's influence is not significant for Israel | 20% | 18% | 18% |
| China's influence is positive for Israel | 16% | 13% | 13% |
| Don't know | 31% | 28% | 29% |

- Which view do you find more acceptable?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Israel should prioritize developing relationships with democratic regimes | 47% | 41% | 42% |
| The type of regime should not be a consideration in Israel's decisions on establishing relations with countries | 31% | 46% | 44% |
| Don't know | 22% | 13% | 14% |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|------|-------|------|
| Israel should prioritize developing relationships with democratic regimes | 42% | 36.2% | 42% |
| The type of regime should not be a consideration in Israel's decisions on establishing relations with countries | 43% | 49.9% | 44% |
| Don't know | 15% | 13.9% | 14% |

C. Implications of the Judicial Reform for Israel's Foreign Policy

- Some Western world leaders, including US President Biden and French President Macron, have expressed concern over the Judicial Reform being promoted by the Israeli government. To what extent do Israel's future relations with its Western partners affect your support of or opposition to the reform?

| | Total | Grouped |
|------------------------|-------|---------|
| To a very great extent | 20% | 45% |
| To a great extent | 25% | |
| To a small extent | 16% | 40% |
| Barely or not at all | 24% | |
| Don't know | 15% | 15% |

The future of Israel's relations with its partners in the Western world in light of legislative changes - grouped, by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Legislation has an impact | 59% | 43% | 45% |
| Legislation does not have an impact | 17% | 44% | 40% |
| Don't know | 24% | 13% | 15% |

- The Israeli government is promoting two main efforts - legislation to change the judicial system, and an annexation and application of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank. To what extent do you think these efforts are interrelated?

| | Total | Grouped |
|---------------------------------------|-------|---------|
| Greatly interrelated | 26% | 49% |
| Interrelated to a fairly large extent | 23% | |
| Interrelated to a small extent | 19% | 34% |
| Hardly or not at all interrelated | 15% | |
| Don't know | 17% | 17% |

Interrelation between judicial reform legislation and promoting annexation - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Interrelated | 52% | 48% | 49% |
| Not interrelated | 20% | 37% | 34% |
| Don't know | 28% | 15% | 17% |

D. Israel and the Region

- Do you regard Israel as belonging more to the Middle East, more to Europe, more to the Mediterranean Basin, or to none of the above? By sector and total.

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| More to the Middle East | 34% | 34% | 34% |
| More to Europe | 26% | 23% | 24% |
| More to the Mediterranean Basin | 12% | 21% | 20% |
| None of the above | 10% | 11% | 10% |
| Don't know | 18% | 11% | 12% |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|
| More to the Middle East | 28% | 32% | 29% | 32.4% | 31.2% | 34% |
| More to Europe | 23% | 27% | 24% | 22.7% | 25.2% | 24% |
| More to Mediterranean Basin | 22% | 21% | 25% | 22.5% | 19.7% | 20% |
| None of the above | 10% | 7% | 10% | 9.8% | 11.6% | 10% |
| Don't know | 17% | 13% | 12% | 12.6% | 12.4% | 12% |

- The Middle East and Mediterranean Basin are among the world's most susceptible regions to global warming. In other parts of the world, countries have organized regional frameworks for cooperation to deal with the climate crisis. How important do you think it is to establish a similar regional framework in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin? Rate between 1-10, with 1 signifying not important at all and 10 signifying very important.

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| (Not important) 1 | 3.6% | 4.3% | 3.2% |
| 2 | 1.6% | 1.2% | 1.2% |
| 3 | 2.6% | 3.4% | 2.0% |
| 4 | 2.9% | 4.2% | 2.8% |
| 5 | 7.7% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 6 | 12.3% | 10.3% | 8.9% |
| 7 | 12.0% | 15.0% | 15.5% |
| 8 | 16.5% | 17.7% | 17.8% |
| 9 | 11.1% | 8.5% | 10.8% |
| (Very important) 10 | 29.7% | 25.0% | 28.5% |
| Average 1-10 | 7.51 | 7.21 | 7.56 |
| Percent of respondents who expressed an opinion | 89% | 96% | 90% |

- Dealing with climate crisis - grouped, by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Not important 1-3 | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| Not so important 4-5 | 20% | 11% | 12% |
| Quite important 6-7 | 22% | 25% | 25% |
| Important 8-10 | 52% | 58% | 57% |
| Average 1-10 | 7.40 | 7.58 | 7.56 |

Out of 90% who expressed an opinion

- In your view, how important is it to strengthen relations with Jordan? Grade from 1-10 with 1 (Not important), 10 (Very important).

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| 1 | 4.6% | 3.9% | 1.3% |
| 2 | 1.4% | 2.1% | 1.1% |
| 3 | 1.1% | 1.8% | 1.7% |
| 4 | 3.6% | 3.2% | 2.3% |
| 5 | 8.0% | 8.1% | 6.7% |
| 6 | 10.6% | 8.7% | 9% |
| 7 | 13.3% | 14.7% | 14.8% |
| 8 | 15.6% | 19.2% | 21.6% |
| 9 | 14.2% | 12.5% | 14.9% |
| 10 | 27.5% | 25.8% | 26.6% |
| Average 1-10 | 7.5 | 7.46 | 7.82 |
| Percent of respondents who expressed an opinion | 94% | 97% | 95% |

Importance of strengthening relations with Jordan - grouped by sector

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|----------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Not important 1-3 | 2% | 4% | 4% |
| Not so important 4-5 | 12% | 8% | 9% |
| Quite important 6-7 | 13% | 25% | 24% |
| Important 8-10 | 73% | 63% | 63% |
| Average 1-10 | 8.21 | 7.76 | 7.82 |

- Iran is less than a year away from being able to develop a nuclear bomb. In light of this situation, what should Israel do?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Recognize a nuclear Iran as a fait accompli and focus on preparing Israel to deal with this reality | 36% | 12% | 16% |
| Increase diplomatic cooperation with the international community and countries of the region in order to delay Iran's nuclear efforts | 30% | 53% | 49% |
| An all-out Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, even if it leads to a large-scale retaliation against the Israeli home front | 7% | 28% | 25% |
| Don't know | 27% | 7% | 10% |

- Israel and Turkey restored their diplomatic relations last year. What is the next step Israel should take within the framework of improving relations with Turkey?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Cooperate with Turkey to prevent escalation with the Palestinians | 22% | 17% | 18% |
| Promote Israeli gas exports to Europe via Turkey | 28% | 18% | 20% |
| Cooperate on the climate crisis and promoting renewable energies | 19% | 10% | 11% |
| Coordinate on security matters regarding Iran, Syria, and Lebanon | 13% | 42% | 38% |
| Don't know | 18% | 13% | 13% |

- Which aspect do you regard as most important for developing long term relations with Morocco?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Developing cultural, interfaith and civic ties between the two societies | 23% | 11% | 12% |
| Building economic ties between the countries and their business communities | 27% | 34% | 33% |
| Building security ties between the countries | 15% | 25% | 24% |
| Partnering with Morocco in upgrading ties with Africa and Europe | 15% | 19% | 19% |
| Don't know | 20% | 11% | 12% |

- Lebanon is experiencing an economic and social collapse, and Hezbollah has increased friction with Israel in recent months. What main strategy should Israel adopt given this situation, in your view?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Help the international community stabilize the situation in Lebanon | 27% | 17% | 19% |
| Promote interim agreements with the Lebanese government, similar to the maritime border agreement, to reduce friction | 23% | 22% | 22% |
| Stay out of it. This is a domestic Lebanese matter | 19% | 21% | 20% |
| Increase military activity vis-à-vis Hezbollah | 8% | 29% | 26% |
| Don't know | 23% | 11% | 13% |

- Do you regard the EU as more of a friend or more of an adversary of Israel?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|----------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| More of a friend of Israel | 45% | 31% | 33% |
| More of an adversary | 21% | 42% | 39% |
| Don't know | 34% | 27% | 28% |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|
| More of a friend | 18% | 27% | 29% | 24.4% | 33.3% | 33% |
| More of an adversary | 55% | 45% | 43% | 46.0% | 40.4% | 39% |
| Don't know | 27% | 28% | 28% | 29.6% | 26.3% | 28% |

- Those who view the EU as more of a friend (33% of the sample): Why do you see the EU as a friend of Israel? (up to 2 answers)

| | (Arabs (45%) | Jews(31%) | Total(33%) |
|--|--------------|-----------|------------|
| Due to its democratic-liberal values | 28% | 48% | 44% |
| Due to its stand on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process | 30% | 16% | 19% |
| Due to being Israel's largest trade partner | 37% | 50% | 48% |
| Due to its academic cooperation and funding of scientific research | 35% | 33% | 34% |
| Don't know | 7% | 7% | 7% |

- Those who regard the EU as more of an adversary (39% of the sample): Why do you view the EU as more of an adversary? (up to 2 answers)

| | Arabs(21%) | Jews(42%) | Total(39%) |
|---|------------|-----------|------------|
| Due to its stand on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process | 62% | 70% | 69% |
| Due to its stand on the settlements | 29% | 43% | 42% |
| Due to its stand on reaching a nuclear deal with Iran | 19% | 33% | 32% |
| Due to its funding of liberal civil society groups | 19% | 22% | 22% |
| Don't know | 5% | 2% | 2% |

E. Israel and the Palestinians

- What political strategy should the next government adopt on the Palestinian issue?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|--|-------|------|-------|
| Strive for peace based on a two-state solution | 46% | 35% | 36% |
| Strive to annex the West Bank and establish a single state with privileged status for Jews | 16% | 30% | 28% |
| Strive to annex the West Bank and establish one state with full equal rights for all | 17% | 10% | 11% |
| Don't know | 21% | 25% | 25% |

- Do you think Israel should seek the help of the Arab states that have established normalization with it to promote peace with the Palestinians?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Should seek the help of Arab states | 68% | 60% | 61% |
| Should not | 17% | 25% | 24% |
| Don't know | 15% | 15% | 15% |

Multi-year trend - entire sample

| | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|
| Should seek the help of Arab states | 52.6% | 57.2% | 61% |
| Should not | 27.9% | 29.6% | 24% |
| Don't know | 19.6% | 13.3% | 15% |

- Since the current government was sworn in, leaders of the Abraham Accords countries - the UAE, Morocco and Bahrain - have expressed sharp opposition to Israel's policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Do you think Israel's policy in the West Bank should take into account the goal of maintaining and developing normalization with the Arab world?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Should take into account | 59% | 35% | 39% |
| Should not take into account | 11% | 42% | 37% |
| Don't know | 30% | 23% | 24% |

- Do you support or oppose stopping settlement construction and evacuating illegal outposts in return for promoting full normalization with Saudi Arabia?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|----------------|-------|------|-------|
| Support | 60% | 38% | 41% |
| Do not support | 18% | 43% | 40% |
| Don't know | 22% | 19% | 19% |

- Senior government officials have questioned Israel's interest in the continued existence of the Palestinian Authority. To what extent do you see the PA's continued existence as an Israeli interest?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|--|-------|------|-------|
| Its continued existence runs counter to Israeli interests | 18% | 12% | 13% |
| Its continued existence is insignificant for Israeli interests | 17% | 18% | 17% |
| Its continued existence serves Israeli interests | 26% | 32% | 32% |
| Its continued existence is crucial to Israeli interests | 12% | 11% | 11% |
| Don't know | 27% | 27% | 27% |

- A suggestion was made in the past to establish a joint Israeli-Palestinians-Jordanian coordination mechanism to prevent escalation and reduce tensions at Jerusalem's holy sites. Do you support or oppose the establishment of such a mechanism?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|----------------|-------|------|-------|
| Support | 68% | 60% | 61% |
| Do not support | 11% | 18% | 17% |
| Don't know | 21% | 22% | 22% |

Compared to previous survey - entire sample

| | 2022 | 2023 |
|----------------|------|------|
| Support | 61% | 61% |
| Do not support | 20% | 17% |
| Don't know | 19% | 22% |

- What strategy do you think the government should adopt on the Gaza Strip?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| Conduct negotiations with Hamas on a long-term arrangement | 24% | 13% | 15% |
| Strive to restore Gaza to PA control | 26% | 16% | 17% |
| Mobilize international, regional community for comprehensive Gaza rehabilitation | 20% | 24% | 24% |
| Continue with current situation - strive for military deterrence along with economic relief, in return for calm | 9% | 30% | 27% |
| Don't know | 21% | 17% | 17% |

- Do you support or oppose cooperating with the Palestinians in order to better deal with the climate crisis?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|------------|-------|------|-------|
| Support | 68% | 46% | 49% |
| Oppose | 15% | 33% | 31% |
| Don't know | 17% | 21% | 20% |

Compared to previous survey - entire sample

| | 2022 | 2023 |
|------------|------|------|
| Support | 50% | 49% |
| Oppose | 31% | 31% |
| Don't know | 19% | 20% |

- Israeli help for developing independent energy and water infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority will help improve Palestinians' quality of life and could serve as a basis for a future political process. Do you support or oppose such a step?

| | Arabs | Jews | Total |
|------------|-------|------|-------|
| Support | 73% | 48% | 52% |
| Oppose | 11% | 39% | 34% |
| Don't know | 16% | 13% | 14% |

Compared to previous survey - entire sample

| | 2022 | 2023 |
|------------|------|------|
| Support | 54% | 52% |
| Oppose | 33% | 34% |
| Don't know | 13% | 14% |

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