

What is a Revitalized Palestinian Authority?

**Policy Paper
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The idea of rehabilitating the Palestinian Authority (PA) was proposed by US President Joe Biden in response to its weakness and to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's rejection of its restored rule in the Gaza Strip after the war. Like previous US presidents, Biden regards the two-state solution as an international project vital for regulating Israeli-Palestinian relations and bolstering stability in the Middle East.

The PA was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo Accords, which envisioned it as a temporary body to be replaced by a permanent institution within five years. However, a permanent arrangement was not achieved, leaving the PA a “temporary” institution for over three decades, thereby contributing to its increasing weakness. While the Authority bears great responsibility for this weakness, it is not solely and accountable for the erosion of its standing. Israel, its Oslo Accords partner and main backer, has ignored the PA since 2009, clearly intent on dismantling it and rejecting all dialogue options. The PA today is an enfeebled body, lacking legitimacy and the capacity to enforce its authority and provide services for its people.

Reconstituting the PA would entail a lengthy process of reorganization, rehabilitation, and training to adapt its governance to the post-war era. Such a transformation would also necessitate the election of a new leadership that enjoys public legitimacy, enabling it to impose authority and enforce law and order. The PA will have to shed its corrupt image, proving that it can conduct its affairs transparently and use its tax revenues and international aid for the public good rather than the personal interests of its cronies. The education system will require revamping to rid it of anti-Israel content, and the judicial system will require restoration of its independence to provide a recourse for Palestinians seeking justice and protection from government arbitrariness. Israel must actively take part in the renewal process by outlining a real political horizon, declaring the PA a dialogue partner, and its existence as a vital interest. This commitment will require Israel to expand cooperation with the PA, unfreeze PA funds, coordinate measures to boost its economy, carry out confidence-building initiatives, and approve and coordinate reforms to strengthen its international standing.

An efficient and functioning PA is crucial to preserving Israel's identity and security. The rehabilitation of the PA is feasible, as evidenced by its operation for over six years under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, which won Israeli and international praise. In 2012, the World Bank even ranked it higher than some established states in terms of the ease of doing business. A PA that undergoes the necessary reconstruction and reorganization could help Israel achieve security, take responsibility for the 5 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, and form the basis for a lasting resolution of a century-old conflict.

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A. Introduction

US President Joe Biden's declaration on November 2, 2023, regarding the need to revive the PA in preparation for the day after the war in the Gaza Strip has raised a myriad of questions: What will the enclave look like? What connection will it have with the West Bank? Is this connection inevitable after the war? What role can the PA assume, given its eroded standing and legitimacy in recent years? How will a renewed PA restore the standing it enjoyed in its better days? Will a renewed PA be able to meet the complex tasks required of it in the aftermath of the Gaza war, and serve as a basis for advancing the two-state vision?

President Biden coined the term “revitalized Palestinian Authority” as a linchpin of a two-state vision, which he continues to view as the exclusive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Gaza and the West Bank should be reunited under a single governance structure, ultimately under a revitalized PA, as we all work toward a two-state solution.”¹

President Biden apparently sought to address Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's objections to Gaza's rule by the PA, which he regards as a supporter of terrorism that teaches its children to hate Israel. The idea of a renewed PA was meant to address Netanyahu's opposition, although he has made it clear that any control by the PA in the Gaza Strip would be unacceptable.²

Biden is not the only one supporting the strengthening of the PA. Anyone seeking to ensure Israel's security understands that governmental authority to run the Gaza Strip cannot be handed over to the Palestinians without a PA that recognizes Israel's right to exist and has effective capabilities to impose law and order and serve the needs of the population. Thus, a renewed PA has become a necessary component for achieving security and advancing a stable settlement.

B. What is the Palestinian Authority?

The PA is the product of the Oslo Accords (1993) between Israel and the umbrella organization of the Palestinian national movement: The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PA was intended to serve as a governing platform for a transitional period until the conclusion of negotiations on its final status. However, the PA continues to exist long after the transitional period, since the sides have been unable to reach a permanent agreement. One reason for this is that the Palestinians regard the PA as a national-symbolic constituent of Palestinian independence. Its continued existence also serves Israel's security interests and relieves it of

¹ “As we strive for peace, Gaza and the West Bank should be reunited under a single governance structure, ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian Authority, as we all work toward a two-state solution,” Biden [wrote](#).

² Initially, he [said](#) that “the Palestinian Authority in its current form is incapable of accepting responsibility.” He later expressed himself more forcefully, [saying](#), “Not only will there be no renewed Palestinian Authority in Gaza after the war, there will also be no Palestinian Authority in Gaza at all.”

responsibility for the lives of some 3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank, and previously for the lives of some 2 million Gazans. The international community, which is a guarantor of the Oslo Accords and is committed to the two-state solution, also seeks to preserve the PA in the absence of an effective alternative.

The Weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority

Despite the commitment of many parties to its existence, the Palestinian Authority has faced numerous challenges since its inception that threatened its representative status. Chief among these challenges were terrorist attacks **by opposition organizations such as Hamas**, and internal opposition from Fatah figures. These elements contributed to the weakening of the PA and generated negative public discourse about it. Even before the implementation of the Oslo agreements, Hamas, as the leading opposition to the PA, declared its intention to sabotage and thwart the agreements. Despite this, the PA and PLO garnered recognition from Israel, the United States, and the European Union as the exclusive representatives of the Palestinian people. The PA and PLO derived their power from the Oslo Accords, and initiated their implementation with the Israeli side. However, the terms of the agreements also underscored the PA's **weakened status vis-à-vis Israel**, granting Israel exclusive control over security matters, planning, taxation, and trade. Under the agreement, Israel controls materials entering the PA areas and also collects the taxes and customs duties for the PA. Yasser Arafat, the first PA chairman, struggled to turn this inherent weakness into an advantage, speaking apologetically and ambivalently with opposition organizations, implying that these agreements were shameful. Despite periodic PA crackdowns, his conduct strengthened Hamas and the other opposition organizations over time. Eventually, it led the Palestinian people's top representative to isolate himself inside the Muqata'a, his headquarters in the heart of Ramallah, until his death in 2004.

Arafat's successor Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) strongly opposed Arafat's policies. When he took office, the opposition's strength was on the rise, particularly in the Gaza Strip. Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza, and the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, constituted a victory for Hamas, sparking a year-long struggle against its rival, Fatah. Attempts to bridge the divide were unsuccessful, leading Hamas to expel the PA's security forces from the Gaza Strip in July 2007 and take control of the enclave. Since then, the relationship between the two groups has been a zero-sum game, where the success of one signifies the defeat of the other, and vice versa.

The competition with Hamas placed Fatah and the Palestinian Authority at a distinct disadvantage in negotiations with Israel, **and its achievements, such as they were, usually depended on the makeup of successive Israeli governments** and the extent of their commitment to the Oslo Accords. Meanwhile, Hamas successfully exploited growing public antagonism towards the PA and Israel, mobilizing public sentiment in its favor after every Israeli fatality caused by its missile attacks. The Palestinian Authority, on the other hand, has failed since 1994 to prove that it can lead

its people towards an independent state, with few exceptions of effective leadership over the years.

Israel also **contributed to the PA's weakening**. Many Palestinians interpreted Rabin's 1995 assassination as indicating a lack of Israeli interest in the Oslo process. Indeed, subsequent Israeli governments showed little enthusiasm for implementing the agreements. Mahmoud Abbas's rejection of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's 2009 proposal for a final status agreement severely damaged the Israeli public's confidence in the viability of peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians. Olmert was subsequently forced to resign over corruption allegations, and successive governments refrained from resuming negotiations with the Palestinians where he left off. They declined to cooperate with the US efforts to jump-start the peace process, instead investing considerable energy in rejecting such pressure. Israeli leaders frequently delegitimized the PA, portraying Mahmoud Abbas as an anti-Semite and a supporter of terrorism. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his governments completely ignored the messages conveyed by the country's top defense brass praising the security coordination with Mahmoud Abbas, as opposed to that of the Arafat era. **A deep crisis of trust developed between Netanyahu, who has been in office for most of this period, and Abbas, dooming the peace initiative of 2013-2014 by US Secretary of State John Kerry even before it began.** The Israeli governments felt time was on their side and regarded the continuous weakening of the PA as an achievement, even claiming arrogantly that **relations with the Arab world could be normalized while circumventing resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians**. The Trump administration tried to impose the position of Israel's political right on Mahmoud Abbas, ignored his entreaties regarding the unilateralism of the American position, and relegated him to the margins of the political arena, thereby increasing his irrelevance in the eyes of his own people.

The PA, under Abbas, has faced substantial challenges, including a loss of trust among its people and governmental ineptitude manifested by consistent decline in provided services and irregular salary payments. **Abbas, himself, is increasingly perceived as an autocrat** determined to reject vital reforms, and the authority of the courts has diminished, with their rulings constrained by the Chairman's decrees sparking growing unrest among lawyers' groups and trade unions. The severe **erosion of public trust** also affects the functioning of the security apparatus, weakening their capacity to counter terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank, and thereby drawing vast public criticism. These security forces remain loyal to the PA and its leader, despite the criticism they face. Instances of officers and security personnel taking part in terrorist attacks against Israel have not developed into a widespread phenomenon.

Mahmoud Abbas and his fellow PA leaders refrained from condemning the massacres carried out by Hamas on October 7. Some even justified the acts. The PA also continues to pay monthly allowances to the families of Palestinians who perpetrated attacks against Israelis, a move perceived in Israel as encouraging terrorism and

violating agreements between the sides, and has failed to remove anti-Israel teachings from the curricula of Palestinian schools.

The three decades since the Oslo Accords, aimed at fostering Israeli-Palestinian peace, have, instead, solidified mutual **antagonism and hatred** between Palestinians and Israelis.

C. Prerequisites for an Effective Palestinian Authority

A clear political vision

The war imposed by Hamas on Israel abruptly returned the Palestinian issue to the center of the international and regional arena. In order for the enfeebled PA to assume control of the Gaza Strip after the war, it must be guided by a clear political vision that both sides undertake to achieve, and that is based on the following principles:

- Reconstituted and effective PA control capabilities would enable Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip.
- Gaza's civil affairs would be managed solely by the restructured PA, with no Israeli interference in the lives or affairs of Palestinian residents.
- Israel will maintain external oversight of the Gaza Strip for a defined period to be mutually agreed upon as part of an interim arrangement. Deployment of a multinational force could help rehabilitate the Gaza Strip and mitigate friction within the population. However, Israel would reserve the authority to pursue suspected terrorists, as outlined in the Oslo Accords.
- The West Bank and Gaza Strip will be unified under a single government. Their future will be determined after the period of rehabilitation and the consolidation of the renewed authority in the spirit of President Biden's outline.
- A governmental vacuum in the Gaza Strip must be avoided to prevent forces hostile to Israel from retaking control.
- Israel will avoid establishing new realities on the ground during this interim period.

New leadership

Such an authority could be led by a competent and conscientious elected or appointed individual, guided by a sense of mission to serve the common good. Candidates will be required to meet a number of conditions before taking office, and exercising the powers granted to them:

- Acceptance and recognition of all obligations undertaken over the years by the PLO, including recognition of Israel as a sovereign state and affirmation of Israel's right to exist in security.
- A commitment to the PA's monopoly on the use of force and/or possession of weapons, and to a prohibition of militias or any armed non-governmental organizations.

- A declaration of opposition to any form of armed or violent struggle against Israel or other entities.
- Demilitarization of the territory controlled by the renewed PA, with the exception of agreed-upon weapons necessary for enforcing law and order.

Existing organizations, parties or political movements will find themselves, naturally, in a better starting position to compete for the leadership of such a renewed authority. Large organizations with greater potential will need to demonstrate popular support and broad intra-organizational legitimacy for their leadership before being elected to lead the renewed governing body. The Palestinian nationalist movement will contend with Palestinian Islamism for primacy in this process.

The Palestinian Nationalist Movement

Fatah is still widely considered as the largest, most popular and authentic representative of the Palestinian people, despite Hamas' ascendancy. Under Mahmoud Abbas, it has split into three factions that challenge his leadership, seek to change his policy regarding the conflict with Israel, and vigorously protest his corruption and the dysfunction of the PA itself. Abbas has rejected their criticism and has refused to enact reforms or appoint a deputy or successor acceptable to the movement's leadership. Therefore, for Fatah to lead the PA after the rehabilitation process, it must:

- Reunite under one roof.
- Implement comprehensive reforms and conduct elections for all institutions.
- Elect a new leader widely accepted by the Palestinian populace to replace the aging Abbas, who has long since reached the end of his political career and whose continued incumbency delays the PA's urgent rehabilitation process. International or inter-Arab efforts to encourage his resignation or transfer of authority to other PA or PLO figures may be beneficial.
- Publicly declare to the Palestinian public, Israel, and the international community a commitment to uphold all agreements signed by the PLO, and to amend those agreements as necessary in response to evolving circumstances.
- Disarm Tanzim Fatah and any affiliated militia groups.
- Demonstrate strong control capabilities and effective communication with other organizations.

The Palestinian Islamist stream

The Palestinian Islamist stream has a significant presence in the Palestinian arena. Its support stems, in part, from the frustration and revulsion generated by Arafat's lack of credibility and perceived corruption during the time of his leadership, and, more recently, from the weakness of Mahmoud Abbas, who has focused mostly on the survival of the PA he heads. The source of the movement's support also, and perhaps chiefly, lies in the belief in the principles of Islam and its approach to the territory under its control. The significant divergence in the political perceptions of these two

movements will require the formulation of clear guidelines to defuse potential threats to Israel's security and that of the region arising from these differences. Therefore:

- The political body representing the Islamic movement in a post-Hamas era will constitute part of the revitalized PA, and must publicly and definitively declare that it has abandoned armed resistance, and prove that it does not possess weapons or an armed militia.
- If it wishes to join the regime, it must declare that it has abandoned terrorism, recognizes Israel, and is committed to the agreements signed with Israel (in the spirit of the Quartet's "three conditions" since 2007).
- If it prefers to remain out of power as an opposition body, the movement will be allowed to express its opposition publicly and verbally, without the use of force.

Mechanisms of a Revitalized PA

The weakness of the various institutions comprising the PA are not solely attributed to the challenges posed by Israel and the lack of a political horizon. These weaknesses have been evident **since Salam Fayyad left the premiership in 2013**. Fayyad regarded the fight against corruption and the establishment of effective national institutions as the only path toward foundation of an independent Palestinian state. At the start of his term in 2009, and with Mahmoud Abbas' support, Fayyad outlined a plan to bring about the establishment of a Palestinian state by the end of 2011. The Fayyad Plan, as it came to be known, emphasized the establishment of functioning governmental institutions as a preliminary step to the declaration of independence. During his years in office, Fayyad instilled hope among the public regarding the feasibility of developing functioning institutions and a robust middle class to support them. He sought to suppress corruption and bribery, and promote transparency to attract international funding. In an interview with The New York Times after his resignation, Fayyad criticized the PA for lacking strategic vision, and advocated for the unification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2012, the World Bank's Doing Business Report ranked the West Bank and Gaza ahead of several countries in the region in categories such as paying taxes, protecting investors, registering property, and enforcing contracts.

Fayyad's departure from office marked a decline in PA services, the proliferation of corruption, and restrictions on internal auditing. This, as previously mentioned, eroded trust in the PA institutions, and prompted a "brain drain" from its ranks, as well as growing public anger.

The institutions of the revitalized PA must demonstrate greater executive capacity and promise than the current, weak PA. Broad acceptance of the renewed PA, as was the case in the days of Salam Fayyad, will facilitate the building of public trust in these institutions. To ensure legitimacy, these institutions must present relevant agreements to the Palestinian public and commit to their implementation. These measures will boost the PA's international credibility, facilitate the mobilization of international aid, and help control the terrorism and instability that disrupt Israel's political order. It will

also facilitate the participation of moderate Arab states in a coalition that will administer Gaza in the interim postwar phase, encouraging them to finance the reconstruction and development of the enclave. Among these institutions, four will require special attention:

1. Security Mechanisms

These mechanisms form the foundation on which the order, security and functional stability of all the PA's systems rest. Nonetheless, they suffer from a lack of resources, difficulty in sorting and placing qualified personnel and in dealing with rogue elements such as Tanzim Fatah. They gained experience and professional skills during Fayyad's years as prime minister, and even succeeded in consolidating the PA's rule during the difficult crises it is presently undergoing. However, the difficulties that have dogged the PA since 2021, arising from the growing loss of legitimacy and shrinking budget, have led to increased disorder, particularly in peripheral areas such as refugee camps in the northern West Bank, hampering the PA's enforcement capabilities. In some areas of the West Bank, security forces have lost all deterrence in the face of public contempt and anger at the PA. The security apparatuses in the renewed PA will undergo training and adaptation to the new circumstances, with leadership from the US and Arab countries involved in the process. They will be required to:

- Redefine with Israel the objectives of security coordination, and the division of responsibilities and areas of operation in a manner that avoids the labeling of the PA as an Israeli stooge, on the one hand, and meets Israeli security demands, on the other. Security coordination in the Gaza Strip will need to be redefined, given that the enclave is currently considered Area A (under the Oslo Accords), i.e., under full PA military and civilian responsibility, in order to allow Israel the security control it seeks for a mutually agreed-upon time period.
- Reduce the number of security agencies, clearly delineate their authority, and boost their professional capabilities and efficiency. Consistently and decisively enforce security according to the rules noted above, while bolstering the legitimacy of these mechanisms in the eyes of the public.
- Improve the quality and training of recruits, including young Gazans excluded from these apparatuses since 2007.
- Increase the budgets allocated to these agencies.
- Prepare them for work in the Gaza Strip, where they may encounter a suspicious, perhaps hostile, population accustomed to a slightly different, more conservative, regime.

2. Treasury & Finance

One of the primary weaknesses of the PA lies in its limited revenues. Despite the 30 years that have passed since the inception of the Oslo Accords, the PA has struggled to develop an independent economy, lacking growth engines and heavily relying on the Israeli economy. It has incurred heavy debts, and is occasionally forced to cut off power supplies and reduce salaries of government employees and of government

budgets, thereby eroding the services it is required to provide, contributing to its fragility and undermining its public image. Unemployment is on the rise, as are prices. The pervasive corruption in PA institutions effectively prevents the treasury apparatus from controlling donor aid and tax funds deposited in its coffers. To address these challenges, the revamped system will require:

- Establishment of a broad economic infrastructure focused on developing industries and projects to serve as growth engines, offering the younger generation prospects, and providing jobs that will boost the Authority's income.
- Review of trade agreements with Israel that currently limit the PA's economic freedom, in order to allow the PA to sign trade agreements with other countries and establish an independent customs regime.
- Development of ties with economies in the region, some of them capital-intensive, to help establish Palestinian economic independence.
- Increased supervision over the distribution of funds and benefits allocated to cronies and officials, and a strong anti-corruption campaign to restore the PA's legitimacy and rebuild public trust.

3. Education

Israel perceives the Palestinian school system as an assembly line producing generations of Israel-hating graduates due to its hostile curricula and the deep Fatah-Hamas tensions. The intense friction with IDF forces in the West Bank fuels a highly politicized school discourse rife with antagonism and hatred of Israel. The new PA will have to de-radicalize the school system, revising the curricula in accordance with agreements it commits to, and ceasing dehumanizing Israel. This also presents a valuable opportunity to modernize the Palestinian education system, developing digitized curricula which expose students to broader realms of knowledge.

Public Palestinian discourse must also undergo change. In recent years, it has become saturated with expressions of hatred towards Israel, as well as growing doubts and hesitations about reconciliation prospects. Contributing to this trend over the past two years has been the discourse promoted by the religious political right in Israel, which exacerbates Palestinians' fear of expulsion and refugeehood. Resumption of meetings between leaders from both sides to discuss coexistence, and restored people-to-people meetings of the kind held in the past, may contribute to a shift in domestic discourse on both sides.

4. Judicial system

The judicial system has largely lost its independence in recent years due to decrees issued by Mahmoud Abbas limiting its authority. Lack of judicial independence undermines the relationship between individuals and their government. In the Palestinian case, the legal system provides legal backing to narratives and ethos that

present Israel as a target of struggle, often legitimizing violation of agreements signed with Israel. It is therefore incumbent on the revitalized PA to:

- Enshrine the independence of the courts in legislation, inter alia to prevent the president from circumventing it with his own decrees.
- Enshrine the principle of equality before the law in order to prevent corruption and damage to public trust in governmental mechanisms and authorities.
- Expropriate from the president the exclusive authority to appoint judges.

D. What is required of Israel?

A reinforced Palestinian Authority also depends, to a large extent, on actions that Israel can or should undertake. Israel must define the strengthening of the PA as a vital national interest. In accordance with US demands, Israel must commit to supporting an alternative PA-based government in the Gaza Strip. Collaboration with Israel will not only aid in combating terrorism but also help in holding the PA accountable for the five million Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, it will lay the groundwork for advancing a stable political settlement.

In order to advance the renewal of the Palestinian Authority and support the above-described efforts, Israel must:

- Transfer the PA's tax revenues that it has collected and frozen (in compliance with the American demand to do so).
- Increase overall coordination between the Palestinian Authority and the relevant government ministries in Israel.
- Renew the meetings of the Joint Economic Committee and formulate a plan to boost the Palestinian economy.
- Promote confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, including in Area C (West Bank) and the Gaza Strip.
- Coordinate and support the reform measures led by the international community.

E. Conclusion

An efficiently functioning Palestinian Authority is essential to Israel's security and even to its identity. Such an authority proved itself well in the 2007-2014 period, and won recognition in the international arena and in Israel. The security coordination worked well, and the lives of many Israelis were saved as a result. Despite the PA's weakness and the internal criticism associated with its leadership, the PA was and remains a legitimate and authentic elected authority ruling some 5 million Palestinians. Despite complaints from Hamas and the opposition about its "delegitimization" of the "armed resistance," no one has so far sought to remove the PA, unlike measures taken by opposition forces against Arab leaderships during the Arab Spring.

A reconstituted PA that aligns with President Biden's definitions and adheres to the structures and institutions established under the Oslo Accords could address Israel's security needs. Presently, Israel opposes the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Netanyahu also rejects a role for a revitalized PA as intended by President Biden. However, Netanyahu has not presented any alternative suggestions and is reluctant to outline a plan for the "day after" the war. Two conflicting forces are at play in both domestic and international arenas. Within Israel, believers in a Greater Israel enjoy strong political backing in the current government, view the PA as an enemy, and demand the reestablishment of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. Conversely, heavy international pressure from the US and Arab countries, and from the Israeli defense establishment, urges the eventual restoration of PA rule over the Gaza Strip. While the proponents of resettlement may lack sufficient influence to realize their goals, they have, at least for now, successfully galvanized opposition to any PA involvement in Gaza. If Israel adheres to this position, it may find itself in control of the Gaza Strip once again, thus enabling the pro-settlement camp to realize its ambitions.

On the other hand, President Biden and other countries seeking a restored PA have an interest in maintaining the post-Oslo order and the pressure levers that can be applied to Israel. Many Israelis regard the US under Biden as an honest and close ally who can legitimately place demands on Israel, which other countries cannot do. As far as these countries are concerned, the Oslo process has become entrenched in the consciousness of many Palestinians and Arabs in the region, despite the many crises it has faced. Abolishing it as an organizer of bilateral and regional relations would not augur well for the countries of the region, nor for the US and European countries that have participated in this process for decades and were signatories to it. For them, repairs and reforms in the existing structure that can serve Israel's security needs are preferable to destroying this existing format.

Without an Israeli plan for the day after, the Israeli defense establishment is grappling with how to conclude the war. This indecision could needlessly prolong the war, and further strain relations with the US, which is reshaping its policy in the Middle East and relies on its Israeli ally to help determine the future of the Gaza Strip.

This proposed outline of a renewed and broadly reformed Palestinian Authority could provide a response to any Israeli government that views security as a paramount concern. It hinges on achieving the war's objectives, including stripping Hamas of power, and initiating the rebuilding of Gaza. This outline does not address the negative sentiments Gazans may hold toward Israel in response to the IDF's killing of tens of thousands of Gazans during the present war, which some believe was done in a deliberate and vindictive manner. It also does not address the Gazans' rage at Hamas for the grave disaster it inflicted on the enclave; feelings that have yet to be publicly expressed. These sentiments will undoubtedly need to be addressed after the war, by whatever entity controls the Gaza Strip.