



# THE ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY INDEX 2025

FINDINGS OF THE MITVIM  
INSTITUTE SURVEY



SEPTEMBER 2025

# The Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2025

## Mitvim Institute

September 2025

The 13th annual public opinion survey of the Mitvim Institute on Israel's foreign policy was conducted in late August 2025. The survey was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, in collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation, among a representative sample of Israel's adult population (839 men and women, Jews and Arabs, sampled according to Israel's current political divisions), with a sampling error of 3.3%.

The 2025 Foreign Policy survey, published as we near the second commemoration of the October 7<sup>th</sup> attack, comes amid a severe humanitarian crisis and preparations for further escalation in the Gaza war. These developments have led to an unprecedented diplomatic crisis and ongoing erosion of Israel's international image. The survey is released as Israel enters an election year, giving it particular value in clarifying the public's baseline views/positions on the policies Israel should pursue in various arenas.

The survey looks not only at views on the war in Gaza and Israel's policy in the West Bank, but also at public attitudes toward Israel's strategy in the three key arenas of conflict over the past year: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. It examines how the public sees the possibility of moving from military campaigns to future political-diplomatic arrangements in each of these arenas. It also explores public perceptions of how these conflicts shape Israel's relations with the Arab world. At the same time, the survey examines public responses to major regional developments, such as the rise of new regimes in Syria and Lebanon and Turkey's growing regional influence. A distinct focus of the survey is the ongoing deterioration of Israel's international standing and public perceptions of the steps taken and planned by Western states in response to Israel's actions in Gaza.

This document presents the survey's findings in four chapters: **Israel's foreign relations; Israel and the Palestinians; Israel's relations with regional actors; and Israel's policy toward Iran, Lebanon, and Syria.**

### 1. Israel's Foreign Relations

- Similar to last year's survey results, the Israeli public continues to view the country's **international standing as poor** (4.39 compared with 4.31 last year). Only one-third of the public considers the situation to be good or fairly good. The perception of Israel's standing as poor cuts across political lines – about half of those who identified themselves as right-wing or far-right described the situation as not good or not very good.
- The public is divided over **Israel's international standing in one year from now**. 37% believe it will improve, while 32% expect it to deteriorate. In contrast, 31% think the situation will remain the same.
- The public continues to give the government **low marks for its performance in foreign policy** (3.93 compared to 3.84 last year). 70% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with

the government's diplomatic performance, including nearly 70% of those identifying as center-right and more than half of those identifying as right-wing or far-right.

- A majority of the Israeli public (57%)\* is quite or very concerned about **Israel deteriorating into the status of a “pariah state” as a result of its actions in Gaza**. Only one-third of those identifying as core right-wing (right or far right) share this concern, compared with two-thirds of center-right supporters and 79% of those identifying as centrist.
- A majority of the Israeli public (62%) attaches **great importance to Israel's belonging to the liberal-democratic camp of the Western world**. Only about one-tenth of respondents believe this affiliation has no importance at all. 15% have not yet formed an opinion on the matter.
- When asked to name the **three most important countries for Israel, besides the United States, Germany stands out** for the third consecutive year as the most important. Unlike the close race of previous years, this year Germany leads by a significant margin. Nearly 40%\* of respondents identified Germany as the single most important country for Israel's foreign relations, with the UK in second place (same as last year), but this year with only 13.4%. 61% of respondents mentioned Germany among the top three countries (the UK came second with 47%). Moreover, Germany's prominence in Israeli public opinion is notable against the backdrop of a relative decline in the perceived importance of other European states, especially France and the UK. France, for example, dropped from 43% to 29% in the “top three countries” measure. At the same time, there is a modest rise in the importance attributed to strengthening ties with Russia and China (26% and 16% respectively), though these countries have not yet returned to the higher levels of importance seen in surveys conducted before the October 7th attack. The survey also confirms the continuation of last year's trend: a steady decline in the relative importance attached by the Israeli public to states in the Middle-East.
- Six months after the inauguration of the second **Trump administration**, 35% of respondents say that the U.S. president has largely met their expectations. The rest are evenly divided between those who were positively surprised by Trump's policy toward Israel (24%) and those who were disappointed (23%). 18% have not yet formed an opinion on the matter.

## 2. Israel and the Palestinians

- A majority of the Israeli public (55%)\* supports an international package deal that would include the **establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, the return of hostages, the dismantling of Hamas's rule and military capabilities in Gaza, and full normalization with the Arab world**. Support for this package is a dividing line between those identifying as core right-wing—only 29% of whom support or somewhat support it—and the rest of the public, among whom large majorities are in favor, including 57% of the right-center supports, and 72% of center supports
- On the question of the preferred **solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict**, there is a rise in support for annexing the territories and extending Israeli sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank (from 29% last year to 35%\* this year). As in 2024, 31% of respondents continue to support a two-state solution. 15% favor a unilateral separation, while 6% support the establishment of a single democratic state with equal rights from the river to the sea. Only



13% believe that Israel should refrain, at this stage, from taking strategic steps regarding the conflict.

- The public is divided on whether Israel **should act to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza**. 51%\* believe Israel should not act (including nearly 80% of those identifying as core right-wing). Among opponents of action, the overwhelming majority argue that Israel bears no responsibility for the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Among supporters of action, only 17% of the public (including 45% of left-wing respondents) back it for moral reasons, while 32% view it as necessary to preserve Israel's international standing.
- The deployment of a multinational force that includes moderate Arab states remains the **preferred temporary solution** for most respondents regarding **governance and administration in Gaza in the coming years**, until a permanent arrangement is reached. Support for this option has risen slightly compared to last year (\*52% this year versus 46% last year), while support for temporary Israeli control has declined (from 38% last year to 33% this year). As in the previous year, only a small share of respondents (12%) views the Palestinian Authority as a central actor in an interim solution for Gaza.
- Nevertheless, a majority of the Israeli public (54%)\* supports, to a great or some extent, **Israeli cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank on urgent environmental issues**. This includes 60% of center-right supporters and more than 70% of those identifying as centrist.
- In light of the intentions by additional countries to **recognize a Palestinian state**, a majority of the Israeli public (54%)\* is principally opposed to any such move. Among the rest, 20% oppose recognition unless it comes within the framework of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and 17% support recognition on the condition that it ensures Israel's security and removes Hamas from power. Fewer than one in ten support recognition of a Palestinian state without conditions.
- As in last year's survey, half of the Israeli public (50%) sees a strong link **between the Government's judicial reform and efforts to advance sovereignty over the West Bank**. In contrast, only 29% believe the two trends are unrelated or only loosely connected. 21% of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the matter.
- The public is divided on what **Israeli banks** should do if **the international community demands that they choose between continuing operations in the settlements or facing full international sanctions**. 38% believe the banks should ignore the sanctions and continue operating in the settlements, while another 38% support halting operations — either entirely (25%) or with state compensation to settlers (13%). Nearly one-quarter of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue.
- As in last year's survey, a majority of the public (51%) supports the **international initiative to impose sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories**, provided the measures are limited to violent settlers only. In contrast, 34% oppose the initiative outright. Among supporters, 20% back it as long as sanctions are not applied to all settlers, 13% support it, provided it does not target Israeli citizens within the Green Line, and 18% support the move without reservations. 15% of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the matter.

### 3. Israel and Regional Actors

- A plurality of respondents (39%) believes that **the war in Gaza endangers the future of Israel's normalization process with the Arab world**, compared to 25% who think it actually strengthens Arab interest in normalization. 22% believe the war has no significant impact on Israel's relations with Arab states, while 14% have not yet formed an opinion.
- In contrast, a similar percentage of respondents (39%) also believes that **the war with Iran increases Arab willingness for normalization with Israel**. Only 13% think it has reduced that willingness. 29% say the war has not had a significant impact on the normalization process, and nearly one-fifth have not yet formed an opinion.
- A large majority (65%)\* of the public supports Israeli assistance or direct involvement in a future **regional initiative to rebuild Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon**. Among supporters, the majority (45% of all respondents with an opinion) favors Israeli assistance for international and regional reconstruction efforts, but without active Israeli involvement.
- When asked **which two Middle Eastern countries are most important for Israel's relations**, the trend identified in 2024 continues: a preference for the long-standing peace partners, Egypt and Jordan, over other Arab states, including the Abraham Accords countries. As in last year, Egypt is seen as the most important by a wide margin (44%)\*, followed by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Despite political shifts in the region, only 14% of respondents selected Syria or Lebanon as one of the two most important countries for Israel in the Middle East.
- In this context, as in last year, the public is divided on the extent to which Israel should take **Egypt into account when shaping its military and political moves**. Half\* of the public believes Israel should give Egypt's interests very high or fairly high consideration, 32% think they should be given only limited weight, and 18% believe they should not be taken into account at all.
- As in last year's survey, the Israeli public continues to view the **restoration and strengthening of relations with Jordan** as a highly important goal (7.56 out of 10). More than 80% of respondents described it as important or fairly important.
- **The Israeli public's growing hostility toward the EU, evident last year, has persisted and deepened**. 67% of the public now sees Israel's leading trade partner as an adversary, compared to only 14% who view it as a friend. 19% have not yet formed an opinion. This stands in contrast to 2024, when 54% saw the EU as a rival, and to 2023, when only 39% did. This is the highest level of hostility towards the EU recorded since the question was first introduced in 2018. A sharp polar shift is evident in Arab respondents' perceptions of the EU: only 14% now see it as a friend, while 46% view it as a rival. This compares to the 39% who considered the EU a friend in 2024, and 45% in 2023.
- At the same time, a clear majority of the Israeli public (67%)\* is very or somewhat concerned about the possibility that **Europe will impose sanctions and halt economic, tourism, and technological cooperation with Israel**. Among those very concerned are 63% of left-wing supporters and half of centrist respondents, compared to only 21% of those identifying as core right-wing.

#### 4. Israeli Strategy toward Iran, Syria, and Lebanon

- Two months after the **military campaign against Iran**, there is a clear public preference for focusing on military action (57%)\* as Israel's main strategy. Supporters of military options are almost evenly divided between those favoring reigniting a military campaign to bring about the collapse of the Iranian regime and those advocating targeted strikes to prevent the rebuilding of Iran's nuclear project, even at the risk of escalation ("mowing the grass," as Israel does in Lebanon). Only 28% see the promotion of a long-term international agreement with Iran—aimed at limiting its nuclear activity and support for terror organizations—as the preferred option. Support for a military strategy marks a shift in public perception. In surveys conducted over the past two years, a majority preferred to focus on non-military diplomatic pressure as Israel's main strategy toward Iran. In addition, nearly half of core right wing supporters favor a proactive renewal of the military campaign against Iran.
- At the same time, there is a notable increase in the share of the public that sees value in **creating a channel for dialogue and message exchange with Iran** (through a third party). Half of the public\* now views such a channel as beneficial, compared to 38% last year. 32% see this option as irrelevant to Israel's interests (down from 42% last year).
- The public is divided on what **Israel's strategy toward Lebanon should be following the weakening of Hezbollah**. Nearly half\* of respondents support maintaining the current approach—targeted strikes against Hezbollah to prevent its recovery, even at the cost of increased friction with the Lebanese government. The rest favor political solutions. 28% believe Israel should support international efforts to strengthen Lebanon's new government, even if this requires limiting strikes on Hezbollah. 24% support an independent Israeli political initiative to reach an arrangement with the Lebanese government.
- The Israeli public is divided over how Israel should **deal with the new regime in Damascus**. One-fifth of respondents view the al-Sharaa regime as an immediate threat and believe Israel should act to topple it. 26% support continuing the current policy of military responses to emerging threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syria. In contrast, 23% favor advancing a long-term political and economic agreement with the regime to reshape Israel-Syria relations, while 10% support promoting a temporary security arrangement that would include an Israeli withdrawal to the ceasefire line. More than one-fifth of respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the issue.
- In light of **Turkey's growing influence in Syria**, 44%\* of the public believes Israel should reach understandings with Turkey on dividing spheres of influence in Syria in order to avoid confrontation. The rest are evenly split between those who see Turkey as a rival whose power should be curbed even at the risk of direct conflict, and those who think Israel should cooperate with Turkey in strengthening the new Syrian regime.

\* Data marked with \* refers to respondents with an opinion only, excluding those who did not express an opinion.

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## Background Variables of the Sample

**Sample size:** 862.

**Gender:** 50% women and 50% men.

**The Arab public** constitutes 17% of the total sample.

**Immigrants from the former Soviet Union** constitute 15% of the Jewish sector.

**The survey was conducted at the end of August 2025.**

## Trends Over the Years

	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
<b>Israel's Global Standing</b>	<b>4.39</b>	4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.10	5.82	5.49	5.01	3.96	5.12
<b>The Government's performance in the field of foreign policy</b>	<b>3.93</b>	3.84	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05	5.99	5.22	5.05	4.55	4.03	4.80

\* In the years 2014–2018, the question regarding the state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was phrased differently.

## 1. Israel's Foreign Relations

- Overall, what is your impression of Israel's global standing today? Please rate on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means very good and 1 means very poor.

	2025	2024	2023
<b>1- very poor</b>	16%	17%	13.7%
<b>2</b>	9%	6%	5.7%
<b>3</b>	15%	16%	9.0%
<b>4</b>	11%	15%	13.0%
<b>5</b>	16%	15%	14.4%
<b>6</b>	9%	13%	12.6%
<b>7</b>	12%	10%	13.3%
<b>8</b>	8%	4%	11.1%
<b>9</b>	2%	1%	2.9%
<b>10 – very good</b>	2%	3%	4.3%
<b>Average score on a scale of 1–10</b>	<b>4.39</b>	<b>4.31</b>	<b>5.03</b>



o Israel's global standing – grouped by sector

	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Poor	40%	38%	51%
4-5 Fair	27%	28%	26%
6-7 Good	21%	21%	17%
8-10 Excellent	12%	13%	6%
1-10 Average	<b>4.39</b>	<b>4.53</b>	<b>3.68</b>

o Israel's global standing – multi-year trend

	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
Average	<b>4.39</b>	4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.10	5.82	5.49	5.01	3.96	5.12

• How do you foresee Israel's global standing one year from now?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion
Much better	13%	<b>37%</b>
Slightly better	24%	
Same as today	31%	<b>31%</b>
Slightly worse	15%	<b>32%</b>
Much worse	17%	
Better-worse gap		<b>5%+</b>

o Grouped by sector

	Total	Jews	Arabs
Better	37%	41%	20%
Same as today	31%	30%	35%
Worse	32%	29%	45%
Better-worse gap	<b>5%+</b>	<b>+12%</b>	<b>-25%</b>



- To what extent are you satisfied with the government's handling of foreign relations since the start of the war, with 10 signifying "very satisfied" and 1 "not at all"?

	2025	Grouped
1-Not at all satisfied	33%	50%
2	9%	
3	8%	
4	8%	20%
5	12%	
6	8%	17%
7	9%	
8	5%	13%
9	4%	
10- Very satisfied	4%	
Average 1-10	3.93	

- o Government's handling of foreign relations since the start of the war, grouped by sector

	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 Dissatisfied	50%	49%	58%
4-5 Not very satisfied	20%	19%	22%
6-7 Quite satisfied	17%	17%	13%
8-10 Satisfied	13%	15%	7%
1-10 average	3.93	4.05	3.30

- o Government's foreign relations performance – multi-year trend

	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Average	3.93	3.83	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05
Jews	4.05	3.96	4.89	5.52	5.25	6.16
Arabs	3.30	3.24	4.39	5.58	5.57	5.40

- The media reports that Israel is increasingly seen as a “pariah state” following its actions in Gaza. How concerned are you about this trend?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (90%)	Among those expressing an opinion (90%)
A great deal	29%	31%	57%
To quite a large extent	23%	26%	
To a small extent	20%	22%	43%
Not at all	18%	21%	
No opinion	10%	-	-

o Grouped by sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (90%)	Jews (93%)	Arabs (74%)
A great deal	31%	31%	36%
To quite a large extent	26%	25%	31%
To a small extent	22%	22%	23%
Not at all	21%	22%	10%
<b>Grouped</b>			
Concerned	57%	56%	67%
Not concerned	43%	44%	33%

o Multi-year comparison (by sector, among respondents with an opinion)

2024	Total (90%)	Jews (92%)	Arabs (81%)
A great deal	29%	28%	33%
To quite a large extent	28%	28%	34%
To a small extent	22%	23%	18%
Not at all	21%	21%	15%
<b>Average</b>			
Concerned	57%	56%	67%
Not concerned	43%	44%	33%

In the 2024 survey, the question was phrased slightly differently: Some say the prolonged Gaza war and government policies are eroding Israel’s international standing, potentially turning it into a “pariah” state. To what extent does this concern you?

- How important is it for Israel to align with the global liberal-democratic camp?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (85%)
Very important	29%	73%
Quite important	33%	
Not very important	13%	27%
Not at all important	10%	
No opinion	15%	-

- Among those expressing an opinion, by sector

	Total (85%)	By sector	
		Jews (88%)	Arabs (73%)
Very important + Quite important	73%	73%	76%
Not very important + Not at all important	27%	27%	24%

- Multi-year comparison (among respondents with an opinion)

	2025 (85%)	2024 (78%)
Very important + Quite important	73%	77%
Not very important + Not at all important	27%	23%

In the 2024 survey, the question was phrased slightly differently: Given the growing tensions between the US, China and Russia, how important is it for Israel to align with the global liberal-democratic camp?

- Multi-year comparison (among Jewish respondents with an opinion)

	2025 (88%)	2024 (80%)
Very important + Quite important	73%	79%
Not very important + Not at all important	27%	21%

- Multi-year comparison (among Arab respondents with an opinion)

	2025 (73%)	2024 (71%)
Very important + Quite important	76%	65%
Not very important + Not at all important	24%	35%

- Besides the US, which three countries are currently most important to Israel?

(Up to 3 answers, among those who mentioned any country other than the United States – 62% of all respondents (31% gave no opinion, 7% named the United States))

	First country	Two other countries	Aggregate of 3
Germany	39.9%	21.4%	61.3%
United Kingdom	13.4%	33.8%	47.2%
France	6.0%	23.2%	29.2%
Russia	9.3%	16.6%	25.9%
China	4.6%	11.3%	15.9%
Egypt	2.2%	10.2%	12.4%
India	2.9%	6.5%	9.4%
Jordan	2.8%	6.0%	8.8%
Saudi Arabia	3.2%	4.5%	7.7%
United Arab Emirates	1.7%	3.5%	5.2%

- o Multi-year trend

	2025 (62%)	2024 (66%)	2023 (85%)
Germany	61.3%	57.9%	35.3%
United Kingdom	47.2%	62.4%	31.5%
France	29.2%	43.5%	23.1%
Russia	25.9%	16.1%	33.8%
China	15.9%	9.9%	28.5%
Egypt	12.4%	17.3%	23.6%
India	9.4%	5.6%	6.4%
Jordan	8.8%	9.5%	13.0%
Saudi Arabia	7.7%	10.3%	12.9%
United Arab Emirates	5.2%	5.7%	11.3%

- Donald Trump has completed the first six months of his term. What is your view of him?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (82%)
Disappointed	23%	28%
Pleasantly surprised	24%	29%
Met expectations	35%	43%
No opinion	18%	-



o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (82%)	Jews (84%)	Arabs (70%)
Disappointed	28%	24%	54%
Pleasantly surprised	29%	31%	22%
Met expectations	43%	45%	24%

## 2. Israel and the Palestinians

- Regional and Western states are jointly offering Israel an arrangement for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, which would include the return of the hostages, the disarmament and removal of Hamas from power in Gaza, and full normalization with the Arab world. What is your position on this proposal?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (85%)
Strongly support	20%	55%
Support	27%	
Oppose	15%	45%
Strongly oppose	23%	
No opinion	15%	-

o Among those expressing an opinion, By sector

	Total (85%)	Jews (88%)	Arabs (78%)
Support	55%	52%	69%
Oppose	45%	48%	31%

- Which strategic objective should the government pursue on the Palestinian issue?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (82%)
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	26%	31%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza and the West Bank	28%	35%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	11%	13%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	13%	15%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	4%	6%
No opinion	18%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (82%)	By sector	
		Jews (84%)	Arabs (72%)
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	31%	27%	58%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza and the West Bank	35%	40%	7%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	13%	13%	13%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	15%	16%	9%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	6%	4%	13%

o Multi-year comparison, among those expressing an opinion

	2025 (82%)	2024 (80%)
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	31%	31%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza and the West Bank	35%	29%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	13%	15%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	15%	19%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	6%	6%

o Multi-year comparison, among Jewish respondents expressing an opinion

	2025 (84%)	2024 (81%)
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	27%	26%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza and the West Bank	40%	33%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	13%	15%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	16%	21%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	4%	5%

o Multi-year comparison, among Arab respondents expressing an opinion

	2025 (72%)	2024 (72%)
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	58%	62%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza and the West Bank	7%	8%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	13%	12%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	9%	7%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	13%	10%

• Should Israel act, or not act, to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (88%)
No, it is not Israel's responsibility	39%	44%
No, the crisis serves Israel's interests	6%	7%
Yes, to preserve Israel's international standing	28%	32%
Yes, as a moral duty	15%	17%
No opinion	12%	-
<b>Grouped</b>		
Should not act	-	51%
Should act	-	49%

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (88%)	Jews (91%)	Arabs (77%)
No, it is not Israel's responsibility	44%	50%	9%
No, the crisis serves Israel's interests	7%	7%	6%
Yes, to preserve Israel's international standing	32%	31%	37%
Yes, as a moral duty	17%	12%	48%
<b>Grouped</b>			
Should not act	51%	57%	15%
Should act	49%	43%	85%

• Who would you like to govern Gaza and manage the lives of its residents in the coming years, until a permanent solution is reached?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (90%)
A weakened Hamas	2%	3%
Israel	30%	33%
A revitalized Palestinian Authority	11%	12%
A multinational force with moderate Arab countries	47%	52%
No opinion	10%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (90%)	Jews (93%)	Arabs (70%)
A weakened Hamas	3%	2%	8%
Israel	33%	36%	13%
A revitalized Palestinian Authority	12%	9%	31%
A multinational force with moderate Arab countries	52%	53%	48%

o Multi-year comparison, among those expressing an opinion

	2025 (90%)	2024 (86%)
A weakened Hamas	3%	2%
Israel	33%	38%
A revitalized Palestinian Authority	12%	14%
A multinational force with moderate Arab countries	52%	46%

o Multi-year comparison, Jewish sector

	2025 (93%)	2024 (92%)
A weakened Hamas	2%	1%
Israel	36%	41%
A revitalized Palestinian Authority	9%	11%
A multinational force with moderate Arab countries	53%	47%

o Multi-year comparison, Arab sector

	2025 (70%)	2024 (72%)
A weakened Hamas	8%	7%
Israel	13%	21%
A revitalized Palestinian Authority	31%	31%
A multinational force with moderate Arab countries	48%	41%

- To what extent do you think Israel should cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank in addressing urgent environmental issues (such as water, food, and pollution)?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (89%)
Strongly support	18%	21%
Somewhat support	30%	33%
Slightly support	16%	18%
Not at all	25%	28%
No opinion	11%	



o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (89%)	Jews (92%)	Arabs (79%)
Strongly support	21%	16%	45%
Somewhat support	33%	33%	37%
Slightly support	18%	19%	12%
Not at all	28%	32%	6%
<b>Grouped</b>			
Strongly support+ Somewhat support	54%	49%	82%
Slightly support + Not at all	46%	51%	18%

- What is your position on an initiative by Israel's allies, such as the UK and Germany, to recognize a Palestinian state?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (90%)
Support in principle	8%	9%
Support, provided the recognition includes ensuring Israel's security and the removal of Hamas	15%	17%
Oppose unless it is within the framework of a bilateral peace agreement	18%	20%
Oppose recognition of a Palestinian state in principle	48%	54%
No opinion	10%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (90%)	Jews (94%)	Arabs (70%)
Support in principle	9%	4%	43%
Support, provided the recognition includes ensuring Israel's security and the removal of Hamas	17%	15%	31%
Oppose unless it is within the framework of a bilateral peace agreement	20%	21%	18%
Oppose recognition of a Palestinian state in principle	54%	60%	8%

- The current Israeli government is pursuing two main initiatives: legislation to change the judicial system and the annexation and application of sovereignty over the West Bank. To what extent do you think these efforts are related?

	Total	Grouped, among those expressing an opinion (79%)
Related to a very large extent	21%	64%
Related to quite a large extent	29%	
Slightly related	14%	36%
Unrelated or very slightly related	15%	
No opinion	21%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (79%)	Jews (82%)	Arabs (64%)
Related	64%	63%	73%
Unrelated	36%	37%	27%

- If the international community were to require banks in Israel to choose between continuing operations in the settlements or facing full international sanctions, what would your position be?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (76%)
The banks should ignore the sanctions and continue operating in the settlements	38%	50%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	13%	18%
I would prefer the banks to stop operating in the settlements in order to prevent harm to all Israeli citizens	18%	23%
No opinion	24%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (76%)	Jews (79%)	Arabs (61%)
The banks should ignore the sanctions and continue operating in the settlements	50%	56%	15%
The banks should cease operations in the settlements, with the state compensating the settlers	18%	17%	19%
I would prefer the banks to stop operating in the settlements in order to prevent harm to all Israeli citizens	23%	21%	33%
I would support the international ultimatum and the decision by the banks to halt operations in the settlements	9%	6%	33%

- Several countries have imposed sanctions on violent settlers and on settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories. What is your position on such sanctions?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (85%)
Unreservedly support	18%	21%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	20%	24%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	13%	15%
Oppose the sanctions	34%	40%
No opinion	15%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (85%)	Jews (87%)	Arabs (70%)
Unreservedly support	21%	16%	52%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	24%	25%	14%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	15%	14%	21%
Oppose the sanctions	40%	45%	13%

o Multi-year comparison, grouped.

	2025 (85%)	2024 (83%)
Unreservedly support	21%	24%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	24%	25%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	15%	12%
Oppose the sanctions	40%	39%

In the 2024 survey, the question was phrased slightly differently: What is your opinion on the recent sanctions imposed by several countries on violent settlers and settler organizations that incite violence in the territories?

o Multi-year comparison (among Jewish respondents with an opinion)

	2025 (87%)	2024 (85%)
Unreservedly support	16%	17%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	25%	26%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	14%	12%
Oppose the sanctions	45%	45%

o Multi-year comparison (among Arab respondents with an opinion)

	2025 (70%)	2024 (71%)
Unreservedly support	52%	59%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	14%	18%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	21%	15%
Oppose the sanctions	13%	8%

### 3. Israel and Regional Actors

• In your view, how does the war in Gaza affect Israel's relations with Arab countries?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (86%)
The continuation of the war endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	39%	45%
The continuation of the war is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	22%	26%
The continuation of the war and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	25%	29%
No opinion	14%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (86%)	Jews (89%)	Arabs (70%)
The continuation of the war endangers Israel's relations with its allies and the future of normalization	45%	42%	64%
The continuation of the war is not expected to significantly affect Israel's relations with Arab states	26%	27%	21%
The continuation of the war and the struggle against Hamas will strengthen Israel's relations with the Arab world and increase Arab willingness for normalization	29%	31%	15%



- In your view, how has the war with Iran affected Israel's normalization process with Arab and Gulf states?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (81%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	13%	16%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	29%	36%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	39%	48%
No opinion	19%	-

- o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (81%)	Jews (85%)	Arabs (70%)
The war with Iran has reduced Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	16%	13%	34%
The war with Iran has not significantly changed the motivation of Arab states to pursue normalization with Israel	36%	35%	46%
The war with Iran has increased Arab willingness for normalization with Israel	48%	52%	20%

- Arab states have presented a comprehensive plan to rebuild Gaza, and they are also involved in the reconstruction of Lebanon and Syria. What do you think Israel's role should be in this process?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (87%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	30%	35%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts but refrain from taking an active role	39%	45%
Israel should take an active role, making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	18%	20%
No opinion	13%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (87%)	Jews (90%)	Arabs (71%)
Israel should not cooperate with the regional reconstruction process	35%	39%	13%
Israel should allow and support international and regional efforts but refrain from taking an active role	45%	45%	39%
Israel should take an active role, making reconstruction a central goal in rebuilding its relations with regional states and the Palestinians	20%	16%	48%

• Which two Middle Eastern countries do you consider most important to Israel?

Up to two countries could be named, among the 66% who expressed an opinion.

	First country	Two other countries	Aggregate of 2
Egypt	43.6%	19.9%	63.5%
Jordan	14.8%	29.4%	44.2%
Saudi Arabia	14.0%	8.4%	22.4%
United Arab Emirates	5.5%	7.0%	12.5%

o Two most important countries – grouped by sector

	Aggregate of 2 (66%)	Jews (69%)	Arabs (54%)
Egypt	63.5%	65.2%	52.7%
Jordan	44.2%	44.3%	43.2%
Saudi Arabia	22.4%	22.7%	20.3%
United Arab Emirates	12.5%	12.6%	12.2%

o Multi-year comparison - two most important countries

	2025 (66%)	2024 (73%)
Egypt	63.5%	62.9%
Jordan	44.2%	52.3%
Saudi Arabia	22.4%	27.5%
United Arab Emirates	12.5%	15.6%

- Egypt has been directly affected by the war in Gaza and the growing humanitarian crisis, while also serving as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. To what extent do you think Israel should take Egypt's interests into account when shaping its military and political moves?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (87%)	Grouped among those expressing an opinion (87%)
To a large extent	12%	14%	50%
To an extent	31%	36%	
To a slight extent	28%	32%	50%
Not at all	16%	18%	
No opinion	13%	-	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (87%)	Jews (89%)	Arabs (73%)
To a large extent	14%	11%	37%
To quite a large extent	36%	36%	33%
To a limited extent	32%	34%	19%
Not at all	18%	19%	12%
<b>Grouped</b>			
Consider Egypt's position	50%	47%	69%
No need to consider Egypt's position	50%	53%	31%

o Multi-year comparison, among those expressing an opinion

	2025 (87%)	2024 (88%)
To a large extent	14%	14%
To quite a large extent	36%	33%
To a limited extent	32%	35%
Not at all	18%	18%
<b>Grouped</b>		
Consider Egypt's position	50%	47%
No need to consider Egypt's position	50%	53%

o Multi-year comparison, Jewish sector

	2025 (89%)	2024 (90%)
To a large extent	11%	10%
To quite a large extent	36%	31%
To a limited extent	34%	39%
Not at all	19%	20%
<b>Grouped</b>		
Consider Egypt's position	47%	41%
No need to consider Egypt's position	53%	59%

o Multi-year comparison, Arab sector

	2025 (73%)	2024 (75%)
To a large extent	37%	37%
To quite a large extent	33%	39%
To a limited extent	19%	15%
Not at all	12%	9%
<b>Grouped</b>		
Consider Egypt's position	69%	76%
No need to consider Egypt's position	31%	24%

- How important is it for Israel to restore and strengthen relations with Jordan, with 10 signifying "very important" and 1 "not at all"?

	Total 2025	Grouped
1 – Not at all important	3%	7%
2	1%	
3	3%	
4	2%	10%
5	8%	
6	10%	
7	15%	25%
8	19%	
9	9%	
10 – Very important	30%	58%
Average 1-10	7.56	



o By sector, grouped

	Total	Jews	Arabs
1-3 not important	7%	7%	6%
4-5 not too important	10%	10%	10%
6-7 quite important	25%	25%	28%
8-10 important	58%	58%	56%
Average 1-10	7.56	7.55	7.60

o Multi-year comparison

	2025	2024	2023	2022
1-3 not important	7%	8%	4%	7.7
4-5 not too important	10%	11%	9%	11.3
6-7 quite important	25%	21%	24%	23.4
8-10 important	58%	60%	63%	57.6
Average 1-10	7.56	7.57	7.82	7.46

o Multi-year comparison, Jewish sector

	2025	2024	2023	2022
1-3 not important	7%	8%	4%	7.6
4-5 not too important	10%	9%	8%	10.8
6-7 quite important	25%	22%	25%	24.8
8-10 important	58%	61%	63%	56.9
Average 1-10	7.55	7.69	7.76	7.46

o Multi-year comparison, Arab sector

	2025	2024	2023	2022
1-3 not important	6%	11%	2%	8.6
4-5 not too important	10%	22%	12%	14.8
6-7 quite important	28%	17%	13%	14.8
8-10 important	56%	50%	73%	61.7
<b>Average 1-10</b>	<b>7.60</b>	<b>6.96</b>	<b>8.21</b>	<b>7.47</b>

Note: In the current survey, the question was phrased as “to restore and strengthen.” In previous surveys it was phrased as “to strengthen” only.

• Do you regard the EU as more of a friend or adversary to Israel?

	Total	Jews	Arabs
More of a friend	14%	14%	14%
More of an adversary	67%	71%	46%
No opinion	19%	15%	40%
<b>Friend-adversary gap</b>	<b>-53%</b>	<b>-57%</b>	<b>-32%</b>

• Europe is considering imposing sanctions and halting economic, tourism, and technological cooperation with Israel. How concerned are you about this?

	Total (90%)	Jews (94%)	Arabs (70%)
Very concerned	33%	35%	24%
Somewhat concerned	34%	34%	30%
Slightly concerned	15%	15%	18%
Not concerned	18%	16%	28%
<b>Grouped</b>			
Concerned	67%	69%	54%
Not concerned	33%	31%	46%

#### 4. Israel's strategy towards Iran, Syria, and Lebanon

- Following the war with Iran, what should Israel's strategy towards it be?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (87%)
Return to war — launching a new preemptive attack on Iran with the goal of bringing down the regime	24%	27%
"Mowing the grass" as in Lebanon — targeted strikes against Iranian attempts to rebuild nuclear and missile facilities, even at the risk of renewed escalation	26%	30%
Promoting international, economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime without military action	13%	15%
Advancing a long-term international agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear activity and curb its support for terrorist organizations	24%	28%
No opinion	13%	-

- o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (82%)	Jews (84%)	Arabs (70%)
Return to war — launching a new preemptive attack on Iran with the goal of bringing down the regime	27%	30%	10%
"Mowing the grass" as in Lebanon — targeted strikes against Iranian attempts to rebuild nuclear and missile facilities, even at the risk of renewed escalation	30%	31%	23%
Promoting international, economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime without military action	15%	14%	21%
Advancing a long-term international agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear activity and curb its support for terrorist organizations	28%	26%	46%

- The war between Israel and Iran was halted just before it escalated into a full regional conflict. In your view, how would creating a channel for dialogue and message exchange between Israel and Iran through third countries affect Israel?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (80%)
Creating a dialogue channel could benefit Israel	40%	50%
Creating a dialogue channel would harm Israel	14%	18%
Creating a dialogue channel would not significantly change the situation	26%	32%
No opinion	20%	-
Gap between benefit and harm		32%+

- o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Total (80%)	Jews (87%)	Arabs (74%)
Creating a dialogue channel could benefit Israel	50%	50%	51%
Creating a dialogue channel would harm Israel	18%	18%	19%
Creating a dialogue channel would not significantly change the situation	32%	32%	30%
No opinion	32%+	+32%	+32%

- After Hezbollah's collapse, a new Lebanese government has emerged that seeks to limit the organization's legitimacy to bear arms. What should Israel's main strategy toward the Lebanese government be?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (84%)
Maintain the current approach of targeted strikes against Hezbollah to prevent its recovery, even at the cost of increased friction with the Lebanese government	41%	48%
Support international efforts to strengthen the new government, even if this requires limiting strikes on Hezbollah	23%	28%
Initiate an independent Israeli move to reach a comprehensive agreement directly with the Lebanese government	20%	24%
No opinion	16%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (84%)	Jews (88%)	Arabs (64%)
Maintain the current approach of targeted strikes against Hezbollah to prevent its recovery, even at the cost of increased friction with the Lebanese government	48%	52%	23%
Support international efforts to strengthen the new government, even if this requires limiting strikes on Hezbollah	28%	26%	42%
Initiate an independent Israeli move to reach a comprehensive agreement directly with the Lebanese government	24%	22%	35%

- After the collapse of the Assad regime and amid uncertainty surrounding the consolidation of the new regime, what should the position of the Israeli government be toward the al-Sharaa regime in Damascus?

	Total 2025	Among those expressing an opinion (79%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should seek its overthrow	20%	26%
Continue the current policy of military response to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	26%	33%
Promote a temporary security arrangement — withdrawal from Syrian territory and limiting the military activity of both Israel and the Syrian regime along the border	10%	12%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel–Syria relations	23%	29%
No opinion	21%	-

o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (79%)	Jews (80%)	Arabs (71%)
The al-Sharaa regime endangers Israel and its allies. Israel should seek its overthrow	26%	26%	27%
Continue the current policy of military response to threats and maintaining an Israeli presence inside Syrian territory	33%	36%	14%
Promote a temporary security arrangement — withdrawal from Syrian territory and limiting the military activity of both Israel and the Syrian regime along the border	12%	10%	24%
Promote a long-term political and economic agreement with the al-Sharaa government to reshape Israel–Syria relations	29%	28%	35%



- Israel and Turkey are each pursuing their own interests in Syria. What should Israel's policy be toward Turkey's activities in Syria?

	Total	Among those expressing an opinion (85%)
Israel should regard Turkey as a rival and act to curb its power in Syria, even at the cost of military confrontation with Turkey	24%	28%
Israel should reach understandings with Turkey on dividing spheres of influence in order to avoid confrontation	38%	44%
Israel should promote cooperation with Turkey to stabilize the new Syrian regime and support the reconstruction of the Syrian state	23%	28%
No opinion	15%	-

- o By sector, among those expressing an opinion

	Among those expressing an opinion (85%)	Jews (88%)	Arabs (66%)
Israel should regard Turkey as a rival and act to curb its power in Syria, even at the cost of military confrontation with Turkey	28%	29%	22%
Israel should reach understandings with Turkey on dividing spheres of influence in order to avoid confrontation	44%	46%	34%
Israel should promote cooperation with Turkey to stabilize the new Syrian regime and support the reconstruction of the Syrian state	28%	25%	44%